Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916078
Yuliy Anatolievich Nisnevich,
Andrey Vilenovich Ryabov
MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM
AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM
WORKING PAPERS
SERIES: POLITICAL SCIENCE
WP BRP 44/PS/2017
This Working Paper is an output of a research project implemented at the National Research University Higher
School of Economics (HSE). Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily reflect the
views of HSE
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916078
Yuliy Anatolievich Nisnevich1
, Andrey Vilenovich Ryabov2
MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY
This article analyses the ideologies of authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes. The
analysis is carried out in three clusters: “rudimentary” authoritarian regimes, post-colonial
dictatorships, neo-authoritarian regimes. The first cluster is subdivided into two subgroups:
authoritarian monarchies and “communist regimes”. The regimes in the third cluster are also
subdivided into two subgroups: post-Soviet regimes and neo-authoritarian regimes in Africa,
Asia and Latin America. In an age of the decline of ideologies on a global scale, authoritarian
and neo-authoritarian regimes, as before, need political ideologies to legitimise their power.
However in the contemporary epoch which sets authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes new
and much more complicated challenges, these regimes are forced to use more flexibility
ideologies in order to adapt to the rapidly changing world. Ideologies of such regimes lose their
former integrity and become “multi-layer”, eclectic. “Non-ideological” elements such as
corruption have become a part of the ideologies of neo-authoritarian regimes. But herewith
priority of the state as the highest value remains “the bearing structure” of the political ideologies
of all authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes. Despite the official protection of human rights
and liberties by neo-authoritarian regimes, this occupies a secondary and subordinate place in the
ideological hierarchy and political practice of these regimes.
Key words: authoritarianism, neo-authoritarianism, political ideologies, values, personified
regimes, democracy, human rights and liberties, triad “state–society–individual”.
JEL classification: Z
1
professor, D.Sc. in Political Science, professor of the department of political science, faculty of
social science, leading research scientist of the scientific and educational laboratory of political
research of the National research university Higher School of Economics, jnisnevich@hse.ru
2
associate professor, Ph.D. in Historical Sciences, leading research scientist of the Primakov
Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
chief editor of World Economics and International Relations Journal andreyr@imemo.ru
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916078
3
Introduction
In the first half of the 20th century the influence of political ideology both on the internal
political processes of numerous countries and on their international relations reached its peak.
Today there are multiple definitions both for “ideology” in its general scientific sense,
and for “political ideology” with differences in meaning, but none of them are universally
accepted.
In the most common sense, in Russian language ideology is defined as “a mindset and a
system of views and ideas” (Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian language, 2001) and
accordingly this system can be either widespread, held by a certain social group or an individual.
It may be either public or latent. In this context, political ideology is seen as a system of political
views, ideas and directives, including those of the public authorities.
To make the notion of political ideology instrumental, it is best to conceptualize it as a
structural and functional phenomenon which determines political decisions and actions and
having certain functions in the processes of interactions aimed at acquiring, holding and using
public authority. Utilizing this approach, political ideology can be defined as a “systematized and
conceptualized set of ideas and directives used for the identification and self-organization of
certain groups in the space of authority, the articulation and representation of their interests,
relevant changes in state policy based on collective views of the past, present and future
development of society” (Soloviov, 2007: 347).
“Groups in the space of authority” may be either ruling or oppositional social groups or
their coalitions, or the ruling political actors and their clients. Low-profile, intentionally
concealed sets of views, ideas and directives about public authority, i.e. latent political ideology,
may be used for self-identification, self-organization and the intra-group articulation of the
interests of ruling groups. A different publically promoted political ideology, differentiated for
internal and international political representation, may be used for the public articulation and
representation of the interests of ruling or oppositional groups, the motivation for policy or its
change.
The following functions of public political ideology, formed by representatives of
professional and ruling groups specializing in ideological issues as an element of the
informational and communicational support of political processes, can be distinguished: the
reflection and representation of group interests; provision for or support of the political course
pursued by the ruling social group, political power or party; boosting the support of the ruling
social group, political power, party or the submission to the ideas and aims of numerous social
classes by utilizing propaganda or agitation; confrontation with and struggle against other
ideologies, doctrines and aims.
4
It was due to the ontological confrontational nature of public ideology, among other
factors, that in the first half of the 20th century many people fell victims of totalitarian ideologies
both in the process of the establishment of totalitarian regimes in a number of countries, and in
the course of the Second World War.
In the first half of the 20th century in the majority of democratic countries even rival nontotalitarian
ideologies were based on varying systems of values and had different plans for the
future of society. For example in European states, the political ideals of social-democrats were
different from the goals proclaimed by liberal, conservative, catholic or agrarian parties. The
electorate of the parties of that time was usually limited to support of one or several classes or
social groups, which also promoted the conflictive character of politics.
The tragic events of the Second World War led humanity to an understanding of its need
for a common axiological and legal framework, ensuring the peaceful coexistence of countries
and peoples. This resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and declared
by resolution 217А(III) of the UN General Assembly on 10 December, 1948. At the voting, only
8 of 58 UN states abstained and none voted against it (Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
2007). This declaration, despite not being legally binding, fundamentally determined that the
main universally adopted social value is the human being, his/her dignity and inalienable rights,
the recognition of which, according to the preamble of the declaration, is “the basis of freedom,
justice and universal peace”.
The adoption of human rights and freedoms as a system of universal values by sovereign
countries constituting the UN arguably served as the starting point of the process usually defined
as deideologization – the elimination of the influence of ideology on mass political conscience
and social processes (Pogorely & Philipov & Fecenko, 2010), which lead to the beginning of
“post-ideological era” (Zinoviev, 2003: 178) or, to be more precise, “the era of the downfall of
classical political ideologies” (Halapsis, 2010).
The theoretical interpretation of this process in political science is in the form of the
thesis that “ideology has come to an end”. According to Soloviov, “in the 1950s and 60s, Aaron,
Shills and a bit later Bell and Lipset raised the question of “the end of ideology”…[which]
mainly stemmed from criticism of totalitarianism, primarily Stalinism, as the form of authority
which turned ideology from a political factor into the primary foundation for the whole system of
political power…” (Soloviov, 2007: 348).
In 1989 the “end of ideology” thesis in a different interpretation was reflected in an
article by Fukuyama, “The end of history?”, which contained the following assumption: “What
we are experiencing now is probably not only the end of the Cold War or yet another period of
post-war history, but also the end of history as it is, the end of the ideological evolution of
5
mankind and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of government”
(Fukuyama, 1990). Fukuyama probably meant by “the end of the ideological evolution of
mankind” that the basic social values of liberalism – the human being, human rights and
freedoms, besides becoming the formally universal value of the modern world, has become, to a
certain extent, a part of reality for most modern countries as the basis of their system of adopted
ideas and values (Nisnevich, 2011).
The institution of human rights and freedoms was formally legalized in December 1966
in international pacts on civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. In that
period, not a single one of 122 states constituting the UN voted against those pacts, which came
into effect nine years later in March 1976. Currently these pacts have been ratified and observed
by 186 and 164 respectively of the 193 sovereign states with UN membership (The international
pact on civil and political rights; The international pact on economic, social and cultural rights).
Although the vast majority (no less than 85%) of UN countries have legally recognized
human rights and freedoms through participation in these international pacts, the real situation
looks different. According to Freedom House, in 2014 only 88 sovereign countries could be
considered free, i.e. properly observing political rights and civil liberties, and only 123 states
were considered to be electoral democracies, i.e. fulfilling the minimum requirements for
democracy – free and fair elections (Freedom House, 2015).
It is true to say that countries pursuing the path of democratic development or having
adopted this path, if they have not completely lost all ideology in the above sense, they have
surely ended the confrontation of ideologies. Even determined opponents of the “end of
ideology” thesis admit significant transformations in the “sphere of the ideology of western
countries” according to terminology of Zinoviev (2003: 178) or the “ideological space”
according to Zhizhek (1999: 93).
Changes in political systems and social structures in developed democratic countries after
the Second World War and the consolidation of democratic regimes have gradually lead to more
common political views of rival parties. For example, the influential social-democratic parties in
Western Europe have abandoned the idea of socialism and have adopted the ideological concept
of the development of liberal capitalism. The ties of parties with the traditional electorate have
become weaker, and in pursuit of votes they have begun to court all social and professional
groups. Under such conditions, social and class differences between parties have gradually
become blurred, and the claims of political ideologies promoted by certain political parties to the
position of a universal future projection of their countries have inevitably become irrelevant.
With time, the functions of ideologies and party programs have diminished so much that they
6
have become a kind of political marker helping parties to mobilize their supporters in preelection
periods.
The basic values of modern democratic states are determined not by a certain ideological
structure shaped by the ruling political party or coalition, but by the majority of society and the
non-fringe political powers which recognize the observation and protection of human and civil
rights and freedoms as the first and foremost responsibility of the state. Nowadays, unlike the
old-time uncompromising fighting and confrontations of political ideologies, political projects
and programs for the development of society and state compete on a unified platform of basic
ideas and values.
However in the modern world, besides countries ruled by democratic regimes, including
those meeting only the minimal requirements for democracy, there are quite a few countries
governed by non-democratic, authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes (Nisnevich, 2016). For
these regimes, although, to a much lower extent and in softer forms of appearance, political
ideology has retained its value as an instrument used “to support the social supremacy and the
self-legitimization of the regime” (Soloviov, 2007: 351) and to rally and mobilize the masses in
pursuit of its certain interests and goals.
For modern authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes, the “end of ideology” apparently
has not come yet, an analysis of the political ideologies of such regimes seems to be a timely and
significant research task. The methodology for this task includes the use of comparativehistorical
method (Encyclopedia of epistemology and philosophy of science, 2009) together with
the political and legal analytical method (Nisnevich, 2011) and the processing of factual
information by comparing, crosschecking and fusing information from various sources.
Scientific publications and internet sites (Geveling, 2001; Karosers & Oren, 2015; Gabriel, 2009;
Goemans & Gleditsch & Chiozza, 2009) have been used as sources of factual information on
constitutional, legal, political, historical and other characteristics of the countries and regimes
investigated.
“Rudimentary” authoritarian regimes and their political ideologies
The first subgroup of “rudimentary” authoritarian regimes consists of 11 authoritarian
monarchies among 43 UN countries with monarchical rule, including the Westminster model
(Big legal dictionary, 2007). The main features of these monarchies are demonstrated in Table 1.
7
Table 1
No Constitutional
name
Type of
monarchy
Beginning
of the
regime
Religion
Region Notes
1 Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia
absolute
theocratic
1932 Islam Middle
East
2 State of Kuwait absolute 1961 Islam Middle
East
Emirate
3 Sultanate of
Oman
absolute 1970 Islam Middle
East
4 State of Qatar absolute 1971 Islam Middle
East
Emirate
5 United Arab
Emirates (UAE)
absolute
federative
1971 Islam Middle
East
seven emirates – absolute
monarchies
supreme body of power –
High council of emirs
6 State of Brunei
Darussalam
absolute
theocratic
1984 Islam South-East
Asia
Sultanate
7 Hashemite
Kingdom of
Jordan
constitutional
dualistic
1946 Islam Middle
East
8 Kingdom of
Bahrain
constitutional
dualistic
1971 Islam Middle
East
kingdom since 2002,
former emirate
9 Kingdom of
Swaziland
constitutional
dualistic
1968 none South
Africa
10 Kingdom of
Morocco
constitutional
parliamentary
1956 Islam North
Africa
11 Federation of
Malaysia
constitutional
parliamentary
federative
theocratic
1963
(without
Singapore
1965)
Islam South-East
Asia
13 states and 2 federal
territories
9 states are monarchies
High leader is elected by
the Council of rulers
Note: state religion as defined in the Constitution
Out of the eleven countries still ruled by authoritarian monarchs, eight are Arabic states,
seven of which are located next to each other in the Middle East, and Morocco lies in the area of
North Africa which is traditionally referred to as Maghreb. Two monarchies – Brunei and
Malaysia – are situated in South-East Asia, while Swaziland is the only monarchy located in
South Africa.
Six of the authoritarian monarchies are absolute, including two theocratic ones – Saudi
Arabia and Brunei, and one federative – UAE. Out of five constitutional monarchies, three are
dualistic and two – Morocco and Malaysia – are parliamentary, the latter being also both a
federative and theocratic monarchy. Malaysia, where the real power is concentrated not in the
hands of the High leader (one of the nine monarchs), but the head of the Federative government,
is by common opinion slowly drifting towards electoral democracy.
The ideological component of the remaining authoritative monarchies is determined by a
combination of the state religion – Islam – and the monarchism it promotes. The only exception
is Swaziland which has no official state religion with the majority of the population (82.7%)
8
being Christian. In this state the authority of the monarch stems from patriarchal and tribal
structures and the traditions of the local authoritarian society.
The combination of Islam and a monarchic ideology determines the basic values shared
by the rulers and their subjects. This combination serves as the key factor which unites and
mobilizes subjects in support of the reigning dynasty. In Malaysia and Brunei this combo is
backed by Malay nationalism, though its interpretation is different in these two countries. In
Malaysia nationalism is used to promote the consolidation of the local multi-racial, poly-ethnic
and multi-confessional society. In Brunei it is an important ideological structure which justifies
the existence of this small Malay state on the huge Kalimantan island.
The ideological triad “state–society–individual”, the hierarchic structure of which is
instrumental for the evaluation of various political approaches and ideologies. In authoritarian
monarchies there are two mutually associated peaks. One peak represents the monarchic state,
while the other is the society in form of religious communion. The only exception is Swaziland
which has only one peak of ideological triad – the state. People and their rights and freedoms
play a subordinate role under authoritarian monarchies. This being said, it is worth noting that
the constitutions of such absolute and constitutional authoritarian monarchies as Bahrain, Jordan,
Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, instead of a section describing the human and civil rights and
freedoms, have a whole section on the rights and, specifically, the responsibilities of their
citizens.
The second subgroup – “communist rudiments” – includes four states governed by
authoritarian communist regimes and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), ruled
by the last remaining totalitarian communist regime in the world. It is more precise to call it a
“nationalist-communist regime”. The main features of these countries are outlined in Table 2.
Table 2
No Constitutional name Type of regime Beginning
of the
regime
Rulers Region
1 Lao People's Democratic
Republic (LPDR)
corporate 1975 People’s
revolutionary party
of Laos
South-East Asia
2 Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (SRV)
corporate 1976 Communist party of
Vietnam
South-East Asia
3 People’s Republic of China
(PRC)
corporate 1949 Communist party of
China
East Asia
4 Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK)
personalistic
dynastic,
1948 Kim family Labor
party of Korea
East Asia
5 Republic of Cuba personalistic 1959 Castro brothers
Communist party of
Cuba
Caribbean
9
“Communist rudiments” where the form of government is a soviet republic (Big legal
dictionary, 2003) have primarily remained in Asia: two south-eastern and two in the far east,
while the Republic of Cuba is located in Central America on a cognominal island in the
Caribbean Sea.
Authoritarian communist regimes formed as the result of transformations of initial
totalitarian communist regimes into “softer” authoritarian forms, which are designated as posttotalitarian
regimes according to the Lenz-Stephan classification (Linz & Stepan, 1996). In most
cases in the process of such transformation, communist ideology is “reduced” both for rulers and
their subjects. The final goal of this “reduction” is for the party establishment to retain the power
in changed societies.
The final stage of such “reduction” played a significant role in the crisis and later
downfall of the communist regime in USSR. Yakovlev, Ex-secretary and ex-member of the
Political Bureau of the CPSU, described it as follows: “Political life in the country became so
dogmatic, that even some phrases attributed to Marx and Lenin were regarded as revisionist and
suspicious. The level of vigilance raised by the risk of losing power, was far beyond common
sense. However, hardly anyone was seriously interested in Marxist-Leninist theory anymore.
Maybe just a small number of people who worked in scientific and educational institutions and
made their living by studying it. They had to write clichéd articles and to prepare lectures and
seminars accordingly” (Yakovlev, 2003: 367).
In the triad “state–society–individual”, reduced communist ideology proclaims the
priority of society in form of a new community. This was called “the Soviet people” in USSR.
But politics is absolutely dominated by an omnipresent state – a “cue ball” according to
Huntington – the rulers of which must be obeyed without question and their activities must be
totally approved and universally supported.
In DPRK, however, as a result of the transformations, communist ideology hardened.
This started in 1955 when the founder of the country, Kim Il Sung, proclaimed his idea of
“Juche” to oppose Marxist ideas brought from USSR and China. It is an ideology of “originality”
or “relying only on the country’s own strengths” (Balkansky, 2011: 144). According to Juche,
the top of hierarchy is occupied by the decision-making leader, followed by the party which
transfers these decisions to the masses, which in turn carry out their leader’s will. One of the
primary highlights of Juche ideology is the idea of the key role of the leader in the life of the
country (Balkansky, 2011: 181-182). DPRK has actively tried to popularize Juche ideology in
third world countries.
At the beginning of the 21st century the Juche ideology was backed by the “songun”
doctrine which justified turning DPRK into a solid military camp (which it had always been) and
10
gave the army a special role in its political system. This pointed at an evolution in communist
ideology in DPRK. After abandoning failed attempts to represent Juche as one of the competing
global communist doctrines in the years of Kim Il Sung’s reign, DPRK leaders reduced
communist ideology to playing an exclusively defensive role, justifying the need to protect the
system from outside world and assure their population of the uniqueness of its way of
development.
In China, Vietnam and to a smaller extent in Laos (due to its significant
underdevelopment) communist ideology has been used for almost 30 years for their transfer
towards market economies and bureaucratic capitalism.
Due to the peculiarities of far eastern societies, communist ideology initially served as an
ideology of progress aimed at eliminating the huge underdevelopment of those countries and
mobilizing their societies for the transition from agrarian to modern and urban. This lasted
approximately until the 1970s, when it became apparent that capitalistic South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore and Hong Kong created much more efficient development models in the Far East than
the communist regimes of China, DPRK and Vietnam. The reigning communist parties of these
countries reacted differently to these challenges. In DPRK the authorities decided to maintain the
existing order and communist ideology, which has gradually become used exclusively as a
means of defence.
In China and Vietnam, which at the end of 1970s and middle of 1980s respectively began
their transition to market economies, the role of communist ideology as the ideology of progress
partially remained at the early stages of the reorganization of their social and economic
structures. The accent though was now made on “raising the quality of life of the working class”.
In this period the communist parties of China and Vietnam, having proclaimed the development
of socialism with national peculiarities as their aims, gave themselves the credit for the
significant growth of material wealth of their nations in the course of on-going economic
reforms. However, as their countries were constructing the new social and political reality of
state capitalism, which had nothing to do with 20th century socialism with its social guarantees
and the dominance of state property, the roles of communist ideologies in China and Vietnam
changed. Modernist ambitions became widespread among the burgeoning class of national
entrepreneurs and experts whose areas of work were connected with the new economic order.
Controlling people’s desire for further development was no longer seen as the exclusive domain
of communist parties. In these conditions communist ideology became defensive, used to
maintain the authority of communist parties and the privileges of the members of the
establishment, who had accumulated significant wealth in the previous decades due to the
development of state businesses and corruption. At the same time, the communist ideology in
11
China and Vietnam retains its function of determining the imperative of morals – the code of
social behaviour. This closely resembles the “Moral Code of the Builder of Communism”
adopted at the 22nd CPSU congress under Khrushchev. In modern China, for example, the role
of the moral regulator of people’s behaviour was attributed to the “system of the core values of
socialism” (Lomanov, 2015). According to the requirements set by the highest members of the
communist party of China, these values had a strict “top-down” hierarchy – from state to society
and then to the individual. According to Lomanov (2015), the wealth and strength of the state,
not personal freedom, play a primary role in them. So, even in a modernizing and dynamically
developing China, state values still play the same essential role in the official communist
ideology as in earlier forms of communist authoritarianism.
Unlike China, Vietnam and Laos, Cuba is only beginning its economic reforms.
Accordingly, the future of the communist ideology in this country is as yet unclear. For Cuba, in
the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, this ideology was
practically a kind of left-oriented nationalism utilized to persuade and mobilize the population to
rally against a foreign enemy, the USA. It is possible that in the near future the role of the
communist ideology in the country will be reduced to simply justify the claims of the current
party establishment for power and the acquisition of property in an already renewed capitalist
state.
Postcolonial dictatorships and their political ideologies
The main features of the 18 post-colonial dictatorships are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
No. Constitutional
name
Form of
government
Type of
dictatorship
Beginning of
the regime
Rulers Region
1 Gabonese Republic presidential
republic
personalistic
dynastic
1967
El Hadge
Omar Bingo
Ondimba
(1967-2009)
president
son Ali ben
Bingo
Ondimba
since 2009
West
Africa
2 Togolese Republic semi-presidential
republic
personalistic
dynastic
1967
military coup
Gnassingbe
Eyadema
(1967-2005)
president
son
For
Essozimna
Gnassingbe
since
2005
West
Africa
3 Republic of the
Congo
presidential
republic
personalistic 1979
military coup
(1977)
president
Deni Sassu-
Ngesso
West
Africa
4 Republic of
Equatorial Guinea
presidential
republic
personalistic 1979
military coup
president
Teoboro
Mbasogo
West
Africa
5 Republic of
Cameroon
semi-presidential
republic
personalistic 1982
forced
resignation
president
Paul Beya
West
Africa
12
6 Guinea Republic presidential
republic
corporate 1984
military coup
military
junta
West
Africa
7 Democratic
Republic of the
Congo
semi-presidential
republic
personalistic
dynastic
1997
coup d'etat
Loran-Desire
Kabila (1997 -
2001)
president
son Joseph
Kabila
since 2001
West
Africa
8 Republic of
Djibouti
presidential
republic
personalistic
dynastic
1977
Hassan Guled
Antidon
(1977-1999)
president
nephew
Ismail Helle
since
1999
East Africa
9 Republic of Uganda presidential
republic
personalistic 1986
military coup
president
Yoveri
Moseveni
East Africa
10 Eritrea parliamentary
republic
personalistic 1993
independence
war against
Ethiopia
president
Isayas
Afework
East Africa
11 Republic of Angola presidential
republic
personalistic 1975
civil war
president
Jose
Eduardo dos
Santos
since 1979
South
Africa
12 Zimbabwe presidential
republic
personalistic 1980
guerilla war
against
segregation
president
Robert
Mugabe
South
Africa
13 Republic of the
Sudan
presidential
republic
personalistic 1989
military coup
president
Omar
Hassan al
Bashir
North
Africa
14 Democratic
People's Republic
of Algeria
semi-presidential
republic
personalistic 1999
military coup
(1992)
president
Abdel Asis
Butaflica
North
Africa
15 Republic of Chad semi-presidential
republic
personalistic 1990
military coup
president
Idris Debi
Central
Africa
16 Rwandese Republic semi-presidential
republic
personalistic 2000
military
invasion
president
Paul
Kagame
Central
Africa
17 Republic of the
Union of Myanmar
parliamentary
republic
corporate 1988
military coup
military
junta
South-East
Asia
18 Kingdom of
Cambodia
constitutional
parliamentary
monarchy
personalistic 1998
coup d'etat
prime
minister
Hong Tseng
South-East
Asia
The vast majority of postcolonial dictatorships are in Africa: eight in the west, three in
the east, two in North and South Africa respectively and one in Central Africa. Only two
postcolonial dictatorships, Myanmar and Cambodia, are in South-East Asia and both are special
cases.
In November 2015, Myanmar held its first fair parliamentary election according to
foreign observers. The election was won by an opposition party called “The National league for
democracy” lead by the 1991 Nobel peace prize laureate Awn San Suu Kyi. Unlike the election
in 2011, the parliamentary election of 2015 can be seen as a possible beginning of a transition of
13
real power from the military junta, which has been reigning over Myanmar for over 25 years, to
civilian politicians, and a sign of real movement of the country towards democracy. However,
this will only become clear after 2-3 election cycles. Currently the real power is still in the hands
of military leaders, and it is not quite clear whether they are ready for radical changes or will try
to negotiate an intermediate stage, sharing power equally between them and democratically
elected politicians. Even the election of Thin Cho, candidate from the “National league for
democracy”, as the president of Myanmar in March 2016, which made him the first civilian
president in the history of the country, has not significantly changed the situation. If there is a
rapid process of democratization, there is also the risk of the separation of several fringe
territories from Myanmar, populated by national minorities, who have fought against the
government of the country for a long time. All this makes the immediate future of Myanmar
uncertain.
Cambodia is the only postcolonial dictatorship which, since 1993, has been a
constitutional parliamentary monarchy. However, the regime is led not by the king, whose role is
merely symbolic, but by the prime minister Hong Tseng, former high leader of the procommunist
People’s Revolutionary Party which ruled over Cambodia in the years of Vietnamese
occupation (1979-1989). He has become the sole actual ruler of Cambodia since 1998 when
Prince Norodom Ranarit was removed from the office of first prime minister (since 1993 Hong
Tseng had been the second prime minister), stripped of authority and put under house arrest.
Earlier Hong Tseng had been the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic
of Kampuchea (1985-1989) and the State of Cambodia (1989-1993).
Among the 16 African postcolonial dictatorships, 9 are presidential republics, and 6 are
parliamentary-presidential republics, only Eritrea is a parliamentary republic. This being said,
one can assume that the priority form of government for African dictatorships is the one
dominated by presidential power.
In 15 of the African dictatorships, the ruling regimes are personalistic. In Gabon, Togo,
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Djibouti the current personalistic regimes have already
become dynastic in character. Only in Guinea, ruled by a military junta, does the regime remain
corporate.
The personalistic perception of political power has deep roots within the political culture
of the peoples of tropical Africa. This stems from traditional ideas about the power of tribal
leaders, religious in nature and unlimited by any terms. These ideas have been transmitted into
political power and transformed into the idea of a lifetime presidency (Vacunta, 2006: 35). This
is the main reason why African nations are so content about the long-term reign of their
14
dictators. Within such a tribalized system of views there is no place for the understanding of the
importance of strong opposing forces within society.
It seems ultimately important that the vast majority, namely 13 of the current African
dictatorships were established through military action (military coup, military invasion, civil or
guerrilla war).
Although El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, the father of President Ali ben Bingo Ondimba
who has ruled Gabon since 2009, came to power in 1967 after the natural death of his
predecessor, earlier in 1964 there had been a military coup in Gabon which was subdued by
French troops. conversely, in Djibouti the military conflict based on ethnic tensions between the
tribes of Afar and Isa began after the uncle of the current president Ismail Halle (who has ruled
since 1999) was elected in 1977. The conflict lasted until 2001. Although there were no open
military conflicts in Cameroon, Paul Biya, the president since 1982, came to power after his
predecessor had been forced to resign by France, so in essence, this was a military coup.
It is characteristic of African postcolonial dictatorships to be ideologically diverse, in
other words, different countries use different publically declared ideologies. Various factors
influence the choice of ideology, but primarily it depends on the origin of the regime. This
means that all regimes that have seized power after civil war or military conflicts with
neighbouring countries are eager to present themselves in some way as the protectors of the
unity, territorial integrity and independence of their countries, as guardians against the
recurrence of tribal or ethnic wars. Dictators are eager to present peace as their personal
achievement and persuade people that the only alternative to their rule is chaos and defeat.
It seems that a ruler having acquired power after military struggle, especially after a longlasting
one, coup or rebellion, and having become a dictator, is absolutely convinced of his right
to economic and social dominance, and is ready to utilize the principle that “the end justifies the
means” to secure and solidify it. This determines the dictator’s basic system of views and ideas,
the personal ideology of the solitary political actor. This ideology determines the political
decisions and actions of the dictator, who utilizes all kinds of violence including the physical
elimination of undesirables and all kinds of corruption—not only for personal gain, but also to
“feed” his attendants to buy their loyalty.
One may assume that such the personal ideology of the ruler determines the fact that
postcolonial dictatorships are the regimes that exercise the most violence, outside the totalitarian
DPRK. This thesis is illustrated in Fig. 1 using the dynamics of the average extrajudicial killing
index (EKI) values for various subgroups of authoritarian regimes, determined according to the
Chingranelli-Richards database of human rights (CIRI Human Rights Data Project). Note that
lower the value for the index, the higher the level of violence. Specifically, the EKI index, now
15
discontinued, takes the value of 0 if extrajudicial killings were frequent (over 50 times per year),
1 if they took place, but were rare (1 to 49 times) and 2 if there were none at all. Although there
are some doubts about the data provided by this database, it can still be used as an illustrative
example.
Fig.1 Extrajudicial killing index
However, the personal ideology of the rulers of postcolonial dictatorships is definitely
unsuitable for social consumption or the rallying and mobilization of the masses in support of the
regimes. These aims require a publically articulated ideology that puts the state at the head of the
ideological triad and instils obedience to it into society as a whole and into each individual
person.
The ideological diversity of modern African dictatorships also means that some of them
use ideologies that seem completely divorced from the African political context. For example,
the former Marxist “Popular movement for liberation of Angola – labor party” (MPLA), whose
leader, José Eduardo dos Santos has ruled the country since 1979, after abandoning the soviet
model proclaimed itself to be a social-democratic party and even joined the Socialist
International. However, the formal acceptance of a multiparty system and ideological pluralism
did not lead to the end of dictatorship, which has not changed much since the times when it was
within the sphere of influence of USSR and was a “socialist oriented country”. Another formerly
0,5
1
1,5
2
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
EKI
average
Monarchies Neo-authoritarian regimes Dictatorships
16
Marxist-Leninist authoritarian regime, the Republic of Congo, followed the example of Angola
in many ways. Other authoritarian regimes that have abandoned their former “socialist
orientation” are characterised by their ideas of militarism and anti-separatism (Equatorial
Guinea) or the defence of political stability against external and internal enemies (Algeria).
In the recent times, some African dictators have been turning back to pan-Africanism
which was popular as an anticolonial ideology in the middle of the 20th century. However, today
the idea to protect Africa from foreign interference and influence is becoming popular again,
with the dictators fearing prosecution by the International Criminal Court for their crimes
(Wamwere, 2015). Among them are Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Paul Kagame (Rwanda), and
Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe). Such prosecutions have already occurred (the International tribunal
for Rwanda was created to investigate the genocide of the Tutsi people in the country; the order
issued by the International Criminal Court in the Hague for the arrest of Omar al Bashir, the
president of Sudan, accused of civilian murders; Hissen Habre, former dictator of Chad, was
sentenced to life imprisonment by the court of Senegal for mass repressions).
The ideologies of some dictatorships are characteristic for their eclectic fusion of
completely different ideological doctrines. For example, the regime of President Kagame,
besides the ideas of securitism and patriotism typical for African dictatorships, associates itself
with a modernist policy which has boosted economic growth and reduced corruption levels, and
pan-Africanism. However, appealing to development as a value is uncommon for postcolonial
African dictatorships. Ideologically they usually utilise ideas of saving the country and
protecting it from external pressure. These are typical authoritarians trying to keep their status
quo.
The state is also the top of the “state–society–individual” triad in postcolonial
dictatorships, serving as the ultimate “protector and guardian” of the regime.
Neo-authoritarian regimes and their political ideologies
The group of states ruled by so called authoritarian-kleptocratic or neo-authoritarian regimes can
be divided into two subgroups.
The first subgroup is comprised of 9 states that were part of the former USSR. Their
ruling regimes can be characterized as post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes. The main features
of these states are demonstrated in Table 4.
17
Table 4
No Constitutional
name
Form of
government
Type of regime Beginning
of the
regime
Rulers Region
1 Republic of Belarus semi-
presidential
republic
personalistic 1994 president
Alexander
Lukashenko
Eastern
Europe
2 Republic of
Kazakhstan
semi-
presidential
republic
personalistic 1991 president
Nursultan
Nazarbaev
Eastern
Europe —
Asia
3 Russian Federation semi-
presidential
republic
corporate
personified
2000 political-
economic
groups
president
Vladimir Putin
since 2000
Eastern
Europe —
Asia
4 Republic of
Azerbaijan
presidential
republic
personalistic
dynastic
1993
president
Geidar Aliev
(1993-2003)
president son
Ilham Aliev
since
2003
Western
Asia
Caucasus
5 Republic of
Armenia
semi-
presidential
republic
corporate 1991 political-
economic
groups
Western
Asia
Trans-
Caucasian
region
6 Republic of
Kirghizia
since 2010
parliamentary
before 2010
presidential
republic
corporate 1991 patrimonial
clans
Central
Asia
7 Republic of
Tadjikistan
presidential
republic
personalistic 1994 president
Emomali
Rahmon
Central
Asia
8 Turkmenistan presidential
republic
personalistic 1991
president
Saparmurat
Niyazov
(1991-2006)
president-
successor
Gurbanguli
Berdimuhamedo
v since 2007
Central
Asia
9 Republic of
Uzbekistan
semi-
presidential
republic
personalistic 1991 president Islam
Karimov
Central
Asia
The form of government in these countries is a presidential-parliamentary republic in five
cases and presidential republic in three cases. Kyrgyzstan is the only parliamentary republic, but
it was presidential prior to 2010. Armenia, which is currently a presidential-parliamentary
republic, had a national referendum in December 2015 and has adopted constitutional reform
which will turn the country into a parliamentary state. This means it is possible that there will be
another parliamentary republic on ex-soviet territory in the near future.
However even considering this possibility, it is clear that for post-soviet neo-authoritarian
states, as for African dictatorships, absolute priority is given to forms of government with
dominating presidential authority.
18
Six post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes are personalistic. The regime in Azerbaijan has
already become dynastic, and after death of Heydar Aliyev who had ruled the country for ten
years, the presidency was passed to his son Ilham Aliyev, while Turkmenistan demonstrated
political continuity when it chose the successor for president Saparmurat Niyazov, who died
after ruling for fifteen years. Three regimes, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, are corporate in
character, ruled by political-economic groups in the first two cases—these regimes can also be
described as oligarchic—while in Kyrgyzstanpower belongs to patrimonial clans. In Russia the
regime led by President Vladimir Putin is highly personified.
The key characteristic of post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes is that without regard to
their personalistic or corporate character, the social groups or their leaders running these regimes
are representatives and/or direct descendants of the party and administrative establishment that
ruled the USSR.
At the same time, these post-soviet establishments are significantly different from soviet
elite in numerous ways including their values and ideologies (Nisnevich, 2015). While the soviet
establishment was still trying to hide its money-focused ambitions, which were most apparent in
the era of “developed socialism”, under the fig-leaf of their devotion to Marxist-Leninist
ideology – the fact demonstrated by the quote of Yakovlev above, the post-soviet establishment
has rejected this ideological umbrella.
The Soviet establishment played the role of “local bandit”, which “is infinitely interested
in its controlled territory and accordingly secures domestic order and provides other social
benefits” (Olsen, 2012: 39). Living behind the “iron curtain” which prevented the members of
the Soviet elite from moving to western countries, the elite, having monopolized power and
control over property, had to take a certain social responsibility for their citizens. It was also
imposed on them by communist ideology, which limited their drive for material wealth.
Basic value for the post-soviet establishment and its ideology is the acquisition of
material wealth and social supremacy by utilizing state power. But the essence and institutional
mechanism of corruption in the public sphere is the unjustified use of various resources of power
not for state functions and social development, but to gain some illegal advantage, personal or
group benefits, either material or otherwise (Nisnevich, 2012: 109). And in this context the
ideological justification of corruption, which can be called the ideology of corruption, serves as
the personal ideology of social groups that rule post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes. In the
1990s the post-soviet establishment cunningly used the moment of transition to a market
economy, completely abandoning their social responsibility upon the pretext that under the new
conditions “every person must make one’s own living”.
19
The policy of integrating post-soviet states into the global economy provided vast
possibilities for the new establishment to transmit pillaged values into stable and flourishing
western countries. In relation to this, the attitude of these people to their own country is like the
attitude of a “travelling bandit” (Olsen, 2012: 33), who inherently cannot have any ideology
besides personal gain.
However, the ideology of corruption as the ideology of the ruling post-soviet
establishments obviously cannot be made public and clearly cannot be used to rally the masses.
The ideology of a national state, which is most suitable for these needs and natural for ex-soviet
republics, is used as an instrument of support for the ruling regimes in all post-soviet countries
except Russia. Such ideology becomes nationalistic to different extents in different countries. In
Russia the regime actively promotes the idea of renaissance (“getting up from our knees”) and a
return to the position of a great power, which has to struggle against the resistance of imaginary
“external enemies”. The regime is balancing between an imperial ideology and an ideology of
supremacism with certain orthodox Christian flavour.
All post-soviet states, despite their neo-authoritarian tendencies, recognize both
international pacts on human rights; human rights and freedoms are stated as basic values in their
constitutions.
All in all, post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes are characterised by their three-layer
ideologies: the ideology of corruption as a latent ideological and axiological basis for the
functioning of the post-soviet establishment; the state ideology with a certain shade of
nationalism for public use in internal politics, aimed at rallying and mobilizing the masses in
support of the existing regime; and the ideology declared in the international political
environment for use in foreign politics, imitating devotion to the ideas of human rights and
freedoms. For the public, the top of ideological pyramid is de facto occupied by the national
state, which requires all efforts to defend its sovereignty.
On the level of public propaganda the ideology of corruption is often translated as
“survival skills”, dividing modern society into “users” (successful people) and “losers” (unable
to live “the right way” and suffering because of that). This is why the struggle against corruption
is also ideological in essence, has a certain ideological value and, as noted by Panfilova, “The
struggle against corruption, against the dishonesty of civil servants is increasingly changing from
the routine activity of some governmental bodies to a demand for a change of values. Even for a
revolution of values. In numerous countries people can no longer stand living alongside those
who violate basic moral imperatives and, being in authority, impose their ideas on others, on the
whole society” (RBC, 2016).
20
Among the ruling layers of society the ideology of corruption is becoming popular in
form of their perception of power as a chance to change the country into a business project
allowing it to gain vast, enormous profits. Through this ideological construct, the neoauthoritarian
state became defined as a “state-corporation” in the literature (Fursov, 2006).
The second subgroup of states governed by neo-authoritarian regimes includes 10
countries. Their key features are demonstrated in Table 5.
Table 5
No Constitutional
name
Form of
government
Type of regime Beginning
of the
regime
Rulers Region
1 Republic of
Burundi
presidential
republic
personalistic 2005 after
civil war
president Piere
Nkurunziza
East Africa
2 Federal Democratic
Republic of
Ethiopia
parliamentary
republic
personalistic 1991
downfall of
Mengistu
regime
since 1991
president
since 1995
prime
minister
Meles
Zenaui
(1991-2012)
prime minister,
successor
Hailemariam
Desalen since
2012
East Africa
3 Republic of the
Gambia
presidential
republic
personalistic 1996
military
coup in 1994
president Yaya
Jamme
West
Africa
4 Federal Republic of
Nigeria
presidential
republic
corporate 1998 fourth
republic
political-
economic
groups
West
Africa
5 Mozambique presidential
republic
corporate 1992
after civil
war
FRELIMO party South
Africa
6 Islamic Republic of
Mauritania
presidential
republic
corporate 1991
civil rule
after military
coup in 1984
military groups North
Africa
7 Republic of
Nicaragua
presidential
republic
personalistic 2006 president Daniel
Ortega
Central
America
8 Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela
presidential
republic
personalistic 1998
President
Hugo
Chavez
(1998-2013)
President,
successor
Nicolas Maduro
since 2013
South
America
9 Democratic
Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka
presidential
republic
corporate 1972
until 2009
civil war
family clans South Asia
10 Islamic Republic of
Iran
theocratic
presidential
republic
corporate
personified
1979 islamic
revolution
ayatollah
Ruhollah
Hoymeni
(1979-1989)
groups of
religious leaders
ayatollah Ali
Hamenei
since 1989
Middle
East
21
Just like the subgroup of colonial dictatorships, most of these countries are situated in
Africa: 2 in the east, 1 in the west and 1 each in central and north Africa. Two states are in Latin
America, 1 in South Asia and 1 in the Middle East.
All of these countries except for Ethiopia, which is a parliamentary republic, are
presidential republics.
Iran is a special case: despite being presidential, it is not the president who is the head of
the state, but according to constitution it is the imam (rahbar), the religious “state leader”, who is
appointed by “publically elected experts” (par. 107 in the Iranian constitution). According to the
constitution, “The Islamic Republic of Iran is governed by legislative, executive, and legal
authorities which remain under absolute authority of the imam” (par. 57). This being said, Iran
combines theocracy, where state power belongs to a religious institute, and a presidential
republic. Despite that, in times of the first leader of the country, Ayatollah Hoymeni (1979-
1989), who is mentioned in the constitution as “the great leader of the world Islamic revolution
and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, great ayatollah imam” (par. 107), the regime was
expressively personalistic. Since 1989 during the reign of his successor, Ayatollah Hamenei, the
regime became corporate, dominated by various groups of religious leaders who chose Hamenei
as the leader of the country as a compromise.
In Iran, the basic values shared between the rulers and their subjects, are determined by a
combination of Islam and the ideology of the preservation and development of the national state
populated by numerous peoples and ethnic groups. The state of Iran in form of a shah monarchy
had existed for over 2500 years until it was destroyed by the 1979 revolution. The democratic
republic which existed for a short time after the downfall of the shah, could not retain its power.
Under these conditions the new elite which came to power after the revolution chose an Islamic
republic as the only form that they considered able to maintain the integrity of the multicultural,
polyethnic and multiconfessional state of Iran. This is why for the current regime the ideological
triad has two interconnected peaks, just like in authoritarian monarchies. One peak represents the
state in the form of the national Islamic state, and the other is society in the form of the Islamic
religious communion. Iran recognizes both international pacts on human rights and freedoms and
its constitution contains a relevant section, which has the rather peculiar name the “Rights of
people”.
According to the nongovernmental agency Transparency International (Corruption
Perceptions Index) and The World Bank (The Worldwide Governance Indicators), the values of
the Corruption Perceptions Index and Corruption Control Index show that Iran has very high
corruption levels; corruption in the public sphere of this state is systematic and has infected all
levels of public authorities starting with the heads of the government.
22
The following features are characteristic of neo-authoritarian regimes existing in the 6
African states, and Sri Lanka, which are similar in their main parameters (see Table 5).
First, these regimes were established either after military coups to overthrow more violent
dictatorships, or after internal military conflicts including those with foreign interference.
Second, these states, except for Burundi, had periods when they were to some extent
under the influence of Marxist ideology. In Ethiopia and Mozambique, Marxist ideology was
abandoned by the rulers, a decision much influenced by the downfall of the USSR. In Gambia
and Sri Lanka, which formally remain socialist-oriented, as suggested by the official names of
these countries, there were foiled military coups plotted by radical followers of Marxist ideology.
In Mauritania, the current regime is still engaged in a military conflict with military and political
separatist organization called POLYSARIO which calls itself a socialist movement.
Third, all these states have faced significant problems preserving the unity and stability of
the state, since the beginning of their independence and up to the present day. According to the
2015 data, except for Mozambique (86.9) the values of indexes of inconsistency (fragility) of
these states (the Fragile States Index) exceed 90, which is the lower border of the danger zone.
For the leaders of these regimes, no matter whether the regime is personalistic (3 African
regimes) or corporate (3 African regimes and Sri Lanka), like the post-soviet establishment, the
personal ideology is material gain and social supremacy achieved by utilizing state authority, in
other words, the ideology of corruption. This is seen in the fact that after the analysis of
corruption practices in the countries of West Africa, primarily Nigeria, Geveling introduced the
term “kleptocracy” for such political regimes. He determined kleptocracy as the “reign of
thieves”, which he defines as a “form of the organization of power based on corruption and
relevant social and political groups, the members of which seriously violate social convention by
utilizing their authority (usually state and political) for quick material gain and the consolidation
of their positions within the society” (Geveling, 2001: 10).
In these countries, the ideology of consolidating the integrity of the country and national
sovereignty is used as a public political ideology to rally the masses in support of the ruling
regimes. Considering the way they came to power, one can assume that within the framework of
such an ideology the regimes have not only abandoned socialism, but also utilize criticism of
socialist development, Marxist ideology and radical nationalism.
The regimes of Nicaragua and Venezuela are significantly different from other states in
the second subgroup of neo-authoritarian regimes in terms of their coming to power and
ideological preferences for rallying the masses.
First, at the initial stages of their formation their leaders became presidents elected after
free and fair democratic elections, namely Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998 and Daniel Ortega
23
in Nicaragua in 2006. Further presidential and parliamentary elections in these countries were no
longer free and fair according to the nongovernment organization Freedom House.
2006 was the second “call to power” for Ortega. He had been among the leaders of the
Sandinist revolution that had overthrown dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979. Then Ortega lead
the State junta for national reconstruction, which began to build socialism in Nicaragua from
1980. In 1982 the Ortega administration imposed a state of emergency in the country, which
lasted until 1988. In 1984 he was elected president in elections which were not accepted by the
opposition. Then he lost the presidential elections three times, in 1990, 1996 and 2001, and from
1990 till 2006 the country was democratic. In 2011 Ortega won his third presidential election, to
which he was admitted by the Constitutional court, which changed the constitution to allow the
incumbent president to stand in elections for the third time running.
Chavez was elected as the president of Venezuela four times in 1998, 2000, 2006 and
2012, much because in 1999 he had changed the constitution to prolong presidential term to six
years, and made it possible for the incumbent president to be re-elected for a subsequent term.
After the death of Chavez, his political successor Nicolas Maduro became president in 2013. On
December, 6 2015 Venezuela had parliamentary elections, won by opposition “Round table of
Democratic unity” getting 99 seats out of 167 in the single-chamber National Assembly. This
may be the beginning of the end for the left-oriented regime of Chavez-Maduro which has
reigned over the country for 17 years.
Second, in both Nicaragua and Venezuela, the neo-authoritarian regimes and their leaders
are supported by the dominant ruling parties with left-oriented ideologies.
In Nicaragua, the Sandinist National Liberation Front has been such supporting party
since the Sandinist revolution. It began as a Marxist party, but has since adopted an ideology of
left-oriented traditionalism.
In Venezuela, Chavez began his political career as the leader of a large coalition of left
parties, but in 2007, after the Bolivarian revolution he created his own “United Socialist Party of
Venezuela” with an ideology of Boliviarism. Boliviarism whose main ideologist was Chavez
himself, is a special kind of socialist teaching with its main accent on left radicalism rather than
national patriotism (Kusakina, 2008).
This being said, both the left traditionalism of Ortega and Boliviarism of Chavez are
institutionally oriented in the construction of a national socialist state with a so-called socialist
democratic form of government.
Third, for both Venezuela and Nicaragua according to Transparency international and the
World Bank, the values of Corruption Perceptions Index and Corruption Control Index
demonstrate that these countries, like all other countries of the second subgroup, have extremely
24
high corruption levels, meaning that corruption in the public sphere of these countries has
become systematic and has infected all levels of public authority starting with the leaders of the
state. The system of views and ideas justifying it has become the personal ideology of the
reigning social groups and their leaders. This is seen in the fact that the neo-authoritarian
regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua are mainly maintained due to political corruption. For
example, Chavez secured his power in 1999 by changing the constitution. To prolong the
presidency of Ortega, at his request the constitutional court made amendments to the constitution
in 2011, making it possible for the incumbent president to be immediately re-elected for a
subsequent term. Public accusations of corruption played a significant role in Ortega’s defeat in
the presidential elections of 1996 and 2001.
Together with the leaders of the neo-authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua,
the leaders of the current regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa, being
part of the so-called “left turn” in Latin America, are also regarded as “radicals” (Bukova, 2011).
However, according to Freedom House, the regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador are currently
electoral democracies (Freedom House), because the elections there are free and fair, thus the
countries fulfil the minimum requirements to be regarded as democratic. However, the second
binary order of polyarchy according to Dahl (Nisnevich, 2012), namely turnover of officials
according to election results is currently maintained neither in Bolivia, nor in Ecuador. Morales
was elected as the president in 2005, 2009 and 2014 and Correa was elected in 2006, 2009 and
2013.
This means that these countries are forming the kind of regime described by Karosers as
regimes of “dominant authority”, under which the “long-term retention of power by a single
political group usually results in massive corruption and crony capitalism” (Karosers, 2003).
This means that Bolivia and Ecuador are forming neo-authoritarian regimes similar to those in
Venezuela and Nicaragua, and if they persevere, they will sooner or later deform the institute of
free and fair elections to retain power.
All countries currently run by neo-authoritarian regimes in the second subgroup have
recognized international pacts on human rights with the exception of Mozambique which has not
joined the pact on economic, social and cultural rights.
All in all, the neo-authoritarian regimes of the second subgroup, are characterized by
similar three-layer ideologies to the post-soviet neo-authoritarian regimes outlined above.
Conclusion
Modern authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes show a wide range of ideologies.
However, the classic ideologies, either defensive, declaring the need to defend the country’s
25
independence and sovereignty from various internal and external threats, or, ideologies of
development and modernization in their pure form are becoming increasingly rare. There are two
fundamental reasons for this.
The first is the global trend for the grip of ideology on politics to be weakening which
also affects third world countries, where authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes are most
common. Only rudimentary communist regimes are strongly ideological, because ideology is the
main way to justify the monopolization of power by communist parties. However, even in these
countries the traditional versions of communist ideology are undergoing significant
transformations now that the international socialist system has fallen apart.
Second, the modern epoch, which is increasingly called “post-Fordist” (Ilchenko &
Martyanova, 2015), requires ever greater flexibility and adaptability from any political systems
due to constantly changing internal and external political conditions. This means new challenges
for authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes. In order to survive, they have to sever their close
ties to one ideology and demonstrate an ideologically eclectic and multi-layered strategy,
sometimes even seeming to be “omnivorous”. In this ideological cocktail, the drive of certain
authoritarian regimes to present the ideology of their thriving corruption as a new ideology,
justifying the authority of “successful people” and a kind of new meritocracy, is becoming
increasingly clear. Such phenomena are most common in countries with stagnating economies,
when external or internal threats to the existing government systems are weak or absent.
However, despite their diversity and eagerness to adopt modifications, ideologies of all
authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes have retained their traditional distinctive features.
For them, the main value is still the state, while the human being, human rights and freedoms are
at the bottom of the hierarchy of values.
A vivid example, demonstrating the crucial distinction between basic values—human
rights and freedoms for democratic political regimes, and the state for authoritarian and neoauthoritarian
regimes—can be found in the speeches of US President Barack Obama, and
Russian president Putin at the 70th
anniversary session of the UN General Assembly September
28, 2015 (Speeches of the world leaders at the 70th session of UN General Assembly).
The public part of the ideas and values of authoritarian and neo-authoritarian states is
determined by the fact that only the ideology of etatism allows the construction of an ideological
justification for the need to maintain and universally support such regimes. Etatism views the
state as the result and aim of social development (Big encyclopaedic dictionary, 2003: 1247) and
as the only way to ensure the integrity of the national state and protect it from external enemies
by manipulating the notions of the “state” and “legitimate power”.
26
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Yuliy Anatolievich Nisnevich
professor, D.Sc. in Political Science, professor of the department of political science, faculty of
social science, leading research scientist of the scientific and educational laboratory of political
research of the National research university Higher School of Economics, jnisnevich@hse.ru
Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily
reflect the views of HSE.
© Nisnevich, Ryabov, 2017