

# Veřejné mínění a vládní responzivita

21. 11. 2019

# Vztah mezi politikou a veřejností?

- „Unless mass views have some place in shaping of policy, all the talk about democracy is nonsense.“
  - V. O. Key Jr. (Public Opinion and American Democracy)

# Mechanismus vlivu?

- 1) Limity vládní aktivitě
- 2) Aktivní motivace pro opatření
- 3) Ignorance veřejného mínění

# Testování politické responzivity

- 1. studie = reprezentace v zákonodárném sboru
- Jak řešit problém více systematicky??
  - Zda je většina pro/proti policy opatření a zda výsledek odpovídá preferenci

# Monroe 1983:

- Pozice stran ve vztahu k PO (1960-1980)
- Celkem 222 issues
- Rozlišuje status quo vs. Policy change
- 59 % issues vykazuje kongruenci s PO

TABLE 10.1. **Public Preference and Policy Outcome for All Nonpending Cases**

<i>Policy Outcome</i>	<i>Public Preference</i>	
	<i>Status Quo</i>	<i>Change</i>
<b>Status Quo</b>	56 (76%)	61 (41%)
<b>Change</b>	18 (24%)	87 (59%)
<b>Total</b>	74 (100%)	148 (100%)

SOURCE: Adapted from A. D. Monroe, "Consistency Between Public Preference and National Policy Decisions," *American Politics Quarterly* 7 (1979): 9.

# Page a Shapiro 1983

- Sledují ZMĚNY v preferencích a ZMĚNY v opatřeních
- 30-70. léta
- 375 opatření, u kterých došlo k významné změně mezi sběry dat

**Table 1. Congruence Between Opinion and Policy, 1935-1979**

	Total cases		Cases with policy change	
	%	N	%	N
Congruent change in opinion and policy	43	(153)	66	(153)
Noncongruent change in policy	22	( 78)	34	( 78)
No change in policy	33	(120)		
Uncertain	2	( 6)		
	100	(357)	100	(231)

*Note:* Each case is an instance in which public policy preferences changed significantly, according to repeated administration of identical survey items.



**Table 3. Frequency of Congruence for Opinion Changes of Different Sizes**

Size of opinion change	Direction of policy change					
	Congruent		Noncongruent		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
6-7 percentage points	53	(25)	47	(22)	21	(47)
8-9	64	(32)	36	(18)	22	(50)
10-14	62	(32)	38	(25)	29	(65)
15-19	69	(22)	31	(10)	14	(32)
20-29	86	(18)	14	( 3)	9	(21)
30+	100	(10)	0	( 0)	4	(10)
	65	(147)	35	(78)	100	(225)

Gamma =  $-.29$ .

# Time series data

- Měření postojů k jednomu issue
- Mnoho měření v čase
- Stejná otázka
- Velmi málo dat tohoto typu




FIGURE 10.1. **The Opinion-Policy Relationship in Defense Spending.**

SOURCE: Adapted from Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion," in David A. Deese, ed. *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994)

# Cross section data

- Data srovnávají PO v různých zemích nebo státech
- V jednom čase
- PO i policy měříme na nějakém kontinuu (např od malých po vysoké výdaje, nebo od liberálního kraje po konzervativní)
- Zlomová práce:
- Miller a Stokes 1963: Constituency Representation in Congress
- Civil rights (.6)
- Welfare (.3)
- Mezinárodní intervence (-.9)

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


FIGURE 1. Connections between a constituency's attitude and its Representative's roll call behavior.

Civil rights: intercorrelations




FIGURE 2. Intercorrelations of variables pertaining to Civil Rights.


# Mezinárodní srovnání

- Hobolt a Klemmensen 2005

Role institucionálního nastavení? (většinové vs. Proporční systémy)

Jaký je směr kauzality?

Figure 3: Model Fit for Different Time Lags





**Table 3: The Impact of Public Opinion on Policy Intentions in Denmark, 1970–2002**

<i>Category</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Constant</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>
Social problems	0.34**	0.04**	0.37
Immigration	0.15**	0.01**	0.31
Economics	0.32**	0.19**	0.25
Constitutional issues	0.16*	0.02**	0.11
Foreign affairs	0.32	0.17**	0.09
Health and housing	0.22	0.05**	0.09
Education	0.83	0.07**	0.08
Environment	0.13	0.04**	0.08
Taxation	0.21	0.11**	0.07
Employment	0.05	0.12**	0.06

Notes: *N* = 230, \*significant at 0.1, \*\*significant at 0.05. In this OLS estimation *t* = 1.

**Table 4: The Impact of Public Opinion on Policy Intentions in Britain, 1970–2002**

<i>Category</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Constant</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>
Foreign affairs	0.18**	0.03**	0.35
Economics	0.05**	0.03**	0.28
Education	0.37	0.13**	0.12
Constitutional issues	−0.14	0.04**	0.04
Environment	−0.17	0.34**	0.02
Immigration	0.05	0.20**	0.02
Social problems	−0.08	0.03**	0.02
Employment	0.00	0.00**	0.01
Taxation	0.07	0.08**	0.01
Health and housing	−0.06	0.07**	0.00

Notes: *N* = 180, \*\*significant at 0.05. In this OLS estimation *t* = 1.

# Zatím nejvíce komparativní studie

- Rasmussen et al. 2019
- 31 zemí
- 20 témat
- Institucionální kontext: volební systémy

Table 2. Congruence by country and policy issue

Country	Congruence in % (number of issues)	Issue	Congruence in % (number of countries)
Iceland	100 (4)	Military involvement in Afghanistan	100 (15)
Portugal	85 (20)	Progressive income tax	94 (16)
Estonia	77 (13)	Nationwide minimum wage	89 (27)
Romania	77 (13)	State support for caregivers	86 (28)
France	75 (20)	Embryonic stem cell research	81 (31)
Sweden	75 (20)	Nuclear power	81 (27)
Austria	74 (19)	Adoption of children by same-sex couples	77 (31)
Greece	71 (17)	Ban of tobacco sale through vending machines	74 (27)
Hungary	71 (17)	Abortion	74 (27)
Malta	69 (13)	Smoking ban in bars and pubs	68 (28)
Netherlands	68 (19)	Same-sex marriage	63 (27)
Slovakia	67 (15)	Detaining terrorist suspects without charge	56 (18)
Cyprus	64 (14)	Right to earn an income while receiving a pension	56 (16)
Denmark	63 (19)	Mandatory retirement age	53 (30)
Finland	63 (19)	Experiments on animals like monkeys and dogs	52 (31)
Lithuania	62 (13)	Online voting	44 (16)
Bulgaria	60 (15)	<i>Ius soli</i> (citizenship on the basis of birth in a territory)	40 (20)
Germany	60 (20)	Asylum seekers' right to work	38 (21)
Spain	60 (20)	Ban of plastic waste disposal in landfills	21 (28)
Luxembourg	59 (17)	Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles	7 (27)
Croatia	57 (7)		
Latvia	56 (16)		
Norway	55 (11)		
United Kingdom	55 (20)		
Belgium	53 (17)		
Slovenia	53 (17)		
Switzerland	50 (6)		
Czech Republic	47 (17)		
Ireland	47 (19)		
Italy	41 (17)		
Poland	41 (17)		
Total	63 (20)		63 (31)

Table 3. Effects on public opinion-policy congruence

	Model			
	5	6	7	8
Opinion majority			3.48 (1.08)**	3.90 (1.14)***
Electoral system measure (ENPP)			-0.10 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)
Regime type (Ref. = Parliamentary)				
Semi-presidential			0.34 (0.24)	
Presidential			-0.11 (0.56)	
Legislature's influence				-0.14 (0.08)
Bicameralism			-0.74 (0.26)**	-0.66 (0.27)*
Federalism (Ref. = Unitary)				
Hybrid			0.36 (0.34)	0.32 (0.33)
Federal			0.62 (0.36)	0.58 (0.35)
EU member			0.53 (0.41)	0.81 (0.43)
Salience			0.49 (0.14)***	0.48 (0.15)**
Year			-0.09 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)
Intercept	0.63 (0.28)*	0.51 (0.09)***	0.33 (0.46)	0.18 (0.47)
Issue intercept variance	1.31 (0.55)		0.95 (0.42)	1.06 (0.47)
Country intercept variance		0.00 (0.00)		
Deviance	582	650	547	505
N level 1 (level 2)	491 (20)	491 (31)	491 (20)	457 (20)

Note: \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001.

# Jaký je vztah PO a jednáním politických elit?


- Proč a jak došlo k institucionalizaci průzkumů veřejného mínění?
- Politické elity se obrací k průzkumům
- Jako prostředek národního plánování a správy
- Institucionalizace i v ČSR – 1945 – Československý ústav pro výzkum veřejného mínění
- Úmysl: manipulace průzkumy (Lawrence Jacobs 1992)

# The Recoil Effect

- Transformace systému měření preferencí
- V UK a USA aparát na výzkum veřejného mínění
- Původně určeno k manipulaci
- Ale nakonec opačný směr působení průzkumů
- V obou zemích efekt na reformu zdravotnictví

# K jakému účelu jsou průzkumy využity?

- Kennedy: 16 soukromých výzkumů
- Johnson: 130
- Nixon víc než 200 v prvním období



**Figure 1.** Payments to White House pollsters. Source: Federal Election Commission, *Party Disclosure Documents, 1977–99*. Figures are from the Republican National Committee or the Democratic National Committee and from all presidential reelection committees. Congressional campaign committees are not included. See appendix and table A1.



# Čí mínění ve skutečnosti hraje roli??

- Hraje veřejnost opravdu takovou roli?
- Elity vs. veřejnost:?

# Gilens a Page 2014

- Většinová volební demokracie
- Vliv ekonomické elity
- Většinový pluralismus
- Biased pluralismus

**Table 2**  
**Correlations among independent variables**

	Average citizens' preferences	Economic elites' preferences	All interest groups	Mass public interest groups	Business interest groups
Average citizens' preferences	—				
Economic elites' preferences	.78***	—			
All interest groups	.04	.05	—		
Mass public interest groups	.12***	.01	.47***	—	
Business interest groups	-.10***	-.02	.96***	-.05	—

\*\*\* $p < .001$ ;  $n = 1779$ .

Note: Entries are correlation coefficients corrected for measurement error as explained in Appendix 2.

**Table 4**  
**The separate policy impact of business-oriented and mass-based interest groups**

Average citizens' preferences	.05 (.08)
Economic elites' preferences	.78 (.08) <sup>***</sup>
Mass-based interest groups	.24 (.07) <sup>***</sup>
Business interest groups	.43 (.08) <sup>***</sup>
R-sq	.07

\*\*\*p<.001

Note: All predictors are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percent of respondents at the fiftieth ("average citizens") or ninetieth ("economic elites") income percentile that favor the proposed policy change, and the Net Interest-Group Alignment Indices described in the text. Standard errors are asymptotically distribution-free, and all analyses reflect estimated measurement error in the predictors, as described in Appendix 2. N=1,779.

# Problematické aspekty agendy responzivity

- Co víme o politických preferencích?
- Existují samy o sobě? Jak vznikají???
- Čí mínění hraje roli?
- Reflexivita, nejednoznačný vztah mezi preferencí elity a občanů
- Informovat veřejnost o policy a dát jim mechanismus k vyjádření vlastního názoru