144 W. H. R. RIVERS systems I have considered possesses a single feature which is not compatible with social conditions arising out of this marriage. Apart from quantitative verification, I doubt whether it would be possibie in the whole range oi science to find a case where we can be more confident that one phenomenon has been conditioned by another. I feel almost guilty of wasting your time by going into it so fully, and should hardly have ventured to do so if this case of social causation had not been explicitly denied by one with so high a reputation as Professor Kroeber. I hope, however, that the argument will be useful as an example of the method I shall apply to other cases in which the evidence is less conclusive. The features of terminology which follow from the cross-cousin marriage were known to Morgan, being present in three of the systems he recorded from Southern India and in the Fijian system collected for him by Mr Fison. The earliest reference [Grant 1870: 276] to the cross-cousin marriage which I have been able to discover is among the Gond of Central India. This marriage was recorded in 1870, which, though earlier than the appearance of Morgan's book, was after it had been accepted for publication, so that I think we can be confident that Morgan was unacquainted with the form of marriage which would have explained the peculiar features of the Indian and Fijian systems. It is evident, however, that Morgan was so absorbed in his demonstration of the similarity of these systems to those of America that he paid but little, if any, attention to their peculiarities. He thus lost a great opportunity; if he had attended to these peculiarities and had seen their meaning, he might have predicted a form of marriage which would soon afterwards have been independently discovered. Such an example of successful prediction would have forced the social significance of the tern ■ ology of relationship upon the attention of J " dents in such a way that we should have V spared much of the controversy which ha long obstructed progress in this branch of c ology. It must at the very least have acted ■. stimulus to the collection of systems of r ■■ tionship. It would hardly have been pass that now, more than forty years after ihe .. pearance of Morgan's book, we are stil complete ignorance of the terminology of r tionship of many peoples about whom vohir have been written. It would seem impossi. ■ for instance, that our knowledge of lnts. systems of relationship could have been \\ ■. it is today. India would have been the com --in which the success of Morgan's predici would first have shown itself, and such event must have prevented the almost t< neglect which the subject of relationship . .. suffered at the hands of students of lnc ■ sociology. REFERENCES Grant, C., 1870. Gazetteer of Central Provin 2nd ed., Nagpur. Kohler, J., 1897. Zur Urgeschichte der Ehr. l . schrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenich 12, pp. 187-353. Kroeber, A. L., 1909. Classificatory System' Relationship. Journal of the Royal Anthrn logical Institute, 39, pp. 77-84. McLennan, J. F., 1876. Studies in Ancient /: tory, London. Morgan, L. H., 1871. Systems of Consangni. and Affinity of the Human Family. Smith-.or ■ Contributions to Knowledge, 17, Washingrt Rivers, W. H. R., 1914. The History of Mclm ion Society, 2 vols. Cambridge. 8 Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology Claude Lévi-Strauss listics occupies a special place among the 1 sciences, to whose ranks it unquestion-belongs. It is not merely a social science he others, but, rather, the one in which by ie greatest progress has been made. It is ibly the only one which can truly claim to science and which has achieved both the ■ ulation of an empirical method and an rstanding of the nature of the data submit-o its analysis. This privileged position ;s with it several obligations. The linguist jften find scientists from related but differ-Jisciplines drawing inspiration from his .pie and trying to follow his lead. Noblesse p.. A linguistic journal like Word cannot ne itself to the illustration of strictly linie theories and points of view. It must also ">me psychologists, sociologists, and an-lologists eager to learn from modern lin-ics the road which leads to the empirical .'ledge of social phenomena. As Marcel ■is wrote already forty years ago: "Soci-' would certainly have progressed much er if it had everywhere followed the lead : linguists___"l The close methodological »gy which exists between the two discip-imposes a special obligation of collaboration upon them. F\er since the work of Schrader2 it has been mi necessary to demonstrate the assistance which linguistics can render to the anthropologist in the study of kinship. It was a linguist and a philologist (Schrader and Rose)3 who showed the improbability of the hypothesis of matrilin-eal survivals in the family in antiquity, to which so many anthropologists still clung at that time. The linguist provides the anthropologist with etymologies which permit him to establish between certain kinship terms relationships that were not immediately apparent. The anthropologist, on the other hand, can bring to the attention of the linguist customs, prescriptions, and prohibitions that help him to understand the persistence of certain features of language or the instability of terms or groups of terms. At a meeting of the Linguistic Circle of New York, Julien Bonfante once illustrated this point of view by reviewing the etymology of the word for uncle in several Romance languages. The Greek Osioc, corresponds in Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese to zio and tio; and he added that in certain regions of Italy the uncle is called barba. The "beard," the "divine" uncle -what a wealth of suggestions for the anthropologist! The investigations of the late A. M. Hocart into the religious character of the avuncular relationship and the "theft of the sacrifice" by the maternal kinsmen immediately come to mind.4 Whatever interpretation is given to the data collected by Hocart (and his own interpretation is not entirely satisfactory), there is no doubt that the linguist contributes to the solution of the problem by reveaiing the tenacious survival in contemporary vocabulary of relationships which have long since disappeared. At the same time, the anthropologist 146 CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS explains to the linguist the bases of etymology and confirms its validity. Paul K. Benedict, in examining, as a linguist, the kinship systems of Southeast Asia, was able to make an important contribution to the anthropology of the family in that area. But linguists and anthropologists follow their own paths independently. They halt, no doubt, from time to time to communicate to one another certain of their findings; these findings, however, derive from different operations, and no effort is made to enable one group to benefit from the technical and methodological advances of the other. This attitude might have been justified in the era when linguistic research leaned most heavily on historical analysis. In relation to the anthropological research conducted during the same period, the difference was one of degree rather than of kind. The linguists employed a more rigorous method, and their findings were established on more solid grounds; the sociologists could follow their example in "renouncing consideration of the spatial distribution of contemporary types as a basis for their classifications."6 But, after all, anthropology and sociology were looking to linguistics only for insights; nothing foretold a revelation.7 The advent of structural linguistics completely changed this situation. Not only did it renew linguistic perspectives; a transformation of this magnitude is not limited to a single discipline. Structural linguistics will certainly play the same renovating role with respect to the social sciences that nuclear physics, for example, has played for the physical sciences. In what does this revolution consist, as we try to assess its broadest implications? N. Troubetzkoy, the illustrious founder of structural linguistics, himself furnished the answer to this question. In one programmatic statement,8 he reduced the structural method to four basic operations. First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to study of their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat terms as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the relations between terms; third, it introduces the concept of system - "Modern phonemics does not merely proclaim that phonemes are always part of a system; it shows concrete phonemic systems and elucidates their structure"9 -; finally, struc- tural linguistics aims at discovering f>ctw laws, either by induction "or... by logical duction, which would give them an ab.-oh character."1 Thus, for the first time, a social science able to formulate necessary relationships."]'[ is the meaning of Troubetzkoy's last poi, while the preceding rules show how linmuj^ must proceed in order to attain this end. h not for us to show that Troubetzkoy's d.i'n are justified. The vast majority of modern li guists seem sufficiently agreed on this poii But when an event of this importance tali place in one of the sciences of man, it is n only permissible for, but required of, represe tatives of related disciplines immediaielv examine its consequences and its possible ,i plication to phenomena of another order. New perspectives then open up. We aru longer dealing with an occasional collabor.iti. where the linguist and the anthropologist ea working by himself, occasionally commiinic. those findings which each thinks may inieri the other. In the study ofkinship problems! m no doubt, the study of other problems as wd the anthropologist finds himself in a siuiaiii which formally resembles that of the stměnu linguist. Like phonemes, kinship term» ;i elements of meaning; {ike phonemes, the) t-quire meaning only if they are integrated in systems. "Kinship systems," like "phone-n systems," are built by the mind on the \c\e\ unconscious thought. Finally, the recurrence kinship patterns, marriage rules, simitar pi scribed attitudes between certain types or rd tives, and so forth, in scattered regions or t globe and in fundamentally different socicíií leads us to believe that, in the case of kin-.hi p well as linguistics, the observable phermmc result from the action of laws which are genor but implicit. The problem can therefore he t< mulated as follows: Although they belong another order of reality, kinship phenomci are of the same type as linguistic phenoinvn Can the anthropologist, using a method ana) gous in form (if not in content) to the nie-rlu used in structural linguistics, achieve the s\ir kind of progress in his own science a> di which has taken place in linguistics? We shall be even more strongly inclined follow this path after an additional observj 11< has been made. The study of kinship problems STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN LINGUISTICS AND IN ANTHROPOLOGY 147 , j.lV broached in the same terms and seems to , jrl Ehe throes of the same difficulties as was i'nfiuistics on the eve of the structuralist revoSu- ■ ' Xhere is a striking analogy between certain ,mpts by Rivers and the old linguistics, which «oupht its explanatory principles first of all in h;sr"ry- *n kQtn cases' '£ ls solely (or almost je|y) diachronic analysis which must account for synchronic phenomena. Troubetzkoy, comparing structural linguistics and the old linguistic;., defines structural linguistics as a "systematic structuralism and universalism," which he contrasts with the individualism and -atomism" of former schools. And when he considers diachronic analysis, his perspective is a profoundly modified one: "The evolution of a phonemic system at any given moment is directed by the tendency toward a goal— This isolation thus has a direction, an internal logic, which historical phonemics is called upon to elucidate."11 The "individualistic" and "atomistic" interpretation, founded exclusively on historical contingency, which is criticized by Tnmbetzkoy and Jakobson, is actually the sunie as that which is generally applied to kinship problems.12 Each detail of terminology and i\uli special marriage rule is associated with a specific custom as either its consequence or its survival. We thus meet with a chaos of discontinuity. No one asks how kinship systems, ruj^rded as synchronic wholes, could be the arbitrary product of a convergence of several hoicrogeneous institutions (most of which are hypothetical), yet nevertheless function with some- sort of regularity and effectiveness. However, a preliminary difficulty impedes the1 transposition of the phonemic method to the anthropological study of primitive peoples. Tk superficial analogy between phonemic systems and kinship systems is so strong that it immediately sets us on the wrong track. It is incorrect to equate kinship terms and linguistic phonemes from the viewpoint of their formal tre.iTment. We know that to obtain a structural lau the linguist analyzes phonemes into "distinctive features," which he can then group iuio one or several "pairs of oppositions." 1 "Mowing an analogous method, the anthropologist might be tempted to break down analytically the kinship terms of any given system into their components. In our own kinship >wem, for instance, the term father has posi- tive connotations with respect to sex, relative age, and generation; but it has a zero value on the dimension of collaterality, and it cannot express an affinal relationship. Thus, for each system, one might ask what relationships are expressed and, for each term of the system, what connotation - positive or negative - it carries regarding each of the following relationships: generation, coliaterality, sex, relative age, affinity, etc. It is at this "microsociological" level that one might hope to discover the most general structural laws, just as the linguist discovers his at the infraphonemic level or the physicist at the infra-molecular or atomic level. One might interpret the interesting attempt of Davis and Warner in these terms.15 But a threefold objection immediately arises. A truly scientific analysis must be real, simplifying, and explanatory. Thus the distinctive features which are the product of phonemic analysis have an objective existence from three points of view: psychological, physiological, and even physical; they are fewer in number than the phonemes which result from their combination; and, finally, they allow us to understand and reconstruct the system. Nothing of the kind would emerge from the preceding hypothesis. The treatment of kinship terms which we have just sketched is analytical in appearance only; for, actually, the result is more abstract than the principle; instead of moving toward the concrete, one moves away from it, and the definitive system - if system there is - is only conceptual. Secondly, Davis and Warner's experiment proves that the system achieved through this procedure is infinitely more complex and more difficult to interpret than the empirical data.16 Finally, the hypothesis has no explanatory value; that is, it does not lead to an understanding of the nature of the system and still less to a reconstruction of its origins. What is the reason for this failure? A too literal adherence to linguistic method actually betrays its very essence. Kinship terms not only have a sociological existence; they are also elements of speech. In our haste to apply the methods of linguistic analysis, we must not forget that, as a part of vocabulary, kinship terms must be treated with linguistic methods in direct and not analogous fashion. Linguistics teaches us precisely that structural analysis 148 CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS cannot be applied to words directly, but only to words previously broken down into phonemes. There are no necessary relationships at the vocabulary level.17 This applies to all vocabulary elements, including kinship terms. Since this applies to linguistics, it ought to apply ipso facto to the sociology of language. An attempt like the one whose possibility we are now discussing would thus consist in extending the method of structural linguistics while ignoring its basic requirements. Kroeber prophetically foresaw this difficulty in an article written many years ago.1 And if, at that time, he concluded that a structural analysis of kinship terminology was impossible, we must remember that linguistics itself was then restricted to phonetic, psychological, and historical analysis. While it is true that the social sciences must share the limitations of linguistics, they can also benefit from its progress. Nor should we overlook the profound differences between the phonemic chart of a language and the chart of kinship terms of a society. In the first instance there can be no question as to function; we all know that language serves as a means of communication. On the other hand, what the linguist did not know and what structural linguistics alone has allowed him to discover is the way in which language achieves this end. The function was obvious; the system, remained unknown. In this respect, the anthropologist finds himself in the opposite situation. We know, since the work of Lewis H. Morgan, that kinship terms constitute systems; on the other hand, we still do not know their function. The misinterpretation of this initial situation reduces most structural analyses of kinship systems to pure tautologies. They demonstrate the obvious and neglect the unknown. This does not mean that we must abandon hope of introducing order and discovering meaning in kinship nomenclature. But we should at least recognize the special problems raised by the sociology of vocabulary and the ambiguous character of the relations between its methods and those of linguistics. For this reason it would be preferable to limit the discussion to a case where the analogy can be clearly established. Fortunately, we have just such a case available. What is generally called a "kinship system" comprises two quite different orders of reality. First, there are terms through which vat kinds of family relationships are exprc But kinship is not expressed solely thrc ■ nomenclature. The individuals or classe individuals who employ these terms feel do not feel, as the case may be) boun< I .' prescribed behavior in their relations with another, such as respect or familiarity, rieh > -obligations, and affection or hostility. 1 .,. along with what we propose to call the sy.. '. of terminology (which, strictly speaking, ... stitutes the vocabulary system), there is ■ other system, both psychological and soci ■ nature, which we shall call the system of tudes. Although it is true (as we have sh > above) that the study of systems of termino -. places us in a situation analogous, but op: ite, to the situation in which we are de< ■ with phonemic systems, this difficult "inversed," as it were, when we examine . terns of attitudes. We can guess at the ■ played by systems of attitudes, that is, to in group cohesion and equilibrium, but we dc ■ understand the nature of the interconnect between the various attitudes, nor do we ceive their necessity.19 In other words, as ir case of language, we know their function, the system is unknown. Thus we find a profound difference betv ■ the system of terminology and the sy< of attitudes, and we have to disagree i A. R. Radcliffe-Brown if he really believei has been said of him, that attitudes are not -. but the expression or transposition of term ■ the affective level.20 The last few years 1 ■ provided numerous examples of groups wl-chart of kinship terms does not accurate!; fleet family attitudes, and vice versa.21 It wi be incorrect to assume that the kinship syj ■ constitutes the principal means of regula interpersonal relationships in all socie Even in societies where the kinship syř does function as such, it does not fulfill role everywhere to the same extent. Furi more, it is always necessary to distinguish tween two types of attitudes: first, the difi1 ■ uncrystallized, and non-institutionalized tudes, which we may consider as the reflec or transposition of the terminology on the chological level; and second, along with, t addition to, the preceding ones, those attiti" * which are stylized, prescribed, and sanctic - STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN LINGUISTICS AND IN ANTHROPOLOGY 149 •»boos or privileges and expressed through a j riuial. These attitudes, far from automat-v refecting the nomenclature, often appear -solidary elaborations, which serve to re-Ľ thv contradictions and overcome the defi--•!(."! inherent in the terminological system. • j\iithetic character is strikingly apparent ,]!<> the Wik Munkan of Australia. In this m joking privileges sanction a contradic-bt-rween the kinship relations which link unmarried men and the theoretical rela-ship which must be assumed to exist be--.n diem in order to account for their later riaii^s to two women who do not stand nst'lves in the corresponding relationship.22 re is a contradiction between two possible ;ins of nomenclature, and the emphasis ctí on attitudes represents an attempt to äíraiv or transcend this contradiction. We t.;ii.ity agree with Radcliffe-Brown and it i ht: existence of "real relations of interde-Jľiia: between the terminology and the rest ic .-a stem."23 Some of his critics made the aké- of inferring, from the absence of a rig-is parallelism between attitudes and no-claiiire, that the two systems were ii.ilb1 independent. But this relationship of rdependence does not imply a one-to-one da i ion. The system of attitudes constitutes, it. a dynamic integration of the system of linology. ranted the hypothesis (to which we whole-tcdly subscribe) of a functional relation-lntween the two systems, we are neverthe-i-ntirled, for methodological reasons, to L independently the problems pertaining :k:!i astern. This is what we propose to do for a problem which is rightly considered point of departure for any theory of atti-:s ■■ that of the maternal uncle. We shall npr to show how a formal transposition ir method of structural linguistics allows o slied new light upon this problem. Be-ť the relationship between nephew and -Tiinl uncle appears to have been the focus :ignificant elaboration in a great many liiiw societies, anthropologists have de-d special attention to it. It is not enough otľ ihe frequency of this theme; we must account for it. -V u< briefly review the principal stages in development of this problem. During the entire nineteenth century and until the writings of Sydney Hartland,24 the importance of the mother's brother was interpreted as a survival of matrilineai descent. This interpretation was based purely on speculation, and, indeed, it was highly improbable in the light of European examples. Furthermore, Rivers' attempt25 to explain the importance of the mother's brother in southern India as a residue of cross-cousin marriage led to particularly deplorable results. Rivers himself was forced to recognize that this interpretation could not account for all aspects of the problem. He resigned himself to the hypothesis that several heterogeneous customs which have since disappeared (cross-cousin marriage being only one of them) were needed to explain the existence of a single institution.26 Thus, atomism and mechanism triumphed. It was Lowie's crucial article on the matrilineai complex27 which opened what we should like to call the "modern phase" of the problem of the avunculate. Lowie showed that the correlation drawn or postulated between the prominent position of the maternal uncle and matrilineai descent cannot withstand rigorous analysis. In fact, the avunculate is found associated with patrilineal, as well as matrilineai, descent. The role of the maternal uncle cannot be explained as either a consequence or a survival of matrilineai kinship; it is only a specific application "of a very general tendency to associate definite social relations with definite forms of kinship regardless of maternal or paternal side." In accordance with this principle, introduced for the first time by Lowie in 1919, there exists a general tendency to qualify attitudes, which constitutes the only empirical foundation for a theory of kinship systems. But, at the same time, Lowie left certain questions unanswered. What exactly do we call an avunculate? Do we not merge different customs and attitudes under this single term? And, if it is true that there is a tendency to qualify all attitudes, why are only certain attitudes associated with the avuncular relationship, rather than just any possible attitudes, depending upon the group considered? A few further remarks here may underline the striking analogy between the development of this problem and certain stages in the evolution of linguistic theory. The variety of possible 150 CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS attitudes in the area of interpersonal relationships is almost unlimited; the same holds true for the variety of sounds which can be articulated by the vocal apparatus - and which are actually produced during the first months of human life. Each language, however, retains only a very small number among all the possible sounds, and in this respect linguistics raises two questions: Why are certain sounds selected? "What relationships exist between one or several of the sounds chosen and all the others?28 Our sketch of the historical development of the avuncular problem is at precisely the same stage. Like language, the social group has a great wealth of psycho-physiological material at its disposal. Like language too, it retains only certain elements, at least some of which remain the same throughout the most varied cultures and are combined into structures which are always diversified. Thus we may wonder about the reason for this choice and the laws of combination. For insight into the specific problem of the avunculate we should turn to Radcliffe-Brown. His well-known article on the maternal uncle in South Africa29 was the first attempt to grasp and analyze the modalities of what we might call the "general principle of attitude qualification." We shall briefly review the fundamental ideas of that now-classic study. According to Radcliffe-Brown, the term avunculate covers two antithetical systems of attitudes. In one case, the maternal uncle represents family authority; he is feared and obeyed, and possesses certain rights over his nephew. In the other case, the nephew holds privileges of familiarity in relation to his uncle and can treat him more or less as his victim. Second, there is a correlation between the boy's attitude toward his maternal uncle and his attitude toward his father. We find the two systems of attitudes in both cases, but they are inversely correlated. In groups where familiarity characterizes the relationship between father and son, the relationship between maternal uncle and nephew is one of respect; and where the father stands as the austere representative of family authority, it is the uncle who is treated with familiarity. Thus the two sets of attitudes constitute (as the structural linguist would say) two pairs of oppositions. Radcliffe-Brown concluded his article by proposing the following interpretation: In the final analysis, u is dcs that determines the choice of oppoSlt. In patrilineal societies, where the Luher a the father's descent group represent tr-. tional authority, the maternal uncle ů sidered a "male mother." He k gcncr, treated in the same fashion, and sonu-tir even called by the same name, as the u\qú In matrilineal societies, the opposite oeci Here, authority is vested in the mater uncle, while relationships of tenderness a familiarity revolve about the father and descent group. It would indeed be difficult to exaggerate importance of Radcliffe-Brown's contrihutii which was the first attempt at synthesis on empirical basis following Lowie's authority and merciless criticism of evolutionist nie physics. To say that this effort did not entir succeed does not in any way diminish i homage due to this great British anthropolo^ but we should certainly recognize that R: cliffe-Brown's article leaves unanswered so fundamental questions. First, the avuncul does not occur in all matrilineal or all patril eal systems, and we find it present in so systems which are neither matrilineal nor p,u lineal.30 Further, the avuncular relationship not limited to two terms, but presuppose^ fn namely, brother, sister, brother-in-law, a nephew. An interpretation such as Radclil Brown's arbitrarily isolates particular eleme of a global structure which must be treaii-d a whole. A few simple examples will illusir, this twofold difficulty. The social organization of the Trohru Islanders of Melanesia is characterised matrilineal descent, free and familiar relaric between father and son, and a marked «int. onism between maternal uncle and nephew On the other hand, the patrilineal Cherkess the Caucasus place the hostility between rati and son, while the maternal uncle assists nephew and gives him a horse when marries. Up to this point we are still wiii the limits of Radcliffe-Brown's scheme. But " us consider the other family relatinush. involved. Malinowski showed that in i Trobriands husband and wife live in an atmi phere of tender intimacy and that their re tionship is characterized by reciprocity. '1 relations between brother "and sister, on I STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN LINGUISTICS AND IN ANTHROPOLOGY 151 hand, are dominated by an extremely taboo. Let us now compare the situation Caucasus. There, it is the brother-sister unship which is tender - to such an extent among the Pschav an only daughter its" a "brother" who will play the cus-ry brother's role as her chaste bed com-n.33 But the relationship between spouses irely different. A Cherkess will not appear blic with his wife and visits her only in According to Malinowski, there is no aj insult in the Trobriands than to tell a that he resembles his sister. In the Cau- there is an analogous prohibition: It ■bidden to ask a man about his wife's i. ien we consider societies of the Cherkess Trobriand types it is not enough to study )rrelation of attitudes between father/son mcle/sister's son. This correlation is only .spect of a global system containing four of relationships which are organically i, namely: broth er/sister, husband/wife, r/son, and mother's brother/sister's son. wo groups in our example illustrate a law which can be formulated as follows: In both groups, the relation between maternal uncle and nephew is to the relation between brother and sister as the relation between father and son is to that between husband and wife. Thus if we know one pair of relations, it is always possible to infer the other. Let us now examine some other cases. On Tonga, in Polynesia, descent is patrilineal, as among the Cherkess. Relations between hus-nancl and wife appear to be public and harmonious. Domestic quarrels are rare, and although the wife is often of superior rank, the husband "... is nevertheless of higher authority in all domestic matters, and no woman entertains the least idea of rebelling against ifuu authority."34 At the same time there is great freedom between nephew and maternal uncle. The nephew is fahu, or above the law, in relation to his uncle, toward whom extreme familiarity is permitted. This freedom strongly contrasts with the father-son relationship. The father is tapu; the son cannot touch his father's head or hair; he cannot touch him while he rats, sleep in his bed or on his pillow, share has food or drink, or play with his possessions. 1 lovvever, the strongest tapu of all is the one between brother and sister, who must never be together under the same roof. Although they are also patrilineal and patri-local, the natives of Lake Kutubu in New Guinea offer an example of the opposite type of structure. F. E. Williams writes: "I have never seen such a close and apparently affectionate association between father and son___"35 Relations between husband and wife are characterized by the very low status ascribed to women and "the marked separation of masculine and feminine interests----" The women, according to Williams, "are expected to work hard for their masters... they occasionally protest, and protest may be met with a beating."37 The wife can always call upon her brother for protection against her husband, and it is with him that she seeks refuge. As for the relationship between nephew and maternal uncle, it is "... best summed up in the word 'respect'... tinged with apprehensiveness," for the maternal uncle has the power to curse his nephew and inflict serious illness upon him (just as among the Kipsigi of Africa). Although patrilineal, the society described by Williams is structurally of the same type as that of the Siuai of Bougainville, who have matrilineal descent. Between brother and sister there is "... friendly interaction and mutual generosity.... "39 As regards the father-son relationship, Oliver writes, "... I could discover little evidence that the word 'father' evokes images of hostility or stern authority or awed respect." But the relationship between the nephew and his mother's brother "appears to range between stern discipline and genial mutual dependence. ..." However, "... most of the informants agreed that all boys stand in some awe of their mother's brothers, and are more likely to obey them than their own fathers----"4i Between husband and wife harmonious understanding is rare: "... there are few young wives who remain altogether faithful... most young bus-bands are continually suspicious and often give vent to jealous anger. ..marriages involve a number of adjustments, some of them apparently difficult___"42 The same picture, but sharper still, characterizes the Dobuans, who are matrilineal and neighbors of the equally matrilineal Trobrian-ders, while their structure is very different. Dobuan marriages are unstable, adultery is 152 CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS widespread, and husband and wife constantly fear death induced by their spouse's witchcraft. Actually, Fortune's remark, "It is a most serious insult to refer to a woman's witchcraft so that her husband will hear of it"43 appears to be a variant of the Trobriand and Caucasian taboos cited above. In Dobu, the mother's brother is held to be the harshest of all the relatives. "The mother's brother may beat children long after their parents have ceased to do so," and they are forbidden to utter his name. There is a tender relationship with the "navel," the mother's sister's husband, who is the father's double, rather than with the father himself. Nevertheless, the father is considered "less harsh" than the mother's brother and will always seek, contrary to the laws of inheritance, to favor his son at the expense of his uterine nephew. And, finally, "the strongest of all social bond-the one between brother and sister.44 What can we conclude from these exarm The correlation between types of descent forms of avunculate does not exhaust the p lem. Different forms of avunculate can cot with the same type of descent, whether p lineal or matrilineal. But we constantly fine same fundamental relationship between four pairs of oppositions required to const the system. This will emerge more clearly f the diagrams which illustrate our exam The sign + indicates free and familiar relati and the sign - stands for relations c acterized by hostility, antagonism, or re? (Figure 8.1). This is an oversimplification, we can tentatively make use of it. We : describe some of the indispensable refineiv farther on. A = O A Trobriand-matrilineal A = Siuai-matrilineal Figure S.l A = O A Cherkess-patrilineal A = O A A Tonga-patrilineaf O A Lake Kubutu-patrilineal STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN LINGUISTICS AND IN ANTHROPOLOGY 153 . |ie synchronic law of correlation thus sug-Ľd may be validated diachronically. If we marize, after Howard, the evolution of ily relationships during the Middle Ages, [ad approximately this pattern: The broth-authority over his sister wanes, and that of prospective husband increases. Simultan-|y, the bond between father and son is kened and that between maternal uncle nephew is reinforced.45 lis evolution seems to be confirmed by the iments gathered by Leon Gautier, for in the iservative" texts (Raoul de Cambrai, Geste _,oherains, etc.),46 the positive relationship tablished chiefly between father and son is only gradually displaced toward the ma-.il uncle and nephew.47 urns we see48 that in order to understand the r.VUnculate we must treat it as one relationship fliilnn a system, while the system itself must be considered as a whole in order to grasp its srrutture. This structure rests upon four terms ibrmher, sister, father, and son), which are linked by two pairs of correlative oppositions in such a way that in each of the two generations there is always a positive relationship .»ní a negative one. Now, what is the nature of rliis structure, and what is its function? The answer is as follows: This structure is the most elementary form of kinship that can exist. It is, prupedy speaking, the unit of kinship. One may give a logical argument to support rliis statement. In order for a kinship structure in t-vist, three types of family relations must always be present: a relation of consanguinity, a rd.ition of affinity, and a relation of descent -in orher words, a relation between siblings, a relation between spouses, and a relation be-twivn parent and child. It is evident that the siuicture given here satisfies this threefold requirement, in accordance with the scientific principle of parsimony. But these consider-aiions are abstract, and we can present a more direct proof for our thesis. I he primitive and irreducible character of the basic unit of kinship, as we have defined iu is actually a direct result of the universal piVH-nce of an incest taboo. This is really living that in human society a man must »br.un a woman from another man who gives »sni «i daughter or a sister. Thus we do not need to explain how the maternal uncle emerged in the kinship structure: He does not emerge - he is present initially. Indeed, the presence of the maternal uncle is a necessary precondition for the structure to exist. The error of traditional anthropology, like that of traditional linguistics, was to consider the terms, and not the relations between the terms. Before proceeding further, let us briefly answer some objections which might be raised. First, if the relationship between "brothers-in-law" is the necessary axis around which the kinship structure is built, why need we bring in the child of the marriage when considering the elementary structure? Of course the child here may be either born or yet unborn. But, granting this, we must understand that the child is indispensable in validating the dynamic and teleological character of the initial step, which establishes kinship on the basis of and through marriage. Kinship is not a static phenomenon; it exists only in self-perpetuation. Here we are not thinking of the desire to perpetuate the race, but rather of the fact that in most kinship systems the initial disequilibrium produced in one generation between the group that gives the woman and the group that receives her can be stabilized only by counter-prestations in following generations. Thus, even the most elementary kinship structure exists both synchronically and diachronically. Second, could we not conceive of a symmetrical structure, equally simple, where the sexes would be reversed? Such a structure would involve a sister, her brother, brother's wife, and brother's daughter. This is certainly a theoretical possibility. But it is immediately eliminated on empirical grounds. In human society, it is the men who exchange the women, and not vice versa. It remains for further research to determine whether certain cultures have not tended to create a kind of fictitious image of this symmetrical structure. Such cases would surely be uncommon. We come now to a more serious objection. Possibly we have only inverted the problem. Traditional anthropologists painstakingly endeavored to explain the origin of the avunculate, and we have brushed aside that research by treating the mother's brother not as an extrinsic element, but as an immediate given of the simplest family structure. How is it then 1 54 CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS that we do not find the avunculate at all times and in all places? For although the avunculate has a wide distribution, it is by no means universal. It would be futile to explain the instances where it is present and then fail to explain its absence in other instances. Let us point out, first, that the kinship system does not have the same importance in all cultures. For some cultures it provides the active principle regulating al! or most of the social relationships. In other groups, as in our own society, this function is either absent altogether or greatly reduced. In still others, as in the societies of the Plains Indians, it is only partially fulfilled. The kinship system is a language; but it is not a universal language, and a society may prefer other modes of expression and action. From the viewpoint of the anthropologist this means that in dealing with a specific culture we must always ask a preliminary question: Is the system systematic? Such a question, which seems absurd at first, is absurd only in relation to language; for language is the semantic system par excellence; it cannot but signify, and exists only through signification. On the contrary, this question must be rigorously examined as we move from the study of language to the consideration of other systems which also claim to have semantic functions, but whose fulfillment remains partial, fragmentary, or subjective, like, for example, social organization, art, and so forth. Furthermore, we have interpreted the avunculate as a characteristic trait of elementary structure. This elementary structure, which is the product of defined relations involving four terms, is, in our view, the true atom of kinship. Nothing can be conceived or given beyond the fundamental requirements of its structure, and, in addition, it is the sole building block of more complex systems. For there are more complex systems; or, more accurately speaking, all kinship systems are constructed on the basis of this elementary structure, expanded or developed through the integration of new elements. Thus we must entertain two hypotheses: first, one in which the kinship system under consideration operates through the simple juxtaposition of elementary structures, and where the avuncular relationship therefore remains constantly apparent; second, a hypothesis in which the building blocks of the system are already of a more complex order the latter case, the avuncular relations!-while present, may be submerged within a ferentiated context. For instance, we can q ceive. of a system whose point of depanure ] in the elementary structure but which adds the right of the maternal uncle, his wife, and the left of the father, first the father's sister n then her husband. We could easily demonirr that a development of this order leads tc parallel splitting in the following generatii The child must then be distinguished accord to sex - a boy or a girl, linked by a relnii which is symmetrical and inverse to the ter occupying the other peripheral positions in structure (for example, the dominant posit of the father's sister in Polynesia, the Soi African nblampsa, and inheritance h\ mother's brother's wife). In this type oímt ture the avuncular relationship continues prevail, but it is no longer the predoinm, one. In structures of still greater complex the avunculate may be obliterated or rr merge with other relationships. But precis because it is part of the elementary structu the avuncular relationship re-emerges unit takably and tends to become reinforced er time the system under consideration renchc crisis - either because it is midergoin« nv transformation (as on the Northwest (.0,1 or because it is a focus of contact and conŕ between radically different cultures (as in . and southern India), or, finally, because ic ií the throes of a mortal crisis (as was Europe the Middle Ages). "We must also add that the positive and ne; tive symbols which we have employed in above diagrams represent an oversimpiifi tion, useful only as a part of the demons! r.uit Actually, the system of basic attitudes co prises at least four terms: an attitude of art tion, tenderness, and spontaneity; an acriti which results from the reciprocal exchange prestations and counter-prestations; and, addition to these bilateral relationships, r unilateral relationships, one which corr ponds to the attitude of the creditor, the od to that of the debtor. In other words there a mutuality (—), reciprocity ( + ), righis ! and obligations (—). These four fundamen attitudes are represented in their reciprocal lationships in Figure 8.2. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN LINGUISTICS AND IN ANTHROPOLOGY__________155 + = e 8.2 many systems the relationship between individuals is often expressed not by a e attitude, but by several attitudes which :her form, as it were, a "bundle" of atti-ä (as in the Trobriands, where we find both lality and reciprocity between husband wife). This is an additional reason behind lifficulty in uncovering the basic structure. vave tried to show the extent to which the ;ding analysis is indebted to outstanding emporary exponents of the sociology of itive peoples. We must stress, however, in its most fundamental principle this an-s departs from their teachings. Let us cite 1 example Radcliffe-Brown: ; unit of structure from which a kinship tern is built up is the group which I call an ;mentary family," consisting of a man and wife and their child or children----The štence of the elementary family creates ee special kinds of social relationship, that ween parent and child, that between chil-n of the same parents (siblings), and that ween husband and wife as parents of the ne child or children___The three relation- ps that exist within the elementary family istitute what I call the first order. Relation-ps of the second order are those which >end on the connection of two elementary lilies through a common member, and are h as father's father, mother's brother, wife's er, and so on. In the third order are such as tier's brother's son and mother's brother's e. Thus we can trace, if we have genea-ical information, relationships of the irth, fifth or nth order.50 ie idea expressed in the above passage, that biological family constitutes the point of irture from which all societies elaborate ' kinship systems, has not been voiced solely by Radcliffe-Brown. There is scarcely an idea which would today elicit greater consensus. Nor is there one more dangerous, in our opinion. Of course, the biological family is ubiquitous in human society. But what confers upon kinship its socio-cultural character is not what it retains from nature, but, rather, the essentia! way in which it diverges from nature. A kinship system does not consist in the objective ties of descent or consanguinity between individuals. It exists oniy in human consciousness; it is an arbitrary system of representations, not the spontaneous development of a real situation. This certainly does not mean that the real situation is automatically contradicted, or that it is to be simply ignored. Radcliffe-Brown has shown, in studies that are now classic, that even systems which are apparently extremely rigid and artificial, such as the Australian systems of marriage-classes, take biological parenthood carefully into account. But while this observation is irrefutable, still the fact (in our view decisive) remains that, in human society, kinship is allowed to establish and perpetuate itself only through specific forms of marriage. In other words, the relationships which Radcliffe-Brown calls "relationships of the first order" are a function of, and depend upon, those which he considers secondary and derived. The essence of human kinship is to require the establishment of relations among what Radcliffe-Brown calls "elementary families." Thus, it is not the families (isolated terms) which are truly "elementary," but, rather, the relations between those terms. No other interpretation can account for the universality of the incest taboo; and the avuncular relationship, in its most general form, is nothing but a corollary, now covert, now explicit, of this taboo. Because they are symbolic systems, kinship systems offer the anthropologist a rich field, where his efforts can almost (and we emphasize the "almost") converge with those of the most highly developed of the social sciences, namely, linguistics. But to achieve this convergence, from which it is hoped a better understanding of man will result, we must never lose sight of the fact that, in both anthropological and linguistic research, we are dealing strictly with symbolism. And although it may be legitimate or even inevitable to fall back upon a 1 56 CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS naturalistic interpretation in order to understand the emergence of symbolic thinking, once the Satter is given, the nature of the explanation must change as radically as the newly appeared phenomenon differs from those which have preceded and prepared it. Hence, any concession to naturalism might jeopardize the immense progress already made in linguistics, which is also beginning to characterize the study of family structure, and might drive the sociology of the family toward a sterile empiricism, devoid of inspiration. NOTES 1 Marcel Mauss, "Rapports reels et pratiques de la psychologie et de la sociologie," Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique (1924); reprinted in Sociologie et Anthropologie (Paris: 1951), p. 299. 2 O. Schrader, Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples, trans. F. B. jevons (London: 1890), Chapter XII, Part 4. 3 Ibid. See also H. J. Rose, "On the Alleged Evidence for Mother-Right in Early Greece," Folklore, XXII (1911), and the more recent studies by George Thomson, which support the hypothesis of matrilineal survivals. 4 A. M. Hocart, "Chieftainship and the Sister's Son in the Pacific," American Anthropologist, n.s., XVII (1915); "The Uterine Nephew," Man, XXIII, No. 4 (1923); "The Cousin in Vedic Ritual," Indian Antiquary, LIV (1925); etc. 5 Pain1 K. Benedict, "Tibetan and Chinese Kinship Terms," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, VI (1942); "Studies in Thai Kinship Terminology," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXIII (1943). 6 L. Brunschvicg, Le Progres de la conscience dans la Philosophie occidentale (Paris: 1927), II, p. 562. 7 Between 1900 and 1920 Ferdinand de Saussure and Antoine Meillet, the founders of modern linguistics, placed themselves determinedly under the wing of the anthropologists. Not until the 1920's did Marcel Mauss begin - to borrow a phrase from economics -to reverse this tendency. 8 N. Troubetzkoy, "La Phonologie actuelle," in Psychologie du langage (Paris: 1933). 9 Ibid., p. 243. 10 hoc. cit. 11 Ibid., p. 245; Roman Jakobson, "\ll der historischen Phonologie," Travau-Cercle linguistique de Prague, IV (u and also Jakobson, "Remarques sin- ľéi tion phonologique du russe," ibid., II [ i c 12 W. H. R. Rivers, The History of Melon, Society (London: 1914), passim; Soctai ganization, ed. W. J. Perry (London: I* Chapter TV. 13 In the same vein, see Sol Tax, "Some I lems of Social Organization," in Fr«J V (ed.), Social Anthropology of North Aj can Tribes (Chicago: 1937). 14 Roman Jakobson, "Observations sut !e sement phonologique des consonne*. " ceedings of the Third International Con-of Phonetic Sciences (Ghent: 1938). 15 K. Davis and W. L. Warner, "Structural alysis of Kinship," American Anthmi gist, n.s., XXXVII (1935). 16 Thus at the end of the analysis carried oi these authors, the term husband is repl by the formula: C272ci/° SU13 8/Ego {Ibid.) There are now available two works u employ a much more refined logicu aj. atus and offer greater interest in terni-, of method and of results. See F. G. U bury, "A Semantic Analysis of the V;\\ Kinship Usage," Language, XXXU. 1 (1956), and W. H. Goodenougb. ' Componential Analysis of Kinship," ibi 17 As will be seen in Chapter V, I have refined this formulation. 18 A. L. Kroeber, "Classificatory S; srerr Relationship," Journal of the Royal Am pological Institute, XXXIX (1909). 19 We must except the remarkable vuir W. L. Warner, "Morphology and ľunti of the Australian Murngin Type of Kins! American Anthropologist, n.s., XX XXXIII (1930-1931), in which his .uu of the system of attitudes, although tu mentally debatable, nevertheless iniri.u new phase in the study of problem*- <>l ship. 20 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Kinship lcr ology in California," American An!hm} gist, n.s., XXXVII (1935); "The Stud Kinship Systems," Journal of the Royal thropological Institute, LXXI (194 11. 21 M. E. Opler, "Apache Data Conceriiim Relationship of Kinship Terminolog; STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN LINGUISTICS AND IN ANTHROPOLOGY 157 ^ ..j íl Classification," American Anthro-pnbyst, n.s., XXXIX (1937); A. M. Hal-' ,rn "Yuma Kinship Terms," American %ihropologist, n.s., XLIV (1942). n ľ. Thomson, "The Joking Relationship •ind Organized Obscenity in North Queens-I'liitl," American Anthropologist, n.s., XXXVII (1935). R;ulcliffe-Brown, "The Study of Kinship Svsvms," op. cit., p. 8. This later formula-[i'nii seems to us more satisfactory than his 19 i 5 statement that attitudes present "a fairk high degree of correlation with the terminological classification" (American Anthropologist, n.s., XXXVII [1935], p. 53). •ivi-noy Hartland, "Matrilineal Kinship and :\vc Question of its Priority," Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association, No. 4! 1917). Vi', hl. R. Rivers, "The Marriage of Cousins n [iulia," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society ■; July, 1907). Ibid.. p- 624. It. 1-1. Lowie, "The Matrilineal Complex," University of California Publications in \mcrican Archaeology and Ethnology, XVI. No. 2(1919). Roman Jakobson, Kindersprache, Aphasie vid allgemeine Lautgesetze (Uppsala: 1941). \. [t. Radcliffe-Brown, "The Mother's Brother in South Africa," South African Journal of'Science, XXI (1924). ;\>. among the Mundugomor of New Guinea, where the relationship between ma-.or-!i;il uncle and nephew is always familiar, .ililumgh descent is alternately patrilineal or ■lutrilineal. See Margaret Mead, Sex and I'caiperament in Three Primitive Societies Nvu York: 1935), pp. 176-185. .í. Malinowski, The Sexual Life of Savages .». Northwestern Melanesia (London: 1929), I vols. JuKiis de Monpereux (1839), cited in M.