

Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War

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# Primed for Peace

Stephen Van Evera

## Europe After the Cold War

One year has passed since the Berlin Wall and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe came crashing down in the revolutions of 1989. The euphoria first evoked by these events has been replaced by a more sober contemplation of the realities and challenges of the new Europe. For all its flaws, the postwar order that divided Europe into two rival blocs kept the peace for 45 years, a new European record. Now this order is rapidly crumbling. Soviet forces will be gone from Germany by 1994, and Soviet leaders have declared their readiness to withdraw all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe by 1995.<sup>1</sup> U.S. forces, too, will certainly be reduced in Central Europe. Germany has been reunified, the Warsaw Pact has effectively dissolved, and the Soviet Union shows signs of political fragmentation. These dramatic changes have sparked worried debate on the opportunities and dangers facing the new Europe, and on the best way to preserve peace.

This article explores two questions raised by these events. First, how will the end of the Cold War affect the probability of war in Europe? In particular, what risks will arise from the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and from the possible further transformation or splintering of the Soviet Union? Second, what U.S. and Western policies would best contribute to preserving Europe's long peace?

Some observers warn that Europe may return to its historic warlike ways once the superpowers are gone. One such view holds that bipolar state systems are inherently more peaceful than multipolar systems; that the Cold War peace was caused partly by the bipolar character of the Cold War

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1. Thomas L. Friedman, "Pact on European Armies May Skip Troop Limits to Speed Accord," *New York Times*, September 12, 1990, p. A14; Michael Parks, "USSR talks of full European pullout," *Boston Globe*, February 12, 1990, p. 20.

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international order; and that the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces will now produce a less stable multipolar system like those that spawned Europe's centuries of war, including the two great wars of this century.<sup>2</sup>

A second pessimistic perspective suggests that Germany may return to the aggressive course that caused both World Wars, once it is united and free from the police presence of the superpowers. Proponents of this view believe that past German aggression was driven largely by flaws in German national character; that Germany has behaved well since 1945 largely because it was not free to behave badly; and that a united and more autonomous Germany may return to its old ways.<sup>3</sup> This fear is often thought, sometimes whispered, but rarely stated baldly.<sup>4</sup> It nonetheless is implicit in fears that Germany will be the focus of instability in post-Cold War Europe.

Third, some worry that the promise of democracy in Eastern Europe, so great in the heady days of late 1989 and early 1990, will go unfulfilled. Instead of developing Western-style democracy, the post-communist regimes of the region may evolve into "praetorian states"—flawed democracies that lack the

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2. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56. Mearsheimer is a qualified pessimist: he does not forecast a complete return to the levels of danger of 1914 or 1939, and he sees some possibility of dampening the dangers he outlines. He also recognizes the importance of factors other than the polarity of the international system in causing war, although he believes these factors are less important than the structure of the international system. However, he does warn that the new European order will be substantially more dangerous than the Cold War order, largely because the system will be multipolar.

3. A variant of this view suggests that Germany was aggressive in the past because it found itself surrounded by strong neighbors, with borders that offered few physical barriers to invasion; hence it expanded to bolster its security. In this view, these unchanging geographic facts may stir renewed German aggression once Germany is reunified and unoccupied.

4. A crude example is Leopold Bellak, "Why I Fear the Germans" (op-ed), *New York Times*, April 25, 1990, p. A29. Bellak argues that German children are abused more often than children in other societies, and grow up to become aggressive adults "whom I don't trust to be peaceful, democratic people." For replies, see letters to the editor by Werner M. Graf, Mark Tobak, and Joseph Dolgin, *New York Times*, May 10, 1990, p. A30. See also Dominic Lawson, "Saying the Unsayable About the Germans" (an interview with British then-Secretary of State for Industry Nicholas Ridley), *The Spectator* (London), July 14, 1990, pp. 8–10, in which Ridley expressed fears of Germany. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reportedly shares Ridley's views: see Anthony Bevens, "Bitter memories shape views on Germany," *The Independent* (London), July 13, 1990, p. 3. Likewise, former NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns warned that a united Germany someday might seek to expand beyond its current borders, adding: "Ridley said out loud what many Europeans think. We all know about the German character, don't we? Germans naturally become a little arrogant when they are powerful." Robert Melcher and Roman Rollnick, "Axis urged to counter Bonn," *The European*, July 27–29, 1990. *The Economist* reported that "Mr. Ridley's words . . . reflect the visceral feelings of millions of fellow-Britons, thousands of Tory party workers and scores, if not hundreds, of Tory MPs." "Nick and his mouth," July 14, 1990, p. 33.

institutions required to channel growing popular participation. In such states, governments are often captured by narrow interest groups. If this occurs, these groups may pursue aggressive policies that benefit themselves, even if these policies harm the larger society.<sup>5</sup>

A fourth school of thought suggests that Europe's virulent ethnic hatreds and latent border conflicts will re-emerge, like plagues from Pandora's box, if the superpowers lift the lid by withdrawing. These conflicts are most likely between and within the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, and among the nationalities inside the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup>

I argue that all but the last of these pessimistic views rest on false fears, and that the risk of a return to the warlike Europe of old is low. The European wars of this century grew mainly from military factors and domestic conditions that are largely gone, and will not return in force. The nuclear revolution has dampened security motives for expansion, and the domestic orders of most European states have changed in ways that make renewed aggression unlikely. The most significant domestic changes include the waning of militarism and hyper-nationalism. Secondary changes include the spread of democracy, the leveling of highly stratified European societies, the resulting evaporation of "social imperial" motives for war, and the disappearance of states governed by revolutionary elites.

Europe's past multipolar systems would have been far more peaceful without these conditions and factors. A return to multipolarity poses no special risks in their absence. Germany has undergone a social transformation that removed the roots of its past aggressiveness, and unified Germany can be expected to remain a responsible member of the European community. The risks of imperfect or stunted democratization are real, but these problems are confined to a small number of Eastern European states. Even in that

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5. See Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5–41; and for historical background on the problem of praetorianism, Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Snyder is the main exponent of the praetorian scenario, but others also fear the emergence of flawed democracies in the East. See, for example, Timothy Garton Ash, "Eastern Europe: Après Le Déluge, Nous," *New York Review of Books*, August 16, 1990, pp. 51–57; and Valerie Bunce, "Rising Above the Past: The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europe," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 395–430.

6. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 5 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 1–25; F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 58–91; Paul Kennedy, "The 'Powder Keg' Revisited," *Los Angeles Times*, November 1, 1989, p. B7; and Samuel R. Williamson, "1914's Shadow on the Europe of Today," *Newsday*, July 27, 1989, p. 61.

region, communism has removed much of the social and economic stratification that gives rise to hyper-nationalism, militarism, and aggressive praetorianism.

The risks of renewed ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe are more serious, however, and constitute the most important reason for concern in the new Europe. The immediate dangers raised by the break-up of the Soviet Union and by resurgent border and inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkans would be confined to that region, but a conflict arising there could spread westward, giving the Western states a major stake in preserving peace in the East.

Overall, the risk of war in the new Europe may be greater than under the Cold War order, but only slightly so. Western Europe seems very secure from war, and any dangers that might arise in that region could be dampened by appropriate American policies. The main dangers lie in the East, where potential causes of war are more potent, and the West has less capacity to promote peace.

To bolster Europe's peace, the West should seek a general Cold War peace settlement with the Soviet Union, and should revamp NATO into a collective security system. The United States should retain its membership in this new NATO, and should maintain a significant military force on the European continent to symbolize the continuing U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States should also take active steps to dampen hyper-nationalism and militarism in Western Europe, and the West should use economic leverage to encourage Eastern European states to adopt democracy, protect the rights of national minorities, accept current borders, and eschew the propagation of hyper-nationalism.

The following discussion is necessarily speculative. Our knowledge of the causes of war is incomplete; our stock of hypotheses is small, and many plausible hypotheses have not been tested empirically. I believe the propositions that underpin my analysis are deductively sound, but many are still untested. The ongoing transformation of Europe will not wait for further empirical studies to accumulate, however, and social science owes the world what it knows about this transformation, however incomplete that knowledge may be.

The next section reviews the many causes of past European conflicts that have disappeared over the past few decades, or are now disappearing, and offers reasons why these causes are unlikely to recur. In the section that follows, I assess the specific dangers of multipolarity, German aggression, and praetorianism, and indicates why they pose little danger. Causes of war

that may persist or reappear are noted in the subsequent section. The last section offers prescriptions for American and Western policy.

*Why Europe is Primed for Peace: Vanished and Vanishing Causes of War*

The case for optimism about Europe's future rests chiefly on the diminution or disappearance of many of the principal causes of wars of the past century. Specifically, eight significant causes of past wars have markedly diminished, or are now diminishing. Of these eight, the waning of the first three—offense-dominance, militarism, and hyper-nationalism—is most significant. The following list also progresses from largely systemic causes (the first) to unit-level domestic factors (the last seven).

OFFENSE-DOMINANCE

War is far more likely when offense appears easy and conquest seems feasible, for five main reasons.<sup>7</sup> First and most important, arguments for territorial expansion are more persuasive: states want more territory because their current borders appear less defensible, and the seizure of others' territory seems more feasible. Second, the incentive to launch preemptive attack increases, because a successful surprise attack provides larger rewards, and averts greater dangers. When the offense is strong, smaller shifts in ratios of forces between states create greater shifts in their relative capacity to conquer and defend territory. As a result, a state has greater incentive to strike first—in order to gain the advantage of striking the first blow, or to deny that advantage to its opponent—if a first strike will shift the force ratio in its favor. This increases the danger of pre-emptive war and makes crises more explosive.

Third, arguments for preventive war are more powerful. Since smaller shifts in force ratios have larger effects on relative capacity to conquer or defend territory, smaller prospective shifts in force ratios cause greater hope and alarm, bolstering arguments for shutting "windows of vulnerability" by force. Fourth, states are quicker to use diplomatic tactics that risk war in order to gain diplomatic victories. Since security is scarcer, more competitive behavior seems justified when assets that provide security are disputed

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7. These and other dangers are detailed in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1984), pp. 77–123.

between states. As a result, states use competitive tactics, like brinkmanship and presenting opponents with *faits accomplis*, which raise the risk of war.

Fifth, states enforce tighter political and military secrecy, since national security is threatened more directly if enemies win the contest for information. Hence states try harder to gain the advantage and avoid the disadvantage of disclosure, leading them to carefully conceal military plans and forces. This can lead opponents to underestimate one another's capabilities and blunder into a war of optimistic miscalculation.<sup>8</sup> It also may ease surprise attack, by concealing preparations from the opponent, and may prevent arms control agreements, by making compliance more difficult to verify.

These dangers have been ubiquitous causes of past European wars, and faith in the relative ease of conquest played a major role in the outbreak of both World Wars, especially the First.<sup>9</sup> However, three changes since 1945—the nuclear revolution, the evolution of industrial economies toward knowledge-based forms of production, and the transformation of American foreign policy interests and thinking—have powerfully strengthened the defense, and largely erased the rationale for security competition among the European powers.

THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION. As many observers note, nuclear weapons have bolstered peace by vastly raising the cost of war; states therefore behave far more cautiously.<sup>10</sup> If this were the sole effect of the nuclear revolution, however, it would represent little net gain for peace, and would provide little basis for optimism about Europe's future. Wars would be far fewer, but far more destructive. Over the long run the number of war-deaths might be as

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8. On wars of optimistic miscalculation, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 35–56.

9. On World War I, see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Steven E. Miller, ed., *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 58–107; and Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). The effect of offense-defense calculations on the outbreak of World War II is more complicated; a "cult of the defensive" among the states opposing Hitler also played a role in setting the stage for that war. See Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 232; and Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137–168, at 166. However, this defensive cult was not shared by Hitler, who believed that offensive military action was feasible, if not easy, and who exaggerated the ease of conquest overall by underestimating the political forces that would gather against an aggressor.

10. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99–142, at 120–123.

large as always; the difference is merely that the dead would die in a smaller number of more violent conflicts.

A second effect of nuclear weapons is far more important: they strengthen defending states against aggressors. States with developed nuclear arsenals can annihilate each other even after absorbing an all-out attack, giving rise to a world of mutual assured destruction (MAD). In a MAD world, conquest is far harder than before, because international conflicts shift from tests of will and capability to purer tests of will—to be won by the side willing to run greater risks and pay greater costs. This strengthens defenders, because they nearly always value their freedom more than aggressors value new conquests; hence they will have more resolve than aggressors, hence their threats are more credible, hence they are bound to prevail in a confrontation.

For these reasons the nuclear revolution makes conquest among great powers virtually impossible. A victor now must destroy almost all of an opponent's nuclear arsenal—an enormous task requiring massive technical and material superiority. As a result, even lesser powers can now stand alone against states with far greater resources, as they never could before.

Britain, France and Soviet Union are Europe's only nuclear powers today, but a number of others could develop powerful deterrents if they ever faced serious threats to their security. This potential greatly diminishes the risk of war. Before 1945, states sought to redress insecurity by territorial expansion and preventive war. The nuclear revolution has given states the option of achieving security without resort to war, by peacefully acquiring superior defensive weapons. As a result of this increased security, competition for security will be muted in the new Europe; arguments for preemptive and preventive war will be less common; diplomacy will be conducted with less reckless search for unilateral advantage; and foreign and security policies will be relatively open.<sup>11</sup>

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11. The Cold War "reconnaissance revolution"—embodied in the deployment of reconnaissance satellites by both superpowers—reflects this last effect. As John Gaddis notes, this revolution helped stabilize the Cold War, by preventing optimistic miscalculation, inhibiting surprise attack, and facilitating arms control. Gaddis, "Long Peace," pp. 123–125. See also John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 195–214. The reconnaissance revolution, in turn, was largely a product of the nuclear revolution. It required the development of ballistic missiles that could loft satellites into space, but it also required tacit acceptance by both superpowers, who otherwise could have developed and used anti-satellite weapons to prevent satellite overflights. Nuclear weapons made the superpowers better able to agree tacitly to allow mutual surveillance, even if one side gained more information than the other from such surveillance. Such unilateral gains made little difference in a world of redundant, secure nuclear arsenals, since even a large advantage to one



The possibility of nuclear proliferation should thus be seen as a net benefit to peace in Europe. Proliferation would entail obvious dangers. For example, new nuclear states might develop frail deterrents that are not secure from terrorism, accident, or surprise attack, raising the risk of terrorist use, and of accidental or preemptive war; and surrounding states might be tempted to launch preventive wars against emerging nuclear powers. However, these dangers can be managed by the existing nuclear powers. These powers can limit proliferation to states capable of maintaining secure deterrents, by guaranteeing the security of other non-nuclear states, thereby reducing their need for nuclear weapons. They also can manage any proliferation that does occur by deterring preventive attack on emerging nuclear states when proliferation is deemed acceptable, and by giving them the technical help required to build secure arsenals. If proliferation is constrained and managed in this fashion, it can bolster Europe's peace by making conquest infeasible.<sup>12</sup> Things would be safest if all European states that might someday desire nuclear deterrents already possessed them; the dangers of the proliferation process would then be avoided. Overall, however, the possibility of proliferation makes Europe far safer than it would be if that possibility did not exist.

**ECONOMIC CHANGE: THE END OF THE AGE OF EXTRACTION.** The shift toward knowledge-based forms of production in advanced industrial economies since 1945 has reduced the ability of conquerors to extract resources from conquered territories. This change, too, diminishes the risk of war in Europe by making conquest more difficult and less rewarding.

Today's high-technology post-industrial economies depend increasingly on free access to technical and social information. This access requires a free domestic press, and access to foreign publications, foreign travel, personal computers, and photocopiers. But the police measures needed to subdue a conquered society require that these technologies and practices be forbidden, because they also carry subversive ideas. Thus critical elements of the eco-

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side would not give it a strategic first-strike capability. Hence both sides felt that the danger of allowing the other side to gain a unilateral information advantage was outweighed by the mutual gain provided by an open information regime.

12. Some pessimists expect that if nuclear proliferation occurs, it is likely to be mismanaged, and argue that the possibility of proliferation therefore poses a net danger. See, for example, Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 37–40. However, if the United States remains in Europe, it seems implausible that the Americans will stand idly by while a botched proliferation process unfolds. Hence proliferation poses a danger only if the United States withdraws fully from Europe—which seems unlikely, as I note below. Moreover, even if the United States does withdraw, the European nuclear powers also have the wherewithal to manage any proliferation that might occur, and have every interest in doing so.

nomic fabric now must be ripped out to maintain control over conquered polities.

As a result of these changes, states can afford to compete less aggressively for control of industrial areas, since control adds little to national power, and control by others would give them little power-gain. Hence it poses little threat. This change undercuts the geopolitical motives that produced past European balance-of-power wars. It is now far harder to conquer Europe piecemeal, using each conquest to gain strength for the next, since incremental conquests would provide little gain in power, and might even produce a net loss. Hence would-be aggressors have less motive to expand, and defenders less reason to compete fiercely to prevent others' gain.<sup>13</sup>

This is a marked change from the smokestack-economy era, when societies could be conquered and policed with far less collateral economic harm. The Nazis sustained fairly high levels of production in France and Czechoslovakia, even while they subjugated the conquered populations. Likewise, the Soviet regime was able until recently to squeeze high production from a society that was also subject to tight police controls, including severe limits on information technology, foreign publications, and travel. The slowdown of Soviet economic growth after 1970, and the stall in Soviet economic growth during the 1980s, reflect the new economic reality. The Soviet economy hit the wall partly because Soviet means of political control now collide with the imperatives of post-industrial economic productivity. The Soviet Union had to institute *glasnost* and other democratic reforms if it hoped to re-start its economy, because the police measures required to sustain the Bolshevik dictatorship would also stifle Soviet efforts to escape the smokestack age.

Any expansionist European state would confront the same dilemma. It would have to adopt harsh police measures to control its newly-acquired empire, but these measures would wreck productivity. Industrial economies could once be domesticated and milked; now they would wither in captivity. Hence any future European state that pursued successful military expansion would then face only two options: liberalize and lose control politically, or maintain tight political control and impoverish the empire. This change

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13. Carl Kaysen notes further reasons why conquest now pays smaller strategic and economic rewards than in the past. See Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42–64, at 48–58. However, most of the factors he identifies have evolved over several centuries, and thus provide little reason to hope that the world is significantly safer now than it was in 1914 or 1939.

dampens the balance-of-power concerns, and the attendant competition for control of industrial regions, that helped cause both world wars.<sup>14</sup>

AMERICA AS BALANCER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS AND IDEAS. When diplomatic coalitions fail to form against aggressors, aggression becomes easier, making war more likely. Such failure represents a diplomatic variety of offense-dominance, and has the same effects as the military variety. Thus the two world wars were caused partly by American and British failure to balance firmly against German aggression in both 1914 and 1939, and Soviet failure to balance in 1939. This left Germany's neighbors less secure, and allowed Germany to hope that hegemony was possible. Peace has been preserved since 1945 partly because the United States and Britain reversed course after 1945, playing an active role in counterbalancing Soviet power on the European Continent.

American foreign policy interests and thinking have changed dramatically since the 1930s. The United States is therefore likely to continue playing an active balancing role, at least in Western Europe, even after the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.<sup>15</sup> As a result, the danger of inadequate diplomatic balancing is unlikely to recur in the new Europe.

The nuclear revolution reduces the threat posed by a hegemonic European state to American sovereignty, since a nuclear-armed America could defend itself against such a hegemon far more easily than it could in the pre-nuclear era. This lowers America's geopolitical interest in balancing actively against a potential European hegemon. However, the nuclear revolution also heightens America's interest in avoiding war in Europe, since such a war would now inflict far more harm on America if it spread to engulf the United States. America could well be drawn into such a war, because it has deep cultural and ethnic ties to Europe, and would find it difficult to stand aside while

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14. This change does have a downside: by slackening the impulse to balance against aggression, it could weaken the resistance that aggressors face, weakening deterrence. However, the new economics would cause net damage to peace through this effect only if aggressors' motives to commit aggression are not reduced by the new economics, while defenders' will to defend is weakened. This asymmetry might develop, but there is no clear reason why it should be expected.

15. A continued American military commitment to Europe will not diminish the risk of war in Eastern Europe unless the United States guarantees the security of the Eastern European states against attack by one another—a policy I do not expect or recommend—but it will inhibit aggression in Western Europe, and dampen the spread of war from Eastern to Western Europe. Moreover, the United States can use measures short of military commitment, such as economic incentives, to punish aggressors and reward good conduct in Eastern Europe, as I note below. This would constitute a balancing policy implemented by non-military means.

the homelands of American ethnic groups were conquered or destroyed. A future European war could also harm American commercial or other interests, drawing in the United States by a process parallel to that which pulled it into the French Revolutionary Wars and the First World War. Thus while one argument for balancing has diminished, another has become more persuasive. As a result, the United States is unlikely to return to its pre-World War II policy of isolation.<sup>16</sup>

The experience of the two world wars has also changed American foreign policy thinking in ways that will probably not be reversed. Before both wars, the United States remained aloof from Europe in the belief that it could stand aside from Europe's wars, but this proved impossible both times. National historical learning is often ephemeral, but this experience forms a large part of American historical consciousness, and its main lesson—that the United States could be drawn into any future European conflagration—is relatively unambiguous. As a result, it is difficult to imagine a return to the simple isolationism of the 1930s. The disastrous results of that policy are too difficult to explain away. Moreover, during the Cold War the United States developed a large military establishment whose main reason for existence lies in the American commitment to Europe. This establishment has an institutional interest in reminding Americans of the history of 1914–45, if they begin to forget it.

The post-Cold War world has yet to emerge, but early signs indicate that those who forecast a complete American withdrawal from Europe will be proven wrong.<sup>17</sup> During the 1980s some Americans called for such a withdrawal,<sup>18</sup> but these voices have now largely faded away. The current American administration seems committed to staying in Europe even after the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe,<sup>19</sup> and there is little dissent from this policy in the United States.

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16. For further discussion of America's post-Cold War interest in Europe, see Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 1–51, at 2–12.

17. Mearsheimer suggests that the dissolution of NATO and the complete withdrawal of American and British forces from the European continent are likely if the Soviet Union withdraws fully from Eastern Europe. "Back to the Future," pp. 5–6.

18. For examples, see Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't," pp. 1, 34–35n.

19. President Bush has declared that American forces are needed to provide a "stabilizing presence" in Europe even if the Soviet Union withdraws fully from Eastern Europe, and in early 1990 he successfully pressed Moscow to agree that American forces in Western Europe would be reduced more slowly than Soviet forces in the East. See Michael Gordon, "American Troops

MILITARISM

World War I and the Pacific War of 1941–45 were caused in part by the domination of civilian discourse by military propaganda that primed the world for war. This domination has now disappeared in Europe.

As a general matter, professional military officers are nearly as cautious as civilians in recommending decisions for war.<sup>20</sup> However, militaries do sometimes cause war as a side-effect of their efforts to protect their organizational interests. They infuse the surrounding society with organizationally self-serving myths; these myths then have the unintended effect of persuading the rest of society that war is necessary or desirable. Militaries purvey these myths to convince society to grant them the size, wealth, autonomy, and prestige that all bureaucracies seek—not to provoke war. Yet these myths also support arguments for war; hence societies infused with military propaganda will be warlike, even if their militaries want peace.<sup>21</sup> Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan are prime examples of societies that were infused with such myths, and waged war because of them.<sup>22</sup> Other European powers also fell under the sway of militarist mythology before 1914, although to a lesser extent than Germany.<sup>23</sup>

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Needed in Europe, President Asserts," *New York Times*, February 13, 1990, p. 1; and Thomas Friedman, "Soviets, Ending Objections, Agree to U.S. Edge on Soldiers in Europe," *New York Times*, February 14, 1990, p. 1.

20. The only empirical study on this question is Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). Betts found that America's Cold War military leaders were as cautious as American civilian leaders in recommending war, although military leaders were notably more hawkish than civilians when the escalation of warfare was considered.

21. I develop this argument in Van Evera, "Causes of War," pp. 206–398.

22. Thus Hans-Ulrich Wehler notes "the spread of military values throughout German society" before 1914, and argues that "this 'social militarism' not only placed the military highest on the scale of social prestige, but permeated the whole of society with its ways of thinking, patterns of behavior, and its values and notions of honor." Wehler, *The German Empire 1871–1918*, trans. Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa/Dover, N.H.: Berg Publishers, 1985), p. 156. German Admiral George von Müller later explained German pre-war bellicosity by noting that "a great part of the German people . . . had been whipped into a high-grade chauvinism by Navalists and Pan-Germans"; quoted in Fritz Stern, *The Failure of Liberalism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), p. 94. For more on the role of the military in Wilhelmine Germany see Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955); and Martin Kitchen, *The German Officer Corps, 1890–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). On Japan see Saburo Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931–1945* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), pp. 13–54. A survey on the problem of militarism is Volker R. Berghahn, *Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861–1979* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982).

23. I summarize the beliefs purveyed by European militaries before 1914 in Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 80–117, at 83–99.

Five principal myths have been prominent in past military arguments and propaganda. First, militaries exaggerate the power of the offense relative to the defense, and the ease of conquest among states. Before World War I the German army's chief propagandist, General Friedrich von Bernhardi, expressed the common military prejudice when he wrongly asserted that "the offensive mode of action is by far superior to the defensive mode," and that new technology favored the attacker.<sup>24</sup> Such illusions bolster arguments that larger forces are needed to defend against aggression, and support arguments for the offensive military doctrines that militaries strongly prefer.<sup>25</sup> However, they also cause war, by conjuring up the many dangers (noted above) that arise when national leaders believe that security is scarce and conquest is easy.<sup>26</sup>

Second, military propaganda exaggerates the hostility of other states, painting neighbors as malevolent and aggressive. This bolsters the military's case for large budgets by exaggerating the likelihood of war, but also causes war by bolstering arguments that enemies should be forestalled by launching preemptive or preventive war.<sup>27</sup>

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24. Friedrich von Bernhardi, *How Germany Makes War* (New York: Doran, 1914), p. 155. Before 1914, British generals likewise declared that "the defensive is never an acceptable role to the Briton, and he makes little or no study of it," and that the offensive "will win as sure as there is a sun in the heavens." Generals W.G. Knox and R.C.B. Haking, quoted in T.H.E. Travers, "Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900–1914," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 51 (June 1979), pp. 264–286, at 275. For more details on British thought and practice see Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). On offensive thinking in Germany, France, and Russia before 1914, see Snyder, *Ideology of the Offensive*, pp. 41–198; on France, see also Basil Liddell Hart, "French Military Ideas before the First World War," in Martin Gilbert, ed., *A Century of Conflict, 1850–1950* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966), pp. 135–148; and for further examples see Van Evera, "Causes of War," pp. 280–324, 571–607.

25. The reasons for this preference are detailed in Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp. 47–51, 58, 67–74; and Snyder, *Ideology of the Offensive*, pp. 24–25.

26. See pp. 11–12, above.

27. Thus German officers in the Wilhelmine era depicted a Germany encircled by envious neighbors about to attack, and naval officers in imperial Japan warned of an aggressive encirclement of Japan by America, Britain, China, and the Netherlands in the 1930s. Such warnings created a general belief that war was inevitable, which strengthened the arguments of German and Japanese advocates of preventive war. For an example from Germany see Imanuel Geiss, *German Foreign Policy, 1871–1914* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 121–122, quoting General Alfred von Schlieffen; for other pre-1914 examples from Germany, Britain, and Russia, see Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed," p. 85. On Japan see Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto with Dale K.A. Finlayson, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931–1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 225–260, at 243–244, 251.

Third, militaries exaggerate the tendency of other states to give in to threats—to “bandwagon” with the threat instead of “balancing” against it.<sup>28</sup> Such myths bolster the military’s arguments for larger forces by reinforcing claims that a bigger force can be used to make diplomatic gains, but also cause war by feeding confidence that belligerent behavior will bring political rewards.<sup>29</sup>

Fourth, militaries commonly overstate the strategic and economic value of empire.<sup>30</sup> These exaggerations strengthen arguments for forces required to gain or defend imperial conquests, but also feed arguments for waging imperial wars.

Finally, militaries often understate the costs of warfare, sometimes even portraying it as healthy or beneficial.<sup>31</sup> This raises the prestige of the military by increasing the apparent utility of the instrument it wields, but it causes war by encouraging states to behave recklessly. The bizarre pre-1914 popular belief that a European war would “cleanse” and “rejuvenate” society largely sprang from such military propaganda, and helped set the stage for war.

The scourge of militarism kept the world in turmoil until 1945, but has now almost vanished in Europe. European militarism diminished sharply

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28. On bandwagoning and balancing, and the prevalence of the latter over the former, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 17–33, 147–180, 263–266, 274–280.

29. Thus the Wilhelmine German Navy justified its big fleet with its famous “risk theory,” which proposed that a large German fleet could be used to cow Britain into neutrality while Germany moved aggressively. See Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier, 1962), pp. 212–213; Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945* (London: Fontana, 1984), pp. 127–162, and specifically on the intimidation of Britain, pp. 133, 135, 139. Germany’s General Schlieffen similarly contended that even if Britain fought to contain Germany, it would abandon the war in discouragement once the German army had defeated France. Gerhard Ritter, *The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth*, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972), p. 163. These notions strengthened the arguments of German war-hawks in 1914.

30. For example, before 1914 the German Admiral George von Müller saw Germany locked in a “great battle for economic survival”; without new territories “the artificial [German] economic edifice would start to crumble and existence therein would become very unpleasant indeed.” Müller memorandum to the Kaiser’s brother, quoted in J.C.G. Röhl, ed., *From Bismarck to Hitler: The Problem of Continuity in German History* (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 56–57, 59. General Bernhardt likewise declared that “flourishing nations . . . require a continual expansion of their frontiers; they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population.” Friedrich von Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, trans. Allen H. Powles (New York: Longmans, Green, 1914), p. 21, and see also pp. 82–83. In France Marshall Ferdinand Foch spoke in similar terms; see Foch, *The Principles of War*, trans. de Morinni (New York: Fly, 1918), pp. 36–37. For more examples see Van Evera, “Causes of War,” pp. 339–347.

31. For examples see Van Evera, “Causes of War,” pp. 348–360; and Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed,” pp. 90–92.

after World War I, when Europe's militaries were widely blamed both for causing the war and for waging it foolishly. This reduced the military's ability to shape public opinion by lowering its prestige.

Since World War II the potential for militarism has diminished further, with the end of the deep social barriers between the military establishment and civilian society. Before 1914 European militaries stood apart from society in two ways. First, military officers were socially segregated and isolated. This allowed them to develop a separate culture, including an arrogant sense of a right to command civilian ideas on foreign and military policy. Second, the military officer corps were preserves of the upper class, especially in Germany and France, and were seen by that class as pillars of its social dominance.<sup>32</sup> Hence militaries had a double motive to sow propaganda that enhanced their prestige: to advance the interests of military institutions, at the expense of wider societies with which they felt little identification; and to advance the interests of the upper class as a whole.<sup>33</sup> Three changes, which began after World War I and gathered momentum after World War II, have now diminished these motives: European officers are more integrated into civilian society; the officer corps are no longer an upper-class preserve, instead representing a wider cross-section of society; and European societies have undergone a process of social leveling, which has sharply reduced class conflict.

In addition, new barriers have been built against a militarist revival. These barriers are embodied in the spread of democracy in Europe, the development in the West of governmental institutions for the civilian evaluation and control of defense policy, the growth in Western Europe of university-based civilian expertise in military affairs—which is weaker than in the United States but is nevertheless significant—and the awareness of European military officers that their institutions did great harm in the past. The growth of official and unofficial civilian defense analysis, combined with democracy and norms of free speech, guarantees that military propaganda would face greater public criticism than before 1914. The greater historical awareness of European military officers—a product of their greater social integration,

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32. On Germany see Wehler, *The German Empire*, pp. 125–127, 145–146, 155–170; on France see Snyder, *Ideology of the Offensive*, chap. 3.

33. In France the military also believed that its social purity could best be preserved by an offensive doctrine that would require a fully professional army, untainted by masses of middle-class reserves, and for this reason as well it purveyed offensive ideas. See Snyder, *Ideology of the Offensive*, chap. 3.



which brings them into greater contact with common historical discourse—causes militaries to use more self-restraint than before in defending their institutional interests.

The permanent disappearance of European militarism is not guaranteed, however, and logic suggests that militarism could make a modest comeback in the future. This danger lies in the same dynamic that makes great powers more vulnerable to militarism than medium powers. Great powers must provide for their own security, which causes them to maintain larger militaries, which then have larger effects on the discourse of surrounding society. More importantly, great power militaries stand to gain more from the propagation of militarist myths than do medium-power militaries, because great powers address the foreign threats that these myths depict by counter-buildup, while medium powers more often respond by seeking support from allies. Hence great power militaries gain a greater budgetary payoff from propagating such myths, giving them greater incentive to do so.

This dynamic helps explain the marked confinement of past militarism to great powers, or to isolated medium powers that lacked allies to provide security. It also suggests that Europe will become more prone to militarism as the superpowers reduce their European presence. European states will then be forced to provide more of their own security; hence their security policies will come to more closely resemble those of great powers, restoring one condition for militarism.

The risk of militarism will also increase in the Soviet Union, due to *glasnost* (in the short run) and the end of the Bolshevik dictatorship (in the longer run). Some argue that these changes will reduce the influence of the military, by allowing greater public criticism of military policies.<sup>34</sup> However, *glasnost* also gives the military new freedom to purvey propaganda, and the end of the Bolshevik monopoly on power will lift the longstanding Communist Party monopoly on political ideas, giving the military an even greater opportunity. There is still no sign that the Soviet military has begun to exploit these opportunities, but it may not remain quiescent forever. Moreover, unlike the West, the Soviet Union lacks established academic or governmental civilian institutions with military expertise, so civilians are poorly prepared to use their new freedom.<sup>35</sup> Hence it seems possible that the Soviet military will

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34. David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 5–24.

35. See Stephen M. Meyer, "Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race in the

gain more power than it loses from Soviet liberalization, at least until strong civilian analytic institutions are developed.

However, a resurgence of European militarism to the levels seen during 1900–14 seems unlikely, because pre-1914 militarism arose partly from social conditions unique to those times, and because European societies are at least partly immunized against a repetition by the memory of its results.

#### HYPER-NATIONALISM AND ITS MYTHS AND MISPERCEPTIONS

During the period 1871–1939, a great wave of hyper-nationalism swept over Europe. Each state taught itself a mythical history of its own and others' national past, and glorified its own national character while denigrating that of others.<sup>36</sup> The schools, the universities, the press, and the politicians all joined in this orgy of mythmaking and self-glorification. Boyd Shafer summarized the common tenor of European education:

Text and teacher alike, with a few notable exceptions, taught the student that his own country was high-minded, great, and glorious. If his nation went to war, it was for defense, while the foe was the aggressor. If his nation won its wars, that was because his countrymen were braver and God was on their side. If his nation was defeated, that was due only to the enemy's overwhelmingly superior forces and treachery. If his country lost territory, as the French lost Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, that was a crime; whatever it gained was for the good of humanity and but its rightful due. The enemy was "harsh," "cruel," "backward." His own people "kind," "civilized," "progressive."<sup>37</sup>

This chauvinist mythmaking poisoned international relations by convincing each state of the legitimacy of its own claims, the rightness of its own

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U.S.S.R.," in Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), pp. 37–61. The danger presented by enlarged military influence is seen in the sharp difference between Soviet military and civilian views on foreign and military policy; this difference is described in Celeste A. Wallander, "Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought: Does the 'New Thinking' Grow Prematurely Grey?" *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989), pp. 31–63; and R. Hyland Phillips and Jeffrey I. Sands, "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense: A Research Note," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 164–178.

36. For examples from before 1914 see Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed," pp. 93–95. On the doctoring of history in Germany during the interwar years and its consequences, see Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany After the Great War," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1987), pp. 5–44. A general survey on nationalism is Boyd C. Shafer, *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972).

37. Boyd Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), p. 185.

cause, and the wrongfulness and maliciousness of the grievances of others. Oblivious that its own past conduct had often provoked others' hostility, each country ascribed hostility to others' innate and boundless aggressiveness. This led each to assume that others could not be appeased, and should be dealt with harshly.<sup>38</sup> Countries also approached war with a reckless confidence engendered by a sense of innate superiority. Such ideas fed the climate that fostered both world wars.<sup>39</sup>

The stability of postwar Europe has been partly due to the remarkable decline of nationalist propaganda, especially in European schools.<sup>40</sup> As I note below, this decline resulted in part from the social and economic leveling of European societies after the 1930s, and the less competitive relations that developed among Western European states after 1945. It also grew from the Allied occupation of Germany, which destroyed the Nazi textbooks and imposed a more honest history curriculum in German schools;<sup>41</sup> and from the concerted efforts of international agencies and educational institutions, most notably the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the Brunswick International Schoolbook Institute in Germany.<sup>42</sup> These institutions oversaw textbook exchanges whose purpose was to force the educators of each country to answer foreign complaints about their curricula, with the aim of causing Europe to converge on a single shared version of European history. Their efforts were a dramatic success, largely ridding Western Europe of hyper-nationalism. Nothing suggests that this achievement will soon be undone. Moreover, the social leveling of Eastern

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38. I suspect that such nationalist mythmaking is the main cause of the "spiral model" pattern of conflict described by Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58–113. Jervis emphasizes psychological causes; empirical research comparing these explanations would be useful.

39. During World War I an American historian reflected on the responsibility of chauvinist historical writing for causing the European war: "Woe unto us! professional historians, professional historical students, professional teachers of history, if we cannot see written in blood, in the dying civilization of Europe, the dreadful result of exaggerated nationalism as set forth in the patriotic histories of some of the most eloquent historians of the nineteenth century." H. Morse Stephens, "Nationality and History," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 21 (January 1916), pp. 225–236, at 236.

40. See Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900–1970," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77–100.

41. A survey of this often-mismanaged but ultimately successful endeavor is Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-education of German and Her Allies After World War II* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985).

42. An account is E.H. Dance, *History the Betrayer* (London: Hutchinson, 1960), pp. 126–150. The Brunswick Institute has since been renamed the Georg Eckert Institute for International Schoolbook Research, after its founder, Dr. Georg Eckert.

Europe makes the emergence of hyper-nationalism unlikely in that region as well, as I note below.

#### SOCIAL IMPERIALISM

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries European elites sometimes sought to bolster their domestic position by distracting publics with foreign confrontations, or by seeking successful foreign wars.<sup>43</sup> Russian bellicosity toward Japan before the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05 has been ascribed partly to such motives.<sup>44</sup> Hans-Ulrich Wehler argues that the Prussian government launched the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 partly “to legitimize the prevailing political system against the striving for social and political emancipation of the middle classes.”<sup>45</sup> Before 1914 some Germans feared the domestic effects of war,<sup>46</sup> but others favored bellicose policies because they thought a victorious war would strengthen the monarchy.<sup>47</sup>

This cause of war has been removed from Europe by the democratization of European politics, and the leveling of European societies. The coming of democracy has legitimized Europe’s regimes, and social leveling has reduced popular discontent with the existing social order. Both changes have reduced the elites’ need to use foreign policy to bolster their legitimacy. Today’s

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43. On social imperialism in Germany see Wehler, *The German Empire*, pp. 24–28, 103–104, 171–179, 200; Volker Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 81–82, 93–94, 97, 185; Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*, trans. Marian Jackson (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), pp. 253–254; and Arno Mayer, “Domestic Causes of the First World War,” in Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern, eds., *The Responsibility of Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 286–300. Some have ascribed Soviet Cold War expansionism to similar causes; a discussion is Gaddis, “Long Peace,” pp. 118–119. A criticism of the social imperial explanation for German conduct is Marc Trachtenberg, “The Social Interpretation of Foreign Policy,” *Review of Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (July 1978), pp. 328–350, at 341–344. A more general discussion of social imperialism and other scapegoat theories of war is Jack S. Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 259–288; a criticism of these theories is Blainey, *Causes of War*, pp. 72–86.

44. The Russian minister of the interior, Viascheslav Plehve, stated at the time: “What this country needs is a short victorious war to stem the tide of revolution.” Quoted in Levy, “Diversionary Theory of War,” p. 264.

45. Wehler, *German Empire*, p. 26.

46. For examples see Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War*, pp. 82, 97, 185; and Wehler, *German Empire*, p. 200.

47. Thus shortly before the war, former Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow wrote that an expansionist policy was the “true antidote against social democracy,” and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg noted in June 1914 that belligerent German agrarian interests “expected a war to turn domestic politics in a conservative direction.” Quoted in Wehler, *German Empire*, pp. 177–178; and Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War*, p. 185.

European elites face less pressure from below, and hence have less motive to divert that pressure by foreign adventurism.

#### UNDEMOCRATIC POLITIES

European societies are more democratic than before 1914 or 1939, and democracy is spreading rapidly in Eastern Europe. This trend is bound to continue, because key pre-conditions for democracy—high levels of literacy and industrial development, and a relatively equal distribution of land, wealth, and income—are now far more widespread in Europe than they were 80 years ago.<sup>48</sup> This change bolsters peace.

Empirical evidence suggests that democracies are not generally more peaceful than other states, but that relations among democracies are more peaceful than relations among non-democratic states, or between democracies and non-democracies.<sup>49</sup> Logic suggests two related reasons why relations among democracies should be peaceful.<sup>50</sup> First, the ideologies of democracies do not incorporate a claim to rule other democracies, so they have no ideological motives for expansion against one another. The democratic presumption of the right of peoples to choose their own political path precludes the idea that world democracy should be run from a single center, or that any democracy has a claim to rule another. The communist world has long been rent with conflict over who would be the leader, most clearly manifest in the Sino-Soviet and Yugoslav-Soviet conflicts.<sup>51</sup> The Arab states have likewise clashed over leadership of the Arab world.<sup>52</sup> The democratic world has suffered no parallel conflict, because democratic ideology preempts the question “who should lead?” with the answer that “no one should lead.”<sup>53</sup> This dampens expansionism among democratic states, and eases their fears of one another.

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48. The prerequisites for democracy are discussed in Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 48–188; and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, expanded ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 27–63.

49. For empirical studies see Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617–648; and Erich Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement,” in *ibid.*, pp. 649–664.

50. Developing these arguments is Michael Doyle: “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Parts 1 and 2, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, No. 4 (Summer, Fall 1983), pp. 205–235, and 325–353; and Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December, 1986), pp. 1151–1169.

51. A general account through the early 1960s is Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

52. See Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 206–212.

53. Making this point is Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 35–37, 211–214.

Second, democratic elites would have more difficulty legitimating a war against another democracy. They could not claim that they fought to free the people of the opposing state, since these people would already be free. The elite would also face arguments that warring to overthrow another democratic regime is anti-democratic, since such a war would seek to undo the popular will of the other society. Thus democracies have less motive to attack each other, and would face greater domestic opposition if they chose to do so.

Deduction suggests two additional reasons why democracies should be more peaceful. First, war-causing national misperceptions—militarist myths, hyper-nationalist myths, or elite arguments for “social imperial” wars, for example—should be dampened by norms of free speech, which permit the development of evaluative institutions that can challenge errant ideas. Even in democracies the evaluation of public policy is seldom very good, and fatuous ideas can often influence state action; but this danger is smallest in societies that permit free debate, as all democracies must to some degree. Second, democracy tends to limit social stratification. This limits the elite’s motive to purvey nationalist myths or to pursue war for social-imperial reasons, and removes a past cause of militarism.<sup>54</sup>

These last two deductions suggest that democracies should have more peaceful relations with both democracies and non-democracies; hence they are contradicted by empirical studies showing that democracies have in fact not been more pacific in their relations with non-democratic states.<sup>55</sup> However, these studies have not controlled for perturbing variables that may explain the discrepancy, hence they do not definitively disprove these deductions.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, this question need not be resolved to establish the effect of the spread of democracy in Europe. It has created a homogeneously democratic Western Europe, and most Eastern states are likely to become democracies also. If so, nearly all international relations in Europe will be

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54. Thus democracy and social leveling are reciprocally related; each bolsters the other.

55. See Chan, “Mirror, Mirror”; and Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement.”

56. For example, these studies did not control for the strength of states. This omission may make democracies appear more warlike, because democracy tends to develop in industrialized states; industrial states tend to be strong states; and strong states tend to be involved in more wars. See Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) pp. 220–222, who notes that European great powers have averaged twice as many wars as lesser states since 1700. Moreover, case studies of the origins of wars indicate that hyper-nationalism, unchallenged official propaganda, and social imperialism have sometimes played a role in their outbreak; this supports the argument that democracies are more peaceful overall, since democracy should dampen these diseases. Thus the total body of empirical evidence points both ways.

intra-democratic, and most scholars agree that intra-democratic relations are more peaceful.

#### SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION

European societies are now far less socially and economically stratified than they were before 1914 or 1939.<sup>57</sup> In Western Europe, stratification was ended by democracy and the political mobilization of the working class. In Eastern Europe it was ended by communism. This transformation has operated as a remote cause of peace by contributing to the four changes just discussed—the growth of democracy, and the decline of militarism, hyper-nationalism, and social imperialism.

These four effects of social leveling vary in importance. The demilitarization and democratization of Europe have removed important causes of war, but social leveling was not the sole cause, nor perhaps even the main cause, of these changes. It played a large role in eliminating social-imperial motives for war, but this cause of war, while significant, probably mattered less than others. The most significant effect of leveling has been the reduction of hyper-nationalism; leveling removed the taproot of the great wave of hyper-nationalism that swept Europe during 1870–1939.

This wave of hyper-nationalism was a largely artificial phenomenon, engineered by elites who resorted to nationalism to persuade publics to tolerate the steep stratification of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European societies. As the nineteenth century progressed, Europe's elites faced increasing challenge because industrialization weakened previous

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57. For data on the evolution of income inequality in Europe, see Peter Flora, Franz Kraus, and Winfried Pfenning, *State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, 1815–1975: A Data Handbook in Two Volumes*, Vol. 1: *The Growth of Industrial Societies and Capitalist Economies* (Chicago: St. James, 1987), pp. 611–674. They report inequality diminishing over the past several decades in eight of nine countries covered. For example, the share of national income received by the top 10 percent of the British population fell from 38.8 percent to 25.8 percent between 1938 and 1976 (p. 672); in Germany the share received by the top 10 percent fell from 40.5 to 31.7 percent between 1913 and 1974 (p. 652). Inequality in the distribution of wealth in Europe has diminished even more markedly. For example, in England and Wales the share of total wealth controlled by the richest 1 percent of the population fell from 61 percent to 32 percent between 1923 and 1972; in Sweden the share of total taxed net worth controlled by the richest 1 percent fell from 50 percent to 17 percent from 1920 to 1975. See A.B. Atkinson and A.J. Harrison, "Trends in the Distribution of Wealth in Britain," in A.B. Atkinson, ed., *Wealth, Income and Inequality*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 214–229, at 218; and Roland Spänt, "Wealth Distribution in Sweden, 1920–1983," in Edward N. Wolf, ed., *International Comparisons of the Distribution of Household Wealth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 51–71. On the United States see H.P. Miller, "Income Distribution in the United States," in A.B. Atkinson, ed., *Wealth, Income and Inequality* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 111–135, at 113, 125–126.

methods of social control. The spread of mass literacy and the rural migration to the cities broke the elites' monopoly of information and caused the spread of egalitarian ideas. The development of mass armies, caused partly by the invention of mass production methods to make small arms, forced each state to arm its citizenry to avoid defeat by mass foreign armies; this broke the elites' monopoly of force. These changes impelled elites to seek new instruments of social control—so they switched from coercion to persuasion. Hyper-nationalism, purveyed chiefly through public education, was their prime weapon. This hyper-nationalism was crafted to persuade publics to continue to serve and obey the state loyally.<sup>58</sup>

The profound leveling of European societies, however, now allows European elites to command public loyalty without resort to hyper-nationalism. Hence this motive for the propagation of nationalism has largely disappeared, which suggests that hyper-nationalism will not return in force.

Social stratification was not the sole cause of European hypernationalism: a secondary cause lay in the felt need to mobilize publics to support the costly defense efforts required by the competitive international politics of the era.<sup>59</sup> This cause may reappear as the European states begin providing more of their own security, and their elites may be motivated to propagate somewhat more nationalism in order to persuade publics to back enlarged defense programs. The elites of seceding Soviet republics will also fan nationalism to mobilize popular support if they face long liberation struggles. However, the United States can dampen security motives for the propagation of nationalism in Western Europe by continuing its military presence in Europe. And any nationalism fanned by liberation struggles in the Soviet republics will be weakened by the absence of the social inequities that nourished hyper-nationalism in the past.

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58. Overall, as Hans-Ulrich Wehler notes, the German "teaching of history was used as an anti-revolutionary mind-drug for the inculcation of a patriotic mentality." *German Empire*, p. 121. However, see also Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Eley argues that nationalist propaganda had its main effect on the German middle class, while leaving the working class relatively unaffected. And for a different view on the causes of nationalism, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Gellner explains nationalism without reference to social stratification.

59. Thus the Kaiser's government instructed German teachers to produce "self-denying subjects . . . who will be glad to pay the supreme sacrifice for king and country," by teaching "the power and greatness of our people in the past and in the present." Quoted in Walter Consuelo Langsam, "Nationalism and History in the Prussian Elementary Schools Under William II," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 243–245.



AGGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY STATES

War spawned by revolution is another danger absent from the new Europe. States led by movements that seized power through mass revolution are more war-prone for a number of reasons. Once in power, revolutionary elites fear counter-revolution, leading them to defensive wars of expansion to remove threatening counter-revolutionaries from their borders. They infuse themselves with self-glorifying myths to motivate supporters during the revolution; these myths live on after the revolution, fueling chauvinism toward other countries. They frequently adopt universalist aims and rhetoric to inspire supporters to sacrifice for the revolution, but these universalist aims often become dogma that outlives the revolutionary struggle, fueling messianic expansion later on. They demand a monopoly of ideas and suppress dissent during the revolution itself; this habit later leads to the suppression of free speech and public debate, allowing misperceptions and illusions to govern state conduct. Neighboring regimes with different social systems may fear the contagious impact of a revolutionary example on their own publics—especially if these regimes lack domestic legitimacy—and may foment the counter-revolution that the revolution fears, or even attack it directly. Neighbors may also be influenced to attack by emigrés who flee the revolution and then work to persuade neighboring states to restore them to power. Thus revolutionary states are more prone to attack others, and more likely to be attacked.<sup>60</sup> Revolutionary France, the Soviet Union, Khomeini's Iran, and Castro's Cuba all suffered these syndromes and sparked these reactions, leading them into international confrontation.<sup>61</sup>

This cause of war will not arise in the new Europe, because Europe is devoid of revolutionary states, and of illegitimate regimes that might be threatened by them. The revolutionary cycle has burned itself out in the Soviet Union. The new regimes of Eastern Europe gained power in popular upheavals, but these were not mass revolutions; they involved no long insurgencies of the sort that nurture battle-hardened, myth-ridden revolutionary organizations. Revolutionary regimes might arise in republics seced-

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60. Advancing these hypotheses is Stephen Walt, "The Foreign Policy of Revolutionary States: Hypotheses and Illustrations," paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987; and Stephen Walt, "Revolution and War," paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1990.

61. See T.C.W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (New York: Longman, 1986); Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, *Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Arab World* (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle East Studies, 1987); Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

ing from the Soviet Union if they are forced to gain freedom by lengthy wars, but this scenario, while plausible, now seems unlikely. Moreover, the older regimes of Europe would feel less threatened by revolution, and would respond more temperately if a revolutionary regime did appear, because they are now democratic, socially leveled, and legitimate.

#### AGGRESSIVE CAPITALIST STATES

Some scholars, mostly Marxist, have blamed distempers of capitalism for past troubles in Europe. Such arguments have been overblown, but they also contain a grain of truth. During the 1890s many Europeans and Americans came to believe that the conquest of colonies could avert or cure economic depression by providing a market for unsold goods. Such ideas played a major role in American imperial expansion during 1898–1902.<sup>62</sup> They soon lost fashion, with the worldwide recovery from the great depression of the 1890s, and with the failure of markets to appear in conquered colonies. However, after-echoes of these ideas continued in Germany, where arguments that Germany should seize territory to create markets for unsold goods played a minor part in the expansionist propaganda that fueled German chauvinism and set the stage for war in 1914.<sup>63</sup> After-echoes also continued in the United States; after World War II American policymakers feared a new depression, and America's early Cold War belligerence was given an extra push by arguments that the United States should acquire or protect overseas markets to avert it.<sup>64</sup>

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62. See David Healy, *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 42–46, 159–177.

63. Thus German journalist Arthur Dix explained in 1901 that a world power requires “extensive territory . . . as a market for [its] manufactures,” and General Bernhardt in 1911 saw a Germany “compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our growing industries.” Wallace Notestein and Elmer E. Stoll, *Conquest and Kultur: Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 51; *Germany and the Next War*, p. 103. See also *ibid.*, pp. 82–83. France's Marshall Foch explained that modern states needed “commercial outlets to an industrial system which produces more than it can sell, and therefore is constantly smothered by competition,” and argued that “new markets are opened by force of arms.” Foch, *Principles of War*, p. 37.

64. For examples see Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–1980*, 4th ed. (New York: Wiley, 1980), pp. 10–11, 18, 27, 45, 52, 55, 59–61, 110–111, 179–180, 235. It may not follow that these ideas helped cause the Cold War, however: perhaps they fueled American belligerence, but this belligerence may have deterred the Soviets from further aggression, thus dampening the Cold War, as much or more than it provoked them. Making this argument is Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). A good survey of the debate on Cold War origins is John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 171–204.

This problem, never large, has now disappeared completely. Fears of economic depression have abated throughout the West, with the development of fiscal and monetary tools for managing the business cycle. The European and American colonial experience has delegitimated the concept of colonialism in general, and with it the concept of regulating the business cycle by imperial expansion. Reflection has brought the realization that any attempt to relieve depression by one-way colonial trade could last only until the colony's currency reserves were exhausted, which would happen quickly. These changes remove the main causes of any past capitalist belligerence.

SUMMARY: ABSENT AGGRESSOR STATES

If all states accept the status quo and none wish to change it, wars are far fewer. Indeed, if no aggressor state is on the scene, war can only occur by accident or misunderstanding.<sup>65</sup> The causes of war discussed above all operate primarily by fueling expansionism, thereby creating aggressor states that reject the status quo. Aggressor states will be rare in the new Europe, because both domestic and systemic factors will provide little stimulus to aggression, and powerful dissuasion. This is a vast change from 1914, 1939, and 1945.

This auspicious condition is likely to persist. Today's Western European states are far less bellicose in their general approach to foreign relations than the European states of 1914 and 1939. In part this reflects their status as smaller powers, which are generally less bellicose than great powers, reflecting their smaller, tamer militaries. This could fade as they assume their own security burdens, if both superpowers withdraw from Europe completely. But it also reflects the nuclear revolution, the knowledge revolution in economics, and the transformation of European domestic societies, which are far more healthy than those of the European states of 1914 or 1939. The emerging societies of Eastern Europe are likely to develop eventually along similar lines.<sup>66</sup>

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65. I use the term "aggressor state" to refer to states that seek to expand for any reason. Others often use the term to refer only to states that seek to expand for reasons other than security, while classifying expansionist states that are driven mainly by security concerns as status quo powers. See, for example, Charles Glaser, "International Political Consequences of Military Doctrine" (manuscript, July 1990), p. 4.

66. Some observers have suggested that two additional changes since 1945 may prevent renewed conflict in Europe. John Mueller has argued that the great horrors of past conventional wars have delegitimated even conventional war, and that warfare is therefore now largely obsolete. See John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books,

*False Fears: Illusory New Causes of European War*

Pessimists about the future peace of Europe have said little about these propitious changes, focusing instead on four dangers: the multipolar character of the emerging Europe, the possibility of renewed German aggression, the risk of praetorian states emerging in the East, and the problem of national and border conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, the first three dangers (discussed next) are largely illusory; only the fourth poses large risks, as I explain in the subsequent section.

A MULTIPOLAR EUROPE

Prominent scholars have argued that bipolar systems are more peaceful than multipolar systems. John Mearsheimer recently used this theory to predict that the emergence of multipolarity in Europe will raise the risk of war.<sup>67</sup>

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1989). Others point to the spread of free economic exchange in Europe since 1945, the greater prosperity and economic interdependence that this change produces, and the development of international institutions, including the European Economic Community (EC) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to foster and protect these changes. They argue that prosperity and interdependence promote peace, by dampening economic motives for war, and by raising the economic cost of war. Some also argue that international economic institutions could grow stronger, developing into a kind of super-state that could bolster peace by playing a police role. I find both views largely unpersuasive. Even the horrors of World War I failed to delegitimize war, and if World War I cannot do the job, nothing can. (Germany developed a large war-celebrating literature only a decade after World War I ended: see Wolfram Wette, "From Kellogg to Hitler [1928–1933]: German Public Opinion Concerning the Rejection or Glorification of War," in Wilhelm Deist, ed., *The German Military in the Age of Total War* [Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985], pp. 71–99. For a general criticism of Mueller's argument see Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?")

The prosperity promoted by economic liberalism probably promotes peace indirectly, by bolstering democracy, and by pushing economies further toward knowledge-based forms of production. However, there is little reason to believe that prosperity reduces economic motives for war. Economic interdependence is more likely to cause war than peace, by inducing states toward aggressive policies to relieve dependence on other states they feel they cannot trust. Such motives drove Germany and Japan to seek economic autarky through expansion in World War II, and arguments that America depends on Third World raw materials have often been advanced by American advocates of U.S. Third World intervention. Finally, the European liberal economic order is likely to dissolve if other causes of war appear to produce conflict in the new Europe; instead of dampening these causes, the European economic order will succumb to them. Mearsheimer convincingly criticizes both theories on these and other grounds: see "Back to the Future," pp. 29–31, 40–48; and Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 194–199. On interdependence see also Gaddis, "Long Peace," pp. 110–114; and, for examples of arguments for American intervention premised on American raw-materials dependence, Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't," pp. 19, 43n.

67. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer

The European system is indeed losing its bipolar Cold War character with the decline of Soviet power and the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. It will become fully multipolar if the United States also withdraws from the West. However, those who fear this development rest their case on weak theory. Some aspects of bipolarity favor peace, but others favor war. Still other aspects of bipolarity have indeterminate effects. Overall, the two types of systems seem about equally prone to war.<sup>68</sup>

FACTORS FAVORING BIPOLARITY. Four aspects of bipolarity favor peace. First, the two poles of a bipolar system comprise larger states whose size makes them more difficult to conquer; hence states are more secure, and aggression is better deterred.<sup>69</sup> This argument assumes that the size of states is not held constant in our analysis, and that we instead compare the effects of bipolar or multipolar arrangements in a given region; if so, the poles of a multipolar system must be smaller than those in a bipolar system, since multipolarity subdivides the same territory into more poles. This assumption seems appropriate in an analysis of the future of Europe, however, since the evolution of Europe toward multipolarity entails the subdivision of two vast blocs led by very large states into a system of smaller states that can be more easily overrun.<sup>70</sup>

Second, bipolarity facilitates cooperation on arms control and other matters, and makes it easier to establish and maintain "rules of the game" and agreed spheres of influence.<sup>71</sup> Cooperation is easiest among the few;<sup>72</sup> a

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1964), pp. 881–909; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 161–176; Gaddis, "Long Peace," pp. 105–110; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 13–19, 21–29.

68. My thinking on the effects of multipolarity has profited greatly from conversations with Chaim Kaufmann.

69. Chaim Kaufmann suggests this argument. I find it the strongest element of the case for bipolarity; yet it has not been advanced by bipolarity advocates, although Waltz comes close. Waltz clearly assumes that bipolar poles are larger than multipolar poles; see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 146–160. However, Waltz does not suggest that this size differential makes conquest harder under bipolarity.

70. As Kaufmann notes, however, a case could be made for holding size constant even when analyzing the effects of multipolarity in Europe, because the nuclear revolution largely eliminates the effects of small size. If the size of states is held constant, the case for bipolarity is substantially weakened.

71. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 174; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 16–17. Waltz stresses the greater ease of cooperation under bipolarity; Mearsheimer stresses the greater ease of establishing and maintaining rules of the game and spheres of influence.

72. On the effects of the number of players on the feasibility of cooperation see Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1–24, at 18–20.

bipolar order has the fewest players. An agreed order is most easily created and maintained in an unchanging world; a bipolar world changes least. Under multipolarity, by contrast, cooperation faces the difficulties of complex diplomacy among many states, and an agreed international order is harder to maintain because the whirl of shifting coalitions sweeps away the facts on which the old order was premised. Consequently, arms control and other forms of cooperation are more difficult, rules of the game are harder to establish, and agreed spheres of influence are harder to maintain.

Third, misunderstandings and miscalculations are less likely under bipolarity, because great powers face a simpler world. States face only one opponent, and have many years to study that opponent. Hence they are less likely to misconstrue its interests, or to underestimate its strength or resolve. This lowers the risk of wars arising from misunderstanding or optimistic miscalculation. A multipolar world is more complex, creating greater room for error.<sup>73</sup> It forces states to diffuse their focus of attention toward a number of states, causing them to know less about each. As a result, states can more easily stumble into conflict by misconstruing another state's interests. States also must do more complex calculations to predict the results of war—they must estimate the strength and resolve of their opponent's potential allies, in addition to those of their opponent. This uncertainty magnifies the likelihood of war-causing optimistic miscalculation.<sup>74</sup>

Fourth, the greater complexity of multipolarity increases the possibility that defending states will underestimate how much effort is necessary to balance against aggressors, and will therefore do too little or act too late. This can happen if defending states exaggerate the willingness of other defenders to balance, and fail to make military preparations of their own adequate to compensate for this unwillingness. If so, balancing will be too weak, and opportunities for aggression will appear. With bipolarity, in contrast, defenders know that they can secure themselves only by their own efforts. They are therefore less likely to place fruitless reliance on others.<sup>75</sup>

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73. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 168, 170, 172–173.

74. The greater uncertainty produced by multipolarity may also prevent some wars, by fostering pessimistic miscalculation that leads states to avoid wars that they would otherwise fight. However, it seems likely that overall, wars would be fewer if all states always accurately foresaw their outcome. Losers would then fight only if they thought a losing contest was still worthwhile to preserve their honor and credibility.

75. This possibility is partly offset by its converse: defending states in a multipolar system may underestimate others' willingness to balance, and may therefore make extra efforts to balance internally, producing a stronger defending coalition than would otherwise develop. However,

FACTORS FAVORING MULTIPOLARITY. These factors are counter-balanced by two others that operate to make multipolarity more peaceful. First, the coalition politics of a multipolar world usually produce defensive coalitions that overmatch aggressors by a greater margin than is possible under bipolarity. This effect makes conquest more difficult, and offsets the offense-strengthening effect produced by the smaller size of states under multipolarity, and by the possibility that defenders will not balance adequately because they exaggerate others' willingness to balance.

In a bipolar system, the ratio of defending to aggressing states never falls below 1:1, but also never exceeds 1:1. Under multipolarity, an aggressor can gain advantages of more than 1:1 against a defender if other states bandwagon with the aggressor. If others coalesce against the aggressor, however, it can face overwhelming superiority. Since balancing behavior is the prevalent tendency of states, the latter pattern prevails over the former—large defensive coalitions usually form against aggressors, confronting them with stronger opposition than they would face under bipolarity. If so, a successful defense is more certain, and the penalty for aggression is higher. The aggressor will certainly be thwarted, and may also be smashed—a penalty that is unlikely under bipolarity. Hence aggressors are better deterred, and all states are more secure.

Balancing can break down if appropriate conditions are absent.<sup>76</sup> Thus effective defending coalitions failed to form against ancient Rome, against Chi'n in ancient China, and against American expansion in North America during the nineteenth century. However, history indicates that such cases are the exception, not the rule.<sup>77</sup> This has been true in Europe, where over the past 500 years every hegemonic aggressor eventually faced a coalition that outgunned it. Moreover, even if balancing fails, multipolarity is no worse than bipolarity on this count. International conflict then reduces to duels that

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this often bolsters a balance that is already adequate, and thus merely makes less likely wars that are already unlikely; hence it does not fully offset the risks raised by the possibility of failures to balance due to exaggerated expectations of balancing by others.

76. Specifically, balancing is inhibited if geography prevents states from coming to the aid of the victim, for example, if states are arranged in a geographically linear fashion, leaving some remote from others; if geography allows the aggressor to sever communications between the victim and others; if diplomacy is hobbled by poor communication among states (as occurred in ancient times); or if the system is composed of small states whose size makes them less prone to balance.

77. A survey concluding that balancing has prevailed over bandwagoning in both the Middle East and worldwide during the Cold War is Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 147–180, 263–266, 274–280.

assume a bipolar character, in which conquest is no easier than it would be under bipolarity. Alliance dynamics make conquest easier under multipolarity than bipolarity only in the rare event that states bandwagon—or if, as noted above, states fail to balance adequately because they exaggerate others' willingness to do so.<sup>78</sup>

Under bipolarity, as Kenneth Waltz notes, competition extends widely and hard as the two poles quickly move to contest each other everywhere, because if each does not check the other, no one else will. This ensures that aggressors will not get a free ride, which is good; but it also reflects the greater insecurity produced by the absence of potential allies under bipolarity, and highlights the dangers that this insecurity creates. States compete widely and hard precisely because they know they have no one to fall back on if the balance of power turns against them. This knowledge persuades them to balance, but it may also lead them to adopt exceedingly competitive or aggressive policies that may trigger crises and war. By contrast, desperate states in multipolarity can call on allies for help. Such recourse to allies is often a safer solution than early and belligerent confrontation.<sup>79</sup>

Second, militarism is a greater danger under bipolarity than multipolarity. With bipolarity, the military captures the full benefit of the myths it sows, while under multipolarity this benefit is dissipated as the government re-

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78. Bipolarity advocates claim that the balancing mechanism is more efficient under bipolarity; each side will be quick to resist the other's aggressive moves, and will counter-balance the other's military effort with its own. Balancing by such internal methods (direct action to thwart aggression, or arms buildup) is more certain and effective than the external methods (seeking allies) that are possible with multipolarity. Thus under bipolarity, they argue, a fairly defense-dominant world results, in which each side cannot easily commit aggression because the other prevents it. In contrast, states often "pass the buck" under multipolarity, leaving the burden of balancing to their allies; but if all states buck-pass, they will fail to counter-balance the aggressor. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 164–165, 168; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 15–16. (Waltz wrote before discussion of the effects of the offense-defense balance became common currency, and I embellish his concepts by using offense-defense terminology, but this terminology is consistent with his meaning.) The logic of this argument for the greater peacefulness of bipolarity is flawed, however. If states balance at all under multipolarity, aggressors will face greater opposition than under bipolarity, even if states buck-pass quite a lot. Even if states buck-pass all the time, multipolarity is no worse than bipolarity. States then must fully provide for their own security; hence they should exhibit the same rapid and forceful internal balancing behavior that Waltz predicts for bipolarity.

79. Waltz's argument that bipolarity forces states to behave prudently implicitly concedes the same point. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 176. As I note below, he suggests that states must be prudent because there is no one to save them from disaster. However, prudence that is forced by insecurity, while beneficial in itself, arises from a cause that has other, dangerous effects.



sponds by forging alliances rather than building forces.<sup>80</sup> Bipolarity therefore gives the military greater incentive to propagate militarist myths, raising the risk of militarism.

At first glance history seems to disprove this hypothesis: militarism flourished in the multipolar Europe of 1890–1914, but was far less evident in the United States and the Soviet Union during the bipolar Cold War. However, this merely demonstrates that militarism has a number of causes, and other causes that matter were abundant before World War I, but absent during the Cold War. Most important, the domestic political systems and culture of both superpowers were notably uncondusive to militarism: the Soviet Union's Communist Party insisted on a strict civilian monopoly of all political ideas, and America's democratic free-speech culture demanded civil control of the military, and guaranteed some public challenge to military propaganda. Even so, a case could be made that the United States, and perhaps both superpowers, were mildly infected by the militarism virus.

Finally, another test provides opposite results. History shows that militarism is a disease confined to great powers or isolated states,<sup>81</sup> and is never found in medium powers allied to others. If we extrapolate from this pattern, a system whose powers reach the top limit of power and isolation—bipolarity—should see militarism most often. In any case, scattered instances do not provide a persuasive test of a theory, so at this stage the verdict on the hypothesis that multipolarity lessens militarism should rest chiefly on its deductive soundness.

**INDETERMINATE FACTORS.** Bipolarity advocates argue that two additional aspects of bipolarity favor peace, but deduction suggests that these factors are in fact indeterminate.

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80. Bipolarity also may foster militarism by causing states to maintain larger military establishments. This occurs because states cannot "free-ride" on allies, and must instead rely wholly on their own efforts for security. See Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266–279. Some increase in militarism may result, as larger size gives militaries greater domestic influence. However, this effect is at least partly offset by the greater security afforded by the greater size of states under bipolarity, which should reduce their military requirements.

81. Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan are prime cases of militarized great powers. Both also saw themselves as largely isolated, and thus also illustrate the militarizing effects of isolation. Lesser states largely isolated from great-power allies that have suffered at least some militarization include South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. On the latter three, see Jack Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors* (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 19–85, 98–105. On South Africa see Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 58–67.

First, some assert that bipolarity bolsters peace by removing the possibility that benign great powers will be dragged into wars begun by more reckless powers. Multipolarity raises the risk of the “chain gang” phenomenon—a circumstance in which the whole system is led to war by its most bellicose states, who drag in their allies. Bipolarity eliminates this risk; the system only goes to war if one of the two poles are themselves bellicose.<sup>82</sup>

However, this argument cuts both ways. The alliances that form under multipolarity can pull states back from war as well as pulling them in. The “chain gang” phenomenon is a danger, especially when elites believe they live in an offense-dominant world (as in 1914), because states then must join wars that their allies provoke, since they cannot afford to see the ally defeated.<sup>83</sup> However, the opposite can also happen, especially when the defense is believed to be dominant. An alliance then functions like a “drunk tank,” containing and calming its most aggressive members.<sup>84</sup> The aggressive state must explain its policies to its allies, and listen to their counter-arguments. These allies can afford to stay out of the aggressor’s reckless adventures, and can further threaten to cancel their ties of alliance if it moves aggressively, leaving it without protection against aggression by others. Knowing this, it may not move at all. Thus American membership in NATO helped restrain the United States in the 1950s: the cases for preventive war against the Soviet Union, for escalating the Korean War, for intervening in Indochina in 1954, and for using nuclear weapons against China during the 1954–55 Taiwan Straits crisis were all dampened by arguments that European NATO states would not help, or would actively disapprove.<sup>85</sup>

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82. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 167; and on the chain gang metaphor, Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.” Mearsheimer makes a similar argument using different logic; see “Back to the Future,” pp. 14–15. He notes that multipolarity creates more dyadic relationships than bipolarity, creating more relationships that could flare into war. He further notes that war has a general propensity to spread, hence each dyadic war could bear the seed of a system-wide war, creating more possibilities for general war under multipolarity than bipolarity. Thus Waltz focuses on the chain gang phenomenon, Mearsheimer on the general tendency of war to spread, as the mechanism by which one bellicose state can trigger system-wide war.

83. See Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.”

84. Suggesting that alliances often served to restrain alliance members in Europe during 1815–1945 is Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227–262.

85. On American consideration of preventive war in the 1950s see Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954,” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 5–49; and Russell D. Buhite and William Christopher Hamel, “War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive War against the Soviet Union,”

The allies of a bellicose state can also go further by moving to balance actively against it if it moves aggressively.<sup>86</sup> If so, multipolarity operates to prevent or shorten local wars by facing the aggressor with overwhelming opposition. Thus, overall, a multipolar system creates the possibility that other states in the system can be drawn into local wars, but it can also operate to dampen or prevent such wars—by threatening adventurous states with the loss of its allies, or by facing them with an overwhelming coalition.

Second, some suggest that bipolarity creates greater incentives to behave cautiously, and to choose wise national leadership. Under multipolarity states can hope to rely on each other, but with bipolarity they must rely on themselves, and hence on their leaders. This leads societies to behave carefully, and to choose prudent leaders.<sup>87</sup>

However, this argument clashes with other elements of the case for bipolarity. Some favor bipolarity because states in bipolarity compete widely and hard, hence aggressors face strong opposition; however this competitive conduct can cross the line to become reckless conduct. Bipolarity advocates also argue that multipolarity is more complex and confusing, raising greater risks of war—but if so, states in multipolarity should try harder to find wise leaders who can cope with these complexities. Overall, it is not clear which system best fosters cautious conduct and wise leadership.

The total case for each system is hard to assess, since we have no way to measure the power of the factors favoring each system. Overall, the case for each seems equally persuasive. Moreover, even if bipolarity is somewhat safer, the difference between the two systems is not dramatic, and forms a frail basis upon which to argue that the risk of war will rise sharply in the new Europe.

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*Diplomatic History*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 367–384. Trachtenberg mentions (but does not elaborate) Dulles's view that the likelihood that American allies would refuse to support such a policy was an important consideration against it (pp. 42–43). On Korea, see Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 127, 145–146, 200–201, 217–219; and Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 28–29. On Indochina see George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950–1975* (New York: Wiley, 1979), pp. 31–36. On the Taiwan Straits crisis see Buhite and Hamel, "War for Peace," p. 382. These examples are especially noteworthy because they show lesser powers restraining a superpower in a bipolar system; in a multi-polar system, allies should be better able to restrain each other, since power is distributed more equally among them.

86. The Soviet decision to balance against expansion by its Iraqi ally during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis provides a recent example.

87. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 176.

#### GERMAN AGGRESSION?

The argument that a free and united Germany will return to its past aggressiveness is refuted by the dramatic transformation of German society since 1945. Five changes have erased the roots of past German aggressiveness. First, German society, like the rest of Europe, has undergone a dramatic social leveling process.<sup>88</sup> The Junkers and big industrial barons are history. Their departure removed the arrogant elite whose stubborn defense of its class privilege helped provoke World War I and, less directly, World War II.

Second, Germany is an established democracy. German society contains all the preconditions for democracy in abundance, so we can be confident that this democracy is robust and durable.

Third, flowing in part from the first and second changes, German hypernationalism has dissipated, and a powerful barrier against its return has been erected by a strong movement in Germany for the honest discussion of German history. German secondary schools and the German media generally provide accurate coverage of Germany's past crimes.<sup>89</sup> German academic historians have largely abandoned the nationalist habits of their Wilhelmine predecessors, often taking a more critical view of German conduct than foreign historians do. For example, Fritz Fischer and his students have assigned more of the blame for the First World War to Germany than many British and American historians do.<sup>90</sup> A few German historians have tried to justify Germany's conduct in the Second World War, but many others have beaten them down.<sup>91</sup>

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88. See World Bank, *World Development Report 1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 237. The distribution of income in Germany is more equal than in most other major industrialized states, including the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand; it is less equal than in Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands, and Belgium; and is roughly comparable to the distribution in Norway and Spain.

89. See Anne P. Young, "Germans, History, and the Nazi Past," *Social Education*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (February 1981), pp. 86–98; and Hildegund M. Calvert, "Germany's Nazi Past: A Critical Analysis of the Period in West German High School History Textbooks" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ball State University, 1987). Calvert notes some objectionable omissions, but concludes that German textbooks "satisfactorily covered the majority of the topics examined" (p. ii).

90. The Fischer school's views are summarized in Geiss, *German Foreign Policy*; and Fischer, *War of Illusions*. A good survey of the controversy stirred by the Fischer school is John A. Moses, *The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography* (London: George Prior, 1975). As Moses notes, most German historians now accept Fischer's argument that Germany deliberately unleashed the First World War in June–July 1914, disputing only Fischer's contention that the war was planned long in advance (p. 73). An example of a non-German interpretation far more sympathetic to Germany than the Fischer school is L.C.F. Turner, *Origins of the First World War* (London: Edward Arnold, 1970).

91. On this dramatic debate see Richard J. Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and*

If historical mythmaking did make a comeback in Germany, an acute danger would arise. Germany was badly mutilated by the two world wars, losing 34 percent of its pre-1914 territory,<sup>92</sup> and suffering the expulsion of 13.8 million Germans from the lost territories.<sup>93</sup> Germans who forget that German conduct was the main cause of this mutilation would begin blaming others, and could develop an extreme sense of grievance. The potential danger is even larger than in 1914 and 1939, since Germany was whole in 1914, and had less “lost” territory in 1939 than it has now. Hence German behavior is highly dependent upon German historical memory, and benign German behavior depends on sound memory. However, the commitment to honest history now seems stronger in Germany than anywhere else in Europe, and the main causes of past historical mythmaking have disappeared with the leveling of German society and the growth of German democracy.

Fourth, German civil-military relations have been transformed since the 1930s. The German military is no longer an upper-class preserve, and is integrated into German society. As a result, German officers understand the civilian viewpoint, and largely accept the civilian right to determine foreign and defense policy. German military officers learn the history of the German military’s past misdeeds, which creates a barrier against their repetition.<sup>94</sup> German mass media contain no echoes of past military propaganda.

Fifth, the nuclear revolution has made available weapons of absolute security, should Germany ever need them. If Germany again faces a serious threat from without, it will not need to reach for more defensible borders or

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*the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York: Pantheon, 1989); and Peter Baldwin, “The Historikerstreit in Context,” in Peter Baldwin, ed., *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust and the Historian’s Debate* (Boston: Beacon, 1990), pp. 3–37. Noting the defeat of the German apologists in this debate are Baldwin, *ibid.*, p. 29; and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Unburdening the German Past? A Preliminary Assessment,” in Baldwin, *Reworking the Past*, pp. 214–223, at 214–215. Noting the absence of chauvinism in Germany today is Hans Mommsen, who concludes that “Germany today is ahead of its neighbors in its wariness of patriotic appeals and violent solutions to domestic conflicts.” Hans Mommsen, “Reappraisal and Repression: The Third Reich in West German Historical Consciousness,” in *ibid.*, pp. 173–184, at 183.

92. *World Almanac and Book of Facts 1990* (New York: World Almanac, 1989), pp. 712–713.

93. At the end of World War II a total of 13,841,000 Germans were expelled from formerly German territories annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union, and from other East European countries; of these, 2,111,000 died during the expulsion, leaving 11,730,000 expellees alive during 1945–50. Most settled in West Germany, some in East Germany, and small fraction in Austria and other western countries. Alfred M. de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of the Germans From the East*, 3rd rev. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), p. xxv.

94. I am indebted to Dr. Roland E. Foerster, Director of the Department of Education, Information, and Special Studies at the Military Historical Research Institute at Freiburg, and to Professor David Large of Montana State University, for sharing information on this question.

for wider territories to provide economic autarky, as it once did; now it can secure itself by building a nuclear deterrent. Germany's transition to nuclear power would not be without danger, in the form of possible preventive attack by outsiders. However, outside powers, most notably the United States, have the power to deter such an attack. Moreover, they would have every reason to do so, since a secure Germany is a more benign Germany, and is thus in the common interest.

In short, the new Germany is very unlikely to launch a new campaign of aggression. Its benign behavior since 1945 was due less to its divided and occupied condition than to the postwar transformation of German society, which removed the causes of its past belligerence. It is time for the rest of the world to stop viewing Germany with suspicion, and begin treating it with the respect that its responsible conduct deserves. The world should ask that Germans remember their past, if they ever need reminding. It should also ask that Germans accept a continuing obligation to reassure Germany's victims that Germany's past crimes will not be repeated. But the world should not ask for penance from a German generation that was not yet born in 1945, and should not make them pariahs for crimes committed by Germans who are long gone.

#### PRAETORIAN STATES IN THE EAST?

Jack Snyder has suggested that the tide of democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may produce flawed praetorian polities, reminiscent of Wilhelmine Germany, rather than the civic-democratic or corporate-democratic states now found in the West.<sup>95</sup> Fledgling democratic institutions may be inadequate to channel growing popular political participation. This could leave control in the hands of narrow elites. These elites might then pursue aggressive foreign policies that would profit these elites, even if they produced net harm for the whole society.

However, this danger has been sharply reduced by the social leveling imposed by Soviet communist rule. Praetorianism is largely a disease of stratified societies; in praetorian states political institutions are inadequate to channel rising participation chiefly because elites want to exclude the public from politics, not because democratic channels for participation would be hard to establish if elites wished to create them. Communism has done great

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95. Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," pp. 18–38.

harm throughout the East, but its egalitarian policies have ended steep class stratification, and thereby reduced the elites' motive to constrict democracy and create praetorianism.

The possibility of praetorianism is not gone altogether, because some social stratification persists in the East. The upper-class elites are gone, but the communist party bureaucracies and military establishments form elites of a different sort. Their power has not been broken in the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria, where this old guard still clings to its privileges, and seeks to choke off democratic reforms. In the Soviet Union it also recommends belligerent foreign policies, and criticizes President Gorbachev's withdrawal from Eastern Europe.<sup>96</sup> Nevertheless, praetorianism will probably be muted, because the net stratification of Eastern European societies seems substantially smaller than in past states where praetorianism flourished.

The states in the East might also suffer from other maladies of new democracies. Most notably, they lack developed non-governmental institutions for the evaluation and criticism of public policy—free universities, a skilled free press, and free research institutions. This raises the risk of the debasement of public discourse, political demagoguery, and the domination of dishonest propaganda purveyed by the government or private special interests. As a result, these states are likely to elect more than a few crackpot politicians of the Theodore Bilbo–Joe McCarthy–Jesse Helms–Gus Savage variety, and find their public debates polluted by European Al Sharptons. However, this is a short-term problem: these societies have the resources to develop evaluative institutions, and should be able to build them fairly quickly.

#### *Why Peace Isn't Assured: Persisting and Emerging Causes of War*

Two major dangers will emerge in the new Europe: the breakdown of established international and domestic order in Eastern Europe, and the reappearance of nationality conflicts and border disputes in the East. These two

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96. Yegor Ligachev, a spokesman for the Communists Party old guard, has warned of the dangers of German reunification, and criticized acquiescence to this reunion as a "new Munich." "Excerpts From Speech By Ligachev to Party," *New York Times*, February 7, 1990, p. A12. Army General Albert Makashov has complained that "because of the so-called victories of our diplomacy the Soviet army is being driven without combat out of the countries which our fathers liberated from fascism." "Loyal to Lenin, Soviet general blasts Gorbachev," *Boston Globe*, June 20, 1990, p. 17. See also Helen Womack, "Kremlin under fire from generals," *The Independent*, July 6, 1990, p. 9.

dangers feed and magnify one another: the breakdown of order allows latent border and national conflicts to resurface, while these conflicts magnify the dangers created by the breakdown of order.

#### THE BREAKDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ORDER

Peace among states is most durable when spheres of influence, the “rules of the game,” and the rights and responsibilities of all parties are clear. Dangers rise when these are ambiguous; each state then tends to define its own rights broadly and others’ narrowly, and to dispute the others’ definitions. Crises erupt as states issue threats and stage *faits accomplis* to force others to accept their own definition of their rights. The breakdown of established order could take two forms, both of which are now appearing in Europe.

INTERNATIONAL BREAKDOWN. Agreements on spheres of influence and regimes governing international behavior can dissolve if new events make them obsolete, or new issues arise. Thus the Cold War erupted partly because World War II demolished the old European order, leaving the Soviet Union and United States facing each other in Central Europe with only the sketchy rules of the wartime agreements to define their rights. Both then jockeyed hard to stake their claims, and collided on questions where rights and rules were ambiguous—most notably, over Western access rights to Berlin, and the Soviet Union’s right to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba. The later Cold War saw fewer crises largely because the rules of the game and the boundaries of the two superpowers’ spheres of influence were more clearly worked out after 1962.<sup>97</sup>

The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe creates a situation that resembles the early Cold War. The Soviets have blundered by withdrawing without first demanding an accord on the new status of Eastern Europe. Now a huge zone of Europe has re-entered the international system, but no agreement defines the rights of outside powers in Eastern Europe, or the responsibilities

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97. The outbreak of the Seven Years War illustrates the same dynamics. The origins of that war lay partly in the lack of clarity over ownership of the Ohio Valley, which allowed Britain and France each to convince itself that it owned the valley and the other was encroaching. See, e.g., Patrice L.R. Higonnet, “The Origins of the Seven Years War,” *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 40 (1968), pp. 57–90; and Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 195–236. Likewise, each of the many European “wars of succession” in the eighteenth century grew from the breakdown of agreed international spheres of influence upon the death of a monarch; states then struggled to establish successions that would favor their own states or dynasties, or to avert such gains by others.



of the East European states to one another.<sup>98</sup> This ambiguity raises the risk of misunderstandings and collisions, as states inside and outside the region struggle to establish their rights.

DOMESTIC BREAKDOWN. Order can also unravel with the domestic collapse of imperial states, and the secession of outlying provinces. As imperial control wanes, outer territories spin off from the center; but absent prior agreements, there will be no rules to delineate others' rights in these territories, or to define their inhabitants' responsibilities to one another. This can spark an unregulated competition for control among outsiders, and fighting among the newly-free peoples. These dangers are magnified if the borders of the newly-emerging states are poorly defined, as they often are. Imperial collapse can also cause collisions between outside powers and the imperial metropole, as that metropole struggles to retain or regain control of areas that it still defines as its own, but others have come to define as free states.<sup>99</sup>

Collisions of the last sort are made more intense by the insecurity felt by the declining metropole, and its resulting willingness to take extreme measures to sustain itself. The domestic weakness of the metropole creates a domestic-political version of offense-dominance: the metropole is insecure not because military or diplomatic factors favor the offense, but because its own domestic weakness enables an "offensive" against it in the form of outside subversion or support for secessionist movements. Thus the domestic weakness of Austria-Hungary before 1914 caused it to fear Serbian subversion in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This spurred Austria to counter-attack against Serbia, sparking World War I.

The Soviet Union is Europe's last colonial empire. It is now riddled with secessionist movements among the many non-Russian peoples that Russia

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98. For example, there is no explicit East-West understanding on whether the East European states can join NATO, whether NATO states can base forces in Eastern Europe, or whether Soviet forces can return to Eastern Europe, either to police civil or inter-state wars or for some other reason.

99. The crises surrounding the slow collapse of the Ottoman empire after the Napoleonic Wars illustrate these dangers. This collapse spawned three great crises, in 1832–33, 1839–40, and 1875–78, and two great wars—the Crimean War and World War I—plus the Balkan wars of 1912–13. The territories escaping Turkish control were of relatively little strategic value, but the undefined nature of other states' rights in these territories caused outsiders to collide over their possession. Thus Britain and France clashed over Egypt and Syria in the crisis of 1839–40, and Austria and Russia collided over the Balkans in 1914. The collapse of Ottoman authority also produced violent conflicts among the newly independent Balkan states. A general account is M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923* (New York: Macmillan, 1966). A summary is Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 40–55, 84–92, 167–177, 280–286, 321–334.

conquered under the Tsars. It seems inevitable that this empire will eventually go the way of the British, French, Dutch, and Belgian empires. Its demise will raise greater dangers than the dismantling of the other colonial empires, however, for three main reasons. First, its seceding provinces lie closer to its imperial core, making that core more nervous about their possible alignment with hostile powers.<sup>100</sup> Second, the boundaries between metropole and colony are relatively unclear; for example, are the Ukraine and Byelorussia colonial provinces, or in some sense part "Russian"? And third (as I discuss below), the populations of the Soviet Union have intermingled, leaving millions of Russians living outside the metropole, and millions of other nationalities living outside their home republics. This situation creates immense potential for conflict over each group's rights and status, and gives the metropole a potent reason to refuse them independence. Some voices in the United States have already begun to call for treating the seceding nationalities as independent states, and for lending them support; this could cause a Soviet-Western confrontation if the Soviet leadership decides not to permit their unilateral secession.<sup>101</sup>

#### BORDER DISPUTES AND INTERMINGLED OR DIVIDED NATIONALITIES

The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe uncovers border disputes and revanchist claims that were previously suppressed by the Soviet imperium, and similar conflicts will doubtless emerge among the Soviet republics as they gain independence from the Soviet Union. These conflicts arise partly from border shifts produced by past wars that have not been accepted by the loser. They also arise from the intermingling of nationalities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which sparks claims for territories inhabited by nationals living outside the home territory. Finally, the intermingling of nationalities also raises the risk of confrontations even across settled borders, as one state is aroused against the oppression of its nationals in another.<sup>102</sup>

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100. On the other hand, the nuclear revolution should dampen fears in the Russian metropole that the secession of nearby republics will leave it insecure. However, this logic does not always prevail, as shown by the great nervousness that the United States has displayed in the past over the appearance of Soviet-aligned states and movements in the Caribbean and Central America.

101. For example, see Richard L. Berke, "Nine GOP Senators Attack Bush on Lithuania," *New York Times*, April 28, 1990, p. 4; and Richard L. Berke, "On Right, Signs of Discontent With Bush," *New York Times*, May 1, 1990, p. A18.

102. Such nationality conflicts should be distinguished from those arising from the hyper-nationalism discussed above (pp. 23–25, 28–29.) Hyper-nationalism is artificially generated or magnified by chauvinist myths. Conflicts arising from hyper-nationalism thus derive from the

These conflicts heighten the dangers posed by the absence of an agreed international order for Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet internal empire, by providing concrete cause for the unregulated competition that these conditions permit.

These dangers have diminished since World War II. Eastern Europe's borders are more widely accepted now than fifty years ago, and Eastern Europe's nationalities are less intermingled because in the cataclysm of World War II millions of Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe, and the Nazis mass-murdered East European Jews and Gypsies. Nevertheless, a tour of the map of Eastern Europe reveals at least nine potential border disputes, and at least thirteen significant ethnic pockets that may either seek independence or be claimed by other countries.<sup>103</sup> If Yugoslavia breaks up, as now seems possible, additional border disputes would arise among its successor states, and ethnic pockets would exist within them.

In the Soviet Union, nationalities are even more intermingled than in Eastern Europe. The Soviet population totals some 262 million people, comprising 104 nationalities living in 15 Soviet republics. Of these, a total of 64 million (24 percent) either live outside their home republic, or are among the 89 small nationalities with no republic of their own, and thus would be minorities in the successor states to a dismantled Soviet Union (assuming that all 14 non-Russian republics secede but are not further sub-divided).<sup>104</sup> Of these 64 million, some 39 million (15 percent of total Soviet population) are members of nationalities that have their own republic, but live outside it; these include 24 million Russians (17 percent of all Russians) and 15 million

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*beliefs* of nations. The national conflicts discussed here arise from the *circumstances* of nations—from their intermingling or their division by international borders. Such conflicts can be magnified by nationalist myths, but do not require them. Even nations that are not imbued with false self-glorifying history will tend to fall into conflict if they are intermingled or divided.

103. Frontiers that may be disputed include the Romanian-Soviet, Romanian-Hungarian, Polish-Soviet, Polish-German, Polish-Czechoslovakian, Hungarian-Czechoslovakian, Yugoslav-Albanian, Greek-Albanian, Greek-Turkish, and Greek-Yugoslav-Bulgarian. Ethnic pockets include Romanians in Soviet Bessarabia; Hungarians in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union; Poles in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; Germans in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania; Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece; Turks in Bulgaria; Greeks in Albania; and Albanians in Yugoslavia. Summaries include Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses"; Istvan Deak, "Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History," *Orbis*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 51–65; and Barry James, "Central Europe Tinderboxes: Old Border Disputes," *International Herald Tribune*, January 1, 1990, p. 5.

104. All demographic figures are for 1979, the most recent Soviet census, and are calculated from John L. Scherer, ed., *USSR Facts and Figures Annual*, Vol. 5 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1981), pp. 49–51.

members of other nationalities (15 percent of all such nationalities). Another 25 million people (9 percent of the total Soviet population) are members of smaller nationalities without home republics, who would be minorities wherever they live.<sup>105</sup>

A dismantled Soviet Union would thus be riddled with national conflicts.<sup>106</sup> These could arise from a nationality's demand to annex territory in another republic inhabited by its own members; from complaints against the oppression of national brethren who live across accepted borders;<sup>107</sup> and from demands by the small, stateless nationalities for autonomy or secession from the republics where they reside. Border disputes could also arise because some nationalities may claim larger borders dating from the days of their independent pre-colonial greatness. Armenian nationalists have already laid claim to Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and radical Georgian nationalists claim parts of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Russia. Other claims will doubtless be lodged by nationalists in other republics.

These ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes will pose significant dangers in the years ahead to both Eastern and Western Europe. Western Europe itself is largely free of such problems; its borders are well-settled,<sup>108</sup> and its populations are not significantly intermingled. However, war anywhere in Europe could spread to engulf others; hence the whole continent has an interest in dampening conflict in the East. The risk that an Eastern conflict could spread westward is smaller than in the past, because the nuclear revolution has made conquest harder, and the high-technology revolution has reduced the strategic value of empire; these changes reduce the security implications of affairs in the East for other European states, which lowers their impulse to intervene in Eastern wars. Nevertheless, some risk of spread

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105. This excludes the Kazakh residents of Kazakhstan, but a literal accounting would include them, because the Russians outnumber them in Kazakhstan, 41 percent to 36 percent. In all other Russian republics the nationality after whom the republic is named are the majority or (in Kirgizia) a plurality.

106. A survey of relations among Soviet nationalities is Rasma Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the U.S.S.R.* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

107. The Soviet Union already has over 600,000 internal refugees who have fled from such oppression, and hundreds have died in communal violence. Francis X. Clines, "40 Reported Dead in Soviet Clashes," *New York Times*, June 9, 1990, p. 1.

108. The Polish-German boundary is the only Western frontier that might be disputed. Before unification the East and West German governments both agreed to guarantee the current German-Polish border; if the united German government adheres to this agreement, this border dispute is settled. See Serge Schmemmann, "Two Germanys Adopt Unity Treaty and Guarantee Poland's Borders," *New York Times*, June 22, 1990, p. 1; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Two Germanys Vow to Accept Border With The Poles," *New York Times*, July 18, 1990, P. 1.

remains; hence the Western countries should take active measures to dampen conflicts in the East, and be prepared to prevent the spread of any wars they might ignite.

*Policy Prescriptions*

The United States has a large interest in preserving peace in Europe. Accordingly, the United States should be active to keep the risk of war as low as possible. Four specific policies are recommended.

PURSUE A GENERAL EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

The world sails dangerously if it allows momentous changes without moving early to agree on the rights and responsibilities of all in the new world. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will be a magnet for outside interference, and a possible wellspring of general conflict, unless the main NATO powers and the Soviet Union promptly agree on the rights of all powers in the Eastern region. This need is made more urgent by the Eastern conflicts over borders and among nationalities. Without prior understandings, outside powers might be drawn into these conflicts, perhaps in response to pleas from states in the region, who can be expected to exert themselves to find outside allies.

These dangers could be reduced by a comprehensive Cold War peace settlement. Such a settlement should attempt to balance the security interests of all states against human rights concerns. Two questions are foremost: the status of Eastern Europe, and the status of seceding Soviet republics.<sup>109</sup> Eastern Europe's status should be settled by "Finlandizing" the region: the West would promise not to incorporate East European states into Western military alliances or to base forces on their territory, while the Soviet Union would guarantee their complete domestic freedom. Such a settlement would seem to strike the best balance between Soviet security interests and Western human rights concerns.

The West should also seek an accord with the Soviet Union on the rights of all peoples in the Soviet republics. The Soviet nationalities conflicts, and the international effects of a breakdown of the Soviet empire, are best dampened by reaching an understanding before these crises are manifest.

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109. A third major issue, the status of Germany, has recently been settled by agreement that a united Germany will be incorporated into NATO.

Specifically, the West should agree not to support or encourage the unilateral secession of Soviet republics. In exchange, the West should ask that the Soviet Union establish a fair and expeditious procedure for legal secession, if its current procedure is deemed too unwieldy. Western agreement to refrain from support for unilateral secessions makes sense for three reasons.

First, an unregulated breakup of the Soviet Union could produce a human rights disaster, by risking communal violence against the 64 million Soviet citizens who are now minorities in the republics where they live. In a worst case, a chain of non-negotiated secessions could trigger violence like the slaughter in India after the British withdrawal that killed 800,000 people and created millions of refugees during 1946–48, and killed many more in later years.<sup>110</sup> Bloody post-independence communal conflicts in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, Sudan, Zaire, Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, and Lebanon further illustrate this danger. It can best be averted if the republics negotiate their departure from the Soviet Union, and are not allowed to leave until they provide robust guarantees of the political and economic rights of their minorities. The West should favor their continued membership in the Soviet Union until they accept these obligations.

Second, non-negotiated secessions from the Soviet Union would also raise the risk of inter-state warfare among republics after they gain independence. Peace will be most robust if seceding republics first settle their borders and their post-independence economic and political relations with Russia and the other republics by negotiation. Otherwise these issues will later brew conflicts. Third, American support for unilateral secessions could spark a Soviet-American collision. States facing breakup seldom accept it gracefully, and outside interference in such situations can spark war, just as Serbian support for secessionists in Bosnia-Herzegovina sparked the Austrian counter-attack that triggered World War I. Western support for separatist groups in the Soviet Union might have similar results.

As a general matter, the West should seek a moderate settlement with the Soviet Union, and should not seek to exploit current Soviet weakness to press home every advantage. Perhaps the West could now impose a harsh peace, but this would fuel Soviet revisionism once the Soviet Union recovers from its current malaise. Just as Germany overthrew the Versailles peace once it recovered its strength, a later Soviet or Russian regime would some-

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110. Casualty data are from Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1989), p. 22.

day move to overthrow today's harsh settlement, and might disturb the peace of Europe in the process. Instead, the West should seek a settlement that will stand the test of time. A settlement that does not last is worse than none at all, since it provides no benefits and its breakdown will sow bitterness and suspicion, just as the breakdown of the wartime accords added bitterness to East-West relations early in the Cold War.

DAMPEN HYPER-NATIONALISM, MILITARISM, AND CONFLICT AMONG NATIONALITIES; PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

The experience of both world wars warns that hyper-nationalism and militarism can be potent causes of conflict. Accordingly, the United States should take active measures to combat these syndromes in the new Europe. Both are at low ebb in Europe today, and are unlikely to return to their former levels, for reasons noted above. However, their permanent disappearance is not guaranteed; hence the United States should act to prevent their resurgence. Otherwise we waste lessons that the world paid dearly to learn.

To dampen nationalism, the United States should monitor historical education in Europe, and should object when it finds omissions or distortions.<sup>111</sup> American relations with NATO states should be conditioned on their willingness to teach honest history in the schools, and the West's economic relations with the East should be likewise conditioned on the East's willingness to teach truthful history. The United States should also be willing to examine its own treatment of history, and to meet the same standard it sets for others.<sup>112</sup>

Some argue that the United States lacks the means to influence education in other countries. However, education is largely controlled by the state; and since historical education affects foreign policy conduct, and thereby affects the interests of other states, it is a legitimate subject of international negotiation. The United States has negotiated details of strategic nuclear force

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111. This prescription has even more relevance in Japan, where the government has been slowly moving to re-patriotize education. See Tracy Dahlby, "Japan's Texts Revise WWII: 'Invasion' Becomes 'Advance'; Asians Becomeirate," *Washington Post*, July 28, 1982, p. A1; Urban C. Lehner, "More Japanese Deny Nation Was Aggressor During World War II," *Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 1988, p. 1; Colin Nickerson, "In Japan, war and forgetfulness," *Boston Globe*, August 15, 1988, p. 1; and Patrick L. Smith, "A Textbook Warrior in Japan," *International Herald Tribune*, November 1, 1989, p. 18. Ominously, these moves have met little domestic resistance in Japan, and no objection from the United States government.

112. American historical education is not above criticism; see, for example, Frances Fitzgerald, *America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); and William L. Griffin and John Marciano, *Teaching the Vietnam War* (Montclair, N.J.: Allenheld, Osmun, 1979).

posture with the Soviet Union, and intimate aspects of domestic economic policy with Japan;<sup>113</sup> historical education policy surely can be negotiated as well. The content of historical education is public, hence compliance with understandings on education would be easy to verify. Arms control diplomacy has overcome more difficult verification problems.<sup>114</sup>

The problem of militarism seems even more distant in today's Europe, with its level-headed professional militaries and pacific publics, but this situation could deteriorate. This possibility can best be averted by promoting public understanding of security affairs, especially by fostering the scholarly study of security affairs in European universities; and by ensuring that the education of military officers includes discussion of the past disasters that militarism produced in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere. Again, such education could be monitored and negotiated among states.

The United States and other governments will hesitate to move against hyper-nationalism and militarism, because these problems are now largely invisible. However, these governments should recognize that both nationalism and militarism are best contained by early action, and may be uncontrollable if the world waits until they are manifest. After a society develops full-blown symptoms it is very difficult to bring it back to sanity, because its regime closes it off to outside influence. The best medicine is prevention.

Finally, the West should also act to dampen nationality conflicts and promote democracy in the East. Specifically, the Western countries should ask that the East European countries protect the rights of their national minorities, accept current boundaries, and adopt democratic reforms. Western economic relations with the East should be conditional on Eastern compliance

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113. In 1990 the United States and Japan reached a trade accord that undertook to change fundamental characteristics of both economies that inhibit commerce between them. For example, Japan undertook to increase public works spending, reduce its protection of small retail shops, and enforce laws against bid-rigging and price-fixing. The United States undertook to cut its budget deficit, provide greater education for the American workforce, and increase spending on scientific and commercial research. See David E. Sanger, "U.S. and Japan Set Accord to Rectify Trade Imbalances," *New York Times*, June 29, 1990, p. 1. International accord on the content of national historical education seems far less difficult to reach and verify than these accords.

114. Such negotiation would be complicated by the fact that education is controlled by local governments in many countries (as in the United States and West Germany), and that in a few (such as Britain), standard textbooks are seldom used in history teaching. See Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, "Introduction: History Textbooks and Perceptions of the Past," in Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, eds., *Perceptions of History: An Analysis of School Textbooks* (New York: Berg Publishers, 1982) pp. 1-16, at 5-7, 13. However, even states whose school curricula are locally controlled could agree to provide incentives to local school districts to eliminate mythical and distorted history, and such incentives could be negotiated between countries.



with these requests. Full membership in the Western economy, and in Western economic institutions, should be offered as carrots; trade and investment embargoes should be held in reserve as sticks.<sup>115</sup> These incentives should be effective tools, since the states of the East will be eager to draw on Western resources to rebuild their economies.

#### BOUND AND MANAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe would be a traumatic event, and is best deferred as long as Europe's non-nuclear states are content with their existing security arrangements. However, one or more European powers may eventually decide that its national security requires a nuclear deterrent. If so, the United States should not seek to prevent any proliferation. Rather, it should seek to bound and manage the process. If Germany decides to become a nuclear power, the United States should not resist: Germany has proven its responsibility, and it has the resources needed to develop an invulnerable deterrent secure from accident or terrorism. However, Europe is more dangerous with 20 or 25 fingers on the nuclear trigger than with a handful, because the additional states might be unable to secure any nuclear forces that they build.<sup>116</sup> Hence the United States should seek to confine proliferation sharply—ideally, to Germany alone.<sup>117</sup> It should also actively manage any proliferation that might occur, by deterring preventive attack on emerging nuclear powers, and by giving new nuclear states technical help to secure their deterrents.

#### CONTINUE AMERICA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE

The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe will allow large American troop withdrawals from Western Europe, but the United States should leave a sizable residual force in Europe. Such a presence will allow the United States to deter aggression and play the balancing role that it failed to play in 1914 and 1939. It will also strengthen America's hand if America hopes to build

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115. A full discussion of this idea is Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," pp. 31–36.

116. Explaining this danger is Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 37–40.

117. America's ability to dampen proliferation in Eastern Europe will be hampered if the United States follows my recommendation that Eastern Europe be "Finlandized," since the United States would thereby forswear the right to extend the alliance protection to East European states that might be required to persuade them not to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the main stimulus to proliferation in the East would probably lie in German acquisition of nuclear weapons; the United States can unilaterally guarantee the East European states against German aggression without forming broader alliances with those states or putting forces in Eastern Europe.

barriers against hyper-nationalism and militarism, to exert leverage over East European states, and to bound and manage proliferation. The American force should be small enough to forestall taxpayer demands for further cuts, but large enough to provide some military capability, to serve as a visible token of America's commitment to Europe, and to remind Americans and Europeans of that commitment. A force of roughly 50,000–100,000 troops, backed by large additional forces in the United States, would seem to fit this requirement.

Such a deployment requires an institutional framework to define its purpose, and to bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of the American and European publics. The current NATO framework seems unsatisfactory. A continued American deployment would have the purpose of deterring aggression from any quarter, while NATO exists only to address the now-fading Soviet military threat; hence NATO's aim and the aim of the American deployment no longer match.

One solution would be to revamp NATO into an explicit collective security system, whose members guarantee each other against attack by any state, including other member states.<sup>118</sup> Collective security systems have a dismal history; the hapless League of Nations is the main exemplar. However, a NATO collective security system need not work like a Swiss watch. Its main purpose would simply be to provide a public rationale for a continued American presence in Europe, and to legitimate American action if action is ever needed. This task is far less demanding than the tasks faced by the League. Moreover, the League of Nations failed because it lacked strong leaders, but if the United States decides to continue playing a peacekeeping role in Europe, NATO already has the strong leader it needs.

Some instead propose constructing a single Europe-wide collective security system, perhaps based on the 35-country Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>119</sup> Such a system would have the merit of

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118. This would require a new NATO Charter. The current Charter obliges NATO members to defend one another from attack from any quarter, but it uses language implying that it does not contemplate attack by NATO members on one another. See "The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Anxiety and Affluence: 1945–1965* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 85–89, at 87. Nor does it define a process for triggering and operating the alliance against aggression by its own members, and the alliance has refused pleas from member states for guarantees against other NATO members. See, for example, Athanassios Platias, "High Politics in Small Countries: An Inquiry into the Security Policies of Greece, Israel, and Sweden" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1986), pp. 165–166, recounting Greek requests for NATO guarantees against Turkey, and NATO refusal on grounds that NATO's purpose does not include the defense of NATO members against each other.

119. Discussing this possibility are Jane M.O. Sharp and Gerhard Wachter, *Looking Beyond the*

providing security for all the states of Europe; no one is left out. However, a smaller system based on NATO would have two advantages over a single pan-European system. First, it would operate more smoothly, for several reasons: the internal politics of a smaller system would be less unwieldy; it would build on a developed alliance (NATO) which already has a shared sense of culture and interest, whereas a single system would build on a thinner institutional base, and would encompass a more diverse membership; and the residue of the Soviet threat would tend to hold it together. Second, a large system is incompatible with a "Finlandization" agreement for Eastern Europe. Under Finlandization, the West agrees to keep its forces out of the East, but a comprehensive Europe-wide collective security system would draw Western forces into the East for peacekeeping if war broke out there. Thus the Western-Soviet disengagement achieved by Finlandization is undone by a CSCE security order.

The main disadvantage of a small NATO system lies in its inability to address conflict in the East. This is a serious shortcoming, since war in the East is the main danger facing Europe. However, the Western countries could still use economic incentives to induce peaceful conduct—to include truth-telling in historical education, the protection of national minorities, the adoption of democratic reforms, and the acceptance of national boundaries—from Eastern countries.

Finally, however, Americans should not blithely assume that American power in Europe will automatically be wisely applied for peaceful purposes. If the United States pursues fickle or short-sighted policies, the American presence in Europe could cause more problems than it solves.

A peaceful American policy therefore requires conscious effort to maintain national self-control. In the past the United States has often allowed its policies to be shaped by foreign governments or ethnic special interests. A recurrence would shake the steady hand that the United States must apply if it is to act as peacekeeper in Europe. This danger is a special threat to America's European policy, because many Americans have ethnic ties to Europe. Hence American policy should be actively protected against manip-

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*Blocs: European Security in 2020*, Paper No. 16, Peace Paper/Common Security Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Peace and International Security, December 1989), pp. 71–81; and Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European Security Organization," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 215–250.

ulation by foreign governments, or capture by domestic special interests. This can be achieved by reminding the American public and foreign policy-makers of the damage that such manipulation and capture have done in the past.<sup>120</sup> Domestic interests and foreign governments should make their case, but all Americans must understand that America's European policy affects the general welfare, and should insist that it reflect the general will.

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120. Scholarship on both subjects is thin, and more is needed. Existing studies include Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); and Horace Cornelius Peterson, *Propaganda for War: The Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914–1917* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939).