Democratic Competition and Political Representation CPDD Fall 2019 Doc. Marek Rybář, PhD. Linkages between parties and voters lprogrammatic lclientelistic lcharismatic Programmatic Linkage lNormatively a precondition of a well-functioning democratic regime lSuch linkage is conditional and performance-dependent (how well do parties keep their manifesto pledges?) lScrutinized throughout the electoral cycle: party manifesto à elections à performance in government à elections à etc. Programmatic Linkage lLinkage between party/candidate and voters is never fully programmatic, always a mixture of motivations : lLeaders: policy and office lParty activists: collective and selective incentives lVoters: rational and affective components of party choice Programmatic Linkage lFormally can be analysed as a chain of delegation: Principal-agent relationship lvoter—parliamentarian—government—minister—(civil servant) lParties have a say in all the “pairs”, even though legitimacy of their interference varies lagency drift: what are the possible solutions? Clientelistic Linkage lA form of personalised bilateral exchange, asymmetric relationship, a sense of duty l“Old” clientelism: a hierarchical relationship between patron and client in traditional communities lPatron offers basic resources to his clients, who in turn repay by providing services or economic goods (rent, labour, etc.) Clientelistic Linkage lA strong sense of responsibility (patron) and duty (client) lThis traditional interaction can take up modern forms: lPatron (or their associates) run in elections lClients supply votes, patron supplies or promises goods) Clientelistic Linkage l “New” clientelism: less personalised, a key role played by networks and brokers: lA pyramid: patron is on top (politician, party), clients-voters are at the bottom lThey are connected through a network of local officials, local entrepreneurs, party organizational structures etc. lIt remains a bilateral relationship (important broker, important broker—less important broker, less important broker—client/voter) Why is clientelism a problem? lVoters disregard a broader context of their party choice lPoliticians do not have a mandate (motivation) to pursue public interests lClientelistic linkage is rigid, in conflict with the role of elections as a feedback-providing mechanism Why is clientelism a problem? lIt is not voters who control politicians//Rather, politicians control voters lTransactions typically do not take place simultaneously, trust is needed for the system to work (a growing number of exchanges tends to strengthen the linkage) Clientelism: explained by political culture? lPutnam (1993): differentiated performance of Italy’s regions explained by existence in the north of deep-seated patterns of behaviour: lRepresentative institutions (guilds etc.) of the medieval era à self-organizing behaviour understanding for public/collective interestà policies in search of common good lAbsence of such patterns in the south: low trust in parties—problems with collective action—rent-seeking = clientelism, nepotism Clientelism: explained by strategic interactions? lShefter (1994): timing of democratisation and state-building lIf parties and party competition emerged BEFORE autonomous state apparatus was established = public resources are exploited for distribution of private benefits lAutonomous state bureaucracy BEFOTE party-based mobilisation = a strong barrier preventing widespread clientelistic exchange Charismatic linkage lConsidered a pre-modern form of political authority in political theory (M. Weber) l“Charisma” traditionally studied by social psychology lPappas (2009): charisma is primarily a political phenomenon, a specific type of political leadership Charismatic personalism (Pappas) l1. nearly absolute and centralised control by the leader over “his” party l(division of powers and labour depend on leader’s decisions, formal rules are not observed) l2. a strong and unmediated emotional link between the leader and followers Charismatic personalism (Pappas) l3. delegative and missionary relationship between the leader and his followers l(delegation in the sense of missing horizontal accountability) lIt may exist in democratic regimes lA plan of radical (but not necessarily authoritarian) transformation of institutional architecture of the state What shapes party systems l1. a political sociology approach: politics mirrors society (Lipset and Rokkan) l2. strategic choices of political elites (what themes to politicize) l3. formal institutions, especially the electoral system and executive-legislative relations How do electoral rules shape party systems? lDuverger law: the simple majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system lExample: United Kingdom lDuverger’s hypothesis: simple majority system with second ballot, and proportional representation favor multipartism lExamples: France, Spain etc. lHowever, in structuring party systems, electoral systems are “supplemented” by the structure of societies (cleavages) A decline in importance of political parties lAn ongoing social and political modernisation = a decline in importance of parties lRise of educational levels à no need to rely on parties to provide a link to the state (institutions) lIndependent mass media lAlternative channels of political mobilisation (social movements, organized interests) The Consequences of dealignment lA drop in voter turnout (voters who identified with parties had traditionally voted more often than those without party identification) lOn average, some 10 percentage points drop over the last 50 years lIncreased volatility levels: entry of new parties and the rise of the number of relevant parties lIndividual level: split ticket voting and divided government The Consequences of dealignment lTiming of decisions about who to vote for in elections lAn increased trend of identification with a politician (and not with their party) lDecrease in active participation at election campaigns lLess voters with „party predispositions“ What is a party system? lA stable, valued and recurring pattern of interactions between its components (parties) l“Systemness” - Interactions among parties that go beyond their individual characteristics l l Party „systemness“ lResults from competition among parties: lNumber of parties (how to count them?) lRelative size and strength (how to assess it?) lDimensions of party competition lDistance between parties (polarization) lPropensity to govern together l Number of parties lNearly all classifications take into account the number of parties lAll that compete in elections? lAll that gain parliamentary seats lAll that have a say in who governs The 2005 UK Elections lCandidates of 14 parties competed in the parliamentary elections lCandidates of 14 parties gained seats in the Parliament lThree parties gained an overwhelming majority of seats (Lab 35,2%=356, Con 32,3=197, LibDem 22%=62 mandates) lOther parties tend to gain votes in specific regions Duverger (1954) lNumber of parties alone shapes the dynamics among them lOne party system, two party system, multipartism lBipartism is natural and normatively superior, multipartism leads to instability Relative size of parties lBlondel (1968): an empirical classification of democratic party systems l1945-1966: UK, USA, NZE, AUS, AUT (two parties combined >89% lCAN, GER, IRE: (two parties combined gain 75-80%, a third relevant party exists, important for government formation l l Dimensions of party competition Sartori (1976) lWe only need to take into account the relevant parties (i.e. parties with a coalition potential or with a blackmail potential) lThe more relevant parties in the system, the greater the ideological distance among them lPolarised pluralism: anti-system parties at both ends of the ideological spectrum lHowever, very few cases of polarised multipartism after 1989 l Tendency of parties to govern together lGoverning is at the core of contemporary parties lStructures of competition can be seen to be either closed (and predictable) or open (and unpredictable) depending on: l the patterns of alternation in government, lthe degree of innovation or persistence in processes of government formation, and lthe range of parties gaining access to government Party system institutionalization (PSI) lConceptually different from party institutionalisation (PI) lCrucial for democratic consolidation and survival lCasal-Bertoa: PSI as sufficient (not necessary) condition of democratic survival lNo link between PI and democratic breakdown l PSI and democratic collapse (FCB, 2016) PI and democratic collapse (FCB, 2016)