CHAPTER 15

The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: The Quest for Purpose

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Summary

This chapter is concerned with the ways in which, since the late 1990s, the European Union (EU) attempted to emerge as an increasingly autonomous security and defence actor, albeit one that focused overwhelmingly on overseas missions connected not with expeditionary warfare but with crisis management and embryonic nation

building. It begins by reviewing the theoretical approaches to the emergence of this new policy area, before addressing the factors which drove the Union to tackle new and significant security challenges. It then examines the implications for international relations of the EU's overseas interventions, both as a military and as a civilian crisis management entrepreneur. Finally, it assesses the implications of the Lisbon Treaty and the 2016 European Global Strategy (EGS) (European Union 2016) for the further development of Europe's security and defence policy, in the context of new and serious security threats in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods. It offers some initial thoughts on the implications of Brexit for European security.

Introduction: EU security and defence in the context of international relations

> The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
>
> (Article 24/1, Treaty on European Union)

On paper, the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, seem both clear cut and very ambitious. Foreign policy, security policy, and, eventually, defence policy are, it appears, to be progressively coordinated and even integrated. Of the 62 amendments to the existing treaties that were introduced by Lisbon, no fewer than 25 concern the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). All of them were designed to strengthen EU coordination. Indeed under Lisbon, ESDP is rebranded as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), further underscoring the stated objective of commonality in the EU's approach to international relations. The major innovations of Lisbon were the creation of two senior EU positions: President of the European Council and High Representative (HRVP) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the latter post doubling up as Vice President of the European Commission. The first incumbents, respectively Belgium's Herman Van Rompuy and the UK's Catherine Ashton, ultimately failed to exercise clear authority in the teeth of opposition from the member states. Van Rompuy's successor, former Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, fared no better, whereas the new HRVP, Italy's former foreign minister Federica Mogherini, immersed herself energetically in the challenging task of devising a global strategy for the EU. We will evaluate her performance at the end of this chapter. This ongoing tension between the collective interests of the EU on the international stage and the specific interests of a handful of (essentially large) member states

constitutes the great puzzle behind the CFSP and the CSDP. Why did the member states go to the trouble of creating high-profile European officials and pursuing a notional commonality of objectives if they remain determined to exercise their sovereign rights over foreign and security policy?

The notion of a CFSP was first floated in February 1990. The EU, since the early 1970s, had been attempting to generate a common foreign policy—mainly in the guise of European Political Cooperation (Nuttall 1992). The Western European Union (WEU), which, since its creation in 1955, had lain almost dormant, had been 'reactivated' in the 1980s (Deighton 1997). Its Ministerial Council asserted in October 1987 that 'the construction of an integrated Europe will be incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence'. The main institutions of WEU (the Council and the Secretariat) were relocated in 1992 from London to Brussels to enhance coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some European states—through the WEU—sought to create a European Security and Defence Identity from inside NATO, but any notion of an autonomous EU role in the field of security (let alone defence) remained virtually unthinkable for most of the 1990s.

And yet, beginning in 1999, after the groundbreaking Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo,[1] the EU progressively sought to develop an autonomous capacity in security and even—at least on paper—defence policy. This involved the creation of an entirely new set of Brussels-based institutions and an intensive political quest for greater and more usable EU military and civilian capacity for deployment in overseas crisis-management missions. Between 2003 and 2016, the EU engaged in no fewer than 36 overseas missions (as we shall see). This seemed to portend a revolution in the trajectory of CSDP. The aim of this chapter is to place the overall impact of these missions not only in the context of changes within the EU and the international arena, but also in the context of thinking about security and defence policies in International Relations (IR) more generally. It begins with a review of the ways in which IR theory might approach the reality of and the questions raised by CSDP. Next, it explores the continuing challenges facing EU security and defence policies in terms of resources and institutions, particularly in the context of tensions between Brussels and the national capitals. It also explores the prospects for operational implementation of an EU security and defence policy. Finally, the chapter turns its attention to the longer term, and to the elaboration of a strategic vision for the EU.

European security and defence in theoretical perspective

The role of the EU as an international actor on the global stage over the past 15 years has become one of the most widely analysed of all the EU's policy areas. From a situation in the early decades of European integration in which foreign policy was regarded as the poor relation of European studies, we have witnessed the burgeoning of a vast international laboratory of research and writing that seeks to shed light on this important policy area. Scholars of IR have begun to focus more closely on what is perceived as a unique type of international actor and behaviour.

Traditional academic theories, of both international relations and European integration, have had difficulty in explaining the existence of CSDP. Most theorists, from most schools, have long suggested that, whatever other policy areas might one day come under the aegis of European integration, security and defence would not be among them. Indeed, what most theorists over the years have focused on and 'explained' is the *absence* of CSDP (Ojanen 2006, 58–60; Howorth 2014, 190–3). In the case of IR theory, none of the existing schools seems to come close to explaining the 'CSDP effect'. Structural realism, so long the dominant force in US IR theory (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), has no convincing explanation for the phenomenon whereby sovereign state actors pool their sovereignty and, apparently ignoring the rules of the Westphalian system, elect to intervene in the internal affairs of neighbouring—or even in some cases quite distant—sovereign countries. For structural realists, state actors alone can engage in security and defence—that is, military—activities, either individually or as part of a military alliance. A body such as the EU, in this conception, is theoretically incapable of engaging in security and defence policy. Indeed, Mearsheimer (2001, 392–6), gives little credence to European integration and tends to assume, on the contrary, that the EU, as a result of the end of the Cold War, will go 'back to the future' and revert to the type of nationalist rivalry we saw in the 19th and early 20th centuries. CSDP is, in any case, little studied by structural realists for the simple reason that it does not fit into their vision of things. The principal explanation offered for the EU's behaviour—that it is 'balancing' against US dominance (Walt 2005; Posen 2006)—is not hard to refute (Howorth and Menon 2009).

Other scholars from within the realist family tend to see European integration as a standard process of interstate bargaining with a view to furthering the national interests of member states. This school, among scholars of European integration, is known as intergovernmentalism. Stanley Hoffmann argued 50 years ago that integration could only take place in policy areas where state gains constantly outweighed losses. This, he predicted, would not and could not be the case in the area of 'high politics', of which defence was the ultimate example (Hoffmann 1966). This approach was taken to its ultimate theoretical conclusion by Andrew Moravcsik (1998), who argued that although actors other than just states—social actors of many types—can bargain at the international level for more rational policy coordination, ultimately, key decisions will always be taken by states. Once again, foreign, security, and defence policy is regarded as the prime policy area where coordination (let alone integration) will not happen. Recently, a new theoretical approach has been forged that seeks to explain why states are prepared to bargain with one another over issues such as security and defence policy while keeping the supranational institutions of the EU at arm's length. This 'new intergovernmentalism' (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015a) reflects changes in the way national preference formation has occurred in the post-Maastricht era. While governments are increasingly drawn into policymaking at EU level, they resist any further delegation of power to supranational institutions. Moreover, the traditional institutions of supranationalism, it is argued, have by and large accepted the dominance of intergovernmental policy-shaping practices. This approach can help explain the (nevertheless still strictly limited) phenomenon of CSDP. The other main school of European integration theory, neo-functionalism, consciously excluded from its key processes of spillover the entire field of foreign and security policy—considered as the last bastions of sovereignty (Haas 1958).

Neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on trade and economics as the twin pillars of interdependence and soft power (Keohane and Nye 1972, 1977), while offering useful interpretations of the purely civilian actor the EU used to be, has its work cut out trying to explain why the EU chose to don the accoutrements of military power. Neo-liberal approaches are, at one level, geared to explaining the absence of war and the presence of peace in complex multilateral settings. Their focus on soft power is informed by a belief that military instruments have been over-analysed in IR and that the significant aspects of the present are the features of attractiveness and exemplarity of which the EU is a model (Nye 2004). These approaches appear to lend themselves awkwardly to the analysis of CSDP, a policy area which at first glance seems to run against the grain of neo-liberal theory. On the other hand, supranationalists are also hard put to come to terms with a European reality in which the main actor in their integrationist system—the European Commission—has little more than a bit part to play in CSDP (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 2001). As with the realists, neo-liberals and supranationalists have tended to neglect or eschew analysis of this key policy area, whose very existence poses a challenge to the bases of their theoretical approach.

To the extent to which the recent wave of constructivism has addressed these issues, it has been to suggest that international relations can be understood in more value-based or normative terms (rather than as a simple clash of interests), and that in this sense EU security integration is theoretically unproblematic. Where neo-realists and neo-liberals insist that states have more or less fixed preferences dictated by unchanging factors such as the international system or national interests, constructivists have insisted that those preferences are in fact socially constructed through forces such as identity, ideas, normative beliefs, and socialization—which are in a state of constant evolution. Initially, constructivists seemed, for the most part, somewhat ill at ease with the EU. Two of the major tomes of constructivist theory (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999) fail even to look at the EU as such. Constructivism has, since the mid-1990s, succeeded in broadening national concepts of security (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998), with the result that there has been some measure of convergence between neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches on the one hand and the newer, sociologically derived theories of international relations on the other (S. Smith 2000). The past decade has seen a veritable outpouring of constructivist scholarship on CSDP which has finally begun to offer valuable theoretical insights into this dynamic policy area (Berenskoetter 2005; Tofte 2005; Giegerich 2006; Meyer 2006; Mérand 2008; Davis Cross 2011; Kurowska and Breuer 2012; Sjursen 2012b; Jørgensen *et al.* 2015; M. Smith, Keukeleire, and Vanhoonacker 2016).

In one of the earliest studies of CSDP, I coined the concept of 'supranational intergovernmentalism' (Howorth 2000, 36 and 84). By that I meant the phenomenon whereby a profusion of agencies of intergovernmentalism take root in Brussels and, through dialogue and socialization processes, reaction to 'events', and a host of other dynamics, gradually create a tendency for policy to be influenced, formulated, and even driven, from within that city. This is close to the idea of 'Brusselsization' used by other commentators (Nuttall 2000; Allen 2004). Governments, often against their wishes, are constantly being forced in directions they had not anticipated. European statesmen, even the most powerful, have demonstrated repeatedly that national institutions are inadequate to the task of driving forward a coherent European response to the external environment. New European institutions and agencies have recently popped up like mushrooms to fill the gap (Davis Cross 2010; Howorth 2010, 2012; M.E. Smith 2017). Policy legacies and preferences—the extent to which long-standing approaches remain valid—are likewise factors to which even the most powerful statesmen have been forced to submit. Above all, discourse—the ability to change preferences by altering actors' perceptions and articulation of the available options—has proven to be a powerful factor in driving forward the CSDP process (Howorth 2004; Schmidt 2008, 2010). Policy preferences which, only a few years previously, would have seemed unimaginable to many a leading actor have in recent years and in this crucial policy area rapidly been embraced, developed, and integrated into the mainstream. However, the specific trajectory taken by CSDP has been overwhelmingly attributable to 'events'. Since November 1989, and especially since 9/11, 'events' have run ahead of the capacity of politicians and statesmen—even strong ones—to determine their precise course. In the area of security and defence, events have also ridden roughshod over most of the established theories of European integration.

From foreign policy coordination to a European security and defence policy

By the turn of the 21st century, the EU had begun to ride roughshod not only over IR theory, but—more importantly—over its own previous diffidence in the field of security and defence. It now sought to generate a European security and defence policy, which, as it arose from the Saint-Malo declaration of December 1998, explicitly called for the 'capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces'. Two important explanatory sets of variables underlie the EU's move towards assuming a security and defence remit. The first set—exogenous factors—derives from the shifting tectonic plates of the international system in the aftermath of the Cold War. The second set—endogenous factors—derives from the internal dynamics of the European project.

When the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, it brought down with it a Eurocentric reading of international relations that had been unquestioned since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The very discipline of IR was built around analysis of European conflicts. All of that came to an end in 1989. For the USA and for much of the rest of the world, the 'dawn of peace in Europe' (Mandelbaum 1996) shifted the continent to the margins of the international radar screen where it featured as little more than a blip. In particular, the focus of policymakers and military planners in Washington, DC switched to Asia, to the Gulf, to the Middle East (Clinton 2011). Europe, for the time being at least, was simply no longer a problem. The corollary to this realization was that tens of thousands of US troops were not optimally employed sitting around in bases in Germany preparing for a war that would never happen. The security of the European continent should logically be delivered through Europe's own resources. This was the earliest affirmation of CSDP as a subset of the international system. Why was this so problematic? The new crisis management missions of the 21st century required specific kinds of assets, especially force projection. The USA possessed them; the Europeans did not. Europe suffered from a 'capabilities gap' (Hill 1993a). While the Europeans discussed ways to convert their Cold War, defensive militaries into useful—projectable—instruments, it seemed sensible that they should seek access, through NATO, to available US assets that would allow them—temporarily—to plug the capabilities gaps between their past and their future. This would take the pressure off US forces more urgently needed elsewhere, and would allow EU forces, pending their professionalization and modernization, to take over peacekeeping missions in areas such as the Balkans where the USA had no identifiable interests. Two powerful exogenous forces then combined to galvanize that seriousness of EU purpose: the prospect of US military disengagement from Europe and the re-emergence of insecurity and instability on the EU's periphery. From the Balkans to North Africa and from the Caucasus to Ukraine, not to mention the Arctic, the 1990s and 2000s seemed to pose a succession of major security challenges to the EU.

The second set of explanatory variables behind CSDP stems from the dynamic processes unleashed within the EU itself by the developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s. However long delayed may have been the Union's embrace of 'actorness', there was never any doubt that the European project was a political project. Its fundamental objective was the resolution of a double conundrum: how to bind together the fates of Europe's core nations in a way that would both render intra-European war unthinkable and maximize European influence in the outside world. As European integration gathered speed in the late 1980s, impelled by the single market project, by plans for a single currency, and by the Schengen process, the domestic forces behind foreign policy convergence meshed with those suggesting the need for greater security policy autonomy. These dynamics were intensified after the fall of the Berlin Wall by the growing awareness of the strategic challenges posed by enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The immediate European security challenge in the 1990s was twofold. Institutionally, it involved rethinking the complex relationship between the EU itself (in which several member states, led by the UK, wished to deny any active involvement in security or defence discussions), the WEU (which was too small and increasingly too diverse in membership to be effective), and NATO (which many analysts were declaring moribund if not obsolete). Militarily, it involved developing a serious EU military capacity that would allow the Union to assume responsibility for crisis management tasks. At a meeting in Petersberg, near Bonn, in June 1992, the WEU had defined three such tasks: 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace*making*'. The latter might even include war fighting such as the Kosovo operation of 1999—that is, 'high-end Petersberg tasks'. The EU's initial attempt to meet these challenges involved using the good offices of the WEU to work with NATO in generating European Combined Joint Task Forces (Terriff 2003, 39–59) drawing on earmarked NATO troops (Howorth and Keeler 2003). This involved the so-called 'Berlin Plus' arrangements whereby the EU could enjoy 'assured access to NATO planning', 'presumed access to NATO assets and capabilities', and a pre-designated Europeans-only chain of command. This awkward process proved unsatisfactory in several ways. First, the WEU was too insignificant a body to be entrusted with the major political responsibility for oversight of European military operations. Second, the unresolved nature of the political relationship between the EU and WEU failed to demonstrate who owned the process. Third, the mechanics of Berlin Plus proved extremely difficult to nail down.

By the spring of 1998 (as the Kosovo crisis began to erupt), Tony Blair, whose first year in office had been dominated by domestic politics, began to look seriously into security issues. A group of senior officials in Whitehall, liaising with their opposite numbers in Paris, had come up with a solution to the EU–WEU–NATO 'trilemma' (Howorth 2004). Since the inadequacies of WEU were clearly a large part of the problem, they suggested that that organization, whose 50-year treaty base was up for renewal in 1998, should be scrapped. The EU should take on direct political responsibility for deciding on and overseeing military operations. And, in the hypothesis (which the experience of Kosovo rendered increasingly likely) of an EU-only operation in which the USA wanted no part, it should develop autonomous forces in order to escape dependence on complex borrowing arrangements such as Berlin Plus. That was the rubicon crossed by Tony Blair at the historic summit meeting with Jacques Chirac in Saint-Malo in December 1998. CSDP appeared to be emerging as an increasingly autonomous subset of the international system.

Saint-Malo raised a number of challenges with which the EU collectively and the member states individually have been grappling ever since. The institutional implications were rapidly resolved and the EU successfully implanted in Brussels a raft of new bodies—the HR for the CFSP (HR-CFSP: Javier Solana) and his advisory Policy Unit;[2] the Political and Security Committee (PSC) comprising ambassadors from each member state's permanent representation in Brussels; the EU Military Committee formally made up of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff of all member states; and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) comprising some 150 senior officers from across the Union. This institutional nexus, modelled largely on NATO, rapidly demonstrated its ability to work relatively well (Dijkstra 2013; M.E. Smith 2017).

More problematic was the resolution of the EU's working relationship with NATO, and in particular the involvement in CSDP of non-EU NATO members such as Turkey and Norway. Turkey was particularly disturbed by the CSDP project for two main reasons. First, while Turkey had been fully involved in intra-European security discussions as an associate member of the WEU from 1992, under CSDP it was abruptly excluded. Second, this was all the more unpalatable for the Turks in that most scenarios for armed conflict and crisis management in the European theatre were situated in the south-eastern parts of the continent, which Turkey regarded as its own backyard. In particular, Ankara feared the use of CSDP military assets to intervene in Cyprus in support of Greece. Turkey therefore decided, in spring 2000, to block the entire process by threatening to veto the transfer to the EU of those indispensable NATO assets without which the EU could hardly embark on any military operation. It took almost 3 years of high-level negotiations to reach an agreement acceptable both to Ankara and to Athens (Haine 2003, 136–40; Tofte 2003). On 16 December 2002, the EU and NATO issued a 'declaration on [C]SDP', announcing their strategic partnership and asserting that, while the EU would ensure 'the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within [C]SDP', NATO, for its part, would guarantee the EU 'assured access to NATO's planning capabilities'. These arrangements are often referred to as 'Berlin Plus'. However, in practice, they remained something of a dead letter, and relations between CSDP and NATO remain essentially dysfunctional (Howorth 2009). This did not prevent the EU from embarking on its first military missions in 2003, when CSDP came of age.

European military operations and capacity: the rhetoric and the reality

2003: The EU becomes a 'military' actor

The CSDP is best understood not in terms of institutions or of capacity, but in terms of *what it does*. Between January 2003 and mid-2016, the EU engaged in no fewer than 36 overseas 'crisis management' missions. *That is what CSDP does* and, ipso facto, what it is. That broad generalization conceals a complex pattern of military and civilian deployments, the balance of which has shifted significantly over time in favour of the latter. In 2003, the EU embarked on its first four overseas missions, including two police missions and two military missions and in 2004 it launched its biggest ever military mission, Operation *EU Force Althea (EUFOR Althea)* in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, three of the first five missions were military missions. That early statistic gave a misleading impression of the real footprint of CSDP. Only five further strictly military missions were mounted between 2004 and 2016, compared with a total of 29 missions which, while not being 100 per cent 'civilian', were all basically 'non-military'. Geographically, no fewer than seven of the CSDP missions have been in the former Yugoslavia, and 18 in Africa. Of the remaining 11, classed as 'other', five have been on the EU's Eastern border (three in Georgia and two in Ukraine and/or Moldova). Two have been in the Palestinian Authority, for which the EU assumed special responsibility decades ago. The final three missions have been 'one-offs'—a police mission in Afghanistan, and a rule-of-law training mission for Iraq, both symbolic of the EU's solidarity with the USA after 9/11, and a brief peace monitoring mission in Indonesia (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane 2009). Any objective geographical analysis of these missions would have to conclude that the overwhelming majority of them have been in the EU's immediate neighbourhood and Africa. To this extent, it is clear that the EU is a *regional* actor, but one which frames regional conflicts and destabilization in a broader globalizing context.

The launch date of these missions also tells an interesting story (see Table 15.1). Fourteen of the total number of CSDP missions were launched in the first 3 years (2003–5). A further 12 missions were started in the following 3 years (2006–8). Only one—rather minor—mission was launched between 2009 and 2011, whereas eight new missions were mounted between 2012 and 2014. All but one of those more recent missions were in Africa, the other being an advisory mission in Ukraine. The initial emphasis on the Balkans was both obvious and correct, given the need to stabilize a sizeable geographical area situated *inside* the borders of the EU itself, an area, moreover, which had been formally declared in June 2003 as being destined eventually to join the Union (Prifti 2013). The emphasis on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has attracted six missions, is easily understood in that that country is probably the least stable and the most violence prone of any in Africa. It was in a state of continuous civil and interstate war from 1996 to 2003 and has been riven ever since with insurgency and conflict. It is estimated that as many as 5.4 million people may have died (Prunier 2009; Autesserre 2010).

The absence of new initiatives at the turn of the decade is easily explained in terms of the onset of 'mission fatigue' around the time of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. By then, the EU had launched 26 missions in 5 years, and many member states were also involved in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is significant that, since 2012, the Sahel has become the dominant focus for CSDP missions. It has become the new stomping ground for al-Qaeda whose activities (hostage-taking—mainly of Europeans—assassinations, trafficking in people, drugs, and weapons, and terrorism) were affecting societies and politics from Mauritania to Chad (Chivvis 2016). In 2015, EU Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) was launched, a naval military mission to tackle human trafficking of African migrants across the Mediterranean. The threat to the EU from recent developments in Africa has grown considerably since the Arab Spring.

TABLE 15.1 Dates and host countries for CSDP missions

Date	No.	Balkans	Africa	Other
2003	4	3 (BiH + FYROM – 2)	1 (DRC)	0
2004	2	1 (BiH)	0	1 (Georgia)
2005	8	0	3 (DRC – 2 + Darfur)	5 (Iraq; Aceh; Palest; Georgia; Ukr/Mold)
2006	4	2 (FYROM + Kosovo)	1 (DRC)	1 (Palestine)
2007	2	0	1 (DRC)	1 (Afghanistan)
2008	6	1 (Kosovo)	4 (DRC; Chad; Guinée-Bissau; Somalia)	1 (Georgia)
2009	0	0	0	0
2010	1	0	1 (Somalia)	0
2011	0	0	0	0
2012	3	0	3 (Niger; Horn; Sudan)	0
2013	2	0	2 (Mali; Libya)	0
2014	3	0	2 (Mali & CAR)	1 (Ukraine)
2015	1	0	1 (EUNAVFOR Med)	
2016	1	0	1 (EUTM-RCA)	
Totals	37	7	18	10

However, the biggest weakness of CSDP as a defence actor has been its failure to deliver on its promise of 'autonomy'. Despite the existence of 36 CSDP 'missions', whenever there has been a serious destabilization threat on the EU's borders—in the Balkans, in North Africa or the Mediterranean, in the former Soviet space, including Georgia, Ukraine, and Crimea, or, potentially, in the Baltic Sea area—the EU has repeatedly turned to the USA and to NATO for security.

Indeed, the EU's 'CSDP mission profile' has emerged as overwhelmingly civilian in nature, with a somewhat rhetorical emphasis on synergies between civilian and military instruments (the 'comprehensive approach'). The typical 'mission' involves the deployment of small numbers of EU personnel—from a handful to around 100—involved in various types of stabilization, reconstruction, and 'nation-building' exercises (Nowak 2006). Missions generally last less than one year. Throughout the 2000s, the EU progressively defined a complex set of objectives in terms of civilian crisis management, seeking to identify and deliver key civilian enablers: planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios for stabilization and reconstruction missions; capabilities inventory; assessment of national contributions and identification of shortfalls. In November 2007, these procedures were refined via a 'civilian headline goal 2010' which set itself ambitious objectives in terms of improving quality, enhancing availability, developing instruments, and achieving synergies with other actors, as well as drawing up a strategic inventory of available personnel, concentrating on recent retirees from the civilian sector who can rapidly be retrained in the appropriate nation-building skills. Moreover, in August 2007, a new structure was established in Brussels, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) with 60 staff seconded from the Council and the member states with overall responsibility for the planning and conduct of civilian missions, under a civilian operations commander. The CPCC has been in overall charge of the 25 essentially civilian missions undertaken since its inception.

It took several years before analysts began to assess the reality and the lessons of these civilian missions. When they did, the verdicts varied widely. A major assessment concluded gloomily that 'ten years after the creation of [C]SDP, most EU missions remain small, lacking in ambition and strategically irrelevant' and that such missions are 'woefully ill prepared to deal with threats to their own security' (Korski and Gowan 2009, 11). The disparities between member-state capacity and willingness to recruit civilian experts (judges, accountants, auditors, customs officials, penitentiary officers, etc.) is enormous and the EU suffers from chaotically divergent recruitment practices. However, another comprehensive analysis concluded that

> the EU has managed to make valuable civilian contributions in conflict and post-conflict environments, especially when they are close to Europe. Although the EU has often fallen short of its own goals, especially when it comes to staffing, and has encountered frequent logistical and planning problems, the general trend is positive. Provided that European states continue to invest in developing civilian capabilities, the EU can be expected to make a growing contribution in the years ahead.
>
> (Chivvis 2010)

The challenges remain significant. It is far more difficult to deploy overseas policemen, judges, tax lawyers, auditors, customs officers, and the like, all of whom are invariably volunteers.

Spending patterns, defence budgets, and deployability

It should be borne in mind that none of the activities subsumed under 'crisis management intervention', whether military or civilian, has anything to do with European defence per se. Collective defence remains, in all official discourse, the responsibility of NATO. The EU28, in 2015, nevertheless spent US$227 billion on 'defence' (see Table 15.2). That is a considerable sum. It is, however, less than 40 per cent of the US defence budget for that year (~$598 billion) (see Table 15.3) and it is

TABLE 15.2 Defence expenditure (2015): EU member states compared with the USA

Country	US$m	US$ per capita	% of GDP
USA	**597,503**	**1,859**	**3.33**
UK	56,244	878	2.05
France	46,751	702	1.93
Germany	36,686	454	1.09
Italy	21,552	348	1.18
Poland	10,308	267	2.14
Spain	10,754	223	0.88
Netherlands	8,901	525	1.19
Sweden	5,261	537	1.09
Greece	4,729	439	2.45
Belgium	3,980	351	0.87
Denmark	3,450	618	1.19
Finland	2,989	546	1.30
Romania	2,521	116	1.44
Portugal	2,176	201	1.10
Austria	2,051	237	0.55
Czech Rep.	1,776	167	0.97
Ireland	993	203	0.44
Slovakia	924	170	1.07
Hungary	879	89	0.74
Croatia	674	151	1.38
Bulgaria	600	83	1.27
Lithuania	474	164	1.14
Estonia	449	355	1.96
Slovenia	447	225	1.05
Cyprus	355	298	1.83
Latvia	266	134	0.96
Luxembourg	215	376	0.37
Malta	56	135	0.61
EU-28 Totals	**226,634**		
Norway	6,850	1,455	1.37
Turkey	8,347	105	1.16

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2016, 484–90), ©Taylor & Francis, www.tandfonline.com

TABLE 15.3 World military expenditure 2015

Country	Expend.$millions	$ per capita	% of GDP
1. United States	597,503	1,859	3.33
2. China	145,832	106	1.28
3. Saudi Arabia	81,853	2,949	12.95
4. UK	56,244	878	2.05
5. Russia	51,605	362	4.18
6. India	47,956	38	2.2
7. France	46,751	702	1.93
8. Japan	41,013	323	1.00
9. Germany	36,686	454	1.09
10. South Korea	33,460	681	2.40
11. Brazil	24,260	119	1.35
12. Australia	22,764	1,001	1.83
13. Italy	21,552	348	1.18
14. Iraq	21,100	569	12.78
15. Israel	18,597	2,310	6.22
16. Iran	15,862	196	3.81
17. Canada	14,007	399	0.89
18. Poland	10,308	267	2.14
19. Taiwan	10,257	438	1.98
20. Spain	10,754	223	0.88
21. Netherlands	8,901	525	1.19
22. Norway	5,510	1,058	1.39
23. Sweden	5,261	537	1.09
24. Greece	4,729	439	2.45

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2016, 484–90), ©Taylor & Francis, www.tandfonline.com

falling. In 2008, the collective EU defence budget was equivalent to the combined defence budgets of the eight next biggest defence spenders (China, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, South Korea, and Australia: ~$289 billion), which include all the 'rising powers'. In 2015, it was dwarfed by those powers, China and Saudi Arabia alone spending more than all EU member states put together. The EU gets very little bang for its euros. Out of that considerable overall 'defence' outlay, the EU28 have been attempting to fund 28 separate armies, 24 air forces, and 21 navies. Furthermore, just three countries in the EU (France, the UK, and Germany) together account for over 60 per cent of the combined EU28 defence budgets; and if Italy is added to the trio, the four nations alone contribute over 70 per cent of the total EU defence expenditure. The only one of the new accession states with any significant military clout is Poland, which has tripled its defence budget in the past decade and ranks (at ~$10 billion) in fifth place out of the EU28. Many member states (and not just the smallest ones) are simply cheap riders. The average 'defence' expenditure of the 15 lowest-spending EU member states (who collectively account for barely 5 per cent of the 'EU budget') comes to just $822 million. That is less than the defence budget of the Ivory Coast. One might ask exactly what those nation states believe they are buying with their money. In the view of one leading expert, much of the money the EU spends each year on defence 'is simply wasted' (Witney 2008). NATO's benchmark for defence expenditure is 2.0 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Only the UK, Poland, Greece, Estonia, France, and Cyprus approached or exceeded that mark in 2015. The overwhelming majority of EU NATO members are devoting between one-half and one-quarter of that target. The case for rationalization is overwhelming and long overdue.

Some progress has been made. Emerging out of the Cold War, the first practical necessity for most EU member states was to abolish conscription and organize professional military forces capable of being usefully deployed (Gilroy and Williams 2007). In 2005, when the first edition of this book was published, of the armed forces of the EU27, only seven were fully professionalized, the others relying to varying extents on conscripts. By 2015, that picture had changed significantly, with only six EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and Greece) continuing to retain conscription for specific political-cultural or geostrategic reasons. There are almost 1.9 million European troops 'in uniform'. Of that number, about 10 per cent (190,000) are adequately trained for serious peacekeeping missions, and of those probably a maximum of 50,000 could be used for high intensity conflict. Factoring in the requirements of rotation, the number falls to a maximum of 20,000 who, at any given moment, are genuinely usable in serious military missions (Venusberg Group 2004, 27). In 2007, only 64,134 military personnel from the EU's 27 member states were deployed on missions—a total of 3 per cent of the available manpower (Giegerich and Nicoll 2008). By 2013, that number had dropped to 58,000. Clearly, at a time when serious threats continue to accumulate around the EU's periphery, CSDP remains a project that is seriously suboptimal.

The generation of European military capacity

As the EU has progressively mounted a range of overseas missions, the need for greater diversity in the Petersberg tasks has been recognized. The Lisbon Treaty, under Article 43(1), saw the CSDP missions as henceforth covering: *'joint disarmament operations*, humanitarian and rescue tasks, *military advice and assistance tasks*, *conflict prevention* and peacekeeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-making *and post-conflict stabilization*' (expanded Petersberg tasks in italics). How has the Union set about the task of generating military capacity?

The Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), established at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, was conceived as a broad 'force catalogue' from which would be drawn appropriate resources for a range of hypothetical European missions, including the original three levels of Petersberg tasks. The force catalogue envisaged 60,000 troops, 100 ships, and 400 aircraft, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year under the EU flag. By 2004, it was already clear that the HHG was simply not being met. At the European Council on 17 June 2004, a new target—headline goal 2010—was adopted. Building on the HHG, the headline goal 2010 committed the Union to be able by 2010 to respond to a crisis with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis-management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. Significant steps were taken, including the establishment of the European Defence Agency in 2004, and the designation of force packages at high readiness based on 'battle-group' units of around 2,000 soldiers, capable of high-intensity warfare in desert, jungle, or mountain environments (Lindstrom 2007). Although the battle-group formations (many of them multinational) were drawn up and have since 2007 been on standby for their 6-month stint, to date none has been deployed on a single mission. This reflects a serious inability among the EU's member states to agree on sending soldiers into combat missions (Henrion 2010). The European Council's 'Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities' of 11 December 2008 stated that the EU should develop the capability of mounting a number of missions simultaneously: two major stabilization and reconstruction operations; two rapid response operations of limited duration; an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals; a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; a civilian–military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; plus about a dozen CSDP civilian missions of varying formats. Since those targets were set, the EU has in reality come nowhere close to meeting them, despite the growing threats around its periphery. One innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty was *permanent structured cooperation*, a procedure designed to encourage member states to coordinate their military capacity in a variety of ways. Article 42(6) calls for: 'Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework' (Biscop 2008). To date, however, this clause has never been invoked. Indeed, progress remained so slow that a special European Council was convened in December 2013, under the banner of 'European Defence Matters'. The HRVP was charged with reporting back to the Council in June 2015 on the challenges and opportunities facing the Union in foreign and security policy, and this report (Missiroli 2015) led directly to the preparation of the EGS of June 2016. We will return to that document in the Conclusion. Meanwhile, a number of constructive developments took place in parallel.

Cooperation, planning, and intelligence

The 'clusters approach'

All member states, including the large ones, accept the necessity of rationalization, pooling, sharing, and specialization (Maulny and Liberti 2008). One promising development has been cooperation among geographically close and like-minded member states, often referred to as the 'clusters approach'. On 2 November 2010, France and the UK concluded a Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation which underscored recognition in both London and Paris that these two would-be global players and permanent members of the UN Security Council could only continue to aspire to global player status if they combined their military efforts in a number of highly strategic sectors: aircraft carriers, transport aircraft, nuclear submarines, military satellite technology, unmanned aerial vehicles, expeditionary forces, and eventually combat systems (Jones 2011; Menon 2011). In recent years, there has also been intensive cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, five countries with very different relations to NATO and the EU (Bailes 2006).[3] The Nordic Defence Cooperation has also been extended to the three Baltic countries, which have created an integrated naval minesweeping force, the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), and which are dependent on allied support for the control of their airspace (Mölder 2011).

A third example is offered by the Benelux countries which have a long tradition of cross-border cooperation. The Belgian and Dutch navies share an integrated command and feature common training and maintenance operations. At the level of governance, education, training, control of the Benelux airspace and other matters, cooperation has been successful. This particular cluster of countries is also deeply interested in extending cooperation to both France and Germany (Biscop *et al.* 2013).

A fourth example of a cooperative cluster is that of the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia). While the driver of this experiment is probably as much NATO as the EU (these countries wish to demonstrate their loyalty as US allies), the range and variety of cooperation projects is encouraging. In June 2012, a broader grouping of Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia formed the Central European Defence Cooperation initiative (Kurowska and Németh 2013). It is unclear how coherent this grouping might prove to be given the rather different agendas of the Czech Republic, which focuses massively on NATO, and Austria, which clings to its neutrality. Finally, there is much ongoing cooperation between France, Germany, and Poland in the context of the 'Weimar Triangle' (Adebahr 2011) and also, increasingly, between Portugal and Spain (Joint Statement 2013).

Operational planning

The absence of any significant EU planning capability and in particular of a dedicated Operational Headquarters (OHQ) has long been seen as a major handicap to the development of CSDP (Biava 2009). France has consistently sought to promote such a facility (in the name of empowering and autonomizing CSDP) and the UK has equally consistently opposed it (arguing that this would 'duplicate' existing planning facilities at NATO, and that CSDP should prioritize civilian planning where it can add value). Germany has hidden behind this stand-off to avoid taking any decision, conscious that it has misgivings about France's military ambitions for the EU and, for its own different reasons, not unsupportive of the UK's somewhat disingenuous support of civilian planning (Simon 2010). By early summer 2011, a significant majority of EU member states was determined to forge ahead. A 'status report' on CSDP, containing a proposal on the OHQ, was put by the HRVP to the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 July, but the measure was angrily vetoed by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague. A year later, a group of 11 foreign ministers, including those from all the large countries except the UK, issued a report in which, alluding darkly to the OHQ issue, they called openly for 'more majority decisions in the CFSP sphere [...] to prevent one single member state from being able to obstruct initiatives' (Future of Europe Group 2012). In mid-November 2012, the 'Weimar Five', citing the launch of several new CSDP missions in Africa, including one planned for Mali, wrote 'We are convinced that the EU must set up [...] true civilian-military structures to plan and conduct missions and operations' (Waterfield 2012). The issue remained blocked as late as summer 2016.

Intelligence

Intelligence is a domain that goes to the very core of state sovereignty. Attempts to develop some formal EU intelligence-sharing agency (or even procedures) have been bedevilled with suspicion and mistrust (Muller-Wille 2004). Small states with no intelligence-gathering facilities of their own resent their dependence on the large states. Large EU states that do gather their own national intelligence are reluctant to share it fully either with one another or (still less) with smaller states. The result is that the EU has to make do with whatever scraps of intelligence its member states are prepared to give it. There are two main intelligence operations in the EU, the *Intelligence Analysis Centre*, which is a branch of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the EUMS's *Intelligence Division* (Duke 2014). The former involves 70 to 80 analysts from all member states, working 24/7. It feeds intelligence, garnered from agencies around the world, to the Council, via the PSC. The Intelligence Division, which is the largest single component of the EUMS, involves several dozen senior officers working in three main branches: Policy, Requirements, and Production, supplying focused intelligence reports for the purposes of operational planning and early warning (Antunes 2007). These agencies liaise with and receive data from the EU's Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Spain.

The current arrangements are encouraging, but for the EU to generate a serious intelligence-gathering facility of its own would require two major developments. The first would be for the large member states that enjoy their own intelligence-gathering facilities to agree to pool the results in a comprehensive and transparent way. This would be a huge step forward (Walsh 2009). The second would be for the UK radically to revise its intimate relationship with US intelligence. The price of this relation is a US-imposed prohibition from sharing most data with EU partners. This would be an even greater leap forward and, after Brexit, seems unthinkable (Svendsen 2009; Clark 2012).

In February 2015, many of these developments were reviewed in a major policy paper from the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS 2015) which called for the creation of a 'European Defence Union'—a project that had first been floated in 2003. The main recommendations of this report by a panel of top-level former officials and politicians covered the need for a strategic upgrade, reform of institutions, procedures and funding, the introduction of a 'European semester' for member states' defence budgets, and a galvanization of industrial and technological capacity. All this leads logically to the question: What are the political ambitions of the EU under CSDP? To what extent, and in what ways, does the EU aspire to the third of our editors' perspectives: the attributes of power?

Development of strategic vision

The 2003 European Security Strategy and its sequel

The European Security Strategy (ESS), approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003 (European Council 2003), was an initial attempt to think through the broader political objectives behind CSDP. It aimed to harmonize the different views of the member states without falling into lowest-common-denominator rhetoric. The document, entitled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', identified five key threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, and regional conflicts. It drew attention to the root causes of world poverty and global suffering, and stressed the 'complex' causes behind contemporary international terrorism. It recalled the destabilizing effects of regional conflicts such as Kashmir, the Great Lakes, and the Korean peninsula, all of which feed into the cycle of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, state failure, and even international criminality. The very complexity of these issues, the document asserted calls for 'an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world' (Biscop 2005; Dannreuther and Peterson 2006; Biscop and Andersson 2008). However, the 2003 document was hardly a statement of the EU's strategic purpose. It focused on responding to security challenges posed by 'new' threats and saw the EU response overwhelmingly in terms of crisis management, international institutions, multilateralism, improved governance, and development aid. An attempt to update the document in 2008 produced no real change in the EU's overall approach (Biscop 2009; Biscop, Howorth, and Giegerich 2009).[4]

The European Global Strategy and Brexit

It was not until the special European Council meeting in December 2013 that the new HRVP, Federica Mogherini, was charged with drafting a new EGS document (Missiroli 2015). The Council remit specifically asked her to 'assess the impact of changes in the global environment' and to report to the Council on 'challenges and opportunities' for the EU arising from that shifting global context. Despite scepticism in some areas about the political value of a document that all EU member states can find it possible to sign (Menon 2012), the way Mogherini went about this task offers some reason for optimism. The most important factor was that she appeared to be asking the correct questions. Not, 'How do we export our values to the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods?', but, 'What can the EU realistically hope to achieve in these neighbourhoods given the massive changes they have recently undergone?' The EGS document was published as this volume was being prepared for publication and it coincided with the UK's Brexit decision to leave the EU. Time and space allow for only the briefest assessment of these two potentially game-changing developments.

The EGS differs in several respects from the 2003 ESS. Where the ESS was bold, confident, and even occasionally hubristic, the EGS is realistic, modest, and constructive. It offers useful guidelines to the implementation of key policy preferences. Space allows me to focus on only two of them: strategic autonomy and regional involvement. Strategic autonomy is arguably the central key phrase in the EGS. It appears no fewer than seven times in the text. This echoes the message from Washington that has remained constant for a decade: Europeans *must* take over greater leadership in their own neighbourhood. The significance of the EGS is that this issue, first raised at Saint-Malo, is being kick-started all over again—at precisely the moment when the Warsaw summit of NATO (July 2016) announced a 'new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership' (NATO 2016). The implication is clear: the EU will acquire autonomy through and via NATO rather than in competition with it. At the same time, a more realistic approach to the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods is announced. Instead of bold assertions about 'normative power' and the 'export of European values' to Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia, we learn of the need to generate 'resilience' among the states of the neighbourhood. The enhancement of 'resilience' emerges as the main statement of the EU's responsibility in the neighbourhood—which has been extended all the way into Central Asia and Central Africa. There is also a clear recognition that regional regimes (African Union, Arab League, the Sahel G-5, Economic Community of West African States) are probably more significant partners and actors in their own parts of the world than the EU itself. They understand the regional dynamics more closely than does Brussels. Modesty is in order. Indeed, the EGS explicitly states that 'We will not strive to export our model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences' (European Union 2016, 32). The EGS offers a 'global' ambition both geographically and functionally. It will serve as the foundational text for CSDP over the coming decade.

Commentators on the security implications of Brexit offered radically opposed versions. For one, the departure of the UK would make no difference to CSDP precisely because Britain has progressively taken a back seat in this policy area since the Iraq crisis and because CSDP is of little strategic significance (Heisbourg 2016). For another, it would make little difference precisely because the UK will remain a key player in European security via NATO (Menon 2016). For yet another, it would finally allow CSDP to come into its own (Bruxelles 2 2016). One thing is certain. The security challenges facing the EU will not change as a result of Brexit. What will have to change is the EU's relationship with the UK. The nature and direction of that change will have massive bearing on the future of CSDP.

Conclusion

CSDP is a strange political phenomenon. Traditional IR theorists have difficulty understanding the acquisition, by a grouping of sovereign nation states in an international subsystem, of the accoutrements of collective decision-making over security and defence policy. Constructivist scholarship helps explain the phenomenon in terms of identity, ideas, and discourse, but it fails to pay due account to the powerful historical forces that have driven the new policy area since the end of the Cold War. Those forces derive from a new strategic focus on the part of the USA, from a reassertive Russia, and from the generalized chaos that has struck the Middle East and North Africa since 2011. They also stem from a new globalized international order in which failed states are more problematic than powerful ones, human security is as significant as state security, underdevelopment in the Global South is a source of direct concern for the well-being of the industrialized north, the deployment of naked military power is increasingly perceived as being of limited usefulness, and in which the major challenges concern environmental harmony, regional stabilization, crisis management, conflict prevention, counterterrorism and counterproliferation. The most appropriate instruments with which to address these challenges are of the 'softer' type—multilateral bargaining, institutional capacity, the forces of international law, civilian nation-building assets, humanitarian relief. The EU possesses these attributes in abundance and, once it begins to think strategically (as opposed to reactively) about its long-term objectives in an emerging multipolar world and the way in which it can deploy its considerable assets to help meet those objectives, it will be able to bring much to the collective table.

The greatest weakness of this new policy area is the tendency of some of the EU's (mainly larger) nation states to believe that they can still make more impact in the 21st century through traditional national assets. Old habits die hard and the sense of national interest is deeply rooted. Yet even the most powerful EU states recognize that the Union is an actor that can multiply their own global influence. They have, sometimes grudgingly but always lucidly, presided over the emergence of a collective security ambition that has seen greater importance and impact accrue to 'Brussels'. It remains to be seen whether they can learn to align their own national interests with the overall European interest.

NOTES

1 This summit constitutes the birthplace of the ESDP, the predecessor of CSDP. The text of the Saint-Malo declaration of 4 December 1998 is published, along with other *Core Documents* of ESDP, in Rutten (2001, 8–9).

2 In fact, the decision to introduce these features was taken at the European Council in Amsterdam (1997).

3 Norway and Iceland are members of NATO but not of the EU; Sweden and Finland are members of the EU, but not of NATO; Denmark is a member of both organizations, but has an opt-out from CSDP.

4 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels 11 December 2008: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

FURTHER READING

There has been a huge literature on ESDP/CSDP since the first edition of this book appeared in 2005. The annual volumes of *Core Documents* produced by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), as part of their Chaillot Papers series (http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/chaillot-papers/), are an invaluable source. Nine volumes have been produced, the last one being Chaillot 117 (Glière 2009). In addition, in 2009, the EUISS produced two major books to mark the tenth anniversary of ESDP: Grevi, Helly, and Keohane (2009) and de Vasconcelos (2009).

Three major overviews, offering quite different perspectives, are to be found in Howorth (2014), Jones (2007), and Mérand (2008). On the ESS, see Biscop (2005) and Biscop and Andersson (2008). On the EGS, see Missiroli (2015) and a special issue of the *International Spectator* (Tonne 2016). Good constructivist accounts, offering insights into both security culture and institutions are Meyer (2006), Giegerich (2006), and Davis Cross (2011). On the development of military capacity, see Giegerich and Nicoll (2008).

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WEB LINKS

Two key websites give wide access to most aspects of CFSP/CSDP. The European Council site at **http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1&lang=en** offers links to CSDP itself; the offices of Donald Tusk are reached at this site (**http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-president.aspx**). The website of the EEAS (**http://www.eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm**) gives access to the offices of the HRVP Federica Mogherini as well as to the various overseas operations of CSDP (**http://www.eeas.europa.eu/security-defence/index_en.htm**).

The website of the EUISS is an unparalleled source of analytical materials: **http://www.iss.europa.eu/**.

CHAPTER 16

The External Dimension of the European Union's Internal Security

Sarah Wolff

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Summary

Since the end of the Cold War, the internal–external security nexus, namely the links between formerly distinct concepts under the Westphalian approach to international relations, has become increasingly relevant. This chapter reviews the development of the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) that has evolved from a side product of European economic integration to a complex and dynamic policy area. Although since the Lisbon Treaty the European Union (EU) has considerably expanded its internal and external security tools and competences, the EU's global influence in this area is constrained by normative, national, institutional, policy, and legal challenges. The rapid evolution of global security challenges—such as counterterrorism, migrant and refugee flows, and cybercriminality—means there is a need for continuous