262 Amy Verdun Helleiner, E., Paglian. S. and Zimmermann. H. (eds) (2010) Global Fmance , Politics of International Regulatory Change (London. Routledgel. C"sis Holzinger. K.. Knill. C, and Arts. B. (eds) (2008) Environmental Po,lcy -Europe The Impact of International Institutions and Trade (Cambr,dge. Ca ^«fc „ versity Pressl U*. Jabko. N (2006) Playing the Market A Political Strategy for Uniting £Ur (Ithaca. NY Cornell University Press). r°pe- '985^ OatleyJ (20121 International Political Economy. 5th edn (London: RoutledgQ) Piketty, (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: The B Harvard University Press). elknaP PieSs 0) Schimmelfennig, F and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (2005) 77ie Politics of Eur largement Theoretical Approaches (London Routledge). Pean Ur"0n &. Young. A R (2007) Trade Politics Ain't What It Used to Be. The Europea Doha Round'. Journal of Common Market Studies. 45/4: 789-8H Un'°n ln WEB LINKS A good source of information on the EU's international economic and financial actives is the Europa website (managed by the European institutions), https://europa.eu, whereto mam agencies and institutions post policy statements, documents, and other mater* that are in the public domain On monetary policy, see the website of the ECB. http:/, www.ecb.int/ The major economic and financial newspapers have websites that offer j wide range of useful matenals, for example http://www.ft.com/ {Financial Times anaris" summitof the original six members and Britain, Denmark, and Ireland ence on the Human Environment) in Stockholm in June1972. ln October of ^ Sed'I tormaTdedarauon thathenceforth economic growth would be lempered'bv a concern to protect the environment (McCormick 2001, 47). A number of well- publicized accidents and environmental disasters alongside an increasing recognition of the scale of transboundary pollution encouraged European action to protecl the environment—a process that was generally promoted by green leader' states, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany (Andersen and Liefferink 1997). ln 1973 an environmental action programme was announced, the first of successive programmes under which a mass of protective legislation was to be generated-m excess of 250 specific acts. By the 1990s action on the environment had resulted in one of the most substantial areas of European law. European Community (EC) and now Union competences (where the right to make policy passes from the member states to the Union) were acquired in a range of significant areas, including atmospheric and water quality, the disposal of hazardous waste, noise abatement, and the protection of wildlife and habitats—to the extent that upwards of 80 per cent of member state domestic environmental legislation is initiated by EU environmental directives. Environmental policy achieved treaty recognition in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and is now incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 191 and 192, TFEU). A 'high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment' is one of the objectives of the Union, which shall also 'contribute to the sustainable development of the earth' (Article 3, (3,5)). In fact, for most issues involving environmental policy, competences are shared between the Union and the member states (Article 4(e), TFEU).' The proportions of competence vary by issue. For example, in relation to trade in hazardous waste there is a very high degree of Union competence, while for climate change there are important areas of exclusive member stale competence. For EU environmental policy under Article 191, the normal legislative procedures apply, which means the application of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council and co-decision with the Parliament. Questions of shared competence and internal legislative procedures have significant implications for the role and effectiveness of the EU in international environmental politics, to which we shall now turn. The Challenge of the Environment. Energy. and Climate Change The inte rnational dimension ,h other areas, such as transport, u was evident,ha, the implications of the * 1 could not easily be contained within the boundaries of the Common At&'c _____ nf rnurse. alreadv had a ranop nf __ ECs Common Mar- ^""""beVstates, of course, already had a range of existing international commit-k* Memd trcaty obligations. Whereas in the case of trade it had been clear from the K^'r, authority to negotiate on behalf of all members had to be transferred to olllSel mission, this was hardly the case elsewhere. Indeed, the very idea of hand-lhECOm ngh« to conduct external policy was strongly contested by some member in§0VC vernments. It was only following a significant legal judgment of the Euro-S'JlC Court of Justice (ECJ) (European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA), ECJ Case P0"1 March 1971, see Box 12.1) that the 'parallel' relationship between internal 22/7 ternal EC policy was finally established. The precise terms and circumstances ^ \cn in Box 12.1 and are significant because the ERTA judgment provided the arte" n which the Commission was able to assen its right to represent the EC ^ally where internal environmental policy competence had been achieved. ^The judgment provided the basis for participation of the Community (and now Union) alongside member states in international negotiations. Both were allowed ' be signatories to international undertakings, known as mixed agreements' In ne-10 tions it is possible for either the Commission or the Presidency to take the lead ^representing the Union, depending upon their competences, and this has sometimes irritated and bewildered outsiders who have to interact with the EU Furthermore there is a need to attain agreement during a negotiation among the member slates such that there is usually an internal EU negotiation being conducted within the international meeting. Much time, which arguably might be used more productively is spent by the Commission and national officials in coordination meetings that mirror Council Working Groups sur place sometimes described as the EU bunker' (Afionis 2011,346). With a rotating Presidency, shared competences, and an increasing number of member states, it might have been expected that the EU would be an ineffective environmental negotiator, hamstrung by its own internal deliberations and capable only of moving al the speed of the slowest member state. However, as we shall see, the EU was able to make credible claims to leadership in environmental diplomacy, although its internal arrangements can still cause difficulty. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty reopened debates about the extent of Union competence and the right to represent the EU in climate and other environmental negotiations. In climate and other negotiations there is now a pragmatic compromise whereby representatives of the Commission and of the member state 'president in office' sit behind 1 single EU nameplate and share representational duties.2 Even if the EU was able to organize itself for the conduct of environmental diplomacy, there remained the question of external recognition. The Community and "°w the Union enjoy international legal personality, thai is to say they have the Wal right to incur international obligations in the same way as the member However, although the Commission may assert the Union's right 10 268 John Vogler ^^TJntemal to external competence red relatively mundane road transport issues. It was the mtentio The case at issue cover ^ ^ be devebped ^ ™ nof |he treaty of orn, wM«H iM Union It * party . ,.....m<*t*b* iii«hiňvAwi»rfthěMe IH/1 ""'I I"'*""** f II'* ''«'•»"'/»'......'"'...... M"""" llVIIIIJ llfKMIIIII H4 iv'i KHIK1WWI' ""/•"»•"" •»* I H*tf>1«" 1MB V»i«* ' mnwM\ m> llw IMi »1 Km fcl'»lo«|ili«H'. O/imip I nyní IIMfi nt«l Ifa (mm IWnml IW/ ( ,,.,,»i,i,i,f. 1.« Hi» I'i»/»iiIkiii'd MmniB h,!l,il„,i, Ilnin I nn'l IIbwI U„f><"> w,<| |'„„ h„i.».,i man n»ui. i ..m/m.ind.i.ii iI.m i ..mih,i ni DM limiqli'iiiinlniy M'rvMinniil ni Hn/milfiiiiWHto •ml il,»,i |i.ii|»,«»l Vtmi 1/.........i......l,,i'ri./,.,ii I ,,i,,oi,ii,,i, i i,,,,nin l hiingn IIIIII 1.(1 | IHIV mul KyM« r-m,i„i,ii mi UMIml I In Ni ii h i iiiiřBiiliiin nu liaumlilli nlinn m'lX UfillsiHliiiiiiini iiiiysfilliiiiiiiiHliiliiuiiallJivninily IHI»; i nilngniin I'iiiIiimiIfill lluiMlW* /OHu mm'I N*$W WoUll „I -ni A/1 Bid mul Mm,i,ln 'ilinlllnj 71)11 1.........1.........<'•"""" "m I'nni InlniiiiBil i i .nmiiil l',,„ nilum lni I In/m'luili IhniiwHl mul IV«.....|b^ Mrlll ....."' ""viu.11,,1, mi Aíiíbb* liifnvllimiMBiilnl InliiiniDlliiii llltm "'"'^.......i' '"wwiliiiiuiii Ii»ibi,i Oigmiiu hilliiinnN '/fMII Mlnimmm „„„„li,,,, „„ Maiouiy /HI I r**"JL "to' '""i"*,im " ^ w ~ imwaV^ mni'****"" mm****. rVv* Mm^ «m nMf**^ 4, ^ 10 . ŮH-trnMh^mm»Uhton,**, ,|„,^r(i 111 II"' l'''M,!> I""-'"1"'1 * I"'1"""' w.ll«„ (he iL unUi ^kvMMrl Ml P*«d«#»Wpi»«^d upon 11* IMctimI MKy^h^rm^i, winř itm i" "i""/ Wi*V" th« r« Iproenl * the previous rcalizatl0n that strong internal measures would be J, P r^ntasTo -am a credtb.e leader (Oberthur and Pal.ernaer* ^ rented a major reversal m the EUs approach^ rom opponent to prin^ Toca.e of an in.ernanonal market-based approach to emtssions JJ He seen to function became essenttal to the EUs exemplary strategy and m « , _____i;__,„ „orppment there were even hones thai a e„u_. be seen to iunw~» -------- • ' —6/ ana, ,„ ., absence of a new climate agreement, there were even hopes that a substitute JZ be found by extending the ETS market to individual US states and elsewhere ljn[ tunately it continued to be beset by problems reflected in the collapse of the canT price and underwent successive attempts at reform. far iccanu unut-i"v.»-— By 2005 it was clear that, even if the Kyoto targets were to be achieved, which Was ,Br from certain, they fell far short of what would be required to give a reasonable chance of climate stability. Above all. the large developing countries would have to participate in restricting their projected emissions. The differences in rclatton to energy use and levels of development within the EU are mirrored to a much greater extent across the rest of the world economy (see Table 12.2). Developing countries can claim that their per capita GHG emissions are a fraction of those existing among TABLE 12.2 Comparative carbon dioxide emissions 2014 Carbon dioxide in billion m.t. % global emissions m.t. per capita China 105 29.5 076 USA 05.3 14.9 165 EU 03.4 09.6 06.7 India 02 3 06.5 018 Russia 01.7 04.8 12.4 Japan 01.3 03.6 10.1 Brazil 05.0 01.4 02.5 Australia 04.1 01.1 173 South Africa 04.0 01.1 02.5 ml = metric ton Source- European Commission Joint Research Cenire 12016) EDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research. 'C02 Time Series 1990-2014 per region/country' and 'par capita for world counir.es hnp//edgar|rcec.europaeu/overviewphp?v^C02lsl99C-2014 The Challenge of the Environment c mem'E-^andC,irnateChanse inisatJon for Economic Co-operation and Develop, HOs have an atmospheric lifetime of up to loo , Counln«. Further- 1 .1 i_____i__• , r w /Cars. *• C,HG5| historical burden imposed upon the earth by the industrial develop-^tion° dvanced economies. Under these circumstances the UN framework iUl o( lhC * ul'd not have been negotiable without agreement on the principle of c0tlV««ltion differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'. This required oIr,rnonbUt 0untnes as well as the EU lake the lead in making emissions i *•» ^Tcfed in the terms of the Kyoto Protocol i "4 ^ the ^rage 5.2 per pare"1in inadcquate whet __________- ^M«irement to avoid a 2"C lempera- ,vete*°etU effective action after 2012, when the first commitment period of Kyoto mrt'ncrcaSe' jjre not only more cuts in developed-country emissions but major ,ded. w°uld rf^m the fast-developing economies cuts tin - < ------------—"pea-country emissions but major lrlbuti°ns from the fast-developing economies of the south. Whereas in 1992 the Shid heen second only to the USA in its carbon emissions, by 2007 both had been «ed by China in terms of current (but not cumulative) emissions and by 2014 IS had widened (see Table 12.2). In 2007 the European Council committed to a 20 per cent emissions reduction by 1020 and a 30 per cent reduction if other developed-country parties were prepared o match them, plus an internal target of a 20 per cent share for renewables. At the end of the year the Union was prominent in the negotiation of the Bali Plan of Action envisaging broad-ranging discussions to produce a new climate agreement on mitigation, adaptation, finance, and technology by COP 15, scheduled to be held in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. Most significantly, by splitting negotiations into two tracks, one on the future of Kyoto and the other on the Convention itself, US participation was ensured. Providing the internal means to implement the EUs stated targets and timetables was regarded as critical to its continued climate leadership. Unlike the approach to Kyoto, it involved the development of new common energy policies with potential costs (Vogler 2009). It also coincided with the global economic crisis of 2007-8. On the one hand the economic slowdown meant that emissions targets were easier to achieve, on the other it raised acute issues of competitiveness which were accompanied by worries about energy security highlighted by the gas crises in the east. The IEA (2014, 3) commented that 'in 2008 sustainabihly—notably mitigating climate change—was the key driver for EU energy policies' but 'the context of policy changed dramatically.. concerns of energy security and competitiveness have become much more pressing'. This began to be reflected in the legislative process to agree the internal means to achieve the targets set in March 2007 The 'climate and energy package' (Box 12.3) wound its way through co-decision prolonged by extensive lobbying by industrial interests, who saw their competitiveness eroded by potential rises in en-"gy prices and by member states aggrieved at their treatment under the new arrangements to reform the next phase of the ETS. The final amended package was P'toed, with some difficulty, through the December 2008 European Council by the Ftench Presidency (sec Box 12.3).6 Tne Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and CI, John Vogler | i no - " Z, means to achieve the EU's 20-20-20 climate and energy ,arg SSI— — he,d in December 200B, entering lnto S^key elements were as follows: . A revised ETS to commence from 2013. National allocation plans will be replaced bv a single EU-wide emissions cap. Th.s will be progressively reduced in order to yield a 21 per cent reduction ,n emissions by 2020 relative to 2005. The auct,on,na of allowances will be introduced to replace the system of free allocation, al,h0Ugh derogations from this rule were negotiated to assist some coal-dependent power generators and to counter the risks of 'carbon leakage' where foreign competl,ors might otherwise take advantage of relatively high EU energy prices. A limited use of |omt implementation and CDM credits will continue to be allowed (Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC). An 'effort-sharing' decision to cover emissions from transport, agriculture, hous-ing. and waste not controlled under the ETS (which covers power generation and from 2012, aviation). Member states have agreed to binding national targets that vary according to their level of development in much the same way as the previous burden-sharing agreement. The overall 2020 target is for a 10 per cent reduction from 2005 levels but within this new EU 'bubble' there are wide variations. Denmark is committed, for example, to a 20 per cent reduction and the UK to 16 per cent, while Bulgaria is allowed a 20 per cent increase (Decision 406/2009/EC). • There are similar binding national targets for the introduction of renewable energy sources to achieve an EU average of 20 per cent by 2020. Again there are substantial differences reflecting national circumstances: the Finnish target is 38 per cent while that for Malta is only 10 per cent (Directive 2009/28/EC). • The promotion of carbon capture and storage technology is the final part of the package—whereby it is hoped that the carbon dioxide released by burning coal can be prevented from adding to the greenhouse effect through capture and then storage underground. This technology is as yet unproven on a large scale and is thesubiect of EU collaboration with China (Directive 2009/31/EC). >va5 There were high expectations for the 2009 COP at Copenhagen. The election of President Obama enabled a convergence of positions with the USA at the expense of the EU's previous commitment to the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol. The objective was a comprehensive, ambitious, fair, science-based and legally binding global treaty (European Commission 2009a). The EU set out to reassert its exemplary leadership with its 20-20-20 target, plus a substantial €7.2 billion 'start-up funding' package to be provided to least developed countries before 2013. It would be an understatement to say that for the EU the outcome of the long-awaited Copenhagen meeting was a disappointment. Without a final agreed text after 2 years of preparatory negotiation the USA and the newly formed BASIC innate Change 283 -the uth Africa, India, and China) group cut a last minute dea, ^ .binding Copenhagen Accord. In retrospect by acknowledging the 1 he non-D1"" ° , —r~. acKnowiedgine the 2 E^lhhreshold and inviting voluntary emtssions pledges from Parties the Accord d< A some foundations for the 2015 Paris Agreement. But at the time the Swed-P1" idency characterized the conference as 'a disaster' while Chancellor Merkel *h "J; best gloss on proceedings-'a step, albeit a small one, towards a global dt- P"1 lecture (E8enho^r„and,C;fO^ie^0>09' l)' That EU was 'the bigge f the Copenhagen failure' (Laidi 2010) was an opinion widely shared victim01 ^ Commission developed a 'road map' to a competitive, low carbon economy ilut ade the case for the economic and energy security benefits of ecological mod majon wrough developing 'cost efficient pathways' in key economic sectors. The lZa"°as for an overall emissions reduction of 40 per cent by 2030, 60 per cent by iar8el * a no less than 80 per cent by 2050 (European Commission 201 la). Accord-jotO.anano'^ _ ^__________________ v mg' I ,he IEA there has already been 'strong progress' in this direction (IEA 2014,4). Partly as a result of the economic downturn, GHG emissions had by 2012 decreased bv 19.2 per cent and the share of renewables in final energy consumption had increased to H.l per cent (ibid.). On the other hand the ETS, beset by surplus allowances and low fuel prices, had failed to perform as intended with a 2014 carbon price oljusi 6 euro per tonne, and there were continuing internal political difficulties with jtiempts at reform through the 'backloading' of allowances. This meant that it was national subsidies, rather than the stimulus of a high carbon price, that supported ihe introduction of renewables and energy saving. An attempt to incorporate international aviation emissions within the ETS also stalled. From 2012 airlines using EU airspace were to have been required to buy ETS credits to cover their emissions. However, under strong international pressure and threats of trade sanctions leading to opposition by Germany, France, and the UK, the European Parliament was persuaded to postpone the external operation of the scheme until 2017, pending a decision of the International Civil Aviation Organization to institute alternative arrangements for taxing aviation emissions (Keating 2014). In the same period, high gaspnces and relatively cheap supplies of coal on world markets had the counterproductive effect of putting old coal-buming power stations back on stream. Sufficient progress had been made towards the 2020 targets to allow the EU to enter into a second Kyoto commitment period but there were doubts about the achievement of longer term objectives. As the IEA (2014, 5) commented ...there has been a lack of integration of climate and energy policies at EU level and between EU and national Mergy policy decisions, which could not address the interplay and trade-offs between different targets and policy measures'. The uncertain development of the EU's long-term de-carbonization strategy coin-add with a highly significant reassertion of EU leadership demonstrated at the 2°H Durban COP where the Union could take credit for brokering agreement on to Durban Platform'. This set of guidelines for a new comprehensive agreement countries. It essentially evolved both the USA, BASICS, and other developing 284 John Vogler ■ ,he .firewair between Annex I and the rest, although argUmenu ' , of the Annexes and the meaning of'common but differen"'lhc continuing relevance resp Sties and respective capabilities' remained On the other hand, 2020-30 would comprise 'contr.butions rather than 'commUl '"ted North-South agreement the willingness of the Union to part.cpate in . secon/*« d of the Kyoto Protocol appears to have been crucial. Rencwi, mitment pcnoi W hich mandates GHG reductions by developed countries and allows benefit transfers under the CDM, was a key requirement of the G77 countries if th , 'al to accept participation in a comprehensive agreement. The EU, which had mistaT enly appeared to drop its support for Kyoto mark 11 prior to Copenhagen, was alm alone in supporting it in 2011, as Canada, Japan, and Russia refused to renew the'' participation. (Unlike some other participants in the first commitment penod uV EU had also achieved its 8 per cent reduction target.) The renewal of the Kyot0 PJ tocol was formalized in the Doha Amendment of 2012 and its quantified emission reduction commitments for the EU, over the period 2013-20 were met by the targcu of the climate and energy package, where the headline goal of a 20 per cent reduction had already almost been achieved. The EU commitment was important because there was a need to continue to reduce emissions in the period prior to the entry into force of a new climate agreement in 2020.7 The EU position in advance of the Paris COP, where an agreement for 2020 was to be concluded, stressed the need for a new Protocol under the Convention, which was ambitious, legally binding, multilateral, rules-based with global panicipation and informed by science' (European Union 2013) Of all the major Parties, the EU was most insistent on establishing timely and verifiable national emissions pledges sufficient to provide certainly and mutual confidence in the achievement of an ambitious agreement. After the usual internal negotiations and concessions to national energy interests, the October 2014 European Council was able to announce its Conclusions on a 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework (European Council 2014; Keating 2014). Included was a binding 2030 overall target of a 40 per cent reduction in GHG emissions, against a 1990 baseline, as the Union's 'intended contribution'. Less impressive were 'non-binding' targets of 27 per cent increases in energy efficiency and the share of renewables over the same period. This was a Union-wide target, member states refused to surrender control over their national energy mix. The 2015 Paris COP 21 did not repeat the mistakes of Copenhagen, indeed the outcome was rather more successful than many had anticipated. A notable achievement was text that included reference to the aspiration to constrain global mean temperature increase to ISC, something long demanded by small island developing stales. The agreement also included a new 'transparency' framework for the review of nationally determined contributions by all parlies alongside some subtle variations in what was expected of developed as opposed to less developed countries 2023 was agreed as the date for the first of regular five yearly global stocktate' on 'he adequacy of national efforts. This constituted a vital part of what was a The Challenge of the Environment, Energy and rr B». and Climate Cha so* ^. a" rurally, rather than substantively, binding agreement where ,h c pf ,,d (hat 'he 'nationally determined contributions'ann JeUnat 1,3(1 I result in a 2.7-C mean temperature increase ^ * "» «™« would inge 286 til as climate negotiator Trie cu |n50mc ways the EUs leadership in the climate regime was surprising. ,n fl* area „, £ competence, wh.ch involvestaxation, and energy poT™ leadefship aTd 2 Ration falls to the rotating residency. The EU will negotiate at 28' L^l emission and 27 member stales. There have been real problems In ensuring conti ltyacross a complex range of tssues in successive negotiation rounds (van Schaik and , .<•„.. inrviV In order to coDe. Darticular mmL, r.— ■ ------ai zo involvin minion and 27 member states. There have been real problems in ensuring, ltyacross a complex range of issues in successive negotiation rounds (van Schaik and Lenhofer 1005). In order to cope, particular member states have been allowed to lead „ .ssues on which they have specialized, and the working practice of the Council has hen to involve Presidencies over an 18-month cycle (Oberthur and Roche 2008). As «idi other external policy areas, coordination within the negotiation is required that ^ take up excessive amounts of time, and irritate interlocutors of the EU The EU can appear cumbersome and there has sometimes been a lack of agility and flexibility. Cli-Conferences of the Parties involve long and complex negotiating sessions at official level but end with a high-level segment in which final political deals are done over outstanding issues arising from an agreed text. High-level involvement can become problematic if there are unresolved issues and attempts are made to short circuit the UN process through an informal deal. Ministers and heads of government can interfere with the EUs operating procedures. The 2009 Copenhagen COP provides evidence of the manifold difficulties faced by the Union.8 The Presidency was held by Sweden, but the appearance of heads of government Brown, Merkel, and Sarkozy tended to divert attention and they pursued their own lines of negotiation. When President Obama conferred with the EU it presented itself in the form of Commission President Barroso. Swedish President in Office Reinfeldt, and the UK, French, and German leaders. In these circumstances the previous ability of the EU to function as an entity, to supervise the negotiation of the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, and make a credible claim to climate leadership appear remarkable, but the Copenhagen conference appears to have placed too much strain on the Union's coordinating capabilities. As the Danish chair of the COP and incoming EU Climate Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard remarked: There are very important lessons from Copenhagen. In the last hours, China, India, Russia, Japan each spoke with one voice, while Europe spoke with many different voices ... A lot of Europeans in the room is not a problem, but there is only an advantage if we [all] sing from [the] same hymn sheet. We need to think about this and reflect on this very seriously, or we will lose our leadership role in the world. (Phillips 2010) Difficulties of internal coordination were far from being the only reason for the E"'s disappointing performance in Copenhagen. Much more significant than any orSanizational or tactical shortcomings were profound changes in the structure of johnVogler .1 c«tem thai had begun to work themselves out in the n„i-** 'rrSL^cC reg-. The EU's initial rise to prom,^' * " ,„m1 nohtics depended lo a great degree on ihe favourable in, " 8 °bal Id"ha,C- rl the endtng of the Cold War. EU leaders^ ined by the willingness of the counlr.es or Eastern Europe to associate then! wnth its pohc.es and by the special posit.on that it held as the largest donor of d opment a.d (when both EU and national programmes are counted) with a T long-standing relationships with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of*! °' (ACP) countries. Furthermore, its role in climate pohl.es was firmly anchored t position in the international economic structurc-the Union being second onl^ the USA in the league or carbon emitters. The abdication of the USA from its J'° cus role of environmental leadership left the field open for the EU to assert itself^ to emphasize its identity as climate leader. As we have seen, this opportunity seized in the EU's successful campaign to turn the Kyoto Protocol into a runqW* international regime. However, even at the point of Kyoto ratification it was becoming evident that th underlying international structure was shifting. In general terms this has been sociated with the rise of the so-called BRIC countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China, to which South Africa should also probably be added (see Chapter 17) a, the WTO the kind of duopoly that had previously existed between the USA and theElJ was no longer evident, reflected in the emergence of the G20. In terms of climate politics even an enlarged EU found itself in third place in terms of current carbon emissions, China having overtaken both Europe and the USA. Up until this point both China and India had been relatively quiescent in climate politics, protected by the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' formula, which did not require them to make any emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. In the post-2012 discussions this was no longer a tenable assumption and the USA would, in any case never accept it. The other critical development was the re-engagement of the usa under the Obama Administration. The logic of the situation appeared to suggest that any future climate arrangements would require a comprehensive agreement that abandoned the firewall' between Annex I developed countries and the rest. Furthermore, although the G77 and China as non-Annex I countries had previously negotiated as a bloc (and the EU often attempted lo mediate between them and the Annex 1 countries), there was now a clearer distinction between the least developed countries, likely to be the first victims of climate change, and fast-developing new economic powers of the south. After Copenhagen came a revival of EU climate diplomacy, centred upon the Cartagena Dialogue (van Schaik 2012) which brought together 'progressive' Parties from a the main negotiating groups and provided the basis for the 2011 Durban «*■ orm. Th.s agreement, brokered with some skill by EU delegates, provided the ramework within which the 2015 Parts Agreement was formulated. Commentators ElesJmTm IT EU'S rCle Was increasin8'y 'hat of a mediator (Backstrand ad a»3). Sensitivity towards the development needs of ihe South and a The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate Change 287 l0 build bridges between them and the harder-line developed countries *>l"ng hrella Group' had long been part of the EU's negouattng repertoire. In the {UY'L' itex' 0f a new agreement this was not only significants accoVnTofZ 'T JWith the BASIC countries but also because of an aware"!sZ 7 " ' ™lnerab'e S°Uth reqUired *"^ ^ « A where Copenhagen had failed and for .is part the EU beean ,h. In involved with .coalition of high, ambuton including the USA and whtch sue Jfully promoted the inclusion of reference to the l.yC urge,. Paris represented a m]0r departure from the EUs previous commitment to Kyoto-like targets and t.me-Jcsand its 'nationally determ.ned contnbutions' probably represent the only fea slble way of constructing a truly comprehensive agreement. Whether it represents anything more than a symbohc success will depend upon the procedures for the encouragement of greater efforts towards de-carbonization and adaptation ,n wh.ch ,he EU's influence will still be of critical importance. Conclusion Environment and climate change have been areas in which the Union has managed to carve out for itself a position of international leadership. The foundauon or this achievement was the development ol the EU's internal environmental acquis, which allowed ihe attainment of external competences. Over the years the Union has been moresuccessfiil than might have been predicted in the light of the problems of coordination, competence, and coherence that continue to afflict its external activities even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Climate change poses a very different challenge because of the high economic slakes involved if effective action is to be taken and because of the ways in which it impacts upon the security of the Union. Most particularly it conjoins environmental and energy policy. In the initial stages of involvement in the climate regime the EU was able to claim leadership without the assistance of an internal carbon tax and to agree the Kyoto Protocol under the rather favourable circumstances of the burden-sharing agreement. Kyoto implementation and the search for a posl-2012 successor, however, required the serious development of internal tn«gy policy in the ETS and subsequently the 2008 climate and energy package. The latt« was only achieved with some difficulty and compromise because of the differing interests of member states. There are evident opportunities and contractions in EU climate and energy policies and a need to fully involve the Europe External Action Service in their pursuit. This has received belated recognition ID 'he adoption by the Foreign Affairs Council of a 'Climate Diplomacy Action i„,egraie the elements ^ ^ (his chapler within a new Energy n John Vogler Plan' (European Council 2015). The wider context is provided by nergy security, economic competitiveness ""^P' lo (European Commissior ' The evidence in this chapter provides strong support for the thr around which this volume centres. First, it is clear that the ways in w^* ^y theti,e, evolved as a (sub)system of international relations have played a ke t ticning its ability to operate on a broader stage. The development of ^ "n c°«di. gime for environmental policymaking and the emergence of an emb"1 'n'eri,a' 'e - —Ii«, er., "Altai cessesc security policy show in < nd forces on EU external policy. Not only this, but the interaction of envtronrne| and energy policymaking with broader processes of international relat,ons sh( lhe ways in which the EU system is penetrated by broader forces. This leads ,0 ou second theme: that the EU has become an indispensable part of the broader J ; of regime building and negotiation in climate change and has helped i0 SW as well as be shaped by these processes. The picture is less clear in energy, parllJJ least because the development of institutionalized processes in that area is le* ad vanced than in climate change and environmental politics more generally. Climate diplomacy has also clearly provided an arena in which the EU is a 'power' that compares very favourably with other areas of external action.10 It pr0Ved capab,e of executing an exemplary strategy of'targets and timetables' and took responsibility (or turning the Kyoto Protocol into a functioning international agreement. This was no mean achievement when operating under shared competence. The ratification process demonstrated an ability lo deploy diplomatic assets and to use trade instruments in pursuit of climate policy objectives. As the economic crisis of the European economies deepened, the experience of Copenhagen in 2009 appeared to reveal how far the EU's previous climate leadership rested upon some peculiarly favourable domestic and international circumstances. Confounding many expectations, the Union was again able to play a central role in setting the course towards a new climate agreement in Paris in 2015. The 2016 decision of the UK electorate to leave the Union will certainly diminish the weight and significance of the EU in international environmental and energy politics. This may become particularly evident in climate negotiations where the UK. alongside Germany, has been a lead state bringing substantial diplomatic, scientific, and technical resources to the Union's collective endeavour. On the other hand, Britain cannot simply be 'unplugged' from European energy and environmental systems and real connections will persist. Here, as elsewhere, much will depend upon the forms of coordination that will be worked out between the Union and the UK in such areas as the continuation of existing environmental directives and emissions trading. The UK government will have to strike a balance between the attractions ol independent action and the enhanced power and effectiveness that come from working in consort with the Union. Change 289 0 The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and airnate N° TT«s is also the case for energy policy (Article 4(i)| 1 i. arauments hinge upon the interpretation of article'; in ,ho , u T 2 ti ii TFEU apparently gives the Un.on and hence the Sol Sb°" T,ea,y 2,61 'Jions where the conclusion of an agreement: ,. nZ ^ °* "9ht ,0 <*»*** SfiJSSdS m the Treaty A proposed UNEP agrVemen, *! 5jsBS»^^,", mean*,hat ,he Eu Led ^^ssx Sample is provided by the ,973 Convention ^In^^^lni^ Sees of Wild Fauna and Flora where Un,on competence ,s clear Afte 40 yem Te parties approved the Gaborone Amendment, which admits the Union as an RElO . The reference here is to the notorious 'southern agreements' of the CFP where West 4 African governments were persuaded to sell dshing rights ,0 EU trawlers to the detriment of the sustainable development of their own coastal populations Both the CAP and CFP have been sub,ect to extensive reform to render them more sustainable but both continue to damage the EU s reputation. 5 The gases are carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane, along with three additional industrial gases The CFCs are also GHGs but are separately controlled under the Montreal Protocol The Convention also covers reduction by 'sinks', but their inclusion ,s controversial if n allows avoidance of actual emissions cuts 6 The climate and energy package was subiect to ctHJecision procedures and the final details were negotiated at the level of the European Council with significant concessions being granted to Poland and other East European countries 7 |f all the pledges made by Parties under the Copenhagen Accord—including those of the Kyoto second commitment period—are taken together and fully implemented, then the effect by 2020 would be to reduce the 'emissions gap' between the present position and the required trajectory for climate safety (as calculated by UNEP 20131 by more than half, to 8 GtCO,e (carbon dioxide equivalent) Achieving this would require that conditional pledges are fulfilled and that rule changes are strictly adhered to 8 The chair of the conference was the host state Denmark, which controversially floated its own informal text (widely regarded as embodying the Union's real negotiating position!, and replaced its environment minister in the chair by its prime minister, who was himself removed in the final hours by a coalition of countries, including an EU member state 9 This was also reflected in the reorganization of the Juncker Commission in 2014. In 2010 Climate responsibility had passed from DG for Environment to a new DG for Climate Action under Connie Hedegaard. In 2014 this was merged into a DG Climate Action and Energy led by Commissioner Miguel Canete, itself part of an Energy Union proiect team under Vice president Maros Sefcovii. 10 This was the conclusion of the European Council for Foreign Relations (2012. 122) that publishes an annual scorecard rating the success or failure of EU external action. The EU achieved a B+ for the Cancun COP in 2010 and a rare A- for the 2011 Durban COP FURTHER READING Delreux 12011) is a book length study of the EU as an international environmental negotiator, while Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler (20161 provide an up-to-date and detailed general study of EU energy policy including a chapter on its external dimensions. A number of collections on climate leadership are beginning to appear—Oberthür and Pallemaens (2010a) along with Wurzel and Connolly (2010) are good examples. Damro [2006), Light-foot and Burchlll (2004), and Vogler (2005) cover the EU in international environmental poll-lies. Falkner (2007) considers biotechnology negotiations and Hadfield (2008a) and Youngs du (2007). John Vogler «noj -he EU's d.ff.cult energy relat.onsh,p with Russia and other suPp,ie 120 ,of 1,ernat1onalleadersh1pisakeytherneexarr,1nedbYSchreursandThlm^ -,2006, confer this from an actor perspe^> sl3l ,2010) brings together some ot the latest research on EU climate POI,cVmak n> Z useful general and historical surveys. »>•*, Bretherton, C and Vogler. J. (2006) 77ie European Union as a Global Acto, 2nd ter 4 (Abingdon Routledge) Damro. C. (2006) 'The EU and International ^Environmental Politics: The Chall Mn.Ch Shared Competence', in K.V Laatikamen and K.E. Smith (eds). The Europear.,^ 01 the United Nations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 175-92. Delreux. T (201V The EU as International Environmental Negotiator (Abingdon; Ash Falkner, R. (2007) "The Political Economy of "Normative Power" Europe: EU En ^ tal Leadership in International Biotechnology Regulation'. Journal of Europ"'0^ Policy 14/4: 507-26. ea" *** Hadfield. A. (2008a) 'Energy and Foreign Policy: EU-Russia Energy Dynamics', in S. Sm,lh A Hadfield, and! Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors. Cases (Oxford: 0xf0,d University Press). Jordan. A., Huitma, D., Van Asselt, H,, Rayner. T. and Berkhout, F. (eds) (2010) Cllm3le Change Policy in the European Union: Confronting the Dilemmas of Mitigation m Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Lighrfoot, S. and Burchill. J. (2004) 'Green Hope or Greenwash? The Actions of the European Union at the World Summit on Sustainable Development', Gktui Environmental Change 14/4: 337^4. Oberthür, S and Pallemaerts. M (2010a) "The EU's Internal and External Climate Policies an Historical Overview', in S. Oberthür and M. Pallemaerts (eds) with CR. Kelly, The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy (Brussels: VUB Press), 27-63. Schreurs, M andtiberghien, Y. (2007) 'Multilevel Reinforcement: Explaining European Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation', Global Environmental Politics!'/4:113-37 Schubert, S.R., Pollak, J., and Kreutler, M. (2016) Energy Policy of the European Union (London. Palgrave Macmillan). Vogler, J. (20051 'The European Contribution to Global Environmental Governance' International Affairs81ß: 835-49. Wurzel. R. and Connelly, C. (eds) (2010) The European Union as a Leader in Internationa' Climate Change Politics (Abingdon: Routledge). Youngs. R. (2009) Energy Security: Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge (Abingdon Routledge). topics such as climate change or the marine environment Th„ r Agency is a mine of information at http://www.eea.europa Jln^ Enwonmen, nlCations on climate change can be found at the official UNFcrr ***** and ^ whlle this and all other major environmental negotiations are ,«« Negotiations Bulletin, which can be found at the Internattonal \<2T, *e — http://www.iisd.org. For energy and environmeni ^ Devel" NeflOtiations b«..........~..«,»u„gallne international Instituteh,c7~" "y u'e B"m opfT1ent site http://www.Hsd.org. For energy and env,ronrnenla Sus1a,nabl« Devel-tvV0 key international organizations, the IEA at http-//wwwi- qL,estlons the'ealso „ww.unep.org WWW',ea or8 and UNEP at http:// WEB LINKS The Europa website, https://europa.eu, provides the essential point of entry from where ZZr9Tt0 re'eVam partS 0f Commission. DGs Environment, CLIMA, arrf w wen as the Council and Parliament. There are also useful web pages on spe*