The Second Caucasian wars
IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Frozen Conflicts in the Caucasus
Mgr. Zinaida Bechná, Ph.D.
16 December 2020
Structure

Ingush-Ossetian conflict
 The roots of the conflict

Conflict escalation

Large scale violence

Spiralling violence

No war no Peace

Dagestan

Wrap up session
The roots of the conflict

Most of the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia,
have re-emerged respectively in 2008 and 2010. The Chechen conflict has not
terminated in a real sense. The Nagorno-Karabakh case has again become a hot
issue in 2020.
 The Prigorodnyj district – only one im which two ethnic groups with lower ranked
autonomous status came into ethno-territorial conflict with each other.

The roots: nature of ethno-territorial policies in the Soviet era. Especially the
punishment of many North Caucasian peoples by Stalin, in the form of systematic
and organised deportations, have caused psychical traumas in the collective
memories of those people.
The roots of the conflict

Differences between ethnic groups:

The Ingush speak a Nakh language close to Chechen, Ossetians speak an East Iranian language
and are believed to be the descendants of the Scythian (resp. Sarmatian and Alan) tribes.

Religion

The Prigorodnyj district belonged to Chechen-Ingush ASSR.

In 1944, Stalin gave the order to deport the Ingush and Chechens, and their ASSR was abolished.

The real causes of the Prigorodnyj conflict are, in fact, created by the deportation of the Ingush and
awarding the district to North Ossetia, by effect of which many Ingush were ethnically cleansed from
the area.

The roots of this conflict, indeed, can be traced primarily to political factors, not by any means to old
or modern hatreds (Kaufman 2007) between the Muslim Ingush and the Christian Ossetians.
Northern Caucasus
Conflict escalation

After the Ingush returned from exile, they have been seeking justice from
the authorities. Armed clashes between the Ingush and Ossetians have
occurred, the Ingush had petitioned the Soviet government for the return
of the Prigorodnyj district to them.
 In 1957 the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was reconstituted in 1957 - the Prigorodny Raion part of North
Ossetia.

In early 1973, they staged a mass protest in Grozny to demand the return of Prigorodny Raion, the
organizers were put on trial.

After Perestroika, Chechnya announced its independence, but Ingushetia preferred to remain part of the
Russian Federation, hoping that it would improve its negotiating position vis-à-vis North Ossetia.

Ingushetia - the most pro-Yeltsin territorial entities in Russia, while the North Ossetian leadership
sympathised with the hardliner communists.
Conflict escalation

In September 1989, the second congress of the Ingush people in Grozny: the Prigorodniy’s a
part of Ingushetia and re-establishment of a separate Ingush territorial entity and not the part of
the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.

In April 1991 the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet adopted a Law on the Rehabilitation of the
Repressed Peoples that stated that Prigorodny Raion should be handed back to the ChechenoIngush
ASSR, but the Ossetians pressured Moscow to impose a five-year moratorium on
implementing it.

“Aside from the Ingush’s desire to remain within the Russian Federation, their particular relations
with the North Ossetians, their distinct language, and their compactly-settled territory have
contributed to their willingness to split the former Republic of Checheno-Ingushetia. In 1988-
1989, before Chechnya had undertaken to separate from the Russian federal structure, 60,000
Ingush citizens signed a petition calling for the formation of an autonomous Ingush Republic. On
8 January 1992, the Chechen parliament announced the restoration of the 1934 border between
Chechnya and Ingushetia”.
Conflict escalation
 The North Ossetian Supreme Soviet took a decision that suspended the right of the Ingush to live in North
Ossetia. The Ingush resisted this demand and set up self-defence militias, which resulted in the escalation
of tensions.
 North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov oversaw the distribution of weapons to illegal Ossetian
paramilitary groups. Creation of a National Guard of 5, 000 men and 20 armoured vehicles. Meanwhile,
the Russian demonstrated seeming indifference to the imminent crisis.
 War of words in 1992 plus both parties arming themselves
 October 1992: a series of incidents: Russian officials (including then-Emergency Situations Minister Sergei
Shoigu, dispatched to Vladikavkaz, the North Ossetian capital, and gave the green light for the deployment
of Russian Army troops, which made no effort to protect Ingush civilians. In Tishkov's words, "preventing
casualties and destruction and trying to separate the conflict parties was not the primary motive behind the
federal center's actions." Consequently, tens of thousands of Ingush fled for their lives to Ingushetia as
marauding Ossetians systematically destroyed their homes. Both sides took hundreds of hostages.
Large scale violence

After a time of tensions and skirmishes (including blow up of a gas pipeline a crush of 12 years old
girl by the North Ossetian forces) between the armed Ingush and Ossetians the Ingush selfdefence
units were established. “The council also decided to close entrances and exits to all
Ingush settlements and to subordinate volunteer organizations to the Ingush authorities. The
Ossetians naturally saw this as a threat to their sovereignty, and actually regarded it a casus belli”.
 The large scale violence broke out on 30 October 1992. Russian troops entered the territory to
“restore law and order” on 31 October. 6960 military personnel,

Russian forces included: 116 tanks, 276 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and 156 artillery
units. However the violence went on.

10 November, Russian forces at the borders between Chechnya and Ingushetia.
 The largest number of people (over 450 persons) was killed in a short time between 30 October
and 4 November 1992. According to official sources, 644 people had been killed by June 1994.
Spiralling violence

The war in Chechnya contributed to the deterioration of situation: over 150, 000
refugees have flown into Ingushetia.
 New series of clashes in Prigorodniy district in the spring and summer of 1995 – lack
of law.
 In Ingushetia, several incidents of Russian troops attacking civilians.
 July 1997 re-escalation of tension: Russian “joint action programme” which has been
interpreted as heavily tilted toward the Ossetian standpoint.”
 Russia sent 200 billion rubles (then worth $34.5 million) annually for the next two
years: financial reconstruction in Prigorodny Raion and thus enable Ingush families
to return. Yeltsin called for a 15-20-year moratorium on Ingush territorial claims,
which Aushev deplored as tantamount to "burying one's head in the sand."
No war no peace

A program of returning Ingush persons to Prigorodny Raion by the end of 2006 was
only partially implemented. In October 2016, just 23,430 Ingush had succeeded in
returning and most of them had problems finding work; Ingush and Ossetian children
attend separate schools.
 No real reconciliation by Russia.

Deep-rooted stereotyped perceptions of "the adversary,"
mythologized perception of past events: the mutual distrust and
suspicion between the two nations still persists.
Dagestan
Dagestan
 In 1999 clashes on the Chechen-Dagestani border.

On 28 May, Chechen attacked a Russian checkpoint on the border, prompting a
Russian helicopter attack on their positions.

Several more similar attacks took place
 The Islamic Peacekeeping Army, invaded villages in Dagestan in order establish an
Islamic state over Chechnya and Dagestan.
 Russian Prime Minister Stepashin fired, in a fear not to lose Dagestan.
 Putin came to power, he claimed to restore order in two weeks.

Dagestan supported Russia
 September another attack by Chechens, pretext for Russia to extent it military presence
around Chechenya.
Dagestan

“Dividing Dagestan up into ethnic autonomous regions would repeat the mistakes of Soviet ethnic
federalism and could have horrifying consequences given the republic’s ethnic geography”.

power-sharing arrangement

As argued by Svante Cornell: “ the situation nevertheless remains worrying, especially given the
persistence of an unrepresentative government with a power base in the two largest ethnic groups
of the republic. The grievances of certain groups such as the Kumyks and Laks need to be
addressed promptly to prevent further popular activism. However, the proposals to split up
Dagestan into autonomous units, cherished by Tenglik, indeed seem to be a recipe for disaster
rather than a recipe for lasting peace. Dagestanis do seem to share a certain overlapping common
identity, heavily coloured by Islam, which may be capitalized upon to prevent communalism from
expanding. Many Dagestanis are aware of the danger of the national question, and efforts are
being undertaken both by government and opposition to seek to promote transnationality
cohesion. There are promising trends, nevertheless the present structure of the republic needs to
be revised sooner or later to cope with the new challenges that confront Dagestan in a new era.”

Wrap up session