Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Today
Mgr. Zinaida Bechna, Ph.D.
IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Frozen Conflicts in the Caucasus
18.11.2020
Structure:
Skirmishes in N-K
The Four Days War
Six Weeks Armed conflict
Peace Agreement
Skirmishes in N-K
• In the years preceding 2014 total fatalities averaged 20–30 (2012 was the worst
year, with 34 fatalities reported), and in several years the number of non-combatrelated
deaths exceeded those resulting from enemy action.
• Three trends converged to alter this situation: increasing military capabilities on
both sides, changing military intent, and the marginalization of negotiations.
• Both sides’ military capabilities have substantially increased over recent years in
terms of the scale, sophistication and range of their arsenals. As a proportion of
GDP, Armenia and Azerbaijan have emerged as the biggest military spenders in the
post-Soviet space bar Russia.
• Globally, both countries have featured in the top 10 militarized states since 2011;
moreover, they are the only pair of states within the top 10 engaged in active
conflict with each other.
Skirmishes 2014

July 30 – August 4 flash skirmishes

–> 13 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and five Armenians died (mod.gov.az, August 4).

Azerbaijan accused Armenia of having “repeatedly violated the cease-fire regime by attacking positions of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan” (mfa.gov.az, August 3); Yerevan made a similar statement about the Azerbaijani
forces.

May 29 meeting - Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Moscow stated that Armenia should be admitted to the
future Eurasian Union only within its United Nations–recognized borders, i.e. not including Karabakh (armradio.am,
June 5).

The United States’ co-chair of the Minsk Group Ambassador James Warlick as well as the US ambassador to
Azerbaijan Richard Morningstar gave statements emphasizing a route to conflict resolution via restoring Azerbaijani’s
territorial integrity, in line with the Madrid Principles (carnegieendowment.org, May 7; apa.az, May 16).

Diplomatic failure for Armenia: sacrificed its European integration ambitions to join the Russian-led Eurasian Union,
in large part based on the assumption that Moscow would support it on the Karabakh issue.
The Four days war 2-5 April 2016
Violence along the Line of Contact – after the Nuclear Summit in Washington D.C.
Skirmishes since 2014 – signal of bigger violence, In the course of the fierce fighting, both
sides used all types of weapons at their disposal (tanks, heavy artillery, rocket launchers, and
to a limited extent air power), including the shelling of civilian targets.
Armenian Deputy defence Minister David Tonoian: Armenian move from a “static defense”
to more active deterrence mode as a respond to the 2014 August skirmishes.
Shair Ramaldanov - a retired Azerbaijani colonel - “(the aim) of the April war was to prevent
constant shelling of civilian settlements.The goal was to (protect) civilian settlements from
Armenia’s positions, especially in the Lele Tepe and Talish direction.”
Azerbaijan seized a sliver of territory.
Several hundreds deaths
Escalation of conflict

July 12/13 2020 fights erupted on the northern border of the two countries in the Armenian region of Tavush and
Azerbaijani region of Tovuz:

shelling and drone attacks

More than a dozen deaths, 15 soldiers (one Azerbaijani civilian died along a remote northern section of the border
and Armenian civilian has been wounded from an Azeri drone attack).

Specific trigger not clear, both Armenia and Azerbaijan blaming each other.

Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov: aim was „to prevent provocations and reduce the impact of gun emplacements
on our communities.“

Azerbaijan’s frontline posts - tactical disadvantages, resulting in more casualties. April 2016 offensive aimed to
strengthen Azerbaijan’s frontline positions: 1. in the north Seysulan/Talish Aghdere (Mardakert) direction with
minimal gains; 2. the Lele Tepe heights success and better tactical advantage.

The success of the April events resulted in a psychological boost for the Azerbaijani leadership, as well as for the
public.
Six weeks armed conflict in N-K
Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other of starting
deadly clashes that broke out on September 27, 2020.
Azerbaijan said it was launching a "counter-offensive" in
response to Armenian aggression.
Several thousand people have died and shelling has killed
civilians on both sides. Tens of thousands have fled their
homes.
Peace Agreement

On November 10, the agreement: Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia on the cessation of
hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh came into force. Along the line of contact of Nagorno
Karabakh and the Lachin corridor along the deploying peacekeepers Russia in the
amount of 1 960 troops with small arms, 90 armored personnel carriers, 380 units of
automobile and special equipment.

On November 11, the defense ministers of Russia and Turkey signed a memorandum
on the establishment of a joint center to control the observance of the ceasefire in
Nagorno-Karabakh. He will be located on the territory of Azerbaijan and will collect,
generalize and verify information on the observance of the truce in NagornoKarabakh.
The center will also consider complaints, questions or problems related to
violations of agreements, the Russian Defense Ministry said ( https://www.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/356532/)
Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime
Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian
Federation
1. A complete ceasefire and all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are
announced from 00:00 hours Moscow time on November 10, 2020. The Republic of
Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, stop at their
positions.
2. Aghdam region is returned to the Republic of Azerbaijan until November 20, 2020.
3. Along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor, a
peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is deployed in the amount of 1,960
servicemen with small arms, 90 armed personnel carriers, 380 units of automobile and special
equipment.
4. The peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is being deployed in parallel with
the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces. The duration of the stay of the peacekeeping
contingent of the Russian Federation is 5 years with automatic extension for the next 5-year
periods, if none of the Parties declares 6 months before the expiration of the period of
intention to terminate the application of this provision.
Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime
Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian
Federation

5. In order to increase the effectiveness of control over the implementation of the agreements by the Parties to the
conflict, a peacekeeping center is being deployed to control the ceasefire.

6. The Republic of Armenia will return the Kelbajar region to the Republic of Azerbaijan by November 15, 2020, and
the Lachin region by December 1, 2020. The Lachin corridor (5 km wide), which will ensure the connection between
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and at the same time will not affect the city of Shusha, remains under the control of
the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation.

By agreement of the Parties, a plan for the construction of a new route along the Lachin corridor will be determined in
the next three years, providing communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, with the subsequent
redeployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to protect this route.

The Republic of Azerbaijan guarantees the safety of traffic along the Lachin corridor of citizens, vehicles and goods in
both directions.

7. Internally displaced persons and refugees return to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas under the
control of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

8. The exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons and bodies of the dead is carried out.

9. All economic and transport links in the region are unblocked. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the safety of
transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic
with the aim of organizing the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions. Control over
transport communication is carried out by the bodies of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia.
Peace Agreemnt

The return of 5 regions adjacent to N-K
would be more profitable for Amenia, but the
society was not ready in accordance to
Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan.

„This is a big setback for us, a big
catastrophe, a big mourning for the lost lives
(...) We fell, but we did not slide into the
abyss, we made the decision to stop in time.
Otherwise, our condition would be much
worse. Lessons must be learned, this can help
the future development of our country“
(www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/356328/)
Protests in Yerevan against the Peace Agreement

The Yerevanians, dissatisfied with
the signing of a peace agreement
with Azerbaijan, broke into the
building of the Armenian
government last night and
demanded Nikol Pashinyan's
resignation.

The protesters also attacked the
speaker of the Armenian parliament
Ararat Mirzoyan and beat him.
The role of Russia and Turkey

Turkey

Since the fighting started on Sunday, Turkey has
declared its unconditional support to Azerbaijan,
and appears to be lending Azerbaijani various
kinds of military capability. There is little doubt
that highly regarded Turkish military drone
technology is being deployed.

Yerevan has also accused Ankara of shooting
down an Armenian SU-25 aircraft on 29
September, which Ankara denies. Although such
claims have been made before and found to be
untrue, there are also unconfirmed - but growing claims
that Turkey has mobilised mercenaries
from Syria to fight for Azerbaijan.

Russia

Russia plays diverse, often contradictory, roles in the
conflict. Through bilateral ties and the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation, Moscow provides
Armenia with security guarantees, but these do not
extend to the combat zone in Nagorno-Karabakh,
which is internationally recognised as part of
Azerbaijan. Moscow also supplies weapons to both
sides and is one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group
mediating the conflict.

Moscow has an uneasy relationship with Armenia's
new post-2018 leader Nikol Pashinyan,

Russia was not able in the 1990s to deploy
peacekeeping forces on the ground in Nagorno-
Karabakh.