EXAMINING ARMED CONFLICT: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON SELECTED ASPECTS

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CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

Studies on armed conflicts are among the traditional themes of international relations. Neither the theoretical, nor the practical importance of this issue is declining in any way. It is an extremely complex research field, integrating a plethora of findings from international relations, social sciences, as well as natural sciences. The complexity of the issue exacts a plurality of theoretical and methodological approaches in examining the phenomenon of wars. Consolidating obtained findings into a homogenous and coherent framework can, however, be even more demanding. This work represents a contribution to ongoing academic discussion in all major areas currently relevant to armed conflict research while identifying the main issues of academic debate and analyzing their shared features.

The chapter on international relations theory surveys the main approaches of the discipline toward the causes of wars and seeks to answer whether international relations have come closer to the development of a general theory concerning the causes of war. Theoretical comprehension of the causes of war is among the oldest and most developed issues in international relations theory. It is also exceptionally fruitful from an academic perspective while maintaining the greatest overlap with everyday international politics routine in practice.

Humanitarian intervention represents a contested concept of military action undertaken on behalf of populations subjected to flagrant persecution either from their own state or from other actors in a situation where their state is unable or unwilling to rectify the situation. The next chapter shows that even though the application of this concept is predominantly considered illegal from the perspective of international law, it is promoted by multiple thinkers. The chapter subsequently sheds light on the position of this concept within various theories of international relations and describes the development of the concept in connection with the RtoP doctrine. Fundamental criteria for humanitarian intervention are outlined as a conclusion and exemplified in empirical applications.

The chapter on typologies of conflicts develops a conceptual framework for studying and understanding armed conflict after the end of the Cold War. The objective is to clarify the contested narratives about the nature of armed conflicts and address the puzzling nature of the phenomenon. By proposing a typology of armed conflicts, the study seeks to achieve analytical clarity and to present a constructive analysis of issues that are at stake during the dynamic course of conflicts. This approach, typological theorizing, provides a rich depiction of involved phenomena and brings a more nuanced and explicit distinction to the understanding of the heterogenic nature of armed conflict while enhancing our knowledge of conflict processes and their characteristic features.

International organizations emerged as standard international relations entities through the course of the 20th century. Their growing role in international politics has been reflected by increasing research interest formulating theories on the rise of international organizations, their operation, and influence upon international politics, including the pertinent question of whether international organizations can prevent war by changing state behavior. There are approximately 250 international organizations at present; those playing an important role in conflict resolution have been selected for analysis. While the United Nations hold a superior position as the only global international organization of essential relevance with the primary goal of maintaining international order and security, three other regional organizations with significant contributions to conflict resolution were also analyzed – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Each of these organizations provides us with specific know-how putting them in a distinctive position within the international system.

The chapter on responding to armed conflicts via arms embargoes analyzes the position of this instrument in the current spectrum of tools employed by the international community toward conflict management. The primary focus is set on the distinct theoretical and practical attributes of arms embargoes setting them apart from alternate approaches. The contribution attempts to explain the existing disparities between the ill repute of arms embargoes and their frequent application, between their comparative advantages and flaws in their design,

and between the existing implementation capacities and key challenges to their effectiveness. Approached as a smart sanction instrument, arms embargoes are moreover contrasted with the specific hindrances posed by new armed conflicts.

Rather than trying to find an answer to the "essential question" of international relations, the book's authors strove to identify the main issues relevant to current war and peace studies and find the underlying links between them. It remains for the reader to decide to what degree this effort has succeeded.

1. THE NEVER ENDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STORY: THEORIES DEALING WITH THE CAUSES OF WARS

Zdeněk Kříž

1.1 Introduction

International relations (IR) as an autonomous academic discipline was eventually formed in the interwar era and it set quite an explicit goal – to contribute to the studies of wars and especially to prevent their re-occurrence. Hence the new discipline responded to the existing demand in a society recovering from the horrors of World War I. It had a purely practical task that could hardly be questioned in the social atmosphere of that time. Then as well as nowadays, to fulfill this ambition, it is necessary to pay attention to the study of the causes of wars. Therefore, theories dealing with the studies of the causes of wars are an essential part of the tradition of international relations.

Empirical theory is an organized system of abstract statements about relationships between elements in a specific delineated area and it is the key element of every science. By the notion of empirical theory, we refer to theories with descriptive-explanatory ambition that are falsifiable. Empirical theory enables us to describe the examined empirical reality arranged in abstractly defined categories between which relationships of dependency are sought. Empirical theory makes space for formulating and testing hypotheses. From a falsifiable empirical theory, it is possible to derive basic statements arguing that a certain phenomenon exists in the real, empirical world. This Popperian process of falsifiability has three stages. In the first stage, a presupposition is derived from the theory by means of deduction in the form of a falsifiable hypothesis. In the second stage, basic statements, i.e. empirical consequences, are deduced from the hypothesis. Consequently, in the third stage we compare basic statements with the data of the empirical world that can be acquired by means of various methods of data collection (e.g. observations, historical reconstruction based on the study of

archival resources, structured interviews, questionnaires, etc.). A good-quality empirical theory allows us both to understand and explain the examined phenomena. Only on the basis of good-quality empirical theory is it possible to make reliable predictions as to whose probability of fulfillment is greater than only random. Theory and empirical evidence represent two sides of the coin, i.e. knowledge. Naïve empiricism, i.e. faith that one can approach the examined reality without prior understanding of the issue provided by the theory can exceptionally lead to new findings, yet there is less and less space for it in academically-oriented research. The main problem of naïve empiricism lies in the fact that our pre-understanding affects to which phenomena of the empirical world we pay attention and to which we do not (Hendl 2009: 27–33). Hence it is essential to focus on the theoretical cognition of the causes of wars, which must go hand in hand with empirical evidence.

Theories dealing with the causes of wars developed against the background of the development of the general IR theory within the framework of individual great debates paying attention to other phenomena as well. Hence it is impossible to separate theories about the causes of wars and the general theory of international relations from each other. Despite that, it is evident that international relations theories deal with the causes of wars with different intensity. Especially in the early stages of the development of international relations as an academic discipline, the emphasis on the study of the causes of wars was greater than nowadays, which was manifested both in realism and idealism. It does not mean that the present-day theory of international relations would neglect this issue. There is only a relative decline in the importance of the study of wars in international relations theory, as the modern theory of this discipline deals with a greater range of topics than in the past. The study of wars and their causes definitely does not belong to under-theorized issues of international relations.

In his classic book *The Man, State and War*, Kenneth Waltz classified existing international relations theories according to the level of analysis at which the causes of war are sought.[1] Waltz speaks of the theories of the first, second and third image. First image theories seek the causes

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[1] Waltz himself did not use this notion. It was introduced by David Singer in the early 1960s.

of wars at the level of the biological and psychological characteristics of human beings as an animal species. Second image theories concentrate on the level of the basic building unit of the international system, the state. The third image theories are systemic theories deriving the existence of war from the qualities of the international relations system (Waltz 1979). The obvious weakness of Waltz's approach is that many theories cannot be classified so unequivocally. For instance, it is difficult to classify geopolitical theories regarding geographic determinants as a determining independent variable affecting the behavior of a state (dependent variable) and hence also its belligerence. Applying this system consistently, foreign policy should depend on exactly measurable and quantifiable parameters of the natural environment. Furthermore, theories based on the application of game theory and stimulus response theory are also hard to classify. Their conclusions are relevant for decision-making in all the images. Last but not least, Marxist theories and all their variations include in their analysis both the second and the third image. Therefore, the small-group level and dyadic international level are used as well. The small-group level solves the issue of decision-making at the governmental level and the dyadic international level deals with the relations between direct actors of war (Cashman 2000: 13).

Furthermore, one must also take into account that besides empirical theories striving for the description and explanation of phenomena present in the international system, there are also normative approaches referred to in scholarly literature as normative theories. As opposed to empirical theories, which have descriptive and explanatory ambition, their aim is not to explain the phenomena of the empirical world, but to determine ethical and legal norms to which international relations should conform. Above all, this is the ancient concept of just war and the modern concept of humanitarian (military) intervention. To make the entire problem more intricate, many theories with descriptive explanatory ambition also comprise strong prescriptive features. These tendencies can be found in authors dealing with war and peace in the realist, liberal and Marxist traditions.

Due to the impossibility of classifying the majority of the main theories into categories defined by Waltz's images, this text will proceed in a different way. First, we will introduce biological and psychologi-

cal theories. It is clearly evident that their content is relevant for our discipline. If Homo sapiens had not been predisposed to perpetrate violence, wars as its extreme form could not exist at all. After that, we will pay attention to Marxist and liberal theories. These schools of international relations theory pay attention to both Waltz's second and third image. It is crucial that they analyze the intuitive presumption of a different predisposition of various political regimes to violence in general and wars in particular. Finally, we will end our explanation with realism and neorealism, placing great stress, or even exclusive stress in the case of neorealism, on the level of the international system.

1.2 Biological and psychological theories about the causes of wars

Biological and psychological theories seek the causes of wars at the level of biological and psychological parameters of humans as an animal species, i.e. in other words, in evil human nature. According to the classical classification by Waltz, it is the first image theory (Waltz 1979). Perhaps it could be argued that for this reason they do not come exclusively under the field of interest of social sciences, where international relations also belong. Nevertheless, they do have a direct impact on our discipline, which benefits from them. It is the multidisciplinary study of the phenomenon of war that is a promising area of research. Last but not least, the system of international relations exists just because people form it via their spontaneous and controlled actions too. Therefore, it is impossible to dismiss the argument that human biological and psychological characteristics as an animal species affect the form and functioning of international relations easily.

Looking for causes of wars in human nature has a long tradition and this approach can already be found in the proto-theories of international relations. After all, St. Augustine perceived as the cause of wars man's desire to dominate (libido dominandi); man, who lost his virtue given by God through original sin (Thompson 1994: 44–53). Furthermore, it can be deduced also from Thomas Hobbes's concept of the state of nature as war of all against all that Hobbes regarded man as a priori aggressive and violent, i.e. an evil individual (Hobbes 2008: 66–69).

In the modern view, these numerous theories are rooted in the works of Sigmund Freud. However, that does not mean that they would adopt Freud's opinions mechanically. Freud's untestable (and hence controversial) theories, grounded more likely in abstract speculations than empirically verified data, are based on the belief that human beings are affected by impulses to destroy. Hence aggression is not man's reaction to an outside stimulus, but a permanently present force. People destroy because it brings them satisfaction. In this respect, Freud speaks of Eros as the life instinct and Tantalus as the death instinct (Fromm 2007: 29).

In biological and psychological theories, causes of wars are sought in instincts and human passions. According to these theories, human aggressive behavior stems from the phylogenetic programed innate aggressive instinct that is manifested in aggressive, destructive and sadistic behavior. However, as is emphasized by Erich Fromm, two different types of aggression are characteristic in man. The first type is benign defensive aggression urging humans to fight or flee in case of danger. This type of aggression is something that human beings share with other animal species. The second type of aggression is evil, malign aggression, which is exclusively human and leads to aggressive behavior, the purpose of which is not to survive but to inflict pain on others for one's own pleasure. In his time, Fromm held the opinion that humans were the only primates that killed just for pleasure and fun and not only from their desire to survive (Fromm 2007: 29). However, the latest research implies that humankind may not have this exclusivity.

Jane Goodall's observations show that killing for pleasure may not be exclusive only to Homo sapiens. Similar types of attacks have been observed also in chimpanzees. Goodall documented many attacks between two groups of chimpanzees, not excluding even attacks on females. Attacks on females were brutal, as they do not represent a physical threat for males. The attacker had no evident benefit from the attacks. Killing the young was usually not the goal and even when it was, the attacker was not able to conceive new young with the female if he had killed the old offspring. According to Goodall, such behavior is caused by the animosity of chimpanzees carrying out the attacks. It is especially males between 14 and 18 years of age that incite these encounters. Females on the verge of adulthood are not attacked in this

way and sometimes become the members of the new group. Goodall provided evidence that troops of chimpanzees can split in new groups and become enemies. It was observed that one group established in this way systematically eliminated another one and consequently had to face similar pressure of a neighboring stronger group. Cases of cannibalism were even observed in chimpanzees. These observations show that chimpanzees are able to calculate the proportion of forces and if it is inauspicious, they do not escalate the clashes. On the whole, it is questionable how to interpret these data and it is not the aim of this text either. However, it is evident from these observations that social behavior that is referred to as war in human beings need not be the invention of the Homo sapiens species. Generally speaking, Goodall's observations and work have led to the conclusion so far that chimpanzees, our close relatives, have very similar patterns of behavior as Homo sapiens regarding intraspecies behavior. It is a territorial species, whose members, when in conflict with members inhabiting another territory, use force that resembles "wars" (Goodall 1996).

Theories about innate human aggression as the main cause of wars were especially popular in the 1960s. As the main works of this ethological movement, we can regard the works of Konrad Lorenz *Das Sogenannte Böse* (So-called Evil), and his successors, such as the text *Liebe und Hass* (Love and Hate) by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt. Their reflections are related to intraspecies violence, as its contribution, as opposed to interspecies violence to preserve the species, is questionable and sometimes also counterproductive. Lorenz adopts Hobbes's thesis about the initial state of "war of all against all", which he applies on Neolithic cultures of hunters and gatherers. He assumes there was a state of permanent hostility between them. In this ethological view, war is a phenomenon that cannot be avoided. Aggression, which should be spontaneous, became an instinct in their concepts. Lorenz refutes the opinion that aggression is a reactive behavior and poses his drive-discharge model against this thesis. According to the model, the energy of the aggressive instinct is accumulated in the body and looks for an opportunity to be released (the so-called catharsis). If it is not vented naturally (fighting, rivalry), it can be released by other stimuli. According to the ethological approach, aggression became a human instinct as a result of phylogenetic adaptation. Lorenz believes that aggression, including intraspecies

aggression, plays a crucial role in preserving the species, as it maintains equilibrium in the territory between the population and sources, helps defend the young, contributes to the survival of the most able and plays a major role in establishing social relationships. Lorenz does not think that intraspecies aggression is dangerous from the perspective of species preservation. Nevertheless, he states that even though aggression in general serves the survival of the species, this instinct has become too strong in humans and hence it puts them in danger as a species. Moreover, Lorenz claims that people are the only animal species that routinely kill themselves (Lorenz 2007). However, this thesis is called into question today, as current research confirms that intraspecies violence is not characteristic only of human beings, as was shown in the aforementioned parts dedicated to Goodall's observations. On the other hand, available empirical data do not yet refute the argument that intraspecies violence is much more developed in people than in other species. In fact, Goodall, too, claims that such extreme violence is very rare among chimpanzees (Goodall 1996). According to ethologists, the development of modern science and technology has resulted in a discrepancy between people's physical abilities to kill and their instincts. Modern technologies have offered humanity the possibility of mass murder, yet evolution has not equipped it with inhibitions in the form of instinct to use these technologies. Moreover, according to ethologists, institutional mechanisms decelerating violence are not sufficient either. Furthermore, Lorenz supposes that modern man has few opportunities to vent this aggressive instinct. Therefore, according to Lorenz, war in modern times waged in an extreme case by means of weapons of mass destruction, is no longer a tool serving the preservation of the species, but a threat to the survival of Homo sapiens (Lorenz 2007).

If Lorenz attributes violence occurring in primitive tribes to human nature, Eibl-Eibesfeldt integrates violence into the process of cultural evolution. In this concept, the natural ability of Homo sapiens to commit violence contributes to cultural evolution. Hence cultural evolution depends on biological pre-evolution. Aggression by which the group delineates its territory contributes to the development of group identity. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, too, emphasizes the crucial role of weapons enabling people to commit more intensive violence and kill members of other groups. In his opinion, an important factor enhancing intergroup

aggression is the fear of foreigners, and war is a cultural mechanism enabling the group to keep foreigners on the outside. Violence and its extreme form, i.e. war, despite being accompanied by many negative phenomena, has a major impact on cultural evolution (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 2005: 88–93).

When evaluating ethological theories, we also need to take into consideration that in humanity, war is a possible, yet exceptional inter-action. Although the history of international politics is interpreted by many authors as the history of wars, only a minority of political issues has been and still is solved by wars. The vast majority of interactions between states takes place in a peaceful mode and modern society shows tendencies more likely towards mitigating violence than its in-crease, as was shown by Steven Pinker in his famous book *The Better Angels of our Nature. The Decline of Violence in History and its Causes* (Pinker 2011). Regarding ethological theories, the question arises as to whether it could be possible to interpret this in the light of the social evolution of mechanisms reducing the discrepancy between people's abilities to kill and insufficient institutional mechanisms that would prohibit people from doing so.

A relatively strong opposition was formed against Lorenz's approach opposing this allegedly fatalistic approach. In this respect, let us men-tion the well-known Seville Statement of 20 scientists from 1986 that was adopted by UNESCO in 1989. These scientists object to the argu-ment that the tendency to wage wars was inherited by humanity from its predecessors, that Homo sapiens is genetically programmed for war and other forms of violence, that human evolution has preferred the choice of aggressive behavior and rewarded it, that the human brain is inclined towards violence and that war is caused by human instincts. At the end, the document states that "*we conclude that biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism…*" (Ginsburg 2005: 94–96). Already in its time, the Seville Statement met with criticism from the advocates of the thesis of the evil nature of humankind. Also nowadays, within interdisciplinary procedures in studying wars that are typical in par-ticular by combining the international relations theory with Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory, the first image theories have become popular once again.

In his book *Darwin and International Relations: On the evolutionary origins of war and ethnic conflict,* Bradley A. Thayer made a coherent and very sophisticated contribution to this discussion (Thayer 2004). Thayer, who is one of the realist authors, has reached the conclusion that human nature is an important phenomenon that must be taken into consideration in the international relations theory. He believes that the biological theory of evolution supports the initial presumptions of classical realism included in the works by Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. Human egoism is, in his opinion, an integral part of hu-man nature, as it is the product of the process of evolution driven by natural selection. According to Thayer, our antecedents used armed force in order to make gains and protect resources, and hence it is no surprise that other natural species capable of social life also show war-rior-like behavior. Wars developed in humanity exactly because it is an efficient way of gaining and protecting precious resources. Moreover, Thayer has also come to the conclusion that wars are definitely not a phenomenon occurring exclusively in Homo sapiens. People did not have to invent war; the process of evolution did it for them. Last but not least, Thayer pays attention to epidemics as playing a crucial role in international relations too; as is shown in history, they are able to significantly contribute to the fall of rich and powerful empires (Thayer 2004). The most valuable contribution of applying the procedures of Darwinism and evolutionary biology on international relations is the return to the original realist thesis, i.e. the thesis about the evil nature of man, which has again become a crucial starting point of realist re-flections.

In general, we can argue that there are the following controversial points of the first image theory. (1) Is aggression really an instinct or a reaction to the stimuli from the environment? (2) Is it possible to transfer conclusions reached on the basis of observing other species (reptiles, birds) to people? (3) Is the monocausal explanation of such a complex social phenomenon as war maintainable? (4) Is it possible to test ethological theories empirically? (5) What are the empirical (e.g. anatomical) proofs for the drive-discharge model of aggression? (6) What is territoriality based upon? Is it based on the biological basis, as is claimed by ethologists, or the cultural basis, as is claimed by social psychologists? (Cashman 2000: 22–23).

The main direction of the criticism of the first image theories argues by saying that human aggression is a reactive phenomenon whereby people react with aggression to the stimuli from the outside environment. To support their conclusions, Lorenz's critics use as their arguments empirical cases of primitive societies that hardly know aggressive behavior. Fromm argues in a similar tone. However, his line of argumentation trying to explain the causes of wars is part of the Marxist theory and will be dealt with elsewhere. The main weaknesses of Lorenz's conclusions are both that they are difficult to verify empirically, and the empirical basis on which they were formed – i.e. formulating theories originating by observing other animal species than Homo sapiens. Moreover, the problem also is that if Lorenz's theses were true, there would have to be a negative selective choice in the evolutionary process, which is highly esteemed by Lorenz and other ethologists. Aggressive individuals would lose their lives more often and their increased aggression would not be handed down to further generations (Fromm 2007: 27–46).

Looking at the whole issue of causes of wars in its entirety, it cannot be doubted that without the predisposition of humans as an animal species to commit violence, wars could not exist. On the other hand, these theories seeking the causes of wars in the nature of Homo sapiens are not capable of explaining an absolutely evident fact that war is a minor form of interaction between states in the system of international relations and violence a minor phenomenon in society. Moreover, empirical evidence also suggests that there may be a correlation between the state's character and its greed for war, as is actually presupposed by the theory of democratic peace. If things are the way they appear, it is a great challenge to all theories looking for the causes of wars in human nature. In other words, besides human nature, other variables also participate in the origin of wars, which are not dealt with in biological and psychological theories. The evil human nature is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for war. However, these variables are at the center of attention of other theories.

1.3 Marxism and neo-Marxism

1.3.1 Key assumptions of the Marxist Social Theory

Marxism, a very influential stream of social theory that is rooted in the 19th century, was founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who built upon the works of the utopian socialists like Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier and Robert Owen (Muravchik 2003). In a way, the very term "utopian socialist" can be perceived as a Marxist denouncement of the pre-Marxist thinkers. However, unlike the so-called scientific socialists like Marx, Engels, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong, these thinkers actually tried to test and verify at grassroots level the viability of their socialist theories. We should, therefore, ask whether the term "utopianism" should not rather be related to the works of the scientific socialists, i.e. to the Marxist mainstream.

Not only is Marxism a very rich social theory that manifests itself in philosophy, sociology, history, political science, and international relations, but it is also an ideology defined as a set of ideas that aspire to legitimize a specific distribution of power in a society and, thus, a particular social order. Therefore, since Marxism tries to change the world so as to correspond to its own beliefs, it can also be seen as influential constitutive approach. However, while it is necessary to differentiate between these two manifestations of Marxism, it is at the same time very difficult as they are closely interconnected. All streams of the multifaceted Marxist social theory and political ideology – including both Marxism-Leninism, theoretically and practically developed by Lenin and Stalin, and neo-Marxism in which distinguished roles have been performed by Fromm and Immanuel Wallerstein – basically depart from the ideational legacy of Marx and Engels. In general, Marxism and its sub-varieties represent theories that identify the causes of war in the second and third image, i.e. in the states and in the international system respectively.

Marxist theories dealing with war depart from several key assumptions based upon the principle of historical materialism. The changes in material production are supposed to have an imminent impact upon the character of the social order and result in shifting the socio-economic order. For Marxists, the change in the mode of production is followed

by changes in the ways of thinking, since the views of individuals are predestined by the material basis of the society. In the Marxist jargon, the changes in the production forces interfere with the mode of production, i.e. with production relations and the ownership structures. Therefore, as the Marxists argue, if we want to understand the causes and the dynamics of social changes, we need to pay attention to the economics of the era – and the same can be said about the studies of war.

The idea of the class struggle constitutes another cornerstone of Marxist political theory. The class struggle, allegedly the driving force behind social changes, is supposed to occur in all kinds of societies based on the private ownership of the modes of production. The Marxists define classes in terms of their relations to the modes of production: for them, the classes can in principle be divided into two categories: the exploitative that own the modes of production, and the exploited that do not. In Marxism, the class struggle is perceived as a causal mechanism that allows for revolutionary changes in the socio-economic orders ranging from the primitive communal society through slave society, feudalism, and capitalism up to socialist and communist societies.

1.3.2 The causes of war in the political theory of Marxism

Marxism perceives most of the classical issues of the international relations as secondary; however, this does not mean Marxist theory and ideology refrain from addressing them. The study of war has constituted a relevant issue area since the very beginnings of Marxism as is evidenced by two crucial Marxist works: *The Civil War in France* by Marx and *The Peasant War in Germany* by Engels (Marx and Engels 1976; Engels 1950). For the Marxists, war is a historically conditioned phenomenon rooted in the exploitative socio-economic order. The causes of war are thus sought after in the social structures of the society; moreover, the Marxists – although they also pay obvious attention to the level of the international system – in their majority consider it decisive that this system is constituted and shaped by the capitalist states. In the socio-economic order, war represents the function of a state, as it is caused by the interests of the ruling political classes that use the war to promote their economic, social, and power-

politics goals. War is both a part and the consequence of broader political relations. In various socio-economic orders, the specific causes of war are different since they are the result of particular historical developments. As Jaroslav Javůrek states, the cause of war in the slave socio-economic order is supposed to have been found in the exploiters' aspiration to gain hosts of new slaves. In feudalism, the cause of war should consist in the subjugation of new vassals, while in capitalism it should follow from the contestation of various national capitalists who strive to change the balance of power in the world and to achieve its reconfiguration (Javůrek 1975: 22–24). Marxists pay special attention to the fact that wars are prepared intentionally and for a long time, and never break out haphazardly and incidentally (Javůrek 1975: 31–32). The class character of the society, the Marxists argue, constitutes the decisive element that shapes the character of the international system and is responsible for the emergence of wars. The distribution of power within the system is sidetracked in their considerations.

The original theory of Marxism was enriched by Lenin who internalized and further elaborated some thoughts presented by the British Marxist thinker John A. Hobson (Hobson 1965), while paying special attention to the highest stage of capitalism – imperialism. To differentiate this new – according to the Marxists – form of imperialism from its older versions, Lenin argued the major feature of the most recent form of capitalism could be seen in the dominion of the monopolist unions of big entrepreneurs or, in other words, that imperialism could be interpreted as the monopolistic stage of capitalism (Lenin 1946: 86, 96). In the era of imperialism, war represents a tool to reconfigure a world that has already been partitioned. Given the unequal development of capitalism in respective countries, the states that initially lagged behind the others and failed to participate in the first partition of the world seek to earn their own share, gain access to natural resources and markets, and create their own spheres of influence. These efforts are necessitated by the extent of the concentration of the capital; moreover, as Lenin argues, the economic expansion beyond the boundaries of a national state and the related wars are necessary to guarantee the survival of the capitalist system. Consequently, imperialist states (in the Marxist understanding) wage mutual wars and, in turn, these particular wars occur much more frequently than in the past as only very few unoc-

cupied territories are left in the world. International relations are thus interpreted as a zero-sum game in which the benefit gained by an actor inevitably means the other actors have to lose.

As Lenin argues, the more intense the internal exploitation within the capitalist states is, the more aggressive the imperialist states are beyond their borders, since wars can also be utilized to employ false slogans highlighting the chances to gain new territories and resources sufficient for the surplus of population, thus diverting the attention of the exploited domestic classes to external expansion. An important role is also played by the military-industrial complex, i.e. the alliance of the military elites and the producers of the military equipment that share an interest in the occurrence of wars, since the military-industrial complex directly benefits from wars. As long as there is a capitalist system based on the private ownership of the means of production, there will also be wars (Lenin 1946).

The Marxist agenda, focused on the elimination of wars, departs from the very roots of the theory. However praiseworthy the campaign against war, based on moral arguments, may be according to the majority of Marxists (Lenin being an exception), it cannot produce the desired results. If, according to the Marxists, the causes of war are derived from the exploitative nature of the existing societies, then in their judgment wars can only be eliminated by surplanting those socio-economic orders that are based on exploitation. In other words, thus, the peaceful future of mankind can be ensured by the victory of socialism in the whole universe (Javůrek 1975: 97–99). As Lenin stated, the goal is to establish a socialist social order that will eliminate the division of mankind into classes and, subsequently, also the occurrence of wars (Lenin 1956: 398). Should these social changes result in the constitution of a global federation of socialist republics, as Lenin and Stalin dreamt about, the international system as such would be abolished. The Marxist way to overcome wars consists in a radical, revolutionary change of society that will lead to the transformation of the international order. For these revolutionaries, no price is too high if, once it is paid, it enables such a revolutionary change of the international order that eliminates all wars. To establish such peace, the revolutionaries believe it is possible to make use of any available means, regardless of whether these are acceptable in terms of the existing morals and ethics.

The view, as applied in the theory of Marxism, regarding the chances of maintaining peace given the presence of the global capitalist order and the coexistence of capitalism and socialism has undergone a number of modifications. Once it became clear the export of global revolution into the advanced Western states had failed, Lenin began to promulgate the idea of the peaceful coexistence of states based on different social orders. Therefore, since socialism in the Soviet Union was in need of reinforcement, he promoted the idea that it was necessary to establish economic co-operation with the West (Lenin 1955: 212–213). However, the arguments advocating peaceful co-existence did not rely upon any theoretical background; rather, they were part of an externally-driven policy. Once the Soviet Union had grown stronger – and the Western states substantially contributed to this development – Stalin, pupil of Lenin, came to a different conclusion: he believed under these new conditions that war was inevitable and it was thus necessary to seek a transformation of war from an imperialist war into a socialist one, i.e. the war that would destroy capitalism and achieve the final victory of socialism. Consequently, he actively worked towards the emergence of an environment favorable for the occurrence of an imperialist war, and made very conspicuous contribution to the outbreak of World War II by the infamous 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Crozier 2004: 447–449).

At any rate, according to the neo-Stalinist Marxists, war between the capitalist and socialist worlds was not inevitable since the peace was guaranteed by the existence of militarily and economically strong global socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. Since as a consequence of the movements for national liberation and against colonialism global capitalism had lost its dominant position, it was possible to avoid a war (Javůrek 1975: 101–103). However, such arguments belong among the ideas of realism and neorealism rather than Marxism as they rely upon the change in the global distribution of power, or upon the idea that a balance of power between the capitalism and socialism can be established. For the Marxists, it is only the expansion of socialism that can create an area of lasting peace in which wars are impossible (Javůrek 1975: 103–104). Basically, this is a socialist version of the liberal Democratic Peace Theory.

Although after World War II Marxist political theory in its various forms acquired a dominant position in the Western social sciences and,

as political ideology, also in Western political practices, it must face – as every great theory – various criticisms. First, the Marxist approach sharply contradicts the liberal theories that hold that peace is brought about by the economic interconnectedness of the world based upon the market economy (i.e., in the Marxist jargon, capitalism), which makes war unprofitable. Moreover, it is obvious that only a minority of capitalist states embarked upon the course of imperial expansion. To the contrary, there are doubts as to the capitalist nature of the economic systems of several strong imperialist states of the past, e.g. Russia and Japan (Cashman 2000: 133). It is thus questionable whether capitalism inevitably produces an imperial expansion that results in wars. Last but not least, the socialist states that according to Marxism are closest to the classless society are not really peaceful either. Although Marxist political theory is able to explain their bellicosity in relation to non-socialist states, as evidenced for example by the Soviet attack against Finland in 1939, the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union in 1940, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, it fails to explain – and does not really try to, while at the same time neglecting the available data – the wars between both the socialist states, and those on the road towards socialism: see for example the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, the Soviet-led invasion of the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia in 1968 that, however, given the Czechoslovak decision not to resort to military defense, did not develop into a full-scale war in terms of casualties, the Sino-Soviet war in 1969, the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979, the Sino-Indian war in 1962, and the Vietnamese invasion into Cambodia in 1979 that was connected to the Sino-Vietnamese war of the same year. Since, except in the case of Czechoslovakia, these armed conflicts comply with generally acknowledged criteria of war, we can express serious doubts about the peacefulness of the socialist states as stipulated by the Marxist political theory.

1.3.3 The neo-Marxist varieties

While the classical political theory of Marxism – despite its primary focus on the studies of economic and social processes – pays quite extensive attention to the phenomenon of war, contemporary neo-Marxism is less attentive. This is evident also in the World-System Theory presented by Wallerstein, which is probably the most influential political theory of neo-Marxism. Wallerstein argues the contemporary world is dominated by the capitalist world-economy, understood as the antipode of traditional system, i.e. the world-empire. The world-economy emerged in the West in the 16th century and currently incorporates the whole world. According to Wallerstein, it consists of the core, periphery, and semiperiphery (Wallerstein 1993). Here Wallerstein's concept conspicuously resembles Lenin's approach, as Lenin, when analyzing imperialism, states the imperialist era is characterized not only by the existence of colonies and colonial countries but also by the presence of states immersed in financial and diplomatic interdependence. In other worlds, the concept consisting of the core, periphery, and semi-periphery had been outlined by Lenin (Lenin 1946: 89) a long time before Wallerstein presented his theory. The World-System Theory pays only secondary attention to the causes of war; however, it understands war as a consequence of economic developments while it also makes it possible to deduce that war is perceived as a tool to seek a balance within the system and supplant the hegemon. Wallerstein introduces the concept of systemic war utilized as a tool by which the hegemon reinforces its power in the system, or which is applied by a state that seeks a hegemonic position to undermine the power of the existing hegemon. The Thirty Years War, Napoleonic Wars, and both World Wars are presented by Wallerstein as examples of such conflicts (Wallerstein 1993).

Fromm, another influential neo-Marxist who can be ranked among the theoreticians seeking to discover the causes of war at the societal level, also paid very thorough attention to war. Fromm rejects the idea of the Hobbesian state of nature. Departing from the analysis of the anthropologic researches of the surviving primitive hunter-gatherers cultures, he concludes that in comparison with the modern man these cultures were relatively less aggressive. Hence he deduces the prehistoric hunters and gatherers about whom we have very little information (or none) behaved in a similar way. Following his studies of these cultures Fromm concluded the love of property was not inherent to man but rather represented a behavioral pattern gained through socialization. Fromm also concluded that the psychology of dominance and subservience is derived from the social order (Fromm 2007: 147).

These findings were generalized by Fromm so as to state that man only acquired the ability to wage a war in the latter stages of societal development since society became differentiated on the basis of unequal access to the modes of production. According to him, such a process must have occurred during the Neolithic revolution, especially in its late stage when the first patriarchal city states began to emerge. Fromm argues the more advanced a society is in terms of the socio-economic orders as identified by the Marxists, the more bellicose it is. Fromm conducted a meta-analysis of thirty so-called primitive tribes which made him conclude that three systems could be identified: the society of positive attitude, non-destructive aggressive society, and destructive society. In positive societies, violence is almost non-existent and wars do not occur at all; moreover, in these societies there is no private ownership of the modes of production and only minimal level of the social and power stratification. Non-destructive aggressive societies can experience violence and war but these are just peripheral phenomena. But destructive societies are imbued with violence – and it does not come as a surprise that Fromm, being neo-Marxist, blames private ownership for this condition. In summary, following the criticism of the instinctivist theories, Fromm concluded aggression and destructiveness were not innate but derived from a socio-cultural environment (Fromm 2007: 136–185). As regards war as the extreme form of aggression, Fromm rejects the idea it follows from inherent predispositions (Fromm 2007: 211). For him, war represents an action that is organized and carefully planned and which leaves no space for a sudden outburst of emotions or the venting of aggressive instincts. War is made possible by the organization of human societies and especially by the respect of authority and willingness to follow orders. According to Fromm, war is always an instrumental act (Fromm 2007: 215). The only way to eliminate wars consists in a comprehensive transformation of the social system leading to the elimination of private ownership and, at least, to the debilitation of the hierarchical structure of the society that enables a group of people to rule the others. Brand new forms of decentralized government must be established; furthermore, a society organized along these lines must purposefully aspire to diminish defensive, phylogenetically programmed aggression, as Fromm does not deny its existence (Fromm 2007: 211–217). Thus we can say

Fromm's ideas rely upon the assumption that the major cause of war can be found in the capitalist order of the society: it encourages human greediness that in the end results in war (Fromm 2007: 210). Therefore it is in a strong contradiction with the conclusion made by Steven Pinker several decades later (Pinker 2011).

1.4 Liberal theories

1.4.1 General features

The liberal school of international relations theory, pejoratively called idealist by realists, is very broad and diverse. It includes a number of approaches sharing some fundamental mutual points of departure. Liberals generally admit that when contemplating the causes of wars, it is reasonable to operate with the concept of human nature. As opposed to realists, liberals see human nature as "good". In this concept, Homo sapiens is a rational and altruistic creature capable of cooperation. If we approach the world from this initial point and confront it with the reality of international politics, it is logical to ask why this "good man" makes war from time to time. Revealing conditions necessary to achieve a permanent peace and the cooperation between nations in the system of international relations is at the top of the liberal research agenda. Contrary to realists, liberals do not perceive the international environment as an anarchic space in which no society of states can exist a priori. It is far from being an approach exclusive to the liberal school. Moreover, the thesis claiming that, despite the anarchic character of international politics, a community of states has been formed, can be also found in Hedley Bull, who sits close to realism (Hoffman 1986). Nevertheless, the existence of the community of states is, alongside the thesis about the good nature of man, another fundamental building block of liberal ideas about war and peace. Although originally this school of international relations had a great ambition to change society (normative-prescriptive approach) and it still keeps this ambition, there are also significant descriptive-explanatory approaches within this school.

A great difference between liberalism and realism lies in the a priori value that is attributed to war. While realists and neorealists perceive

war as a natural part of international politics and regard it as an eternal institution, liberals view it as a phenomenon that can be eliminated from the international system via appropriate reform. Even though the original message of this school lies in the elimination of wars, for liberals the political-security-military dimension of international relations is not the only, and perhaps not even the most important dimension. A great emphasis is placed on the economic, normative and ethical dimensions of international relations in which tools to eliminate wars are sought.

Liberal theories typically focus their main attention on thinking about how to prevent wars rather than analyzing why wars start and what functions they have in the international system (Clark and Sohn 1960). Therefore, it is apt to further divide liberal theories according to the methods by which they want to eliminate war. From this perspective, it is possible to divide liberal approaches into three major categories. The first group of liberals believes in the strength of economic cooperation generating interdependence within the global economic system. The second group pays attention to eliminating the anarchic nature of the international system. Establishing such a central authority could prevent wars forever. The appropriate recipe for how to restrict wars until a central authority is established is collective security organizations, such as the League of Nations or United Nations, delegitimizing war as a tool of foreign policy. A central world government, seen by various liberals in various ways, would then be capable of eliminating wars for good. The third great group of liberal theoreticians believes that the key to permanent peace is states' democratic political form of government, as democracies do not wage wars against each other. In other words, the qualities of individual states matter. It is evident from the classification of liberal theories in relation to war that it is a school looking for the causes of war both at the level of Waltz's second and third image.

1.4.2 The impact of economic cooperation

The first category of liberal theories argues that economic cooperation promotes peace. What has now become a classical liberal argument is that wars are inconvenient due to the economic interdependence of modern states. This conclusion should be no surprise. After all, this

tradition of international relations theory was founded by the 1933 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Norman Angell, and his work *The Great Illusion* of 1910. He concludes that war is an irrational act from which nobody can benefit due to the economic interdependence of individual states and the costs connected to waging a modern war. According to Angell, war contradicts the general trend of reducing violence, which can be observed in the history of humankind. Angell perceives humans as rational individuals striving for economic benefit and prosperity. Accumulating military power and its use ultimately prevents economic success. Hence in his view, peace is understood as a result of economic interdependence, and intentional development of economic cooperation between states is then the best tool for its preservation (Angell 1910). This optimistic presumption was rebutted by the reality of World War I, which broke out at the time when world economies were at their most interdependent ever and Western political and intellectual elites believed that the world had reached a golden age of reason and prosperity.

Modern liberal scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed this line of argumentation in their work *Power and Interdependence* and introduced a theory of complex interdependence, according to which an increased economic interdependence between states increases the probability of their cooperation. Keohane and Nye define themselves against the main presumptions of realism, i.e. that states are coherent units and dominant agents of world politics, that politics is especially a fight for power in which the state's strength is the main tool, and that there is a hierarchy of issues in world politics with wars at the top, to which economic and social issues are subordinated. States in the world are interrelated by interstate relations, transgovernmental relations and transnational relations, interconnecting not only governments, but also parts (political elites, economic elites, academia, etc.) of highly complex societies. There is no clear hierarchy between the individual agendas of international politics. States have various goals in various agendas, asserting them at the same time. At the state level, an important role is played by bureaucracy, which may often pursue contradictory interests in individual agendas. Various agendas generate various coalitions between states according to the character of the agenda. Moreover, to solve disputes in a majority of agendas, military force and other coer-

cive methods are not a decisive tool when negotiating a compromise. To be successful, it is much more important to be able to determine an agenda in the given area and form alliances. As is claimed by these authors, "*as the complexity of actors and issues in world politics increases, the utility of force declines and the line between domestic policy and foreign policy becomes blurred: as the conditions of complex interdependence are more closely approximated, the politics of agenda formation becomes more subtle and differentiated*" (Keohane and Nye 2008: 167).

Another influential liberal author is Richard Rosecrance and his pivotal work, *The Rise of the Trading State* of 1986. Rosecrance reached the conclusion that in international relations there is specialization and differentiation of states on the grounds of the division of labor in many functional areas going beyond the framework of economics. In his opinion, this development should take place in defense. Therefore, mutual interdependence, exchange and sharing of resources lead to the restriction of social conflicts. Where there is a lack of resources, there must be law and the rule of law enforcing established rules. War is not very probable, as it is inconvenient for states in a system of mutual interdependence. A new type of agent has occurred in international relations, the trading state. The primary goal of the trading state is to improve national welfare and optimise allocation of resources by internal (economic) development and trade. From the perspective of the interest of the trading state, security and defense are set aside. The trading state chooses its strategy on the grounds of a rational calculation of costs and profits, in which war always appears as a less efficient and more costly strategy than other strategies (Rosecrance 1986).

Within this line of argumentation, among other current authors there is, for example, Carl Kaysen; however, to be consistent, he takes into account also the peacemaking effect of the social structures of modern states. Kaysen reaches the conclusion that war between modern industrialized states is not an economically convenient enterprise and thus it is not very probable. Moreover, it is a concept that is a priori objected to in modern society due to the experience of the two world wars in 20th century, just like the concept of slavery. People strive for economic prosperity, which can be achieved much more easily via economic development than war. The era of agrarian societies that could be easily controlled by a class of warriors perceiving limited war as a seasonal matter belongs to the past, at least in Europe (Kaysen 1998: 441–463).

Another prominent contemporary liberal author examining the relationship between economic interdependence and war is Dale Copeland. To a certain degree, Copeland reconciles the liberal argument that economic interdependence makes war less probable with the realist argument that anticipated profit from economic interdependence cannot outweigh fears for security, as is evident from the experience from the two world wars. Copeland introduces a variable of expectations, whose current value decides whether the interdependence increases the probability of war or whether it functions in favor of peace. He claims that the emergence of war supports expectations of a state depending on interdependence that a high degree of its international trade will decrease and steps will be taken against this dependent state that will cut it off from international trade. On the contrary, if the economic interdependence is high and states do not fear it will be used against them, conditions for peace are made. Copeland argues that both before World War I and II Germany feared that interdependence would be used against it, that it would be cut off from the supplies of raw materials and food, and that it would be prohibited by force from profiting from international trade, and hence it launched the war (Copeland 1998).

1.4.3 The role of international institutions

The second liberal approach stressing the importance of international institutions to accomplish permanent peace grew in importance after World War II, even though its roots date back to the interwar era. Woodrow Wilson's project of collective defense in the form of the League of Nations embodied in his Fourteen Points is a major example of an approach looking for a recipe for the elimination of wars by establishing international institutions. Wars are also caused by autocracies that intrigue by cabinet diplomacy out of the public eye against the interests of world peace. Hence this project partially belongs also to the liberal school, which regards democratization as a tool to get rid of wars. Yet simultaneously, according to Wilson, war is generated by the anarchic international system based on power politics. Wilson's recipe for peace anticipated the elimination of both of these causes.

The League of Nations was to become the central authority, enforcing peace by force too, if the arguments of ethics and international law were not taken into account. However, at the same time, Wilson requested the democratization of states, as only cutting old autocratic elites off from power, together with public diplomacy, would make favorable conditions for peace. According to Wilson, the guarantee of peace is a community of democratic states. Wilson rejects old methods of accomplishing the balance of power (Wilson 2008). As he states, "*there must be, not a balance of power, but community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace*" (Wilson 2008: 132). At a theoretic level, the impacts of these institutions on world peace were examined by Alfred Zimmern in advocating the idea of the moral reform of the international system via education (Zimmern 1935).

In the past, the idea of collective security was the pillar of liberal reflections about the possibilities of peacekeeping. The practical failure of the League of Nations and the deficits of the UN were used by realist critics to call this idea into question. After the end of the Cold War, a new round of scholarly debate on this issue took place. Collective security was defended against realism and neorealism by Charles and Clifford Kupchan. These authors regard collective security as a much more efficient tool to achieve the balance of power than any other alternative, as the aggressor must calculate the risk that it will have to face the united forces of the entire world. The institutions of collective security also boost the trust between states and lessen potential impacts of the security dilemma. Furthermore, these authors point out that history offers enough empirical evidence supporting the statement that domestic factors have a great influence on states' belligerence. It was the domestic factors in the form of an ideology that stimulated the aggressive behavior of the national-socialist Germany, militarist Japan and Marxist Soviet Union (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991).

David Mitrany, who also belongs to the liberal school, suggests increasing the irrationality of war by developing a practical cooperation between states, typically in transport and communications, which would lead to the establishment of regimes regulating these areas. Thereafter, cooperation in one area would boost cooperation in other areas as well. Regimes deepening the mutual interdependence of states would not be controlled by politicians, but bureaucrats

(Mitrany 1943). A similar way of considering the issue of war can be found in the works by Karl Deutsch, later modified by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. In their opinion, mutual transactions lead to integration. Within this integration, rules and procedures to solve disputes are formed that the authors regard as their own. This development leads to the establishment of a security community within which wars as a tool of solving disputes are eliminated. This community can have three degrees: community without wars (European community), pluralist community (NATO) and amalgam community (USA) when states establish a higher political unit – federation (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998).

Modern approaches of the liberal school of international relations theory towards the possibilities of peacekeeping are also documented in the text by Keohane and Lisa Martin *The Promise of Institutionalist Theory* (Keohane and Martin 1998), in which they define themselves especially against John Mearsheimer's essay *Back to the Future* (Mearsheimer 1990). The criticism is aimed at Mearsheimer's prediction about the disintegration of NATO and the European Union. The core of their argumentation is the thesis that international institutions can eliminate the size of unequal gains as a result of cooperation between states, and thus encourage states to cooperate. Unequal relative gains in the environment formed by international institutions are no longer an obstacle preventing the cooperation of states. Similarly, institutions are able to reduce the feeling of insecurity and weaken the impacts of the security dilemma. After all, the entire American foreign policy after 1945 illustrates how the USA established international institutions and encouraged their founding in order to transform old hostilities and moderate disputes in the Western world in the face of the Soviet threat.

An interesting approach combining liberal and constructivist elements is represented by the Trier school, which sees the possibility of eradicating wars in a gradual elimination of traditional international politics based on a sovereign state via the concept of civilizing international relations. Its analysis and application is examined by several German authors, the most significant of them being Hans W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, Knut Kirste and Dieter Senghaas (Phillipi 1997: 25). The concept of civilizing international relations, driven by a special type of state, a civilian power, originated as a tool to understand Ger-

man behavior within the system of international relations after 1945. Nevertheless, the entire concept of civilian power and civilizing international relations has more general impacts on that part of the international relations theory that deals with the causes of wars.

First of all, the Trier school repudiates realist and neorealist reductionism. Contrary to the approach of realists and neorealists, the internal parameters of the individual state actors functioning in the international relations system (culture, historical experience, prevailing ideologies and values) are given great attention by the theoreticians of the civilian power concept when analyzing states' belligerence (Frenkler et al. 1997: 2–3). The civilian power concept combines liberal and constructivist approaches to international relations. Some authors count it among the liberal school, others among constructivism. It is important that the advocates of the civilian power concept do not see the increased civilianization of international politics as only a spontaneous, natural process worth being analyzed by political scientists, but also a positive tendency that must be supported and that must be actively undertaken by the civilian power (Maull 1992: 774). Hence the Trier school combines a descriptive-explanatory approach with a prescriptive-normative approach.

The theoretic roots of the civilian power concept date back to the 1930s and are related to the works of the German sociologist Norbert Elias, who conceived the evolutionary sociological theory about the process of the origin of civilization. The core of his work is analyzing the process of the gradual elimination of violence at the intrastate level and installing the power monopoly of the state (Elias 1997a; Elias 1997b). Elias' theory was modified by the aforementioned authors and adopted to the environment of international relations. Generally, these authors' theories stem from the belief that – despite certain internal problems and uncertainties of Elias' theory – the entire concept can be adapted to the level of international relations. According to Maull's interpretation of Elias' work, the following features are characteristic of civilizing society and politics: (1) development of the procedures of the division of labor and specialization, (2) curbing the tendencies towards organized social violence and self-help via developing the monopoly for using force of a central institution, (3) formulating and asserting generally binding principles and norms by which social and political

processes are legally regulated, (4) development of democratic political structures enabling participation, (5) restricting the spreading of conflicts and their regulation in order to minimize violence, and (6) efforts to counterbalance economic and social differences within the social environment on the grounds of solidarity.

According to Maull, the pace of civilianization varies in individual societies and hence asserting these tendencies into the system of international relations is typical especially of countries where the civilizing process has advanced most, i.e. Western Europe, Scandinavia and North America (Maull 1992: 772–773; cf. Maull 1993: 119). As a consequence, these phenomena are present also at the international level where their overflow is accelerated and they actively support above all the most civilized states, the so-called civilian powers. The Trier school regards Germany and Japan as the states that are most approaching the ideal civilian power, whilst certain features can be found also in the United States. Theoreticians believe that the entire process of civilianizing international relations is based on a gradual creation of a monopoly of a supranational institution to use force and reducing the space of national states to use force autonomously (Maull 1992: 772). The primary goal of the civilian power's foreign and security policy is the development of the process of civilizing the international-political arena by imposing the rules to delegitimize war and placing emphasis on their adherence. Another goal is the spreading of universal values, mainly including human rights and democracy. Furthermore, among the civilian power's goals there is also the founding of supranational institutions to overcome the traditionally perceived sovereignty of the national state. Great emphasis is placed by the civilian power on asserting international law, which should achieve primacy over a power-oriented foreign policy. The final intention of the civilian power is to maintain an international order based on a general consensus in which decisions will be made by the democratic participation of all actors (cf. Kirste 1998: 53).

If we bring the ideas of the Trier school theoreticians to a logical conclusion, the whole process of civilizing international relations should result in the formation of a similarly hierarchized system as is the system that originated at the level of states: a system that not only delegitimizes war but also deprives states of all possibilities to wage war. In other words, the process of civilizing international politics

should put an end to the anarchic nature of the international system, just as anarchy was eliminated at the intrastate level. From a certain point of view, it would mean the elimination of the international system as such.

1.4.4 The Democratic Peace Theory

The third and perhaps the most influential liberal approach towards the questions of war and peace is the theory of democratic peace. The Democratic Peace Theory, which belongs to the theories that nurse explanatory ambitions, strives to find out if, how and why the independent variable – the character of the political regime – influences the existence and value of the dependent variable, i.e. the war. The Democratic Peace Theory is perceived as one of the most influential varieties of the liberal theories of international relations and is popular both in academia, and in practical politics. Its arguments are employed not only in the rhetoric of almost all the members of the US political establishment, regardless of whether they are affiliated to the Democrats or the Republicans, but we can also trace its strong influence in the political rhetoric of Western European politicians. However, for this reason the danger that the Democratic Peace Theory can be abused in practical politics is even more substantial than in the case of other theories of international relations. For example, the idea that democracy should be spread as a tool to preserve peace regardless of the historical, social, and cultural environment of the target countries can in its practical application achieve results contrary to our initial expectations (Haas 2007). Therefore, although this theory is primarily descriptive and explanatory, we cannot neglect its constitutive impact, which appears to be more significant than in the majority of other theories.

The Democratic Peace Theory draws its inspiration from the proto-theories of international relations. As early as in 1795 in his work *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, Immanuel Kant defended the proposition that democratic (republican) states could establish mutually peaceful relations. In principle, Kant advocated the Hobbesian idea of the state of war as the state of nature (Kant 1999: 15). According to Kant, peace does not emerge naturally but can be installed by the establishment of a federation of free republican states (Kant 1999: 16–26).

In the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville also defended the view the democratization of the political environment in the European states could result in more peaceful behavior since the populations of these states do not long for war (Tocqueville 2012).

Modern Democratic Peace Theory is based on the liberal axioms of humanity, which allegedly tends towards rational and co-operative solutions of conflicts and aspires to achieve peace, which is seen as the most fundamental value. The Democratic Peace Theory presupposes the continuation of politics through military means is in democratic states less likely than in the case of autocracies. Moreover, the Democratic Peace Theory holds that democracies are less prone to employ military power. However, at this point – since various thinkers define the notion of democracy in various ways – we already impinge on a serious weakness of the theory. Consequently, such a disagreement in defining democracy, the crucial concept of the theory, means once the theory is empirically tested, we count as democracies also those regimes that exhibit obvious non-democratic tendencies. In many cases, as if there are no other relevant elements of democracy, we also present as democracies states in which the change of the government was achieved through comparatively free elections. However, should this be the case, then we could declare Germany under Adolf Hitler or Chile under Salvador Allende democracies. Such a reductionist approach towards the definition of democracy must be nonetheless rejected. Free elections by secret ballot based on universal, equal and direct suffrage and the representative form of government must be supplemented by other elements defining democracy including the existence of a liberal regime that guarantees the inhabitants their civic rights and liberties and the market economy. Furthermore, this regime must be stable and must have experienced a number of peaceful transfers of power through formalized procedures. In such a case, we can speak about a fully democratic state – i.e. about consolidated democracy. To refine the theory it would be desirable to differentiate among various levels of democracy as applied in the states we investigate – for if we understand democracy as an ideal by which we assess the empirical reality, democracy and autocracy will thus constitute two opposite elements of a continuum upon which real-world regimes are to be located (Čermák 1992).

For the time being, the empirical evidence upon which the Democratic Peace Theory is heavily based does not refute the proposition that we cannot find any example of war between (consolidated) democracies, i.e. democratic states. Of course, while – judging by the existing empirical evidence – we can neither make a conclusion such a war cannot occur at any time in the future, the Democratic Peace Theory on this basis anticipates that consolidated democracies do not wage wars against each other. Such a position constitutes a hard core of the Democratic Peace Theory which has until now (2013) been corroborated by very robust empirical evidence.

However, besides this hard core, the Democratic Peace Theory also possesses a soft cover, a set of conclusions that are much less logically consistent and not so much immune to empirical testing. An example of a conclusion of this kind can be found in the statement that according to the Democratic Peace Theory, the cases of wars between unconsolidated democracies – i.e. imperfect democracies – are less likely than cases of wars between undemocratic regimes. Nevertheless, although this conclusion also relies upon empirical experience, which makes it clear we can present just very few examples of such conflicts, in this case we are able to point out to several wars of this kind that did occur in the past – including for example the War of 1812 between the USA and the UK. Last but not least, it is argued that if democracies do enter into war, they only employ violence to the limited degree.

The soft cover of the Democratic Peace Theory is subject to very intense and intellectually stimulating disputes among the researchers who have established two major groups. The first group of Democratic Peace Theory researchers assumes the peacefulness of democracies is not manifested in relation to non-democracies. These researchers challenge some of the soft cover propositions and argue democracies are in their relationship to non-democracies no less bellicose than non-democracies among themselves. John MacMillan labels the views held by this group as a separate theory of democratic peace, and refers to the works of its major advocates like Michael W. Doyle, Bruce M. Russett, and John Oneal. These views, drawing upon the separate theory of democratic peace, were prevalent among the Democratic Peace Theory researchers in 1980s (MacMillan 2003: 234).

The second group of Democratic Peace Theory researchers defends the proposition that democracies initiate war less often than undemocratic regimes. For democratic states, war is a last-resort solution that is only employed when all non-military means to resolve the dispute have failed; moreover, should such a necessity arise, the democracies voluntarily accept various restraints in their application of military force and strive to limit the armed violence during the war as much as possible. The views asserted by this group constitute the so-called general theory of democratic peace. The empirical evidence supporting some propositions of the soft cover of the Democratic Peace Theory was presented by Michael Haas who concluded that democratic regimes are least susceptible to conflicts (Haas 1980). Similar results were attained by Rudolph Rummel (Rummel 1983) who stated that "*violence does not occur between libertarian states. Moreover, whether states are considered individually or dyadically, the less free – libertarian – a state, the more violence it engages in.*" (Rummel 1983: 67). Other data – significantly less convincing – that support the theory were presented by Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Dina A. Zinnes, Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann (Cashman 2000: 127). According to MacMillan, however, although the existing empirical research seems to back up the general theory of democratic peace, there still is a number of questions that remain unresolved. As MacMillan argues, one of them refers to the conditions under which democracies are willing to take the initiative and get engaged in an armed conflict (MacMillan 2003: 235, 241), and under which the general causal mechanisms of democratic peace do not apply. Thus, especially with regard to the discussions about the validity of various propositions of the soft cover of the theory, it is obvious how much the application of different definitions of democracy as applied by respective researchers limits the usefulness of the theory.

The causal mechanism linking together dependent, mediating, and independent variables operates as a fundamental element of every explanatory theory. In principle, there are three major approaches to explain the causal mechanism of democratic peace. The first, general mechanism emphasizes the nature of democratic political system and the rationality of a society which is entitled to participate in the democratic political process and shape the politics of the state (institutional logic). The likelihood that a war can break out is further reduced by the

fact the citizens are not interested in waging a war, since this could pose the danger of losing their lives and properties, and could make them subject to burdensome military service on the battlefields. In such a society, its elected leaders are well aware the war is highly unpopular and, in the case they initiate a war, they are very likely to lose their political power. While this explanation is rooted in the work of Kant (Wagner 2003: 696–697), in modern times it is Joseph Schumpeter who is the most prominent advocate of the view that democracy results in peace. For him, the relationship of democracy and capitalism is crucial since – as Schumpeter argues – war never benefits society as such but only the military elites and aristocracy. In this context, he points out the most powerful anti-militaristic and anti-war movements have obviously emerged in states based on democratic capitalism (Schumpeter 1955).

Reviewing theoretical literature, Sebastian Rosato identified five sub-varieties of causal mechanisms that draw upon the nature of democratic political system (institutional logic). Pursuant to Rosato's sub-varieties the peacefulness of democracies is based on the reluctance of the public to engage in wars, the influence of anti-war groups that counterbalance the influence of their pro-war opponents within the democratic polity, the inability of democracies to quickly mobilize, the inability of democratic government to make a surprise attack necessary to gain time and achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis, and finally on the liberal information politics that is alleged to establish an environment favorable for the prevention of war. Rosato thus concluded this causal logic could explain why democratic leaders are willing to fight autocrats, and argued this willingness was primarily derived from the universal distrust these leaders nursed towards the autocratic rulers. On the other hand, Rosato states in general such an explanation cannot stand up to an empirical test since even the public in democratic states may be willing to go to war and listen to the leaders who foment it – after all, the United States has participated in more than two hundred military interventions. Moreover, in fact democracies are able to mobilize quickly and make surprise attacks as evidenced by the Israeli actions in 1967. So in the end, transparent democratic politics can help confuse the opponent so that is overwhelmed by ambiguous information (Rosato 2003: 587, 593–599).

The second approach, relying upon normative logic, points out to the relevance of democratic culture based on individual liberty, human rights, and elaborated mechanisms of non-violent solutions to social conflicts. Liberal ideology in its classical form results in the emergence of a democratic collective identity that also incorporates the awareness that political opponents do have their own rights, and that these rights must be respected since the opponents are also members of the human race. In the process of socialization, democratic politicians adopt this culture and transfer it to the international level. Therefore, in international relations they should strive to resolve political disputes among states in a similar non-violent way to what they do at the domestic level (Wagner 2003: 697; MacMillan 2003: 233–243; Owen 1998). These mechanisms inevitably include the externalization of internal norms and mutual respect and trust among democratic politicians (Rosato 2003: 596). In summary, we can describe this process as a spill-over mechanism. However, John Owen warns that if a state possesses a democratic form of government but lacks the prevalent role of liberal ideology, then such a state does not have to be peaceful. In the same vein, a liberal state can also be bellicose in relation to another liberal state provided the opponent is not acknowledged and perceived as an entity sharing liberal values. According to Owen, the peaceful effects of democracy consist of the combination of normative and institutional logic (Owen 1998). Also Rosato, arguing by the history of expansion of the Western states in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, put forward numerous arguments against the proposition the democracies externalize their internal norms and nurse more trust towards their adversaries.

The third approach, which can be traced back to de Tocqueville, emphasizes the role of institutional restraints stemming from the division of power in democratic states (the logic of checks and balances). Here, the division of power should serve as a check that prevents the politicians of democratic states from entering into war. In a democratic political system it is immensely difficult to declare war; therefore democracies are more peaceful than states based on different political regimes (Wagner 2003: 697–698).

This brief introduction into the issues related to the Democratic Peace Theory makes it clear the existing research, focused on its soft

cover, is not really convincing and the theoreticians of the Democratic Peace Theory wildly disagree even in views on the entirely fundamental question – i.e. if democracies are in general more peaceful than states based on a different political regime. While currently the advocates of the general theory of democratic peace prevail in academia, this concern remains unresolved. However, it is even more important to understand none of the three major causal mechanisms we previously mentioned, presented by the democratic peace theoreticians as possible explanations, provide us with general and logically consistent arguments against the soft cover of the Democratic Peace Theory. Given the logic of causal mechanisms there is no reason to think these mechanisms should not apply even when a democracy has a dispute with a non-democracy. In other words, we can say even if a consolidated democracy clashes with a non-democratic state, its bellicosity should be reduced by the political elites' fear of losing power and consequently their unwillingness to wage a war (institutional logic), by the democratic political culture based on negotiation and compromise (normative logic), and by the restraints that follow from the division of power (the logic of checks and balances). As stated by the soft cover of the Democratic Peace Theory, consolidated democracies should thus be more peaceful than non-democratic states.

As with any great theory, Democratic Peace Theory also naturally faces numerous critical voices. In fact, the proposition that democracy inevitably breeds peace was criticized even by the proto-theoreticians of international relations. After all, Niccolo Machiavelli concluded that republics were political entities that were ideal for imperial expansion since the free citizens were willing to fight both for their own glory and honor, and for the public welfare of the state in which they rule (Machiavelli 1985).

Considering modern theories of international relations, the views held by Democratic Peace Theory primarily run counter to both the realist/neorealist, and Marxist/neo-Marxist approaches. Some researchers challenge the theory as such, while the others only oppose its soft cover, i.e. the proposition the democracies are more peaceful also in relation to non-democratic states. Realism and neorealism criticize what they see as insufficient consideration of the systemic level of analysis. This level is only of secondary importance in Democratic Peace

Theory since the anarchical character of the international system is underestimated in various democratic peace theories.

However, apart from these general reservations that we do not need to take too seriously, as some of the realist theories cannot be tested in general and are thus considered as unscientific, there are also examples of intellectually more rigorous, methodologically more elaborate, and especially testable realist and neorealist criticisms of Democratic Peace Theory. One of these examples is represented by Christopher Layne who empirically tested the causal mechanisms of Democratic Peace Theory. Layne selected cases in which democracies found themselves on the brink of war, and strove to find out whether the causal mechanisms operated in these critical situations and whether there is an alternative explanation why war did not break out – here, he focused on the Trent Affair (1861), the British-American dispute over the borders of Venezuela in 1895-1896, the Fashoda crisis that occurred in 1898 between the United Kingdom and France, and the Franco-German crisis in 1923. However, Layne concluded that peace in these cases could be more effectively explained from the realist perspective since, according to his findings, all actors took into account the balance of their powers. For him, this was the main reason why these crises did not escalate in war, while the mutual respect of democracies and other causal mechanisms of democratic peace did not play any role (Layne 1998).

The Marxist and neo-Marxist criticisms of Democratic Peace Theory are based on what they perceive as insufficient consideration of the economic order and an allegedly too optimistic understanding of the character of capitalism as assumed by most democratic peace theoreticians. Moreover, Marxists argue the mass culture of modern democracies allegedly educates the people to support aggressive behavior. Last but not least, the universally accepted definition of war as an armed conflict that during the period of one year results in the loss of at least one thousand lives in military actions reduces the number of cases that could falsify Democratic Peace Theory. This arbitrary definition of war, which is generally accepted in the theories of international relations, excludes from analysis those cases in which a democratic state makes use of armed force against a non-democratic one and, given a significant disparity of the military potentials of both actors, is able to win easily (Krejčí 1997: 281–282).

Democratic Peace Theory is generally criticized because it does not differentiate states in the process of transition towards democracy – i.e. the states that possess some elements of a democratic regime – from completely consolidated democratic regimes, i.e. states in which we can identify all elements of democracy (or at least their overwhelming majority). Only under these conditions it is possible to declare the United States in the middle of the 19th century a democracy, i.e. at a time when slavery, brought to this country by the European colonizers, still persisted and the dispute about its future resulted in the civil war. And only under these conditions we can declare the German Empire and Austria-Hungary before the World War I as states based on representative government, although the administration of these countries was under the strong influence of the aristocracy and the military elites. And only under these conditions we can declare the United Kingdom a consolidated democracy, at a time when there was very selective suffrage. However, it is necessary to point out the very fact the theoreticians of democratic peace define democracy in different ways opens up space for the critics of Democratic Peace Theory. This problem is symptomatic for the theory as such, not only for the criticism of the theory. Thus, the debate between the critics and advocates of the Democratic Peace Theory is – due to divided and imprecise operationalization of the notion of democracy – affected by confusion in the language.

However, the criticism is not in any case voiced only by the realists and Marxists. Quincy Wright had already come to the conclusion that the political regime as a variable was irrelevant in terms of the initiation of war since both the democratic, and non-democratic states initiate war equally frequently (Wright 1942: 833–842) a long time ago. However, given the period in which Wright's research was done, we can see it only took into account such democratic regimes that were not fully democratic in terms of our contemporary criteria. Therefore, Wright's conclusions are only valuable for the discussion about the soft cover of Democratic Peace Theory. Very similar conclusions were made by J. David Singer, Melvin Small, Russett, and R. Joseph Monsen. Nevertheless, neither of the analyses made by Singer and Small challenge the hard core of the theory but only its soft cover – they refute only that segment of Democratic Peace Theory which presupposes that democratic states will be more restrained in using the military force

not only against democracies but in general. In a similar vein, Layne concluded there was no relevant empirical evidence to support the existence of a positive correlation between the peacefulness of a state and its democratic character (Layne 1998).

Still, the hard core of Democratic Peace Theory – especially if applied only to consolidated democracies (consolidated democracies do not wage wars against each other) – cannot easily be refuted by means of empirical evidence. Those who criticize this theory are unable to provide any example of war between consolidated democracies. Moreover, the cases of wars between unconsolidated democracies are very rare: the war between Finland and the Western powers during World War II and the war of supposedly republican France against republican Rome in 1849 can be seen as the most unequivocal examples of wars in which one unconsolidated democracy fought with another one (Cashman 2000: 126–129). And, provided we include older examples, the War of 1812 can also be classified as a war between unconsolidated democracies.

For the time being it seems in general both the Marxist, and non-Marxist criticisms of Democratic Peace Theory support the conclusions arrived at by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. These authors argue that states that are in the process of transition towards democracy are more bellicose, and specify four reasons why new democracies enter into war. First, the elites of the old regime often hide their power struggles that occur on the new, domestic democratic political scene, and mask them under the disguise of nationalism. Second, the new elites also consider it necessary to manifest nationalist feelings. Third, the public which has just been recently mobilized is difficult to handle. And fourth, if democracy collapses, the return to autocracy increases the probability of entering a war. The fundamental problem the states in the process of democratization face is they lack the stabilizing institutions already operating in advanced democracies. As Mansfield and Snyder argue, it is difficult to form stable coalitions that can keep power and further coherent politics. Therefore, the pressure to spread democracy globally does not have to necessarily result in the support of peace. To weaken the danger that democratization might enhance the bellicosity of a state, Mansfield and Snyder recommend the former autocratic leaders should be exiled and receive a so-called

"golden parachute" so as to deprive them of any motivation to pursue power anymore and assert an aggressive political presence in their former country. The free press, the strengthening of the independence of journalists, and pluralistic debate about security – all these elements should help decrease the danger anybody could create myths based on nationalist feelings (Mansfield and Snyder 1998).

In fact, both the Marxist, and the non-Marxist criticisms of the Democratic Peace Theory focus especially on the soft cover of the theory. In other words, they challenge the proposition that democracies are generally more peaceful than states based on other regimes – i.e. not only in their mutual relationships. However, despite this, the existing empirical evidence still makes it evidently clear in some cases that democratic states can also on their own initiative employ armed force and apply it as a political tool against non-democratic states. Since the end of the Cold War, without any question, the war of NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the American invasion in Iraq in 2003 can be seen as examples of this phenomenon. Thus, when considering the issue of whether democratic states are also more peaceful in their relationships to non-democracies (the soft cover of the theory) we need to take these examples into account. While so far there is no credible empirical evidence against the hard core of Democratic Peace Theory – i.e. that fully democratic states do not wage wars against each other – the soft cover of the theory has to face numerous empirical challenges and it remains dubious if it can be successfully defended. The major challenge theoreticians must tackle is that we are able to find empirical evidence of wars between semi-democratic states; moreover, there is substantial empirical evidence that semi-democracies do wage wars against non-democracies. Last but not least, under some circumstances fully democratic states (consolidated democracies) can also start wars against non-democratic states. The existing empirical evidence suggests such a phenomenon can occur provided there is an extensive humanitarian disaster in the location of military action, or if there is a serious concern such a disaster could happen in the foreseeable future (Kříž 2013).

In the subsequent research, it is desirable to focus in more detail on the nature of the mutual dependence between the extent of democratization and bellicosity, on the quest for a more precise definition of the causal mechanisms that supposedly prevent democracies from entering into war, and on the analysis of intervening variables which can make democracies peaceful. Since most democracies rank among the most advanced capitalist states characterized by a high degree of economic interdependence, we need to ask whether such economic interdependence can be perceived as a variable that explains why consolidated democracies do not wage wars against each other. Furthermore, Democratic Peace Theory has to cope with the neorealist critique and its argument that in the case of crises between democratic states, neorealism is better suited to explain why these crises were not resolved by "blood and iron". And finally, we need to take into account Rosato's neorealist proposition that peace among the democracies is produced by the global American hegemony (Rosato 2003: 600). Since the democratic states achieved their consolidated character only after 1918, i.e. in the period in which the global American hegemony manifested itself in full, we cannot reject such a hypothesis a priori. Therefore, it is difficult to assess where we can find the roots of empirically obvious unwillingness to wage mutual wars that is so very typical of democracies in recent decades.

1.5 Realism and neorealism

1.5.1 Realism

Realism is still the most influential theory of the discipline. Realists claim that, as opposed to liberals, they explore the world in the way it is. Their motivation is entirely pragmatic, as they want to develop a theory that could be used as a tool of practical foreign policy. A theory that aims to become a practical tool of politics must first try to find out how international relations work. Naturally, these ideas about the role of the theory are no longer sustainable nowadays. If we accept the existence of the principle of a self-fulfilling prophecy, it is evident that theories with a descriptive-explanatory ambition, such as realism, undoubtedly have a constitutive impact on social reality. Nevertheless, in its time, i.e. 1940–1950s, it was an ambition very much different from the ambition of liberalism.

Taking a quick look at the realist tradition of IR theory, we will discover that war is a significant, if not the key issue of realism. After all, *The History of Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides is regarded as the first proto-realist work, giving an account of the fighting between Athens and the Peloponnesian League. Probably the most famous part of this story for IR theory is the Melian dialogue showing that military power and not morality matters as the most powerful argument in international relations. The lesson learned rests in the fact that weak states can be destroyed and their inhabitants slaughtered and enslaved in the anarchic international system at any time for any reason. Thucydides explains the dynamics of war by economic and political factors. The analysis of war is an important part of another proto-realist book, i.e. Machiavelli's *The Prince*. A part of the realist tradition also perceives the natural state of the world as an arena where all fight against all, as was depicted by Hobbes in *Leviathan*.

On the one hand, the realist orientation on studying the usage of violence in IR is understandable in the social atmosphere of the early Cold War period; yet on the other hand, the question arises as to whether it is really the key form of interaction in the international system. From the perspective of possible impacts it may be, as a lost war can result in the destruction of a state as an actor in international relations. However, if we look at this concentration of realism on war from the perspective of the frequency of this phenomenon, the stress of realism on war is questionable, as it is a constant but very minor form of interactions in the international system.

All variants of realism are of the same opinion that the causes of wars must be sought in the anarchic form of the international system, where there is no authority able to set out and enforce the rules of the game. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's metaphor of the stag-hunt, in which individual hunters pursue their short-term interests, is used to explain the alleged non-cooperativeness of actors in international politics (Rousseau 1950: 238). According to these variants, the international system is in the Hobbesian state of war of all against all.

Despite this systemic aspect of realism, in its classical Morgenthauan form, realism is a theory combining the first and third image approach, if we use the Waltzian classification of theories about the causes of wars. One must take into account the "evil nature of man" pointed out

by another founder of realism, Niebuhr (Niebuhr 1947). According to Morgenthau, politics follows objective rules stemming from the biopsychosocial predispositions of human beings as an animal species and politics is an autonomous area of human activities. These human predispositions are relatively stable and thus rules derived from them withstand the ravages of time. Realists perceive the human desire for power as the quality of crucial importance for politics. As these predispositions are characteristic of all the members of the Homo sapiens species, the differences in the culture of individual human societies are not relevant and the rules of (international) politics are, according to Morgenthau, universally valid. International politics is a phenomenon emerging between states that are able to rationally delineate an objectively existing national interest and pursue it in the international arena by exercising their own power. International politics is perceived as a zero-sum game, as the growth in power of one actor means loss of power in other actors. In this concept, war is a natural consequence of searching for the balance of power in the international system. Hence the main interest of every state is to survive in competition with other states following their specific rules (Morgenthau 2005). Raymond Aron once expressed his requirement that international relations theory should work with the risk of war as a constant (Aron 1968: 16). Offensive realists believe that states are inherently aggressive, whilst defensive realists adhere to states' desire for security.

If we sum up the main line of argumentation of the majority of the realist theory scholars, we will reach the conclusion that man's evil nature typified by his drive for power (animus dominandi) bears the tendency towards violence in the process of following national states' interests, which results in the anarchic form of the international system, whose decisive factor is the security dilemma. Using Alexander Wendts of the constructivist school of IR theories famous wording, "*anarchy is what states make of it*" (Wendt 2008). John Herz emphasized the influence of the security dilemma affecting interactions in the international system. States cannot be sure of other states' motives and intentions, and they do not have perfect access to information either. They formulate their politics on the grounds of insufficient information and hence they prepare for the worst case scenario, i.e. war, which could be conducted against them by any state in any time. Maximizing one's

military power is a question of the state's survival. As a consequence, all states prepare for war, as none of them is sure about the intentions and capacity of other states. The subsequent armament spiral then increases uncertainty and as a result decreases the security of all. An unintentional consequence of states' desire for security in the environment of information insecurity is a threat posed for all (Waltz 1979: 186–187).

1.5.2 Neorealism

Waltz's neorealism formed against the background of a clash of ideas with scientism and behavioralism somewhat changed the conceptualization of international politics and abandoned some crucial premises of classical realism. In particular, in the neorealist way of thinking, there is no space for the premise of permanent and "evil nature" of Homo sapiens leading to the steady rules of the international system and, inter alia, to the recurrence of wars. This premise was also rejected for its problematic empirical testability under the pressure of scientific criticism. Moreover, neorealists do not link the existence of wars with the internal qualities of states like liberals and Marxists do. The neorealist approach is consistently systemic, as by applying some neoclassical economy approaches it constructs the structural theory of international relations. Systems theories explain how agents act under the pressure of forces to which said agents are subjugated. Placement of the unit in the system matters. Internal qualities of the agent are not important, so systems theories can explain why agents different in their internal qualities act in a very similar way. Neorealists do not explain why a particular war is fought. Neorealists deal with the general conditions of the IR system that lead to wars. It is the nature of the system and not the collective characteristic of Homo sapiens, qualities of particular states, or the individual characteristics of particular leaders that generates wars.

According to neorealists, wars can be understood only if the effects of structures are added to the unit-level explanations typical of traditional realism. Competition and conflict among states in IR stem from the facts that states must provide for their own security and threats to their own security abound. In the neorealist conception, the anarchic structure of the international system is a crucial and variable constant in time affecting behavior of states. Anarchy, understood as the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force, is thought to be the essential structural quality of IR and the starting point of the neorealist analysis. States wanting to survive in this system must pursue certain particular strategies in order to ensure this survival. If they do not adopt them, states cease to exist in the competition for power with other competitors. Thus, according to Waltz, the anarchic structure of the international system leads to the homogenization of units within the international system.

Waltz claims that change occurs especially in the third parameter of the international system, the distribution of power, ranging between its two marginal values, multipolarity and bipolarity. According to neorealists, within the international system, there is a permanent balance between the powers of individual actors. If we accept the assumption that politicians, based on a rational analysis, pursue the interests of their states, it is the balance of power mechanism that can slow down the emergence of wars. If there is a balance of power in the system, conducting war is not rational, as it cannot result in a desirable goal. On the other hand, war can also be perceived as a mechanism for achieving the balance of power. Neorealists claim that the causes of wars lie in the anarchic structure of the international system lacking a central authority capable of setting out and enforcing the rules of the game. In opposition to realism, there is no longer place for contemplating the nature of Homo sapiens in neorealism. Neorealist reasoning about the causes of wars is concentrated on the analysis of the importance of two independent variables, i.e. the distribution of power within the system and the influence of available armament technologies.

From the perspective of power distribution, realists and neorealists find some types of the system more prone and others less prone to produce wars. The main attention of the theoretic discussion is focused on the occurrence of a major war, i.e. a war that is able to transform the entire system. Hence the central question of the debate is whether it is the bipolar or multipolar system that is more stable. Arguments for the greater stability of the multipolar system lie in the thesis that a greater number of actors with balanced power makes more conditions for cooperation; there are many more chances to form alliances

deterring a potential aggressor; there is a greater number of potential mediators in the system; arms races do not escalate as quickly as in the bipolar system; states do not define themselves against a single actor, as they must pay a certain degree of attention to all the relevant ones; conflicts between superpowers do not have such grave consequences, as they only rarely result in a systemic transformation; a greater degree of insecurity make states be more careful, and if wars do occur, they are of a smaller intensity. However, the discussion also contains many arguments against the thesis that the multipolar system is less prone to wars. First of all, a greater number of actors lead to an increase in the opportunity for a conflict; a greater number of superpowers generates more clashes of interests; states pay attention to the most dangerous opponents and this orientation is relatively stable; in the multipolar system there is a greater chance of misperception; in this system resources are distributed less evenly and there is a greater chance that there will be a state in the system willing to bear the risk of war than in the bipolar system (Cashman 2000: 235–239).

At the same time, there are many arguments in favor of the thesis that the bipolar arrangement is less prone to wars. These authors substantiate their argument by the fact that in this system there is an ideal balance of power, which is much easier to sustain than in the multipolar system, as the change of alliances between other actors has no influence on the global balance of power; that both actors must act with care because the conflict anywhere could change into a global war; in the bipolar arrangement, it is easier to calculate the balance of power and the opponent's interests and goals, and two superpowers are able to make other actors act in a reserved way. As opposed to that, the theoretic discussion also articulates arguments stressing the cons of bipolarity. They include theses about a high degree of hostility between superpowers, an absent mediator, the risk that any conflict can escalate into a conflict between major powers, the thesis that conflicts on the periphery are tolerated against the background of bipolar confrontation, and the thesis that the certainty in the balance of power in the system can lead to war (Cashman 2000: 239–240).

Stephen Walt supplements the concept of balancing power by a reflection about balancing threats. He argues that states do not always perceive the growth in power of one actor as a threat and try to balance it. Walt digresses from a strictly neorealist argumentation and points out a banal fact from the perspective of studying history that the perception of threat depends also on ideological, geographical and in fact many other factors. Hence he introduces new variables that Waltz did not see as relevant. In this modification, states need not try to balance the power of a state that they do not regard as a threat in their perception of the situation. It is evident that a great role in international relations is played by mutually shared values and ideas about the surrounding world. Therefore, democratic states in the Cold War period did not try to balance the power of the USA (the stronger actor in the bipolar confrontation) by siding with the USSR, the weaker actor of bipolar confrontation (Walt 1987).

This issue was also dealt with in the debate with neorealism by the constructivist Wendt, who analyzed the importance of social structures dependent on mutually shared values, expectations and a partner's image in the international arena. These non-material factors formed in the process of social learning have a great impact on the perception of events in international politics. Therefore, democratic states are little afraid of the nuclear arms belonging to the USA, France or the United Kingdom, but they do fear a much smaller number of these weapons in the arsenal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Wendt 1995).

Nowadays, one of the most influential neorealist approaches to the issues of war causes is the theory of hegemonic war by Robert Gilpin introduced in the book *War and Change in World Politics* from the early 1980s. In his analysis, he focused on wars emerging as a consequence of conflict between superpowers over the position of hegemon in the system. In his approach, the hegemon is defined as an economically and militarily dominant state performing public goods by its policy in the system of international relations, due to which its position in the system is tolerated for a certain time by other powers. A hegemonic war emerges in the system if another state actor occurs wanting to take over this position. The occurrence of such an actor is due to an uneven growth in power between states, which generates a new challenger. The position of hegemon is connected both with gains and costs burdening it and at a certain moment even outweighing the profit. Hence the hegemon grows economically and militarily more slowly than its potential challengers. At the moment when the method of organizing

the international system corresponding with hegemon's interests no longer corresponds with the distribution of power in the system, there is a higher risk that any of the powers within the system will want to occupy the position of a hegemon. Gilpin claims that such a situation arises when the challenger, on the grounds of a rational choice, reaches the conclusion that it is convenient. Gilpin's substantial contribution to the discussion on the causes of war is drawing attention to the dynamics of the change of power distribution, not only the interest in the distribution of power itself. In situations when it is clear who the hegemon is, there is peace. Otherwise, there is a risk of hegemonic war (Gilpin 1981).

The issue of comparing the susceptibility of the multipolar and bipolar system was dealt with also by Mearsheimer in his now already classic text *The False Promise of International Institutions*. Mearsheimer defines himself especially against liberal theories, arguing by the importance of economic cooperation for decreasing the probability of the emergence of war. According to Mearsheimer, war can emerge at any moment, as the international system is anarchic. Mearsheimer includes in his reflections the rational actor model. States employ war especially if potential gains outweigh losses. In his opinion, the convenience of war is particularly affected by the distribution of power within the system and the nature of modern armament technologies. Weapons can prefer offensive or defensive conflict. Mearsheimer believes that the bipolar distribution of power reduces the probability of war, as it facilitates deterrence and reduces the probability of miscalculating the opponent's intentions and the mutual balance of power. As regards armament technologies, Mearsheimer perceives nuclear weapons as a significant peacemaking factor, as even a much weaker defender may cause unacceptable damage to the attacker. Moreover, in the era of nuclear weapons, the equation for counting the balance of power becomes radically simplified. To start a war against a nuclear state is always unwise. Mearsheimer believes that the bipolarity of the international relations system together with the existence of nuclear weapons is an environment in which wars are less probable than in any other distribution of power (Mearsheimer 1990). Although none of these theses lack internal logic, one can find empirical evidence opposing the intuitive conclusion that the nuclear state can always be certain it is not going to

be attacked. In 1950, the then non-nuclear China attacked the nuclear USA in Korea, and in 1982 a territory under British sovereignty (the Falklands) was attacked by Argentina. Hence nuclear weapons need not always be a guarantee of peace, which is true especially when the attacker is absolutely convinced that the defender is not going to use nuclear weapons due to the stigmatization of nuclear weaponry.

The effect of armament systems is stressed in the paper *Offense, Defense, and Causes of War* by Stephen Van Evera. Van Evera pays attention to the phenomenon of the impact of existing armament systems on the balance between offense and defense. Van Evera put to test the hypotheses claiming that war is more likely within the international relations system if an attack is perceived as more convenient than defense and that states in a situation convenient for an attack will initiate wars more often than other actors. On the grounds of an analysis of the history of international politics, he then reached the conclusion that this theory had stood the empirical test. Nevertheless, regarding Van Evera, it must be pointed out that the prevalence of offense or defense is not for him only the consequence of available military technologies, but that he also takes into consideration the influence of geography, diplomacy and the social order ruling in the particular states. Hence he departs from neorealist reductionism to a certain extent (Van Evera 1998).

Regarding the impact of war on the form of the international system, it is important to stress the finding of the realist movement of international relations theory that the particular strategy enabling the state to survive in the selection process of the anarchic international system is a primary concern about one's own security via the accumulation of military power and formation of alliances. States that do not pursue this strategy cease to exist in the course of history. They are either absorbed by their neighbors or disintegrate into smaller units. This conclusion is valuable especially as it can be tested empirically; by comparing states' security strategies, one can reach the conclusion whether it is true or not. If it turned out that this strategy is not accepted universally by states and despite that these states are able to survive, this finding would be a great challenge for this movement, which is still the main movement of our discipline.

Fundamentally, neorealists adopt the realist concept of the security dilemma described above. Hence the key difference between realists

and neorealists in looking for the causes of war lies in the fact that neorealists, under the pressure of behavioral and scientific criticism, renounce the concept of the evil, aggressive nature of Homo sapiens. The central concept of realism and neorealism is the security dilemma. Nevertheless, this mechanism does not yet explain the origin of wars. Realism provides only a general explanation of the context (the anarchic nature of the international system) and the origin of a situation (armament spirals or superiority of offensive weapons), against the background in which wars emerge. When evaluating the quality of this theory, the question arises as to how it is possible that war is a minor phenomenon in the anarchic international system. If it were caused by anarchy, it could be anticipated that the prevailing form of interactions in international politics would be conflict leading to war and not peacekeeping cooperation. In this respect, it must be pointed out that some neorealists have argued in favor of the explanation of this phenomenon. For example, Charles Glaser reached the conclusion that war is not an inevitable consequence of the anarchic nature of the international system (Glaser 1994/1995).

Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the integral notions of realist and neorealist theories, i.e. anarchy, power of the state and balance of power are very vaguely defined, unsatisfactorily operationalized and immeasurable. Despite that, the community of researchers in international relations still uses these notions. On the other hand, even from these imperfect realist and neorealist axioms, one can derive empirical data anticipated in the reality of international relations and by analyzing the empirical evidence of real political processes, confront and test the theory.

1.6 Conclusion

There is a general agreement within IR that this discipline is still not endowed with a complex theory that would be able to explain the question of the origin of war. Moreover, it is doubtful whether there is any point in expecting the existence of such a theory in the future (Suganami 2001: 199–210). Due to the fact that the academic discipline of international relations has been dealing with this issue for nearly a

century, and, if we take into account also its proto-theoretic roots, even much longer, it is not a very pleasing finding at first glance.

However, a more profound view brings about a different conclusion. At present, there is a relatively strong trend of refuting the mono-causal explanation of the causes of wars in international relations theory. Researchers more likely seek to discover certain factors correlating with the origin of wars and look for necessary, yet not sufficient phenomena for the outbreak of war different from phenomena that are the triggers of war themselves. Hidemi Suganami argues that "*the following three types must be clearly distinguished as a preliminary move in any discussion of the cause of war: (a) What are the conditions which must be present for wars to occur?; (b) Under what sort of circumstances have wars occurred more frequently?; and (c) How did this particular war come about?*" (Suganami 1996). Furthermore, Suganami claims that the confusion of all these three issues is evident both in Waltz and also other authors. The problem of this general approach is that it takes the discipline of international relations in the wrong direction. The point is that the fundamental neorealist argument blaming international anarchy for being responsible for war is trivial as a matter of fact (Suganami 2001: 200–201). Even though Waltz criticized the one-sidedness of a majority of approaches, he regarded as the key image the third image, i.e. the international system, and hence he was just as one-sided as his predecessors. Even if we posit that the international system had a central authority capable of imposing and enforcing the rules of the game, it cannot be ruled out that wars would occur in it as a consequence of parts of the system trying to emancipate themselves from this central authority. Moreover, many concepts of international relations theory are not clearly defined and they are hardly, if at all, measurable. In fact, that is also true for the main concept of this discipline, i.e. the concept of the balance of power and anarchy of the international system forming not only the core of the neorealist theory, but IR theories in general.

On the other hand, despite these general deficiencies of the discipline, we now know much more about the causes of wars than ever before. There are islands of knowledge that can offer us solid ground to walk on in this mire. It is absolutely clear that without certain predispositions of Homo sapiens to aggression, wars could not occur at all. The predisposition of our species to aggression is a necessary, yet

not sufficient condition. The majority of conflicts in international relations are actually solved by other than violent means and hence the predisposition of Homo sapiens to aggression cannot be the key variable causing war. Also the arguments of psychological theories looking for the causes of wars at the level of small groups and leaders' personal predispositions cannot be automatically refuted. After all, Czech society still asks the question of what could have been if Czechoslovakia had been led in 1938 by a politician of different personal and volitional qualities than Edvard Beneš. Or alternatively, how it would have developed if the military elites had remained loyal to the nation and not its political representation. There have been many similar cases in history when the decision of a single leading person pushed the course of events at the crossroads in a direction from which there was seemingly no way out and it would be a failure to ignore them in researching the causes of wars.

It is evident from state-of-the-art theoretical research that while looking for answers about the causes (not a cause!) of war, the findings of a number of other international relations theories must be taken into account. Indeed, available empirical evidence more likely proves the conclusion that the variable of the political regime does matter, as consolidated democracies do not wage wars on one another. Moreover, economic interdependence is really more likely harmful to wars, as it makes this costly distraction even costlier, and hence it suppresses belligerence. Further on, some types of authoritarian regimes incorporating socialist ideas, i.e. more likely totalitarian regimes, such as international socialism (communism), national socialism and fascism, have also produced, considering the short time for which they have left a trace in human history, remarkably rich evidence of aggressive acts in international politics. The fact that they have demonstrated a great ability to put themselves in the position of victims of others is not relevant in this respect. On the other hand, it is evident that liberal socialism, incorporating the main liberal values into the socialist ideology, is exceedingly peaceable, as we can see in Scandinavian countries nowadays. Available empirical evidence also confirms the conclusion that available military technologies are a crucial variable affecting the frequency of wars as well. Despite the vagueness and difficult empirical embeddedness of the main concepts used by realism and neorealism,

it is clear that the absence of a central authority in the system, security dilemma and distribution of power within the international system have a great impact on the frequency of wars. The problem is that researchers cannot agree on how great this impact is. In other words, as is stated by Greg Cashman, certain parts of the existing theory are both logically consistent and capable of resisting empirical falsification. They can explain several cases, but never all of them (cf. Cashman 2000: 279–288).

In the empirical world, all levels of analysis offered by existing international relations theories merge and it is questionable whether their separation can help find universally valid answers about the causes of wars. Rather than looking for a single universal cause, it is advisable to concentrate on revealing conditions in which wars occur and certain typical sequences of events preceding them. Moreover, while conducting an empirical analysis of wars, researchers cannot be wrong if they return in every analyzed empirical case to the individual "islands of knowledge", analyze them thoroughly and try to gain a better understanding of the whole via the acquired findings. Consequently, in the next round of the hermeneutic circle, better understanding of the whole will produce a better insight about the individual parts.

The current state of international relations theory in this area can arouse pessimism. On the other hand, now we know much more about the causes of wars than at the beginning of the story called "international relations as an academic discipline". Therefore, we are more capable of finding out wherever there are weak spots in our theoretical knowledge. Rather than resignation, this fact could generate cautious optimism.

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2. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Kateřina Fridrichová

2.1 Introduction

This chapter dealing with humanitarian intervention might be opened by the statement that "everyone talks about them, but no one has seen one yet". Thinking about humanitarian intervention, one enters muddy waters indeed. It is an anomaly in the system of international relations, a contradiction in and of itself. It is hard to explain this phenomenon and extricate it from the different layers of meaning, norm and practice.

Firstly, what exactly is humanitarian intervention? Well, it would be wise to use a definition that is narrow enough to define the subject at hand. J. L. Holzgrefe used following definition: "*the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied*" (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003: 18). Thomas Weiss chooses to use somewhat similar definition in meaning, though less elaborate: "*coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among inhabitants*" (Weiss 2012: 6). This is a narrow definition, but offers some criteria for distinguishing humanitarian intervention from other types of intervention or warfare.

First, it is conducted without the consent of the government on whose soil it happens. The fact that intervention goes across national borders is implied in the name of the operation. This, naturally, causes disturbances in the international system. Secondly, there has to be a use of force. Holzgrefe includes also the threat of use of force, based on the UN Charter and the fact that it prohibits even the threat of the use of force; it is a possibility, but that would be difficult situation to deal with methodologically.

Thirdly, the justifications for intervention are humanitarian; the action is taken to help inhabitants of a foreign country. One of the main features that differentiate humanitarian intervention from other types is intent. Reasons to conduct military action might vary and states usually have mixed motivations for what they do. However, in order to claim real humanitarian intervention, it is necessary to show almost beyond all doubt that the humanitarian reasons are those at the forefront of the list of motives, namely to stop such atrocities that, as the widely quoted phrase goes, "shock the conscience of mankind", such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. As Michael Walzer rather surprisingly notes, "*clear examples of what is called "humanitarian intervention" are very rare. Indeed, I have not found any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one among several. States don't send their soldiers into others states, it seems, only in order to save lives. The lives of foreigners don't weigh that heavily in the scales of domestic decision-making.*" (Walzer 2006: 101–102).

Thus it is easier to treat humanitarian intervention as an ideal type, rather than sharply delineated phenomenon. It belongs to a grey area; the vast literature describing the discussion surrounding this topic serves as proof of the disunity of ideas. There is little agreement among statesmen, diplomats or scholars on the legality or desirability of humanitarian intervention. Some would carefully embrace the existence of its legal or moral permissibility, but then they would not agree on criteria for intervention. And some would insist that intervention is the best way to fix problems of certain states for the good of the whole world.

2.2 Legalist approach

When talking about the international law, it is important to see that international law was, in the words of David Kennedy, "*fashioned, promoted, interpreted, and applied to moderate the use of military force*". That has been one of its chief functions since its inception. It is important to hold in mind that international law developed the norm of non-use of violence deductively from abstract positions arguing top down, in contrast with the part of *jus in bello* that was developed from practice (Kennedy 2005).

In the beginnings of the development of international law, the right to use force was not even questioned. War was matter of diplomacy and politics, rather than law (Kennedy 2005: 240); it was a way of expressing the sovereign will of the ruler. There was no *jus ad bellum* regulated by the body of international law. Only later did the development of the codified prescriptions on use of force bring it about, culminating in the UN Charter. Article 2(4) clearly states: "*All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*" This changed not only the understanding of the legality of war, but also the way war is seen in the international community. "*War was no longer the free act of sovereign will. […] The Charter system was more than a political regime of collective security – it was also a new legal order which inaugurated a new law of war.*" (Kennedy 2005: 254).

Under natural law, humanitarian intervention was a possibility or right, under positive law it is not. No binding guidelines have ever been developed for conducting humanitarian interventions because these were simply not supposed to happen.

This is also why, in order to deal with this legal obstruction, the use of the just war doctrine is making a comeback. It fits the legalist framework nicely; any justification for use of force has to be put through the lenses of international law. And the just cause criterion has to fit the right parameters to get the UN Security Council (SC) to pass a resolution that would allow intervention. That would have to be a threat to international peace and security. It is understood that the SC cannot authorize military intervention on humanitarian grounds alone (Wheeler 2001: 41). That is why states go to such pains, so much paper is wasted, and so many legal discussions are held to justify interventions, be it humanitarian or other.

The legalist approach, however, does not solve the dilemma of justice and order in international relations, neither has it solved the problem of use of force in international relations. Despite the conscious efforts of those who formulated the positive body of international law, wars still do break out and interventions still happen, though according to the law they might not be called such.

2.3 Sovereignty

Sovereignty is still the ordering principle in the system of international relations. Though again, it is hard to agree on a definition of this concept. Francis Abiew notes that "*definitions of sovereignty tend to focus on its legal content which is often perceived to change little and thus the concept is viewed as a static, fixed one. Internally, sovereignty connotes the exercise of supreme authority by states within their individual territorial boundaries. Externally, it connotes equality of status between states comprising the society of states. Thus, the formal position of the concept in legal and diplomatic convention has implied both supremacy within and equality of status without.*" (Abiew 1999: 24–25). Sovereignty keeps the international system stable and as long as it is respected, protects weaker states from the interference of stronger states.

The danger is not only that a power-hungry state may want to acquire new territories or gain other advantages through the use of force, which would result in an increasing number of wars in the system. The contemporary world is also struggling with the problem of an increasing number of failing states that are unable or unwilling to use their power to hold their populations in check. That might result in peace-disturbing events, such as civil wars that generate an exodus of refugees into other states.

However, sovereignty is also a contested notion. There are different interpretations as to what it exactly means in practice. Apart from the strictly legal understanding, there are other possibilities, for example the view of sovereignty in stages, not as an absolute notion. Different theories of international relations take slightly different looks at the problem of intervention. Their approaches differ according to their view of the nature of the international system and their take on sovereignty.

When it comes to the big theories of IR, realists have not covered this topic systematically (Almeida 2002). But nevertheless, it is possible to pass at least some general remarks about intervention in realist thinking. The nature of the international system is, of course, such that it requires states to rely on themselves in order to survive. Principally the necessity of self-help contradicts the principle of non-intervention and when necessity arises; either when national security is threatened or when the balance of power is at stakes, overrides it (Almeida 2002:

158). When it comes to humanitarian intervention, it is the intentions and motivations of the intervening state that are questioned, not the legality or the permissibility of the action. Simply there would be no reason to intervene to save strangers, unless the situation within the concerned state was so serious that it threatens the balance of power or endangers the interests of the state. In that case intervention would create only secondary humanitarian outcomes to those which are primarily self-serving.

A school of thought that does cover humanitarian intervention to some extent is the English School of IR theory. It is far from unitary and the approach to intervention indicates one of the splits inside this stream. As a whole the English School approaches the world and its organization as an international society, not only as a system of hierarchically ordered units and their system-driven interaction, like the neorealist would, but as a society with its changes in the norms and interactions that are generated within and through those interactions. States in this society, as some of the authors would argue, are in an important sense fictions, whose status rests on the strength and breadth of people's willingness to believe in, or merely accept, their reality (Buzan 1993). That way, international society is conceived as a game with self-contained rules and that explains why states obey the rule of law though no one can enforce it and that they and their actors willingly participate in process of readjustment and of perpetuation of those rules (Wheeler 2001: 21–22). In this sense it is also possible to view sovereignty and non-intervention as the rules of a game, such as football or ice-hockey, with the states as the players that are trying to sway the referee to see the situation from their point of view.

When facing a state's abuse of the human rights of its own citizens, Nicholas Wheeler asks: "*What moral value attaches to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention if they provide a license for governments to violate global humanitarian standards? And what are outsiders legally and morally permitted – or even required – to do in the face of such violations of international law?*" (Wheeler 2001: 27). This is where the English School pluralists argue that it is better for the good of the individual to adhere to the rule of non-intervention. "*The pluralist concern is that, in the absence of an international consensus on the rules governing a practice of unilateral humanitarian intervention, states will act on their*

own moral principles, thereby weakening an international order built on the rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force." (Wheeler 2001: 29). The fear is that since in international society there is plurality of what to consider as good, states would impose their own moral, ethical or political views on others which would in turn result in more anarchy. The permissibility of humanitarian intervention would mean only that the decision on whether to intervene would depend on those who have the strength to carry the action out based on the cultural assumptions of the intervening party (Wheeler 2001). Intervention then is wrong not only legally, but also morally; it weakens the position of the state and the status of international society.

However, when the case would really require intervention, the pluralists prefer a collective body to carry it out as a means to restoration of international order, narrowly defined as a preservation of international stability and security; the actions have little to do with human rights and democratic institutions within concerned states (Almeida 2002: 165).

2.4 Solidarists' approach

The English School solidarists consider humanitarian intervention as an exception to the rule; an exception that is permissible under certain circumstances. Writers like Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel considered intervention on behalf of subjects that are mistreated by their tyrant rulers as a part of the natural law (Abiew 1999: 35–36), contrary to the newly developing positive law. However, it was still difficult to square the circle of humanitarian demands in difficult situations and that is why authors at the beginning of 20th century regarded humanitarian questions more as a matter of policy than of a law and some even maintained that though humanitarian intervention technically lacked legality, it should be not condemned (Abiew 1999: 38–39). This approach, for example, somewhat resonates with the findings of the commission that was reviewing the intervention in Kosovo and stated that it was "illegal but legitimate" (IICK 2000: 4).

Solidarists base their convictions on moral arguments. Though for Adam Roberts the question is still a legal one and that leads him to discuss matters in the UN framework (Almeida 2002: 167), Wheeler sees it as a moral one. The biggest difference between solidarists and pluralists is the emphasis on morality as the basis for intervention. Solidarist writers, such as R. J. Vincent, Adam Roberts and Nicholas Wheeler also include domestic standards of good governance and a cosmopolitan conception of moral obligations in their definition of international order (Almeida 2002: 169). According to Wheeler, "*states should be subject to minimum standards of decency before they qualify for such protection from the international community*" (Wheeler 2001: 38). Solidarists lean towards more universalistic take on what is good for individual and society.

This is a slightly different approach to sovereignty than legalist or realist. It is not treated as an absolute value, but something that comes in degrees or might even first have to be earned. Regardless of how much power a state has, there are still factors that diminish its control over its population and international interaction, especially since post-Cold War development and globalization has done a lot to weaken the hold that a state has over its territory, population and its belief system. Steven P. Lee, for example, mentions three categories of states: a *normal state* is one in control of the country. An *inept state* is one whose government is only partially in control and a *failed state* is such a state where there either is not a central government, or no government is in control at all. This according to Lee, varies the degree of "sovereignty" that has to be dealt with (Lee 2010). Methodologically this approach is very difficult to use, because there is still the matter of operationalization of the concepts.

Fernando Tesón, when addressing this particular question, takes sovereignty for its instrumental, not intrinsic value; according to him, "*tyranny and anarchy cause the moral collapse of sovereignty*" (Tesón 2003: 93). Tesón approaches the question of humanitarian intervention from a liberal perspective and makes the moral argument that right to intervene stems "*from a general duty to assist victims of grievous injustice*" as opposed to the contrarian view that sees the "*moral significance of state sovereignty and national borders*" (Tesón 2003: 97).

2.5 Responsibility to Protect

The real world when dealing with the issue of humanitarian intervention in the beginning of the new millennium required an approach that combined practicalities, political compromises and assumptions about legality. It was the campaign in Kosovo (1999) that rekindled debate about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. One of the well-known outcomes of this rather vigorous debate was the launch in 2000 of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) by the Canadian government. It was a direct response to Secretary-General Kofi Annan's challenge that was delivered through his Millennium report: "*I recognize both the force and the importance of these arguments. I also accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small and weak states. But to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?*" (Annan 2000: 48).

The question was clear enough and the Commission consisting of several prominent members, who according to Ian Johnstone (2011: 71) were "*respected figures from around the world, connected to officialdom but independent*", travelled the world and organized several workshops in order to formulate a new approach to the problem, in the words of Weiss "*to square the circle of sovereignty and human rights*" (Weiss 2012: 4). Alex Bellamy puts the task of this Commission in this way: "… *to encourage and enable intervention in genuine humanitarian emergencies—while also constraining the use of humanitarian arguments to justify other types of force—by changing the terms of the debate*" (Bellamy 2006: 146). It seemed that the phrase "humanitarian intervention" usually leads to communication deadlock. According to Weiss, one of the reasons is the fact that many humanitarian agencies view it with antipathy. This argument is not that convincing, since there are moments when only military action can halt atrocities (Weiss 2012: 111). And many well-meaning non-military, "humanitarian" means of help lead to worse consequences (see Luttwak 1999). It is more sensible to shift the debate from language to the focus of it. Most of the time the debaters are concerned with the "right to intervene" of the would-be interveners and they forget the afflicted populations. This new focus should be on the rights of the victims (Weiss 2012: 112).

Another change came in the understanding of the sovereignty. It was not solely the language of the RtoP report; it was also natural outcome of the work of the UN Secretary-General Annan who had taken great measures to press the issue during his tenure. In 1999 an opinion piece on sovereignty was published in The Economist. In this article he modifies the understanding of the concept: "*State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.*" (Annan 1999).

This new approach was adopted by the Commission and in the final report it is possible to read the following: "*State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.*" (ICSS 2001: XI).

The reaction of the world to the RtoP report was to be expected to some extent. When it came to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, they were highly suspicious of any procedure that would lead to intervention outside of the sufficient, according to these countries, UN system (Bellamy 2006: 151). Other permanent members were supportive; representatives of the Non-Aligned Movement were highly suspicious of the concept, because it seemed like masked humanitarian intervention (Bellamy 2006: 152). Simply put, humanitarian intervention is understood as a tool for the mighty to meddle into the affairs of weaker, a tool of neo-colonialism and this aversion was transferred to the RtoP concept. It is also advis-

able to remember that this debate took place in the background of the bitter disagreement on Iraq when the United Kingdom and the United States tried to use humanitarian reasons as a secondary justification for the invasion.

However, through Annan's unrelenting work, endeavours of Canadian diplomats and members of the ICISS, the agenda was pushed further and the catchphrase "responsibility to protect" and some of the ideas were incorporated into the final outcome document of the 2005 World Summit. However, this incorporation was at the price of its effectiveness; there is very little from the list of the original recommendations in the final document. Most of it was bargained away during the negotiations to get at least something (Bellamy 2006: 167). The United States were unwilling to agree on any formulation that would imply obligation to intervene, because of the fear that they would have to intervene in places where it would make little sense to further national interests (Bellamy 2006; Johnstone 2011: 71–72). Another no came with the proposition to limit the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council, this recommendation fell through from the onset (Bellamy 2006: 167). This development, however, was not that surprising given the track record of the permanent members and their insistence on their rights. The inclusion of the RtoP concept then was watered-down and rather toothless, and definitely not the answer needed to prevent another Rwanda or Kosovo (Bellamy 2006: 169), meaning it does not answer how to deal with situations when the Security Council is unwilling to take responsibility or action or how to approach a situation when the Security Council is blocked by some actors and it is tempting to carry out an unauthorized intervention. The whole situation in practical aspects remains much the same as before. The Secretary-General did not succeed in convincing the Security Council to set out principles for authorizing interventions and express its intention to be guided by them (Secretary-General 2005: 126).

However, thanks to the follow-up work of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, RtoP did not die, but developed into a three-pillar concept. The first pillar is the responsibility of states to protect their own citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Its second pillar lies, according to the Secretary-General, in the responsibility of the international society to help states fulfill their obligations to their populations. The third pillar is constituted by the responsibility of the UN member states to act in a timely and decisive manner in accordance with the UN Charter (UN 2008). The question of unauthorized intervention was not re-introduced. The third pillar might be divided into two sets of measures: those that fall short of military action, such as sanctions, embargoes, cessation of cooperation or suspending membership in various organizations etc., and military intervention in extreme cases (ICSS 2001: 29).

And that is the "humanitarian intervention" part of the larger framework of RtoP, however its essential form and understanding has not changed much. Officially, the threshold criteria are still lacking, at least in the sense that the Secretary-General had in mind when he addressed the Security Council, and this is most probably intentionally so. The final wording of the paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome includes an action according to Chapter VII "on a case-by-case basis" (General Assembly 2005: 139), leaving a lot of room for the members of the Security Council to interpret what is sufficient cause for authorizing humanitarian intervention and, of course, in this way also leaves a lot of room for dealing with the situation according to their own interests.

2.6 Humanitarian intervention criteria

What are, then, the criteria for humanitarian intervention? To find at least some hints it is necessary to draw on some previous documents, those preceding the 2005 inclusion of paragraphs 138 and 139 into the World Summit outcome document, and see if there has been any change since then in terms of the clarification of the principles. When approaching this topic, the ICISS uses the parlance of just war theory to gauge the fairness of humanitarian intervention. That means it specifies that it is in the areas of right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.

For the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, the criterion of rightful authority is crucial, at least in the tradition that leans heavily on the just war tradition. The UN and UN-related documents, of course, consider the Security Council the ultimate arbiter over war and peace in the world. Hence any intervention would require either a SC

resolution or at least a General Assembly "Uniting for Peace" resolution. Although a two-thirds majority in General Assembly is not binding, it puts a great legitimizing force behind that decision. Another option in the UN Charter is given to regional organizations that act within the borders of their member states, but they are still subject to the authorization of the SC.

The problem is that this solution often suffers from the fact that members of the SC use their power to veto resolutions that go against their interests. Some thinkers then speculate about the possibility of different authorities that would have justifying power. The Kosovo report, for example, admits the possibility of legitimizing an intervention by some kind of a coalition of the willing in the case of the UN SC's inaction or when it would be impractical to raise the issue during an Emergency Special Session of General Assembly. The Kosovo report in its contextual principles insists, however, on a multilateral approach to the problem and also that the action is not formally condemned in any way by a major organ of the UN, especially the International Court of Justice or UN SC (IICK 2000: 192–195).

Second, maybe the most important criterion is just cause. According to the ICISS report, humanitarian intervention would be justified in cases of "*large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale "ethnic cleansing," actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.*" (ICSS 2001: 32). There are some suggestions that a failing state unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizens from suffering in cases of mass starvation or natural disasters could be considered a legitimate reason for intervention (ICSS 2001: 33; IICK 2000: 193). But during the clarification process of the RtoP concept this issue was raised and rejected. According to the Secretary General's remarks in 2008, "*extending the concept of Responsibility to Protect to cover other calamities such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility.*" (UN 2008). The ICISS also excluded other violations of human rights, such as systematic racial discrimination, or systematic imprisonment or other repressions of political opponents (ICSS 2001:

34). In other words, the threshold seems to be quite high, but there is no quantitative measurement.

For Wheeler, intervention should come to answer a "supreme humanitarian emergency", but he struggles to operationalize this case. "*It is no good trying to define an emergency in terms of the numbers killed or displaced, because this is too arbitrary. A supreme humanitarian emergency exists when the only hope of saving lives depends on outsiders coming to the rescue.*" (Wheeler 2001: 34). Tom Farer suggests a "spike test". He means that there has to be a huge spike in the gross violations of human rights (Farer et al. 2005). But again his just cause part of the test is quite intuitive and his reasons for insisting on "spike" are understandable. Farer considers this threshold high enough that nobody could make a case for intervention in countries that chronically deprive their citizens of their democratic rights and those unable to protect their citizens from suffering due to natural disasters (Farer et al. 2005). However, high enough or not, Farer's test does not push the discussion further. So the just cause reasons for invoking the responsibility to protect are, after more than ten years from the ICISS report, still only four crimes that "shock the conscience of humankind": genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity as defined by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.

When it comes to right intention criteria, the only objective, of course, should be the alleviation of the suffering of the civilians. Economic or territorial goals are not legitimate reasons for intervention. Otherwise the intervention would rightfully be seen as an act of aggression. However, motives are very often hard ascertain, foreign or domestic. The Kosovo report states that "*right intention is probably best carried out by withdrawing military forces and coercive economic measures at the earliest point in time consistent with the humanitarian objectives*" (IICK 2000: 195). This criterion, however, is hardly quantifiable and measurable. Another major debate involves the questionability of bringing the regime change as an intention or motivation of intervening states. It might be argued that in some cases the regime change might be seen as a necessary precondition to stop the violence. It is still a highly contested aspect of intervention because regime change itself is not a legitimate goal of intervention, even in the case of democratic government ousted by a military coup (ICSS 2001: 34).

As regards last resort, the RtoP principle is built on three pillars in which military intervention is one of the options, but not the only one. The ICISS report is quite clear in this matter. RtoP seeks to broaden the scale of preventive measures ranging from political to economical, so that, in the words of Ban Ki-moon, the international community is not limited either to send in the marines or to watch the slaughter of the innocents (UN 2008). Military intervention should be the last resort to stop the gross violations of human rights.

The next criterion is proportional means. The authors of the Kosovo report call for stricter adherence to the laws of war and international humanitarian law than during standard military operation, and ICISS agrees (IICK 2000: 195; ICSS 2001: 54). Means employed during military intervention have to be proportional to the original provocation and should reflect the limited nature of the mission.

Last but not least, military intervention should be carried out only if it stands a chance of achieving its goals – that means if it protects the population. If the operation would not be able to do so, or, if its launching would worsen the impact on the population, it should not be considered. The most obvious example of interventions that are doomed to fail this test are cases when the intervention would be aimed at a strong state or even major power that has considerable military power that would be able to draw the intervening forces into a protracted war. Or, alternately, it would be complicated to intervene in a country that has powerful allies opposed to the intervention.

2.7 Short history of humanitarian interventions

During the development of the Westphalian system, the practice of humanitarian intervention went through several phases, differentiated by the state of the international system. The first period, from the times of the evolution of the system till 1945, can be characterized by the fact that war was at the time considered a legitimate tool of foreign policy. At that time, the humanitarian intervention was to serious extent discussed by international lawyers during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, probably starting already with Grotius. However, it was only at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the concept was put into prac-

tice by states (Wheeler 2001: 45). As Martha Finnemore notes, the European powers intervened on behalf of Christian populations in Muslim countries, namely multilateral (French, British, Russian) intervention on behalf of the civilian population in Greece during the war of independence (1821-1827); French intervention on behalf of the Maronite population in Syria/Lebanon (1860-1861) and Russian intervention on behalf of the Bulgarian population of the Ottoman Empire (1876-1878). Finnemore explains this fact by the culture-based understanding of what "human" or "civilization" meant. What followed was a universalization of the perception of humanity, manifested in the international system by the British fight to abolish the slavery (Finnemore 1996). Oded Löwenheim also adds the British campaign against white slavery practiced by Barbary pirates in Algiers (1816) as an often overlooked example of a norm-driven humanitarian intervention (Löwenheim 2003).

After the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the rules of the world changed, use of force or threat of the use were practically out of the question in legal terms. During the Cold War, the climate was not conducive to multilateral interventions. With the UN Security Council in deadlock, the only options left were legally dubious unilateral interventions and those were more often than not conducted as means of power politics by the United States and the Soviet Union; it is enough to mention the Contras in Nicaragua or interventions in Budapest (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). However, there were unilateral interventions that merit consideration as those with some humanitarian outcome. These were not even framed as humanitarian interventions; interveners claimed that they were dealing with threats to national security. These were the interventions of India against Pakistan in Bangladesh in 1971, by Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978 and Tanzania in Uganda in 1979. It is also interesting to mention that none of these were approved by the SC.

The 1990s were definitely a turbulent decade. The SC emerged out of the deadlock with the fall of communist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but the UN also became more assertive when it came to different conflicts around the world. During this decade the number of interventions authorized by the SC increased, although the practice did not prove to be any less problematic than in previous decades. This type of military action does not seem to be a panacea for every single conflict; on the contrary, 1990s witnessed several very

problematic interventions that ended in skepticism about the whole concept. Somalia (1992–1993), where the situation escalated, intervention had no success and USA preferred to withdraw, illustrates this vividly. This particular case led towards reluctance in subsequent situations, especially later during the Rwandan tragedy (1994–1996) when whatever action was taken, it was too late. Somalia is a case where intervention happened and was unsuccessful, Rwanda is a case where it did not happen and the situation turned tragic. In 1999, the Kosovo crisis came about. The SC did not authorize the NATO intervention, and only later was the KFOR mission authorized that carried out peacekeeping in subsequent years.

It was the Kosovo crisis that brought about a new round of discussions about humanitarian intervention and the whole process resulted in RtoP doctrine (see above). This particular concept was already used in action; it was invoked in UN SC resolution 1973 authorizing the no-fly zone over Libya (UN 2011). However, it referred more to the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens than responsibility of other states to intervene. The Libyan case is going to be important for further implementation of the concept and it is not helpful that the interveners in this case did not act strictly according to the resolution, but decided to push further and opted for regime change, which became the aim of the intervention, not impartial alleviation of suffering. Thus they exceeded the mandate (Kříž 2012).

2.8 Conclusion

When looking at humanitarian intervention as a whole, its tradition is far longer and richer than the last twenty years. The discussion will not be concluded with RtoP. As long as the tension between sovereignty and protection of populations exists, there will also be those who will take sides in this question, not only as an academic pursuit, but in policy-making.

What the future will bring for humanitarian intervention as a part of RtoP is not sure. That will depend on how the Libyan intervention is perceived by other members of SC and also by international society and whether it will prove useful in the long run.

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3. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF ARMED CONFLICT

Zinaida Shevchuk

3.1 Introduction

The end of the bipolar world has resulted in the emergence of the "new disorder" in which interstate violence has become less of a concern, whereas intrastate conflicts that have increased across the globe have occupied the attention of the international policymaking and academic communities. In this chapter, I will develop a conceptual framework for studying and understanding armed conflict. The objective is to shed light on the contested narratives about conflict phenomena. Typological theorizing provides a rich depiction of phenomena and brings more nuanced and explicit distinction to the understanding of heterogenic aspects of armed conflicts.

The logic of inferences in this chapter is organized as follows. At the beginning of this chapter, I define the phenomena of conflict, leading the discussion to categorization efforts on the conceptual level. The second part of the chapter is based on typological theorizing, evaluating our knowledge about all possible types of conflict that have guided research within the field of international relations. The last part introduces advantages of such an approach and challenges that have to be addressed in future research.

Conflict is part of human history and unfortunately will probably never end. The concept of conflict has been used to identify a variety of social interactions. The most destructive types of conflict involve coercion and armed confrontation among parties, leading to casualties among human lives. Efforts to understand the multiple causes have accumulated scientific knowledge about the phenomena. The mainstream academic literature has produced different approaches about how to study conflict; however, the outcomes to delineate the concept remain ambiguous. In order to understand the research object, an adequate conceptualization that will formulate concepts and illuminate what is theoretically significant is essential. This section gathers the

most influential definitions in the field of IR by those who have collected data on armed conflict.

The term *conflict* is derived from the Latin words *con* and *fligere*, meaning to strike together, and later *conflictus*, a contest. Most of the definitions include the element of collision of inconsistent interests and values among conflicting parties, ranging from struggles for status to resources and social change. In general, conflict is understood in terms of aspirations of conflicting parties to achieve incompatible goals simultaneously (Pruitt et al. 2003). Goals are incompatible when the action of one party threatens the interests of another party. The complexity of conflict depends whether tangible issues (like recognition, security, territory, money) are more significant than intangible aspects like symbolic meanings that shape values and ideologies, legitimizing a certain conflict behavior (Jeong 2008: 26).

Thus, in the conflict research literature, the term *conflict* entails a situation in which at least two actors fight over mutually exclusive and incompatible goals. In the words of famous scholar of ethnic conflict, Donald L. Horowitz, "*conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals*" (Horowitz 1985: 95). The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research defines conflict as "*the clashing interests (political differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organization) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases*" (HIIK 2005: 2). Similar logic is used in the book *Using Conflict Theory*, which describes conflict as a unique type of behavior caused by incompatible goals and/or expression of hostility among conflicting parties (Bartos and Wehr 2002: 13).

This chapter employs the definition by Peter Wallensteen, one of the most recognized scholars in peace research, whose definition is accepted by the majority of the academic community in the field. In order to understand and provide conflict analysis, we have to focus on three major components of the phenomenon: (1) actors, (2) process (action), and (3) incompatibility (issues at stake). By combining these aspects, we arrive at a most comprehensive analysis of all possible kinds of conflict, which is a "*social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set*

of scarce resources" (Wallensteen 2011: 15). Therefore, conflicts can be categorized in terms of types of conflicting parties, interaction patterns ranging from war to non-violent conflict, and incompatibility of issues at stake within a particular conflict. This scheme will be applied in the following sections.

3.2 Typology of conflict by its actors

The primary attribute of typology according to actors is embedded in the identification of conflict participants – actors in the international system or states, which play a decisive role in international relations. The major scholarly literature distinguishes four types of conflict: (1) extrasystemic armed conflict, which takes place between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory; in the Correlates of War (COW) project, this category is further divided into colonial wars and imperial wars; (2) interstate armed conflict, which occurs between two or more states; (3) internal armed conflict, in which the government of a state is in conflict with internal opposition groups without intervention from another state; and (4) internationalized internal armed conflict, when conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal groups in opposition to it and with intervention from an outside state (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 11).

The life cycle of a conflict requires the understanding of types of actors involved in an armed confrontation, sources of conflict and their change over time. For example, a civil war, one of the types of conflict which is defined as an armed confrontation within boundaries of a recognized sovereign state, may have multiple issues at stake. In this type of conflict, there have to be two conflicting parties, one of which is a state and both of the parties have to have the capacity to physically harm each other. The issue at stake is the question of a common authority at the outset of organized violence (Kalyvas 2006: 17; Toft 2010: 9).

Civil war–affected states are states in which "*it is almost the case that significant elements of actual or potential military power exist outside the control of the central state apparatus*" (Giddens 1987). Violence is a central feature of such a conflict and the only way to establish the authority of one or the other conflicting party. Under this condition a state uses

its military power to suppress rebellions challenging its authority and legitimacy. As a result, civil conflict is brutish and nasty, accompanied by killing, which is "*to a great extent a matter of national pride*" (Misra 2008: 45). The use of violence by both rebellion and state may lead to anarchy and the indiscriminate killing of civilians. Incompatibility of goals in civil wars could be motivated by different factors, as for example, the spread of terror among the opposition, the elimination of threats from the opposing party by killing members of the group, the gain of materialistic benefits, implementation of a different ideology or achieving a change in the political regime and political elites (Misra 2008: 52–62).

If we follow recent developments in conflict areas, we cannot overlook the fact that the emergence of new non-state actors has led to the development of new types of conflict. Trends that have increased a range of worldwide arms trades expanded the power of multinational corporations and the growth of trans-border exchange of weapons, drugs, and people, which in turn has contributed to the formation of coalitions that have acquired the capacity to form armies. Consequently, the power of non-state actors has considerably increased, which allows them to enter armed conflict both within traditional states and across state borders (COW 2005).

This development has expanded the typology of armed conflict conducted by non-state actors. Maintaining the focus on the members of the state system, there are four types of armed conflict: first, between states; second, between a state and non-state actors outside of the state; third, between a state and non-state actors within a state; and fourth, between non-state actors taking place outside of the state.

3.3 Conflict typology by process – violence intensity

It is common knowledge that conflicts are not always violent. In fact, the vast majority of conflicts in international relations are non-violent. Thus, there is a significant and growing literature on these types of conflicts that do not always take a violent form. The COSIMO (Conflict Simulation Model) conflict categorization belongs among the most prominent classifications; it has been developed by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), aiming to grasp

armed conflict from non-violent, latent conflict to violent war phases. Conflict analysis within this framework is divided into two main categories: non-violent and violent conflicts. The non-violent form of a conflict does not mean that the conflict is absent, rather that conflicting parties do not employ violent methods to resolve incompatible goals. Put in the words of Dennis Sandole (1998), non-violent conflict is a manifestation of conflict processes during which one party seeks to undermine the goal-seeking capabilities of another conflicting party by non-violent means, as i.e. economic sanctions, exclusion of some groups from access to power, and so on.

There are two types of non-violent conflict: latent conflict and manifested conflict. While conflicting parties do not use force against each other, a latent conflict occurs when one of the conflicting parties has incompatible differences over issues, values, or objectives that have national significance for them. When these clashing interests are articulated in the form of demands and claims, the conflict enters a stage of manifestation in which tensions still remain below the threshold of full-scale violence. As illustrated in Table 1, the conflicts are divided into two major categories: non-violent and violent conflict.

As far as violent conflicts are concerned, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) introduces an empirical-quantitative analysis of conflicts and offers a deeper differentiation of conflict intensity. There are three categories of armed conflict: (1) minor armed conflict, which involves at least 25 battle-related deaths but less than 1,000 for the whole duration of the conflict; (2) intermediate armed conflict, in which the number of deaths counts more than 25 people and fewer than 1,000 per year, but more than 1,000 during the entire conflict; and (3) war, a conflict in which there are more than 1,000 deaths in one year (Wallensteen 2011: 22). It means that a conflict has to reach a certain magnitude before it is classified as "armed". It is measured in terms of a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility.

Undoubtedly, the highest level of violent conflict is war. In order to grasp the whole dynamics of war, scholars have developed definitions that stem from different theoretical perspectives. As a result, the research has developed different sets of aspects for investigation. Bull's definition, which has guided research within the field of IR, defines war as "*organized violence carried on by political units against each other*"

(Bull 2012: 184). Significant assumptions made by this definition elucidate the following aspects of war: first, it is fought by political organizations (not by any other collective actors, as for example economic corporations); second, war is organized violence with its own rules and norms; and third, war is collective, not individual (Vasquez 1993: 35). This definition, however, does not include that war is a special tool to compel opposing actors to fulfill their will and attain a goal that cannot be attained by other means. As the most well-known definition by famous military theorist Carl von Clausewitz claims "*war is merely the continuation of politics by other means*" (Clausewitz 1989: 87).

Given the diversity of theoretical perspectives and plurality of hypotheses in the literature about the causes of wars, it has been impossible to reach a universally acceptable definition on a theoretical level. Further significant attempts to define war were determined by the empirical domain of the concept. An attempt was made to create a data set that could be used by every scholar to verify or falsify hypotheses derived from different theoretical approaches. In this regard, the criteria to define war were drawn across the causality line. Quincy Wright, an outstanding political scientist, made one of the first contributions to this attempt by involving under the criteria of war all hostilities among "*members of the family of nations, whether international, civil, colonial, or imperial, which were recognized as states of war in the legal sense or involved 50,000 troops*" (Wright 1965: 636). Another prominent scholar, Lewis F. Richardson, took a different perspective. He differentiated war from other acts of violence by the number of the dead, grouped by various logarithms to base ten (Richardson et al. 1960).

Mel Small and David Singer, who have developed the conceptualization and typology of war within the Correlates of War Project, have combined work of their two main predecessors, Wright and Richardson. The starting point for Small and Singer, who collected data on war since 1816, was to understand the concept as follows: "*we must define war in terms of violence. Not only is war impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical sense), but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war*" (Small and Singer 1982: 205–206).

Since then the concept of war has been based on two primary criteria: (1) a certain magnitude of battle related fatalities (initially includ-

ing only soldiers and military staff) and (2) the status of the conflicting actors. According to these scholars, the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths caused by sustainable organized armed forces differentiates war from other types of conflict (Singer and Small 1972: 8). This criterion is broadly accepted by the academic community; however, the threshold of 1,000 deaths was broadened to include civilian casualties, as is described above.

Table 1. Categories of Conflict Intensity

Violence	Intensity	Name of Intensity	Definition
Non-violent	Low	Latent Conflict	A positional difference on values of national meaning articulated by one party and perceived by the other as such.
		Manifest Conflict	The use of measures located at the preliminary stage to violent force, such as economic sanctions or verbal pressure to use violence.
Violent	Medium	Crisis	At least one of the parties uses violent force in a sporadic way.
	High	Severe Crisis	A conflict in which violent force is used repeatedly in a systemic and organized way.
		War	The type of armed conflict in which violence reaches a certain magnitude and the conflicting parties exercise extensive measures.

Source: HIIK 2005.

Clearly, there is a number of issues over which conflicting parties fight each other. Classification of the issues is necessary to achieve comprehensive analysis and potential policy recommendation for the resolution of a conflict. The next section of the chapter presents typology of major theoretical approaches that shed light on the causes, processes and conditions that are entailed in understanding interaction patterns in a conflict.

3.4 Competing goals: typology of issues at stake in armed conflicts

Last but not least it is possible to build a typology of conflict by issues at stake. In this respect academic research focuses on such aspects as religion, ideology, language, ethnicity, resources and markets, dominance, equality, and territory. This classification is widely accepted in political science, and conflict research illuminates the significance of each aspect at the stage of conflict outset, its escalation, and its resolution. This section differentiates the major aspects in conflict research in order to explain five major types of conflict: (1) ethnic conflict, (2) conflict over political arrangements, (3) ideological, (4) economic, and (5) territorial cross-border conflict. Such analytical categories present a definition of a particular conflict type and illuminate aspects that are at stake during the entire conflict dynamics. As mentioned above, the aim is to provide a typology of conflict with regards to issues at stake. By identifying clusters of characteristics that differentiate instances of the conflict phenomenon, typological theorizing contributes a powerful tool in conflict studies.

3.4.1 Ethnic conflict

The ubiquity of ethnic aspects in armed conflicts has increased the necessity of giving a scientific definition to the phenomenon of ethnic conflict. There is no comprehensive and widely accepted empirical theory to explain ethnic conflict. Rather, each of the approaches (as discussed below) explains a particular aspect of ethnic confrontation. There is an ongoing scholarly debate over the study as to whether ethnic diversity breeds armed conflict (Wimmer et al. 2009), what the relationship between ethnicity and the duration of armed conflict is (Cederman and Girardin 2007; Collier et al. 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2001), and if ethnic conflicts are more violent in comparison to non-ethnic conflicts (Eck 2009; Kalyvas 2001, 2007). Some scholars argue about the "banality" of ethnic conflict (Mueller 2000) and emphasize the role of violence as a central component of both ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts (Kalyvas 2001). The major shortcoming of such approaches lies in their linking ethnicity and armed

conflict in a problematic way – as if all ethnic conflicts had uniform causes.

Qualitative research highlights the need to "scale down" and trace the *bellicose* aspect in the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict (Beissinger 2007; Van Evera 1994). What marks ethnic conflict as different from other types of conflict is that the interests and claims of ethnic groups are based on ethnic affinities rather than material pay-offs (Sambanis 2001). In other words, the contested nature of the claim defines what a conflict is about and whether key issues and incompatibility in goals are overtly ethnic in nature. Ethnicity in this study is defined "*as thought and action stemming from identification with a community of putatively shared ancestry that exceeds the scale of face-to-face gemeinschaft*" (Kaufmann and Conversi 2012). Aspects like a common *proper name*, the myth of *common ancestry,* shared *historical memories, elements of common culture*, a link to *homeland* and a sense of *solidarity* are used by ethnicities to demarcate their boundaries (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 6–7).

An influential piece of conventional wisdom about ethnic conflict is based on the assumption that ethnic composition of a society influences the probability of ethnic conflict due to tensions across ethnic lines. Many theories – primordial, instrumental, and constructivist – have proposed the explanation of ethnic conflict.

Primordialists argue that ethnicity is rooted in historical experience and that ethnic identity does not change over time (Geertz 1996; Weber 1996). Primoridalist is an umbrella term, which, according to one of the most prominent scholars, Anthony D. Smith (1994, 1995, 1998), involves three different approaches: (1) "naturalist", (2) "evolutionary", and (3) "cultural" determinants. The naturalist approach emphasizes that the nation or ethnic group to which one belongs is "naturally fixed" (Smith 1995: 31). Naturalists do not differentiate between nations and ethnic groups. All nations have a distinctive way of life, "natural frontiers", specific origins, a golden age, "as well as a peculiar character, mission and destiny" (Hutchinson and Smith 1995: 34).

According to one of the main representatives of the evolutionary approach, Pierre Van den Berghe, a human society is based on three principles: kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion (Van den Berghe 1978: 403). This involves more "intergroup than intra-group variance"

(Van den Berghe 1978: 406–407) based on kinship and loyalties of "inclusive fitness" (Smith 1998; Thayer 2009). "*Reciprocity is cooperation for mutual benefit ... and it can operate between kin or between non-kin. Coercion is the use of force for one sided benefit*" (Van den Berghe: 403). A similar combination of ethnic affiliation with kinship ties is presented in Horowitz's very influential work *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*: "*Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity*" (Horowitz 1985: 52).

The next approach, which is known as cultural primordialist, goes beyond pure primordialism and is based on a combination of three major ideas: primordial identities are (1) *a priori* given and static, (2) coercive, and (3) emotional (Eller and Coughlan 1993). The most prominent representatives of cultural primordialism are scholars Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, who emphasize the power of cultural perception and a belief in "sacredness" by ethnic groups.

The second approach, which is in contradiction with primordialism, is instrumentalism. The instrumentalist approach explains ethnic conflict as rooted in (1) modernization, (2) economic indicators, and (3) the role of political leaders (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Brass 1996; Laitin 1998).

Through the process of modernization, which involves better education, urbanization, the creation of better communication channels and mass media, ethnic groups become more aware about their disadvantages, distinctions between them and others, and a need to compete with other ethnic groups (Connor 1972). Political leaders manipulate ethnic identities for their own interests, for example to stay in power. Accordingly, political leaders may occur as supporters of conflict across ethnic lines "*in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantages for their groups as well as for themselves*" (Brass 1991: 111).

There is a big debate in mainstream academic literature between the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches. In order to challenge fundamental assumptions, scholars of each approach have developed a broad range of critical arguments. However, instead of going into a discussion about the weak and strong points of each approach, I would like to introduce a "third way" in the study of the causes of ethnic conflict represented by such outstanding scholars as Anthony D. Smith, John Hutchinson, John Armstrong, Stuart Kaufman, Daniele Coversi, and Andreas Wimmer.

Ethno-symbolism is a more homogeneous category, involving the elements of both previous approaches. It allows us to capture the complex nature of ethnic identity formation, which "*can be located on a spectrum between primordial historic continuities and instrumental opportunistic adaptations*" (Connor 1993). According to this approach, the causes of ethnic conflict are rooted in (1) myths and symbols, (2) fears, and (3) opportunity for mobilization.

Myths and symbols are significant in an ethnic group's construction process. Memories, myths, symbol values, common feelings and opinions may justify a collective behavior. It may take different forms, such as, for example, flags, language, rituals, hymns, special food and costumes, banners, coins, and representations of ethnic heroes and the glorious past (Smith 1999: 16). The core meaning of these symbols represents "inclusive fitness" (Smith 1998: 146–150) to one group, its legitimacy for existence and fear of other groups.

The next necessary condition for ethnic conflict is fear for the existence, security, and status of the ethnic group. As is very rightly stated by David Lake et al., "*ethnicity is not a cause of violent conflict. … But when ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and, indeed, fear of what the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture*" (Lake et al. 1998: 7). The causes of ethnic conflict stem from "emerging anarchy" when a weakening state is unable to provide security guarantees for ethnic groups within the state (Posen 1993). Barry Posen's neorealist assumption is based on the ethnic security dilemma explanation. According to this logic, the incentives to use pre-emptive offensive strategies are high, and factors like emotions, historical memories, and myths exacerbate the escalation of tension to armed conflict.

The combination and interaction of those aspects creates a spiral of escalation, if the necessary conditions – myths justifying ethnic hostility, ethnic fear, and opportunity to mobilize – are present. While ethnic myths and fears can provide justification for ethnic mobilization, there should be political, territorial, and external opportunities for

ethnic groups in order to mobilize their forces (Kaufman 2001: 32–34; Wimmer 2002). The role of the political system (Saideman 1997), the strength of political institutions, the pattern of ethnic settlement, the geographic distance of the ethnic group from the political center (Cederman et al. 2010), transborder kinship support (Wolff 2004), and willingness of external powers are the main determinants of ethnic mobilization.

To sum up, ethnic conflict is a conflict in which the key causes of confrontation run along ethnic lines, which involve some elements of ethnic identity, the status of ethnic groups, and the opportunity to mobilize violent confrontation. At the outset of a conflict, ethnic conflict could be identified by the observable pattern of rebel recruitment, while ethnicity by itself could be a motivation to mobilize forces.

3.4.2 Conflict over political arrangements

Academic research on the links between the political system of the state and armed conflict has a long history in the social sciences. The most prominent scholars of democratization and political transformation, such as Samuel Huntington, Robert Dahl, and Edward Mansfield have emphasized the significance of strong political institutions capable of managing popular political participation of newly enfranchised masses (Huntington 2006; Dahl 1971).

Political conflict is a broad term. For the purposes of this chapter, political conflict is defined as a clash and violent attacks used by groups within a political community against political regimes and authorities (Gurr 1980: 3–4). It is a conflict in which rebels target a political community or regime in a given state with the goal to achieve a degree of political change; a violent confrontation between political elites and counter elite ensues (Eckstein 1980: 137).

As is outlined by Harry Eckstein in the *Handbook of Political Conflict Theory and Research*, the fundamental incompatibility in goals between conflicting parties is the desire to maximize influence or power over decision-making institutions in a state. In order to achieve this goal, collective political violence is a "normal" action, whereas violence is a matter of tactical considerations. Such tactical choice involves cost-benefit ratio calculations, which make cultural patterns less important

(Eckstein 1980: 143), unlike, for example, in ethnic conflicts where the logic of violence is important.

As we have witnessed, the causal connection between democratization and conflict has been significantly striking since the end of the Cold War. Ted Gurr's findings in the late 1980s and 1990s are embedded in the process of democratization (Gurr 2000: 163). One of the most influential political science scholars, Horowitz, argues that weak civil societies, lack of power-sharing commitments, and sharp discrepancies between elite and non-elite groups all increase the probability of armed conflict (Horowitz 1985). "*Democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power. … In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded*" (Horowitz 1994).

A considerable contingent of academics argue that the beginning stages of any transition to democracy are most dangerous and give rise to armed conflict (Horowitz 1985; Saideman et al. 2002). The argument that transition to democracy is risky does not prevent such a development. The struggle for self-determination and political change in newly created states is a dynamic process and cannot be stopped (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). What matters is the way the transition is brought about – with the right steps toward democracy. "*The probabilities of a political system developing in a non-violent, non-authoritarian and eventually democratically viable manner are maximized when a national identity emerges first, followed by the institutionalization of the central government, and then the emergence of mass parties and mass electorate*" (Nordlinger 1971: 458).

Weak institutions per se do not increase the chance of an armed conflict; they do so only during the early phases of an incomplete democratic transition (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). In this case political leaders frequently employ ideological or charismatic appeals to bolster their rule. The contest over national self-determination takes place as the fortunes of both elites and mass groups are shifting. Elites left over from the old regime seek strategies that will prevent their fall, while rising elites try to muscle in, and both scramble for allies among the newly aroused masses.

From this we can stipulate the conditions under which a political conflict is more likely to occur. Of course, the political problems dis-

cussed above lead to different kinds of political conflict. A more fruitful avenue of inquiry than focusing our research on the "causes" of conflict and the "conditions" of peace is to uncover significant characteristics directly relevant to political consolidation and struggle. In order to explain political conflict, it is necessary to operationalize those aspects by which two or more politically defined actors learn that their goals could be achieved only by armed confrontation. The long-term political relationship becomes increasingly conflictive and hostile when (1) political change is used as a tool to mobilize masses, (2) there are conflicting visions about the political arrangement of a state, and (3) incompatibility of goals rests upon a change of political regime.

3.4.3 Ideological confrontation and its consequences

Ideology has been one of the most widely used terms in political thought during the twentieth century. Different scholars used the term in different ways, which poses the question of what this concept means exactly. In this section, I will explore the role of three core determinants of ideology, which are significant to explain armed conflict: (1) a set of norms, (2) political orientation, and (3) religion.

The function of ideology can be explained in different ways. Ideology could be understood as "*a set of systemic principles projecting and justifying a socio-political order*" (Pravda 1988: 227). Ideology can also be understood as the moral basis to justify the use of power by elites. This means that in order to process power, it is important to have a moral and legal basis, doctrines, and beliefs that are accepted by the population. The function of ideology, in this sense, is to integrate the group and legitimize its normative order. It could be a tool used by conflicting parties to maintain or create such normative orders. Other scholars have explained ideology as a "myth" that has supported and determined the group's action in a struggle against other groups. Thus, ideology can have different roles, ranging from strengthening the ties within the group and its identity to aiding conflicting groups in their claims and interests to strengthening the will of particular members of the group to wage war against other groups (Larrain 1979). In some armed conflicts, the same ideology that strengthens ties within a group can also contribute to conflict behavior against other groups.

The linkage between ideology and armed conflict is profound in the states that emerged after the demise of the Soviet Union. The state ideology of Marxism-Leninism was pronounced defunct and Western neoliberalism was introduced in order to assist the political transformation in the whole post-communist sphere. The crucial factor in this process was a need to determine a new place in the "new order", to insure membership in alliances and access to foreign economic assistance, trade, and investments. Following this logic, "*ideology needs to be placed in a continuum of expression of political thought*" and as a concept which provides a "*systemic interpretation of the past and a programme or unfolding future*" (Fawn 2004: 3–4). In this sense, ideology assists the understanding of foreign policy goals of countries and their aspirations in defining their roles on the regional and international level. Put in the words of one of the most prominent scholars, Ole Holsti, "*an ideology provides the intellectual framework through which national roles, images, policy and moral and ethical beliefs are constructed*" (Holsti 1974: 266–267).

The demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its institutions were followed by the displacement of universal values, the task of state-building, and the rise of nationalist movements. All of these factors contributed to the significance of a new ideology in post-communist states. The foreign policy goals of these states cannot be understood without a discourse of belief structures, their system of values, and the perception of the population's and the political leaders' ideological orientation (even if it is in the process of formulation) and their place in the world.

Another type of ideological conflict is rooted in disputed religious beliefs. Religious segregation leads to struggle in a similar way that ethnicity does, but often with more vehemence (Bell-Fialkoff 1996). Religious identity forms a group identity, which might be different from the others and contribute to the escalation of in- and out-group dynamics. The goal of conflicting parties is to replace their civic identity with more faith-based identities (Misra 2008: 15). Religion serves as a power tool for mobilization, strengthening the identity-related need of the individual (Seul 1999). The crucial point that one needs to keep in mind is that particular religious ideas, values, and beliefs have their origins in the supernatural. Religion in this sense is uncompro-

mising (Toft 2006). Differences on this level may contribute to violent behavior by religious actors: non-believers might be converted by force or punished (Basedau et al. 2011).

Overall prejudice against any particular religion by others may have an impact on conflict dynamics. Multi-religious states, such as India, could be more prone to armed conflict across religious lines. The intergroup relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim groups is problematic in European countries too, as, for example, in the United Kingdom.

Links between religion and armed conformation are the subject of increased interest in international politics. Much of the academic literature focuses on terrorism or tests Huntington's famous thesis on the "clash of civilizations". Some studies argue that in order to answer such a question as, "*How has it come about that a generation of village boys and girls, born in the atheist Soviet Union, have turned into Islamic suicide bombers and child killers?*" (De Waal 2004: 55), we have to understand the process of politicization of religion and the role of political leaders (Toft 2006; Basedau et al. 2011). Following this logic, religion can turn to armed confrontation if (1) the religious make-up of a state involves different religious groups, (2) there are conflict-prone religious structures, and (3) religion is a politicized issue and serves as a tool in the hands of political leaders.

3.4.4 Economic conflict

The economic dimension of conflict, uneven distribution of wealth, contributes to antagonism within a state. This has been investigated by many international studies. Since economic stability affects almost all aspects of human life and states alike, research has identified several core issues which are central for international stability. They include fair trade relations, fair competition, foreign investments, distribution of goods, services, and technology, North-South inequalities, and economic crises.

The well-known liberal argument that economic interdependence promotes peace is based on the assumption that trade agreements and institutions reduce conflict on an international level (Doyle 1997; Nye 1971; Russett and Oneal 2001). Trade ties among national states gener-

ate a sense of community, increase trust, and enhance peaceful relationships through expectations of future profit (Deutsch 1957; Mansfield et al. 1999; Russett et al. 1998). Some studies have illustrated that trade ties promote peace processes and that trade partners within the same institutional arrangement use military force against each other less often than states that do not have trade ties (Oneal et al. 1996; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2003).

However, this liberal assumption has its limitations, and there are good reasons to be skeptical about its empirical evidence. Trade ties may lead to trust-building and reciprocity only under a symmetrical relationship between liberal states. However, interdependence is complex and mutual membership in institutions realistically speaking – is epiphenomenal. Like military power, membership in international institutions "*gives states ability to coerce, bribe, reward, or punish others, defining the conditions under which acts of military aggression or cooperation are rational strategies of action*" (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2012: 258).

Research by the excellent scholar Katherine Barbieri (1996, 2005) illuminates that bilateral trade increases the probability of armed conflict. Thus, it is important to find out which variables and what different levels of dependency (direct and indirect, dyadic and systemic, single and multi-dimensional) generate incentives for peace in some circumstances and conflict under others. Liberal preconditions could be expected in such circumstances under which economic dependence among states is relatively equal. However, disparity in interdependence may promote distrust and intensification of armed conflict (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2012: 263).

Where economic causes of armed conflict are concerned, outbreak of armed conflict is causally connected with rapid industrialization and transformation of centrally regulated economies to the principles of unregulated market economies (Schneider 2001). Theories of armed conflict suggest that the causes of violent conflict are rooted in "greed and grievance" (Collier 2000). The mechanism for mobilization stems from political deprivation (Gurr 2000) and self-interest in material gain (Regan and Norton 2005).

According to the theory developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, the probability of violent conflict is high under the following

conditions: dependency on a primary commodity export, a low level of secondary education, large populations, low economic growth, low income per capita, and the presence of previous armed conflict. All of these are assigned to "greed" proxies. This theory emphasizes the role of greed and grievance to explain the outbreak of war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Another economic model of armed conflict emphasizes the role of self-interested behavior "*in which participation is a form of crime; the rebels are criminals acting in pursuit of economic gains*" (Regan and Norton 2005: 322). It does not mean that grievance is unimportant; it is a ubiquitous aspect of every conflict. In other words, while grievance creates the "backbone of protest" of minorities at risk, the resources and the incentives to mobilize are significant factors in an escalation process.

Distinguished scholar Jeremy Weinstein argues that "*differences in how rebel groups employ violence are a consequence of initial conditions*" that rebel groups have at their disposal. "*Rebel groups that emerge in environments rich in natural resources or with the external support of an outside patron*" are "opportunist rebels" – greed leads to grievances. "*Movements that arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence selectively and strategically*"; these are "activist rebellions" – grievance leads to greed (Weinstein 2006: 7–10).

The logic of violence according to the theory of relative deprivation is related to the instrumentalist approach, which is discussed in the section about ethnic conflict. The economic model of armed confrontation is also linked to the rational choice theory. However, what is more important for the analysis of economically motivated armed conflict is that the "greed model" and easy access to valuable resources can contribute to the creation of "opportunistic rebellion" motivated by self-enrichment incentives, but there are also powerful theories that explain the motivation of rebel groups aiming to achieve their political goals: the "grievance model" and the "activist rebellion". The relationship between economic issues and armed conflict takes violent form if there are contested attitudes between conflicting parties about primary access to the valuable resources, there is asymmetric dependency on trade ties and export, and there is disparity in access to jobs.

The relationship between economic issues and armed conflict takes a violent form if there are contested attitudes between conflicting parties about primary access to the valuable resources, if there is asymmetric dependency on trade ties and export, and if there is disparity in access to jobs. Economic development, improvement of the social-economic situation, and democratic transition cannot be achieved without peaceful resolution of conflicts. Almost every armed conflict results in huge economic losses. However, to address economic issues at stake that may lead to conflict escalation, it is essential to point out that some economic processes may lead to armed conflict. For the purposes of this chapter, economic aspects of conflict are operationalized as follows: (1) economic decline and inequality in the economic development of different regions, (2) the shadow economy (smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal trade activities), and (3) interest to control key economic resources.

3.4.5 Territorial cross-border conflict

Territorial issues have been identified as the most war-prone issue in conflict studies. The tendency is seen in the great willingness of people to fight over their homelands as well as over economically and strategically important territories. As John Vasquez wrote, "*territorial issues are 'best' handled by use of force and violence*" (Vasquez 1993: 140). People tend to be emotionally attached to their territory; homeland becomes an integral part of their identity; and the question of who controls the territory becomes very important (Tir 2010).

Territory is a significant part of any state-building process, and it carries its own value. Natural resources, strategic importance in terms of state boundaries, access to the open sea or control over transport routes are all factors contributing to the significance of this issue. It is not surprising, then, that when territoriality is at stake in armed confrontation, a conflict is linked with such issues as the territorial integrity of a state (Wolff 2004). The territorial dimension of internal armed conflict is based on close study of how an internal armed conflict in one place can generate instability in another and what the effects of the actions of one country are on the development of internal conflict in another. Territorial cross-border conflict studies the mechanisms that increase the risk of transmission of instability to a different place.

Trans-border cooperation and military support against a state government may make internal armed conflicts more likely. The nature of the external group and the impact on regional security should be taken into consideration, as they may lead to the outbreak of conflict. Most internal armed conflicts have notable implications for regional stability and have a "spillover" effect. Some neighboring states can trigger the conflict by supporting different groups. This strategy is based on the interests of a particular state. Conditions under which the spillover effect can transmit violence to different places occur when internal tension and instability in one country gives the opportunity to an external power to intervene in order to maximize its interests and gain power. The issue of military intervention is the subject of another chapter of this book.

One of the types of armed conflict involving territorial issues is irredentism. Irredentism is not a state-based process; it is a movement that seeks to attain the external support and territory of the group across the existing border. The goal of this group is to add territory *and* population into an existing state by reason of common affinities, such as ethnic, cultural, historical, or linguistic ties (Wolff 2007). An outstanding study of the complexity of territorial claims of particular minority groups living within the borders of one country and gaining support from outside kinship groups is Stefan Wolff's *Disputed Territories: The Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement*.

Another type of territorial confrontation is secession, which is a process at the end of which a population group inhabiting a defined territory within an existing state has succeeded in splitting itself and its territory off from a titular state. As a result it has established an independent state of its own (Wolff 2004). Secession is a process of political divorce and the formation of at least one new sovereign unit through a formal declaration of independence (Yates 1998: 35). Secession has consequences on political structures, economic development, and the geographic borders of a state. However, it is first of all about the territoriality and sovereignty of a particular land. It may take different forms. First, a large political unit (like a state) separates from the larger entity (union, empire) and declares itself to be an independent unit (for example, the secession of colonies from the United Kingdom). Second, the larger unit is dissolved and all regions secede from it. An example

could be the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, what is the most significant feature of this process is that it involves violence used by conflicting parties to achieve independence.

In summary, a study of territorial armed conflict has to distinguish between the nature and the level of territorial claims of conflicting parties. In most cases of armed conflict, territorial issues are strongly correlated with other issues in conflict dynamics, such as, for example, ethnicity, lootable resources, or the political system of a state.

3.5 Conclusion

Typological theorizing can be a powerful tool in conflict studies. As is represented above, explanatory typology is based on explicitly stated preexisting theory. It is a complement to deductive approaches. The creation of each type requires working through the logical implication of a particular theory to identify the key aspects of a particular conflict type. Thus, typological theorizing may have a classificatory function too. When applied to case studies, we can determine to which "type" this case belongs. Empirical data could be coded as falling into one category or another. It allows us to trace if there is congruence between categories. By placing cases in different categories, we can make most productive comparisons for testing theories.

As stated by Jeffrey Checkel, it is critically significant to think about the dialog between the conceptual and operational level of our analysis (Checkel 2010). The problem remains of how to assess the causal impact of one factor in relation to others. One of the possible ways for establishing the relation between operationalization and measurement lies in the case-oriented view. Within-case causal process observation involves the reconstruction of an empirical sequence of conditions, which are postulated by the theory. The challenge for further research is to explore not only the combination of issues at stake in armed conflict, but also the correlation and causal relationships among these aspects.

Such an approach allows us to bridge theory with practice and assess the extent to which a conflict is about ethnicity, political claims, ideology, territoriality, or a combination of these factors. However, no

conflict is motivated by a single factor, and to avoid oversimplification of our analysis, we have to be aware of some challenges in the process of assessment at the extent to which an individual case conforms to the stipulated causal logic outlined in the theory or shows variation in causal explanations. In within-case causal process observation, the empirical question is to identify not only whether antecedent conditions are linked with the outcome but also whether they do so through the stipulated causal mechanisms too.

Each conflict differs on a range of dimensions and may include ethnicity, religion, political, economic, and territorial aspirations. The question is how these dimensions interrelate in the whole process of conflict dynamics and how far each contributes to armed conflict.

The aim of this chapter was to provide a typology of conflict. The created typology aims to explore the characteristic features of the phenomena and utilize discussion on the theoretical level. Such nuanced distinction brings a need of better understanding of conflict processes. Even though it is hard to grasp the entire dynamics of an armed conflict within a single study, it is important to distinguish the nature of conflicting groups, conflict onset, its escalation, the context of conflict termination, and peacekeeping efforts. A conflict may erupt, for example, from ethnically defined groups, ignited by incompatibility goals over a political issue, which may result in secession at the stage of conflict termination. In other words, ethnic mobilization can be useful for explaining some aspects of armed conflicts, but not useful for explaining others: in time, other features may become a much more powerful identifier of the conflict relationship. By analyzing the heterogenic nature of internal armed conflict we can promote academic study, explore the causes of the conflict and how they change over time, which will contribute to resolution efforts in the future.

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4. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Jana Urbanovská

4.1 Introduction

During the last century international organizations (IOs) emerged as standard entities of international relations. Subsequently, their growing role in international politics was reflected by the increasing interest of researchers who elaborated theories explaining the rise of international organizations, their operation and influence upon international politics. One of the crucial questions that split the researchers into a number of schools of thinking was whether the "*international institutions [can] prevent war by changing state behavior*". In other words we can also ask whether the "*institutions [can] push states away from war by getting them to eschew balance-of-power logic, and to refrain from calculating each important move according to how it affects their relative power position*" (Mearsheimer 1995: 82).

As Clive Archer (2001: 1–2) argues both concepts – "international" and "organizations" – cause some confusion among the researchers. The term "international", whose origin is traced back to Jeremy Bentham, is often perceived as incorrect. Provided it is applied to describe the actions pursued by two sovereign states and their official representatives, numerous authors suggest it should be replaced by the term "interstate" or "intergovernmental". Nevertheless, according to Archer, in recent decades the interpretation of the term "international" that refers to a state or government has been to a substantial extent surpassed. Currently, it is not applied synonymously to the term "intergovernmental" anymore; rather, it incorporates not only intergovernmental relations but also the actions pursued by the individuals and groups in a particular state and their counterparts in another (so-called transnational relations).

The dual meaning of its singular form confuses the word "organizations". International relations are not totally random and chaotic but

are mostly organized. One form of the organization of international relations can be seen in institutions – whether these be trade, diplomacy, conferences or international organizations. Inis Claude expresses the difference in the following way: "*International organization is a process; international organizations are representative aspects of the phase of that process which has been reached at a given time.*" (Claude 1964: 4 in Archer 2001: 2).

The specific character of the international organizations consists of the fact they are based on a formal agreement and their structures include an administrative apparatus. Currently, there are approximately 250 international organizations that group together states or governments. These organizations, then, can be classified in several categories. In terms of their geographical scope we can differentiate among the global and regional, or possibly subregional IOs. International organizations can also be divided according to the extent to which their members transfer their powers to the bodies of a particular international organization: while in international organizations the states keep relevant powers for themselves, transnational organizations are characterized by the transfer of powers to the bodies representing the international organization. Last but not least, international organizations differ in terms of their goals – while multi-functional international organizations incorporate a number of substantial areas of the international relations, single-function IOs only focus on a particular area (Kratochvíl and Drulák 2009: 154).

The next chapter deals with selected international organizations that play important roles in the area of conflict resolution. While we certainly have to begin with the United Nations, the global international organization of essential relevance, whose primary goal is to maintain international order and security, we also need to take into account the roles of three regional organizations – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – that to a significant extent contribute to conflict resolution. Each of these organizations provides us with specific know-how that puts them in a distinctive position within the international system. Since this chapter is limited as to its scope, we will discuss the areas of action that are typical for these organizations and make distinctive contributions to conflict resolution.

The theoreticians of international relations are immersed in an important debate that deals with the role international organizations can possibly play in conflict resolution. This debate is intimately connected to a more general issue of the influence that can be exerted by international institutions – i.e. the entities that incorporate international organizations. International institutions are seen as "*sets of rules meant to govern international behavior*", where rules are understood as "*statements that forbid, require or permit particular kinds of actions*" (Simmons and Martin 2002: 194). While some authors state the institutions are irrelevant since foreign policy actions are based on the egoistic interests of the actors, the others hold the institutions are important as they can influence and modify the behavior of the states and thus constitute peace. However, since so far neither of these schools of thought has significantly prevailed, the debate still continues (Dombroski 2006: 1).

Various theories of international relations assume different views on the role international organizations can play in conflict resolution; nevertheless, as our space is limited we can only pay attention to the two most important schools of thinking in the international relations. The first of them, the neo/realists, perceive the institutions as a source of international actions in a very skeptical way. Mearsheimer muses over the issue of whether international institutions can change the behavior of states and, thus, ward off a war. In his view, institutions cannot prevent states from behaving as power-maximizers. In this approach, the institutions do not have any significant, independent impact upon the behavior of the states. On the other hand, the realists recognize the great powers can occasionally consider these institutions (especially alliances) useful to maintain or even enhance their own share of global power (Mearsheimer 1995: 82).

At the same time, Mearsheimer warns the debate that the influence institutions can have on peace cannot only be seen as an academic dispute, and says it is of serious practical relevance. In the beginning of 1990s, the Clinton administration and many European politicians publicly advocated the opinion that states should not bother with the balance of power, labeled as "old thinking", but should rather rely on the institutions that can protect them. According to Mearsheimer, however, such a perspective could only be meaningful provided we could prove such institutions were able to achieve this goal. Rather, the real-

ity appears to provide evidence that these institutions do not render the ground reliable enough to build up a stable post-Cold War world. Institutions failed to prevent or halt wars in the Caucasus, Bosnia, and Rwanda; therefore, Mearsheimer argues there are no substantial reasons to believe the same institutions can succeed in other troublesome locations. According to Mearsheimer, "*the bottom line on institutions seems clear: despite all the rhetoric about their virtues, there is little evidence that they can alter state behavior and cause peace*" (Mearsheimer 1995: 93).

The followers of the liberal school of thinking in international relations perceive the role of international institutions in a much more optimistic way. According to Keohane, one of the greatest figures of this school, states are interested in institutions because of the functions these institutions perform. In this sense institutions constitute standards of operation, contribute to the reduction of uncertainty that goes along with cooperation between the states in the international system, supply the information that provides states with better understanding of the intentions of other actors, and – finally – reduce the transaction costs since the cooperation, once it is established in a single area of politics, can be utilized to develop more easily also in other related areas (Keohane 1984). Thus, institutions help resolve the problems of collective action that emerge when rational actors are unable to cooperate despite the fact such a cooperation would have been useful. In this way, institutions influence international politics. Since they enable states to act so as to resolve the problems of collective action and establish cooperation, we say in this case they possess regulatory influence (Karlas 2007: 72–74).

The liberal institutionalists reject the realist presupposition that international stability is based on balance-of-power politics; instead, they think international institutions can and do exert an independent influence on the behavior of states, can preclude the emergence of conflicts and wars, and can be seen as a cause of peace (Dombroski 2006: 8). If the realists understood the conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War as confirmation of their presupposition that violence is very likely to break out in the anarchic international system, the liberals – and especially neoliberal institutionalists – perceived the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to create a new international order

relying upon the principles of collective security. Moreover, they were convinced the new international system would reinforce the dense net of institutions, which would bind most of Europe together not only in what used to be traditional areas of integration but now also in the area of security (Hopmann 2002: 3). Considering the situation in the post-Cold War Europe, Keohane and Nye stated: "*Since West Europe was densely institutionalized when the Cold War came to an end, institutionalists anticipate more cooperation in Europe than would be expected if international institutions were insignificant, or merely reflected structural forces in world politics. Institutionalists agree … that common or complementary interests can support cooperation, and that international institutions depend for their success on such patterns of complementary interests.*" (Keohane and Nye 1993: 5–6). In these terms, they point out to an important feature that heavily influences how (un)successful international organizations are (not only) in conflict resolution: international institutions can create positive shared outcomes when the states that participate in them believe in their capacity to serve their own interests as well as the interests of others (Hopmann 2002: 5).

4.2 The United Nations

The United Nations is a primary international organization that is designed to benefit global peace and security. It was founded "*to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war*" (UN Charter: Preamble). Other crucial tasks, i.e. "*to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom*" (UN Charter: Preamble), should serve to fulfill the fundamental function of the United Nations – to guarantee security.

Although the Cold War era significantly limited the role the United Nations could play in the resolution of international security issues, since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been in some way engaged in almost every important international conflict. Despite

numerous failures – and some of them were spectacular – the UN has demonstrated substantial persistence and flexibility. Given its broad mandate, multifarious spectrum of tools and mechanisms, and almost universal membership that bestows a high degree of legitimacy on the UN, the United Nations performs a fundamental role in the institutional resolution of international conflicts (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 60).

However, we need to say conflict resolution is implemented more often through the UN than by the UN. The most significant roles in this area are performed by three fundamental UN bodies – the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General – with each of them possessing particular tools and mechanisms to resolve a conflict. The Security Council, the most important of these bodies, is an exclusive forum which is vested with the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. If a conflict occurs, first of all the Security Council can call upon the adverse parties to resolve the dispute by peaceful means like fact-finding, good offices, negotiation, arbitration, and judicial settlement (UN Charter: Chapter VI). If the Security Council deems the conflict may endanger global peace and security, it can employ its enforcement powers and impose diplomatic or economic sanctions upon the parties to the conflict, or even authorize the application of military force (UN Charter: Chapter VII). Last but not least, the Security Council can delegate its enforcement power to a regional arrangement or agency (UN Charter: Chapter VIII). During the 1990s the agenda of the Security Council underwent a marked transformation: interstate conflicts ceased to be considered the sole threat to international peace and security and were supplemented by other phenomena like extensive violations of human rights, forcible displacement of civilian populations, famine, deposition of democratically elected presidents, or HIV/AIDS pandemics. Moreover, climate change has also been discussed as a possible danger. Here, we can see to what a huge extent the relevance of sovereignty and the perception of what we should understand as exclusively domestic issues have been modified (Weiss and Zach Kalbacher 2008: 330–331).

The General Assembly, in comparison with the Security Council a much more representative body in which all UN member countries are equally represented, constitutes the second pillar of the conflict resolution system within the United Nations. It "*may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security*" and "*make recommendations with regard to any such questions*", while it also can "*call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security*" (UN Charter: Article 11). The General Assembly thus serves as a forum for public discussion and multilateral diplomacy which aims to settle unsatisfactory situations and support cooperation. Unlike the Security Council, the approach pursued by the General Assembly is based more on persuasion than on authoritative decision-making. Since according to Article 12 of the Charter the General Assembly cannot tackle any disputes that are under consideration in the Security Council, it predominantly deals with protracted disputes that still remain unresolved. The General Assembly plays an important role in solving the primary causes of tension in international relations: for a long time it has been active in discussing the issues of disarmament and arms control, regulation of the trade in small arms, environmental protection, racial discrimination, human rights or fair trade (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 64–65). During the Cold War the decisions made by the General Assembly came to assume quite a relevant character that has persisted even after its end. Although the resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding, they inform us about the broad spectrum of global public opinion and have to some extent contributed to the evolution of international legal thinking (Wallensteen 2007: 226).

Finally, the Secretary-General and his Secretariat constitute the last pillar of the UN system that possesses important position in conflict resolution. No wonder Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General, characterized his position as "the most impossible job in the world" since the task of the Secretary-General is to manage approximately 30 thousand employees of the Secretariat and administer global issues (Weiss and Zach Kalbacher 2008: 334). Its authority is derived from Article 99 of the UN Charter: "*The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.*" (UN Charter: Article 99). The Secretary-General performs a crucial role in security issues as he/she executes the decisions made by the Security Council and is on a regular basis engaged in the preventive diplomacy, mediation of dis-

putes, negotiations and fact-finding. More often than not it participates in the so-called "quiet diplomacy" that takes place behind the scene of the international affairs (Weiss and Zach Kalbacher 2008: 335–336).

In terms of security we must say the Secretary-General and his/her Secretariat also perform important roles as they guarantee peacekeeping operations managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In fact, peacekeeping operations can be seen as one of the most noteworthy examples of how the United Nations has adapted itself to the changes of international politics, and are likely to have established themselves as the most conspicuous global tool the United Nations applies in conflict resolution. The traditional operations designed to maintain peace, so typical for the Cold War era, can be defined as "*[o]perations set up by the United Nations with the consent of the parties, and aimed to assist in the control and resolution of their problems under the guidance and control of the United Nations, at the joint costs of the member states and utilizing other staff and equipment these states voluntarily supply, while they act impartially and employ the force only to the minimal possible extent*" (Goulding 1993: 455). Since the character of peacekeeping has changed since the Cold War, the definition of peacekeeping has broadened. As Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis state "*[t]oday, the UN peacekeeping can be seen as a multi-dimensional management of a peacekeeping operation that as a rule follows after the end of a civil war and is designed so as to provide temporary security and help the parties achieve such institutional, material, and ideational changes that are necessary to safeguard durable peace*" (Doyle and Sambanis 2007: 495). Currently, therefore, the term peacekeeping operations does not only refer to military actions related to security but also incorporates civilian activities like political mediation and assistance in the sphere of national reconciliation, electoral support, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the reform of police, or the protection of human rights (Ahmed et al. 2007: 11).

Peacekeeping in its classical form was introduced for the first time in 1956 in the context of the Suez Crisis. At that time, after the death of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leadership was more flexible, the Cold War was less intense, and Dag Hammarskjöld, the then UN Secretary-General, succeeded in establishing a sufficient base among the growing numbers of UN members. Moreover, the Secretary-General enjoyed the active support of the United States and temporary acquiescence of the Soviet Union (Segal 1995: 69). Since the resolution of the Suez Crisis was vetoed by France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council, it was necessary to propose a brand new solution. Together with Lester B. Pearson, the then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and former Ambassador to the United Nations, Hammarskjöld designed the idea of the UN armed forces consisting of the soldiers voluntarily supplied by the member states. These forces were tasked to ensure a buffer zone between the adverse parties (Krasno 2004: 230).

During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were seriously limited by the role the United Nations could play in the international relations, by the events that occurred in the international system, and especially by the relationships between the great superpowers (Segal 1995: 66). However, the end of the Cold War brought about a new, optimistic view on the international relations. UN peacekeeping operations were not any longer paralyzed, and have emphatically multiplied since 1988. While from 1948 till 1978 only thirteen peacekeeping operations were authorized and in the subsequent decade even none, from May 1988 until October 1993 UN approved no less than twenty operations. The major reason why such an expansion occurred can be found in the higher capability of the Security Council to reach an agreement regarding the procedures to be applied in cases of security crises. The very fact the ideological strife between the United States and the Soviet Union had weakened manifested itself in less frequent cases of veto application in the Security Council: while in the period of 1945–1990 the Soviet Union applied the veto 114 times and the United States 69 times, from June 1990 till May 1993 there was only one veto which was put by Russia on the funding of the UN operation in Cyprus (Yilmaz 2005: 16–17).

Nevertheless, as the United Nations was unable to fulfill the expectations it often had to meet, the qualitative and quantitative increase in the implementation of the peacekeeping operations plunged it into deep crisis. Many an operation initiated in the first half of 1990s tragically failed; consequently, the belief in the United Nations as such was shaken as well. "The New World Order" proved to be inadequate; however, the global community lacked any other strategy (Nicklisch 1995: 10). The death of American soldiers in 1993 in Somalia symbol-

ized the demise of high hopes and launched the period in which the UN peacekeeping actions were dampened. Since then only a small number of operations in the "new" countries has been approved – and those that have been authorized were either intensely advocated by a great power, or significantly limited in terms of their scale or duration (Kovanda 1996: 21).

At the end of 1990s, together with the start of four comprehensive operations in East Timor, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo, the revitalization of peacekeeping could be witnessed. In the course of twelve months the number of the staff working in the existing peacekeeping operations more than doubled. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin suggested a series of factors responsible for the revitalization of peacekeeping: Western countries became more interested in the humanitarian problems in their neighborhoods and, moreover, in several cases assumed the leading roles in the operations implemented both under UN auspices, and outside United Nations schemes. In Africa, the revitalization of peacekeeping was facilitated by the activist approach pursued by countries such as Nigeria and Southern Africa, and also by the development of regional arrangements like the African Crisis Response Initiative. Furthermore, in the second half of 1990s, we witnessed the increase in interest in humanitarian issues in general, and especially in the interconnection of the agenda of international development and security. Consequently, peacekeeping grew to be increasingly understood as an integral element of humanitarian and development programs. The development of new practices also made peacekeeping more acceptable for key players like the United States, thus ensuring more relevant support for its implementation. Finally, the revitalization of the operations of UN peacekeeping units in part followed from the application of the lessons learnt from the past, and from the development of new doctrines, institutions, and procedures (Bellamy et al. 2004: 85–88).

What are the fundamental principles of the United Nations peacekeeping? These principles were set up on the basis of experience stemming from the first classic UN peacekeeping operation, i.e. UNEF I that was implemented in the Suez Canal area between 1956 and 1967. Thus, they include the following: consent of all parties to the conflict for the launching of the operation, that no force should be employed exclud-

ing the self-defense, voluntary contribution of military units by small, neutral countries, impartiality, and the control of the operation by the UN Secretary-General (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 93–94). In the course of time, from these five principles three fundamental ones, labeled "the holy trinity of peacekeeping", emerged: consent of all parties to the conflict for the launching of the operation, impartiality, and the minimal use of force.

Initially, the principle of minimal use of force was in accordance with the limited functions the peacekeeping units in question could in most cases perform since, at any rate, they were not deployed to win wars but keep peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2007: 500). Because the parties to the conflict agreed to the UN peacekeeping operation and the resulting mandate of the UN units, there was no need to use force. In most cases, operations were authorized in line with the Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which implied the peaceful resolution of the dispute. Before 1988 more than half of UN peacekeeping operations comprised only unarmed military observers – and in the case they had arms, they only employed force to the extent necessary for self-defense (Goulding 1993: 455). However, the environment in which UN operations were performed was increasingly characterized by the presence of various militias, criminal gangs and other "spoilers" that jeopardized the civilian population and were active in undermining the peace process. The term self-defense was thus gradually broadened so as to include also defense against the forcible attempts to prevent the peacekeeping units from exercising the duties requested by the mandate of the Security Council (UN 2008: 34).

Moreover, since the very beginning the concept of peacekeeping determined an operation could only be launched provided all parties to the conflict agreed to accept the mission. However, such a provision can be perceived in two different ways: as an advantage but also as a weakness. Given this provision the adverse parties do not see peacekeeping as an undesirable intervention into their affairs but rather as an acceptable way to resolve the conflict. Also, since the peacekeeping operation is in advance approved by all parties engaged in the conflict, for the countries that provide the peacekeeping units the provision decreases the risk of casualties while increasing the chances of success. On the other hand, the necessity to get prior consent can be considered as

a source of problems as later on the consent can be withdrawn by one or more parties. Peacekeeping units can thus find themselves amidst renewed fights while they are deprived of any possibility to adequately respond (Goulding 1993: 454). Despite its troublesome nature the principle of consent still continues to be the crucial element in the UN peacekeeping. Should it be absent, the United Nations would remain just another party to the conflict, and thus – given its lack of sufficient capabilities – be unable to achieve the desirable goals.

Finally, according to the principle of impartiality, peacekeeping units are not allowed to back up the interests of any party to the conflict. By doing that they would breach the conditions under which they had been accepted by all parties (Goulding 1993: 454–455). Originally, impartiality was seen as identical to neutrality; first, these concepts were perceived as inseparable, later on as synonymous. In the second half of 1990s, UN Secretary-General Annan initiated the process of conceptual reassessment which underlined impartiality and desisted from neutrality as it was held obvious these concepts are not synonymous. Dominick Donald described the difference between the impartial and neutral approaches in the following way: "*An impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict, based on the judgement of the situation; it is fair and just in its treatment of the parties while not taking sides. A neutral is much more passive; its limited actions are within restrictions imposed by the belligerents, while its abstention from the conflict is based on 'an absence of decided views'*." (Donald 2002: 22). However, Annan failed to finalize the process; consequently, the link between impartiality and neutrality as well as the confusion as to what these concepts actually stand for still persist, thus undermining the efforts of the United Nations to adapt to international political and security environments (Donald 2002: 23).

4.3 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established in 1949 as a military-political organization of democratic countries of Western civilization, is rightly considered to be an offspring of the Cold War during which it was perceived as one of the symbols of the Western world

(Kříž 2012: 7). Once the Cold War was over, many an observer expected within a short time that NATO should be dissolved or, in the case it did not cease to exist, experience substantial diminution of its actions. After all, such an idea drew upon the theories of international relations that explain the emergence, purpose, and demise of alliances: states constitute military alliances so as to respond to external threats, and once these threats are eliminated the alliance should dissolve as well. Although the Soviet threat that constituted NATO's *raison d'être* during the Cold War disappeared, despite every expectation the Alliance did not cease to operate, nor was it significantly weakened. In fact, there was a number of relevant reasons for its continuing existence: the presence of other external threats, the successful process of its institutional adaptation that resulted in the capability to assume new tasks, and – last but not least – its potential to contribute to the preservation of good relations between its members (Duffield 1995: 763–764).

In the early 1990s, the NATO member states and bureaucracy disagreed on whether the Alliance should get engaged beyond its own borders. However, the conflicts that erupted in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided a decisive impulse for the development of peace support operations (PSO) doctrine and for NATO's new role. Manfred Wörner, the then Secretary-General of NATO, emphatically advocated that NATO needed to assume this new role and warned that, given the conflicts in the Balkans, its marginalization would be absurd. He was convinced these conflicts endangered the constitutive values of the Alliance, and perceived them as a fundamental moral challenge (Appathurai 2001: 184).

In 1991, NATO accepted a new Strategic Concept that reflected the changes in the strategic environment and emphasized the necessity to adapt NATO to new security challenges endangering the stability and development of Western democracies. In this way, although at that time the Alliance did not put a specific emphasis on various crisis management operations, it did lay their foundations. A year later the North Atlantic Council sanctioned *ad hoc* support for the peacekeeping operations pursued under the UN or OSCE mandates, went on to approve the principles and conditions NATO has to fulfill when supporting the UN/OSCE peacekeeping operations, and initiated the process of drafting relevant doctrines. According to the most fundamental principle,

NATO peacekeeping doctrine must be drafted in line with the UN Charter and any military action NATO may take under this doctrine must be based solely on the mandate of the UN Security Council. The initial drafts of the doctrine, presented in 1994, still presumed the operations of the Alliance should be limited in accordance with the Chapter VI of the UN Charter; however, the final draft of the doctrine providing for the operations to support peace, submitted in December 1995, already opened up space not only for peacekeeping but also for peace enforcement, peacebuilding, and peacemaking. An important role in shaping the NATO doctrine that backed up the peace support operations was played by IFOR (1995–1996) and SFOR (1996–2004) operations, as they helped NATO verify its crisis management procedures, crucial political-military decision-making, and the process of consultations between the NATO members and their partners. The process in which the doctrine was drafted was very fast, even abrupt – in fact, the final version of NATO peace support operations doctrine was approved just a few days after NATO launched its participation in IFOR (Zůna 2002: 8–10; Kříž 2006: 90).

The NATO Washington summit in April 1999, which approved the updated Strategic Concept, represented an important milestone. The new version of the Strategic Concept bound the Alliance not only to defend its members but also to keep the peace and security in its own area and its surroundings. Moreover, it defined two kinds of NATO operations – specifically, operations according to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Collective Defense Operations) and operations beyond the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Crisis Response Operations) which also included the NATO PSO. The PSO that respond to new security challenges brought about by the end of the Cold War, and to the UN inability to deal with these challenges, are designed so as "*to tackle the complex emergencies and robust challenges posed by collapsed or collapsing states in an uncertain and evolving strategic environment*" (NATO 2001: Article 0001). Here, "the complex emergencies" are defined as a humanitarian disaster that occurs in the conflict area and follows from incompatible interests of the adverse parties (Wilkinson 2000: 64).

If we take into account the principles upon which the operations are based, we can easily see how different these peace support operations are compared to the previous UN peacekeeping. While at first sight they seem identical to the UN principles (impartiality, consent, and limited application of force), their conception is different. As the relevant NATO doctrine explains, the management of peace support operations is always impartial and if force is used against any of the parties, it is not because whom the party represents but rather only as a consequence of what the party does (or does not) in relation to the mandate sanctioning the operation (NATO 2001: Article 0304). NATO understands the consent the parties give to the operation and its mandate as fundamental to achieving a political resolution of the conflict, and is ready to support or enforce it either by means of force, or through subsequent benefits (NATO 2001: Articles 0310-0311).

As a rule, the mandate empowering NATO peace support operations relates to the renewal and maintenance of peace and security while it also supports the principles of the United Nations and of international humanitarian law (Wilkinson 2000: 72). In this context, peace support operations perform a broad range of military functions – for example, surveillance of the maintenance of peace, demobilization and disarmament of belligerent parties, mine disposal, the establishment of secure areas, the preventive deployment of military units, or assistance in reforming the security forces. Moreover, as a part of broader NATO diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic strategy to support peace and security, PSOs also include assistance provided to the civil authorities, especially in areas like preservation of law and order, support of the electoral process, support of the establishment of a temporary government, cooperation with non-governmental organizations, protection of human rights, or surveillance of humanitarian convoys and refugees (NATO 2001: Section IV). In the conception of peace support operations, this civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) occupies an important position. As the NATO doctrine of CIMIC states, "*[t]he interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations*" (NATO 2003: Article 101).

In general, NATO is "reserved" for more demanding and robust operations in which it can best utilize its ability to conduct operations intended to enforce peace against the actors responsible for its violation or interference. Since NATO units are unlikely to perform solely

observation missions or traditional peacekeeping operations in which they would have to operate unarmed and without appropriate rules of engagement, it is most likely their major task would consist in peace enforcement (Frantzen 2005: 80). Thus, operation KFOR in Kosovo or operation ISAF in Afghanistan can be seen as other examples of NATO peace support operations besides IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) which have been deployed during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan can be perceived as another significant contribution NATO makes to conflict resolution. The PRT concept was born as early as in 1990s and it was for the first time applied in practice in 2002 in Afghanistan in the framework of the operation Enduring Freedom. The major goal PRTs are supposed to fulfill is to support the central government in the provinces and assist in the establishment of an environment in which it is safe enough to reconstruct the country. In particular, these teams focus on humanitarian and developmental assistance and take part in its co-ordination, co-operate with the local administration, international non-governmental organizations and other actors engaged in the reconstruction of the country, assist in the build-up of an efficient civilian administration, participate in the reform of the security sector (for example, they train the members of the Afghan National Army /ANA/ and police /ANP/), support the fight against drugs etc. (MZV 2008).

However, PRT actions are restricted by a series of factors that affect the real operation of provincial reconstruction teams. Among these factors we can rank political limitations the national governments impose upon their soldiers serving in PRTs. These limitations very often stem from the public opinion in the countries that participate in PRT actions, and are consequently reflected both in the scope of possible applications of force, and in the priorities of respective reconstruction teams. In Germany we can witness an emphasis on the developmental and humanitarian activities of German soldiers, while at the same time there is a tendency to suppress combat elements of their mission. In the same vein, Italy stresses the non-combat tasks of its soldiers and prefers to label its units – instead of the habitual term PRT – as so-called Reconstruction Support Units. Another relevant factor influencing the operations of Provincial Reconstruction

Teams is represented by the extent of cooperation among the domestic stakeholders (ministries and other institutions) that participate in the organization of PRTs. Moreover, the cooperation between the military and civilian segments of PRTs also plays a crucial role especially since co-ordination in the location of PRT actions has serious impact upon their results. Finally, fundamental relevance is also ascribed to cooperation with local authorities: the experience makes it obvious the best results are achieved by those PRTs that in planning and implementing their projects act in co-ordination with provincial institutions (Abbaszadeh 2008: 7–11).

It is evident that – especially if we consider the actions NATO took in the Balkans in the first half of 1990s – the assumption of a new role by NATO in the sphere of conflict resolution after the end of the Cold War was successful and fast above any expectation. The IFOR and SFOR operations proved to be a convincing test of NATO's new role, which has reinforced the Alliance's appeal in terms of the conflict management and resolution (Frantzen 2005: 58–59). Moreover, this is evidenced with the fact that since 1995 the Alliance has replaced the United Nations in the position of the major military peacekeeper in Europe (Frantzen 2005: 34). In many cases NATO has acted as a useful "enforcement arm" of the UN Security Council. While there can be no doubts the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization only make use of NATO in its capacity of a crisis manager if it suits their own interests, the scope of these interests is ever broader, thus extending the impact of NATO actions in the sphere of conflict resolution (Duffield et al. 2008: 304).

4.4 The European Union

The role the EU plays in the conflict resolution is inseparably linked to the evolution of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), promoted by the Lisbon Treaty to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The official start of this policy dates back to 1998 when the French President Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair signed the so-called Saint-Malo Declaration on European defense. The Declaration stated that the EU "*needs to be in a position to*

play its full role on the international stage" and stresses the "*responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defense policy*". According to the Declaration, "*the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to … use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises*" (Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998).

The launch of the ESDP was not the first attempt to create a common defense policy; let us name the Brussels Treaty (1948) and the Western European Union, the European Defense Community (1950s), the Fouchet Plan (1962) or the European Political Cooperation (1970s). However, only the ESDP has proved viable so far. For a very long time, European security and defense was the exclusive prerogative of NATO. So how come Europeans started to create their own security and defense policy?

Jolyon Howorth distinguishes four fundamental reasons why the EU became a security actor. First, ESDP is a logical outcome of the end of the Cold War. The strategic importance of Europe for the USA lessened and, as a consequence, the US attached less political as well as military significance to European security. There was a vacuum which had to be filled. Second, there was also a rather normative driver behind the ESDP. After the end of the Cold War, the international community began to think in terms of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to end human-rights violations. As Howorth explains, "*[t]he desire to write the new normative rules of the game … came naturally to Europeans who believed that they had finally put their own unruly house in order*". The third important driver behind the launch of the ESDP was the reappearance of military conflict in Europe. The crisis in the Balkans during almost the whole decade of the 1990s created a powerful incentive for the creation of the ESDP. The then head of the European Council of Foreign Ministers, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, famously declared that "*[i]t is the hour of Europe, not of America*". The last driver was influenced by inner developments of the European Union: there was a widespread understanding that the EU can never be a fully-fledged international actor unless it acquires credible military capacity (Howorth 2007: 52–57).

The EU crisis management operations that started to increasingly shape EU's role in the sphere of the conflict resolution thus can be seen as practical fulfillment of ESDP/CSDP. Therefore, in the next paragraphs we need to briefly discuss the terms "crisis" and "crisis management". Although in the context of EC/EU foreign policy the term crisis was for the first time applied in 1970 in the framework of the European Political Cooperation, so far there is no all-EU definition of what constitutes a crisis. As the General Secretariat of the European Council stated in 2002, "*it is a matter of political appreciation depending on the circumstances, if a state of 'crisis' exists*". In this sense, "*attempts to provide a precise definition of the term*" would "*not seem productive*" (Johannsen 2011: 50). Consequently, if there is a need to label a certain state of affairs as a crisis, the actors engaged in EU crisis management are always hesitant to do so, since they are aware there are numerous crises worldwide that might require some solution right away. Should they clearly define what a crisis is, they might have needed to respond adequately while they often prefer to avoid such an action (Johannsen 2011: 50–51).

The term "crisis management", then, describes the ways we may use to deal with a crisis. Its particular understanding primarily depends on the nature, scope, and magnitude of the crisis – in some cases, a crisis can be warded off by diplomatic means, while in other ones it necessitates the application of more robust tools, for example a military action. Thus, given the nature of the crisis and many other circumstances, various kinds of crisis management can be employed (MILTECH 2006: 57). In the EU we can therefore define two broad kinds of crisis management – military and civilian.

Military crisis management should be understood as an intervention by (especially but not exclusively) military forces, and includes a number of actions aimed at creating or maintaining a secure environment, terminating the crisis, and providing for the conditions necessary to safeguard peace and stability (Giegerich 2008: 7). In the context of the European Union the scope of military crisis management is defined by the so-called Petersberg tasks that were set out by the Western European Union as early as in 1992 in the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn. Five years later these tasks were incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty (EU Treaty: Article 17), thus becoming an inseparable part of ESDP/CSDP. The Petersberg tasks provide us with the catalog of possible types of military operations of the EU: the least intensive ones – in terms of the

use of force – are represented by the humanitarian and rescue tasks, followed by the peacekeeping tasks, and finally the most robust tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

We can expect the principles the EU sets out to preserve peace and strengthen international security basically agree with those United Nations applies when fulfilling the same task. In Article 11, the EU Treaty refers to the principles included in the UN Charter: "*The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be … to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter…*" (EU 2002: Article 11). According to Sebastian Graf von Kielmansegg, traditional UN peacekeeping, based on the principles of impartiality, consent by the parties to the conflict, and non-application of force except self-defense, constitutes the core of peacekeeping tasks as defined by Article 17 of the EU Treaty. However, besides traditional peacekeeping, EU peacekeeping tasks also include the modified version of peacekeeping that developed as a response to the end of the Cold War and assumed the character of complex civil-military missions actively supporting the peace process (von Kielmansegg 2007: 633). As the description of the last of the Petersberg tasks (tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) makes clear, it allows for the use of force and is not based on the consent of the adverse parties. It is characterized by the active promotion of the mission tasks focused against those parties to the conflict that reject its non-violent resolution; in this sense, this task basically coincides with the UN peace enforcement (von Kielmansegg 2007: 638). Here, it is important to emphasize that operation Artemis, which took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, significantly influenced future EU operations by its attitudes to the parties to the conflict as it constituted a relevant precedent: it was impartial while at the same time proactive, introduced rules to protect the civilian population in the location of operation, and actively applied force to assert these rules without taking sides with any of the parties (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 519).

The Lisbon Treaty brought a number of important innovations into European security and defense including, among others, the formal extension of the range of Petersberg tasks. According to the Treaty these tasks should include "*joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories*" (EU 2008: Article 43).

In comparison with the military crisis management, its civilian counterpart is conceived as an intervention into the crisis through non-military staff and is intended to prevent further escalation, and to mediate conflict resolution (Lindborg 2002: 4). However, the definition of EU civilian crisis management is to some extent more difficult to agree upon since civilian crisis management falls within both the intergovernmental sphere dominated by the Council of the European Union, and also the transnational sphere in which the most decisive influence is exercised by the European Commission. Therefore, within the former second pillar it incorporates diplomatic tools applied under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and also the range of actions focused on crisis management under ESDP/CSDP. In this sense, we can set out six priority areas which reflect ambitions the EU nurses in the field of civilian crisis management: policing, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection, monitoring capability and the so-called generic support capabilities including the issues of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform, mediation, border control, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and media policy (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 183–184).

While as a rule the European Council carries out short-term crisis management measures, civilian crisis management operated by the Commission is characterized by the application of long-term measures. However, it is not easy to determine the exact scope of civilian crisis management under the Commission – for example, there is a disagreement as to whether (and if so, then to what extent) horizontal tools like the war on drugs, guaranteed access to natural resources, or EU enlargement can also be seen as tools of crisis management (Johannsen 2011: 54).

Civilian crisis management is closely connected to conflict prevention. In the EU conflict prevention is considered an important element of all aspects of the EU's external relations and one of their major

goals; consequently, it assumes a high position in the EU agenda. Here, we can differentiate between tools focused on short-term prevention and those designed to assist in long-term (structural) prevention. The short-term measures include fact-finding missions, monitoring missions, electoral observation missions, human rights monitoring, special observers and other EU representatives and envoys operating in the locations of (potential) crisis. Among the measures applied in the long-term conflict prevention we can rank trade policy, environmental policy, human rights issues (including the efforts to safeguard respect towards minority rights in possibly explosive locations, or EU support for the International Criminal Court), international financial policy, or tools employed in the spheres of arms non-proliferation, disarmament, or arms control (Johannsen 2011: 53–57).

It is exactly the EU's ability to combine military and civilian tools of crisis management which makes it a unique crisis manager; moreover, it constitutes one of the crucial elements of a comprehensive approach that the EU assumes towards crisis management. This approach has been adopted primarily due to the change in the nature of crises, and to the necessity of becoming adapted accordingly. Christian Mölling sums up the transformation of crisis management as occurring in three dimensions. In the first place, the range of tasks has broadened. While traditional peacekeeping focused on limitation and reduction of military escalation, contemporary crisis management deals with social, political, and economic transformation so as to achieve comprehensive conflict resolution. Furthermore, a broader range of tasks results in the prolongation of the period during which crisis management operates: in conceptual and practical terms it reaches from the initial stage of conflict prevention through crisis management itself, up to post-conflict reconstruction. Last but not least, there has been a significant increase in the number of actors that participate in crisis management since its various stages require implementation of various tools and expertise, which are impossible for only one actor to ensure. Moreover, the involvement of various state and non-state actors enhances the political legitimacy of actions of the international community (Mölling 2008: 1).

In the case of the European Union, the comprehensive approach to crisis management is embodied in the concept of the Civil-Mili-

tary Coordination (CMCO) which aims to secure and carry out a comprehensive approach especially at the political-strategic level, i.e. from planning a mission up to its implementation. In this respect, the EU puts a special emphasis on the availability of civilian and military tools and decision-making structures that make it possible to utilize these tools. Moreover, it stresses the inclusive understanding of crisis management which encompasses all stages of the conflict and reflects the security-development nexus as well as interconnection of various policy areas like democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, and also of both short-term and long-term tools. Here, the goal is to attain a coherent, efficient, flexible, and timely response from the European Union, based on internal and external civil-military and civil-civil co-ordination and cooperation at all levels (Johannsen 2011: 70). Nevertheless, in terms of civil-military cooperation, the EU still remains far behind its potential whether this is caused by the inter-institutional struggles or by different positions assumed by the member states that naturally also defend their own interests in this issue area (Mölling 2008: 2–3).

4.5 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Without any exaggeration, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is said to reach from Vancouver to Vladivostok: it includes a broad range of countries of different political, security, economic, and socio-cultural backgrounds. Given the extent of its membership there is no other international organization that would reflect the development of the security conditions in Europe, Central Asia, and North America as faithfully as the OSCE does (Galbreath 2007: 1). The organization launched as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE): in the very beginning it was a somewhat unlikely group that in 1973 in Helsinki brought together representatives of 35 Eastern, Western, and non-aligned countries to discuss the possibilities of cooperation. Once the conference was over two years later, the final agreement included not only a series of measures to reinforce trust and security but also the establishment of cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, environmental, cultural, and humanitarian is-

sues. The broad range of issues under discussion, incorporated into the Helsinki Final Act, has so far been unparalleled (OSCE 2007: 1).

The decade following the end of the Cold War confirmed the relevance of the OSCE as an inclusive pan-European forum and a norm-setting agency. OSCE activities range across Eastern and South-eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus, and Central Asia. In some countries, the OSCE was the only international actor present in their respective territories. Among other things, the Organization strove to resolve the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, and served as a frame-work for actions intended to settle the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The next decade witnessed a series of internal and external troubles – for example, to name just a few, the transformation of the European political geography stemming from the EU enlargement, the impaired position of the OSCE within the European security architecture, which was caused by the dynamic evolution of ESDP/CSDP, the inability of the OSCE member states to agree upon political declarations, and the reform of the OSCE (Lynch 2009: 140–141).

Despite its institutionalization and the establishment of new mechanisms and tools, the OSCE continues to be very loose grouping of states. Unlike older international organizations (UN, NATO, EU), it is not based on a legally binding document and, thus, it is not subject to international law. Consequently, it cannot act on its own, independently of the will of the member states. Moreover, it lacks powerful tools that could be employed to punish those member states violating the commitments adopted by all the members. These commitments thus often remain declaratory and their liability is only political or moral; such a condition frequently results in a discrepancy between positive declarations of OSCE members and their real policies. The disenchantment regarding the real capabilities of the OSCE to get engaged in the conflict resolution is further strengthened by passive stance many a member state of the OSCE assumes towards these commitments, or even by their recurrent infringements (Siegl 2001: 30–31).

The strict adherence to the principle of non-interference into domestic affairs can be seen as another conspicuous feature, which in a way limits the role the OSCE can play in conflict resolution. Given how heterogeneous an organization the OSCE is, as it encompasses states that hold significantly distinct views on the possibilities and justifica-

tions of conflict prevention and on the resolution of domestic conflicts by the international community, this feature becomes even more important. However, the principle of non-interference into domestic affairs was in part undermined by the results of the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in 1991. Here, the OSCE members agreed "*the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension … are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned*"; at the same time, it was decided to institutionalize the expert monitoring missions that are dispatched into regions in critical condition. These decisions opened up space for the OSCE's direct participation in domestic conflicts and for more efficient monitoring and prevention of conflicts (Siegl 2001: 31).

The OSCE possesses a large number of tools it can employ to achieve its goals. Of special importance for conflict prevention and resolution are the High Commissioner on National Minorities and long-term missions. The position of High Commissioner on National Minorities, set up in consequence of the growing relevance of national minorities issues for European security, represents the first of these tools. The Commissioner serves as a unifying bond between the security and human dimensions of the OSCE: on the one hand, it acts as a body of preventive diplomacy designed to forestall the conflicts between national minorities and state authorities; on the other, it represents a body set up to defend collective rights. Its duties include very broad range of actions: it supports dialog and cooperation, assesses which locations are susceptible to tensions, recommends changes in legislation, examines complaints submitted by national minorities, provides for timely warning, and – last but not least – is entitled to evaluate the situation in the very location of conflict (Zwettlerová 2001: 41–42). Nevertheless, the High Commissioner's mandate incorporates a number of provisions that restrict its actions. For example, it is not allowed to deal with individual cases related to persons who are members of a particular national minority. Also, the High Commissioner may not handle national minority issues if there are organized acts of terrorism (OSCE 2013).

The second tool is represented by the OSCE's long-term missions. These missions are established *ad hoc* and their mandates are often de-

fined in a very general way: to observe development, maintain contacts, foster dialog among political or ethnic groups, make arrangements necessary to build up mutual trust, or comply with the OSCE principles (Zwettlerová 2001: 44). The majority of these missions have taken place in the countries that emerged out of former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. It is no wonder, therefore, they have often been seriously restricted by Russian interference. Still, the role Russia plays is perceived as crucial both in terms of continuation of conflicts in these areas, and with regard to their resolution. On the one hand, the long-term missions prove the OSCE does possess capabilities to deal with "hard" issues (i.e. those of traditional security); on the other, however, the very same missions illustrate the limitations the OSCE needs to tackle when trying to successfully resolve these conflicts (Galbreath 2007: 6).

If we evaluate the role of the OSCE in the sphere of conflict resolution, special attention should be paid to the concept of OSCE peacekeeping operations. Theoretically, this concept was defined as early as in the beginning of 1990s in a rather detailed way. The Helsinki Document, approved in 1992, included peacekeeping in OSCE activities in the spheres of timely warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, while presenting it as operations of various scale that incorporate both civilian and military staff, and range from observation/monitoring missions to an extensive deployment of military forces. These forces should be employed to supervise the observance of ceasefires, monitor the withdrawal of military units, support law and order, and provide humanitarian help or assistance to refugees. The Helsinki Document characterized the impartiality and consent of the parties to carry out the operation as fundamental principles of OSCE peacekeeping. A unanimous decision made by all OSCE members and the establishment of an efficient and lasting truce, while the enforcement actions taken to settle the dispute were foreclosed, were required to launch an operation (OSCE 1992: Articles 17–56). However, these provisions have never been implemented. Branislav Milinkovic presents four reasons that can explain why the OSCE has not put its peacekeeping into practice. First, the United Nations, acting in its capacity of major guardian of global peace and security, has also assumed the role of peacekeeper in the area where the OSCE operates. Second, other relevant organizations like NATO, the EU, or the Com-

monwealth of Independent States have developed the doctrine and practice of peacekeeping, and have made it part of the new roles they play in the post-Cold War world. Third, although there might be a case that would appear as an obvious opportunity for the OSCE to manage a peacekeeping operation (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh), the major powers are unwilling to authorize the OSCE to do that, regardless of whether this is due to insufficient funding, unconvincing rules of engagement, or fuzzy command and management structures. Last, while there are numerous signs the OSCE does practice peacekeeping, despite not labeling its actions this way (e.g. the Kosovo Verification Mission), it has never had time and space sufficient enough to develop in full all functions which peacekeeping operations usually perform (Milinkovic 2004: 196).

Despite numerous restraints and defects, the activities the OSCE pursues in the locations of crises make it clear the OSCE plays a significant role, especially in the sphere of long-term conflict prevention and peacebuilding as well as in advocating and implementing new international norms and practices. Last but not least, the OSCE assumes a crucial position in the constitution of the security community, based on common norms, values, principles, standards, obligations, and responsibilities (Sandole 2007: xiii–xiv).

4.6 Conclusion

If we look upon international organizations from the perspective of liberal institutionalists, we can see their role primarily consists in the elimination of traditional problems related to the anarchical character of the international system: the international organizations further cooperation among states, strengthen their mutual trust and weaken their concerns as to the intentions of other states. Although the realists do not share such a positive perception of the role that international organizations play in the evolution of international cooperation, without any doubt international organizations have established themselves as stable actors of international relations, and play a significant role in regulating the mutual relations of both states and other actors of the international system.

The United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe are intrinsically linked to efforts to secure international peace, security, and stability. Some tools they use to achieve this ultimate goal are common while others are only applied by some of them – and this is what makes them exceptional actors in the field of conflict resolution. In this sense, the United Nations is unique in terms of its global membership and scope, and also given its role of global forum that enables the performance of both norm-setting, and agenda-setting functions. The relevance of NATO in the area of conflict resolution resides especially in its deterrent potential and in the power NATO can exert to promote its goals. The comparative advantage of the European Union follows from its ability to combine civilian and military crisis management, and also both short-term and long-term tools of conflict prevention and resolution. The OSCE possesses – in the first place – unique experience in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, the support of human rights, and democratization.

While every organization owns its unique know-how and occupies a distinct position in international conflict resolution, it is true their respective actions often overlap and are significantly duplicated. For all these organizations, it is almost a given to be present and visible in the resolution of relevant conflicts since their presence and an active role underlines their importance and guarantees their survival. Here, the Middle Eastern conflict represents a case in point, as every organization has its own security platform dealing with this issue regardless of substantial overlaps in their tasks and goals. Similar problems and extensive duplications are numerous; moreover, we have every reason to believe such a trend will increase rather than decrease. Still, there is one more related concern – it is not really clear what the responsibilities of respective organizations are and what timeframe should apply for their respective engagements. Last but not least, a certain role should be attributed to inter-institutional "jealousy" and fear one of the organizations could surpass the others. Therefore, what we primarily need is to seek mutual support and reinforcement; furthermore, we should not act in a competitive way which is neither useful, nor economical. The scenario anticipating the existence of interblocking institutions that frustrate one another instead of providing efficient solutions of particular regional and global security problems is without any doubt undesirable (van Ham 2006: 24). Only the future development of international relations will show to what extent we can succeed in fostering efficient multilateralism – of the type the European Union required in 2003 in its European Security Strategy.

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5. MANAGING ARMED CONFLICT AND THE USE OF ARMS EMBARGOES

Martin Chovančík

5.1 Introduction

The array of instruments in the toolbox of the international community capable of exerting palpable influence on the course of armed conflicts is far smaller than we would wish. However, in the latter half of the 20th century and especially in its last decade the toolbox was expanded and upgraded to cope with the evolving challenges of armed violence and international responsibility. Instruments available to the international community in the 21st century have also become more tailored and their role is therefore more specific than in the past. This is also the case of arms embargoes, which have become the most widely used instrument in conflict management, although they are still often expected to fulfill roles they are not tailored to and hence dispraised for their questionable effectiveness.

5.2 Conflict management

It is crucial to the understanding of arms embargoes to emphasize the distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management. When attempting to address armed conflict both between and within states, conflict resolution has become the norm of the 21st century. However, arms embargoes are primarily a conflict management instrument. The final result of conflict resolution is best described by Wallensteen's definition: "*a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with – and/ or dissolve – their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another*" (Wallensteen 2007: 47). Although multiple definitions are common and conflict resolution may be perceived as a process rather than an outcome, conflict resolution is inherently

linked to addressing the basic incompatibilities between the conflict parties.

Conflict management, on the other hand, does not typically seek these goals. Although management can be interpreted as containment, or "*the limitation, mitigation and containment of a conflict*" without necessarily solving it (Tanner 2000: 1) – containment has become a derogatory term implying a lack of will on the part of the international community to solve the conflict. Rather than this passive approach, conflict management has taken on an added logic of changing the mode of interaction between the parties from destructive to constructive (Kriesberg and Dayton 2012: 23–49). The current definition of conflict management therefore involves 3 crucial pillars as it: (a) attempts to minimize the destructive effects of armed conflicts and prevent them from spreading, focusing more on the armed aspect of the conflict than the political one[2]; (b) does not require the voluntary cooperation of conflict parties toward the resolution of underlying incompatibilities, and can thus involve varying levels of coercion; (c) encourages an interaction model change from destructive (zero-sum) to constructive (non zero-sum).

The distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management is of particular importance to sanctions and arms embargoes, which must be understood in the light of the limited goals they should try to achieve and be evaluated by. As shown later, this is often not the case and both international organizations and later evaluators of these instruments struggle with their limited goal design.

It is also worth noting that some literature includes sanctions and arms embargoes in the conflict prevention category. It has been noted repeatedly that the cost of conflict management increases dramatically with the escalation of conflict, while its effectiveness decreases at the same rate. Prevention is by far the least costly and potentially most effective approach to addressing armed conflicts – it is however notoriously difficult to achieve (Lund 1996: 52; Swanström 2002). The later section on challenges provides specific reasons why the empirical track record of arms embargoes shows no cases of preventative implemen-

tation, although this instrument is hypothetically capable of effective direct prevention.

5.3 Arms embargoes

In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, sanctions have become progressively smarter and more focused. Decoupling and selective sanction impositions have become standard in the new millennium thus eliminating the use of general trade sanctions, whose negative impacts were felt throughout the 1990s (a phenomenon studied in depth in Cortright and Lopez 2000, 2002; Lopez 2002; Oette 2002; or recently by Eriksson 2011). Conflict scenarios, and especially humanitarian crises, have repeatedly sparked a knee-jerk reaction within the international community and arms embargoes have become the most often sought conflict management instrument since the end of the Cold War. Arms embargoes – an international policy tool classified as a coercive diplomacy instrument, a measure between wars and words, smart sanction, or intervention on the cheap – have become the most widely implemented sanction regime on the part of international organizations. Although the frequency of other forms of targeted sanctions has increased significantly, especially amid individual senders (namely due to their avid use by the USA), arms embargoes are currently the most often imposed trade restriction by international organizations and more importantly the UN. The United Nations alone, has imposed 31 mandatory arms embargoes since 1990 (with only 2 before 1990); however, the number of all multilateral and unilateral arms embargoes imposed during this period is 94.[3]

Focusing on the UN level, arms embargoes essentially represent intervention on the cheap, whilst satisfying the domestically motivated need to take some form of action. Nevertheless, the design of arms embargoes and their imposition, much like their alteration, requires

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[2] Although mitigation largely involves non-military actors such as IOs, NGOs, and academia.

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[3] This number of course, distorts the real number of sanctioned targets as UN, multilateral, and unilateral arms embargoes often overlap and often serve as a precursor to each other.

further improvement.[4] Literature on the effectiveness and improvement of sanctions in general is abundant (Hufbauer and Schott 1985; Hufbauer et al. 1990; Hufbauer 1990, 2008). However, arms embargoes are studied less frequently – and more for their overall impact, rather than specific influences on conflict dynamics (Fruchart et al. 2007; Brzoska 2001; Brzoska and Lopez 2009). Managing armed conflict via the use of arms embargoes relies on a particular set of expectations laid upon the effects of arms embargoes.

UN arms embargoes are of particular importance, as the UN is the only global organization capable of imposing worldwide mandatory arms embargoes. Although the UN may implement voluntary arms embargoes, urging states not to supply arms, ammunition, training or dual use goods to a target country, this practice is limited and has only occurred 5 times in UN history – all instances prior to 1999 (South Africa 1963, Azerbaijan 1993, Afghanistan 1996, and Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1999).[5] Analyzing the effects of voluntary arms embargoes, much like those of arms embargoes only imposed by individual countries or group of countries such as the EU, ECOWAS, African Union or the League of Arab States, is problematic. They will be touched upon; the main focus, however, remains with mandatory UN arms embargoes, which demand global compliance and are the benchmark of arms embargo effects in conflict management scenarios.

Table 2. Mandatory UN arms embargoes imposed in armed conflict management scenarios

Conflict	Duration	Resolution	Partiality on imposition
Iraq I	1990-1991	S/RES/661	Partial
FRY I (Bosnia conflict)	1991-1996	S/RES/713	Impartial
Eritrea and Ethiopia	2000-2001	S/RES/1298	Impartial
Iraq II	2003-2010	S/RES/1483	Impartial
Somalia	1992-	S/RES/733	Impartial
Liberia	1992-	S/RES/788	Impartial
Angola (UNITA)	1993-2002	S/RES/864	Partial
Rwanda	1994-2008	S/RES/918	Impartial
Sierra Leone	1997-2010	S/RES/1132	Impartial
FRY II (Kosovo conflict)	1998-2001	S/RES/1160	Impartial
DRC	2003-	S/RES/1493	Partial
Sudan (Darfur)	2004-	S/RES/1556	Partial
Côte d'Ivoire	2004-	S/RES/1572	Impartial
Lebanon	2006-	S/RES/1701	Partial
Libya	2011-	S/RES/1970	Impartial

5.4 Non economic sanctions

A strategic approach to arms embargoes, as any smart sanction for that matter, requires the reflection of detailed knowledge on the target and the expected result of its internal decision-making process into its design prior to imposition. However, the logic of general economic sanctions seems to remain the point of departure for the ongoing imposition and in some cases alteration and termination of arms embargoes by the international community, thus resulting in a mismatch between applied measures and their desired outcomes. The argument can be made that arms embargoes are economic sanctions in essence – curtailing the trade of a certain commodity; however, the mechanism of their intended impact differs greatly from this group of sanctions and should be addressed accordingly. This is once again of particular significance in attempts to manage armed conflict.

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[4] Termination, although notoriously more difficult than alteration, is at times addressed as a form of alteration from the design perspective – where the embargo is terminated against one party while being re-imposed on another.

[5] The wording reads "(UN SC) calls upon all States" as opposed to resolutions invoking mandatory arms embargoes which read: "(UN SC) decides that all States shall".

For the lack of better political reactions to the (re)escalation of conflicts into their armed stages, the UN Security Council, as well as the decision-making bodies of other international organizations, default to the use of impartial or "blanket" arms embargoes. The motivation for this step stems from domestic pressure and often the moral obligation of the international community's Responsibility to Protect and will be discussed later. A reaction is necessary of course, although prevention is preferred (and sanctions are better suited to this role) as noted by many authors and summarized by Elizabeth S. Rogers: "*Sanctions are best adapted for containment, next-best adapted for prevention, and least well-adapted for resolution*" (Rogers 1996: 45). Following this argument a reaction toward containment should then be appropriate – it is, however, this problematic understanding of arms embargoes and their perception as a form of economic sanction, without a thorough review, that not only contains the problem without improving the situation but possibly also compounds it.

The assumed logic in engaging armed conflict, short of military intervention, via an arms embargo is intuitively plausible and falls in line with the general theories of economic sanctions, whose effects are meant to (a) change target policies in a relatively modest way, (b) destabilize the target government, (c) disrupt a minor military adventure, (d) impair the military potential of the target, or (e) change target policies in a major way (Hufbauer et al. 1983: 31). Although the articulated aim may differ from conflict to conflict, most UN SC resolutions contain formulations suggesting the international community applies the given sanction measure to achieve the highest of categories – (e).[6] While arms embargoes are seldom solitary measures, the wording of the resolutions predetermines the following expectations and latter evaluations of arms embargoes, perceiving them as an instrument toward conflict resolution, which is not the case.

The sequence of steps leading from arms embargo imposition to category (e) is then only a presupposed anticipation based on the fol-

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[6] Wording may differ case to case, however the recent case of Libya reads similar to all cases: "demanding an end to the violence and deciding to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court while imposing an arms embargo", see S/RES/1970 (2011).

lowing logic. If an arms embargo is imposed multilaterally and with an adequate level of monitoring, the flow of arms and ammunition to the target will be significantly reduced and the decreased availability of war-making materiel will in turn increase the prices of those arms and ammunition that manage to circumvent the arms embargo. For any given sum of resources – fewer arms will be available to the conflict party, both from its previous network of trade relations and from embargo spoilers operating through the black market. Up to this point, the general economic model is upheld by empirical data. Studies conducted on the impact of arms embargoes on the quantity and patterns of arms flow have repeatedly confirmed that well-enforced arms embargoes reduce the available amount and more importantly character of arms, thus contributing to conflict management (Brzoska 2008: 9–23). On the other hand, it is the finding of these studies and reports of expert panels that most arms embargoes have fallen short of high levels of effectiveness in their enforcement due to lack of monitoring, domestic production, and pre-existing partnerships (Fruchart et al. 2007: 21–41).

If the ambition of the imposed measure aspires to category (e) – most often the cessation of hostilities and the peaceful resolution of disputes in order to minimize suffering and loss of life – the reduction in arms availability should then diminish the combatants' abilities to wage war resulting in fewer deaths, less destruction, and a quicker resolution of the conflict through peaceful means. This assumption (integral to the imposition of all impartial arms embargoes), however, finds little if any empirical support. An illustration is readily available from the 2011 impartial arms embargo imposed on Libya – while being one of the best-enforced embargoes in history, it was also a perfect example of the knee-jerk reaction and containment expectation laid upon this instrument. While the embargo did indeed effectively curtail arms flow to the country, in no way did it lessen the government's ability to wage war and thus reduce destruction or the loss of life. Although efficiently enforced, its design was flawed, and only due to the presence of crucial Western interests was it deliberately circumvented.[7] The following text will therefore pursue the merits of arms embargoes if perceived solely

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[7] And other external interests, such as those of Qatar.

as a conflict management instrument. It is worth noting once more that though conflict management and conflict resolution are not strictly separated, they do differ significantly in their primary goals and therefore the measures of their success.

5.5 Comparative advantages of arms embargoes

In the past two decades, the inherent appeal of imposing an arms embargo as a conflict management instrument has been maintained due to the following reasons. Compared to other instruments of conflict management past the negotiation and mediation phases, which do not require an increased degree of coercion, arms embargoes are able to: (a) bear increased signaling power due to their punitive nature; (b) cause minimal collateral damage compared to wider economic sanctions; (c) incur lower costs to the sender as a result of restricted trade; (d) and directly influence the war-making potential of actors in the conflict.

Advantage (a) represents increased international pressure on the target following expressions of concerns over the conflict and public calls for cessation of hostilities. While negotiations and even mediations may be initiated immediately after these public calls, they are not perceived as punitive measures. A very valuable point is brought up by Andrea Charron, who emphasizes the fact that arms embargoes, much like all other sanctions, do not precede the peace process but are rather applied to renewing instances of violence, calling for the cessation of hostilities as the primary goal in the vast majority of cases (Charron 2011: 191–200). This fact is crucial to the understanding of arms embargo imposition, as the post-peace process period severely limits the number of instruments available to the international community short of military solutions.

Arms embargoes are therefore a very appropriate expression of strong international opposition to the renewal of hostilities while maintaining minimal collateral damage (b). The infliction of minimal collateral damage holds the greatest appeal to the international community and falls in line with fulfilling all moral obligations to address the escalation of armed conflict. In this respect (and excluding the detrimental effects of poorly designed impartial embargo episodes

listed later) arms embargoes preceded the evolution of sanctions into their smart version, targeting specific actors with financial sanctions or travel bans. This is also the reason why arms embargoes are most often "packaged" with other restrictive measures. An arms embargo was used as a solitary instrument only in FRY I, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Libya and the onset of the conflict in Liberia. In all other cases the arms embargo has been coupled with other measures.

Lower costs incurred by the sender (c) are easily discernible when compared to the alternatives. Although a sender state, or a private company in the sender state, may lose a customer, the overall share of the industry on national GDP is lower than in the case of oil and far lower than the cost of military intervention. A comparison with general trade sanctions is moot as general trade sanctions also include the arms trade and therefore their cost must always be higher than that of an arms embargo alone. Commodity sanctions may in fact be even cheaper to the sender than arms embargoes as imports are easier to replace, but such sanctions are not always possible because target states or non-state actors may not be dependent on a specific commodity or the sanctioning of said commodity might further destabilize the target country. Furthermore, establishing a link between commodity sales and conflict funding requires time and all previous commodity sanctions have followed arms embargoes after the necessary examination period (e.g. UNITA diamonds, Liberian timber).

Although these individual strengths of arms embargoes may be challenged in practice, with the exception of some crucial failures to uphold embargo implementation – such as Liberia in 1992 and 2001, Sierra Leone in 1998, or Somalia past 1995, arms embargoes are in most cases especially capable of influencing the costs of acquiring materiel necessary for the continuation of armed conflict (d), while maintaining all other comparative advantages over other instruments. Arms embargo episodes where one conflict party has preferential access to arms stockpiles and production (usually the government in intrastate conflicts such as Yugoslavia (FRY) 1991 or the aforementioned case of Libya 2011) will be addressed among the challenges.

The repeated imposition of arms embargoes in cases of armed conflict is not only due to their relative cheapness to the sender in comparison with a military option, their moral value as a limited re-

sponse expected by public opinion, or their often "patch-like" character of a stand-in measure before further action is decided – the true value of arms embargoes in armed conflict management rests with the fact that they do work. Despite criticisms of the design and implementation mentioned throughout the text, studies have repeatedly stated that limited goals (i.e. not conflict resolution), especially those of a material nature and related to restrictions in conflict dynamics, are perfectly achievable by means of arms embargoes. Empirical proof furthermore points to the correlation between the amount of resources dedicated to the arms embargo (in terms of design, but more significantly implementation and monitoring) and its overall success (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Brzoska and Lopez 2009; Vines 2007).

The crucial effect of arms embargoes pointed out in the aforementioned sanctions effectiveness studies lies within the fact that, no matter how politically ineffective a sanctions regime including an arms embargo or an arms embargo alone may be, the fact remains that arms embargoes have an impact on conflict dynamics and thus an inherent potential toward conflict management. Even arms embargoes imposed without the full will of the international community to enforce them (despite still being mandatory) lead to a decrease in potential arms suppliers, a rise in prices, increased risks due to the inclusion of criminal elements, and more importantly a limitation on the types of available arms. Cost-benefit calculations of conflict parties are significantly affected by these variables, thus offering the international community an instrument for limiting the scope of armed conflict, if enforcement is prioritized, to the predominant use of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) and Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS). Multiple authors have, however, pointed to the fact that SALW are sufficient to maintain a conflict, often citing the fact that the Rwandan genocide only required machetes and thus an arms embargo could never have been efficient in its wake. The Small Arms Survey also states that between 60 and 90 per cent of conflict deaths every year are caused solely by SALW (SAS 2005).

5.6 Challenges to arms embargoes in conflict management

Arms embargoes, much like all other instruments employed by the international community in addressing armed conflict, are subject to a host of challenges – some of systemic and some of endemic nature. While some challenges remain immune to change, such as human nature and its seemingly infinite capacity to overcome or circumvent any imposed obstacle,[8] others can be addressed and improved upon. Based on empirical cases, four crucial factors negatively influencing the effectiveness of arms embargoes can be identified: (a) time of implementation and alteration; (b) target selection; (c) enforcement and monitoring dedication; (d) target evasion capacity.

Although the relationship of these factors is of vital importance, cases are too specific to determine their hierarchical order. The order provided here is based on findings signaling the highest occurrence of practical detrimental effects within each factor, i.e. based on empirical data, the time of imposition and target selection are more often than other factors capable of negatively influencing the arms embargo episode if addressed improperly. It is also worth noting that every poorly designed or enforced arms embargo weakens the instrument for future use and leads to the erosion of the coercing and containing power of the arms embargo (Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997).

5.6.1 Time

The delayed imposition of arms embargoes is one of the key detrimental stumbling blocks impeding the success of arms embargo episodes. The reactionary nature of this instrument is the primary reason for its classification as a conflict management rather than a conflict prevention instrument. Although the struggle for early imposition is shared within the whole category of sanctions, arms embargoes in particular suffer a stark penalty due to the stockpiling of weaponry in the early

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[8] "*No matter how smart the sanction, a smarter way of breaking it is always found*" – transcript of interview with former member of Panel of Experts established pursuant to S/RES/751 (1992), London, May 2013.

onset or even prior to the escalation of armed conflicts (Batchelor et al. 2002: 339–354).

What causes the delay? The reasons, of course, are manifold and intricately linked both to the mechanism of sanctions imposition and to national interests. The mechanism itself demands a viable proposal be submitted by a UN member state. All the while, the lack of intelligence data (as the UN relies almost exclusively on data provided by other member states to various UN agencies) and the pre-existing national interests of UN SC members serve to either prolong the reactionary period before a draft is submitted to a UN SC vote or preclude a draft from ever being formed.[9] In practice the political interests and economic costs for potential embargo senders result in only a small portion of armed conflicts being addressed with an arms embargo – out of 32 armed conflicts involving a state actor ongoing in 2012 (6 of which have reached the intensity of war) only 7 were subject to a mandatory UN arms embargo (only 3 of which were imposed on war-intensity armed conflicts) (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013).

In the absolute majority of cases, if an arms embargo is being considered by the UN SC, the situation in the conflict zone must be grave enough to merit an international response greater than the sum of opposing national interests amid sender countries and the loss of profits from curtailing arms trade. The lengthy procedure thus often results in governments or non-governmental forces being able to prepare for the arms embargo by stockpiling armaments and establishing new trade routes prior to its imposition. This has most recently been the case with Sudan in 2004, Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, but also in most episodes throughout the 1990s including Yugoslavia in 1992 or Sierra Leone in 1998. As proven in a logistical regression by Cassady Craft and Joseph Smaldone (Craft and Smaldone 2003), arms imports bear a direct relation to the onset of conflict, especially in Africa, yet a relationship has not been established between the import of arms during the course of a conflict and the conflict duration or outcome.

The detrimental delay phenomenon is furthermore compounded by the use of threats of arms embargoes. In his study, Daniel Strandow

provides evidence of the fact that threats of an arms embargo imposition made by UN SC permanent members are only credible in less than 25 per cent of cases and even if credible do not lead to the desired outcome of conflict de-escalation (Strandow 2007: 2–11). Their effect is therefore rather counterproductive, as it encourages conflict parties to seek additional armaments before an arms embargo is imposed – illustrated once again on the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, both of which significantly increased the import of war making materiel through Somalia and Yemen after the threat of an arms embargo and the imposition of a voluntary arms embargo in 1999.

5.6.2 Target

Determining the target of an arms embargo is not as straightforward as may be assumed. As previously mentioned, the international community is under strong pressure to default to an impartial arms embargo creating no distinction between aggressor and defender in order to maintain a "neutral" stance. Within the UN SC permanent five, China and Russia are stalwart proponents of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for state sovereignty. This stance can be included in the national interest factor mentioned in the sanctions imposition mechanism. Thus in most cases the UN SC lacks the votes or legitimacy to impose an arms embargo only on one conflict party.

Defaulting to impartial arms embargoes has been the norm, where 12 out of 15 arms embargo episodes after 1990 imposed in intrastate conflict were impartial (often cited as blanket). Out of the 3 remaining episodes, 2 were converted from partial to impartial at a later stage – Sudan (S/RES/1591 in 2005) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (S/RES/1596 in 2005, with some exceptions for the governmental forces), leaving Angola the only arms embargo episode in intrastate conflict that remained completely partial against UNITA. This approach was furthermore supported by prior research: "*The case studies provide support for the position that it is best not to deliver any weapons during conflict, unless the supplier favors one side to win. This is not because the halt in deliveries can necessarily stop fighting, but because more weapons tend to make conflicts longer and bloodier, and lead to severe political dislocations in the aftermath*" (Brzoska and Pearson 1994: 216).

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[9] It has become custom for proposals which are strongly opposed by a UN SC member or members in the drafting stages to never reach the final draft or voting stage.

Later research has, however, diverged from encouraging the imposition of impartial arms embargoes, much like the imposition of general economic sanctions. Specific targeting should be preferred, but remains very hard to achieve: "*There are generally preferable alternatives to either an enforced impartial embargo, or inaction. The Security Council should often discriminate in civil wars by targeting the aggressor faction, and, if necessary, by aiding the side whose military success would produce the best chance of a peaceful and secure future for the country.*" (Tierney 2005: 664).

The reasoning for partial arms embargoes stems from undesirable effects which impartial embargoes may have on conflict management and later conflict resolution. Multiple authors have stated that an impartial curtailment of arms imports may adversely affect conflict management due to two specific mechanisms. Firstly, impartial arms embargoes are never truly impartial and often directly strengthen the stronger of the two conflict parties. And secondly, a stalemate brought on by decreased access to war-making materiel may effectively prolong the duration of the conflict with conditions bearable for the combatants but not for the civilians – especially in intractable conflicts (Chesterman and Pouligny 2003: 503–518).

Due to the widespread use of impartial arms embargoes, examples of their negative impacts in retrospect are plentiful. The most recent case of a mandatory impartial UN arms embargo imposed on an intrastate conflict is Libya in 2011. The 2011 Libya episode, due to the intricate involvement of Western Europe and an imposed military solution, displays a prime, albeit accelerated example, of the "neutral" design and problematic alteration of an impartial arms embargo. UN Security Council Resolution 1970 effectively prohibited any arms transfers or training aid provisions to the general populace or their emerging representative bodies. In fact, the international community was forced to construct an artificial loophole within UN Security Council Resolution 1973, keeping the arms embargo in force and breaching it at the same time. Reported violations of the arms embargo include transfers made by France or Qatar, both of which grossly undermined the credibility of an arms embargo as an international instrument of conflict management and were counterintuitive to the initial design of the arms embargo.[10] Were it not for the accompanying military intervention and highly accelerated timeframe, the impartial arms embargo would not have seen an alteration for a much longer time period and would have clearly continued to benefit the incumbent government.

Although Syria is not a case of a mandatory UN arms embargo, the topicality of the situation merits a short parallel. Because political will for a UN arms embargo has been scarce, the UN SC has never voted on an embargo. Instead, the EU imposed an impartial arms embargo by Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP and Council Regulation 442/2011 and was struggling with attempts at the alteration or termination of the arms embargo until mid-2013, finally altering the embargo more than 2 years after its imposition to allow for support to the opposition. Within those 2 years the government of Syria not only controlled access to indigenous arms, it also continued to be supplied by its allies, whereas the victims of the humanitarian crisis were bereft of support. The lifting of the arms embargo or its alteration to a more targeted measure was a notoriously problematic step, as unlike in the case of Libya, a military solution to the conflict has not been at hand.

The two newest examples are supplemented by many previous episodes with possibly even more detrimental consequences. These episodes include Yugoslavia in 1991, when the impartial arms embargo heavily favored the Serbian forces which had access to all the weaponry (and so much surplus that it was exporting) and left Bosnia and Herzegovina with little to no discernable means of defense. Alteration was once again extremely slow until a petition led by Pakistan in 1994 calling for the abolishment of the arms embargo due to its violation of the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to self-defense (S/PV.3370). The impartial arms embargo design flaw resulted in its large scale violations in support of Bosnia and Herzegovina, again undermining the capabilities of the instrument toward conflict management. Further episodes with negative effects due to their impartiality include Somalia from 1992, Rwanda from 1994, or Sierra Leone from 1997.

A connection can furthermore be drawn between the decreased availability of arms and a higher incidence of external military involve-

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[10] S/2012/163, Final report of the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 24 (d) of Resolution 1973 (2011).

ment, i.e. conflicts subjected to at least moderately successful impartial arms embargoes are more likely to achieve a state of "stalemate" encouraging external military involvement to achieve conflict management or resolution (Sislin and Pearson 2001: 136; Peterson and Drury 2011).

Because targeting is such a key factor in arms embargo effectiveness and its incorrect determination (due to its later, hard to achieve alteration) can have detrimental effects such as enforcing the aggressor; prolonging conflict and supporting stalemate in which neither side has the capacity to overcome its opponent; general criminalization and increase in organized crime due to smuggling; or even the devolution of conflict parties into numerous factions thus complicating the management process, it remains one of the most problematic aspects of improving embargo effectiveness.

5.6.3 Enforcement and monitoring

The most often heard complaint vis-à-vis arms embargoes is the argument that they simply do not work because the international community is not capable of enforcing the imposed measures to a standard where no weapons are able to reach the target country. This is an unattainable goal and one that is not generally sought after by arms embargo senders, due to the increased cost and decreased availability mechanic explained above. However, the effectiveness of an arms embargo is in direct relation to the level of its enforcement by the international community (Wood 2006: 1–5). The evasion capacity of target actors is a key modifier to this relation and will be discussed later. Monitoring allows for enforcement to be executed and updated properly.

Arms embargo enforcement includes all measures undertaken in preventing transfers of designated materiel from reaching the target. Highest enforcement level measures involve military presence which allows for border control and interdiction, such as the naval blockade and no-fly zone over Libya in 2011 or Iraq since 2003. Even with the highest levels of enforcement, Panels of Experts have revealed weapons transfers, though the consignments were of severely reduced size and importance. Medium enforcement levels also require the physical presence of the international community, but only in limited scope and

most often in the form of peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN, ECOWAS, or the AU. Individual peacekeeping missions have varying mandates for border control and are more often than not incapable of preventing arms transfers even if mandated to monitor the embargo, simply due to the limited number of personnel and the overwhelming amount of tasks which peacekeeping missions are required to carry out. These missions include UNMIL in Liberia (25 tasks strength of 15,000), UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire (65 tasks strength of 11,000), UNAMID in Sudan (47 tasks strength of 24,000), and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (24 tasks strength of 20,000).[11] Nevertheless, peacekeeping missions provide invaluable support for the enforcement and verification of arms embargoes and as well as the monitoring function for the Panels of Experts, whose sole task consists of monitoring and reporting duties. The lowest level of enforcement requires no military presence and is therefore fully reliant on the compliance and diligence of sender states (specifically in verifying end-user documentation and national export controls) and especially the cooperation of the neighboring states (Hagelin 2002: 2–17).

On every level of enforcement, progress has so far not been made past interdiction. Although binding in terms of international law, individual states do not project arms embargoes into national legislation and the repercussions for individual arms smugglers are often negligible. The situation is even more complicated with sanction-busting states that are fully capable of spoiling even strong international efforts to curtail arms transfers to the target (Vines 2003: 247–253). The UN SC permanent five is de facto exempted from any secondary punitive measures as they possess veto powers and are therefore not able to become subjects of secondary sanctions. Secondary sanctions have in fact only been applied twice in the history of arms embargo violations – Liberia in 2002 (S/RES 1395) and Eritrea in 2009 (S/RES 1907), although violations themselves are plentiful even by the permanent five: China's exports to Sudan, Russia's exports to Iran, French exports to Libya, or Britain's exports to Yugoslavia are but the most prominent examples. The UN SC permanent five is by no means the largest exporter of arms to embargoed countries; it is however a very strong signal and a very

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[11] Source: UN DPKO, https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/.

detrimental blow to the effectiveness of the arms embargo episode if these states chose not to support it before its imposition or by abstaining in the vote: "*In 9 of the 21 cases of a threatened arms embargo, at least one P5 state provided military support to a target after the threat had been made. In 7 of the 21 cases at least one P5 member publicly expressed its opposition to the imposition of a UN arms embargo on a target... 16 cases of a threatened embargo resulted in the imposition of a mandatory UN arms embargo on the target within a year of the threat*" (Fruchtart et al. 2007: 14, 20).

Weak enforcement, wavering support, and potential exports not only by UN SC members past the point of embargo threats create a counterproductive effect, de facto encouraging stronger violence and escalation in the conflict. Exports preceding the immediate imposition of an arms embargo, while the international community is well aware of the ongoing conflict and especially if violence is widespread throughout the region, exacerbate the conflict even further, supporting criminalization, spillover, and future illicit arms trade (Bergman 2007).

Monitoring is closely tied to enforcement due to the mechanism by which it is established. The primary body responsible for reporting to the UN SC is the Sanctions Committee, established by the UN SC as a subsidiary organ according to Article 29 of the UN Charter. As such the Sanctions Committee replicates the membership of the UN SC and thereby propagates the inherent vulnerability of an arms embargo which does not have the full support of the UN SC. Furthermore, Sanctions Committees require a unanimous vote for proposals to be submitted to the UN SC or decisions to be made on exemptions and delisting.[12] Throughout the 1990s, Sanctions Committees were largely ineffective reporting bodies specifically due to the method of intelligence gathering available to them as well as their somewhat lacking activity in pursuing corrective measures. As mentioned before, the UN relies on member states to provide intelligence data and throughout the 1990s arms embargo violations were almost exclusively brought to the attention of Sanction Committees by these means. The only direct

mode of monitoring built upon information provided by military missions present in the countries under embargo; however, due to previously mentioned limitations of this form of monitoring and enforcement and taking into account the fact that even UN troops were on multiple occasions found to be trading weapons, many violations were left undiscovered.[13] The majority of these violations were also undetected by UN investigations because the Sanctions Committees limited themselves to inquiries by letter, to which a state under review may or may not have responded truthfully, if at all, as repeatedly confirmed by the Committees themselves: "*The Committee does not have any specific monitoring mechanism to ensure the effective implementation of the arms embargo, and would like to recall its previous observations that it relies solely on the cooperation of States and organizations in a position to provide information on violations of the arms embargo. During the reporting period, no violations were brought to the attention of the Committee.*" (S/1998/1226: par. 4).[14]

Last but not least, Alex Vines as a former Panel of Experts member, warns that even today Sanctions Committees suffer from personnel difficulties due to the rotation of UN SC members and the assignment of prevalently junior staff to these positions (Vines 2007: 1110).

The UN attempted to correct the extremely paralyzing deficiency of Sanctions Committees through the establishment of Panels of Experts,[15] the first being experimentally established in 1995 pursuant to the arms embargo on Rwanda. However, Panels of Experts only became a useful and efficient instrument in 2000 pursuant to the arms embargo on UNITA in Angola, especially thanks to what is now known as the Fowler Report (S/2000/203). As an investigatory unit, the Panel of Experts consists of 4-9 experts in fields related to the arms trade, who

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[12] Delisting is often a problematic process of removing persons, organizations, or particular items and commodities from the arms embargo list.

[13] The most recent reported case involved Pakistani troops in the MONUC mission to the DRC trading their issued weapons along with confiscated small arms and ammunition for gold in 2005, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6681457.stm. The report of this incident never made it into the final report of the Panel of Experts or the Report of the Sanctions Committee.

[14] Also see for example S/1996/17 Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, or others before 1999.

[15] In some cases designated as Monitoring Group – Somalia, or Group of Experts – DRC.

are not root employees of the UN, but rather practitioners in banking, fraud investigation, arms control, conflict resolution, regional trade and others. This allows the Panel to be detached from outside political pressure and provide in-depth evidence of arms embargo violations. Their reports are also published separately to the reports of Sanctions Committees. Monitoring has therefore been greatly improved over the past decade but still leaves a lacking institutional capacity for the implementation of lessons learned. Multiple former experts from individual Panels have warned that corrections made to individual arms embargoes on the ground have little impact on the future design and implementation of new arms embargoes, while calling for a new body to improve institutional memory and know-how.[16]

5.6.4 Evasion

The evasion capacity of conflict parties subjected to an arms embargo includes all means and measures the targets can apply to circumvent or lessen the impact of the arms embargo on their combat potential. As previously mentioned, some of these measures can alter the cost-benefit calculation of the target due to their high financial strain – specifically black market illicit trade; others are, however, cheaper and often lead to direct circumvention of the arms embargo with no incurred increase in cost – such as the grey market, the regional market, and domestic production.

The black market is represented by different arms brokers, rampant especially in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the pursuant abundance of all types of weaponry from national arsenals (Karp 1994: 175–189). The most notorious cases include the large scale supply of all types of weaponry from Ukraine, Belarus, as well as Slovakia by Leonid Minin (S/2000/1238). An even more infamous case is that of Viktor Bout, who became active after 2003 in violating the arms embargo imposed on the DRC, supplying weapons originating even in the United Kingdom and the USA through Sudan, Uganda, and

Rwanda (APPG 2004; Danssaert and Thomas 2006). Although these are the most notorious and publically recognizable cases they are by no means a rare occurrence and illicit arms brokering remains a crucial sanctions violation mechanism. A crucial systemic weakness of UN sanctions and arms embargoes lies in their relation to national legislation where many UN member states remain powerless to prosecute their citizens for these activities (Portela 2010: 13–30). Although a well-known arms broker, Leonid Minin was sentenced in Italy to 2 years in prison in 2000 for drug possession, Viktor Bout was only arrested in 2008 and sentenced in the USA solely for his crimes in supplying aid to the Taliban as supporting terrorism.

Grey market arms trading is the largest culprit in illegally supplying armed conflict. Less publicized, more covert, and still significantly larger than the black market in volume, composition and value, the grey market involves the legal duality of government approved covert arms transfers to embargoed targets, be they state or non-state actors (Pythian 2000: 1–52). Throughout all arms embargo episodes, the grey market has played a significant role in most, but a crucial role in many including Somalia or Sudan, where supplying governments knowingly accepted obviously falsified end-user certification and weapons continuously flowed into the conflict areas from Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Yemen, Egypt, Eritrea, South Africa, Uganda and others. The worst case is exemplified by Sierra Leone where transfers to the country which ended up in the hands of the armed rebel group RUF originated in many of the aforementioned states, and exacerbated by the constant support of neighboring Liberia and its president Charles Taylor, grossly prolonging the conflict and increasing its destructiveness (SAS 2002: 165–195).

The regional market is very closely related to the grey market, although it has not become an established term and is not a legal market. Arms transfers within the regional market refer to the abundance of especially small arms and light weapons in regions where an armed conflict has occurred in the recent past – due to the modern history of Africa, this term is especially suitable in so-called hotspot areas around long intractable conflicts. The regional market as the illicit transfer of SALW often in small volumes is notoriously difficult to prevent and especially serves non-governmental forces in intrastate conflict. Exam-

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[16] Transcript of interview with former member of Panel of Experts established pursuant to S/RES/1572 (2004), Dublin, January 2011, and S/RES/1343 in London, May 2011.

ples of hotspot readily include the aforementioned conflicts of Somalia, Sudan, DRC and Sierra Leone, but also Libya where the availability of SALW in the region is so high that costs remain low and accessibility high (Bergman 2007). Transfers therefore require very basic transportation and smuggling routes when discovered are quickly replaced by new ones.

The last evasion capability of conflict parties consists in the domestic production of arms. Although production capacities are inherently linked to the state, non-governmental forces in long armed conflicts have also seized or developed limited capabilities. Nevertheless, the issue with domestic production is that it is in no way addressed by the arms embargoes imposed. Thus while enforcing the arms embargo, the international community has no right to interfere with the domestic production of either warring states in interstate wars (like the FRY or Iraq) or state vs. non-state actors (like Libya in case of state production, or DRC in case of non-state actor production by way of seizing facilities).

5.7 Conclusion

Confrontation with armed conflict requires the international community to react both with the utmost care and the utmost efficiency. While no instrument is flawless, the international community has grown accustomed to imposing an arms embargo as one of the primary reactions to the onset or re-escalation of armed conflict. Due to the limited use of this instrument prior to the end of the Cold War and in light of its very minor improvement throughout the 1990s, today the international community can only work with little more than a decade of experience with arms embargoes imposed, monitored, and enforced on reasonable levels. Needless to say this has been a short time for the adjustment of such a multilateral and multifaceted approach. However, arms embargoes remain a viable and potentially effective instrument of conflict management under specific circumstances.

As shown in the above text, arms embargoes are able to retain their comparative advantages over other available instruments of addressing armed conflict and ever more often humanitarian crises, but their goals

must remain limited. Arms embargoes do not possess the capacity for issue solving between the conflict parties and must not be used, and especially evaluated, in such a manner. They are capable of exerting limited influence on conflict actors and above all capable of altering their cost-benefit calculations with the limitation of access to materiel required to sustain armed conflict. As such, arms embargoes also need to be applied carefully, mindful not only of the benefits of an embargo, but also its possible detrimental effects should it be imposed incorrectly – the recent cases of Libya and in part Syria both reflect the fact that the international community is slow to adapt its design procedures to modern conflicts often involving the Responsibility to Protect.

While arms embargoes, much like all other sanctions, may have a very strong impact on the target actor, they remain only as strong as the commitment of the international community to enforce them. Every arms embargo episode presents its own obstacles to prevent circumvention, and effective enforcement is often faced with insurmountable hurdles, especially in regions rife with conflict and in episodes without the full support of the UN SC. Nevertheless, improvement in the understanding, imposition, and timely alteration of arms embargoes is presently visible and promises the future strengthening of this conflict management instrument.

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6. CONCLUSION

International relations as a social science does not have at its disposal a universal and general theory that would enable it to predict with sufficient precision, i.e. at least with non-random probability, the origin of wars and understand their causes. Moreover, within this discipline, there is no agreement on the opinion whether wars are, in fact, inevitable, as is claimed by realists and neorealists, or whether they can be prevented by an adequate form of international arrangement, which is argued by the liberals and the predominant part of the Marxist tradition of this discipline. As the available empirical evidence implies that war is a minor, yet still persisting phenomenon in the international system, it can be assumed according to the state of the international relations theory that it will remain so in the future as well.

War is a social phenomenon with a great destructive and simultaneously also transformative force. It destroys, transforms and shapes. Just as in the tradition of just war, its younger counterpart, the concept of humanitarian intervention strives to establish obligatory norms that would minimize the suffering of the innocent. Therefore, if liberal and Marxist thinkers offer recipes for the reform of society that will eliminate wars, the above-mentioned normative approaches have a smaller ambition, the ambition to "civilize" their progress in the sense of minimizing the suffering of the innocent. Another important tool to alleviate the impacts of wars are international organizations, starting from the universal UN, through the European Union, to the regional organization of collective defense, NATO. All these institutions have been gradually developing tools aimed at conflict management and in the ideal case also conflict resolution. As they are imperfect human inventions, these organizations also reveal similar imperfections, which often leads to general disappointment. One of the frequently applied tools used by these institutions is various arms embargoes. Their effect usually fails to meet the expectations and the practical impacts on the development of the conflict are rather questionable. That is perhaps why it is worth paying attention to their analysis, which can reveal situations when this tool may be really worthy and efficient.

A great majority of theories and concepts of international relations regard war explicitly or at least implicitly as evil. The only exception is a major part of Marxism, which sees wars as the "midwifes of revolution", preparing the conditions for a radical transformation of the international system, which is believed to eliminate wars forever. Yet is war really a universal evil? Or does it depend on what its aim is and by what means it is waged? Unfortunately, we do not know an authoritative answer to this question.

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SUMMARY

Studies on armed conflicts are among the traditional themes of international relations. This is an extremely complex research field, integrating a plethora of findings from international relations and social sciences, as well as natural sciences. International relations as a social science does not have at its disposal a universal and general theory that would enable it to predict with sufficient precision, i.e. at least with non-random probability, the origin of wars and understand their causes. Consolidating obtained findings into a homogenous and coherent framework can, however, be even more demanding. This work represents a contribution to ongoing academic discussion in major areas currently relevant to armed conflict research.

The major objective of this book is to identify the main issues significant to current war and peace studies and find the underlying links between them. The first chapter presents the main approaches of the discipline towards the causes of wars and seeks to answer whether international relations have come closer to the development of a general theory concerning the causes of war. The next critical issue is the subject of analysis in the second chapter of this book. Humanitarian intervention is a contested concept of military action undertaken on behalf of populations subjected to flagrant persecution either from their own state or from other actors in a situation where their state is unable or unwilling to rectify the situation. This leads to the discussion on the changeable nature of armed conflicts; that is, there is no consensus on how to classify armed conflict due to the variable nature of warfare. By proposing a typology of armed conflicts, the third chapter of this book seeks to achieve analytical clarity and to present a constructive analysis of issues that are at stake during the dynamic course of conflicts. The role of the international organizations and their efforts to prevent war by changing state behaviour is analysed in the fourth chapter. Along with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe provides us with specific know-how putting them in a distinctive position within the international system. The last chapter sheds considerable light on the issue of arms embargoes. It explains the existing disparities between the ill repute of arms embargoes and their frequent application, between their comparative advantages and flaws in their design, and between the existing implementation capacities and key challenges to their effectiveness.

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