. ' . .
Social constructivism
M I C H A E L BA R N ETT
• Introduction
• The rise of constructivism
• Constructivism
• Constructivism and global change
• Conclusion
Reader's Guide
This chapter provides an overview of constructivist
approaches to International Relations (I R) theory.
Constructivism explores how the world is made
and re-made through action, how the structures of
world politics do not merely constrain but also constitute
the identities, interests, and practices of the
actors of world politics, how these actors unwittingly
1 56
1 56
1 57
1 63
1 67
or purposefully reproduce these structures, and
how human action is responsible for both stability
and change in world affairs. Constructivism generates
many distinctive insights, including alternative
ways of thinking about power, the role of norms for
explaining the rise and decline of world orders, and
the importance of transnational movements and
other non-state actors in the internationalization of
global politics.
M I C H A E L B A R N ETT
•
Introduction
Constructivism rose from rather humble beginnings
to become one of the leading schools in International
Relations (IR). Twenty-five years ago constructivism
did not exist. Today it is widely recognized for its ability
to capture important features of global politics, and
is viewed as an important theory of international relations.
This chapter explores constructivism's origins, its
core commitments, and features of its research agenda
as it relates to global change. Mainstream International
Relations, as covered in Chapter 8, assumes that states
have enduring interests such as power and wealth, and
are constrained in their ability to further those interests
because ofmaterial forces such as geography, technology,
and the distribution of power. Critics counter
that social forces such as ideas, knowledge, norms, and
rules also influence states' identities and interests, and
the very organization ofworld politics.
Constructivism is not the only theory of international
relations to recognize the importance of
international norms and to conceptualize international
politics not as a system but as a society. Various
theories that pre-dated constructivism, some of which
are included in this volume, made similar claims,
including the English School and feminist approaches
to world affairs, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 17. But
constructivists were more attentive to the issues that
mattered to neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists-how
identity, norms, and culture shape patterns
ofwar and peace. Eventually, constructivism developed
different wings, with some placing emphasis on structure
and others on agency, some on stability and others
on transformation.
The concern with the making and re-making of
world politics underscores constructivism's strong
interest in global change. Although constructivism
has investigated various features of global change, this
chapter will focus on two: the convergence by states
around similar ways for organizing domestic and international
life; and how norms become internationalized
and institutionalized, influencing what states and
non-state actors do and their ideas ofwhat is legitimate
behaviour.
·The
rise of constructivism
Once upon a time, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism
dominated American international relations
theory. Neo-realism made several core claims. States
are the central actors in world politics, and they are fixated
on their security and survival; these interests suffocate
any possibility that ideas, norms, or values might
shape state behaviour. They pursue these interests in
the context of an international system that is defined
by: anarchy (the absence of a supranational authority);
functional non-differentiation of the units (because
anarchy creates a self-help system, all states must be
self-reliant and safeguard their security); and the distribution
of power. But because the world has always
been an anarchy and states have always been obsessed
about their survival, to understand enduring tendencies
in world politics all that really matters is the state's
position in the international hierarchy and the distribution
of power. States are suspicious, misanthropic,
and aggressive, not necessarily because they are born
that way but because the environment punished anything
else (see Chs 6 and 8).
Neo-liberalism lightened neo-realism's dark view
of international politics by demonstrating that states
cooperate all the time on a range of issues in order
to improve their lives. Because a primary obstacle
to cooperation is the absence of trust between states,
states construct international institutions that can
perform various trust-enhancing functions, including
monitoring and publicizing cheating. As recounted in
Chapter 8, these camps disagreed on various issues,
but they shared a commitment to individualism and
materialism. Individualism is the view that actors have
fixed interests and that the structure constrains their
behaviour. Although neo-realists and neo-liberals differ
because the former believe that the pursuit of security
is primary while the latter can envision other goals
such as the pursuit of wealth, for empirical and theoretical
reasons they both assume that state interests are
hard-wired and unmalleable. Materialism is the view
that the structure that constrains behaviour is defined
by distribution of power, technology, and geography.
While neo-realism holds that interests trump ideas and
norms, neo-liberal institutionalism recognizes that
states might willingly construct norms and institutions
to regulate their behaviour if doing so will enhance
their long-term interests. Although both approaches
allow for the possibility that ide�s and norms can constrain
how states pursue their interests, neither contemplates
the possibility that ideas and norms might
define their interests.
This materialism and individualism came to be
challenged by scholars who eventually became associated
with constructivism, a term coined by Nicholas
Onuf in his important book, World of Our Making
(1989). It enjoyed a meteoric rise in the 1990s because
_
of two principal factors. First, it demonstrated that the
notion ofa worldwithout norms and ideas was not only
nonsensical, but also that their inclusion was important
for understanding the behaviour ofstates and non-state
actors, and why they saw the world and themselves as
they did.
The second was the end of the cold war. Although
only a handful of scholars had ever imagined that the
cold war might end with a whimper and not a bang,
neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists were especially
hard pressed to explain this outcome. Their commitment
to individualism and materialism meant that
they could not grasp what appeared to reside at the heart
ofthis stunning development: the revolutionary impact
ofideas to transform the organization ofworld politics.
Constructivism was tailor-made for understanding
what had been unthinkable to most scholars. Nor did
these approaches provide insight into what might come
next. The USA was enjoying a unipolar moment, but
the distribution of power could not determine whether
it would aspire to become a global hegemon or work
through multilateral institutions. Moreover, the end of
Chapter 1 0 Social constructivism
the cold war caused states to debate what is the national
interest and how it relates to their national identitywho
are 'we' and where do 'we' belong? Constructivism
provided insight into the dissolution and creation of
new regional and international orders. The end of the
cold war also clipped the prominence of traditional
security themes, neo-realism's comparative advantage,
and raised the importance of transnationalism, human
rights, and other subjects that played to constructivism's
strengths. Constructivists were speeding past critique to
offer genuinely novel and compelling understandings of
the world. The Culture ofNational Security (Katzenstein
1996) challenged standard neo-realist claims in a series
of critical areas-including alliance patterns, military
intervention, arms racing, great power transformation-and
demonstrated how identity and norms shape
state interests and must be incorporated to generate
superior explanations. The growing literature on sovereignty
investigated its origins, its spread from the West
to the global South, and the historical and regional
variation in its meaning. Constructivism was offering a
fresh take on the world at a time when the world was in
need ofnew ways ofthinking.
• I nternational relations theory in the 1 980s was dominated
by nee-realism and nee-liberal institutionalism; both
theories ascribed to materialism and individualism.
• Various scholars critical of nee-realism and nee-liberalism
drew from critical and sociological theory to demonstrate
the effects of ideas and norms on world politics.
• The end of the cold war created an intellectual space for
scholars to challenge existing theories of international
politics.
.�
Construct1v1sm
Before proceeding to detail constructivism's tenets,
a caveat is in order. Constructivism is a social theory
and not a substantive theory of international politics.
Social theory is broadly concerned withhow to conceptualize
the relationship between agents and structures;
for instance, how should we think about the relationship
between states and the structure of international
politics? Substantive theory offers specific claims and
hypotheses aboutpatterns inworldpolitics; for instance,
how do we explain why democratic states tend not to
wage war on one another? In this way, constructivism
is best compared with rational choice. Rational choice
is a social theory that offers a framework for understanding
how actors operate with fixed preferences that
they attempt to maximize under a set of constraints. It
makes no claims about the content ofthose preferences;
they could be wealth or religious salvation. Nor does it
assume anything about the content of the constraints;
they could be guns or ideas. Rational choice offers no
claims about the actual patterns of world politics. For
M I C H A E L B A R N ETT
instance, neo-realism and neo-liberalism subscribe to
rational choice, but they arrive at rival claims about
patterns of conflict and cooperation in world politics
because they make different assumptions about the
effects of anarchy. Like rational choice, constructivism
is a social theory that is broadly concerned with
the relationship between agents and structures, but it is
not a substantive theory. Constructivists, for instance,
have different arguments regarding the rise of sovereignty
and the impact of human rights norms on states.
To generate substantive claims, scholars must delineate
who are the principal actors, what are their interests
and capacities, and what is the content ofthe normative
structures.
Although there are many kinds of constructivism,
there is unity within diversity. 'Constructivism is about
human consciousness and its role in international life'
(Ruggie 1998: 856). This focus on human consciousness
suggests a commitment to idealism and holism, which,
according to Wendt (1999), represent the core of constructivism.
Idealism demands that we take seriously
the role of ideas in world politics. The world is defined
by material and ideational forces. But these ideas are
not akin to beliefs or psychological states that reside
inside our heads. Instead, these ideas are social. Our
mental maps are shaped by collectively held ideas such
as knowledge, symbols, language, and rules. Idealism
does not reject material reality but instead observes
that the meaning and construction of that material
reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation. The
balance of power does not objectively exist out there,
waiting to be discovered; instead, states debate what
is the balance of power, what is its meaning, and how
they should respond. Constructivism also accepts some
form of holism or structuralism. The world is irreducibly
social and cannot be decomposed into the properties
of already existing actors. The emphasis on holism
can make it seem like actors are automatons. But holism
allows for agency, recognizing that agents have some
autonomy and their interactions help to construct,
reproduce, and transform those structures. Although
the structure ofthe cold war seemingly locked the USA
and the Soviet Union into a fight to the death, leaders
on both sides creatively transformed their relations
and, with it, the very structure ofglobal politics.
This commitment to idealism and holism has important
implications for how we think about and study
world politics. But in order to appreciate its insights,
we must learn more about its conceptual vocabulary,
and to demonstrate the value of learning this 'second
language', I shall contrast constructivism's vocabulary
with that of rational choice. The core observation is the
social construction of reality. This has a number of
related elements. One is the emphasis on the socially
constructed nature of actors and their identities and
interests. Actors are not born outside of and prior to
society, as individualism claims. Instead, actors are
produced and created by their cultural environment:
nurture, not nature. This points to the importance of
identity and the social construction of interests. The
American identity shapes national interests. Not all
is fair in love, war, or any other social endeavour. For
decades, Arab nationalism shaped the identities and
interests of Arab states, contained norms that guided
how Arab leaders could play the game of Arab politics,
and encouraged Arab leaders to draw from the symbols
of Arab politics to try to manoeuvre around their
Arab rivals and further their own interests. How Arab
leaders played out their regional games was structured
by the norms of Arab politics. They had very intense
rivalries, and as they vied for prestige and status they
frequently accused each other of being a traitor to the
Arab nation or of harming the cause of Arabism. But
rarely did they use military force. Until the late 1970s
the idea of relations with Israel was a virtual 'taboo',
violated by Egyptian Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem
in 1977 and separate peace treaty in 1979. Arab states
did not respond through military action but rather
by evicting Egypt from the Arab League, and then
Sadat paid the ultimate price for his heresy when he
was assassinated in 1981. The Arab national identity
has shaped Arab national interests and the behaviour
deemed legitimate and illegitimate.
Another element is how knowledge-that is, symbols,
rules, concepts, and categories-shapes how individuals
construct and interpret their world. Reality does
not exist out there waiting to be discovered; instead,
historically produced and culturally bound knowledge
enables individuals to construct and give meaning to
reality. In other words, existing categories help us to
understand, define, and make sense of the world. There
are lots of ways to understand collective violence, and
one of the unfortunate features of a bloody twentieth
century is that we have more categories to discriminate
between forms of violence, from civil war to ethnic
cleansing, to crimes against humanity, to genocide.
This constructed reality frequently appears to us
an objective reality, which relates to the concept of
social facts. There are those things whose existence
is dependent on human agreement, and those things
whose existence is not. Brute facts such as rocks, flowers,
gravity, and oceans exist independently of human
agreement, and will continue to exist even if humans
disappear or deny their existence. Social facts are
dependent on human agreement and are taken for
granted. Money, refugees, terrorism, human rights, and
sovereignty are social facts. Their existence depends on
human agreement, they will only exist so long as that
agreement exists, and their existence shapes how we
categorize the world and what we do.
Constructivists also are concerned with norms and
rules. Norms come in two basic varieties. Regulative
rules regulate already existing activities-rules for
the road determine how to drive; the World Trade
Organization's rules regulate trade. Constitutive rules
create the very possibility for these activities. The rules
of rugby not only prohibit blocking but also help to
define the very game (and distinguish it from American
football); after all, if forwards began to block for backs,
not only would this be a penalty, but it would change
the game itself. The rules of sovereignty not only regulate
state practices but also make possible the very idea
of a sovereign state. The norms also vary in terms of
their institutionalization, that is, how much they are
taken for granted. In their famous 'life cycle' perspective,
Finnemore and Sikkink identify how normative
structures evolve over time. Not all is fair in love, war,
or any other social endeavour. But we also know that
what counts as playing the game oflove or war can vary
over time, which means that we should be concerned
with their origins and evolution and their corresponding
effects. Furthermore, rules are not static, but rather
are revised through practice, reflection, and arguments
by actors regarding how they should be applied to new
situations. lndeed, actors can engage in strategic social
construction (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Actors
attempt to change the norms that subsequently guide
and constitute state identities and interests. Human
rights activists, for instance, try to encourage compliance
with human rights norms not only by naming
and shaming those who violate these norms, but also
by encouraging states to identify with these norms
because it is the right thing to do.
The social construction of reality and the attempt
by actors to shape the normative environment points
to the concept of legitimacy. Do we choose only the
most efficient action? Do the ends justify the means?
Or is certain action just unacceptable? The earlier distinction
between constitutive and regulative rules parallels
the conceptual distinction between the logic of
Chapter 10 Social constructivism
consequences and the logic of appropriateness. The
logic of consequences attributes action to the anticipated
costs and benefits, mindful that other actors are
doing just the same. The logic of appropriateness, however,
highlights how actors are rule-following, worrying
about whether their actions are legitimate. The two
logics are not necessarily distinct or competing. What
is viewed as appropriate and legitimate can affect the
possible costs ofdifferent actions; the more illegitimate
a possible course of action appears to be, the higher
the potential cost for those who proceed on their own.
The USA's decision to go into Iraq without the blessing
of the UN Security Council meant that other states
viewed the USA's actions as illegitimate, were less willing
to support them, and this raised the costs to the
USA when it went ahead.
By emphasizing the social construction of reality,
we also are questioning what is frequently taken
for granted. This points to several issues. One is a
concern with the origins of the social constructs that
now appear to us as natural and are now part of our
social vocabulary. Sovereignty did not always exist; it
was a product of historical forces and human interactions
that generated new distinctions regarding where
political authority resided. The category of weapons
of mass destruction is a modern invention. Although
individuals have been forced to flee their homes ever
since Adam and Eve were exiled from Eden, the political
and legal category of 'refugees' is only a century old
(see Case Study 1).
To understand the origins ofthese concepts requires
attention to the interplay between existing ideas and
institutions, the political calculations by leaders who
had ulterior motives, and morally minded actors who
were attempting to improve humanity. Also of concern
are alternative pathways. Although history is
path-dependent, there are contingencies, historical
accidents, the conjunction of material and ideational
forces, and human intervention that can force history
to change course. The events of 1 1 September 2001
and the response by the Bush administration arguably
transformed the direction of world politics. This
interest in possible and counterfactual worlds works
against historical determinism. Alexander Wendt's
(1992) claim that 'anarchy is what states make of it'
calls attention to how different beliefs and practices
will generate divergent patterns and organization of
world politics (see Box 10.1). A world of Mahatma
Gandhis will be very different from a world of Osama
bin Ladens.
• M I C H A E L B A R N ETT
Case Study 1 Social construction of refugees
© Oxford University Press
Who is a refugee, why does this category matter, and how has it
changed? There are many ways to categorize people who leave
their homes, including migrants, temporary workers, displaced
people, and refugees. Before the twentieth century, 'refugee' as
a legal category did not exist, and it was not until the First World
War that states recognized people as refugees and gave them
rights. Who was a refugee? Although many were displaced by
the First World War, Western states limited their compassion to
Russians who were fleeing the Bolsheviks (it was easier to accuse
a rival state of persecuting its people); only they were entitled
to assistance from states and the new refugee agency, the High
Commissioner for Refugees. However, the High Commissioner
took his mandate and the category and began to apply it to others
in Europe who also had fled their country and needed assistance.
Although states frequently permitted him to expand into
other regions and provide more assistance, states also pushed
back and refused to give international recognition or assistance
to many in need-most notably when Jews were fleeing Nazi
Germany. After the Second World War, and as a consequence of
mass displacement, states re-examined who could be called a
'[T]he deep structure of anarchy [is] cultural or ideational rather
than material . . . [O]nce understood this way, we can see that
the logic of anarchy can vary . . . [D]ifferent cultures of anarchy
are based on different kinds of roles in terms of which states
represent Self and Other. [T]here are three roles, enemy, rival,
and friend . . . that are constituted by, and constitute, three distinct
macro-level cultures of international politics, Hobbesian,
Lockean, and Kantian, respectively. These cultures have different
rules of engagement, interaction logics, and systemic tendencies
. . . The logic of the Hobbesian anarchy is well known: "the war
of all against all . . ." This is the true self-help system . . . where
actors cannot count on each other for help or even to observe
basic-self-restraint . . . Survival depends solely on military power
. . . Security is deeply competitive, a zero-sum affair . . . Even if
what states really want is security rather than power, their collective
beliefs force them to act as if they are power-seeking . . .
refugee and what assistance they could receive. Because Western
states were worried about having obligations to millions of people
around the world, they defined a refugee as an individual
'outside the country of his origin owing to a well-founded fear of
persecution' as a consequence ofevents that occurred in Europe
before 1 951 . In other words, their definition excluded those
outside Europe who were displaced because of war or natural
disasters or because of events after 1 951 . Objecting to this arbitrary
definition that excluded so many, the new refugee agency,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, working
with aid agencies and permissive states, seized on events outside
Europe and argued that there was no principled reason to deny
to them what was given to Europeans.
Over time the political meaning of 'refugee' came to include
anyone who was forced to flee their home and cross an international
border, and eventually states changed the international
legal meaning to reflect the new political realities. Now, in the
contemporary era, we are likely to call someone a refugee ifthey
are forced to flee their homes because of man-made circumstances
and do not worry if they have crossed an international
border. To capture .these people, we now have a term 'internally
displaced people'. One reason why states wanted to differentiate
'statutory' refugees from internally-displaced people is because
they have little interest in extending their international legal
obligations to millions of people, and do not want to become
too involved in the domestic affairs of other states. Still, the concept
of refugees has expanded impressively over the last 1 00
years, and the result is that there are millions of people who are
now entitled to forms of assistance that are a matter of life and
death.
Theory applied
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The Lockean culture has a different logic . . . because it is based
on a different role structure, rivalry rather than enmity . . . Like
enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and
Other with respect to violence, but these representations are less
threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if
they recognize their sovereignty, their life and liberty, as a right,
and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them . . . Unlike
friends, however, the recognition among rivals does riot extend
to the right to be free from violence in disputes. The Kantian culture
is based on a role structure of friendship . . . within which
states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1 ) disputes
will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of nonviolence);
and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any
one is threatened by a third party.'
(Wendt 1999: 43, 279, 251, 298-9)
Constructivists also examine how actors make their
activities meaningful. Following Max Weber's (1949:
81) insight that 'we are cultural beings with the capacity
and the will to take a deliberate attitude toward
the world and to lend it significance', constructivists
attempt to recover the meanings that actors give
to their practices and the objects that they construct.
These derive not from private beliefs but rather from
culture. In contrast to the rationalist presumption that
culture, at most, constrains action, constructivists
argue that culture informs the meanings that people
give to their action. Sometimes constructivists have
presumed that such meanings derive from a hardened
culture. But because culture is fractured and because
society comprises different interpretations of what is
meaningful activity, scholars need to consider these
cultural fault lines and treat the fixing of meanings as
an accomplishment that is the essence ofpolitics. Some
of the most important debates in world politics are
about how to define particular activities. Development,
human rights, security, humanitarian intervention,
sovereignty are all important orienting concepts that
can have any number ofmeanings. States and non-state
actors have rival interpretations of the meanings of
these concepts and will fight to try to have their preferred
meaning collectively accepted.
The very fact that these meanings are fixed through
politics, and that once these meanings are fixed they
have consequences for the ability of people to determine
their fates, suggests an alternative way of thinking
about power. Most international relations theorists
treat power as the ability ofone state to compel another
Chapter 1 0 Social constructivism
state to do what it otherwise would not, and tend to
focus on the material technologies, such as military
firepower and economic statecraft, which have this persuasive
effect. Constructivists have offered two important
additions to this view ofpower. The forces ofpower
go beyond the material; they also can be ideational
(Barnett and Duvall 2005). Consider the issue of legitimacy.
States, including great powers, crave legitimacy,
the belief that they are acting according to and pursuing
the values of the broader international community.
There is a direct relationship between their legitimacy
and the costs ofa course ofaction: the greater the legitimacy,
the easier time they will have convincing others
to cooperate with their policies; the less the legitimacy,
the more costly the action. This means, then, that even
great powers will frequently feel the need to alter their
policies in order to be viewed as legitimate-or bear
the consequences. Further evidence ofthe constraining
power of legitimacy is offered by the tactic of 'naming
and shaming' by human rights activists. If states did
not care about their reputation and the perception that
they were acting in a manner consistent with prevailing
international standards, then this tactic would have
little visible impact; it is only because law-breaking
governments want to be perceived as acting in a manner
consistent with international norms that they can
be taunted into changing their conduct.
Moreover, the effects of power go beyond the ability
to change behaviour. Power also includes how knowledge,
the fixing of meanings, and the construction
of identities allocate differential rewards and capacities.
If development is defined as per capita income,
Box 1 0.2 Charli Carpenter on the effects of gender on the lives of individuals
'International agencies mandated with the protection of waraffected
civilians generally aim to provide protection in a neutral
manner, but when necessary they prioritize the protection
of the "especially vulnerable." According to professional standards
recently articulated by the International Committee for the
Red Cross, "special attention by organizations for specific groups
should be determined on the basis ofan assessment oftheir needs
and vulnerability as well as the risks to which they are exposed."
If adult men are most likely to lose their lives directly as a result
ofthe fall of a besieged town, one would expect that, given these
standards, such agencies would emphasize protection of civilian
men in areas under siege by armed forces. Nonetheless, in
places where civilians have been evacuated from besieged areas
in an effort to save lives, it is typically women, children, and the
elderly who have composed the evacuee population . . . While
in principle all civilians are to be protected on the basis of their
actions and social roles, in practice only certain categories of
population (women, elderly, sick, and disabled)are presumed to
be civilians regardless of context . . . Thus . . . gender is encoded
within the parameters ofthe immunity norm: while in principle
the "innocent civilian" may include other groups, such as adult
men, the presumption that women and children are innocents,
whereas adult men may not be means that "women and children"
signifies "civilian" in awaythat "unarmed adult male" does
not . . . Similarly, gender beliefs areembedded in . . . the concept
of "especially vulnerable populations" . . . In this context it never
would have occurred to protection agencies to evacuate men
and boys first, even iftheyhad had thechance.'
(Carpenter2003: 662, 671, 673-4)
• M I C H A E L B A R N ETT
then some actors, namely states, and some activities,
namely industrialization, are privileged; however, if
development is defined as basic needs met, then other
actors, namely peasants and women, gain voice, and
other activities, namely small-scale agricultural initiatives
and cottage industries, are visible. International
humanitarian law tends to assume that 'combatants'
are men and 'civilians' are women, children, and the
elderly; consequently, as the discussion of the Bosnian
civil war illustrates, men and women might be differentially
protected by the laws ofwar (see Box 10.2).
Although there is tremendous debate among constructivists
over whether and how they are committed
to social science, there is some common ground. To
begin with, they reject the unity of science thesis-that
the methods of the natural sciences are appropriate for
understanding the social world. Instead, they argue that
the objects ofthe natural world and the social world are
different in one crucial respect: in the social world the
subjectknows herself, through reflection on her actions,
as a subject not simply of experience but of intentional
action as well. Humans reflect on their experiences and
use these experiences to inform their reasons for their
behaviour. Atoms do not. What necessitates a human
science, therefore, is the need to understand how individuals
give significance and meaning to their actions.
Only then will we be able to explain human action.
Consequently, the human sciences require methods
that can capture the interpretations that actors bring
to their activities. Max Weber, a founding figure ofthis
approach, advocated that scholars employ verstehen
to recreate how people understand and interpret the
world. To do so, scholars need to exhibit empathy, to
locate the practice within the collectivity so that one
knows how this practice or activity counts, and to unify
these individual experiences into objectively, though
time-bound, explanations (Ruggie 1998: 860).
Most constructivists remain committed to causality
and explanation, but insist on a definition of causality
and explanation that is frequently accepted by many
IR scholars. A highly popular view of causality is that
independent and dependent variables are unrelated
and that a cause exists when the movement ofone variable
precedes and is responsible for the movement of
another. Constructivists, though, add that structures
can have a causal impact because they make possible
certain kinds of behaviour, and thus generate certain
tendencies in the international system. Sovereignty
does not cause states with certain capacities; instead,
it produces them and invests them with capacities that
make possible certain kinds of behaviours. Being a
sovereign state, after all, means that states have certain
rights and privileges that other actors in world politics
do not. States are permitted to use violence (though
within defined limits) while non-state actors that use
violence are, by definition, terrorists. Knowing something
about the structure, therefore, does important
causal work. Constructivists also are committed to
explanatory theory, but reject the idea that explanation
requires the discovery oftimeless laws. In fact, it is
virtually impossible to find such laws in international
politics. The reason for their absence is not because of
some odd characteristic of international politics: this
elusiveness exists for all the human sciences. As Karl
Popper observed, the search for timeless laws in the
human sciences will be forever elusive because of the
ability of humans to accumulate knowledge of their
activities, to reflect on their practices and acquire
new knowledge, and to change their practices as a
consequence. Accordingly, constructivists reject the
search for laws in favour of contingent generalizations
(Price and Reus-Smit 1998). Because of their interest
in uncovering meaning and discovering contingent
generalizations, constructivists have used a grab-bag
of methods, including statistical models, game theory,
rich case studies, and ethnography.
• Constructivists are concerned with human consciousness
and knowledge, treat ideas as structural factors that
influence how actors interpret the world, consider the
dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as
a consequence of how actors interpret their material
reality, and are interested in how agents produce structures
and how structures produce agents.
• Regulative and constitutive norms shape what actors do,
but only constitutive norms shape the identity and actors
of states and what counts as legitimate behaviour.
• Although the meanings that actors bring to their activities
are shaped by the underlying culture, meanings are not
always fixed and the fixing of meaning is a central feature
of politics.
• Social construction denaturalizes what is taken for granted,
asks questions about the origins of what is now accepted
as a fact of life, and considers the alternative pathways that
might have produced, and can produce, alternative worlds.
• Power is not only the ability of one actor to get another
actor to do what they would not do otherwise, but also the
production of identities, interests, and meanings that limit
the ability ofactors to control their fate.
Chapter 1 0 Social constructivism
•
Constructivism and global change
Constructivism's focus on how the world hangs together,
how normative structures construct the identities and
interests ofactors, and how actors are rule-following,
might seem ideal for explaining why things stay the
same but useless for explaining why things change.
This is hardly true. Constructivism claims that what
exists might not have existed, and need not-inviting
us to think ofalternative worlds and the conditions that
make them more or less possible. Indeed, constructivism
scolded neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism
for their failure to explain contemporary global
transformations. The Peace of Westphalia helped to
establish sovereignty and the norm ofnon-interference,
but in recent decades various processes have worked
against the principle of non-interference and suggested
how state sovereignty is conditional on how states treat
their populations-best known as a responsibility to
protect. World orders are created and sustained not
only by great power preferences but also by changing ,
understandings of what constitutes a legitimate international
order. Until the Second World War, the idea
of a world organized around empires was hardly illegitimate;
now it is. One of today's most pressing and
impressive issues concerning global change is the 'end
of history' and the apparent homogenization of world
politics-that is, the tendency of states to organize their
domestic and international lives in similar ways, and
the growing acceptance of certain international norms
for defining the good life and how to get there. In the
rest of this section, I explore three concepts that figure
centrally in such discussions-diffusion, socialization,
and the internationalization and institutionalization of
norms.
A central theme in any discussion of global change
is diffusion. Stories about diffusion concern how particular
models, practices, norms, strategies, or beliefs
spread within a population. Constructivists have
highlighted two important issues. One is institutional
isomorphism, which observes that those organizations
that share the same environment will, over time,
resemble each other. In other words, if once there was
a diversity of models within the population, over time
that diversity yields to conformity and convergence
around a single model. There used to be various ways to
organize state structures, economic activity, free trade
agreements, and on and on. But now the world is organized
around the nation-state, states favour democratic
forms ofgovernance and market economies, and most
international organizations have a multilateral form.
It is possible that the reason for this convergence is
that states now realize that some institutions are just
superior to others. An additional possibility is that
states look alike because they want acceptance, legitimacy,
and status. For instance, one explanation for
the recent wave of democratization and elections is
that states now accept that democratic elections are a
more efficient and superior way to organize politics; it
also could be, though, that lots of states have decided
to turn democratic and run elections not because they
were persuaded that it would be more efficient, but
rather because they wanted to be viewed as part of the
'modern world' and receive the benefits associated with
being a legitimate state.
How do things diffuse? Why are they accepted in
new places? One factor is coercion. Colonialism and
great power imposition figured centrally in the spread
of capitalism. Another factor is strategic competition.
. Heated rivals are likely to adopt similar weapons systems
to try to stay even on the military battlefield. States
also will adopt similar ideas and organizations for at
least four other reasons. Formal and informal pressures
can cause states to adopt similar ideas because doing
so will bring them resources they need. States want
resources, and to attract these resources they will adopt
and reform their institutions to signal to various communities
that they are part of the club and are utilizing
'modern' techniques. In other words, they value these
new institutions not because they truly believe that
they are superior, but rather because they are symbols
that will attract resources. Eastern European countries
seeking entry into the European Union adopted
various reforms not only because they believed that
they are superior but also because they are the price of
admission.
Also, during periods of uncertainty, when states are
unsure of how to address existing challenges, they are
likely to adopt those models that are perceived as successful
or legitimate. Political candidates in newly
democratizing countries reorganize their party and
campaign organizations in order to increase their prospects
of electoral victory. To that end, they draw from
models of success, largely from the American context,
not necessarily because they have evidence that the
American campaign model is truly better, but rather
M I C H A E L B A R N ETT
because it appears modern, sophisticated, and superior.
Furthermore, frequently states adopt particular models
because of their symbolic standing. Many Third World
governments have acquired very expensive weapons
systems that have very little military value because they
convey to others that they are sophisticates and are a part
of the 'club'. Iran's nuclear ambitions might owe to its
desire for regional dominance, but it could also be that it
wants to own this ultimate status symbol. Finally, professional
associations and expert communities also diffuse
organizational models. Most associations have established
techniques, codes of conduct, and methodologies
for determining how to confront challenges in their
area of expertise. They learn these techniques through
informal interactions and in formal settings such as in
universities. Once these standards are established, they
become the 'industry standard' and the accepted way of
addressing problems in an area. Part of the job of professional
associations and expert networks is to communicate
these standards to others; doing so makes them
agents of diffusion. Economists, lawyers, military officials,
arms control experts, and others diffuse practices,
standards, and models through networks and associations.
If the American way of campaigning is becoming
increasingly accepted around the world, it is in part due
to a new class of professional campaign consultants that
have converged around a set of accepted techniques and
are ready to peddle their wares to willing customers.
In their discussion of changing identities and interests,
constructivists have also employed the concept of
socialization. How can we explain how states change so
that they come to identify with the identities, interests,
and manners of the existing members of the club, and,
accordingly, change their behaviour so that it is consistent
with those of the group? According to Alistair
Iain Johnston (2008), the place to look is the intimate
relations between states within international institutions
and organizations. Specifically, he explores the
possibility that China changed its security policies over
the last two decades because of socialization processes
contained in various multilateral forums. Furthermore,
he argues that socialization can be produced by several
mechanisms: by mimicking, when state officials face
tremendous uncertainty and decide that the best way to
proceed is to adopt the practices that seem to have served
others well; social influence, when state officials aspire
to status within
·
the existing group and are sensitive
to signs of approval and disapproval; and persuasion,
when state officials are convinced by the superiority of
new ways of thinking about the world. Consistent with
the earlier comment that we should look for ways in
which constructivism and rationalchoice are both competing
and complementary explanations of state behaviour,
Johnston argues that some paths to socialization
are closer to what rationalists have in mind, especially
as they emphasize the costs and benefits of action, and
some are closer to what constructivists have in mind,
especially as they emphasize the desire to be accepted by
the broader community and to show the ability to learn.
Discussions of diffusion and socialization also draw
attention to the internationalization of norms. Norms
are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with
a given identity. Norms of humanitarianism, citizenship,
military intervention, human rights, trade, arms
control, and the environment not only regulate what
states do, they can also be connected to their identities
and are thus expressive of how they define themselves
and their interests. Norms constrain behaviour
because actors are worried about costs and because of
a sense of self. 'Civilized' states are expected to avoid
settling their differences through violence, not because
war might not pay but rather because it violates how
'civilized' states are expected to act. Human rights
activists aspire to reduce human rights violations not
only by 'naming and shaming' those who violate these
rights but also by persuading potential violators that
the observation of human rights is tied to their identity
as a modern, responsible state. The domestic debates on
the USA's treatment of 'enemy combatants' concerned
not only whether torture worked but also whether it is a
legitimate practice for civilized states.
These expectations ofwhat constitutes properbehaviour
can diffuse across the population to the point that
they are taken for granted. Norms, therefore, do not
simply erupt but rather evolve through a political process.
A central issue, therefore, is the internationalization
and institutionalization of norms, or what is now
called the life cycle of norms (see Box 10.3).
Although many international norms have a takenfor-granted
quality, they have to come from somewhere,
and their path to acceptance is nearly always
rough and rocky. Although most states now recognize
that prisoners of war have certain rights and cannot
be subjected to summary executions on the battlefield,
this was not always the case. These rights originated
with the emergence of international humanitarian law
in the late nineteenth century, and then slowly spread
and became increasingly accepted over the next several
decades in response to considerable debate regarding
how to minimize the horrors of war. Now most states
Norm emergence
'This stage is typified by persuasion by norm entrepreneurs [who]
attempt to convince a critical mass of states . . . to embrace new
norms. Norm entrepreneurs call attention to issues or even
"create" issues by using language that names, interprets, and
dramatizes them.' Norm entrepreneurs attempt to establish
'frames . . . that resonate with broader public understandings and
are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding
issues'. Norm entrepreneurs need a launching pad to promote
their norms, and will frequently work from non-governmental
organizations and with international organizations and states. 'In
most cases for an emergent norm to reach a threshold and move
toward the second stage, it must become institutionalized in specific
sets of international rules and organizations . . . After norm
entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass ofstates to become
norm leaders and adopt new norms . . . the norm reaches a critical
threshold or tipping point.'
Norm cascade
'The second stage is characterized more by a dynamic of imitation
as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to
accept that prisoners of war have rights, even if those
rights are not fully observed. Several decades ago many
scholars and jurists objected to the very idea ofhumanitarian
intervention because it violated sovereignty's
principle of non-interference and allowed great powers
to try to become sheep in wolves' clothing. Over the last
fifteen years, though, there has been a growing acceptance
of humanitarian intervention and a 'responsibility
to protect'-when states are unable or unwilling
to protect their citizens, then the international community
inherits that responsibility. This revolutionary
concept emerged through fits and starts, in response
to tragedies such as Rwanda and propelled by various
states and humanitarian organizations.
Among the various consequences ofinstitutional isomorphism
and the internationalization of norms, three
are noteworthy. There used to be a myriad of ways to
organize human activities, but that diversity has slowly
but impressively yielded to conformity. Yet just because
states look alike does not mean that they act alike. After
all, manystates gravitate towards particular models not
because they really think that the model is better but
in order to improve their legitimacy. These states, then,
can be expected to act in ways that are inconsistent with
the expectations of the model. For instance, if governments
adopt democratic forms of governance and elections
solely for symbolic reasons, then we should expect
Chapter 1 0 Social constructivism
become norm followers. The exact motivation for this second
stage where the norm "cascades"through the rest ofthe population
(in this case, states) may vary, but . . . a combination of pressure
forconformity, desireto enhance international legitimation,
and thedesire ofstateleaders toenhancetheir self-esteem facilitate
norm cascades.'These processes can be likened to socialization.
'To the degreethatstates and state elites fashion a political
self or identity in relation to the international community, the
concept of socialization suggests that the cumulative effect of
many countries in a region adopting new norms' is akin to peer
pressure.
Norm internalization
The third stage is 'norm internalization . . . Norms acquire a takenfor-granted
quality and are no longer a matter of . . . debate' and
thus are automatically honoured. 'For example, few people today
discuss whether women should be allowed to vote, whether slavery
is useful, or whether medical personnel should be granted
immunity during war.'
(Adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 894-905)
the presence of democratic institutions to exist alongside
authoritarian and illiberal practices. There is also
a deepening sense of an 'international community'. The
internationalization of norms suggests that actors are
increasingly accepting standards of behaviour because
they are connected to a sense of self that is tied to the
international community. These norms, in other words,
are bound up with the values ofthat community. To the
extent that these values are shared, it becomes possible
to speak of an international community. A third consequence
is the presence of power even within an international
community. Whose vision of international
community is being constructed? Diffusion rarely goes
from the Third World to the West; instead, it travels from
the West to the Third World. The international society
ofstates began as a European society and then expanded
outward; the internationalization of this society and its
norms shaped the identities and foreign policy practices
of new members. In other words, the convergence on
similar models, the internationalization of norms, and
the possible emergence of an international community
should not be mistaken for a world without power and
hierarchy. In general, the constructivist concern with
international diffusion and the internationalization of
norms touches centrally on global change because ofthe
interest in a world in motion and transformation (see
Box 10.4).
M I C H A E L B A R N ETT
Agent-structure problem: the problem is howtothinkabout
the relationship between agents and structures. One view is that
agents are born with already formed identities and interests and
then treat other actors and the broad structure thattheir interactions
produce as a constraint on their interests. But this suggests
that actors are pre-social to the extent thatthere is littleinterest in
their identities or possibilitythat they mightchangetheir interests
through their interactions withothers. Anotherview is totreatthe
structure not as a constraint but ratheras constitutingthe actors
themselves. Yet this might treat agents as cultural dupes because
they are nothing more than artefacts of that structure. The proposed
solution to the agent-structure problem istotryand find a
wayto understand how agents and structures constitute each other.
Constructivism: an approach to international politics that
concerns itself with the centrality of ideas and human consciousness;
stresses a holistic and idealist view of structures; and how
the structure constructs the actors' identities and interests, how
their interaction is organized and constrained by that structure,
and how their very interaction serves to either reproduce or
transform that structure.
· Holism: the view that structures cannot be decomposed into
the individual units and their interactions because structures are
more than the sum of their parts and are irreducibly social. The
effects of structures, moreover, go beyond merely constraining
the actors but also construct them.
Idealism: although often associated with the claim that it is
possible to create a world of peace, idealism as a social theory
argues that the most fundamental feature of society is social
consciousness. Ideas shape how we see ourselves and our interests,
the knowledge that we use to categorize and understand
the world, the beliefs we have of others, and the possible and
impossible solutions to challenges and threats. Idealism does not
disregard material forces such as technology, but instead
·
claims
that the meanings and consequences of these material forces are
not given by nature but rather driven by human interpretations.
Identity: the understanding of the self in relationship to
an 'other'. Identities are social and thus are always formed in
• The recognition that the world is socially constructed means
that constructivists can investigate global change and
transformation.
• A key issue in any study of global change is diffusion,
captured by the concern with institutional isomorphism and
the life cycle of norms.
• Although diffusion sometimes occursbecauseoftheview
that the model is superior, frequentlyactorsadopta model
relationship to others. Constructivists generally hold that identities
shape interests; we cannot know what we want unless we
know who we are. Because identities are social and are produced
through interactions, they can change.
Individualism: the view that structures can be reduced to the
aggregation of individuals and their interactions. International
relations theories that subscribe to individualism assume the
nature of the units and their interests, usually states and the
pursuit of power or wealth, and then examine how the broad
structure, usually the distribution of power, constrains how states
can act and generates certain patterns in international politics.
I ndividualism stands in contrast to holism.
Materialism: the view that material forces, including technology,
are the bedrock of society. For International Relations
scholars, this leads to forms of technological determinism or the
distribution of military power for understanding the state's for-
·
eign policy and patterns of international politics.
Normative structure: international relations theory traditionally
defines structure in material terms, such as the distribution
of power, and then treats structure as a constraint on
actors. In contrast to a materialist structure, a normative structure
includes the collectively held ideas such as knowledge, rules,
beliefs, and norms that not only constrain actors-they also construct
categories of meaning, constitute their identities and interests,
and define standards of appropriate conduct. Critical here
is the concept of a norm, a standard of appropriate behaviour
for actors with a given identity. Actors adhere to norms not only
because of benefits and costs for doing so, but also because they
are related to a sense of self.
Rational choice: an approach that emphasizes how actors
attempt to maximize their interests, and how they attempt to
select the most efficient means to achieve those interests, and
endeavours to explain collective outcomes by virtue of the
attempt by actors to maximize their preferences under a set
of constraints. Deriving largely from economic theorizing, the
rational choice approach to politics and international politics has
been immensely influential and applied to a range of issues.
either because of external pressures or because of its
symbolic legitimacy.
• Institutional isomorphism and the internationalization of
norms raise issues of growing homogeneity in world politics,
a deepening international community, and socialization
processes.
Chapter 1 0 Social constructivism
�·
Conclusion
This chapter surveyed the global-historical, intellectual,
and disciplinary forces that made constructivism
a particularly attractive way of thinking about international
politics, whose continuities and transformations
it invites students to imagine. It explores why the
world is organized the way it is, considers the different
factors that shape the durable forms of world politics,
and seeks alternative worlds. In doing so, it challenges
received wisdoms and opens up new lines of enquiry.
Although many in the discipline treated as strange the
claim that ideas can shape how the world works, in fact
what is strange is a view of a world devoid of ideas.
After all, is it even possible to imagine such a world?
What would it look like? Is it even possible to imagine
a world driven only by materialist forces? What would
it look like?
Constructivism challenged the discipline's mainstream
on its own terms and on issues that were at the
heart of its research agenda. Its success has sometimes
led to the false impression that constructivism is a substantive
theory and not the social theory that it is. As
such, it is both much more and much less than meets
the eye. It is much less because it is not properly a theory
that can be viewed as a rival to many ofthe theories
in this volume. It offers no predictions about enduring
Questions
regularities or tendencies in world politics. Instead, it
suggests how to investigate them. Consequently, it is
much more than meets the eye because it offers alternative
ways of thinking about a range of concepts and
issues, including power, alliance formation, war termination,
military intervention, the liberal peace, and
international organizations.
What of the future of constructivism? It depends
on which version of constructivism we are discussing.
Constructivists generally accept certain commitments,
including idealism, holism, and an interest in the relationship
between agents and structures. They also
accept certain basic claims, such as the social construction
of reality, the existence and importance of social
facts, the constitution of actors' identities, interests,
and subjectivities, and the importance of recovering
the meaning that actors give to their activities. But they
also exhibit tremendous differences. Although sometimes
these disagreements can appear to derive from
academic posturing, the search for status, and the narcissism
of minor differences, in fact there also can be
much at stake, as suggested in Chapter ll. These differences
will exist as long as constructivism exists. This is
healthy because it will guard against complacency and
enrich our understanding ofthe world.
What were the silences of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism?
2 What is the core of constructivism?
3 Do you find constructivism a useful approach for thinking about world politics?
4 Do you agree that we should try to understand how actors make meaningful their
behaviour in world politics? Or is it enough to examine behaviour?
5 How are meanings fixed in world politics?
6 What sort of relationship can exist between rational choice and constructivism?
7 What do you think are the core issues for the study ofglobal change, and how does
constructivism help you address those issues? Alternatively, how does a constructivist
framework help you identify new issues that you had not previously considered?
8 Does it make sense to think about states being socialized, as if they were individuals?
9 How does the concept of diffusion help you understand why and how the world has
changed?
1 0 Does the internationalization and institutionalization of norms imply some notion of
progress?
M I C H A E L B A R N ETT
Further Reading
Adler, E. {2003), 'Constructivism', in W. Carlneas, B. Simmons, and T. Risse {eds), Handbook of
International Relations {Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Reviews the origins and fundamentals of
constructivism and its relationship to existing theories of international politics.
Barnett, M. {l 998), Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order {New York:
Columbia University Press). Examines how Arab leaders played the game of Arab politics
and, in doing so, transformed the very nature ofArab politics. An example of how
constructivists might think about how strategic action is shaped by a normative structure.
Fearon, j., and Wendt, A. {2003), 'Rationalism vs. Constructivism', in W. Carlneas, B. Simmons,
and T. Risse {eds), Handbook ofInternational Relations {Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Surveys
how rational choice and constructivism overlap.
Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. {1 999), 'International Norms and Political Change', in P.
Katzenstein et al. {eds), Explorations and Controversies in World Politics {Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press).
-- -- {2001 ), 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in I nternational Relations
and Comparative Politics', Annual Review ofPolitical Science, 4(1 ): 391 -41 6. An insightful
account of constructivism's insights.
Hollis, M., and Smith, S. {l 990), Explaining and Understanding International Relations {New
York: Oxford University Press). An exceptionally clear exposition of the contrast between a
conception of world politics driven by self-interested action and a conception informed by
rules and interpretive methods.
Johnston, A. I. {2008), Social States: China in International Institutions, 1 980-2000 {Princeton,
Nj: Princeton University Press). A terrific introduction to the alternative ways to think about
the socialization of states.
Katzenstein, P. {ed.) {1 996), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University
Press). Explores how identities and norms shape state interests in a range of security areas.
Price, R. {ed.) {2008), Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics {Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press). Constructivist scholars gather to consider the relationship between ethics
and various outcomes in world affairs.
Wendt, A. {1 999), A Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press). The 'bible' of modern constructivism.
Online Resource Centre
Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book to access more learning
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