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Critical Studies on Security
ISSN: 2162-4887 (Print) 2162-4909 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20
The environment and emancipation in critical
security studies: the case of the Canadian Arctic
Cameron Harrington & Emma Lecavalier
To cite this article: Cameron Harrington & Emma Lecavalier (2014) The environment and
emancipation in critical security studies: the case of the Canadian Arctic, Critical Studies on
Security, 2:1, 105-119, DOI: 10.1080/21624887.2013.856197
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2013.856197
Published online: 17 Apr 2014.
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The environment and emancipation in critical security studies:
the case of the Canadian Arctic
Cameron Harringtona,
* and Emma Lecavalierb
a
Department of Political Science, Western University, London, Canada; b
Department of Politics
and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
The traditionally dominant discourse of The Great White North views Canada as a land
of vast wilderness and abundant resources. However, this discourse excludes growing
environmental risk and prevalent insecurity felt by vulnerable populations in Canadian
society, namely indigenous groups whose livelihoods are deeply dependent upon their
relationship with their environments. The effect of the relationship between the
physical environment and conceptions of security can contribute to a deeper understanding
of traditional and critical accounts of security. This article investigates traditional
Canadian environmental security discourses and alternative environmental
security discourses promoted by Arctic Inuit groups. It examines how these discourses
impact the analytic and normative goals of critical security studies and interprets the
way in which they affect the concept of emancipation. It argues that Canadian security
is co-constituted with its understanding of the environment, and that the Canadian case
compels an expansion of the notion of the referent object of security to include the
environment – a change which throws it into contrast with other schools of critical
security, whose visions of emancipation might not, as currently theorized, be equipped
to overcome these phenomena.
Keywords: Arctic; Canada; critical security studies; discourse; emancipation; environmental
security; indigenous security
Introduction
Canadian security has often been shaped and defined by its relationship with the natural
environment. While most studies examining Canadian security identity focus on the
country’s relationship with its powerful neighbour to the south, the United States (Byers
2002; Carment, Hampson, and Hillmer 2003; Barry 2007; Barry and Bratt 2008;
Granatstein 2002), its historical relationship with the United Kingdom (Brebner 1945;
Holmes 1966; Buckner 2005), or its position as a member of NATO (Haglund 2000; Avis
2003; Haglund 2011), this article focuses on the role that the natural environment plays in
Canadian security. Little has been written to date that assesses the ideational effects that
perceptions of remoteness and abundance have had on Canadian national security.
Indeed, the size and scope of the country and its natural resource base are a crucial
component for how Canada is constructed, represented, and how its security is comprehended.
One might even look at the first arrival of the European powers to Canada’s
shores as an early illustration of the attempts to control the fertile land, rich fisheries, and
valuable fur (Brown, Crawford, and Campeau 2008, 9). Today, Canada’s natural resources
contribute significantly not only to the country’s economic well-being but also the
*Corresponding author. Email: cdharrin@uwo.ca
Critical Studies on Security, 2014
Vol. 2, No. 1, 105–119, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2013.856197
© 2014 York University
formation and perpetuation of its national identity. Canada is the world’s second largest
country in total area, it holds the world’s third largest supply of renewable freshwater
(FAO 2003), and it derives 11.5% of its GDP from its natural resources (Natural
Resources Canada 2011, 1). The area north of the Arctic Circle is said to contain about
30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil (Gautier
et al. 2009). The enormity of the country and the richness of its resource base are
consistently invoked as emblematic of Canada’s past and undoubtedly its future.
The effects of the environment upon conceptions of Canadian security are illustrative
of the ways in which security becomes constructed. These constructions range from
traditional, statist approaches that highlight national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
instrumental control of the environment, particularly in the Arctic region,1
to non-statist
approaches from varied indigenous groups that promote well-being, holistic integration of
the human and non-human, and the protection of culture, community, and history. All
told, examining the construction of environmental security in Canada can advance our
understanding of the ways in which the natural environment works as a crucial component
of security.
Understanding the role of the environment in constructing security can impact the
analytic and normative goals of critical security studies. This article draws from the
paradigmatic approach to the study of security developed by scholars at the University
of Wales – Aberystwyth. The ‘Welsh School’ of security offers one of the most prominent
critiques of traditional security and offers a noble call for the re-ordering of security along
progressive, ethical lines. It rejects state-centrism in international security, arguing instead
that the individual should be the referent object to be secured. These scholars, most
notably Ken Booth (2007) and Richard Wyn Jones (1999) offer a vision of security as
emancipation that ‘seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them
carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others.
[Emphasis in original]’ (Booth 2007, 110). This article utilizes many of the central
components of the Welsh School, most notably its commitment to critiquing traditional
analytical allegiances to state-centrism, and its normative pursuit of emancipation as a
guide in security theory and practice. The concept of emancipation is able to contribute
substantially to understandings of environmental security because it is based upon a selfconscious
critique of existing social paradigms (the human, social, economic, and political
institutional arrangements) that contribute to human and ecological suffering (Shepherd
2012, 203). This approach is helpful when thinking about and dealing with integrated and
expanding environmental hazards that disproportionately affect the most vulnerable
populations. Conversely, focusing on the environment can contribute to a deeper and
more nuanced understanding of the concept of emancipation in critical security studies.
That said, we come to question whether the anthropocentric and individualistic focus of
emancipation is suitable in an age of global environmental change.
As this article will show, the environment is itself a crucial component of security
identity. In this interpretation, an understanding of the environment both constructs, and is
constructed by, ideas about security. In other words, Canadian security is co-constituted
with its understanding of the environment. This compels an expansion of the notion of the
referent object of security to include the environment – a change which throws it into
contrast with the Welsh School, whose vision of emancipation might not, as currently
theorized, be equipped to overcome these phenomena.
This article proceeds in three sections. The first section highlights the traditional ways
that environmental discourses have been appropriated and articulated by dominant actors
in Canada.2
It focuses on the familiar trope of Canada as The Great White North, as
106 C. Harrington and E. Lecavalier
perpetuated in official government discourse, to argue that the environment conditions
Canadian national security, and vice versa: specific security appellations condition understandings
of the Canadian environment, specifically in the Arctic region.
The second section highlights alternative security discourses, perpetuated by Arctic
indigenous groups that challenge the naturalization of Canada as The Great White North.
These discourses, articulated by a plurality of indigenous voices, highlight the destructive
implications of this narrative by drawing attention to marginalized groups and security
narratives excluded by the hegemonic discourse. In this article, a focus on one alternative
strand of voices – the Inuit peoples of Arctic Canada – is chosen from this wider
conversation. The Inuit peoples are the focus not only due to their Arctic geography,
but also for the ‘united voice’ with which these diverse groups and peoples speak, as
permanent participants on the Arctic Council through the Inuit Circumpolar Council
(Arctic Council 2011). Of course, as indigenous scholars often emphasize, it is crucial
to recognize the constructed nature of the term ‘indigenous’, and note that the peoples
within this category are often more different from one another than similar (Smith 1999,
7). That said, the case of the Inuit peoples, unified under an institutional banner and
concentrated within the Arctic geographic space, is a rare chance to better understand a
common expression of Arctic security wholly dissimilar to that of The Great White North.
The third and final section assesses the role of the environment in understanding
security. The Canadian context can offer a vivid demonstration of the multiple ways in
which the environment helps construct security and strengthens the analytic and normative
project of critical security studies. In particular, the avowed normative goal of
emancipation inherent within the Welsh School will be better positioned if it more
thoroughly incorporates ecological awareness into its rubric. It is at the intersection of
the environment, security, and emancipation where Canadian critical security approaches
are well positioned to advance the field analytically and normatively.
Traditional security and The Great White North
This section overviews the ways in which traditional security interpretations in Canada
have been shaped through a specific interpretation of the environment, focusing on the
Arctic region. In particular, the enduring narrative of The Great White North has been
utilized both to promote Canadian strength as well as to highlight vulnerabilities and
threats. These interpretations clearly link the natural environment with survival and
stability, two core concerns of traditional security studies. As subsequent sections will
show, however, such visions often obscure and marginalize alternative security discourses
that might provide different understandings of the ways in which the environment can
impact the study of security.
Traditional approaches to security generally focus on protection from perceived threats
through the use of power. This translates to the belief that studies of security should
conform to the ‘real side of politics;’ that is, as policy action in an unchanging international
sphere, where states are the only significant actors and their relations are naturalized
because they are structurally pre-determined (Hutchings 1999, 28). As Sinclair (1996, 6)
points out, traditional theory ‘assumes the functional coherence of existing phenomena’,
meaning that there is little interest on the part of analysts and practitioners to excavate the
meanings and assumptions of discourse or practice. Instead, problems are seen to be
emblematic of various deficiencies between actors, usually a result of misunderstanding,
power disparities, or clashing interests.
Critical Studies on Security 107
Such approaches to environmental security are on vivid display in a Canadian context,
which holds generalizable assumptions about who is to be secured and from what threats.
Evidently, the referent object is the state. The environmental threats that are often highlighted
and reinforced in official and academic discourse are varied, containing both
domestic and foreign elements. They include the struggle to control shipping routes
from a newly opened Northwest Passage (DFAIT 2013b), the need to protect abundant
energy supplies (Senate of Canada 2012), and the potential for environmental activists to
block and/or sabotage government and corporate interests (Public Safety Canada 2011;
Payton 2012; Leahy 2013; Freeze 2013). All told, these traditional interpretations of
environmental security in Canada display continued traction within both historical and
contemporary official discourse. Crucially, they rely upon an understanding of the natural
environment that confirms and abides a homogenous vision of security, whereby the state
is the referent object of protection, and the natural environment exists to be managed,
controlled, exploited, and preserved at the behest of perceived national interests. The
resultant effects are important for not only a deeper understanding of the ways in which
hazards are judged, but also the ways in which the Welsh School stands to benefit from
incorporating an ecological point of view into its programme of emancipatory politics.
There is no greater illustration of the intersubjective construction of Canadian environmental
security than in excavating the familiar trope of Canada as The Great White
North. This narrative is pivotal in the ongoing securitization of the Arctic region in
Canada. The region has persistently been treated as a military object, and as a source of
both pride and vulnerability. It was largely ignored by defence officials until after the
Second World War, when it witnessed a ‘variety of attempts, some relatively minor, others
extraordinarily ambitious, to overcome what was perceived to be an antagonistic environment’
(Lackenbauer and Farish 2007, 923). During the Cold War, Arctic Canada held
important geopolitical significance as a bulwark separating an expansionary Soviet Union
from the North American industrial heartland (Lackenbauer and Farish 2007, 923). In
1946, Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian Ambassador to the United States, published an
article called ‘Canada looks “down north”’, in Foreign Affairs, which outlined a vision of
the Canadian north as the strategic heart of the country, and perhaps even the continent.
He proclaimed that
Canada, like Russia, is looking to the North as a land of the future. The reason is obvious.
The war and the aeroplane have driven home to Canadians the importance of their Northland,
in strategy, in resources, and in communications. We should no longer be deceived by flat
maps and ‘frigid wasteland’ tales of our public school geographies. (Pearson 1946, 638)
For Pearson, and for subsequent Canadian governments, the expansion of sovereign
control over vast swaths of seemingly uncharted, uninhabited land with abundant
resources compelled a heavy emphasis on the ways in which the environment could be
harnessed and utilized for national security.
John Diefenbakers’s election victory in 1958 was largely based on his northern vision
of development. In one of his most oft-cited speeches, he proclaimed:
This national Development Policy will create a new sense of National Purpose and National
Destiny. One Canada! One Canada, wherein Canadians will have preserved to them the
control of their own economic and political destiny. Sir John A. Macdonald gave his life to
this Party. He opened the West. He saw Canada from East to West. I see a new Canada – a
Canada of the North. (Diefenbaker 1958)
108 C. Harrington and E. Lecavalier
Diefenbaker’s northern vision, his ‘roads to resources’ policy, was instrumental in advancing
significant infrastructure projects in the Arctic. Since then, similar sentiments about
Canada’s destiny to the Arctic have retained a high degree of resonance and power for
politicians eager to assert the sovereign duty of Canadian officials to discover, accumulate,
and preserve the riches provided by the abundant resource base, lest they be lost to
competing interests, or left forever untapped.
In contemporary times, the onset of climate change, shifting geopolitical priorities,
and continuing energy needs, has re-activated the security connections with the Arctic.
The region is undergoing a series of significant transformations, which have been
identified by Prime Minister Stephen Harper as a national priority. In 2008, he invoked
the spirit of John Diefenbaker in a major policy address to audiences in Inuvik, Northwest
Territories. He proclaimed that
Prime Minister Diefenbaker is no longer with us, but the geopolitical importance of the Arctic
and Canada's interests in it have never been greater. This is why our government has launched
an ambitious Northern Agenda based on the timeless responsibility imposed by our national
anthem, to keep the True North strong and free …. We will protect the unique and fragile
Arctic ecosystem for the generations yet to come. And of course, we will assert and defend
Canada's sovereignty and security in this region. (Harper 2008)
The three central documents detailing Canada’s current Arctic policy are the 2008 Canada
First Defence Strategy (National Defence [Canada], 2008), the 2009 Northern Strategy
(Indian and Northern Affairs [Canada]), and the 2010 document, Canada’s Arctic Foreign
Policy (DFAIT 2010). Together the three documents represent an aggressive expression of
national sovereignty and security in the far North. The Arctic Foreign Policy proclaims
‘the first and most important pillar towards recognizing the potential of Canada’s Arctic is
the exercise of our sovereignty over the far north’ (DFAIT 2010, 5). Indeed, Prime
Minister Harper declared the protection and promotion of Canadian sovereignty over
the Arctic ‘a non-negotiable priority’ (CBC News 2010). All three documents illustrate
the government’s priorities of ‘exercising sovereignty; promoting economic and social
development; protecting [our] environmental heritage; and improving and devolving
Northern governance’ (Indian and Northern Affairs [Canada] 2009). These priorities
have been reinforced by ongoing security manoeuvres that increase state control over
the farthest reaches of its territory. In the form of material expression, security is being
claimed via the utilization of military ice-breakers; patrol ships; the creation of a new deep
water port in Nanisivik, Nunavut (Harper 2007a); the deployment of military personnel
including the Northern Rangers (Lackenbauer 2004–2005); and the undertaking of joint
military operations with other Arctic countries under Operation Cold Response and
Operation Nanook. As Wilfrid Greaves writes, ‘Canada’s approach to Arctic security
remains preoccupied with traditional, state-centric military threats, despite the fact that all
three documents explicitly specify that no such military threats exist’ (Greaves 2011, 230).
Adding complexity is the fact that, in May 2013, Canada assumed the two-year
Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, the leading intergovernmental body of Arctic
nations. The government’s highlighted priorities include ‘responsible resource development’,
‘safe Arctic shipping’, ‘sustainable circumpolar communities’, and ‘strengthening
the Arctic Council’ (DFAIT, 2013a). These priorities have been identified as part of a
larger strategy to maintain northern control in the face of growing competition for oil and
mineral wealth located in the Arctic. The Chairwoman of the Council, Canadian Health
Minister Leona Aglukkaq proclaimed, ‘We must remember that the Arctic Council was
Critical Studies on Security 109
formed by Northerners, for Northerners, long before the region was of interest to the rest
of the world’ (quoted in Koring 2013).
Effectively, the results are that traditional interpretations of security are being transposed
onto the physical geography of the Arctic region through official Canadian discourse.
In other words, something labelled ‘security’ is being written on the body of the
Earth via discursive and material practices. Recent announcements by Harper have
described government investments in the region as necessary for unlocking the north’s
‘potential’ and the ‘national destiny’ (Harper 2009), for discovering buried resource
‘treasures’ (Harper 2007a), and for managing the vast, seemingly endless ‘frontier’
(Harper 2012).3
The result is that the state has been able to assert traditional means of
control over the natural environment of the far north. Concurrently, the natural environment
conditions Canadian security. Official discourse has frequently incorporated the
region’s ‘remoteness’ into a vision of security where physical enemies and logical
uncertainties are forever lurking and where unfulfilled opportunities abound. Both the
environment and Canadian security itself becomes constructed by mantras of sovereign
control, ownership, and exclusion, which in the face of rapidly increasing climate change
and resultant environmental changes, provides ample contradiction. Harper proclaimed in
2007 that:
Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the arctic. We either
use it or lose it. And make no mistake, this Government intends to use it. Because Canada’s
Arctic is central to our national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it
represents the tremendous potential of our future. (Harper 2007b)
Such statements are reflective of the powerful effects that the environment holds in
traditional security discourse. Government speeches offer lessons on the ways in which
interpretations of the vastness of geography, the spectre of resource abundance, and the
preoccupation with control over nature can stimulate security logics. Lawrence Cannon,
then minister of foreign affairs, proclaimed to a UK audience in 2010 that Canada was an
‘Arctic Nation’, an ‘Arctic power’, and that the ‘Arctic and the North are part of our
national identity’ (Cannon 2010). Such rhetoric effectively demonstrates ‘the ways in
which “The North” is imagined as a space of national pride, belonging, and exploration: a
space that is alternately normalized as a fundamental extension of state territory and
exoticized as a distant wilderness to be conquered’ (Steinberg 2010, 81).
Visions of the environment continue to be deeply implicated in the writing of
Canadian identity and in the operation of Canadian politics. The idea of The Great
White North defines the nation’s security interests – who is to be secured, what way of
life protected. The invocation of The Great White North denotes the natural environment
as an important source of economic value and a salient frame for conceptualizing
international geopolitics.
Remapping the Arctic
Beyond The Great White North, however, alternative security logics do exist and point to
important differences in the relationships between security and the environment. Recent
popular protests and resistance movements across the country may challenge the dominant
imaginings of Canadian security as The Great White North and all its attendant baggage.
Inasmuch as the underlying themes of recent movements such as Idle No More (Wilkins
2013), and against the Keystone XL protests (CBC News 2013) are the protection of
lands, waters, and natural resources, one might begin to identify an alternative narrative,
110 C. Harrington and E. Lecavalier
imbuing new meaning upon the Canadian environmental space and security understandings.
Beyond these high-profile movements, the Inuit peoples of the Arctic region have
also frequently expressed security logics that challenge the hegemonic The Great White
North discourse. All told, while tracing the contours of the environment–security relationship
is central to recognizing the constructed nature of security, it is also crucial to explore
the crags and rifts in the discourse itself as a practice of unearthing what the dominant
narrative has obscured.
By providing a critical reading of the national security vocabulary, this section
challenges the naturalization of Canadian Arctic security as The Great White North,
highlighting the discourse's pernicious implications and drawing attention to the peoples
and narratives omitted from its gaze. The approach to the Canadian north described in the
previous section has two important consequences: first, the exploitative and instrumental
thinking engendered by The Great White North discourse creates new vulnerabilities for
Canadian indigenous peoples. Second, this marginalization is implicated in the silencing
of alternative security discourses emanating from the Arctic like, for instance, Canadian
Inuit peoples. The Great White North discourse effectively writes out the 1,172,790 First
Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada (Statistics Canada 2006). By focusing on a
subset of voices within this population – the Inuit peoples of Inuit Nunaat, stretching from
northern Laborador to the Northwest territories – this section seeks to outline an alternative
Canadian Arctic security. Focusing on the challenges of climate change and
resource extraction, the discussion below seeks to highlight how the processes driving
these changes are at odds with the understandings of nature among Inuit peoples and how
Inuit peoples are struggling to make their particular logic intelligible within the wider
Canadian context. In other words, they are striving to make their particular experiences of
environmental insecurity understood.
According to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), climate change will
acutely affect the Canadian Arctic, with annual mean warming projected to range
between 3°C and 9°C in winter months (ACIA 2005). The myriad consequences of
warming in the Arctic are all too familiar: rising sea levels, a multiplication of insect
activity, and increased vulnerability to air-, water-, and vector-borne diseases (Furgal
and Seguin 2006). These hazards will be compounded by additional changes in Inuit
livelihood. Thinning sea ice in the winter months may jeopardize forms of winter travel
and limit access to wildlife resources (Furgal and Seguin 2006). Moreover, the migratory
patterns of food sources like caribou and geese may change. For the many Inuit
peoples who engage in subsistence activities, these changes are likely to mean
increased food insecurity, and may force these communities to seek inappropriate
food substitutions or expensive alternatives: both options may put Inuit peoples'
cultural live at risk (Wenzel 2009). As one report argues, ‘the contamination of country
food (traditional food sources) raises problems that transcend the usual confines of
public health, and that cannot be resolved simply by health advisors or food substitutions’
(Van Oostdam et al. 1999, 7). Inuit food defines the Inuit way of life and mode of
being (Egede 1995). Practices such as hunting and fishing are not merely instrumental
nutritional practices, but are also culturally important traditions to Inuit peoples as
sources of ‘pride, worth, distinctiveness, and identity’ (Buell 2006, 26). If identity is a
fundamental component of envisioning security – that is, who or what is to be secured –
it is clear that Inuit peoples' food insecurity portends a greater cultural and even
existential threat (Campbell 1992).
In addition to the challenges created by the spectre of climatic change, the extraction
of non-renewable resources in the Arctic adds to the fragility of the social landscape in the
Critical Studies on Security 111
Arctic. Resource extraction increases fears of oil spills and contamination, the loss of
sacred spaces for hunting, trapping and fishing, and disrupts traditional migratory routes
of species such as birds and caribou (Buell 2006). For many Inuit communities, the
resource extraction industries as they currently operate are at odds with their cultural
practices of sustainable and respectful use of the environment (NAHO 2008). At the Third
Session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2004, the
representative from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) argued that thus far, development
projects have failed to take into account indigenous priorities, but that this conflict
was not necessarily predetermined: the ICC representative further noted that
‘Development projects could either help indigenous peoples survive, or destroy them
and their cultural heritage, depending on how they are managed’ (United Nations 2004).
In other words, a more harmonious way of conceptualizing development that does not
come at the expense of indigenous livelihoods is sought. Such conceptualizations are
emblematic of indigenous security alternatives that challenge The Great White North
security discourse.
Inuit leaders and members of the Inuit Circumpolar Council have demonstrated
security alternatives with emancipatory potential. It is useful to examine these alternatives
because they may provide critical security scholars with a deeper appreciation
of the role of the environment in security and can offer a venue for more constructive
thinking about emancipation. In contrast to The Great White North narrative demonstrated
in the previous section, the discourse of the ICC analysed below demonstrates
a belief that the natural world is intrinsically rather than instrumentally important. This
suggests a broader and more profound idea that the environment is as much a source
of identity as it is security. It also demonstrates that the environment is not exogenous
to indigenous life, but is rather a condition of possibility for Canadian indigenous
identity. It thus reflects many of the assumptions of critical security by collapsing the
idea of the security subject as an abstract, detached actor, divorced from the wider
social and natural environments.
A principle goal of the ICC is to develop long-term policies that first and foremost
safeguard the Arctic environment, and as such, many of the ICC's statements and
declarations centre on managing the present and emerging vulnerabilities discussed
above. One of the founding documents of the ICC, the 1991 Principles and Elements
for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy, has the themes of stewardship and sustainability
woven throughout its text, and this informs the Inuit response to the challenges of both
resource extraction and climate change (ICC 1991). These principles emerge from a
community-based and human-centred perspective and they force a reconsideration of
many of the extractive practices promoted in the vision of The Great White North.
Noting the profound implications that rapid resource development has for Inuit peoples
in the Arctic, the 2012 ICC Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit
Nunaat states unequivocally that ‘resource development proposals for Inuit Nunaat must
be assessed holistically, placing human needs at the centre’ (ICC 2012, 3). In other words,
the Declaration demands a reversal of the logic of resource development, beginning with
the health of the community which, as the declaration notes, is predicated upon the health
of the environment. Other declarations implore environmental policy-makers to follow in
the spirit of ‘inoqatigiinneq’, or ‘sharing life’: the 2010 Nuuk Declaration reaffirms the
belief that ‘the respectful sharing of resources, culture, and life itself with others is a
fundamental principle of being Inuit, and is the fabric that holds us together’ (ICC 2010,
1) . As such, extractive practices that undermine the sustainability of resources detract
112 C. Harrington and E. Lecavalier
from this Inuit principle, as they undermine the ability to share resources within and
across generations.
Confronting the adverse effects of climate change, the ICC has also worked to gain a
voice at the negotiations in the post-Kyoto Protocol era. An overarching goal is to argue
for more culturally responsive ways of confronting climate change. The ICC’s
‘Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic’ offers an alternative perspective
on the nature and importance of sovereignty in an era of global environmental
change. It declares, ‘“Sovereignty” is a term that has often been used to refer to the
absolute and independent authority of a community or nation both internally and externally.
Sovereignty is a contested concept, however, and does not have a fixed meaning’
(ICC 2009, 1). The different identifications experienced by Arctic Inuit peoples – as an
indigenous people of the Arctic, as citizens of Arctic states, as indigenous citizens of
Arctic states, and as indigenous citizens of each of the major political subunits of Arctic
states – suggest a need to critically reflect on singular categorizations of sovereignty,
threat, and protection found in the dominant discourses of security such as The Great
White North (Broadhead 2010, 926–927). For Inuit communities struggling to secure a
level of self-determination and control over their lives, territories, cultures, and languages,
the type of sovereignty proclaimed in The Great White North narrative is at odds with a
more holistic and integrated vision of human security intimately tied to the security of the
natural environment.
Another of the innovative approaches articulated by the ICC comes from its 2012
Climate Change Roadmap, which argues for the integration of ‘Two Ways of Knowing’ in
seeking to understand the long-term environmental changes to the Arctic (ICC 2012, 1).
These 'Ways of Knowing' consist of conventional scientific modes of understanding as
well as traditional Inuit ways of knowing. This idea of integrating traditional ecological
knowledge into environmental practices is one of the cornerstones of the ICC's environmental
policies and is a point of considerable value for any critical strategy for Arctic
environmental security.
To an extent, the idea of incorporating indigenous knowledge into environmental
security approaches is not novel. Canadian environmental researchers have approached
the concept of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), with increased alacrity, recognizing
its potential contributions to understanding biological phenomena and the practice of
protecting ecosystems (Berkes 1998; Karst 2010; Paci, Tobin, and Robb 2002). In fact,
this narrative is now so pervasive that TEK is now a required part of all impact assessments
in Canada (Usher 2000). One definition, given by Birkes et al. (2000, 1252) defines
TEK as a ‘cumulative body of knowledge, practice, and belief, evolving by adaptive
processes and handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about the
relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and with their environment’
(1252). However, even within this broad definition there exist important variances
to different peoples and groups (Huntington and Fox 2005, 64).
There are many who suggest the need for scepticism regarding the inclusion of TEK
into modern policy, pointing to the impossibility of ‘harmonizing the needs of economy
and environment within the existing frameworks and institutions’ (Escobar 2008, 281).
Heather Smith and Karyn Sharp concluded in their study of various international environmental
forums that the inclusion of indigenous knowledge has been uneven (Smith and
Sharp 2012). However, as Deborah MacGregor argues, TEK is not a body of knowledge,
but rather a process of ‘coming to know’, suggesting that the inclusion of TEK into public
policy has not been sincere to the epistemological roots of indigenous knowledge
(MacGregor 2004, 390). Rather, the TEK-based approach to the environment utilized
Critical Studies on Security 113
by the ICC is meant to develop ‘ways of knowing’ that lead to ‘freedom of consciousness
and to solidarity with the natural world’ (Battiste and Henderson 1998, 92). In this way,
the discourse utilized by the ICC and the reliance on TEK as a way to understand the
world offers an important emancipatory alternative to traditional practices of environmental
security.
Remapping the environment: a critical approach in Canada
The previous two sections combine to offer significantly different interpretations of
environmental security in Canada. Unsurprisingly, the Canadian government has consistently
employed the language of traditional security to highlight the importance of the
environment, and this is nowhere more apparent than in the Arctic. Conversely, alternative
constructions of security have been articulated by other non-state actors, specifically Inuit
groups who continue to suffer disproportionately than the rest of Canadian society in
terms of health, poverty, and the effects of environmental change.
There are salient conclusions from which to draw in terms of critical approaches to
environmental security. First, in a critical capacity, awareness of the ways in which the
natural environment can be articulated within security discourses can further emancipatory
change, one of the avowed normative goals of the Welsh School of security studies. It
offers tangible examples of ways in which security is pronounced in different contexts, by
different actors. As Matt McDonald points out, these different articulations reflect specific
understandings about ‘who is in need of being secured, from what threats, by what actors,
and through what means’ (McDonald 2013, 49). These basic understandings then are
crucial for conditioning the types of responses utilized in the pursuit of alleviating
perceived insecurity. For various indigenous groups in Canada, including the Inuit in
the Arctic, the environment is a central defining feature of individual security and
community identity. This is an entirely different conception of environmental security
than the version promoted by traditional security discourses. It is unlikely then that the
traditional security practices of resource development, national sovereignty promotion,
and increased surveillance will be accepted by Arctic indigenous groups as legitimate,
effective, or just.
Second, the fundamental opposition between the aforementioned discourses should
compel practitioners to undertake a more profound rethinking of the environment; in
other words, one cannot divorce thinking about the environment from the broader
ethical environmental frameworks in which this knowledge is produced. TEK and a
desire to increase engagement with indigenous knowledge has led to some novel
security analyses from academics, but further work is evidently required (Dalby
2002; Beier 2007).
Third, it is also important to note the significant impacts of the environment itself on
conceptions of security. For critical security scholars to adequately incorporate visions of
the environment into their analyses, they need to take better stock of the ways in which it
is central to conceptions of state security on the one hand, and human health and wellbeing
on the other. This implies a deeper interrogation of the concept of emancipation,
which has received relatively minor attention despite being a central component of critical
security. While critical theory comprises hugely diverse approaches, the linkage between
all of them is the emancipatory intent (Bronner 2002). Ken Booth, the most prominent
theorist of the Welsh School, has conceived of emancipation as ‘the philosophy, theory,
and politics, of inventing humanity’ (Booth 2007, 12). The practical fulfilment of security
as emancipation requires the freeing of individuals from arbitrary structures preventing
114 C. Harrington and E. Lecavalier
them from living as they would otherwise wish (Booth 2007). Its principal characteristics
are that it is radically cosmopolitan, predicated on the rights and needs of the most
vulnerable, and that the means envisaged to achieve or preserve ‘security’ will not deprive
others of it (McDonald 2012). This implies a shift of the referent object from the state to
the individual. Given that individuals’ experiences of security and insecurity are heavily
tied to the overall health of the environment, it is imperative that emancipation be
conceived of in more holistic ways – avoiding the production of anthropocentric analyses
at the expense of deeper ecological appreciations.
The natural environment is central to human well-being, it is essential to emancipation,
and it is a key component of security identities. What this all demonstrates is the
potential for a much broader interest in the security of the environment. The implication
for security studies on the whole is the need for a more holistic understanding of the
environment as a subject in the construction of security – as demonstrated by the narrative
of The Great White North. It also is necessary to see it as a referent object for protection
not only because of the fundamental role the environment plays in constituting indigenous
identity and livelihoods but as an intrinsically valuable entity. In most emancipatory
visions of security, the focus has been on leveraging human potential by breaking through
structural impediments. There has not been a sustained engagement with the ways in
which the environment, central in the construction of security identities, acts as a
structural impediment itself, impacting human potential. Emancipation may indeed be
the best possible hope for becoming, but it needs to better engage ecological frameworks
to fully develop a progressive form of security. There is real danger that by promoting
emancipatory agendas that promote the individual as the heart of security, the environment
is once again positioned as the canvas upon which the human story is painted. This
undermines the inherent value of nature and replicates the anthropocentrism at the heart of
traditional security accounts. Furthermore, the political effects of ignoring the environment
as an intrinsic part of security identity are likely to be the continued marginalization
of individual actors and communities who cannot be divorced from their reliance upon the
environment for the physical, social, and spiritual needs.
Conclusion
Narrative maps can be highly useful in navigating the conceptual terrain of critical
security studies (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). Whether used to navigate the
subject conceptually, temporally, or geographically, maps can be important metaphors for
better understanding the nuances of the academic discipline. Maps construct reality in
specific ways, rendering some issues visible while leaving others invisible (Nunes 2012).
Physical maps of the environment are intrinsically part of the story of security. They
reflect the importance of the land upon the formation of identity and thus the ways in
which security itself is conceived and operationalized. The Canadian context outlined in
this article demonstrates the importance of the natural environment upon security logics –
upon both statist and non-statist approaches. Whether placed within dominant representations
of The Great White North, or in alternative, indigenous representations, like in the
ICC or TEK, the environment works to condition the possible. In this sense, the Canadian
experience demonstrates the importance of incorporating the environment as both a site
for security, and as a site that comprises security. Without deeper acknowledgement of the
role the environment plays in security, the emancipatory project will remain only partially
fulfilled.
Critical Studies on Security 115
Notes
1. The Canadian Arctic is in fact easier to territorially define than other Arctic regions of the
world. The United Nations Arctic Human Development Report adopts 60°N as the general
southern boundary of the Canadian Arctic. This allows for the separation of the three northern
territories from the southern provinces. The Report also includes northern Quebec and Labrador
for reasons relating to the location of jurisdictional or administrative boundaries and the
availability of data (UNDP 2004, 17).
2. Discourse here refers to textual and social processes that combine to condition the way we think
and act in the world (George 1994). Discourses are able to construct social realities by
operationalizing a particular ‘regime of truth’, while excluding other possible identities and
actions. Despite this, dominant discourses may be characterized as ‘unstable grids’, susceptible
to change and demonstrating historical contingency (Milliken 1999, 229–230).
3. It is possible to see recent subtle shifts in Canadian government discourse. A more pointed
focus on northern development initiatives has been utilized at the expense of former appeals to
sovereignty and security. Such shifts though have had little impact on the overall nature of
traditional northern narratives, which continue to avoid discussing the environmental impacts of
security or development (Wingrove 2013).
Notes on contributors
Cameron Harrington is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Western
University. His PhD thesis constructs a critical theory of water security. In 2014, he will hold a
Post-doctoral Research Fellowship, funded by the NRF Global Change, Society and Sustainability
Grant, in the Law Faculty, University of Cape Town.
Emma Lecavalier is an MPhil Candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at
the University of Oxford (St. Antony’s College). She specializes in environmental security and the
politics of disaster relief.
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