Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond

HOLGER STRITZEL

London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

One of the most important and controversial contributions to a vibrant body of new security theories since the 1990s has been the idea of securitization. However, rather than providing a consolidated position the discourse on securitization has only just begun to transform the new idea into a more comprehensive security theory. This article argues that such a theory needs to go beyond the current reflections on securitization by the Copenhagen School. Through internal critique and conceptual reconstruction the article generates an alternative framework for future empirical research and identifies two centres of gravity as a first step towards a more consistent understanding of securitization as a comprehensive theory of security.

KEY WORDS ◆ constructivism ◆ discourse ◆ organized crime ◆ securitization ◆ threat image

Introduction

For many years now, insights of social theory and linguistics have inspired various streams of European approaches to International Relations and have led to a broad range of alternative perspectives on international politics. While being introduced as early as the 1980s, many thoughts became popular to a wider audience only in the course of the 1990s. In security studies traditional military strategists and European or American realists have been supplemented and severely challenged by a vibrant body of theoretical innovations. New security theories often share a more dynamic and, in general, ontologically more reflective perspective on security. Moreover, they often apply discursive methodologies and take a critical stance towards the taken for granted 'realities' of security in the world.

One of the most important and controversial contributions to this the-
oretical discourse has been the idea of securitization as it is articulated in the
works of the Copenhagen School. Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, the core of
the Copenhagen School, define securitization as a successful speech act
'through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a polit-
ical community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued refer-
ent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal
with the threat' (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491). Yet, rather than providing
a consolidated position, the discourse on securitization has only just begun
to transform the new idea into a more comprehensive security theory.

The attempts of the Copenhagen School to construct a more comprehen-
sive theory rest on two central concepts. First, on a triology of the speech act,
the securitizing actor and the audience and, second, on three 'facilitating con-
ditions' that influence the success of a securitizing move. However, as this
article will show, these attempts suffer from several internal tensions in the
argument, an often too vague and undertheorized terminology and, in gen-
eral, the fact that too much weight is put on the semantic side of the speech
act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and se-
quentiality.[1] In order to turn the basic idea of securitization into a framework
to study securitizations and securitizing moves systematically, an alternative
conceptualization is needed.

In principle, one can think of such an alternative as a consistent framework
or a comprehensive theory.[2] An alternative framework would mainly require
to be more systematic and clearer than the Copenhagen School with respect
to the main dimensions and assumed dynamics of securitization. Apart from
a more concise conceptual statement, the main aim would be to provide bet-
ter guidance for systematic and comparative empirical analysis, yet leaving it
to the empirical studies themselves to work out in detail which element of
the framework is, when and why, most important. In contrast, comprehen-
sive theories are usually more specific about how their elements relate and
more demanding with respect to their metatheoretical (ontological and epis-
temological) consistency. Consistent comprehensive theories are also explicit
with respect to their main 'centre of gravity', i.e. that part of the theory from
which the other parts gain much of their own power.

The first contribution of this article to the debate towards a theory of
securitization is *pre*theoretical in the sense that its task is an exercise in in-
ternal critique and conceptual restructuring. The basic idea is similar to what
Hempel has called 'conceptual explication':[3]

> Conceptual explication attempts to specify the logical structure of given ex-
> pressions: ... explication aims at reducing the limitations, ambiguities, and
> inconsistencies ... by propondering a reinterpretation intended to enhance ...
> clarity and precision. (Hempel, 1952: 12)

Thus, at this level the aim of this article is to make transparent the main tensions and boundaries of securitization theory and to suggest an alternative that is more systematic and clearer. With a clearer framework, communication between scholars would be improved and insights from 'real-world' securitizations could be gathered and compared. This, in turn, could help improve the theoretical reflection and conceptual restructuring towards a theory of securitization. In this sense, even a mere conceptual critique and an alternative framework would be of help, given the problematic range of contradictory empirical applications of securitization theory we have experienced so far. When reading 'between the lines', Wæver (2003) admits these problems by writing:

> There is by now a surprising amount of empirical studies done with full or partial use of the securitization theory. These do not follow a standardised format … The theory does not point to one particular type of study as the right one … Optimistically, the diversity is a sign that the theory … can generate/structure different kinds of usage and even produce anomalies for itself in interesting ways. (Wæver, 2003: 16–17)

Less optimistically, however, theoretical contradictions, anomalies and inconsistent empirical applications of securitization cannot only be celebrated as 'diversity', but they also have clear disadvantages. Most importantly, they prohibit the improvement of existing concepts in the light of (comparative) empirical findings.

Beyond these pretheoretical ambitions, the article also suggests first steps towards a more comprehensive theory of securitization. At this level, the article argues that there are two centres of gravity of securitization theory that are currently both theoretically underdeveloped. While these centres could be reconciled to some extent, ultimately they reflect two rather autonomous readings of securitization and are based on two separate metatheoretical convictions. To some extent they perhaps even reflect two opposing views of what a theory (of securitization) can and should do, whether it should be kept diverse and contradictory or whether a more coherent position is good for the future of securitization theory and securitization studies. The first understanding concentrates on the speech act *event* and is grounded in the concept of performativity (or 'textuality'). This understanding would correspond with an 'internalist', more poststructural/postmodern (Derridarian and/or Butler) reading of securitization and is by now only articulated in a rudimentary form in the concept of 'illocution'. An internalist reading of securitization is stronger in Wæver's early works but has become much weaker in the joint works with Buzan. The second understanding theorizes the *process* of securitization, based on, I would suggest, the central idea of embeddedness. This understanding would correspond with an 'externalist', more constructivist[4] reading of securitization. Although there are some

externalist elements in the joint works of Wæver and Buzan (e.g. 'facilitating conditions', 'authority of the speaker' or 'structured field'), in sum, such a reading is strongly underdeveloped and has even been explicitly rejected by Wæver (see e.g. Wæver, 2000, 2004). Towards a theory of securitization, this article takes side with and elaborates theoretically an externalist position by claiming that security articulations need to be related to their broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain their power.

The argument of this article will be developed in four steps. It starts with the basic idea of security as a speech act. This part examines how the idea is articulated by the Copenhagen School and how this articulation relates to speech act philosophy. The second part analyses and criticizes the attempts of the Copenhagen School to transform this basic idea into a more comprehensive theoretical position. Based on this critique, the third part suggests an alternative framework to study securitizations systematically. Fourth, and finally, similarities with the Copenhagen School, boundaries of the suggested alternative and implications for future research will be discussed.

Securitization: Basic Idea and Internalist Centre of Gravity

The defining feature of the Copenhagen School approach to security is the fact that it proposes to study security practices by drawing on speech act philosophy, assuming that the articulation of security is a crucial form of security action. It is this articulation that has the potential to structure the social practices that follow. The articulation of 'security' entails the claim that something is held to pose a threat to a valued referent object that is so existential that it is legitimate to move the issue beyond the established games of 'normal' politics to deal with it by exceptional, i.e. security, methods. This puts an actor in a very strong position to deal with an issue as he/she thinks is appropriate. As Wæver put it, 'by uttering "security" a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it' (Wæver, 1995: 55). The defining textual feature of securitization is therefore a specific security rhetoric which is marked by survival, priority of action and urgency (Wæver, 2003: 10), a claim to a modus of exceptionality that is contained in the meaning of (national) security.

The conceptualization of this distinct modus emerged out of Wæver's analysis of traditional (i.e. realist) concepts of security which centre around the idea of national survival (see Wæver, 1997). In Wæver's concept, the realist meaning of security thus continues to exist as a rhetorical claim marked by the grammar of security as a distinct field of practice that distinguishes — according to realism — 'security' from other fields. Speaking

'security' successfully therefore draws an issue into this particular (realist definition of a) field of exceptionality with all the consequences this may have.

The basic mechanism of this fundamental transformation draws on John L. Austin's concept of 'performative utterances' (see Austin, 1962). Applying Austin, Wæver argues that the very utterance of 'security' is more than just saying or describing something but the performing of an action. According to Austin, performative utterances do not just describe but have the potential to create (new) reality, for the Copenhagen School the modus of exceptionality, of dealing with an issue in a new way. Moreover, performative utterances fall outside the conventional true/false dichotomy. In Austin's words, they do not have 'truth conditions' but 'felicity conditions'. If the felicity conditions are met, the speech act — although perhaps not 'true' — may still happen felicitously. By applying Austin to security studies the conceptual focus thus shifts from the traditional threat–reality nexus (i.e. whether a claim that there is a threat is actually true) to what a speech act does (i.e. what happens because of its utterance). For the Copenhagen School, the main effect of uttering security is its potential to let an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed (Wæver, 2003: 11).

Especially in his single-authored publications (see in particular 1989, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2004; but see also Buzan et al., 1998: 46–7) Wæver also draws on insights from Derrida and Butler[5] to stress the always political and indeterminate nature of the speech act event[6] whose meaning and performative force is not related to its context:

> In my case, some of the most important areas where this 'general philosophy' was worked out by Derrida was in relation to speech act theory … It points to the centrality of studying *in* a text, how it produces its own meaning, rather than relating it to a 'context' which is a doubtful concept because it tends to imply the traditional sender–receiver view of communication where an original meaning can be retrieved if only put in the proper context. (Wæver, 2004: 11)

This is an acknowledgement of Derrida's famous claim that 'there is nothing outside the text' and that meaning can never be fixed.[7] Judith Butler has extended such a poststructural/postmodern position — which Derrida has also directed against Austin (see Derrida 1972, 1977) — to develop the idea of speech acts having *productive power* (see Butler, 1996, 1997). According to her concept of performativity, speech acts have the power to constitute new meaning and create new patterns of significance in social relations. Since for Butler actors and structures must be 'performed' to exist in a meaningful way, both actors and structures are constituted 'retroactively' (see also Zizek, 1989: 100–2).[8] Thus, according to Butler, it is the speech act itself which has the power to create authority and bring about change rather than any pre-existing

context that would empower actors and/or speech acts in the first place. Wæver acknowledges her work when he argues:

> A speech act is interesting because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning that is not already in the context. It reworks or produces a context by the performative success of the act. (Buzan et al., 1998: 46; Wæver, 2000: 286)

In sum, Wæver agrees with Butler and Derrida — and in accordance with Schmitt and Arendt — that a speech act has an indeterminate force of its own that is not related to features of an existing context. Moreover, the authority to speak is constituted by the performative power of the speech act itself which constitutes actors and their social relations retroactively. As I will argue in more detail later on, it is exactly this postmodern/poststructural root in the thinking of the Copenhagen School — that also runs through their co-authored texts — which hints at a possible (internalist) centre of gravity for a comprehensive theory of securitization.

Towards a More Comprehensive Framework: Adding Externalism

The discussion so far mainly reflects the *early* conceptualizations of security as a speech act that can be found in 'Security, the Speech Act', 'Securitization and Desecuritization' and 'Concepts of Security' (see Wæver, 1989, 1995, 1997). Yet, the basic idea laid down in these publications itself is too limited to also guide the study of 'real-world' securitizations. The Copenhagen School has realized this problem. In their joint works on securitization they have moved towards a more comprehensive understanding by outlining what they call 'facilitating conditions' (Buzan et al., 1998: 25, 31–3; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 71–2, 74). In another recent paper on securitization, Wæver is also more specific on the role of actors and audiences (Wæver, 2003). In the analysis that follows I will therefore critically examine these attempts by the Copenhagen School to turn their conceptual idea into a more comprehensive theory. My analysis will start with their understanding of actors and audiences.

Speech Acts, Actors and Audiences

The skeleton of a more comprehensive theory of security action by the Copenhagen School itself is marked by three elements: (1) the speech act, (2) the securitizing actor and (3) the audience. Unfortunately, they have not yet conceptualized the exact relationship between the actor and the audience very clearly. Generally speaking, it is clear that the Copenhagen School regards securitization as an intersubjective act of a securitizing actor acting towards a

significant audience. Thus, rather than reducing threat assessments to a single actor, most often 'the state', the Copenhagen School splits the actor into two elements: the securitizing actor performing a securitizing move by uttering a security speech act, and the relevant audience accepting or refusing this move. With that a certain threat is no longer simply assessed but its interpretation and representation is 'negotiated' between an actor and the relevant audience. While the actor can only propose a certain recognition and representation, it is the audience which decides whether this proposal is accepted as a common narrative, i.e. whether the proposal will be intersubjectively held as real.

However, in empirical studies one cannot always figure out clearly which audience is when and why most relevant, what implications it has if there are several audiences and when exactly an audience is 'persuaded'.[9] Similar problems occur with the idea that a proposal is 'intersubjectively held', which implies 'voluntarily held', as opposed to aspects of coercion, repression and 'silence' (Hansen, 2000). What if a dictator is the securitizing actor? Is the speaker–audience model the most appropriate model for non-democratic settings? And how can this model be reconciled with the Derridarian and Schmittian elements? As we have seen, Wæver explicitly refuses the 'traditional sender–receiver view of communication' (Wæver, 2004: 11) — but at the same time he believes in a speaker–audience model?

Although the concepts of speech act, actors and audience seem to be important for the Copenhagen School, the approach is much too silent about the exact mechanism of their triology and too unspecific about the substance of their terms. In particular, the Copenhagen School should say more about the relative status of the idea of a security *utterance* or speech act *event* as opposed to the idea of an *intersubjectivity* of actor and audience or the *process* of securitization. How does the power of the audience relate to the decisionism of the speech act event? And how can the idea of the performative force of a security articulation stressed in *Security, The Speech Act* be reconciled with the concept of a (social or intersubjective) process of securitization developed in *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*? There are numerous formulations in the works of the Copenhagen School that reflect this tension. It would be most obvious if statements in *Security, The Speech Act* and *Securitization and Desecuritization* were compared to statements in *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*. However, the tension can also be found in a single document such as *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* and even on one page of this document:

> This *self-based violation* of rules *is the security act* ... For the analyst ... it is to understand the *processes* of constructing a *shared understanding* of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The *process* of securitization is what in language theory is called a *speech act* ... it is the *utterance itself* that *is the act. By saying the words*, something is done. (Buzan et al., 1998: 26; emphasis added)

As these lines make clear, Wæver and Buzan continuously fluctuate between the terms *process* and *speech act/utterance* as if both were synonymous. The act is at the same time defined as an intersubjective process of constructing a threat and as just an 'utterance itself'. Yet, I would argue that the (decisionist) performativity of security utterances as opposed to the social process of securitization, involving (pre-existing) actors, audience(s) (and contexts), are so different that they form two rather autonomous centres of gravity.

The Role of Facilitating Conditions

In contrast to the reflections on the triology of speech act, actor and audience, what the Copenhagen School calls 'facilitating conditions' offers a more specific framework for analysing securitizations empirically. To some extent, they can even be interpreted as a 'nucleus' provided by the Copenhagen School itself for a more comprehensive externalist theory of securitization. From an internalist position, however, the introduction of facilitating conditions is a problematic move towards causality which undermines the Schmittian and Derridarian legacy of securitization. Inspired by Austin's concept of felicity conditions[10] (1962: 14–15) they refer to:

1. the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security,
2. the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor — that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and
3. features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization. (Buzan et al., 1998: 33)

In *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, Buzan and Wæver introduce these conditions with remarks that both power (Buzan et al., 1998: 31–2) and the intersubjective establishment of a threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 25) are important to understand securitizing speech acts. In this respect they even claim that '*in concrete analysis* … it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating security. To study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept' (Buzan et al., 1998: 32; emphasis added). Moreover, they claim to conceive of security as a 'structured field' because 'some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security' (Buzan et al., 1998: 31).

With these lines Buzan and Wæver stress that they do not follow radical poststructuralists who would only concentrate on the power structure of the linguistic features of a speech act (Buzan et al., 1998: 46). Instead, they seem to conceptualize the linguistic features of a speech act as only the *internal*

'facilitating condition' and add, contra radical poststructuralism and Wæver's own sympathy for the idea of performativity, an element of contextuality as the *external* side of a successful speech act (Buzan et al., 1998: 32).

However, this would require a much more coherent grounding of securitization theory in, for example, Bourdieu's reflections on 'authority' and 'field'. Indeed, Bourdieu could give securitization theory a contextual twist with which one could also *theorize* what should be done '*in concrete analysis*'. On the other hand, such a move has the potential to destroy the coherence of their theory, the more Buzan and Wæver at the same time adhere to the autonomous productive power of performative speech acts highlighted by Derrida and Butler. And even now, their contextual ad hoc remarks create a certain degree of tension with their ideas on actors, audiences and intersubjectivity: at least, the stronger one emphasizes the idea that 'some actors are placed in positions of power', the more problematic it becomes to uphold a split between the securitizing actor and the audience where the audience is placed in the position of 'having the power to define security'.

On a more general level, one has to ask whether their import of the Bourdieuian concept of authority still is not too narrow to understand the complex and power-laden social dynamics of securitization. Substantively, they limit the concept of power to the power to persuade and the idea of contextuality or embeddedness to a context defining a sort of reputation ('the authority of the securitizing actor'). Temporally, they reduce the speaker–audience relationship to the securitizing attempt: 'the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt'. As a result, more complex power relations as well as more sedimented and sequential forms of the relationship between the speaker and the audience get lost. Yet, because of a sedimented relationship between a speaker and the audience, certain securitizing moves may be prohibited in the first place or not taken at all; *potential* audiences, in other words, may be — to paraphrase a term by Michael Mann (1985) — 'discursively outflanked'. In the concept of the Copenhagen School, any power of 'non-decision' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) as well as more structural notions of power are not captured. Yet, I would argue that a theory of securitization should go beyond an intrinsic understanding of 'social magic' and take into account and conceptualize the deep embeddedness of security articulations in social relations of power without which its dynamics *and* non-dynamics cannot be understood. In other words, what is missing in the current articulations of the Copenhagen School is a better and more comprehensive awareness of the existence of a *social sphere*.

General Problems

The critical discussion of attempts by the Copenhagen School to move from the conceptual idea to a theory of securitization has shown that their own

current proposals are confronted with several single contradictions. In the following I will abstract from these specific aspects and turn to more general problems and tensions of the Copenhagen School approach to securitization. I will argue that the main problem of the current articulation of securitization theory is their insufficient consideration of the situatedness of speech acts and a too-static conceptualization of the speech act event in general.

The first tension concerns a certain degree of implicit objectivism as opposed to a more reflectivist and relativist overall approach. This is particularly evident in their concept of facilitating conditions. Wæver is aware of this when he writes: 'This part of the theory dealing with conditions is highly sensitive (because it can lead to a re-introduction of objectivism into the theory) and it is necessary to be very precise about the exact status of the different elements of the theory' (Wæver, 2000: 252; 2003: 14). In this context it must be particularly perplexing for any more strongly reflectivist scholar to read the third condition: 'features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization' (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). Without any further explanations this reads as if the Copenhagen School would attribute a causal role for a given external materiality outside its being mediated through language. In the meantime, Wæver has weakened this impression by arguing that this condition refers to aspects 'historically associated with a threat [and] generally held to be threatening' (Wæver, 2003: 15). Nevertheless, a certain tension in the argument of the Copenhagen School remains: the more poststructural one reads the Copenhagen School, the more problematic is their concept of facilitating conditions, and, conversely, the more emphasis is put on the facilitating conditions, the more difficult it is to read the Copenhagen School as a poststructural position.

The second tension concerns static elements of the theory as opposed to a more dynamic and contingent overall approach. One example of a static element concerns the separation of referent object and actor and the introduction of neatly separated 'sectors' with many more reflectivist scholars arguing that securitizations usually escape a static 'actor–referent object-sector' heuristic (see e.g. McSweeney, 1996, 1998, 1999; Buzan and Wæver, 1997). Another example is the very conceptualization of the speech act event. As we have seen, the Copenhagen School claims that by speaking security successfully, an issue is drawn into a particular (realist definition of a) mode of dealing with it which is marked by exceptionality. This reduces, contra Derrida,[11] a securitization to a static event of applying a (fixed) meaning (of security as exceptionality) to an issue rather than seeing it as an always (situated and iterative) process of *generating* meaning, i.e. as a dynamic (social and political) sequence of creating a threat text. Furthermore, many scholars would criticize the strong (realist) emphasis on exceptionality in this conceptualization. Taking the realist understanding of security as an intellectual

starting point (Wæver, 1989: 36–41), Wæver perpetuates the realist vocabulary of exceptionality which many scholars would consider to be empirically inadequate (and perhaps even ethically problematic). As risk scholars argue, many current security practices deal with 'threats' *below* the level of exceptionality (see e.g. Coker, 2002; Rasmussen, 2001; see also Abrahamsen, 2005). The realist vocabulary tends to create a rather strict politization–securitization dichotomy which prohibits making securitization theory more widely applicable to 'real-world' securitizations.

My former point relates me back to the initial critique that the Copenhagen School refuses to conceptualize securitizing speech acts and securitizing actors as embedded in broader social and linguistic structures. By taking side with an externalist reading of securitization, I would argue that an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts. This neglect of 'externalism' in the concept of securitization is even more puzzling since Wæver himself has provided first hints for a more embedded approach. In an article on foreign policy analysis he states:

> Discourses organise knowledge systematically, and thus delimit what can be said and what not. The rules determining what makes sense go beyond the purely grammatical into the pragmatic and discursive … *Subjects, objects and concepts cannot be seen as existing independent of discourse. Certain categories and arguments that are powerful in one period or at one place can sound non-sensible or absurd at others.* (Wæver, 2001: 29; emphasis added)

Similarly, in 'Defence of Religion' — which is co-authored by Carsten Bagge Laustsen — Wæver writes:

> By exploring *the structure of discourse constitutive of threats* … we can show what makes securitisation particularly attractive and under what conditions. (Laustsen and Wæver, 2000: 706; emphasis added)

Yet, he then reduces discursive embeddedness to a proper definition of — in this case — religion as a referent object. Again, this is a move towards a static concept that does not capture the relational dynamics of the social and political *process* of generating meaning.

In sum, it seems that Wæver is aware of the virtues of externalist (more structural and discursive) readings in principle but has sided with an internalist position when it comes to conceptualizing securitization. In his joint work with Buzan he has then tried to move his initial idea of security as a speech act some steps towards externalism — with the negative side-effect that severe tensions have been created that make it more difficult to move coherently towards a comprehensive theory of securitization. As a result, the current

state of securitization theory is theoretically vague and it does not provide clear guidance for empirical studies. Therefore, systematic comparisons of 'real-world' securitizations which could help improve the theory cannot be generated.

Embedding Securitization

Building on my critique of the Copenhagen School and Wæver's own hint at the crucial importance of discursive contexts, I will now outline central lines of a more embedded understanding of securitization which I conceptualize as a dynamic three-layered triangle of text, context and positional power. As an exercise in conceptual reconstruction, the boundaries of my own concepts are set by the basic idea of securitization, understood as the act versus process of applying/generating meaning. In other words, the purpose of this section is defined by the interest in a framework (and first steps towards a comprehensive theory) of exactly this act/process and the relations of power involved that can be identified through conceptual reconstruction. One could characterize my reflections as a — broadly defined — constructivist move away from Wæver which shares many insights with structuration theory and critical discourse analysis (see e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Wodak and Meyer, 2001). To illustrate the central concepts of the framework I refer to the securitization of organized crime in the USA.[12]

Meaning, Power and the Relationality of Agents and Structures

The agent–structure problem is a controversy on the extent to which social phenomena can be understood as the result of agents and/or structures, with many social theorists favouring one element over the other and structurationist scholars, most prominently perhaps Giddens (1984), Bhaskar (1979) and Archer (1995), discussing synoptic concepts which integrate both elements into a theoretically 'elegant' hybrid. In light of the intense reflection on agents, structures and structuration over the past decades (see e.g. Parker, 2000; Wight, 2006), it is nowadays almost trivial to state that agential and structural elements of social context and power are related. In other words, most scholars are nowadays aware and take into account that actors always act within a structural context which constitutes them and provides a frame of enabling and constraining conditions and that structures need agents to translate their attributes into a dynamic of action and change. Or, as Colin Hay has stated:

> Agents are situated within a structured context which presents an uneven distribution of opportunities and constraints to them. Actors influence the development of that context over time through the consequences of their actions.

> Yet, at any given time, the ability of actors to realise their intentions is set by the context itself. (Hay, 2002: 116–17)

Among the many structurationist specifications of this basic insight/conviction I personally find the strategic-relational approach (see e.g. Jessop, 2005) particularly interesting. The strategic-relational approach, which extends Giddens' reflections on structuration from a critical realist position and thereby integrates the critique by Archer (1990), has recently been used to fuse mobilization theories on (cultural) frames/framing, opportunity structures and leadership/ norm entrepreneurs (see Fumagalli, 2006). This is in many respects similar to my own framework of a triangle of text, context and positional power. Furthermore, by being able to integrate moderate discursive approaches, the strategic-relational approach also provides an answer to the controversy on discursive versus extra-discursive social practices related to the social construction of threats (see e.g. Huysmans, 2006: 91–5). It is therefore a viable way to socially embed linguistic discourse and thereby specify and improve existing constructivist reflections on the construction of threats (see e.g. Weldes, 1996; Fierke, 1998; Doty, 1993) which have so far mainly or only been focused on linguistic dynamics (but see already Fairclough, 1992: 62–100). Nevertheless, the conceptualization I propose is not explicitly strategic-relational but deliberately abstract, favouring, on the basis of a broadly defined structurationist understanding, a 'grounded-theory' approach towards a comprehensive theory of securitization that would make use of insights gained from (comparative) empirical studies to specify the theory consecutively.

A broadly defined structurationist understanding of social context would stress the relationality of agents, structures and texts in the sense that their existence is mutually constitutive and not reducible to the sum of structural, agential or textual factors treated separately.[13] Indeed, for a structurationist position the three factors are so closely related that they can perhaps best be thought of as different *layers of agency* (see e.g. Wight, 1999). Based on this core assumption, I would propose to distinguish socio-linguistic and socio-political dimensions of context. With the *socio-linguistic* dimension of context I refer to the network of constitutive rules and narratives that surround a single linguistic act. This dimension is essential to *understand* a speech act. Actors can exploit linguistic contexts as a reservoir of analogies, similies and contrasts. We can therefore often observe that securitizing actors speak to and from a broader linguistic context by framing their arguments in terms of the distinct linguistic reservoir that is available at a particular point in time. In contrast, the *socio-political* context concerns the often more sedimented social and political structures that put actors in positions of power to influence the process of constructing meaning. Since a given social context is at best in some very rare cases truly symmetric, actors are usually endowed with an unequal ability to influence the evolution of an individually proposed meaning into a collectively

held representation. The concept of socio-linguistic contexts thus refers to a fairly contingent and usually more fluid dimension of sociality which often involves a high degree of human creativity and (unintended) dynamics. In contrast, socio-political contexts represent a more sedimented dimension which often hint more directly at the likelihood for a securitizing move to be successful.

These dimensions correspond with a structurationist understanding of power as the relatedness of (1) the existing discourse, constituting the performative power and the meanings of security articulations, and (2) the positional power of actors, influencing the process of defining meaning by enacting particular threat texts and/or shaping the existing discursive context. Conversely, the performative force of a threat text can help constitute or change existing discourse coalitions and/or change an existing discourse, thereby reconfiguring existing relations of power. Influencing the process of defining meaning is always marked by *acts of translation* of a certain threat text into an existing discourse. The better the compatibility of the articulated text/textual structure and the existing discourse (i.e. its 'resonance') and the better the positional power of securitizing actors, the easier it is for them to establish their preferred individual text as a dominant narrative for a larger collective.

This understanding of power is more limited than similar attempts in the literature to use structuration to construct a comprehensive framework for the analysis of power (see e.g. Barnett and Duvall, 2004, 2005; Guzzini, 1993). While the notion of power as such may indeed be overly complex and 'polymorphous' (Barnett and Duvall, 2004), i.e. impossible to capture by a single formulation, an understanding of securitization as embedded in (historically distinct) structures of meaning and power has a rather clear-cut centre of gravity: existing discourse. It is, according to this reading, existing discourse in its fluid socio-linguistic and more sedimented (socio-political and/or socio-linguistic) form which privileges or disadvantages certain actors ('positional power') and texts ('performative force') as opposed to others. In this sense, existing discourse is always 'strategically selective' (Jessop).

As a *framework of analysis* these reflections create three central layers/forces of securitization: (1) the performative force of articulated threat texts, (2) their embeddedness in existing discourses and (3) the positional power of actors who influence the process of defining meaning (see Figure 1).

The first element of the framework focuses on the structure of a security articulation ('text') understood as a rather durable product of linguistic and/or symbolic actions (Wodak, 2001b: 66), assuming that different semantic and/or semiotic threat structures generate different performative forces. Understood this way, the concept of text goes beyond mere speech to also include the symbolic language of visuals/images and sound. Moreover, in contrast to the

Figure 1
Framework of Securitization

Copenhagen School, the meaning of a threat text is not given (by the concept of security as exceptionality) but generated — often as the result of a dynamic social process. Its meaning and performative force is therefore never uniform and perhaps impossible to figure out in abstract. Since textual structures, according to an externalist understanding, are always temporally and spatially constituted, one will hardly find texts that can be isolated from both the contingent creativity of actors and their embeddedness in social and linguistic contexts.[14]

The performative force of organized crime mainly stems from what has been coined 'the mafia mystique' (Smith, 1975). It can be poetically and hermeneutically unearthed by interpreting the textual structure and considering its embeddedness in broader (cultural) discourses, in the case of organized crime mainly in Italy and the USA. Organized crime then appears as a discursively sedimented and condensed threat text that was being generated sequentially, gaining influences from diverse cultural, cinematographic/fictional and political sources. These influences have established a rich reservoir of associations which continue to create a 'sublime' mixture of fear and fascination (Burke, 1958) whenever invoked. Politically, the rich cultural heritage of organized crime was constantly invoked by securitizing actors to instil a process of intensification[15] from the early 1950s to the late 1960s (see Moore, 1974; Smith, 1975; Lampe, 1999). Sequentially and increasingly, organized crime became constructed as a macro-threat for the USA.

The second element concerns the power of the existing (linguistic) discourse, i.e. a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated acts (Wodak, 2001b: 66). This dimension refers to the interactions between the text and the larger discursive practices in which it is embedded. Texts often

evolve out of particular socio-linguistic contexts so that they often carry with them the baggage of a historically evolved practice out of which and towards which a particular text was articulated. Texts therefore sometimes even show traces of differing discourses and ideologies struggling for dominance (Wodak, 2001a: 11).

The example of securitizing organized crime in the USA can illustrate this dimension of the framework quite clearly. In particular, it also shows the importance of considering the interrelatedness of 'performative force' and 'embeddedness in (linguistic) discourse'. In Italy, organized crime was mainly constructed as rites of masculinity, honour and violence which were in turn embedded in broader mythical and anecdotal narratives about 'Sicilism' (see Hess, 1973; Paoli, 2003). In the USA of the early 20th century this heritage was taken up and supplemented by experiences of the Prohibition period as well as several rumours and speculations about murders of policemen, politicians and the criminal activities of ethnic (mainly Italian) groups (see e.g. Smith, 1975; Kenney and Finckenauer, 1995). Importantly, also, Hollywood and the US cultural industry discovered the topic and created powerful icons of organized crime such as the Thompson machine gun, the 'gangster suit' and, perhaps most importantly for the political process of securitization, the Italian accent as a 'sound of racketeering' (see e.g. Ruth, 1996). Furthermore, the myth of the charismatic leader heading a hierarchically organized, business-like corporation was established for which 'Al Capone' became perhaps most emblematic. These fictional representations, in turn, resonated strongly with a distinct moralistic and religious discourse that represented New York and Chicago as the sites of immorality, decadence and subversiveness, a form of discourse on the 'evilness' of modern urbanity that has been identified as a typical element of US exceptionalism (Lipset, 1996).

Finally, for the proposed third dimension of securitization I argue that more sedimented forms of context can be amalgamated with an agential notion of power into the concept of positional power.[16] A certain power capacity can be defined as positional to the extent that relevant actors are placed in different positions within a given social environment to influence collective meaning constructions. In extreme cases actors may have some sort of official, delegated or enforced, ability to define meaning so that their power capacity may come close to a monopoly. In other cases their ability to execute power may be more indirect through their privileged position to influence — e.g. 'behind the scenes' — a social and political structure or process that is particularly relevant for the construction of meaning.[17]

In the case of organized crime in the USA, the importance of *positional power* can also be clearly identified. For a very long time during the political process of securitization, the main securitizing actor, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), operated in the background by influencing information

flows over which they had superior power. In contrast, more respected and publicly visible speakers such as the well-respected Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under Edward Hoover as well as several leading politicians were very sceptical about whether a mafia-like organization really existed. Yet, the FBN had the largest database on organized crime, and leading ministerial agencies, such as the Organized Crime Section established under Robert Kennedy, had to rely on their data (Schlesinger, 1978: 181). Also, they could influence public hearings such as the so-called Valachi hearings by secret prior questionings before the official hearings started (Maas, 1968: 29–30). This way, they had a privileged position to shape the public perception and understanding of the organized crime problematique in general, a position of power 'behind the scenes' on knowledge structures that did not correspond with their more visible authority.[18]

Reflecting on the Framework

In this last section I will conclude with a broader reflection on the proposed framework by discussing (1) similarities and differences between the proposed framework and current articulations of the Copenhagen School, (2) limits and boundaries of the proposed framework and (3) consequences for a theory of securitization.

   As a consequence of *re*-conceptualizing securitization, elements of the proposed framework can also be found in the current articulations of the Copenhagen School. Overall, however, the new framework suggests a less-decisionist, less-linguistic and more social/structural understanding of securitization. Again, the agent–structure problematique creates the space for the discussion.

   Elements of *actor-centrism* of the Copenhagen School mainly reside in the idea of the act of utterance bringing about change in conjunction with an emphasis on decisions by the securitizing actor, often the political leader. As Michael Williams (2003) has pointed out, this opens the theory for a rather strong decisionist interpretation which shares central understandings with Carl Schmitt. Their claim that the success of a speech act also depends on the '*authority* of the speaker' — and the speaker–audience relationship in general — then introduces a more Bourdieuian and intersubjective understanding — which, as I have argued before however, presupposes a more reflected (e.g. structurationist) conceptualization of embeddedness. In contrast, the concept of positional power — understood as the ability to influence a process of meaning construction — is (1) more complex, capturing 'hidden' forms of influence, and (2) more structural. As such, it also departs more clearly from a merely linguistic concept of power to give securitization a stronger grounding in social theory.

Structural elements of the Copenhagen School are rather weak and can at best be found in their reflections on facilitating conditions, the speaker–audience relationship and the ad hoc introduction of the term 'field' on p. 31 of *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*. Alternatively, as I have shown earlier, structural elements can also be 're-imported' from Wæver's ideas on foreign policy analysis, yet thereby creating more visible tensions with both the decisionist and the Derridarian elements of securitization. Examined more closely, their introduction of the term 'field', at least in the Bourdieuian sense, is very problematic for the Copenhagen School because they thereby introduce a rather objectivist element of Bourdieu's theory. Regardless of whether Judith Butler is right in calling Bourdieu's concept of field an 'inalterable positivity' (Butler, 1996: 34), it is hard to see how the Bourdieuian field can be reconciled with the 'intrinsic iterability' of performative speech acts and/or the Schmittian/decisionist elements. Thus, while the structural elements of the Copenhagen School are either underdeveloped or very problematic, this article is an attempt to give them a firm grounding by introducing and elaborating the idea of embeddedness. In the proposed framework, all other elements are defined in terms of their *relatedness* to existing (fluid or sedimented) discourse.

Finally, the concept of *(threat) text* is, again, more complex than the concept of speech act. While speech acts — if not understood as iterated through social/political processes — are temporally and substantively limited to the speech act *event*, the introduction of the term 'text' is to stress that linguistic structures can evolve sequentially over longer periods of time, consisting of more complex configurations which stem from various influences (as we could see in the case of organized crime).

The main boundaries of the proposed framework result from the concept of securitization itself and from the structurationist understanding of embeddedness. As a reconceptualization of securitization, the framework is explicitly discursive and does not address questions of intentionality, interests or rationality that have been discussed intensively in political theories of power (see e.g. Lukes, 1974, 2005). It also excludes extremely structural or extremely actor-centric positions such as Wallerstein's reflections on power (Wallerstein, 2003) or many realist concepts (see e.g. Schmidt, 2005). Most importantly, however, the externalist reading of securitization developed in this article creates a more visible tension with the idea of performativity, i.e. that actors and structures must be performed to exist, that they are constituted 'retroactively'.

Ultimately, one can perhaps only have two separate, coherent readings of securitization. The basic idea of uttering a state of emergency can be kept by both readings. And I would argue, an externalist reading can also acknowledge to some extent that threat texts can have a dynamic of their own which

contains a certain degree of contingency or 'magic' which may, moreover, contribute to change a given context. However, the more we search for a comprehensive theory to understand the process of securitization, the clearer we have to be with regard to the main centre of gravity from which the other concepts gain their power. And as a result, the stronger the tension between both readings becomes. At least in its most radical form, the internalist position would hold that there is no social process involved but just the text and its intrinsic iterability, no 'con'-text, no positional power of actors being privileged to enhance one text as opposed to others and no historical 'path-dependency' and intensification over time. Conversely, the externalist position would always hold that it is misleading to think of an intrinsic iterability of 'freely floating' texts (or the definition of meaning as nothing more than a decisionist act). Texts are always interwoven with relational dynamics of power and meaning, rarely the work of any one person (Wodak, 2001a: 11) and often even 'historically intertextual' in the sense that they transform/translate past meaning structures into the present (Fairclough, 1992: 85).

To be sure, there would still be much room for communication between the two wings. For example, Judith Butler's critique of Bourdieu's reflections on 'authorized language' (Bourdieu, 1991: 107–16) in *Performativity*'s *Social Magic* (Butler, 1996) can be read as such an attempt. Her reflections on 'habitus' in particular can be understood as an internalist position trying to integrate elements of the idea of a social sphere into an essentially linguistic position. Moreover, in *Excitable Speech* Butler refers to 'sedimentation' and the existence of a 'context' throughout her book (see Butler, 1997). Similarly, one can interpret her concept of '(heterosexual) matrix' in *Gender Trouble* (Butler, 1990) as an acknowledgement of the embeddedness of performances in sedimented relations of power and meaning — yet, admittedly, for Butler in a more Foucauldian sense than suggested in this article. Conversely, an externalist position can move some steps from the social towards the linguistic to investigate the embeddedness of utterances within spatially and temporally contingent social contexts of meaning and power.

However, for an externalist position Butler overemphasizes the constitutive role of language as an autonomous power at the expense of the social sphere and its more fundamental influences on the very possibility of language — especially in non-democratic environments. Moreover, an externalist would be sceptical towards her strong claims that subjects are created, that they *are*, only by virtue of constitutive utterances and thus cannot be thought of as influencing the social struggle over meaning as pre-existing units. As Terry Lovell (2003) could show, Butler's reflections on performative power and on 'speaking with authority without being authorised to speak' (Butler, 1997: 157) are based on a misrepresentation of the social sphere as

something fully constituted, fixed and unequivocal (Lovell, 2003: 9). Yet, since social contexts are never fully constituted, they do always allow room for change, transgression and resistance. This is even more obvious the stronger one follows a structurationist understanding of the social sphere which stresses process and change through actor–action dynamics — rather than any kind of structural determinism — as an essential conceptual feature.

This leads to the question of future theoretical steps towards a complex understanding of securitization. Currently, scholars are confronted with the problem that many concepts/terms of securitization are undertheorized. Yet, this is not only true for an externalist reading but similarly for an internalist one. The main problem for an internalist theory of securitization is that one would need a clearer and more elaborated theory of the securitizing *act*. A central question, and perhaps dividing line, for the concept of 'act' is to what extent it should be thought of as an always political, contingent and momentous move (as favoured by Wæver) as opposed to a more cultural and sequential one, intensifying an already existing or even partly sedimented practice (as favoured by this article). Following the latter position, securitization studies would always need to be aware of the 'poetics' of the (threat) text, the 'hermeneutics' of its context and their political embeddedness in social relations of power.

While many scholars in favour of a more embedded approach to securitization would probably share a certain scepticism towards a Derridarian and/or decisionist approach to securitization — and Wæver's fascination for both — there isn't one single way to specify 'embeddedness' and/or the securitizing act. Several alternative suggestions have been made so far to better understand the 'act' of securitization, e.g. to conceptualize it as an illocution (Copenhagen School), perlocution (Balzacq, 2005), bodily performance (Hansen, 2000) or as a technocratic practice (Bigo, 2000, 2002). The most promising candidate for an explicitly internalist position would perhaps be to elaborate the concept of performativity. An explicitly internal, retroactive understanding of performative acts would then be clearly distinguishable from the externalist position suggested in this article of conceptualizing the securitizing act as an always situated articulation. Towards a more embedded reflection, one may well follow an explicitly Bourdieuian and/or moderate Foucauldian approach instead. The works by Bigo and Huysmans can be read as such an attempt (Bigo, 2000, 2002; Huysmans, 2002, 2006) with their focus on the role of security professionals and/or techniques of government/governance for framing (in)security.[19] In constrast to Bigo and Huysmans the proposed framework stresses more strongly linguistic text–discourse dynamics. Yet, metatheoretically, a broadly defined structurationist position is clearly compatible with an explicitly Bourdieuian approach and I would say also with at least a moderate Foucauldian one.[20]

Conclusion

In this article I have suggested reconceptualizing the current articulation of securitization posited by the Copenhagen School. The basic idea of security as a speech act itself is too limited to allow a scholar to study 'real-world' securitizations. In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a *single* security articulation at a *particular* point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a *process* of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. I have argued that the attempts of the Copenhagen School to capture these dynamics with a more comprehensive framework are hampered by too many contradictory concepts creating several tensions and multiple centres of gravity in their overall argument.

In light of this, I have suggested working with three layers of securitization: (1) the performative force of an articulated threat text, (2) its embeddedness in existing discourses and (3) the positional power of securitizing actors. Using this revised framework, more empirical insights into the relative importance and precise patterns of interaction can hopefully be generated which can then be compared in a systematic way to reflect upon how to improve securitization towards a more specific and comprehensive theory.

As a contribution to a consistent *theory of securitization*, I have argued for distinguishing two main centres of gravity which emerge from an internalist versus an externalist reading of securitization. Introducing the vocabulary of internalism/externalism to the debate on securitization theory has two advantages. First, it can be used as a lens directed towards the current writings of the Copenhagen School. As a result, a more systematic understanding of many otherwise isolated tensions and contradictions appears. In light of internalism/externalism, it becomes clear that the Copenhagen School struggles with and suffers from an attempt to have both, a social sphere (with 'actors', 'fields', 'authority', 'intersubjectivity', 'audience' and 'facilitating conditions') *and* a (poststructural/postmodern) linguistic theory based on Derrida and performativity. Yet, is not clear how one can have *pre*-established actors and *pre*-structured fields and at the same time claim that both are constituted *retro*-actively by performative acts. Second, the vocabulary of internalism/externalism directs more clearly towards future theoretical research. I have argued that a possible route for an internalist wing of securitization theory would be to elaborate the concept of performativity. For an externalist wing, this article has suggested working with the idea of discursive embeddedness which should be further specified in constant dialogue with a more consistent reservoir of insights from (comparative) empirical studies. Yet, whether a comprehensive theory, to which this article only attempts to make some suggestions, will

indeed finally end up as internalist and/or externalist, and as Copenhagen or beyond, is, ultimately, not for this article to decide.

Notes

1. I owe the term 'sequentiality' to frame specific pitfalls of the Copenhagen School to Michael Williams.
2. The notion of theory, and the related issue of causality versus constitution, are highly controversial. They have in the past often led to seemingly incommensurable understandings. A strictly empiricist/positivist understanding of testing 'a set of general propositions' stands (or has been portrayed to stand) in stark contrast to theory as merely a way of 'structuring the empirical material' — which is treated by other scholars as a 'framework'. Recent IR studies along the lines of critical realism suggest, however, that questions of theory, causality and truth can escape a stark 'positivism–postpositivism' dichotomy if a less empiricist understanding of theory and a more demanding concept of causality is applied (see e.g. Kurki, 2006).
3. This similarity does not imply that I would buy (all of) Hempel's strongly empiricist research programme.
4. By constructivism I refer to approaches which stress (1) the social constructedness of reality, (2) the ideational embeddedness of agency and (3) the focus on constitutive research. The latter point makes me doubt whether to also subsume those 'moderate' constructivist studies under 'constructivism' which operate with a very rigid understanding of causality and empirical testing and therefore appear indistinguishable from soft versions of rationalism.
5. For a reconstruction of the influence of Derrida on Wæver, see e.g. Taureck (2006) who elaborates Wæver's own reflections in *Security: The Speech Act* (Wæver, 1989). For a reflection on the role of Schmitt, see e.g. Williams (2003) and Huysmans (2006). To my knowledge, no one has yet elaborated the influence of Arendt; but see the very thoughtful article by Honig (1991) who compares Arendt and Derrida in a way that is also relevant to better understand the Copenhagen School's insistence on the always political nature of the speech act event.
6. This is why the procedural side of speech act philosophy is much less important than Balzacq (2005) assumes. This is clearly laid down in Wæver (1989).

7. It is controversial, however, whether Derrida really meant that all of reality operates within 'the text' and that interpretation never 'contextualizes' (see e.g. Roberts and Joseph, 2005: 109).

8. I would like to thank Janus Mortensen for introducing Zizek to me. For his own critical appraisal of the Copenhagen School, see Mortensen (1998).

9. See Wæver's own reflections on these problems (Wæver, 2003).

10. Strictly speaking, (linguistic) *felicity* conditions are conventions which regulate the *appropriate use* of utterances. They are not — or not necessarily — identical with (social) conditions of *success*. However, Wæver seems to conflate the two. For example, in *The EU as a Security Actor* he writes: 'On the basis of theories of speech acts, we can say that there are three "*felicity conditions*" *of a successful speech act*' (Wæver, 2000: 252; emphasis added). These conditions then seem to have the status of 'necessary but not sufficient' conditions since they always need to be realized by a *political act*.

11. As we have seen before, Derrida has stressed that meaning is always disseminated and can thus never be fixed.

12. My research on threat images shows that the framework is not limited to the securitization of organized crime. It is here just used to illustrate the framework.

13. This sentence draws on Hay (2002: 127).

14. Yet, although the performative force of a particular text may therefore be the most mysterious and contingent element of the three layers, a force that may never be explained fully by its general features, it would be interesting to examine empirically if some general patterns can still be identified by analysing which linguistic structures generate which effects. There are first hypotheses for such studies already, e.g. the assumption that more elusive structures are easier to translate and are thus more powerful (Best, 2001; Hall, 1989).

15. I owe the term 'intensification' to Michael Williams.

16. I do not claim that the concept of positional power is original. There are several examples both in the general literature on power and in the literature in IR which have invented more relational and/or positional concepts of power. See e.g. Baldwin (1989) and Guzzini (1993).

17. This draws a parallel to agenda-setting theories (Kingdom, 1995; Rochefort and Cobb, 1994; Eriksson and Noreen, 2002) which have identified various reasons why an actor may have the capacity to directly or indirectly influence issues that are put on the political agenda as opposed to those that are 'denied' (Cobb and Ross, 1997).

18. This connection between power and knowledge hints at a more Foucauldian approach to securitization. I will come to this point below when discussing the works of Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans.

19. Unfortunately, both scholars have so far only applied their embedded reflections systematically to internal security, especially to migration, and the EU context where the lines between the domestic and the international are much more blurred than elsewhere. My own comparative research on the representational threat dynamics of organized crime and proliferating states does not support the degree of similarity between internal and external security dynamics and discourse that Bigo takes for granted (see Stritzel, 2006).

20. To be compatible with a broadly defined structurationist approach, one would mainly have to read Foucault as less (macro-)structural and more actor-centred than is usually done.

References

Abrahamsen, Rita (2005) 'Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear', *Alternatives* 30(1): 50–80.

Archer, Margaret S. (1990) 'Human Agency and Social Structure: A Critique of Giddens', in Jon Clark, Celia Modgil and Sohan Modgil (eds) *Anthony Giddens: Consensus and Controversy*, pp. 73–84. Brighton: Falmer Press.

Archer, Margaret S. (1995) *Realist Social Theory. The Morphogenetic Approach.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Austin, John L. (1962) *How to Do Things with Words.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bachrach, Peter and Morton Baratz (1963) 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework', *American Political Science Review* 57(3): 632–42.

Baldwin, David (1989) *Paradoxes of Power.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Balzacq, Thierry (2005) 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context', *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2): 171–201.

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall (2004) *Power in Global Governance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall (2005) 'Power in International Politics', *International Organization* 59(4): 39–75.

Best, Joel (ed.) (2001) *How Claims Spread.* Hawthorne, NY: de Gruyter.

Bhaskar, Roy (1979) *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences.* Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Bigo, Didier (2000) 'When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisation in Europe', in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*, pp. 171–204. London: Routledge.

Bigo, Didier (2002) 'Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives* 27(1): 63–92.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) *Language and Symbolic Power.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Burke, Edmund (1958 [1757]) *A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful.* London: Routledge.

Butler, Judith (1990) *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.* London: Routledge.

Butler, Judith (1996) 'Performativity's Social Magic', in Theodore R. Schatzki and Wolfgang Natter (eds) *The Social and Political Body*, pp. 29–47. New York: Guilford Press.

Butler, Judith (1997) *Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative.* London: Routledge.

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver (1997) 'Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies', *Review of International Studies* 23(2): 241–50.

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver (2003) *Regions and Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Cobb, Roger W. and Marc H. Ross (1997) *Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial: Avoidance, Attack, and Redefinition*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Coker, Christopher (2002) 'Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century. NATO and the Management of Risk', Adelphi Paper No. 345, IISS and Oxford University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1972) 'Signature Event Context', *Glyph* 1: 172–97.

Derrida, Jacques (1977) 'Limited Inc a b c', *Glyph* 2: 162–254.

Doty, Roxanne L. (1993) 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines', *International Studies Quarterly* 37(3): 297–320.

Eriksson, Johann and Eric Noreen (2002) 'Setting the Agenda of Threats. An Explanatory Model', *Uppsala Peace Research Papers* No. 6.

Fairclough, Norman (1992) *Discourse and Social Change*. Oxford: Polity.

Fierke, Karin (1998) *Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Fumagalli, Matteo (2006) 'A Strategic-relational Approach to Post-Soviet Ethno-political Mobilization', paper presented at the PSA conference in Reading, April.

Giddens, Anthony (1984) *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity.

Guzzini, Stefano (1993) 'Structural Power. The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis', *International Organization* 47(3): 443–78.

Hall, Peter (ed.) (1989) *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hansen, Lene (2000) 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29(2): 285–306.

Hay, Colin (2002) *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave.

Hempel, Carl (1952) *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hess, Henner (1973) *Mafia and Mafiosi: The Structure of Power*. Farnborough: Heath.

Honig, Bonnie (1991) 'Declaration of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problems of Founding a Republic', *The American Political Science Review* 85(1): 97–113.

Huysmans, Jef (2002) 'Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security', *Alternatives* 27(1): 41–62.

Huysmans, Jef (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.

Jessop, Bob (2005) 'Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach', *New Formations* 54(2): 40–53.

Kenney, Dennis J. and Jom O. Finckenauer (1995) *Organized Crime in America*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Kingdom, John W. (1995) *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, 2nd edition. New York: HarperCollins.

Kurki, Milja (2006) 'Causes of a Divided Discipline: Rethinking the Concept of Cause in International Relations Theory', *Review of International Studies* 32(2): 189–216.

Lampe, Klaus von (1999) *Organized Crime: Begriff und Theorie organisierter Kriminalität in den USA*. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.

Laustsen, Carsten Bagge and Ole Wæver (2000) 'In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29(3): 705–39.

Lipset, Seymour Martin (1996) *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Lovell, Terry (2003) 'Resisting with Authority: Historical Specificity, Agency and the Performative Self', *Theory, Culture & Society* 20(1): 1–17.

Lukes, Steven (2005) 'Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33(3): 477–93.

Lukes, Steven (1974) *Power. A Radical View*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Maas, Peter (1968) *The Valachi Papers*. New York: Putnam.

McSweeney, Bill (1996) 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', *Review of International Studies* 22(1): 81–93.

McSweeney, Bill (1998) 'Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Wæver', *Review of International Studies* 24(1): 137–40.

McSweeney, Bill (1999) *Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, Michael (1985) *The Sources of Social Power*, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moore, William H. (1974) *The Kefauver Committee and the Politics of Crime 1950–1952*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Mortensen, Janus (1998) *Sikkerhed som talehandling: En kritisk gennemgang af Wævers sikkerhedsbegreb*. Copenhagen: Forlaget Politiske Studier.

Paoli, Letizia (2003) *Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parker, John (2000) *Structuration*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby (2001) 'Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30(2): 285–309.

Roberts, John A. and Jonathan Joseph (2005) 'Derrida, Foucault and Zizek: Being Realistic About Social Theory', *New Formations* 54(2): 109–20.

Rochefort, David A. and Roger W. Cobb (eds) (1994) *The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Ruth, David E. (1996) *Inventing the Public Enemy: The Gangster in American Culture 1918–1934*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. (1978) *Robert Kennedy and His Times*. London: Deutsch.

Schmidt, Brian C. (2005) 'Competing Realist Conceptions of Power', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33(3): 523–50.

Smith, Dwight C. (1975) *The Mafia Mystique*. New York: Basic Books.

Stritzel, Holger (2006) 'The Möbius Ribbon of Insecurity: Myth or Reality?', paper presented at the conference 'Critical Approaches to Security in Europe II — Constructing Insecurity and the Political', 29 September–1 October, Tampere, FL.

Taureck, Rita (2006) 'Securitisation Theory — The Story So Far (Part One): Theoretical Inheritance and What it Means to be a Poststructural Realist', paper presented at the 47th annual ISA convention, 22–25 March, San Diego, CA.

Wæver, Ole (1989) 'Security, the Speech Act: Analyzing the Politics of a Word (and the Transformation of a Continent)', unpublished manuscript.

Wæver, Ole (1995) 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*, pp. 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wæver, Ole (1997) *Concepts of Security*. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science.

Wæver, Ole (2000) 'The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post Sovereign Security Orders', in Morton Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, pp. 250–94. London: Routledge.

Wæver, Ole (2001) 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy', in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds) *European Integration and National Identity*, pp. 20–50. London: Routledge.

Wæver, Ole (2003) 'Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies', unpublished manuscript.

Wæver, Ole (2004) 'Ole Wæver's 10,' *Tidsskriftet Politik* 7(4), December; (http://www.tidsskriftetpolitik.dk/index.php?id=125, December 2005).

Wallerstein, Immanuel (2003) *The Decline of American Power*. New York: The New Press.

Weldes, Jutta (1996) 'Constructing National Interest', *European Journal of International Relations* 2(3): 275–318.

Wight, Colin (1999) 'They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They? Locating Agency in the Agent–Structure Problematique', *European Journal of International Relations* 5(1): 109–42.

Wight, Colin (2006) *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, Michael C. (2003) 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', *International Studies Quarterly* 47(4): 511–31.

Wodak, Ruth (2001a) 'What CDA is About — Summary of its History, Important Concepts and its Developments', in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 1–13. London: Sage.

Wodak, Ruth (2001b) 'The Discourse-historical Approach', in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 63–94. London: Sage.

Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer (2001) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.

Zizek, Slavoj (1989) *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.