CHAPTER 8
Civil Society Initiatives Tackling
Disinformation: Experiences of Central
European Countries
Jonáš Syrovátka
8.1 Introduction
One of the most signiﬁcant milestones of the disinformation debate and
one which is referenced constantly was the situation following the June
2014 downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine.
Consequently, a mass of disinformation literally ﬂooded the Internet and
thus complicated the ability to judge what had actually happened. Despite
that, the nature, causes, and culprits of the incident were disclosed quite
swiftly, and a number of false stories were identiﬁed and debunked. The
key role in this development was played by the organisation Bellingcat,
composed of independent investigative journalists who put all the pieces
J. Syrovátka (B)
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University,
Brno, Czechia
e-mail: syrovatka10@seznam.cz
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
M. Gregor and P. Mlejnková (eds.), Challenging Online
Propaganda and Disinformation in the 21st Century,
Political Campaigning and Communication,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58624-9_8
225
226 J. SYROVÁTKA
of this tragic story together and introduced it to the public (Bellingcat
2019).
However, the famous story of Bellingcat and the MH17 incident
represents only one of many examples of civil society initiatives tackling
disinformation. In recent years, a number of various entities from already
established civil society organisations (CSOs) to passionate individuals all
over Europe started to focus on this phenomenon. This wave of activity
comprises varied initiatives like the Baltic Elves volunteers exposing trolls
and fake proﬁles on social media, fact-checkers from the Ukrainian organisation
StopFake, or activists from the Stop Funding Hate initiative trying
to convince private companies not to advertise on websites spreading hate
speech or conspiracy theories.
An attempt to provide an exhausting account of all civil society
initiatives tackling disinformation within one chapter would be far too
descriptive, far too long, and more too confusing than a phonebook. The
author, however, does not intend to choose the opposite approach either,
which would be to cherry-pick the most interesting cases. Especially since
this narrow perspective brings with it the danger of taking a story out
of its original context, not allowing its successes as well as the limitations
of its application in other environments to be properly explained.
Therefore, this chapter attempts to ﬁnd a middle way between both
mentioned approaches and to describe all the relevant initiatives tackling
disinformation launched by civil society in central European countries.
Speciﬁc attention will be dedicated to Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and Slovakia. This geographical limitation, which, as will be explained, is
quite logical in relation to the given subject, will allow a (still relatively)
precise description of the approaches applied to tackle disinformation by
various civil society actors. However, the chapter has further ambitions
and focuses also on the identity and dynamic of civil society activities
in the analysed countries. By doing so, it might comment not only on
civil society actors themselves but also on the context in which they are
operating.
This perspective has proved to be relevant. The ﬁndings of the chapter
show that the context matters as signiﬁcant differences among civil society
actors tackling disinformation in the analysed countries were identiﬁed.
While, on the one hand, there is vivid debate involving a wide variety of
actors producing innovative approaches to the issue in Czech Republic
and Slovakia, in Hungary and Poland, on the other hand, the issue of
disinformation attracts limited attention, resulting in a low number of
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 227
activities dedicated to it as well as the choosing of rather conservative
strategies to tackle this issue. This ﬁnding to a certain extent questions
the possibility of transporting the experiences to different countries and
recalls the importance of properly evaluating local contexts.
8.2 Civil Society and Disinformation
in Current Understanding and Literature
A vibrant, active, and daring civil society is perceived as a key element of
a democratic political system. Some theories even consider it to be one
of the necessary conditions for the existence of democracy (Diamond and
Morlino 2005). Despite the resonance of this term, its deﬁnition remains
contested, which is not that surprising given not only the heterogeneity of
various civil society actors but also the fact that this topic has attracted the
attention of social scientists only relatively recently. However, among all
deﬁnitions, the strongest emphases are put on the role of civil society as a
balance to the power of state, its heterogeneity, and its voluntary nature.
For the purposes of this text, civil society is understood as a ‘sphere of
institutions, organisations and individuals located between the family, the
state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to advance
common interest’ (Anheier 2013, 22).
Among many areas in which civil society might advance common interests,
the security domain is one of the most interesting, especially since
this area used to be seen as reserved for state institutions, such as military,
police, or intelligence services, in the past. This view has however been
challenged, and some scholars in security studies today put more emphasis
on a wider spectrum of threats, including the societal one (Collins 2010).
In this view, obviously, the role of civil society in security is becoming
equally as important as the role of state intuitions. This fact has been
reﬂected by various authors who have evaluated the role civil society actors
might play in the security domain. It has, for example, been argued that
civil society is sensitive to the various changes occurring in society, and
so it might serve as an early warning system against upcoming threats
(Anheier 2013). Nevertheless, civil society actors are also seen as important
players in formulating security policies because they provide feedback
and recommendations to state institutions active in the security domain
as well as to political decision-makers. At the same time, emphasis has
been placed on their important role as watchdogs scrutinising state security
policies, warning against them should they be considered a threat
228 J. SYROVÁTKA
to the democratic system (Caparini et al. 2006). The underlining thesis
of this chapter is that the reactions of civil society to the disinformation
phenomenon represents an exemplary case study of its ability to advance
common interests in the area security.
An illustrative example of this thesis is the Ukrainian case, in which
state intuitions were ill-prepared for the confrontation with the Russian
Federation starting in 2014. In addition to other areas, Ukrainian civil
society was able to mobilise and defend itself in the information domain,
which represented an important part of the conﬂict, from threats of
propaganda and disinformation campaigns launched by the adversary
(for a detailed account of these initiatives, see Gerasymchuk and Maksak
2018). Since the Ukrainian initiatives tackling disinformation were operating
in the laboratory of information warfare, they are often used as
models for civil society actors in other countries (for example, Pesenti
and Pomerantsev 2016). In fact, civil society started to be perceived as
an indispensable part of the effort to tackle disinformation (see Nimmo
2015; Fried and Polyakova 2018). Based on this assumption, in the years
that followed, a number of civil society initiatives aiming to expose and
tackle disinformation were launched all over the Europe; among many
others, it is possible to name the Brussels-based EU DisinfoLab, the
UK-based Bellingcat, the German Marshall Fund’s Hamilton 68, and
the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab. The relevance of
these initiatives was acknowledged at the political level as manifested, for
example, by their mention in the European Union’s Action Plan against
Disinformation (European Commission 2018).
The list of initiatives launched to tackle disinformation could continue
for a long time. However, to list the countless civil society actors which
have emerged over the past several years all over Europe (or even globally)
and the strategies they have employed against disinformation would
not be helpful in understanding the topic. On the contrary, not only
could this list never be complete or up-to-date given the vibrant development
in this area, moreover, it would not be able (especially with such
limited space) to properly contextualise the presented initiatives either.
This problem might be solved by cherry-picking the most well-known
initiatives. However, the author is convinced that this approach would
have added little value since their activities have already been described
elsewhere.
Therefore, the author has tried to ﬁnd a middle path and describe
civil society initiatives which have emerged in a selected group of central
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 229
European countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
This narrowing of the research scope can be defended by several arguments.
First, it is an attempt to ﬁnd a reasonable compromise between
the range of presented examples and their proper description within the
space provided by this chapter. The second rather pragmatic reason is the
author’s acquaintance with the development of Czech civil society in tackling
disinformation1 and the network of contacts with other researchers
from the analysed countries. This background allowed the author to
conduct a meticulous assessment of the situation in the region. The
analyses in the chosen countries, thirdly, provide an interesting comparative
perspective. Although they have national speciﬁcs, this perspective
is possible to apply due to the fact that the analysed countries are to the
certain extent similar: the same geographical position between western
and eastern Europe, a similar history symbolised by democratisation after
the fall of the Iron Curtain, integration into Western political structures
(such as NATO and European Union), the emergence of populist and
nationalists forces in recent years, and being perceived by the Russian
Federation as within its wider area of inﬂuence. At the same time,
however, as this chapter also shows, it is possible to witness a number
of differences in the ﬁeld this edited volume is dedicated to; for example,
the respective civil societies have a different level of interest in the issue
of disinformation, varying perceptions of this phenomenon, and they use
different strategies to tackle it. Hence a narrowing of the research scope
will not only allow for a description of the existing initiatives themselves
but also their proper contextualisation.
This kind of contribution is highly necessary since the comparative
perspective is missing in existing literature dedicated to civil society
initiatives tackling disinformation, and not only in central Europe. Most
publications dedicated to this issue were published by local CSOs, which
brings with them certain deﬁciencies. The content of these studies is
not in question, but it is appropriate to highlight certain limitations
in their use as a foundation of academic research. Firstly, there is the
lack of methodology as well as a non-transparent evaluation and editing
procedure which does not allow, for example, one to understand why
certain examples of practices were chosen for presentation and others not.
1The author works as programme manager of projects related to disinformation and
strategic communications in the think-tank Prague Security Studies Institute based in
Czech Republic.
230 J. SYROVÁTKA
This limitation is closely related to a second, which lies in the pragmatic
reasoning of these publications. This results in (from perspective of CSOs
completely legitimate) ambition not to provide in-depth analysis of civil
society actors and their actions but rather a selection of the most interesting
examples to follow. This tendency is strengthened even more by
the multiple aims of these publication, which are usually dedicated exclusively
to civic society actors as well as other subjects that hinder in-depth
analysis and predeﬁne the perspectives in which the actions of civil society
are understood.
Examples of studies produced by CSOs which map civic society
activities tackling disinformation are as follows: The Czech think-tank
European Values Center for Security Policy described the activities of civil
society in Western states in a study of countermeasures against the subversion
operations of the Kremlin (Kremlin Watch 2018) as well as in The
Prague Manual, presenting best practices in countering malign foreign
inﬂuences (Janda and Víchová 2018). The pro-Kremlin propaganda in
central and eastern Europe and various initiatives against it was mapped
by Czech CSO Nesehnutí (Dufkova and Hofmeisterova 2018). Another
study, also focused on the same region and its resilience against disinformation
and which mentioned projects in the area of media literacy,
was published by the Ukrainian think-tank Prism (Damarad and Yeliseyeu
2018). The Slovak think-tank GLOBSEC Policy Institute also published a
study focused solely on youth and media literacy as well as projects trying
to enhance it within central Europe and western Balkan countries (Hajdu
and Klingová 2018).
The activities of civil society initiatives tackling disinformation have
also already become the subject of rather critical scrutiny from academic
researchers who have pointed out their inﬂuence over the public discourse
about this issue. Their studies are focused on the identity and interactions
of chosen civil society actors. Even though these investigations are less
interested in practices, they still provide interesting accounts of actors in
this area. Unfortunately, at the moment, they remain limited to Czech
Republic and focused on a period between 2014 and 2016; therefore,
they are not able to capture recent developments (Daniel and Eberle
2018; Kohút and Rychnovská 2018).
To summarise, there are important reasons why researchers should be
focused more on the currently understudied issue of civil society actors
tackling disinformation. Firstly, this example represents an interesting case
study of civil society mobilisation in the area of security, which was until
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 231
very recently seen as reserved to state institutions. Further research may
produce interesting ﬁndings about the role of civil society in democratic
societies in general. Secondly, this kind of research may prove
extremely useful in preserving civil society initiatives. Since currently
existing initiatives are not mapped properly, it is highly likely that, in the
hectic environment of CSOs with very low-level institutional memory, the
gathered expertise will be lost. Bringing more clarity to already-existing
projects also contributes to efﬁciency in the planning of future activities
by CSOs themselves and in the organising of networks that will allow
effective labour sharing. Thirdly, it is necessary to bring more clarity to
the role of civil society actors in decision-making. Since CSOs may have
impact on public discourse about disinformation and (possibly also) how
measures tackling this phenomenon are crafted by state institutions and
policymakers, they should be subject to public scrutiny like any other
actor involved in the decision-making process.
8.3 How to Research Civil
Society Properly and Ethically?
As was already mentioned, the concept of civil society remains vague, and
it is thus not easy to decide which initiatives can be considered a part
of this category. This obstacle is even more problematic since civil society
itself is heterogenous and comprises a number of various actors from individual
activists focused on local communities up to large CSOs operating
internationally. Another obstacle in mapping civil society is its dynamism,
which results in changes to their topic of interest and, consequently, their
activities. This fact was quite profound in the researched area of disinformation,
which was in many cases not a primary but rather a supplementary
ﬁeld of interest among the described actors.
The author decided to overcome the challenge of the applied concept’s
unclear boundaries by creating a dataset of actors who declared themselves
as active in the area of disinformation and are based in the analysed countries.
Activity in this area does not mean only occasionally commenting
on the issue but rather long-term and consistent interested in the topic.
Even though the chapter tries to provide a complex account of initiatives
in the analysed countries, the author cannot guarantee some of civil
society initiatives were not omitted. However, given his personal experience
and consultations with experts from the analysed countries, he dares
232 J. SYROVÁTKA
to claim the chapter presents all actors whose activities are relevant and are
having tangible results and inﬂuence on local debates and communities.
The chapter aims to analyse not only the activities and strategies of civil
society actors but also the dynamic of the debate on the issue of disinformation
in the analysed countries. This knowledge will provide further
understanding of the context in which these actors operate. The dynamic
of the debate will be assessed from the number of civil society actors who
have started to be involved in activities tackling disinformation over time.
The dynamic development of civil society actors complicates the assessment
of which time they started to be interested in the particular issue.
However, for our purposes, this category will be measured according to
the year their ﬁrst public output—publishing research, an article, or a
book; conducting certain activity; or launching a website—was identiﬁed.
Even more problematic is assessing whether they are still active in the
area. Therefore, the focus is solely on the year a civil society actor became
active in tackling disinformation; its eventual termination of activities in
this ﬁled will be mentioned only if is possible to prove.
In assessing the identity of a civil society actor, Anheier’s (2013)
methodology was utilised in identifying individuals, organisations, and
institutions. This categorisation allowed inclusion into the dataset of
two other types of actors whose afﬁliation with civil society might be
questioned: journalists and academics. These actors were crucial for the
debate on disinformation in the analysed countries, and so their exclusion
from the dataset would obscure the research results. At the same, their
speciﬁcity must be understood, and they are therefore treated as separate
categories in the chapter. As for ‘regular’ civil society actors, their
inclusion in the dataset is conditioned by long-term, consistent, and selfproclaimed
interest in the area. Therefore, the dataset will, for example,
include only those journalists who write about disinformation on a regular
basis and have tried to move the debate on this issue further through
their own (for example, investigative) projects. In summary, the categories
described in the chapter are as follows:
• individuals—persons or smaller informal groups established to tackle
disinformation via various means;
• organisations (CSOs)—organised and structuralised entities with a
broad area of interest who have added the topic of disinformation to
their agenda; and
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 233
• institutions—established institutions operating independently from
the state, including
– media (outlets or individual journalists who were or are active
in the debate on disinformation) and
– academia (universities, research institutions, or individual
researchers afﬁliated with academic institutions who were or are
active in the debate on disinformation).
Before presenting the research itself, it should be noted that this kind
of area requires certain ethical consideration. Since disinformation might
be a useful weapon to foreign or domestic non-democratic actors, one
could argue that describing those who tackle this phenomenon puts them
in danger, especially when organisations and individuals are named and
their activities described. Despite that understanding of this argument,
the author does not consider it to be a limitation in this research. Since
the data presented in the chapter relies solely on open sources—in most
cases published by researched civil society actors themselves—the chapter
does not mention anything that the researched organisations would not
be willing (and maybe even be eager) to communicate to the public.
While the security concerns certainly should be seriously considered in
context of authoritarian regimes, the situation in central European countries,
despite a certain indisputable backlash against democratic principles
in some of them, is still far from severe. As such, there is no need to
anonymise the proponents of civil society (Freedom House 2019).
8.4 Civil Society Actors Tackling
Disinformation in Central Europe
Even at ﬁrst sight, it is obvious that debates in individual countries differ.
Dissimilarity concerns all the observed category variables: the time at
which most actors came to be involved in the tackling of this issue and
the identity of civil society actors, as well as their activities (Fig. 8.1).
Generally, it is possible to distinguish two groups among the analysed
countries. In the ﬁrst, consisting of Czech Republic and Slovakia,
it is possible to identify the involvement of a large number of civil
society actors in tackling disinformation (30 in Czech Republic and 26
in Slovakia). The identities of the involved actors are very diverse and
234 J. SYROVÁTKA
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Prior
2014
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
CZ
HU
PL
SL
Fig. 8.1 Number of newly established civil society initiatives tackling disinformation
by year (Source Author)
comprises almost all the categories covered in the chapter. In both countries,
the debate also had similar dynamics: It peaked in Czech Republic
in 2015–16, and the following year in Slovakia. Given the wide variety of
civil society actors involved, it is possible to encounter various strategies
and approaches in tackling disinformation. It is also worth mentioning
that civil society in Czech Republic and Slovakia stimulates activities
related to disinformation across the whole region since local CSOs initiate
cross-border projects related to this issue, and initiatives from these
countries are copied elsewhere.
The situation in the second group, consisting of Hungary and Poland,
is very different. The number of civil society actors tackling disinformation
is lower (6 in Hungary and 14 in Poland). Moreover, the issue of disinformation
is not usually the primary interest of the presented civil society
actors but rather a secondary activity (often caused only be involvement
in projects conducted in cooperation with partners from Czech Republic
or Slovakia). This situation has led to the application of a limited set of
strategies to tackle disinformation which are often untraditional, do not
going beyond the goal of a particular project, or are conditioned by the
identity of the civil society actor. A slight difference between Hungary
and Poland is the intensity of the debate as such. While in the case of
Hungary, it is not possible to indicate any turning point from which civil
society has started to be interested in this issue, for Poland this occurred
in 2017 (Fig. 8.2).
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 235
13
1
7
2
6
9
4
3
4
1
15
4
1
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
CZ HU PL SK
Academia
Media
Organiza on
Individual
Fig. 8.2 Identity of civil society actors in individual countries (Source Author)
These differences clearly illustrate that even in such a coherent region,
domestic factors clearly matter. Therefore, the rest the chapter will offer a
closer look into the separate civil societies of the central European countries,
describing individual actors and their most important activities and
strategies.
8.4.1 Czech Republic
The number of civil society actors tackling disinformation in Czech
Republic was the highest among the analysed countries—30 in total.
As visible in Fig. 8.1, the number of civil society actors included in the
dataset skyrocketed in 2015 when seven new individuals and organisations
became active. This trend continued the following year when another six
new actors got involved in tackling disinformation. Interest in the issues
of disinformation remains high even now as illustrated by the fact that
new initiatives are still emerging—ﬁve new civic society actors became
active in 2018 and another six in 2019. The identity of civil society actors
is the most heterogenous out of all the analysed countries. In the dataset,
13 individuals are present, seven CSOs, four actors from the media,
and six actors from academia. The particularly high level of involvement
of universities and research institutes in the initiatives tackling disinformation
is unique in the context of the central European region. This
variety of actors has resulted in different strategies, including research,
fact-checking, educational activities, political advocacy, and investigative
journalism. A signiﬁcant effort was also made to create platforms where
236 J. SYROVÁTKA
various civil society actors involved in this issue might interact. Moreover,
the Czech debate on disinformation is unique due to the existence of civil
society actors who present critical reﬂection upon the current discourse
of this issue, and it has thus stimulated a debate about the legitimacy and
effectivity of the applied initiatives.
Individuals and smaller, rather informal civil society initiatives started
to be involved in the issue of disinformation even before this issue became
an important part of public agenda. Prior to 2014, it is possible to
identify two initiatives which might not necessarily have been perceived
themselves as tackling disinformation at the time of their foundation
but were already applying the strategies currently utilised to tackle this
phenomenon later on: The website Hoax (established in 2000) aims to
warn users against various hoaxes, chain mail, and other internet content
which might endanger the user and is not in accordance with netiquette
guidelines (Hoax, n.d.), and the project ‘Demagog’ (launched in 2012)
focuses on the fact-checking of political debates (Demagog CZ, n.d.).
A distinct feature were individuals (as well as other civil society actors)
which started to tackle disinformation after 2015 with a strong emphasis
on the security dimension of the phenomena, also seen as closely interlinked
with Russian inﬂuence operations launched against Western states
after the start of the conﬂict in Ukraine in 2014. The inﬂuence of these
events on the Czech debate is illustrated by Roman Máca, an independent
blogger who ﬁrst started to write about the situation in Ukraine and
then became interested in describing and exposing various platforms and
groups spreading disinformation related to Ukraine in Czech Republic.
At the time of this writing, in January 2020, he is still working on this
issue as a programme manager at the think-tank Institute for Politic and
Society (Institute for Politics and Society, n.d.), run by the Czech political
party ANO. Another initiative, launched in 2015, is the website
Manipulátoˇri (Manipulators), which raises awareness about the issue of
disinformation as well as fact-checking and launching smaller investigative
projects (Manipulátoˇri 2020). One of the founders of Manipulátoˇri
Petr Nutil published the book Média, lži a pˇríliš rychlý mozek (Media,
lies, and a brain that’s too fast) focused on issues of online manipulation,
propaganda, and media literacy in 2018 (Nutil 2018). Before the
release of Nutil’s publication, three other books focused on disinformation
were published. First was Pr˚umysl lži—Propaganda, konspirace a
dezinformaˇcní válka (Industry of lies—propaganda, conspiracy, and disinformation
warfare) by PR expert Alexandra Alvarová, who also conducts
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 237
public lectures dedicated to these issues (Rozsypal 2019). The second
contribution to the debate was the book Informaˇcní válka (Information
warfare) by a colonel of the Czech Army Karel ˇRehka, which focused on
the issue of disinformation and propaganda in military operations ( ˇRehka
2017). The third case, published in 2018, represents a popular book
called Nejlepší kniha o fake news, dezinformacích a manipulacích!!! (The
best book on fake news, disinformation, and manipulation!!!) written
by scholars Miloš Gregor, Petra Vejvodová, and their students (Gregor
et al. 2018). The same year, based on an example from the Baltics, a
group of activists started the civic movement ˇCeští elfové (Czech elves)
focused on mapping the spread of disinformation via chain mail and
social network trolls. Monitoring dedicated to these issues is published
on monthly basis (Romea 2018). At the same time, the issue of disinformation
also attracted greater attention in the private sector. František
Vrábel, CEO of the company Semantic Visions, which is involved in open
source analysis, started to be more present in the media while presenting
its research related to disinformation (Semantic Visions 2019). In 2019,
a former member of the East Stratcom Task Force2 Jakub Kalenský
moved from Brussels back to Prague and, as a senior fellow of the Digital
Forensic Research Lab of the Atlantic Council, started to contribute to
the Czech debate as well. Another book focused on disinformation, V
síti (dez)informací (In the net of (dis)information) by PR consultant
Jiˇrí Táborský, focused on manipulation techniques and the current situation
in information space (Táborský 2019). Two further initiatives were
launched as well: ‘#jsmetu’ (#wearehere), aiming to decrease the polarisation
of debate on social media inspired by an example from Sweden
(#JsmeTu, n.d.), and ‘Fair Advertising’, raising awareness about online
advertisements on platforms known to be spreading disinformation by
publishing examples on its Twitter account similar to the US organisation
Sleeping Giants (Cemper 2019).
Over time the issue of disinformation started to attract the attention
of various established CSOs focused on issues of security, media,
or human rights, and who included various projects related to this topic
in their portfolio. The most prominent example of this approach is the
CSO European Values Center for Security Policy (EVCSP), which, upon
2A department of the European External Action Service tasked with tackling disinfor-
mation.
238 J. SYROVÁTKA
entering the area of disinformation in 2015, signiﬁcantly shifted the development
of the whole organisation, especially by launching its programme
‘Kremlin Watch’ in 2016 focused on raising awareness about the issue
of Russian inﬂuence operations. EVCSP put the issue of disinformation
at the centre of its agenda. Due to this fact, EVCSP became not only
a publicly acclaimed authority on the issue but also a counterpart for
state institutions, for example, while drafting the 2016 National Security
Audit (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic 2016). Another
CSO, which entered the scene in 2015, was the Prague Security Studies
Institute, which over time switched its focus from the role of disinformation
in Russian inﬂuence operations to researching the inﬂuence
of disinformation on Czech elections and the area of strategic communications
(Prague Security Studies Institute, n.d.). The well-established
CSO Association for International Affairs, which focused on research and
education in the area of international relations, started to be involved in
tackling disinformation in 2016 through the launch of a Czech version
of the Ukrainian initiative ‘StopFake’ (StopFake, n.d.a); it also became a
research partner in international projects focused on this area. The rapid
development in civic society also attracted the attention of CSOs facilitating
funding and networking among various civil society actors.3 The
most noteworthy example is a project of the Open Society Foundation
Prague (OSF), focused on Russian inﬂuence activities in Czech Republic
and Slovakia and which launched in 2016. Aside from funding projects
related to this topic, OSF also attempted to create a network among
organisations active in this area, conducted its own research, and hold
events. The programme was concluded in 2018, and OSF is no longer
active in this area (Nadace OSF, n.d.). Another CSO, which is at the same
time a ﬁnancial donor, is the Endowment Fund for Independent Journalism,
which has supported various projects focused on disinformation
since its establishment in 2016 (NFNŽ, n.d.). One of the biggest Czech
CSOs People in Need, which is focused primary on humanitarian aid and
human rights, had already started to conduct projects tackling disinformation
in 2015 when it included this topic in its educational activities
3The chapter takes into an account only CSOs with a presence in Czech Republic (and,
respectively, other analysed countries) and were active in creating the network of domestic
civil society actors. Therefore, donors from abroad (such as the US National Endowment
for Democracy) are not mentioned despite the fact that they played an important role in
shaping the debate on disinformation in central Europe.
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 239
(Jeden svˇet na školách, n.d.). However, it has also recently started being
involved in events facilitating the network of civil society actors interested
in this issue by, for example, organising the conference ‘Cyber Dialogue’
in 2019 (Cyber Dialogue 2019). In 2018, the CSO Transitions, focused
mainly on the education of journalists, became involved in tackling disinformation
by launching a series of lectures and workshops about media
literacy for the elderly (Transitions 2018).
The dynamic activities of Czech civil society related to tackling disinformation
did not go unnoticed by the media due, in part, to the fact that
journalists themselves played an important role in the debate about this
phenomenon. Investigative journalist Ondˇrej Kundra (working for the
weekly Respekt) started to write about disinformation extensively in 2015
and conducted an in–depth investigation into the notorious conspiracy
website Aeronet (Kundra 2015). Other actors involved in writing about
disinformation were the news portal Hlídací Pes (Watch Dog), especially
in its news section dedicated to Russian interests in Czech Republic, and
the news portal Neovlivní (Uninﬂuenced), which published in 2016 one
of the ﬁrst lists of websites spreading disinformation (Neovlivní 2016).
Another journalist who contributed to the debate about disinformation is
Jakub Zelenka, who in 2018 received a young journalists award for the
project ‘Dezinformace: Co pro vás znamenají lži?’ (Disinformation: What
do lies mean to you?) (Poljakov et al. 2017).
As in other analysed countries, universities also played a role in tackling
disinformation. It should be highlighted that this does not mean
they ‘only’ conducted academic research on this topic, but rather they
mainly sought to actively enter the public debate on this issue. Masaryk
University started to be engaged in research on this issue in 2016.
The environment at this university also allowed for the creation of
two student initiatives focused on raising awareness about these issues
and empowering critical thinking and media literacy among youth by
introducing the educational activities ‘Zvol si info’ (Choose the information;
established in 2016) and ‘Fakescape’ (established in 2018). These
two projects were later separated from the university and now operate
independently. Furthermore, it was at this university that the project
‘Dezimatrix’, aimed at conducting multidisciplinary research about disinformation,
was launched in 2019 (Dezimatrix, n.d.). In the same year,
Palacký University Olomouc launched the project ‘Euforka’ focused on
informing about the European Union as well as debunking disinformation
240 J. SYROVÁTKA
related to this issue. This initiative later involved other Czech universities
(Palacky University Olomouc 2019). Researchers of the Institute of
International Relations, a research institution supervised by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, published a 2018 article on the Czech debate about
hybrid threats (in which disinformation was one of the main topics) and
reﬂected the argumentation and development of its actors (Daniel and
Eberle 2018). An important role in the increasing awareness of the disinformation
phenomena and the promotion of critical thinking was played
by the wide net of libraries in Czech Republic. For example, in 2019, the
Moravian Library in Brno launched the project ‘Používej mozek’ (Use
your brain), comprised of a series of lectures dedicated to critical thinking
and media literacy (Winkler and Pazdersky, n.d.).
8.4.2 Hungary
The number of Hungarian civil society actors tackling disinformation
was the lowest of all the analysed countries (six in total). Given the low
number of civil society actors, it is not possible to trace any dynamic in the
debate on this issue (see Fig. 8.1). However, in looking at the time scale,
it is possible to observe that research on the topic of disinformation had
started already in 2010 when the CSO Political Capital launched research
projects focused on anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. This example is quite
illustrative since it shows that the roots and focus of the debate on disinformation
in Hungary is different than that of Czech Republic. While
Czech civil society perceived disinformation as an external phenomenon
related to Russian inﬂuence operations in Europe after 2014, Hungarian
actors were more interested in those originating from the domestic environment.
This is especially true of media (representing three civil society
actors in total), who usually started as independent news sites with an
emphasis on investigative reporting related to domestic issues and later
added the issue of disinformation to their agendas.
Similarly, as in the Czech case, the spread of hoaxes on the Internet
had already attracted the attention of civil society at the beginning of
millennium. The website Urbanlegends had already started to map these
kinds of stories in 2004 (Urbanlegends, n.d.). However, disinformation
as a security threat or, more broadly, as a phenomenon which could jeopardise
democracy was introduced only later. As was mentioned, one of the
key players in this debate was the CSO Political Capital, which focused on
researching policy related topics and who had already started to focus on
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 241
them in 2010. Since then, this CSO conducts research projects focused on
foreign (namely Russian) and homegrown disinformation and propaganda
campaigns (Political Capital 2019). The CSO Centre for Euro-Atlantic
Integration and Democracy (n.d.) was a partner organisation in several
projects focused solely on Russian information warfare between 2016 and
2018.
As was previously mentioned, the attention of media dedicated to the
phenomenon of disinformation is mostly related to other malfunctions
of the Hungarian government, such as corruption or the undermining
of democratic institutions. An illustrative case is a group of investigative
reports from the website Átlátszó (Transparent), which started to be
active in 2011 and proclaims its mission as mainly investigative reporting,
working with whistle-blowers and other watchdog practitioners. Nevertheless,
in 2017, Átlátszó added a new government propaganda section
to its website focused on media freedom and homegrown disinformation
campaigns (Átlátszó, n.d.). A similar story might be told about other
media outlets, such as Direkt36, established in 2015 (Direkt36, n.d.),
or K-Monitor, which conducted workshops on disinformation in 2019
(K-Monitor 2019). These media publications were primarily focused on
investigative reporting but later added the issue of disinformation and
propaganda to their agendas as well.
8.4.3 Poland
As Fig. 8.1 shows, the dynamicity of Polish civil society initiatives tackling
disinformation peaked in 2017 with fourteen in total during the covered
period. The number of actors is low given that Poland is bigger than
the other three countries combined. The proportional representation of
CSOs among the categories of civil society actors is the highest of all
analysed countries. However, for Polish CSOs, disinformation remains a
rather secondary topic of interest in which they have become involved
mainly due to participation in cross-border projects or the interest of individual
researchers. These factors likely contributed to the fact that several
initiatives described below are no longer active. Another remarkable
feature of the Polish debate on disinformation is the differing perception
of the phenomenon. While CSOs usually research it in the context
of Russian inﬂuence operations, the majority of media have focused on
those of domestic origin. These different understandings of the causes
242 J. SYROVÁTKA
and context of disinformation has resulted in different strategies being
applied in tackling this issue.
As in other countries, individuals and smaller civil society initiatives
started to be involved in tackling disinformation ﬁrst. In the Polish environment,
2014 saw the launch of the Slovak-inspired project ‘Demagog’
in order to fact-check political debates (Demagog PL, n.d.) as well as the
Polish branch of the Ukrainian initiative ‘StopFake’ (StopFake, n.d.b).
In 2015, the initiative ‘Rosyjska V kolumna w Polsce’ (Fifth Russian
column in Poland) was launched with the aim of increasing awareness
about Russian propaganda in Poland and debunking disinformation.
However, the initiative stopped in 2019 after the project founder was
sued for claims publicised on the project’s Facebook site (WirtualneMedia
2019). In 2018, the initiative ‘Wojownicy Klawiatury’ (Keyboard ﬁghters)
was launched with the aim of debunking disinformation related to the
European Union and to promote a positive image of it (Partycypacja
Obywatelska 2019).
The involvement of Polish CSOs in tackling disinformation, as
mentioned above, is unstable. The most telling story is that of the Cybersecurity
Foundation, whose mission is to increase awareness about various
threats related to cyberspace. Due to this specialisation, it launched two
projects aiming to raise awareness about this issue: in 2015, the Twitter
account ‘Disinfo Digest’, reporting and debunking disinformation in the
information environment, and, in 2017, a project with a similar aim
called ‘Infoops Poland’ (Warsaw Institute 2018). However, both of these
projects were supervised by Kamil Basaj, who left the foundation in 2018,
effectively halting their activities related to disinformation. Basaj later
established his own organisation, INFO OPS Polska (Fundacja INFO
OPS Polska, n.d.). As in Czech Republic, established Polish CSOs active
in research on international relations and security did not adopt the issue
of disinformation to their agenda. For example, the Centre for International
Relations conducted several projects focused on the research
of disinformation in relation to Russian inﬂuence operations starting in
2015, but most of them were dependent on the activity of one researcher,
Antoni Wierzejskii (Centrum Stosunków Mi˛edzynarodowych, n.d.). Similarly,
the Centre for Eastern Studies, whose focus on Russian politics
and society might have led to broader interest in disinformation in relation
to Russian inﬂuence operations, aside from several commentaries on
this issue, did not become involved in the Polish debate on disinformation.
The one exception is the Center for Propaganda and Disinformation
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 243
Analysis; established in 2017, it researches Russian propaganda (Centrum
Analiz Propagandy i Dezinformacji, n.d.). It also cooperated with the
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, which increased the awareness about the
disinformation issue by putting it on the agenda of the Warsaw Security
Forum in 2018 and 2019 (Casimir Pulaski Foundation 2019).
Like the majority of previously mentioned Polish initiatives, media
interest was focused primarily on the dynamic of this phenomenon in
the domestic political debate. The only exception from this trend is the
news site CyberDefence24, launched in 2016. It is focused mainly on
security-related issues and has played an active role in increasing awareness
about Russian inﬂuence operations (CyberDefence 24, n.d.). Similar
to Hungary, some media publications were started by investigative journalists
with a focus on government malpractice and only later added the
topic of disinformation to their portfolio. An illustrative example is the
independent news portal OKO.press, established in 2017 with a focus
on investigative journalism; it started to write regularly on disinformation
in 2019 (OKO.press, n.d.). Similarly, the Reporters Foundation,
which chieﬂy provided media training, started its own investigative work
focused on various issues including disinformation in 2016 (Fundacja
reporterow, n.d.). The private television channel TVN24 launched the
project ‘Kontakt24’ in 2018 aiming to tackle homegrown disinformation
by promoting quality journalism and fact-checking (Kontakt 24, n.d.).
8.4.4 Slovakia
Among the analysed countries Slovakia represent probably the most
interesting example. The total number of civil society actors tackling disinformation
is the second highest (26 in total). Even though the most
dynamic year in the Slovak debate about disinformation was 2017, it
should be noted that it was closely interlinked with other topics that
civil society had already tackled—namely, right-wing extremism, which
is on the rise in the country. The number of individuals and smaller
initiatives tackling disinformation is the highest out of the four analysed
countries (15 in total) and comprise a wide variety of actors from civil
activists and independent bloggers to IT developers and PR experts. Due
to this vibrancy, Slovakia might be considered a hub of civil society initiatives
tackling disinformation from which ideas and strategies are spreading
across the whole region. Given the similarity of the languages, the ﬁndings
and results emanating from Slovak projects are utilised predominantly in
244 J. SYROVÁTKA
Czech Republic. At the same time, Slovakia possesses a vibrant community
of CSOs focused on researching security-related issues which have
incorporated the issue of disinformation into their agendas. The innovativeness
of the Slovak approach to tackling disinformation lies not only
in the use of digital technologies in its research of the phenomenon,
but mainly in the ability to address disinformation as such and to tackle
the roots of this phenomenon by promoting media literacy, deradicalising
youth, or using humour.
One of the streams from which the Slovak debate about disinformation
took its inspiration were activities focused on monitoring right-wing
extremists. An interesting example of a civil society action is pensioner
and former engineer Ján Benˇcík, who early on started to uncover various
networks of conspirators, mainly related to extreme right-wing groups,
on his blog in 2012. Benˇcík was later awarded by the Slovak president
for his activates in 2016 (Deutsche Welle 2017). Another important actor
was the independent investigative journalist Radovan Bránik, who maps
right-wing extremist movements and other security-related issues (Bránik
2020). The role of conspiracy theories among Slovak right-wing extremists
was also an issue of interest for political scientist Gregorij Mesežnikov
(IVO, n.d.).4 All the abovementioned individuals are still active in the
Slovak debate on disinformation and played an important role not only in
its beginnings but also in its further development. ‘Demagog’, an initiative
which has focused on fact-checking political debates since its launch
in 2010 (Demagog SK, n.d.), has served as an important inspiration for
further projects in the region. A signiﬁcant turning point in the Slovak
debate on disinformation came when high school teacher Juraj Smatana
compiled the ﬁrst list of websites spreading pro-Russian propaganda and
disinformation in 2015, thus framing the debate about this issue (Šnídl
2015). Consequently, in 2016, PR expert Ján Urbanˇcík launched the
website Konšpirátori.sk (Conspirators) aiming to undercut the gains made
from online advertisements on websites spreading problematic content,
including disinformation. This initiative also had an international footprint
since the Czech online browser Seznam.cz included it in its interface
4According to the chosen categorisation, Radovan Bránik (as a journalist) and Gregorij
Mesežnikov (as an academic) should be presented separately as individuals tackling disinformation.
However, they are mentioned here together since it is logical from the
chronological perspective and both individuals are only examples of civic society actors in
their given category.
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 245
for commercial providers (Sblog 2018). The list of websites created by
Konspirátori.sk was also used by the webhosting company WebSupport,
which created the Google Chrome plug-in B.S. Detector (see Chapter 5)
in 2017 warning against sites spreading problematic content (Bullshit
Detector, n.d.). Advanced digital means were also used in the project
‘Blbec.online’ (Jerk.online), which scrapes content in real time from
Facebook pages known to be spreading disinformation. In so doing, it
has been able to warn against those going viral since 2017 (Blbec.online,
n.d.). Another noteworthy project using digital technologies to tackle
disinformation is ‘Checkbot’, a Facebook plug-in which helps users to
debunk online disinformation; it was produced by a team led by Peter
Janˇcárik from the PR company Seesame in 2019 (Insight 2019). Several
civil society initiatives approached the topic more proactively and started
to challenge the spread of disinformation directly. This is the case for the
group #somtu (#Iamhere), which has, since its establishment in 2017,
aimed to decrease polarisation in debates on social media (Mikušoviˇc
2017). Slovenskí elfovia (Slovak elves) started to be active in 2018 and,
inspired by their Baltic counterparts, have focused on exposing trolls
on social networks (Brenier 2019). As was mentioned, several initiatives
tried to approach the issue of disinformation more broadly by focusing
on the reasons people are led to believe it. Similarly, as in other analysed
countries, educational projects were launched which focused on media
literacy—‘Zmudri’ (Get wise) in 2018 (Zmudri, n.d.)—and raising
awareness about the issue—‘Infosecurity’ in 2019 (Infosecurity, n.d.).
Given the close link between disinformation and right-wing extremism,
several initiatives were also launched aiming to deradicalise youth and
counter extremist and conspiracy narratives: In 2016, the project ‘Mladi
proti fašismu’ (Youth against fascism) (Mladi proti fašismu, n.d.) and, a
year later, the project ‘Sebavedome Slovensko’ (Self-conﬁdent Slovakia)
(Sebavedome, n.d.) were launched. One strategy used by Slovak civil
society differs from other covered countries in its use of humour and
sarcasm to ridicule conspiracy theories and their disseminators. The two
most popular initiatives of this kind are the Facebook pages ‘Preco ludem
hrabe’ (Why people become loony), launched in 2014, and ‘Zomri’
(Die), launched in 2016.
The high number of civil society activities run by smaller, informal
groups is mirrored in the equally active CSOs community. The ﬁrst CSO
which started to focus on the issue of disinformation was Memo98, which
has been monitoring the information space before elections in various
246 J. SYROVÁTKA
countries globally since 1998 (Memo98, n.d.). The Slovak branch of
the Open Society Fund started projects focused on tackling hate speech
in 2014 (Open Society Foundation 2015). After 2015, basically every
Slovak CSO covering security-related issues conducted at least one project
related to disinformation, mostly understood in the context of Russian
inﬂuence operations. The Slovak Security Policy Institute launched the
website Antipropaganda about this phenomenon in 2015 (Antipropaganda,
n.d.). The GLOBSEC Policy Institute started to be involved in
the debate on disinformation in 2015, and it became one of the beacons
of research on this issue in central Europe. Its resources allowed this
CSO to conduct several studies with an international scope, such as the
opinion poll GLOBSEC Trends which maps public opinion of security
and policy issues in Eastern European countries. It has become an important
networker, with a cross-border network of contacts, and a promoter
of the debate on disinformation—especially by putting it on the agenda
of the GLOBSEC Tatra Summit (Globsec, n.d.). In 2016, the Strategic
Policy Institute organised several public events about hybrid warfare on
NATO’s eastern ﬂank and information warfare in Ukraine (Strategic
Policy Institute, n.d.). Among the projects conducted by the Slovak
Foreign Policy Association, the most signiﬁcant was the informal Slovak
Forum Against Propaganda platform, established in 2017 and which
provides a space for various activists to meet and a hub for future cooperative
projects (Slovak Forum against Propaganda, n.d.). The Centre for
European and North Atlantic Affairs published an analysis on information
warfare as a tool of Russian foreign policy in 2017 (Centre for European
and North Atlantic Affairs 2019), and, in 2018, the Slovak branch of the
CSO People in Need launched the project ‘Nenávistný skutok’ (Hatefull
deed) involving lawyers prosecuting the cases of hate speech on the
Internet ( ˇClovek v ohrozeni, n.d.).
8.5 Summary
The ongoing activities of civil society initiatives tackling disinformation
represent an exemplary method of studying the possibilities and limitations
of active citizen involvement in the area of security. There is
broad consensus among experts, state servants, and politicians of the
fact that individuals, organisations, and institutions from civil society are
important players in overcoming challenges related to the current information
disorder and (in some cases) take their ﬁndings into account while
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 247
making policy decisions. Considering previous statements, it is surprising
how little has been done in providing systematic accounts of civil society
initiatives tackling disinformation.
Despite the number of similarities among analysed countries, the
chapter presents two very different stories of the approach of civil society
towards disinformation. There is a vibrant debate on this issue in Czech
Republic and Slovakia, where local civil society actors not only research
the topic—usually with a strong emphasis on Russian information operations—but
they also are able to devise various innovative solutions; form
coalitions and networks, including cross-border ones; achieve particular
aims; and in some cases also inﬂuence the policymaking processes. In
both countries, the issue of disinformation has become embedded in the
agendas of already-existing CSOs focused on researching security-related
issues, as well as in universities.
Contrariwise, for civil society in Hungary and Poland, the issue of
disinformation has a rather secondary importance and does not attract
much attention. For some civil society actors (mainly from media), disinformation
is not perceived as an external threat but rather as product
of domestic government malpractice. This may, of course, be connected
to the domestic political situation in these countries. The small number
of involved actors as well secondary importance of the topic complicates
the building of stable coalitions among various actors, which results in
a lower number of projects with less sustainability. Moreover, strategies
chosen to tackle disinformation tend to be quite traditional and predetermined
by the identity of the actors. The number of approaches and
initiatives is instead the product of cross-border cooperation rather than
genuine interest in the topic by domestic actors.
Stark differences among civil society actors in the analysed countries
show that interest in the issue of disinformation and strategies to tackle
this phenomenon are very much dependent on the local context. This
fact should be considered when attempting to transplant these experiences
with tackling disinformation to different sociopolitical contexts
outside of central Europe. This chapter provides convincing evidence that
a one-size-ﬁts-all approach is not suitable even within a coherent region,
and, therefore, a more nuanced approach supported by proper research
is needed. Before ﬁnding common ways of tackling disinformation, it is
necessary to understand national speciﬁcs and context and to be sure that
all civil society actors perceive the problem in the same manner—which is
not always the case, even in the rather similar countries of central Europe.
248 J. SYROVÁTKA
Acknowledgements The author would like to thank to Lóránt Gy˝ori, Marta
Kowalska, Tomáš Kriššák, Jakub Tomášek, and Veronika Víchova for their
valuable insights.
Bibliography
#JsmeTu. (#WeAreHere). (n.d.). https://www.jsmetu.org/. Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
Anheier, H. (2013). Civil Society: “Measurement, Evaluation, Policy”. London:
Taylor and Francis.
Antipropaganda. (n.d.). O nás [About Us]. https://antipropaganda.sk/o-nas/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Átlátszó. (n.d.). About Us, Fundraising. https://english.atlatszo.hu/about-usfundraising/.
Accessed 24 Nov 2019.
Bellingcat. (2019, June 19). Identifying the Separatists Linked to the Downing
of MH17. UK&Europe. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/
2019/06/19/identifying-the-separatists-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/.
Accessed 24 Nov 2019.
Blbec.online. (n.d.). Monitoring Extrémistov Na Sociálnych Sieˇtach [Monitoring
of Extremists on Social Networks]. https://blbec.online/preco. Accessed 3
Feb 2020.
Bránik, R. (2020). Blog.sme.sk. https://branik.blog.sme.sk/. Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
Brenier, V. (2019, August 13). Slovenskí elfovia sa prihlásili k odstráneniu
propagandistického videa Kotlebovcov [Slovak Elves Announced That They
Are Responsible for Removal of Propagandistic Video of Kotleba’s Political
Party]. INFOSECURITY.SK. https://infosecurity.sk/domace/livia-a-elf
ovia/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Bullshit Detector. (n.d.). https://www.websupport.sk/en/bullshit-detector.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Caparini, M., Fluri, P., & Molnár, F. (2006). Civil Society and the Security Sector:
Concepts and Practices in New Democracies. Münster: Lit.
Casimir Pulaski Foundation. (2019). On Disinformation of the Margin of Warsaw
Security Forum. https://pulaski.pl/en/on-desinformation-of-the-margin-ofwarsaw-security-forum-2/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Cemper, J. (2019, November 15). Projekt Fair Advertising upozorˇnuje na
nevhodnou inzerci na konspiraˇcních webech. Spoleˇcnosti už reagují [Project
Fair Advertising Draws Attention to Advertising on Conspiracy Sites. Companies
Are Already Responding]. Manipulátoˇri. https://manipulatori.cz/pro
jekt-fair-advertising-upozornuje-na-nevhodnou-inzerci-na-konspiracnich-web
ech-spolecnosti-uz-reaguji/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 249
Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy. (n.d.). Assessment of Kremlin’s
Soft Power Tools in Central Europe. http://ceid.hu/assessment-of-kre
mlins-soft-power-tools-in-central-europe/. Accessed 24 Nov 2019.
Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs. (2019). Information Warfare.
http://www.cenaa.org/en/research/information-warfare/news. Accessed 3
Feb 2020.
Centrum Analiz Propagandy i Dezinformacji. (n.d.). About Foundation. https://
capd.pl/en/mission-and-goals. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Centrum Stosunków Mi˛edzynarodowych. (n.d.). Projects. http://csm.org.pl/
en/projects. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
ˇClovek v ohrozeni. (n.d.). Na ˇco slúži táto stránka [The Purpose of This
Webpage]. https://nenavistnyskutok.sk/blog/co-je-ns. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Collins, A. (2010). Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Cyber Dialogue. (2019). Cyber Dialogue: Active Citizens Against Fakes and
Hatred Online. https://www.cyberdialogue.cz/. Accessed 24 Nov 2019.
CyberDefence24. (n.d.). Bezpiecze ´nstwo Informacyjne CyberDefence24.Pl.
https://www.cyberdefence24.pl/bezpieczenstwo-informacyjne/. Accessed 3
Feb 2020.
Damarad, V., & Yeliseyeu, A. (Eds.). (2018). Disinformation Resilience Index.
Kyiv: Ukrainian Prism.
Daniel, J., & Eberle, J. (2018). Hybrid Warriors: Transforming Czech Security
Through the ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare’ Assemblage. Sociologicky Casopis,
54(6), 907–931.
Demagog CZ. (n.d.). O Nás [About Us]. https://demagog.cz/stranka/o-nas.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Demagog PL. (n.d.). Stowarzyszenie. https://demagog.org.pl/stowarzyszeniedemagog-pierwsza-w-polsce-organizacja-factcheckingowa/.
Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
Demagog SK. (n.d.). O Nás [About Us]. https://demagog.sk/o-nas/. Accessed
3 Feb 2020.
Deutsche Welle. (2017, June 13). Slovak pensioner blogs against neo-Nazis.
https://www.dw.com/en/slovak-pensioner-blogs-against-neo-nazis/av-396
26676. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Dezimatrix. (n.d.). New Ways to Prevent Disinformation. https://www.dezima
trix.org/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Diamond, L. J., & Morlino, L. (2005). Assessing the Quality of Democracy.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Direkt36. (n.d.). Russian Connection. https://www.direkt36.hu/en/category/
orosz-kapcsolatok/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
250 J. SYROVÁTKA
Dufkova, K., & Hofmeisterova, P. (Eds.). (2018). Characteristics of Pro-Kremlin
Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe and Practical Examples How to
Tackle It. Brno: Nesehnutí.
European Commission. (2018). Action Plan against Disinformation. Brussels:
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Freedom House. (2019). Freedom in the World 2019. https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Fried, D., & Polyakova, A. (2018). Democratic Defense Against Disinformation.
Washington: Atlantic Council.
Fundacja INFO OPS Polska. (n.d.). Fundacja Info Ops Polska. Projekt Na Rzecz
Zapewnienia Bezpiecze ´nstwa ´Srodowiska Informacyjnego. http://infoops.pl/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Fundacja reporterow. (n.d.). About Us. https://fundacjareporterow.org/en/abo
ut-us/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Gerasymchuk, S., & Maksak, H. (2018). Ukraine: Disinformation Resilience
Index. Disinformation Resilience Index. http://prismua.org/en/english-ukr
aine-disinformation-resilience-index/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Globsec. (n.d.). Projects. https://www.globsec.org/projects/. Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
Gregor, M., Vejvodová, P., & Zvol si info. (2018). Nejlepší kniha o fake news,
dezinformacích a manipulacích!!! Praha: CPRESS.
Hajdu, D., & Klingová, K. (2018). From Online Battleﬁeld to Loss of Trust?
Perceptions and Habits of Youth in Eight European Countries. Bratislava:
GLOBSEC Policy Institute.
HOAX.CZ. (n.d.). https://hoax.cz/cze/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Infosecurity. (n.d.). O Stránke [About the Webpage]. https://infosecurity.sk/ostranke/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Insight. (2019, March 27). Checkbot je slovenský chatbot, který lidem pomáhá
odhalovat fake news [Checkbot Is Slovak Chatbot, Which Helps to Debunk
Fake News]. https://www.insight.cz/2019/03/27/checkbot-je-slovenskychatbot-ktery-lidem-pomaha-odhalovat-fake-news/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Institute for Politics and Society. (n.d.). Member—Roman Máca. https://www.
politikaspolecnost.cz/en/who-we-are/roman-maca-2/#main. Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
IVO. (n.d.). Inštitút pre verejné otázky [Institute for Public Affairs]. http://www.
ivo.sk/165/sk/pracovnici/grigorij-meseznikov. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Janda, J., & Víchová, V. (Eds.). (2018). The Prague Manual. Kremlin Watch.
https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/our-reports/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Jeden svˇet na školách. (n.d.). Publikace a metodické pˇríruˇcky k mediálnímu
vzdˇelávání [Publications and Methodical Materials for Media
Literacy]. https://www.jsns.cz/projekty/medialni-vzdelavani/materialy/pub
likace. Accessed 3 February 2020.
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 251
K-Monitor. (2019). Outriders Meetup in Budapest: Disinformation. https://
www.kmonitor.hu/article/20190316-outriders-meetup-in-budapest-disinf
ormation. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Kohút, M., & Rychnovská, D. (2018). The Battle for Truth: Mapping the
Network of Information War Experts in the Czech Republic. New Perspectives,
26(3), 1–37.
Kontakt 24. (n.d.). O Serwisie. https://kontakt24.tvn24.pl/o-serwisie.htm.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Kremlin Watch. (2018). 2018 Ranking of Countermeasures by the EU28 to the
Kremlin’s Subversion Operations. European Values. https://www.europeanv
alues.net/vyzkum/2018-ranking-countermeasures-eu28-kremlins-subversionoperations/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Kundra, O. (2015, February 28). Putin˚uv hlas v ˇCesku [Putin’s Voice
in Czechia]. Respekt. https://www.respekt.cz/z-noveho-cisla/putinuv-hlas-vcesku.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Manipulátoˇri. (2020). Manipulátoˇri.cz mají nový web a chystají rozšíˇrení [Manipulatori.cz
Has New Website and Prepares Extension]. https://manipulat
ori.cz/manipulatori-cz-maji-novy-web-a-chystaji-rozsireni/. Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
Memo98. (n.d.). About Us. http://memo98.sk/p/o-nas. Accessed 13 Jan 2021.
Mikušoviˇc, D. (2017, June 27). #Somtu: Ako Mladí Slováci Prinášajú
Slušnosˇt a Fakty Do Nenávistných Diskusií [#IamHere: How Young
Slovaks Bring Politeness and Facts in Hateful Discussions]. Denník
N. https://dennikn.sk/792819/somtu-ako-mladi-slovaci-prinasaju-slusnosta-fakty-do-nenavistnych-diskusii/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. (2016). National Security Audit.
Mladi proti fašismu. (n.d.). O projekte [About project]. https://mladiprotifa
sizmu.sk/o-projekte/. Accessed 13 Jan 2021.
Nadace OSF. (n.d.). Podpoˇrené Projekty [Supported Projects]. https://osf.cz/
podporene-projekty/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Nadaˇcní fond nezávislé žurnalistiky. (n.d.). Již ukonˇcené projekty [Completed
Projects]. https://www.nfnz.cz/podporene-projekty/jiz-ukoncene-pro
jekty/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Neovlivní. (2016). Databáze proruského obsahu od A-Z [Database of Pro-Russian
Content from A to Z]. https://neovlivni.cz/databaze-proruskeho-obsahuod-a-z/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Nimmo, B. (2015). The Case for Information Defence: A Pre-emptive Strategy
for Dealing with the New Disinformation Wars. In Legatum Institute (Ed.),
Information at War: From China’s Three Warfares to NATO’s Narratives.
Nutil, P. (2018). Média, lži a pˇríliš rychlý mozek: Pr˚uvodce postpravdivým svˇetem
[Media, Lies and Too Fast Brain: Guideline Through Post-Factual World].
Praha: Grada.
252 J. SYROVÁTKA
OKO.press. (n.d.). Propaganda. https://oko.press/tag-rzeczowy/propaganda/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Open Society Foundation. (2015). SAY IT TO MY FACE Campaign. https://
osf.sk/en/aktuality/kampan-povedz-mi-to-do-oci/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Palacky University Olomouc. (2019). Euforka: UP a další vysoké školy chtˇejí lépe
informovat o Evropˇe [Euforka: UP and Other Universities Want to Better
Communicate About Europe]. https://www.upol.cz/nc/zpravy/zprava/
clanek/euforka-up-a-dalsi-vysoke-skoly-chteji-lepe-informovat-o-evrope/.
Accessed 24 Nov 2019.
Partycypacja Obywatelska. (2019, February 14). Wojownicy Klawiatury –
społeczno´s´c w walce z fake newsami [Wojownicy Klawiatury—Community
Fighting with Fake News]. https://partycypacjaobywatelska.pl/wojownicy-kla
wiatury-spolecznosc-w-walce-z-fake-newsami/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Pesenti, M., & Pomerantsev, P. (2016). How to Stop Disinformation. Legatum
Institute. https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/public
ations/how-to-stop-disinformation-lessons-from-ukraine-for-the-wider-world.
pdf?sfvrsn=0. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Prague Security Studies Institute. (n.d.). Russia’s Inﬂuence Activities in CEE.
http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in-cee. Accessed 3 February
2020.
Political Capital. (2019). Conspiracy Theories and Fake News. https://www.politi
calcapital.hu/conspiracy_theories_and_fake_news.php. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Poljakov, N., Prchal, L., & Zelenka, J. (2017). Dezinformace: co pro vás
znamenají lži? [Disinformation: What Do Lies Mean to You?]. https://zpr
avy.aktualne.cz/domaci/valka-dezinformace-fake-news/r~7bfb35b23bb311e
7886d002590604f2e/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
ˇRehka, K. (2017). Informaˇcní válka [Information War]. Praha: Academia.
Romea. (2018, November 5). Czech Internet Trolls Have Competition—“Elves”
Are Combating Disinformation and Propaganda. http://www.romea.cz/en/
news/world/czech-internet-trolls-have-competition-elves-are-combating-dis
information-and-propaganda. Accessed 24 Nov 2019.
Rozsypal, M. (2019, October 9). Alvarová: Lež je pro každého vždy nˇeˇcím sexy
a vždy je atraktivnˇejší než pravda [Lie Is Always Sexy for Everyone and
Always More Attractive Than the Truth]. iRozhlas. https://www.irozhlas.
cz/zivotni-styl/spolecnost/alexandra-alvarova-prpaganda-dezinformace-fakenews_1910091950_pj.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Sblog. (2018, February 2). Sklik nabídne klient˚um možnost neinzerovat na
webech oznaˇcených iniciativou Konšpirátori.sk jako dezinformaˇcní [Sklik Will
Offer Clients the Option Not to Advertise on Websites Identiﬁed as a
Disinformation by Konspirátori.sk]. https://blog.seznam.cz/2018/02/sklik-
nabidne-klientum-moznost-neinzerovat-webech-oznacenych-iniciativou-kon
spiratori-sk-jako-dezinformacni/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
8 CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES TACKLING DISINFORMATION … 253
Sebavedome. (n.d.). O Nás [About us]. http://sebavedome.sk/o-nas/. Accessed
3 Feb 2020.
Semantic Visions. (2019). Semantic Visions Wins $250,000 Tech Challenge
to Combat Disinformation. https://semantic-visions.com/semantic-vis
ions-wins-250000-tech-challenge-to-combat-disinformation/. Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
Slovak Forum against Propaganda. (n.d.). http://www.sfpa.sk/projects/sloven
ske-forum-proti-propagande/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
StopFake. (n.d.a). O nás [About us]. https://www.stopfake.org/cz/o-nas-2/.
Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
StopFake. (n.d.b). Najnowsze informacje o nas. https://www.stopfake.org/pl/
category/najnowsze-informacje-o-nas/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Strategic Policy Institute. (n.d.). Projects. https://stratpol.sk/projects/. Accessed
3 Feb 2020.
Šnídl, V. (2015, February 26). Proruskú propagandu o zhýralom Západe u
nás šíri 42 webov [Pro-Russian Propaganda About the Decadent West Is
Spreading Through 42 Websites]. Denník N. https://dennikn.sk/57740/pro
rusku-propagandu-o-zhyralom-zapade-u-nas-siri-42-webov/. Accessed 3 Feb
2020.
Táborský, J. (2019). V síti (dez)informací [In the Network of
(Dis)Information)]. Praha: Grada.
Transitions. (2018). Debunking Disinformation at Third Age Universities.
https://www.tol.org/client/project/27365-debunking-disinformationat-third-age-universities.html.
Accessed 24 Nov 2019.
Urbanlegends.hu. (n.d.). http://www.urbanlegends.hu/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Warsaw Institute. (2018). In the Age of Post-Truth: Best Practices in Fighting
Disinformation. https://warsawinstitute.org/age-post-truth-best-practices-ﬁg
hting-disinformation/. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Winkler, M., & Pazdersky, M. (n.d.). Používej MoZeK [Use the Brain].
Moravská zemská knihovna. https://www.mzk.cz/pouzivej-mozek. Accessed
3 Feb 2020.
WirtualneMedia. (2019, October 11). Fundacja otwarty dialog zło˙zyła 20
pozwów. Chce 1,7 mln Zł od TVP, Polskiego Radia, Fratrii, Sakiewicza i
Polityków PiS. https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/fundacja-otwarty-dia
log-zlozyla-w-sumie-20-pozwow-m-in-tvp-polskie-radio-fratrie-i-tomasza-sak
iewicza?fbclid=IwAR0omUMPalg-vkdEna8qZ9-8576fqBAiqhCkkUn-fJnEfu
l5KygVP7-VkPk. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.
Zmudri. (n.d.). Nauˇc Sa Veci Potrebné Pre Život [Learn Things Important for
Life]. https://zmudri.sk/#section-about-project. Accessed 3 Feb 2020.