

In the first case, consumption starts at G and the drive becomes more intense the closer one is; in the second case the consumption ends at G and the drive is extinguished. Combined into one diagram yields an A-shaped curve known to many actors for many goals.

1.4 Conflict: Actors in Pursuit of Incompatible Goals

Let us now add another actor to create a social system.

If life, action, is the pursuit of goals, then social life, interaction, is the exchange of value. Actors enter into exchange relations, for many reasons, one of them being that they think they gain utility (subjective value); another because they are used to do so; still another because they are forced to. The farmer and the city-dweller exchanging food with manufactured goods are useful as examples of a limited type of exchange. The prison inmate and his guard also exchange values—the inmate is usually forced into his position and the guard is usually paid to be there—but the values exchanged are predominantly negative, like not being a troublemaker against relaxing the rules. We refer to the interaction relation as dissociative if the values exchanged are mainly negative or neutral, and as associative if the values exchanged are predominantly positive.

Both examples above have a certain superficial equivalence or reciprocity about them: the farmer gets his due in terms of manufactured goods, the guard gets back from the inmate as trouble whatever he, the guard, may have added to the punishment in terms of strict reinforcement of regulations, etc. But reciprocity, or equity, is not a generally valid social rule. In the relationship between slave-owner and slave, or between nineteenth century capitalist and worker, it makes no sense to talk about equity in the exchange.

In the following sections the difference between equality among actors and equity in the exchange between actors will be explored. Cases of gross inequity in exchange will be referred to as exploitation, which may even go so far as to involve an exchange between positive and negative value, as when the slave contributes to profit and receives all kinds of deprivation in return.

How is exchange on unequal terms possible? Simply because the two-person free-will market model has very limited applicability. It portrays the individual as master, seeking optimal value exchanges, and not as an element in a more comprehensive and complex social structure where repression plays a major role.

The social structure may prescribe for the individual his patterns of exchange and fix the exchange price for his labor (wages), his love (that love should be reciprocated), etc. Not all actors are able to change the prices since they are often not geared to one isolated individual but to positions, to statuses and roles, as a worker, a lover, an enterprise, a big power, etc., not easily changed. But not all spheres of life are thus regulated and circumscribed, and the spheres that are only regulated up to a certain level leave lots of possibilities for the change-oriented individual, group or nation.

Thus, individuals as well as collectivities are both free and bound, both able to fix the terms of exchange as they want and to withdraw from unrewarding bargains, and unable to do so. With a less complex image of social reality no analysis will carry us very far.

To summarize: life is the pursuit of goals, social life is the exchange of value - and that which pursues values, and exchanges values, is referred to as an actor.

In the pursuit he acts, and in the exchange he interacts; actors move along their life-lines, dotted with goal-consumption, culminating in goal-states.

Occasionally the life-lines intersect: the actors come together in space and time, become relevant to each other and may engage in value-exchange or interaction; positive, neutral, negative.

And this is, of course, where conflict enters, although it can also be defined for one actor.

We can now define conflict, building on the notions of contradiction and incompatibility developed in the general goal-notions explored here. According to these notions there are goals to be realized; the realization sometimes referred to as goal-consumption. Thus, with the units being sets of individuals and the variables being goal-dimensions, INT becomes the region of acceptable goal-realization, here called ACC, or the acceptability region. A conflict, then, is a contradiction where the acceptability region is located inside the incompatibility region:


$$ACC \subset INC$$

This will serve as a point of departure. A conflict simply involves incompatible goals. But there is more to it: those goals are pursued, leading to Conflict=Actors in Pursuit of Incompatible Goals.

1.5 Two Types of Conflict: Structure-Conflict and Actor-Conflict

We now proceed to the basic distinction in conflict theory, with an effort to outline the major features of two fundamental types of conflict, here referred to as structural and actor conflict respectively. They both conform to the definition given in the preceding section and fit into the basic conflict paradigm:

Figure 1.4.



Thus, in either case there are two sets of actors, S_1 and S_2 , and two goals, G_1 and G_2 , and B, the point of bliss with both achieved, located inside the incompatibility region. But from this point on dissimilarities rather than similarities will dominate.

The basic difference lies in the interaction relation between S_1 and S_2 in the two cases; the two fundamental types are based on vertical and horizontal interaction, respectively.

To start with, the extreme version of vertical interaction will be spelt out; the horizontal interaction is then the negation of all three criteria.

The vertical interaction relation can be defined by three criteria that complement and reinforce each other:

1. Exploitation, or vertical division of labor: the interaction relation is set up in such a way that the total value effects are much more beneficial to S_1 than to S_2 .
2. Penetration: S_1 penetrates into S_2 shaping S_2 's consciousness
3. Fragmentation: the interaction relation is set up in such a way that whereas S_1 is kept together in associative relations, S_2 is kept apart in dissociative relations.


This definition is abstract and has to be concretized. To do so let us consider two different cases: S_1 and S_2 are collectivities, and S_1 and S_2 are individuals.

In the first case, like a relation between countries, the vertical relation just defined is identical with what can be referred to as an imperialistic relation. Diagrammatically it looks like this:

Figure 1.5.

Center S_1

Periphery S_2



S_1 is the center countries, S_2 the periphery countries. S_1 is connected with horizontal ties, and to S_2 with vertical ties; the arrows indicating the direction of the exploitation.

The two other criteria can then be regarded as structural devices to protect this exploitation: S_1 penetrates into the top of S_2 (curved arrows); which concretely means that the elite in S_2 thinks and acts in accordance with the desires of S_1 , and particularly of the elites in S_1 , and the countries in S_2 are kept apart from each other by well-known divide et impera strategies, playing on mutual isolation and-or mutual hostility.

Much more could be said about this archetypical structure, and one contemporary example would be the relation between the European Community and the associated African, Caribbean and Asian-Pacific states.

The diagram above can also be used for the second case, the relations between individuals since it is, essentially, the organogram of very many, perhaps most, organizations. The top is integrated by association, the bottom disintegrated by dissociation. The division of labor gives the interesting, the challenging, the personality-expanding tasks to the top, and the routine tasks to the bottom. The economic concomitants in terms of unequal salary etc. are tangible. At the same time there is penetration: the social outlooks of the two layers are “harmonized”, the bottom values what the top not only values but also enjoys, and consequently supports the structure.

How does this work in a third case, with two individuals only, S_1 being the topdog and S_2 the underdog? The archetypical example might be patriarchal husband-wife relations, where the verticality of the division of labor is obvious. But there is also penetration, with the wife’s consciousness being formed by the husband. And there is fragmentation, only that in this case it is not immediately and physically observable. The disintegration takes place inside the underdog, the integration inside the topdog and expresses itself in differential degrees of coordination and harmony in their personality.

The topdog will be well composed, goals coordinated and resources mobilized whereas the underdog will be at a loss and tend to follow the topdog. The underdog will also incline in other directions, but the topdog in a sense penetrates into them all. The integration of the underdog is based on an integration in the topdog: just like an empire is integrated in the center of the Center country, and a company is integrated in its board of directors, trustees etc.


The structure in the diagram implies a double dislocation of the center of gravity away from the periphery, the underdogs, not only in terms of division of labor, but also in terms of level of association or integration. The periphery, the underdog, is integrated in the center, the topdog. Thus, the relation is doubly vertical: it is exploitative, and that exploitation is protected by the whole organizational structure.

What, then, would a horizontal interaction relation look like? By negating the three criteria we get the following:

1. Equity: Horizontal division of labor, which splits into two:
 - (a) the interaction is set up in such a way that the total value effects are about equally beneficial to S_1 and S_2 .
 - (b) there is no interaction, hence no exploitation.
2. Equal consciousness-formation which also splits into two
 - (a) there is mutual inter-penetration, S_2 forms the consciousness of S_1 as much as S_1 forms the consciousness of S_2 (dialogue).
 - (b) there is no interaction, hence no penetration.
3. Equal organization-building the level of association in S_1 and S_2 is about the same.

In other words, the relation would look more like this:

Figure 1.6.



What one observes are two actors, S_1 and S_2 , both of them capable of doing what makes them actors by our definition: autonomous goal-formulation—which presupposes that they

have control over their own consciousness-formation and are not subject to too much manipulation– and mobilization of resources to pursue those goals, which presupposes that they have control over their own internal organization. Neither condition is satisfied for the underdog Periphery in the vertical case, and that is what makes it vertical.

The difference between the two types of conflict can now be made sharper in the effort to define the conflicts, not only the two relations. So, what are the two types of conflicts about?

The way it is conceived of here there is always conflict in the vertical relation because conflict is already built into the structure whereas conflict may come and go in the horizontal relation.

The vertical structure has much more permanence, the horizontal structure is more eventful. For that reason they are best captured, analytically, in what somewhere also has been termed the structure-oriented and actor-oriented perspectives, discourses, intellectual frameworks, respectively.

According to the former, society is seen as a structure and the essential characteristics are the nature of the interaction relation and the interaction structure, not the nature of the individuals and sets of individuals. To refer to them as “actors” presupposes that they can act, i.e. that they have sufficient Spielraum, action-space, that they have alternatives and hence can set goals and pursue them. This opportunity is to a large extent denied the underdog periphery in the vertical relation; and for that reason analysis in terms of consciously formed goals and organized pursuit of them easily becomes false and misleading.

But it is not misleading in the second, horizontal, type of relation. Here there are actors by definition capable of formulating and pursuing goals. Hence the structural network can be permitted to recede into the background in an analysis, and the focus can be on the actors themselves, on their goals and strategies. Just as much as marxist types of analysis are less warranted in the latter, strategic analysis of individuals whose consciousness has been deformed by being at the bottom of a vertical division of labor, penetrated, fragmented, can only lead to illusions of harmony when the bottom does not express any goal different from that of their masters, nor takes any step in that direction. Similarly, marxist analysis of a horizontal situation leads to strained efforts to cast the relationship in terms of exploitative interaction. This, of course, is not to deny that vertical type analysis of internal relation inside S_1 and S_2 may be very fruitful in efforts to understand S_1 - S_2 relations even when the latter look horizontal.

In the following, however, marxist and liberal analytical schemes will not necessarily be

used; the analysis will move forward on its own conflict theory terms, obviously borrowing from either.

And the terms are sufficient to define the two types of conflict, i.e. the typical conflicts in the two social situations. Since the sets of individuals have already been clarified in the two cases, conflict obviously has to be explicated by turning to the goal aspect.

In a vertical relation the conflict is defined in terms of interests, and according to the following axiom:

It is in everybody's interest not to be exploited

The entire analysis of vertical conflict derives from this assumption, and we shall later show that there is a similar assumption behind the much better known analysis of horizontal conflict.

The basic point is, of course, that there is no reference to consciously formulated goals, only to "interests". These interests are objectively defined, and tied to an analysis of the interaction relation itself. If exploitative, then somebody is exploited and somebody is an exploiter. What the axiom says is that however interest is defined, it is in everybody's interest not to be exploited, even when he begs for subjugation.

Is it in somebody's interest to exploit? It is definitely, very often, somebody's subjective goal to exploit, but is it also in somebody's objective interest? A Gandhi might say no: the exploiter may think that it is in his interest, but it actually is not; not merely because the exploiter will sooner or later have an uprising topple his privileged position, but also because he becomes a slave of his own efforts to exploit and to maintain the exploitation. To destroy the exploitative structure, therefore, is also to liberate the exploiter from his exploitation, and set him free.

But the opposite view is indeed also possible. There is such an overwhelming multitude of situations where people, consciously or not, seem to accept positions of privilege, and to react against any effort to reduce the exploitation.

An analytical concept is needed to explain this as well as to explain the situation of the exploited.

The exploiter may not be conscious of his exploitation, so why does he persist in it? One answer may be: because it is in his interest to do so.


On the other hand, the exploited is in a situation not in his interest, so why does he nevertheless sometimes accept it consciously and openly? One often found answer may be: because he has false consciousness or none at all.

Thus, interest is seen as something that may or may not be expressed as a value. If the expressed goal does not coincide with the interest, which we assume for everybody is

not to be exploited, one may talk about false consciousness. Obviously, this can only be done with a criterion to decide whether there is exploitation or not.

We can now define the conflict between exploiter and exploited, here referred to as topdog and underdog, or center and periphery:

Figure 1.7.



It is assumed that either party has a positive interest in exploiting and a negative one in not being exploited, although it is only the latter that is expressed in the axiom above. But to the extent that exploitation is asymmetric (which it is not, S_1 may exploit S_2 in one context and S_2 may exploit S_1 in another) six of the nine combinations above are excluded by definition. They form the incompatibility region. The question is what is acceptable to the two parties. One could imagine some cases, compatible with the axioms:

Figure 1.8.

		S_2	S_2
		only "exploits" acceptable	"exploits" and "equity" acceptable
S_1	only "exploits" acceptable	conflict	conflict
S_1	"exploits" and "equity" acceptable	conflict	no conflict

The result is obvious enough: under the axiom, if either party only accepts "exploits", then there is conflict of interest. Only when both parties accepts "equity" is there no conflict because there is an overlap between the acceptability and compatibility regions,

the equity solution, E. One conflict history would be for a system to start in A with S_1 as the exploiter, then move to C with a revolution with S_2 as the exploiter, and then end up in E with equity.

And that ends our story so far. It all hinges on the concept of equity, not only on the negative concept of exploitation. In equity S_1 and S_2 can meet, but for that to happen much consciousness formation is needed. In both.

Meeting in equity there can still be incompatibility, but the conflict is horizontal, and according to the following axiom:

It is in everybody's interest to maximize value.

Obviously this may bring us from a marxist to an economist paradigm. But there is no assumption that values are egoistic. Cultures will define them and play the role for horizontal conflict structures play for vertical conflict. Their cultures may be altruistic, with no axiom to the effect that the sum of a zillion egoisms is one altruism.

So far conflict has been defined, like many authors do, in terms of incompatibility of goals, and two major subtypes of goals have been indicated, interests and values, giving rise to two major subtypes of conflict: conflict of interest (structural conflict) and conflict of values (actor conflict). The distinction is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive; many, maybe most, conflicts are mixes of the two.

This does not mean that we split the theory of conflict into two conflicts of interest and conflicts of values. On the contrary, we shall assume that there are two basic parts of the theory of conflict, but defined differently.

One is a conflict transformation theory of how conflicts of interest are transformed into conflicts of manifest values. And the other is manifest conflict theory.

In other words, it is assumed that conflict in latent form, as conflict of interest, does not have an independent life, remaining the same, but will be heading for transformation into manifest form, as conflict of values. Indeed, latent conflicts—exploitation, penetration, fragmentation— are persistent facts in social life, but that persistence is for each specific conflict in an unstable equilibrium. Consciousness-formation and organization, individual and collective, are also facts of life.

But can it not be imagined that a latent conflict is resolved without necessarily being transformed into a manifest conflict? From the axiomatic statement just given no, but this is certainly not evident.

For instance, could it not be that somebody comes from the outside, digs into the structural conditions of the conflict of interest, changes-manages the whole situation and produces a more equitable society? Yes, this can certainly be imagined, but there would

still be a conflict of interest in the division of labor between the outside conflict-managers and the conflict-managed. The conflict-managers would use the conflict of others as the raw material that they themselves would process and turn into a processed product, a conflict solution.

With the old Herr (topdog) gone, the Knecht (underdog) will wake up to find himself under a new Herr – the conflict-manager. The rule may be different, but the opportunity of self-growth, of becoming truly autonomous through one's own conflict transformation or conflict manifestation, has been lost.

1.6 Frustration and Conflict

So far we have assumed that goals are not only set but also obtained, that goal-states are reached and goals consumed. However, it is a rather trivial fact of life that it often takes time and other resources to reach goal-states, and even if the actor tries as hard as possible, the goal-state may nevertheless never be arrived at.

It is customary to refer to this as frustration, which means that the access to the goal-state has been blocked. It is also customary to talk about sources of frustration, which are the factors that must be removed to permit the access to the goal-state when the actor is said to be frustrated.

There are many difficulties with these definitions, however. To take an example: a person wants an academic degree, but has to mobilize time, money and other resources. He is frustrated because of this, but in the end gets his degree. In that case one might perhaps say that his frustration is relative to the goal-state of getting his degree easily, and that differs from the frustration of a person who fails the examination for the third and last time.

One major class of sources of frustration can be referred to as scarcity of resources. Not to afford something produces a clear case of frustration; to afford it and discover that it is out of stock another; to afford it, locate it and then discover that somebody one cares for and about dislikes the object, still another. But there may also be goal-states that are blocked because no resources can ever be mobilized to reach them. He who has glued the goal perpetuum mobile on his mind is in a different kind of difficulty from he who merely wants to invent a more effective steam engine than anyone else before him. The same applies to the person some time ago who wanted to go to the moon: today that goal is more realistic.

In other cases we do not know: mathematicians often set themselves goals in terms of theorems they want to prove where they may be unable both to prove and to disprove. Politicians certainly do the same: he who works for the world government cannot say whether his goal is realistic and may become a part of empirical reality. But given the actor, his goal and the resources available we have a basis for operationalizing the degree of frustration as the amount of additional resources needed to reach the goal-state, ie, to remove the sources of frustration. As indicated, it may vary from zero in the case of no frustration to infinity in the case of unrealistic goals.

Let us now complicate the picture again, this time by introducing not only one value-dimension, but two, so that there are two different goal-states, G_1 and G_2 to refer to; for the same actor or for different actors is of no significance. We have mentioned scarcity of resources as one important source of frustration and this now brings us to the next: the situation where two goal-states exclude each other because they are incompatible. This is not the case of having insufficient resources to obtain one's goal, but of realizing that one goal stands in the way of realizing another goal. A person may find it difficult to be both rich and happy, or to be both honest and considerate; a nation may have difficulties being loyal to an international community of nations and at the same time safe-guarding its own more immediate interests. Or: two persons may find that they are in love with the same, third, person who is as monogamous as they are; two countries may find that the desire for autonomy for one conflicts with the desire for markets for the other, and so on.

It is customary to refer to this as conflict, which means that the access to one goal-state is blocked by efforts to reach an other goal-state; the goal-states are incompatible, exclude each other.

In principle this is not very different from frustration. In frustration there is one goal-state and insufficient resources to reach it; in conflict there are at least two goal-states and insufficient resources to realize them all. Thus, conflict is for two actors what frustration is for one actor, for which reason one sometimes treats conflict as a special case of frustration. We shall prefer to do it the other way, however, as will be elaborated below. At any rate, the distinction between the two is important since conflict (except when G_1 and G_2 are pursued by the same actor, the two actors are inside one) is to the social system (and to sociology) what frustration is to the personal system (and to psychology). But it is important to tie them together in a general theoretical framework to be developed in the following two parts of this book.

Life in general, and social life in particular, would now look highly different if goals were always adjusted to the possibilities of satisfying them. It is important to imagine

this state of affairs since this book is dealing with the particular conditions under which goals are not satisfied, whether this is best analyzed in terms of too high ambitions or too limited resources. Under this condition, which is hard to imagine, frustration and conflict would both be unknown since they are both special cases of limited resources. Life would consist in A-shaped wave patterns with limited amplitudes: goals are satisfied, then goals build up again, drives become intense, they are satisfied, and so on and so forth.

It is customary to associate this type of existence closely with stability, and that is probably correct: there would be few ripples on the waves that could serve as foci for the emergence of new social patterns. There would be no motivation for a pattern of change and growth.

But appetites might be growing as conditions of satisfying them develop, challenging even a stable and collectivistic social structure protected by a culture of a buddhist variety. It does not account for the circumstance that the world's richest societies also seem to be the societies that change fastest, or the possibility of having change itself as a value, even a dominant one. Such a world, with sufficient resources for all goal-states to be enjoyed, would probably rather be characterized by non-buddhist patterns of behavior and attitudes.

On the other hand there is the world with a maximum of frustration and conflict. Any grown-up person today will immediately think of the nazi concentration camp as a model, with its seemingly unlimited potential for inflicting frustration and conflict. The results in terms of behavior of the inmates are well-known; they range from animal brutishness to extreme apathy to incredible acts of compassion.

We mention this to place the study of frustration and conflict in its proper perspective, as dealing with human essentials, with matters of life and death. For somewhere on this range from zero to infinity in terms of degree of frustration and conflict every personal and social system on earth is located. The quality of the existence of the actors is a function of this condition. And, as so often is the case in human affairs: the best prescription for most individual and collective actors is in media res. Too much frustration and conflict may have a highly destructive effect, and too little may provide the actor with too low levels of stimulation, challenge, to function adequately.

Conflicts are frustrating but not all frustrations can be put on the standard conflict form with actors, goals, incompatibility and pursuit. To deal with the latter we need more conceptual tools.

1.7 The Elements of Conflict

We have defined conflict as a social system of actors with incompatibility between their goal-states. We shall show that surprisingly much can be said about conflict as such, with no reference to special types of conflicts. It is a property of social systems; then conceived of as a more or less interdependent systems of actors striving to achieve their goal-states. In the process it happens that they stand in each other's way, or so they may believe, and this is where the system becomes a conflict system. We are concerned with the general theory of such systems.

However, to make it less abstract, and to have tools of analysis, some dimensions of conflict systems will have to be introduced. The science of conflicts, conflictology, needs elements of analysis as much as any other science to arrive at hypotheses that can be tested and serve as a basis for the establishment or empirically confirmed propositions, which in turn can serve as building-bricks for theories (or vice versa). Twelve such dimensions will be presented in the next part of this book, in this chapter we shall focus on a more precise version of the definition.

For a start these are the elements in the conceptualization of conflict:

1. The actors, m of them, who may be of any kind. We assume that they are, for good or for bad, relevant to each other so that they form a system of actors.
2. The goals, n of them, also of any kind, that the actors try to achieve, forming a system of goals.

We do not assume that all m actors try to achieve all n goals, but we need information on where they stand on all of them. The system of goals combined with the system of actors form the action-system.

The movements of this system can be traced in the many-dimensional goal-space, R, where each actor can be located on each goal-dimension.

3. The acceptability-region, A, which is defined as the set of positions in the many-dimensional goal space acceptable to all actors. This point of bliss is the point where all m actors enjoying the goal-states on all n dimensions, obviously a part of A. However, often some actors may accept less, thus extending the acceptability region.
4. The incompatibility-region, I, which is defined as the set of points that cannot be realized because one or more goal-states, points on the goal-dimensions, are

incompatible with one or more others. The points not of incompatibility are points of compatibility and also form a set, the compatibility-region, \underline{C} . Clearly, $\underline{I} + \underline{C} = \underline{R}$ if we presuppose that we have sufficient information to decide for each point in \underline{R} whether it is a point of compatibility or incompatibility.

5. The conflict, which is defined as a property of the action-system which obtains when there is no overlap between acceptability-region and compatibility-region. Or, differently expressed: the acceptability-region is a subset of the incompatibility-region. Still differently expressed: when all acceptable combinations of degree of goal-consumption exclude each other, are incompatible with each other.

With the action-system and the definition of conflict, we can now define the conflict-system as the minimum set of actors and goals that does not change the conflict. If we start out with m actors and n goals it is not always the case that all of them are needed, for instance to define the East-West conflict. Thus, the conflict-system is the hard nucleus of the action-system where the conflict is located; if we reduce it further then we lose actors and-or goals that are indispensable for the understanding of the nature of the conflict.

To analyze a conflict, however, we often have to add to the conflict-system some more actors and goals, as when the East-West conflict is analyzed in its global context, adding the Pacific to the Atlantic theater, then referred to as the reference-system. Thus, conflict-system and reference-system are the minimum and maximum, respectively, needed to analyze the conflict.

We then add to the scheme so far developed:

6. Conflict attitude, which we identify with mental states of the actors, and
7. Conflict behavior, which we identify with somatic states of the actors in the action-system.

Thus attitude and behavior are used to describe completely the states of the actors in the system; using the age-old body-soul division between the somatic and the mental states.

This means that the conflict-system is looked at from two different angles: an abstract angle where goal-states are analyzed for their compatibility or incompatibility, and a concrete angle where actors are analyzed in terms of attitude and behavior. We then use "behavior" in such a way as to include verbal as well as non-verbal

behavior, not to mention behavior that consists in keeping constant the state of one's body; inactivity. And we use "attitude" so as to include cognitions as well as evaluations and emptiness; inactivity.

These are very broad concepts, but the line between them is relatively clear, which is not the same as saying that we do not believe in empirical correlations between somatic and mental states of the actors. It should perhaps be added that if the actor is a collectivity, then "behavior" refers to the behavior of its members, and "attitude" to the attitudes of the members. However coordinated and harmonized, even "masses" ultimately boil down to individuals.

We mention this because there might be an alternative definition, reserving "behavior" for collective representative behavior—which may not be representative—and attitude for collective representative attitude—which may not be representative. We reject that approach as being too reminiscent of the old "group-soul" idea, and because of difficulties in drawing the border line.

At the concrete level of behavior and attitude actors act and feel the conflict, they are the conflict. We are used to identifying this as destruction, both in behavior and attitude, an identification which is not necessary even if empirically tenable. But had it not been for the destruction, violence, that may accompany conflict the field would not have attracted so much attention as it does.

8. Conflict negation is now easily defined: it is a process that includes the disappearance of the conflict. In other words; it is a succession of states of the conflict system where the end state has one definitely characteristic: an overlap between acceptability and compatibility has been found. Conflict negation is a process where the final state may be referred to as conflict termination.


Nothing is implied about the quality of the negation: it need not be just, good or lasting; the negation just is in the sense that the conflict is not: acceptability- and compatibility-regions overlap. Thus, a negation may involve killing one actor or suppressing one goal, just as well as it may involve the fusion of two actors into a integrated whole or the dissolution of the incompatibility through the mobilization of reservoirs of time, energy, money etc. All elements we have listed to arrive at the definition of conflict become keys to conflict negation in as much as they are elements in the conflict situation, and constitute in themselves approaches, both in theory and in practice, to the negation and termination of any conflict.

There is only one distinction which should be made here: just as we distinguished between conflict in the sense of contradiction on the one hand and conflict attitude-behavior on the other, we may distinguish between conflict resolution on the one hand and conflict repression as defined above on the other. Conflict repression, then, is the negation of any aspect of conflict, particularly patterns of behavior and attitudes arising from the conflict, that makes the conflict disappear as factual phenomenon. Usually, one will conceive of conflict repression as the cessation of hostilities, a “back to normal” where destructive attitude-behavior is built down, and the conflict as incompatibility may be frozen and enter a stage of latency. This distinction is important for political and ethical debates, since conflict repression is a more modest goal than conflict resolution and these two levels are often confused.

1.8 The Phases of Conflict

We can now conclude this part of the book with a brief note on the phases of conflict. It seems useful, in general, to distinguish between these phases:

Figure 1.9. The Phases of Conflict



The conflict originates somewhere and becomes articulated. Then it develops until a resolution phase can be said to emerge and the conflict dissolves as the system finally reaches the solution state where there no longer is any conflict. The resolution phase is certainly part of the dynamics (and vice versa), and the solution part of the resolution, just as much as the origin is part of the dynamics. Nevertheless the diagram is fruitful as a paradigm since the life history of so many conflicts seems to be that the conflict almost imperceptibly evolves, then there is a process of often destructive behavior and-or attitude until some regulatory forces are called into operation from within or without to start the phase of resolution which then finally leads to some kind of solution. These phases seem to be so relatively easily discernible in the life-history of conflicts that we have used this simple paradigm as organizing axis.

Paradoxically it seems more easy to arrive at a theory for the resolution than for the origin or genesis of conflicts. Much can also be said about the dynamics of conflicts, but it looks as if knowledge of the dynamics and resolution phases of conflicts sheds more light on the phase of origin than vice versa. A conflict system is a succession of states; the more similar these states the more static the system, the more dissimilar the more dynamic, by definition.

Knowledge of the nature of the conflict itself at all points in the history of the system is indispensable, particularly since the conflict will change and generally aggravate by an admixture stemming from the escalation in the dynamics phase. But given the way conflict has been defined most of the relevant properties of the system are already included in the definition of the conflict: the description of the actors, the description of the goals, sufficient knowledge about either to establish acceptability and incompatibility regions and their relation to each other. It is claimed that with this knowledge it should be possible to proceed on the basis of general conflict theory, and that the shadows thrown by the prehistory are of minor significance relative to the impact of the factors already included in the definition of the successive conflicts in which the system is found. History is already absorbed in actors and goals.

1.9 Conflict Theory and Game Theory

We have now presented the building-blocs for a conflict theory: actors, their goals (values, interests) imputed to them by analysis of their interests and studies of their behavior to uncover what they seem to pursue, and on interview methods to get verbal declarations about value-orientations and other attitudes. Acceptability- and incompatibility-regions are defined and compared. The more detailed knowledge about all these factors or aspects of a conflict, the more can be said about the conflict dynamics and possible resolution.

In game theory the same elements appear, but in a somewhat different order so that the emphasis becomes different. There are actors, but usually only two. There are goals but they are usually projected onto a generalized utility-dimension so that for all practical purposes the theory is handling only one goal. This means that game theory in its simple, very common, case is studying (2,1)-conflicts, known as two-person games, but more general formulations of the theory are certainly available.

For some mathematical theorems to apply there is the condition that the goal-dimension (utility-dimension) is additive, even limited to the structure of an interval scale. There is

Chapter 2

DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT

Introduction

This book is written in a spiral; things are touched upon, left behind, approached again when some other themes have been explored a little bit, fade out then to be approached again later on. Thus, after the preparatory work done in Part One an effort will now be made to approach a major theme: the dimensions, necessary and sufficient, to conceive of conflict in all its phases, origin or genesis, process or dynamics, resolution or negation. In short, its ongoing, never ending transformation.

Let us start by making a distinction between typologies of conflict and dimensions of conflict. A typology classifies conflicts into types. A dimension is a variable that apply to all conflicts, regardless of type. Moreover, they can be conceived of dynamically: a conflict can move along these dimensions; that is what makes them different from a taxonomic, static scheme. Actually, there is only one typology that we would not include among the dimensions, the simple typology derived from the type of actors participating in the conflict: conflicts involving persons, involving groups, or involving societies. This is a typology and not a dimension because we would not generally assume it to be dynamic. An interperson conflict would remain an interperson conflict, although its history might reveal ramifications from and to all the other types.

When it comes to dimensions each author in the field will have his own bundle to present, and this book is no exception. The present bundle has been arrived at with two principles in mind.

First, as already mentioned: it should be possible to say what we want to say about conflict relying on these dimensions, and whatever can be derived from them by purely logical operations, alone.

Second, the dimensions should be as few as possible, for economy of thought use conceptual puritanism. Why? Why submit oneself voluntarily to Occam's razor? Are not the richness and variety of society in general, and conflict in particular, so overwhelming that it can only be captured by a language that with the same richness and does that not argue in favor of the variety in natural languages?

If there were a choice between the puritan rigor just advocated and the richness of natural language we would certainly opt for the latter. But there is also virtue to the former, often referred to as "scientific discipline". The virtue is to some extent combinatorial: the researcher says, to himself and to others, here are my terms of reference, let me now try to get as much out of them as possible. If they are very many one cannot possibly explore all the combinations. But if they are very few I can do that, and this may lead me into dark corners where the fruitfulness of the dimensions chosen is measured exactly by their ability to lighten up those corners. Thus, the puritanism of conceptual economy serves as a heuristic, as an aid not only to formulate what I already know, but also to ask questions about the unknown. The fruitfulness of the scheme should be judged on the basis of the latter rather than the former.

To arrive at the dimensions we use the definition of conflict: actors in pursuit of incompatible goals, remembering that as limiting case actors may be parties, goals may be interests, incompatibilities may never be brought into the open, and the pursuit may be steered by the structure. This "limiting case" must be given much prominence.

It has been found useful to group the dimensions under the four headings of actors, goals, incompatibility and pursuit. With three dimensions for each heading this gives a total of 12, but the scheme is not quite that economical since there are subdimensions:

Table 2.1 Dimensions of Conflict

ACTORS	GOALS	INCOMPATIBILITY	PURSUIT
<p>(1) <u>Domain</u> 0 – party 1 – intra-conflict 2 – bilateral, polar . m – multilateral, polar</p>	<p>(4) <u>Scope</u> 0 – interest 1 – 2 – . n –</p>	<p>(7) <u>Analyticity</u> low – empirical (synthetic) medium high – logical (analytic)</p>	<p>(10) <u>Attitude</u> negative neutral positive hatred detached love</p>
<p>(2) <u>Structure of actors</u> <u>Unstructured conflict</u> <u>Vertical Conflict</u> (interaction-defined) weak order strong order linear order specific diffuse <u>Horizontal conflict</u> (interaction-defined) specific interaction diffuse interaction fusion weak strong</p>	<p>(5) <u>Structure of goals</u> <u>Unstructured goals</u> <u>Vertical Goal Infrastructure</u> (priority-defined) weak order strong order linear order <u>Horizontal Goal structure</u> (similarity-defined) specific similarity diffuse similarity fusion</p>	<p>(8) <u>Substitutability</u> low – actor conflict medium high – structural conflict</p>	<p>(11) <u>Behavior</u> negative neutral positive destructive neutral constructive</p>
<p>(3) <u>Consciousness</u> <u>objective/subjective</u> <u>false/true</u></p>	<p>(6) <u>Acceptability</u> <u>Bounded-nonbounded</u> (fundamental) <u>Continuous-discontinuous</u> (step, dechotomous) <u>Boundary-form</u> (indep. vs. dependent) <u>Derivative at boundary</u> (steep vs. flat)</p>	<p>(9) <u>Incompatibility</u> <u>Bounded-nonbounded</u> (impossible) <u>Continuous-discontinuous</u> (step, dichotomous) <u>Boundary-form</u> (harmony and disharmony) <u>Derivative at boundary</u> (steep vs. flat)</p>	<p>(12) <u>Ressource</u> <u>Types: ideological</u> remunerative punitive <u>Distribution (balance):</u> asymmetric: TU conflict symmetric: TT " " " " " "</p>

The Table may look impossible at first glance, but is actually very simple. Thus, the two first two columns simply start with the number of actors and number of goals; then proceed to the structure of the sets of actors and the structure of the sets of goals, obviously defining some kind of “space”; and then continue with two important functions of that space: the type of consciousness the actors have of it, and the extent to which various positions in that goal space are acceptable or not.

In the third column, then, the incompatibility function does the same for what is empirically possible, attainable, realizable or not, preceded by two important distinctions in the theory of incompatibility, analyticity and substitutability.

And finally, there is the fourth column which starts out with such obvious manifestations of conflict as attitude and behavior, and then brings in a basic variable in any theory of conflict: how the resources are distributed, which is a euphemistic way of bringing in power, but then power of different types.

The basic distinction is between ideological or normative, remunerative and punitive forms of power, to be explored in some detail. But underlying that is power or resources as something an actor has, and power as something built into the structure as part of the position of an actor. Obviously this relates to the key distinction in Part One between actor-conflict and structure-conflict, and the two types of power can be referred to as resource power and position-power respectively. We just mention this point to assure the reader that the key distinction from Part One has not been lost sight of but comes up in dimension (12) below.

Let us then dig into this systematically, and in the order indicated in Table 2.1.

ACTORS

2.1 Domain

This is a deceptively simple dimension: simply counting the number of actors. However, there is the basic idea that the counting starts at zero, with the non-actor, the “party” to a conflict. Then, the single actor conflict, the actor at odds with himself, is of course included; defining the category of the intra-actor conflict, whether of the intrapersonal, intra-group or intra-societal variety. Correspondingly, when the domain exceeds 1 we obviously have to do with inter-actor conflicts, starting with the bilateral or bipolar variety, ending with the multilateral, multipolar type where m actors are involved.

How then would we distinguish between, say, an intragroup and an inter-person conflict? Does not the group consist of persons, like a society consists of groups, and does not that mean that an intra-group conflict is simply a conflict between persons, just as an intra-societal conflict would be a conflict between groups? No, although this may be the consequence of an intra-actor conflict, it seems a waste of terms to identify them with each other a priori. On the contrary, we can conceive of an intra-group conflict as a condition where the same intra-person conflict is found throughout the group, in the smallest sub-section; and similarly we can conceive of an intra-societal conflict as a conflict where the same intra-group conflict is found throughout the society. In either case the collectivity is ridden with or by a fundamental doubt, for instance as to what is worse, “to be red” or “to be dead”; or what is preferable, a socialist government headed by Jews or the country occupied, by anti-Jewish Germans (a Cold War, post-World War II dilemma, and a pre-World War II dilemma in France, respectively).

Thus, the intra-collectivity conflict is a collectively shared dilemma, “dilemma” being a term often made use of in connection with intra-personal conflict; here generalized.

Perhaps the difference between intra-actor and inter-actor conflict can be made more clear in terms of some possible, although extreme, outcomes, as indicated in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2. Conflict-Types and Possible Outcomes

		<u>type</u>		
		person	group	society
<u>domain</u>	intra	suicide	apathy	anomie
	inter	homicide	internal war	external war

Typically, the extreme outcome of the intra-actor conflict would be some kind of self-destruction and the extreme outcome of inter-actor conflict some type of other-destruction. But this means that it might be very advantageous for a possible target of that other destruction to manipulate the perception of a conflict so that it is seen as an intra-actor conflict, leading to gradual erosion, inactivity and self-destruction of a potential aggressor.

We do not have to go so far as to the collective suicide found in some cultures for a group or a society to become inactive. Total collective apathy, or one corresponding term at the social level, anomie, would render a potential aggressor innocuous.

For the time being there is not much more to get out of this dimension. It only defines the number of actors in the set of actors, not the structure of that set. To that we now turn.

2.2 Structure of Actors

To define a structure one needs a set of elements, and a set of relations between them. To the social scientist there is no doubt what the latter is: the key relation of interaction, analyzed in terms of ex-change, what passes between the parties, and in-change, what goes on inside the parties as a consequence of the interaction. But what does this interaction relate or connect? We cannot say “actors” because we may have situations without actors, only with parties. But in the latter case it would usually make sense to say “positions”, that in which the party is put to perform according to the interaction rules. We let that do for the time being, and turn to the major distinction: whether the conflict is unstructured or structured, and in the latter case whether it is vertical or horizontal. Needless to say, these distinctions are analytical and hence too blunt. There are all kinds of shades in between, such as the semi-structured conflict, the diagonal conflict, and so on. But, as somebody has said: the existence of hermaphrodites and other intermediate types does not make the dimension of gender invalid as an analytical or practical tool.

First, there is the unstructured conflict which in a sense is a conflict that takes place in a vacuum, a vacuous conflict. There is no prior interaction whatsoever, like the colonial powers suddenly descending on an African society. Analytically speaking this case is often relatively simple to handle since analysis of the resources the two actors bring into the conflict will often carry us a considerable distance in understanding what is happening. This dimension will be explored below, in Section 2.12, under (12). Suffice it here only to say that in this case we could clearly speak about symmetric versus asymmetric conflicts, depending on the distribution of the resources the actors have at their disposal for the conflict.

However, in general we shall assume that conflict is structured, and in that case the major focus would be on the nature of the interaction. More particularly, the focus will be on the results of the ex-change and in-change; on whether the net benefits that accrue from the interaction are unevenly or evenly distributed. In the first case the conflict is vertical, in the second case it is horizontal.

This is the basic, fundamental distinction, because it is so closely related to the distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of goals. The conflicts of interest are structurally defined, they do not necessarily leave any traces whatsoever in terms of consciousness, attitude or behavior in the parties. And the basic, but by no means the only one, conflict of interest would be in connection with verticality. However, as

pointed out in the preceding part of the book there can also be structural conflicts that are horizontal – only that they are probably not so important. Further, in a vertical conflict parties may certainly become actors through organizations and interests become goals through consciousness formation, so there is no contradiction in saying that an actor’s goal is his interest. The point is merely that there can be interests that are not goals.

In horizontal conflict, a conflict between parties in an equitable relationship, we would not talk about conflicts of interest since that term has been tied to some kind of asymmetry in the interaction structure, in the form of exploitation, penetration, fragmentation or marginalization. Thus, the horizontal conflict would typically be a conflict over goals.

At this point it is important not to confuse the vertical–horizontal distinction with the asymmetric–symmetric distinction.

The former has to do with a position in the structure, the latter with the resources they bring into the conflict. The two are strongly related empirically, however analytically distinct they may be.

Thus, exploitation is usually predicated on the assumption that he who is on top of the structure, in its center, will also command the resources. In other words, it is predicated on the assumption that structural power is highly correlated with resource power; relational power with difference power to express the same in terms with a slightly different connotation. But that is not necessarily the case.

Correspondingly, the theory of revolution, the opposite of the theory of repression, assumes that those at the bottom of a vertical structure have latent resources. The function of consciousness formation and organization is to mobilize these resources. When this is done a vertical conflict may turn into a symmetric conflict, or even an asymmetric conflict in favor of the underdog.


Having said this let us introduce some additional distinctions in connection with interaction, highly useful in conflict theory.

First, an interaction relation connects actors. However, it may not necessarily connect all of them, in which case the connection is weak; if it does connect all of them it is strong. If the interaction is vertical this gives us weak order and strong order respectively, and in the latter case one may even have linear order. There is some way of ordering actors so that the differences between them become measurable. An example would be the ordering of civil servants on a salary scale, where they can be compared in terms of the number of ”steps” that separates them. In Figure 2.1 some examples are given, for both the vertical and the horizontal cases. It should be noted that in either case “strong”

interaction relations mean that all actors are related, not only, for instance, neighbors.


It might also be pointed out that linear horizontal interaction is the case where interaction is equitable, and some type of distance, for instance geographical distance, is the same between all actors.

Figure 2.1. Weak, Strong and Linear Order



Let us make use of these distinctions to develop some basic social models that seems to be useful in social analysis. They are developed simply by making use of the vertical/horizontal distinction and the strong/weak distinction, combining them into four social models as indicated in figure 2.2.:

Figure 2.2. Four Social Models



The horizontal types are the simplest ones. In Model III, Communal Society, all interaction is horizontal and the connection is strong, not like in Model IV, Pluralistic Society, where groups relate to each other horizontally, but very weakly or not at all.

In the vertical case “strong” has been interpreted weakly: the point is that no element is isolated from the rest, all are connected, but at the bottom of society there may be fragmentation. It is quite clear who is above and who is below, but those at the bottom are only relate to each other by having the same actor on top of them. This is Model I, Conservative or perhaps better Feudal Society.

Correspondingly, in Model II, Liberal Society, the predominant mode is still vertical but it has been modified by introducing horizontal interaction between equals. The “weakness” in this case, is not exactly of the type indicated in the definition above; that definition would point more in the direction of detachment between vertical units. But in spite of these impurities in the definitions the scheme is so related to what has been presented here for conflict analysis, and also brings us towards more concrete societies.

Thus, conservative society has its obvious manifestations today in archetypical Japan, liberal society in the various types of class societies from the United States to the Soviet Union, communal society in the people’s communes in China, and pluralist society appears as some kind of future utopia, more or less articulated in the minds and actions of some people.

Our point in this connection, however, is not to engage in of futuristic analysis but to indicate something about the concrete setting in which conflicts may take place.

Thus, in Model I and Model II societies the conflicts would predominantly be vertical and in Model III and Model IV societies predominantly horizontal. The latter two would, by definition, have overcome—transcended—vertical interaction. They would be non-exploitative, equitable societies.

The point is that conflict genesis, as well as conflict dynamics and conflict resolution, will take on very different forms in these four societies, and that is a theme which will be developed later.


More particularly, we would be interested in studying what kind of conflict resolution mechanisms would develop in these four social forms; clearly more related to structure-conflicts in Models I and II, and to actor-conflicts in Models III and IV.

Let us then turn to the next aspect of interaction, particularly well known through the works of Sorokin, Parsons and many social anthropologists. The focus is not on inequity-equity, but on the scope of interaction, from the narrow band referred to as specific interaction via the broad band of diffuse interaction to an interaction so encompassing

that one can talk about fusion between the actors.

This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, for both vertical and horizontal cases:

Figure 2.3. Specific and Diffuse Interaction, and Fusion



Obviously, this typology can now be combined with the types in Figure 2.1, or in Figure 2.2 for that matter, and lead to relatively complex configurations. We shall show later that such combinations are quite meaningful for the analysis of conflict in all its phases.

Since what is here called “structure of actors” essentially would be an opening to the whole theory of social structure, it is more than obvious that much more can be said.

Thus, we have only focussed on interaction relations and not on interaction patterns or networks. However, they have already been introduced in connection with the analysis of conflicts of interests in the preceding part: the focus was not only on inequity, but also on penetration, fragmentation and marginalization.

But we do not have to take in all of this analytical machinery for all purposes; they are four different ways of looking at essential asymmetries in social structures, and hence at conflicts of interest, and they already carry us quite far.

The basic point about what we have said under this heading is rather how complicated the actor side of a conflict is.

Thus, one may perhaps say, as is often done, that there are “two” actors. But it makes a lot of difference whether they are unstructured or structured, and in the latter case whether they are vertically and-or horizontally related.

Moreover, there is also a “Chinese boxes” principle involved here: when one opens up one actor one finds, very often, “subactors” inside, and the question then is: how are they structured? Thus, how many participants are there in the classical cold war conflict

formation: 2–two blocs–or $15 + 7 = 22$, the number of participant countries in the two alliances?

How do we take into account the NN, neutral-nonaligned, countries playing an increasingly important role?

And, what difference does it make that the NATO system possibly is more organized like a Model II society with the superpower on top, some middle powers–UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany–in the middle and small powers at the bottom whereas the Warsaw Treaty system is more organized like a Model I society, obviously with the superpower on the top?

And then, what has been done once can be done twice: one can open up the single country actor and ask what it looks like on the inside, what is its structure?

And so on, and so forth. What has been given here are only some major tools for that type of exploration.

2.3 Consciousness

We now come to the question to what extent the parties we have been talking about are capable of seeing the forces operating upon them. To the extent they do we shall say that they have consciousness, consciousness being defined exactly as the insight in one's own situation, or more specifically precisely in the forces conditioning oneself, meaning one's self, including inner forces.

The major significance of this dimension lies in the distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of values. Thus, in the pure conflict of interests we assume no consciousness, no insight in the situation in which the party finds itself.

That does not mean that the conflict does not exist; only that it is objective (independent of, ante consciousness), not subjective (in consciousness). Another term often used for the subjective conflict is one that is “perceived”.

This gives rise to a simple but important combination of the two categories “objective” vs “subjective” conflict, indicated in Table 2.3:

Table 2.3 “Objective” vs “Subjective” Conflicts

		Actor-oriented	
		not subjective	subjective
Structure-oriented	not objective	no conflict	conflict of goals
	objective	conflict of interest <u>False</u> consciousness	interests = goals <u>True</u> consciousness

As mentioned repeatedly above there are two ways of finding out whether there is a conflict anywhere: one is actor-oriented and leads to the exploration of values somewhere in the actor’s consciousness or subconsciousness, revealed in attitudes and/or behavior.

The other is structure-oriented and leads to the exploration of any kind of asymmetry built into the structure. The asymmetry defines interests of two types: the interest in maintaining advantage, and the interest in getting out of disadvantage. Obviously, this leads to four different cases, as indicated in the Table.

The case of “no conflict” is in need of no further comment. But the other three cases can stand some elaboration, although it is rather obvious what is intended.

Thus, there is the important category of the conflict of interest that is not perceived, not subjective. In this case there is a pure conflict of interest, and since we do not assume that parties have no consciousness (they are alive), whatever consciousness they have is false since they do not see their own situation.

This immediately leads to the question of how this false consciousness has come about: what are the structures upholding it? In our analysis this is explored by using the ubiquitous twin of exploitation-penetration.

It is exactly through the penetration of the consciousness of the underdog, through the mystification of the structure for him, that he is led not to see the obvious.

This can take place at the level of the person, of the group, and the society. The precise mechanisms will vary, but they have one thing in common: the topdog somehow gets under the skin of the underdog.

The parents penetrate the consciousness of the children they dominate, the teachers the students; the managers the workers; the Center nations penetrate also physically the Periphery nations by making their elites into pliable bridgeheads for themselves, and so on. Thus, Ibsen’s A Doll’s House is precisely about what happens when a Nora throws away the false consciousness built into her.

And the reaction: All was quiet till Ibsen wrote that play.

Diametrically opposed to this is the pure category of the conflict of values that are subjective, as it would have to be in order for a value to be defined, but structure-oriented analysis does not lead to the issue of any kind of asymmetry certificate. In other words, it is the type of conflict one would have in situation of zero or horizontal interaction, with compatible goals. Thus, a definite stand is taken here: we do not assume that all conflicts have a class character. There are subjective conflicts, and they are vacuous or horizontal – which does not mean that all vacuous or horizontal conflicts necessarily have led to consciousness formation. For this a certain crystallization is needed, maybe through some conflict manifestation in one form or another. But that would not be a case of false consciousness, or at least not of the serious kind mentioned in the category above. It might be a case of unconsciousness, which is something different.

Finally, there is the obvious combination of the two categories: the conflict which is at the same time objective and subjective. In this case there is consciousness, interests are seen as goals, which means that there is true consciousness. For whom? For the underdog, or for the top-dog, or for both. For there is no assumption that the top-dog necessarily has more insight in the conflict of interest than the underdog; that would introduce the palpably untrue hypothesis that all exploitation is somehow premeditated.

It should be emphasized that consciousness is not the same as "attitude". The way it is conceived of here consciousness is cognitive and attitudes cathectic (which is not the same as "evaluative"). Since it is cognitive, the whole notion points to one major function of social science: to contribute to true consciousness.

This is exactly what the social scientist should be equipped for.

On the one hand he should have the tools to develop insights into structures, on the other hand he should also understand actors, and he should be able to combine the two.

However, when this is not necessarily what social scientists engage in, then it may be fruitful to ask what holds him back? And the answer to that question would probably have to be divided into two, at least.

The obvious answer is that the social scientist might himself have considerable vested interest in putting some limits on the extent to which he wants to explore false consciousness, demystify social structures. He may himself be highly privileged, or at least belong to the privileged class. And even if the vested interest is not so strong, he may be ideologically opposed to its clarification. He clearly sees society from one vantage point only, that of his class, or perhaps more importantly, sees the world from one vantage point only, that of this region, however analytically schooled, and this may distort and

contract his perspective.

More importantly, however, would be the idea that analysis might not be enough. We have argued strongly above in favor of the idea that societies can only be understood when they are in a state of excitation, not only in the “normal” state. There is an obvious parallel here to the physicist-engineer encountering some new compound, exposing it to a context different from the “normal” 15°C and one atmosphere pressure to see how it reacts. And this leads to a confrontation, a special type of experience, as a deeper tool for social insight and normal state analysis. He might detest that phenomenon being more law-and-order oriented, and disinclined to engage in or benefit from such experiences.