262   Amy Verdun
Helleiner, E., Paglian. S. and Zimmermann. H. (eds) (2010) Global Fmance , Politics of International Regulatory Change (London. Routledgel. C"sis
Holzinger. K.. Knill. C, and Arts. B. (eds) (2008) Environmental Po,lcy -Europe The Impact of International Institutions and Trade (Cambr,dge. Ca ^«fc „
versity Pressl
U*.
Jabko. N (2006) Playing the Market A Political Strategy for Uniting £Ur
(Ithaca. NY Cornell University Press). r°pe- '985^
OatleyJ (20121 International Political Economy. 5th edn (London: RoutledgQ) Piketty, (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: The B
Harvard University Press). elknaP PieSs 0)
Schimmelfennig, F and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (2005) 77ie Politics of Eur
largement Theoretical Approaches (London Routledge). Pean Ur"0n &.
Young. A R (2007) Trade Politics Ain't What It Used to Be. The Europea
Doha Round'. Journal of Common Market Studies. 45/4: 789-8H Un'°n ln
WEB LINKS
A good source of information on the EU's international economic and financial actives is the Europa website (managed by the European institutions), https://europa.eu, whereto mam agencies and institutions post policy statements, documents, and other mater* that are in the public domain On monetary policy, see the website of the ECB. http:/, www.ecb.int/ The major economic and financial newspapers have websites that offer j wide range of useful matenals, for example http://www.ft.com/ {Financial Times an<j http://vvww.economist.eom/ (The Economist) On the financial crisis a useful resource s the Blog by Professor Nounel Roubini: https://www.roubinimonitor.com
12
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate Change
johnVogler
Introduction 264
Environmental policy 265
The international dimension 267
Sustainable development 270
EL' leadership 272 The climate and energy
problem 273
■
fliraalc and energy security 274
The EU in international climate diplomacy
The EU as climate negotiator Conclusion
NOTES
FURTHER READING WEB LINKS
I Summary
The European Union (EU) has played a prominent role in the global politics of the envi-ronment.This chapter examines how EU external environmental policy was established on the basis of internal policies. Despite problems of coordination and coherence under shared competence, the EU has been able to exercise leadership in global environmental governance and most significantly in the development of the climate change regime. Because the latter concentrates on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the EU has faced the challenge of aligning its energy and climate policies, and internal and external action has been closely interrelated, raising questions of climate and energy security.The second part of the chapter traces the way in which the Union has tried lo lead the negotiation of an international climate regime up until the 2015 Paris conference and considers the ways in which the different energy interests of the member states have been accommodated in order to sustain European credibility. Finally, there '» an analysis of the problems encountered by the Union as a climate negotiator.
John Vogler
Introduction
Environmental policy in general, and climate change policy in particular ren key areas of EU involvement in the processes of global governance. A therne Prese"t through this chapter is that in this area there is a very close relationship betv^^ miemal and external policies of the Union. The acquisition of internal com^"lhe led to very extensive Community (now Union) participation in a wide range p ^ national environmental cooperation, from the regulation of international t°r , hazardous waste to the Kyoto Protocol. As will be demonstrated in the discu "n the links between external climate and internal energy policy, international rt""1 °' ments have also driven domestic policy formulation within the EU. Since theuľ sustainable development has provided the leitmotif of global environmental p0l ^ For the EU this highlights problems of 'coherence' between its environmental" !ľf and development policies, which can limit their effectiveness and legitimacy links to two of the key themes of this volume: the functioning of international h ° tions within the EU and the links between the EU and broader processes oľ inters tional relations.
Despite this, and some of the limitations of coordination and competence that will be examined in this chapter, the EU has made strong claims to international leader ship. This has been of some significance for the Union's emergent international iden lily. Whatever the failings of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) climate leadership did provide an arena in which success might be claimed and in which the EU could be regarded as constituting a 'power' (thus providing evidence for the third of the key themes in this volume), orchestrating regime construction mediating between the developed and developing worlds, and taking on the US government over climate and other issues.
Engagement with the international regime for climate change, from its inception in the late 1980s, has required that the Union take action to limit emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. There had already been some limited connection between energy and environmental policy in the campaign to combat 'acid rain' deposited by emissions from power stations during the 1970s and 1980s, but now wholesale reform of the ways in which Europe generated and used energy became essential both to fulfilling EU obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and to maintaining the credibility of the Union's position in the search for a new post-2020 climate agreement However, the Union had not developed an effective common energy policy and entered into the climate negotiations of the 1990s without a credible foundation (Adelle, Pallemaerts, and Chiavari 2009). Leadership in the developing international climate change regime required that such an internal basis be established, but climate and energy policy impinged upon some core member state interests revealing major differences between countries at different levels of economic development with diverse energy mixes' and dependence upon external suppliers. Thus climate change policy is illustrative of another of the themes of this volume, highlighting the
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy anrt rn
BV. and Climate Change
i politics of the EU as an international system i„ its 0Wn ri„h, <S*r states, and latterly the European ParhamenTs^^ C°m^ i»n' energy requirements in a way that would fulfil ,k rec°n"le
nns and ambitions. the Ws interna
energy
jOtl'
ihe»r
differing'
" rbliWtions and ambitions. -—■- ""erna-
° ,nerey      environmental policy had become entandPH i l
d rarities between conceptions of energy and climate security Ener T" CI framed in terms of security of supply, with many «1 T * ?
largely orthodox kind. On the other hand, cli ~ ~ let different perspective in which environmental changes potentially threatened
nflict or provide much sought after synergies' is a useful approach to examining he Climate-energy connection. It also provides an important example of attempts to achieve sustainabihty through EU policy coherence, both internal and external
A[[er ils successes in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and initiating, in 2005 !he worlds r,*t intern^"31 emissions trading scheme (the EU's Emissions Trading System or ETS), the Union found it much more difficult to take the lead in attempts to develop j new comprehensive climate regime. The Copenhagen climate conference of 2009 was seen as a major reverse but the EU was able to lead the negotiation of the 2011 Durban Platform that provided a basis for the 2015 Paris Agreement. These events t an analysis, in the final section of this chapter, of the factors that determine
Environmental policy
The environment received not a mention in the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty's focus »us upon economic regeneration and expansion and, as the 1955 Messina Declaration had noted, 'Putting more abundant energy at a cheaper price at the disposal of the European economies constitutes a fundamental element of economic progress. The full consequences of success in this enterprise could not have been grasped by ihe authors of the Treaty of Rome. Nonetheless, activists in the Commission were "hie to provide creative interpretations of some of its articles such as to allow the early development of environmental policy. The first piece of environmental legislation is traceable to a 1959 directive on radiological protection under the European tank Energy Community (Euratom) Treaty, to be followed by a range of measures tat used the harmonization of standards within the Common Market to insert envi-ronmental rules. The types of issue covered were vehicle emissions and packaging wmdards, which if not regulated by the Community, could result in distortions to the
John Vogler
,   ~k and services within the market. This 'niche' approach wa,« free flow o goodsand m, „ „f environmenla, ^
"** bV Xot rly basis ,n the European Coal and Stee, Coming °" CnC^h  key "ues of energy mix. supply, and taxation remain with* J*
h EU TFEU). In so far as the Union has been able to develop energy pohci« ™ cn through the utilization of single market, competitor,, and other Comrn * „cluding those that were to develop for the environment.
Union ""^^p^ consciousness within the USA and many 0lher ^sodeties^evideiuin^
An upsurge (
ia Rrst landmark conference on the human en—en, (United Nations Confer. >aris" summitof the original six members and Britain, Denmark, and Ireland
ence on the Human Environment) in Stockholm in June1972. ln October of ^ Sed'I tormaTdedarauon thathenceforth economic growth would be lempered'bv
a concern to
protect the environment (McCormick 2001, 47). A number of
well-
publicized accidents and environmental disasters alongside an increasing recognition of the scale of transboundary pollution encouraged European action to protecl the environment—a process that was generally promoted by green leader' states, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany (Andersen and Liefferink 1997). ln 1973 an environmental action programme was announced, the first of successive programmes under which a mass of protective legislation was to be generated-m excess of 250 specific acts. By the 1990s action on the environment had resulted in one of the most substantial areas of European law. European Community (EC) and now Union competences (where the right to make policy passes from the member states to the Union) were acquired in a range of significant areas, including atmospheric and water quality, the disposal of hazardous waste, noise abatement, and the protection of wildlife and habitats—to the extent that upwards of 80 per cent of member state domestic environmental legislation is initiated by EU environmental directives. Environmental policy achieved treaty recognition in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and is now incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 191 and 192, TFEU). A 'high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment' is one of the objectives of the Union, which shall also 'contribute to the sustainable development of the earth' (Article 3, (3,5)).
In fact, for most issues involving environmental policy, competences are shared between the Union and the member states (Article 4(e), TFEU).' The proportions of competence vary by issue. For example, in relation to trade in hazardous waste there is a very high degree of Union competence, while for climate change there are important areas of exclusive member stale competence. For EU environmental policy under Article 191, the normal legislative procedures apply, which means the application of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council and co-decision with the Parliament. Questions of shared competence and internal legislative procedures have significant implications for the role and effectiveness of the EU in international environmental politics, to which we shall now turn.
The
Challenge of the Environment. Energy. and Climate Change
The
inte
rnational dimension
,h other areas, such as transport, u was evident,ha, the implications of the * 1 could not easily be contained within the boundaries of the Common At&'c _____ nf rnurse. alreadv had a ranop nf __
ECs
Common Mar-
^""""beVstates, of course, already had a range of existing international commit-k* Memd trcaty obligations. Whereas in the case of trade it had been clear from the K^'r, authority to negotiate on behalf of all members had to be transferred to olllSel mission, this was hardly the case elsewhere. Indeed, the very idea of hand-lhECOm ngh« to conduct external policy was strongly contested by some member in§0VC vernments. It was only following a significant legal judgment of the Euro-S'JlC Court of Justice (ECJ) (European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA), ECJ Case P0"1     March 1971, see Box 12.1) that the 'parallel' relationship between internal 22/7 ternal EC policy was finally established. The precise terms and circumstances ^ \cn in Box 12.1 and are significant because the ERTA judgment provided the arte"   n which the Commission was able to assen its right to represent the EC ^ally where internal environmental policy competence had been achieved. ^The judgment provided the basis for participation of the Community (and now Union) alongside member states in international negotiations. Both were allowed ' be signatories to international undertakings, known as mixed agreements' In ne-10 tions it is possible for either the Commission or the Presidency to take the lead ^representing the Union, depending upon their competences, and this has sometimes irritated and bewildered outsiders who have to interact with the EU Furthermore there is a need to attain agreement during a negotiation among the member slates such that there is usually an internal EU negotiation being conducted within the international meeting. Much time, which arguably might be used more productively is spent by the Commission and national officials in coordination meetings that mirror Council Working Groups sur place sometimes described as the EU bunker' (Afionis 2011,346). With a rotating Presidency, shared competences, and an increasing number of member states, it might have been expected that the EU would be an ineffective environmental negotiator, hamstrung by its own internal deliberations and capable only of moving al the speed of the slowest member state. However, as we shall see, the EU was able to make credible claims to leadership in environmental diplomacy, although its internal arrangements can still cause difficulty. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty reopened debates about the extent of Union competence and the right to represent the EU in climate and other environmental negotiations. In climate and other negotiations there is now a pragmatic compromise whereby representatives of the Commission and of the member state 'president in office' sit behind 1 single EU nameplate and share representational duties.2
Even if the EU was able to organize itself for the conduct of environmental diplomacy, there remained the question of external recognition. The Community and "°w the Union enjoy international legal personality, thai is to say they have the Wal right to incur international obligations in the same way as the member However, although the Commission may assert the Union's right 10
268
John Vogler
^^TJntemal to external competence
red relatively mundane road transport issues. It was the mtentio The case at issue cover ^ ^ be devebped ^   ™ nof
|he treaty of orn<M    ^ ^ ^ Qf ^ ^ „ ^ H
would involve                 Because road transport operated right across the E mg the European Lomniu  r _______^
nnn-members alike, triers wac „
lish-uropean
mnt,nent and invoked member states and non-nnembers alike, there was a clear ^
! er5 were not handled differently on either side of the Community's boundaries
' l„ 1962 the attempt to prov.de a set of Europe-wide regulations commenced with J sionature of a European agreement concerning the work of crews and vehlc|es en ,n international road transport (ERTA). Among the signatories were five of the S|< states but insufficient ratifications were obtained during the 1960s for the agreement^ enter into force Meanwhile the Community took the first steps towards the c0mmon transport policy, envisaged in the Treaty of Rome, when at the end of the decade „ .slated on the harmonization of social legislation relating to road transport (Regulate 543/69) The matters covered, involving driver standards and rest periods, were essentially similar to those covered in the ERTA. New negotiations to revise and ratify the latter had begun in 1967 and. aware of this, the member states agreed in a Council meeting 0f May 1970 to concert their national approaches to the negotiations and ensure they were in line with the new Community regulation. The Commission reacted to this apparently sensible arrangement by taking legal action against the Council at the ECJ. calling for the Council's decision on the negotiations to be annulled. Thus began the legal proceedings, known as the ERTA case, that were to define the relationship between internal and «. terna! competence and which served as the basis for much subsequent external policy development by the Community (ECJ case 22/70, 31 March 1971).
The argument of the Council was that the member states were quite within their rights to continue to negotiate the ERTA on an intergovernmental basis because the Treaty did not so provide in the area of transport and that 'authority to enter into agreements with third countries cannot be assumed in the absence of an express provision in the Treaty' (ECJ 22/70). On the issue of principle, the Court disagreed and sided with the Commission. It found that the authority to negotiate externally 'arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from means adopted' (ECJ 22/70, 16). Once the Community has laid down common rules in whatever form, the member states 'no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules or alter their scope' (ibid., 17), Thus 'the system of internal Community measures may not be separated from that of external relations'. This doctrine of 'parallelism' between internal and external policy, and that competence for one implies the other, has been of critical importance in the development of EU external relations.
participate in international organizations, this has not always been accepted by outsiders and the Union is recognized as a full member of relatively few international organizations.
These include the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization but not the United Nauorts Environment Programme (UNEP)
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy
and Climate Change
IIN General Assembly. Thusan ■mportan, part of the history of the Ell i , <Ihe"nal environmental politics has been the Strugs for
<'ERTA judgment allowed environmentally minded Comrnission offl . . ,
Th£    anient and Consumer Protection Service in DG 111- - -       - (l"
EpG was set up only in 1981) to assert the external competed of Z de the member states.' This first occurred at
it merit
dedicated Environ-
Com-
a regional level with the
Convention for the protection of the Rhtne against chemical pollution, to
" flowed by tnc —-------------------- - •" - ««: protection of the Mcditer-
be « Sea. The Community could bring to the table not only its policy competences "ore persuasively, a budgetary contribution.
"Tend of the decade the Community was engaged on a broader scale with Luona1 attempts to deal with transboundary air pollution and acid rain. The tuitions for a convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) "Ter ih£ auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe were T ms«lvcs'in paFt'3 conseqUence °f the chan8es in East-West politics and the Hello process that had helped to stimulate the development of European Political Cooperation during the 1970s. Just as the EC had competence for the trade aspects J East-West relations, so it had competence for questions of atmospheric pollution and for the implementation of any agreement arrived at. Previously the Soviet Union and its a"1" hau refuseu 10 rec°gnize the Community, a practice that involved avoid-,„g eye contact with Commission officials at UN meetings and leaving the room when they spoke. Now, in the hope that the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-mt (COMECON) would achieve similar recognition, a special status of Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) was agreed for the EC, which has ever since served to allow the participation of the Community alongside the member slates. The Union remains the only extant example of an REIO but most recent global environmental conventions on biodiversity, desertification, persistent organic pollutants, climate, etc. contain an REIO clause. This allows the Union to be a full participant and signatory according to its competences and to cast the votes of all the member state parties, but not to vote in addition to them. By contrast, energy questions were rarely subject to international cooperation, rather to the dictates of an often erratic market sometimes subject to political manipulation. In 1974 as a direct result of the oil crisis the International Energy Agency (IEA) was formed to agree on the stockpiling of reserves. It has subsequendy provided a forum for research and analysis in which the EU participates, but not as a full member. Much later, in 2009, the only other formal attempt at global energy governance, the International Renewable Energy Agency, was created with the EU as a full member alongside the member states (Van de Graaf 2013).
Internal environmental legislation gathered pace during the 1980s, and Community competence was definitively established through the treaty amendments agreed wder the SEA of 1986, which also introduced QMV in the Council. These events coincided with a series of significant external opportunities for the development of mvironmental policy. From 1985 to 1987 the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Conation, to combat depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, was negotiated. The
John Vogler
.MMS heavily involved, although not always productively, becaUse... T^tentlinated by the interests of European chemical indus, £ SKSS. P^uct-on ofozone-depleting chemicals W-«*^ 2S US negouators complained that constnuttonal wrangllng within the 2j Section hampered the conduct of negotiations (Benedick 1991). None, " Z agreement was achieved on what has become probably the mos, success*, Z ffcaive international environmental regime. Th.s was also the last occasion, Un Z Obama presidency in 2009-16. that the USA, as opposed to Europe, could,a claim to global environmental leadership.
Sustainable development
The late 1980s was a period of intense international environmental activity leadin 10 the negotiation of global conventions on climate, biodiversity, and desenincaUcf all of which were scheduled to be signed at the 'Earth Summit', to be held in R,Q ln 1992, formally the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develops (UNCED). In 1987, in preparation for this landmark meeting, the Brundiland Re. port (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) popularized ihe concept of sustainable development. Sustainable development has become a very significant idea for the EU and for the wider discussion of the linkages between economic activity, development, and environmental degradation. There are many different and changing interpretations, but its political essence is that there can be no progress without a political and financial accommodation between the desire of the north [o avoid ecological degradation and collapse and the urgent demands o[ the south for development and poverty reduction. Since Rio the Union has embraced the concept as one of its primary objectives, to be mainstreamed' in its policies. The extent to which sustainability can go beyond more conventional and limited ideas of environmental protection is evident from the European Council's own definition: It is about safeguarding the Earth's capacity to support life in all its diversity and is based on the principles of democracy, gender equality, solidarity, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, including freedom and equal opportunities for all. It aims at the continuous improvement of the quality of life and well-being on Earth for present and future generations. To that end it promotes a dynamic economy with full employment and a high level of education, health protection, social and territorial cohesion and environmental protection in a peaceful and secure world. (European Council 2006al
One need not go quite this far to recognize that once environmental policy was re-framed in terms of sustainability, the common commercial, agricultural, and fisheries policies of the Union and its extensive development activities could hardly be excluded. They often provided a source of embarrassment because of the ecological and developmental consequences of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate ^ ^
ui.h fisheries policy, for example, not only served to denlo... c <<  did actual damage to sustainable livehhoods elsw^^T??
K;  ^lopment and transport policy ,„ pursuil of ^ ^ ^
* hilitv contained in the Treaty on European Union and expressed ,„ ,k
* l^P°Ucy C°herenCe'   u (   tWee" thed'fferenl -tivmesof the In) and vertical (between the priorities of the member states and the Union)
Z <***»» FiShenCS P0UCy TW Underg°mg 3 Proc«s "f Tansformauon
regime for the sustenance rather than exploitat.on of fish stocks. Trade pohcy l only been marginally affected by environmental concerns for WTO and bilateral liations continue to be dominated by a set of zero-sum commercial assump-
i *hile il 15 CaSy '° be CyTU theSC ma"erS' " remains the case that the
HI is almost alone among WTO members in taking issues such as animal welfare
assessments, and eco-labelling seriously.
, ilT1pact assess""-""'•------------ —'
is here, a key sustainability issue in the 'coherence' of the Union's policies trade development, and environment frequently appear to pull in opposing
There where
directions
Coherence between the Union's approaches towards energy and climate, which we shall discuss, overlaps significantly with these other areas. There has, for example, been pressure for border tax adjustments to shield industries subject to the higher energy costs imposed by the EU's internal ETS from external competition.
Substantial efforts were made in the Cardiff process (launched in 1998) and tlsewhere to encourage 'horizontal' policy coherence in the pursuit of sustainable development, although it is difficult to judge their success and there has been 'no significant impact' on climate and energy coherence (Adelle, Pallemaerts, and Chiavari 2009,50). Sustainable development was the keynote theme of the 1992 Rio conference, and the EU has continued to be a leading player in subsequent UN follow-up' conference diplomacy. At Rio, much effort was devoted to drafting Agenda 21, a massive compendium of good sustainable development practice, which sull has currency. It was clear that much of its content was covered by Community competence, but the Commission was burdened with the problem of its lack of status at the UN. The latter remained an organization of sovereign states and the EC ws only admitted by the General Assembly inl973asan observer without speaking or voting rights. Great effort was extended by the Commission in advance of UNCED to improve this situation, sometimes in the teeth of member state opposition. As a nsult the following footnote was added to Agenda 21:
^en the term Governments is used, it will be deemed to include the European Economic Community acting within its areas of competence.
In contrast to practices established by the Conventions including those signed in H where the Union has the status of an REIO, the UN General Assembly, and its «*rences and commissions continue to deny full representation to the Union 1 ongsidc the member states (Vogler and Stephan 2007).
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The climate and energy problem
llirlwur ui illlintlc tlumní' finergill on In ihf Inlf riiiUlnnal agtiida II il„ end of ihc l'il«h I ni ihr LU II ir|irc<ii'iiU'(l Imlli .1 |iroloun(lcliiillrii){r and an opportunity. The pnUciiumim 1 il .1 wiiii lín enhanced Krecnhotuc cllrti   1- very dlffcreni Irom f... ii,.„ 1,„1I1I lie iiiuii- miiKiwIy (l.isslliid until i the heading 1)1 environmental Hi., .ililnMii'.li l)(i lni I iiviiiiiiinciil unci ihccnvlrunmcntal loniutuinof the (.nun ii„l Miiiimi |., win In I,ilď ihr lend. Militating tmlHlom uf (,l Ids and adapting to ilirllki'lyi(ii|iii'(|iini(CMil InoreUCI In mříni glohal temperatures sel ihe most severe iiilvmlril 11111!! 1 1111.1 ■ in policy unci, unlike olhrr environmental problems, »uih as Mimimplinir iiiinir ilrplcllim, poleiilliilly I0111I1 uliiiusl every aspect ollhe economy •mlwnlrly Ihc |iuililcni wus inmpimiuli-d by luck (il sclcnllllt certainly as 10 prc-I Irnipnuluif um., mul llioclaud illmnllc ImpuUn, Ihc Intergovernmental lnwliin t Uniati ( \mv (ipt.L) WHK creatad In l°KH to provide tUlhoriUdve review. n| ihc evidence, Over ihc period ol ihc liU'n Invulveiiicni In climate poluus, iiUMMUnenUi have lleadlly narrowed ihe rungc of uiiceriulnty ui least as lar as ",r I'li'lmlillliy ul lubllanilal rlm-H In mean temperatures consequent on liumuii
johnVogler
med Taking this into account, the EU has been commit,ed ■ aclivitics arc concc    ^   ^ ^ global lcmperature (sjnce pre.ind
below *c'dangCrr°on[rasl l0 many other governments, its policy is based Ud ' ? S,rCS5drbai ^   incidence. However, the TC threshold has been wide ^
Change has been an international .sue because the atmosphere «2d as a global common and the preservation of almosphertc quality y * 2 « ni * character** of a public good. Accordingly, concerted ,„£ ■ona. action is necessary if on.y to prevent freend.ng a situation where ; countries might benefit from pollution controls adopted by others without be,' the costs involved. There are other requirements for cooperat.ve international * ,s«-ell—the fading of scientific investigation and, most important, the ,rans[erof funds and .echnology to allow developing nations to participate in mitigaling ^ sions and to adapt to climate change. There is also a key element of compensate here for any restrictions on their growth that may be required to restrain GHG emis. sions. The UN climate regime that has developed from the Convention on Climate Change of 1992 attempts to cope with these problems. It has a somewhat narrow territorial approach to the changing climate, recognizing six GHGs but prioritizing reductions in carbon dioxide (Vogler 2016, 13-34).5 With shipping and aviation excluded from the current UNFCCC regime, this places a heavy emphasis on reducing energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. Thus from the beginning of EU involve-ment, climate policy has been related to energy policy and the EU has sought not only to abide by the agreements that it has signed but more than that, to establish credibility through leadership by example. This effort has been beset by a number of difficulties because although climate and energy policy may be seen as complementary to one another, there are also contradictions. These can be usefully explored by considering the various concepts of security that underpin the EU's approach. Security, defined as the avoidance of a range of physical threats, economic scarcities, and related politico-military dangers will, we can assume, be the ultimate end of Union policy.
Climate and energy security
In classical accounts of international relations, security typically implies the absence of, or the ability to resist, a threat of armed attack across borders. In the search for security the struggle for scarce energy resources characterized a large number of 20th century conflicts. Less well understood in the academic and policy literature was the way in which a changing climate could not only stimulate conflict over diminishing resources but also lead to various other forms of instability and war (Bar-nett 2001). Such an awareness of what we may call the orthodox security implications o climate change has now become part of the approach adopted in the European security■ and Defence Policy. Climate change was placed on the UN Security Council S    a by ^ UK in 2007 a"d ag™ by Germany in 2011. It was also conceptualized
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate Change
ents as a 'threal rauItiPher' (European Council 2008a). Thus a changed d000 jj serve to exacerbate existing conflicts with, for example, increasing Mgdi'n* . m Africa, or even to create new ones such as those presaged by the deS«rliflCa"0ntic ice. Over the longer term, the predictions of the effects of global ^eln^ of ArCture increases including sea-level rise, forest die-back, and loss of ag-^ean temp01*1 have direct security implications for Europe, cultural lanu' is a treaty objective of the Union (Article 194(1), TFEU). Confus-&&&seC . 0bviously related to the other notions of security—it tends to have mg'V^rent meaning. As Yergin (2006,70) points out, it is defined in the devel-jrathtf dl e .simpiy the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices' but oped *°r ' be seen ,„ terms of 'security of demand' for energy exports or in the dsewhere i reassertion of state control over "strategic resources"'. The EU has Russian c*^.th a secunty-of-supply problem over many years. Dependence on im-btCn has been recognized as a source of EU vulnerability
since the oil-price
P°rtC C"f me 1970s and was re-emphasized by the interruption of gas supplies from *0Ck5° the winters of 2006 and 2009. The Union currently depends upon hydro-RUSS'n imports to meet approximately 50 per cent of its needs, a proportion that "wiise dramatically over the next 20-30 years. A standard response to energy C0" rity is to diversify sources of supply. For the EU this has proved to be a prob-because it is heavily dependent upon Russia, Norway, and Algeria for vital im-0f hydrocarbons. With the decline of the UK's North Sea oil reserves, all member countries share an acute dependence on imported oil mainly sourced from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries stales in the Middle East (see Table 12.1). Just a mention of many of the countries listed in Table 12.1 serves to highlight the way in which there is a volatile and difficult interaction between the EUs energy requirements and ongoing conflicts within the EU's neighbourhood'.
Also, the levels of vulnerability of the member slates differ sharply. Some are almost self-sufficient in gas and coal, others such as France have extensive nuclear power generation sectors, while still others such as Romania and Bulgaria are dependent upon a single Russian supplier as a consequence of infrastructure transiting Ukraine that dates from the era of the Cold War. In 2006 and then again in 2009 and 2014 this vulnerability was starkly underlined by disputes between Russia and the Ukraine over the pricing of natural gas, which led the former to shut off supplies. The knock-on effect was that EU members reliant on the same pipelines also suffered and interdependence in the supply of gas was a continuing element in deteriorating relations with the Russian Federation. The Commission's response is revealing in that it highlights the continuing absence of coordination and transparency between the member states over energy issues and the lack of a properly functioning internal energy market, both of which would be required to ensure an effective response to
e kind ot energy security challenges encountered in the Russian relationship 'European Commission 2009b). From the 1990s the Commission has been involved '"a 'ong struggle with the member slates over the 'unbundling' of energy production and lransmission networks and their efficient interconnection. Steps towards this
33.5 11.7 5.6 8.6 8.1 5.8
4.8 3.6
2.9 U.4
Russia Norway Algeria Qatar Libya Nigeria Trinidad Peru Turkey Others
Russia Norway Libya
Saudi Arabia Nigeria Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Iraq Algeria Others
Figures are percentages o( total EU energy imports.
Source EurostaI201S, Main origins of primary energy imports. EU 28. 2003-2013 Ell
15 PNG sc europa eu/Eurosiatfttatistics explained/index php/File Mam onn,n= „< ~     S' 2003-?013
impons_EU_28.2u03-l3 u'ns 01 Pnmary energy
39 0 29.5 12.8
6.7
1.8 1.8 0.8 05 02 69
have been achieved in the third energy package1 but in 2014 the EU 'still lacked the fully integrated electricity and gas markets that it deems vital to a functioning internal energy market' (Schubert, Pollak and Kreutler 2016,166). The development of new nuclear plant and the controversial adoption of 'tracking' technology could help to lessen energy dependence alongside the Union's policies on renewable resources and energy saving, but a resort to external policy is still unavoidable: [Elnergy must become a central part of all external EU relations: it is crucial to geopolitical security, economic stability, social development and international efforts to combat climate change. The EU must therefore develop effective energy relations with all its international partners. (European Commission 2006a, 17)
Within this remit there have essentially been two policy approaches to energy security The first involved an attempt to create a common regulatory space around the EU. effectively extending its own market rules into a 'pan-European energy community' Unfortunately, individual member states continued to negotiate their own energy supply deals with the Russian government, which in its turn was happy to profit from divisions within the EU and to resist Brussels's calls, in the Energy Charter Treaty, for liberalization of its own energy indusiry. The other European strategy for security of energy supply has a more 'geopolitical' intent. The word is often employed rather loosely as a synonym for international politics, but in this case it is appropriate because
Tne Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate Change 277
ill*151°   through avoiding dependence on a single supplier or route through
cnucal geographical location of oil and gas pipelines. The objective is to itythr( e build
^ COn"°oim^heT C- 0rP°rati0nS md,Middk EaSlern' CasP'an' and Russian
sup-
for *e !«iIlsTruggl« for economic advantage and regional dominance involving
seCUritLilding of new pipelines. In reality this has spawned a number of compf
iroverst
rtiac
to circ
umvent their rivals' supply networks. In the view of i
^ chere is here a debate between two 'storylines', one stressing markets and I"*"*"* .._-utt Commission's preferred approach—and the geopolitical alternative ^li,Ull°i hted -regions and empires' (Youngs 2009,6).
iMhlgh *nd cijmate security can complement each other. EU policymakers, since ear to have begun to understand the interconnections: intensifying discus-200°' aP!jie security of future energy supplies to Europe have lent strong support to the 5"*lS°n ent of stringent climate policies' (Oberthur and Pallemaerts 2010b, 15). Also, develop"^ syn£rgies and sought-after Vin-win solutions' potentially available in the ^T'mcnt or renewable energy sources that do not emit GHGs: 'climate change and security are two sides of the same coin. The same remedies must be applied to problems' (Piebalgs 2009). The pursuit of renewable energy sources and demand !j P on can serve not only to achieve energy and climate security objectives, but also K UC bute to achieving the economic objectives of the Lisbon Agenda—setting the pace ""anew global industrial revolution' (European Commission 2007a, 20). There is evidence lha' in the Commission at least, there is a willingness to think through the ben-efiis of aligning energy, climate, and security policies (Vogler 2013). Strategies for energy security that merely ensure that large quantities of hydrocarbons continue to be burned, ihusadding to the greenhouse effect, are in the long run self-defeating and there remain contradictions between EU energy and climate policies. Substituting gas for coal-powered generation, for example, yields a reduction in GHG emissions, but runs up against the supply dependencies outlined in this chapter. Another example is provided by the exploitation of Arctic resources, made accessible by the melting of the ice. In a malign positive-feedback loop the burning of these fossil fuels contributes to further warming, ice melt, and a diminished albedo effect, which in turn allows further extraction of fossil fueb. This does not appear to have prevented serious consideration of improving EU energy security through access to Arctic hydrocarbon resources (European Commission 2012b). At the same time, climate policy, in response to international ambitions and obligations, became a key driver of the EUs attempts at internal energy policy.
The EU in international climate diplomacy
Throughout their two decades of history, international and European climate policy nave evolved in tandem and have fed back on each other' (Oberthur and Pallemaerts 201°a. 27). The precise ways in which external requirements have related to internal "miaiives have varied but at least until 2008 climate leadership framed EU energy Nicy. There were several reasons for this. Awareness of the gravity of the climate ^ has been significant, but also the fact that the EUs external activities on climate
278 JohnVogler
, rnnsistently high level of popular support across the Union (f ChangCFZ   nd    Jp^y successfully 'piggybacked' on the mor^ r      ,cv "del e Pi-rts, and Chiavan 2009. 58). Climate lead^ CHmK Cd an identity and indeed a palpable success for the Union dUr P'P h*
!ion in 2003, trough its ref"endums °f «XB. unu, the J
.  uonof the Treaty of Lisbon in late 2009. ai
TheUmonhasplayedacen.ralrolemthedevelopmentoftheUNFCCC.Its!., approach has been to call for ambitious emissions reduction 'targets and tt* Prior to the signature of the UNFCCC, it clashed with the first Bush Administrati?n over the critical question of whether the new agreement should contain a b,ndin target for developed world emissions reductions (to reduce emissions to 1990 lev^u 2000). US rejection led to a watered-down aspiration (Article 4.2) in a convention thai imposed no obligations on its parlies other than to provide national inventories and reports. The first conference of the UNFCCC Parties (Conference of the Parties, COP) (COP 1) in Berlin gave itself a mandate to negotiate, by 1997, a protocol that would bind Annex I (developed) countries to make real cuts in their emissions.
While the EU had already failed to back up its proposed targets with a carbon tax (Skjaerseth 1994), it now had to consider internal policies to support ambitious external targets. In the event this was done with relative ease upon an internal burden-sharing agreement', popularly known as the EU 'bubble' (see Figure 12.1)
FIGURE 12.1 The 1998 burden-sharing agreement
Source: European Environment Agency (2006)
Member States
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy
a"d Climate Change 279
This
reuses
arrangement allowed some less developed member states tn
their permitted emissions while at the same time deli. ^ ^ ^
" v-----------T        ůl l"e Same Ume del'vering an overall
wtion Uirst of 10 per cent and subsequently 8 per cent). I, Was onl achley.
EU 7 „use of t"e hiShly fortuitous drcu™stances attending the use of a 1990 base ible Iwing Ponies* but large reductions by Germany through the closure of
""ťlnt pi*1115 in ,he °'d GCrman Dem°Cratlc RePublic. "id by the UK, through ,n      ion from coal-based power generation to gas (Ringius 1999).
'^the Kyoto Protoco1 neS°,iations' other ^veloped countries agreed a range of '" itmcnts which aggregated to a 5.2 per cent reduction and the USA insisted f° flexibility mechanisms'. These sought to provide a less painful way of reducing ^Lns through carbon trading and international offsets-joint implementation Aůx Cleatl Development Mechanism (CDM). This was already part of US envt-ental policy and had been much discussed as an economically efficient way of """"'market forces to bring about the desired cuts in carbon emissions. Prior to k'ow sucn mechanisms were opposed by the EU as being antithetical to its own latorv tradition—usually described as one of 'command and control' where en-Ximenial targets were set for member stales and they were required to comply. * The ratification process for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was to extend until 2005. It »isin these years that the EU was called upon to display leadership if the nascent dimate regime was to survive. Even before the ink was dry on the Kyoto signatures u was clear that there would be a problem with US ratification. Not only was the target of 7 per cent difficult and costly to achieve, but the senate had already made it clear in its 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution that it would not ratify an agreement that allowed the developing-world economic competitors of the USA to avoid making cuts in their own emissions. The 2000 COP at the Hague revealed the depths of disagreement between the EU and the USA (Grubb and Yamin 2001). In March 2001 the incoming Administration of George W. Bush formally denounced US signature and then proceeded to pursue a campaign of outright opposition to the Protocol.
At ihejune 2001 Gothenburg European Council, the EU took the momentous decision to proceed without the USA. The challenge was very substantial. Could a regime, much of which only existed in draft form, work without the participation of what was then the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide and when the 55 per cent rale applied to ratification? In the event the Union was able, in successive COPs, in Win and Marrakesh, to turn the Kyoto Protocol into an agreement capable of ratification and implementation. This was no mean achievement because of the sheer complexity and novelty of some of its provisions relating to, for example, monitoring and compliance with the rules of the CDM. Furthermore, there was the need to coun-f US opposition and to gather sufficient ratifications. This required a concerted diplomatic effort by the Union to ensure that Japan ratified but also to persuade the tasian government; some Russian ministers had expressed open scepticism about validity of climate science, and a wanning climate might be regarded as bringing "elus. Russian ratification was achieved in 2004, in part on the basis of promising EU support for Russian entry into the WTO (Bretherton and Vogler 2006.109).
John Vogler
,     ar 2005 was an important one for the Union, marking both the ratify The year 2005 * of the UniolVs key mechamsm for ac ca,,0n
°TSS      eduction target-the ETS. Dunng the Kyoto raüHca^
continuity between internal energy policy and climate thc previous rcallzatlon that strong internal measures would beren, P
r^ntasTo -am a credtb, leader (Oberthur and Pallemaerts Jjg rented a major reversal in the EUs approach^ rom opponent l0 p^ H oca.e of an tn.ernanonal market-based approach to emissions reduc,lon Pa
He seen to funcuon became essenttal to the EUs exemplary strategy and m « , _____i;__,„ „orppment there were even hones thai a e„u_.
be seen to iunw~»-------- •    '    --6/ ana, ,n .,
absence of a new climate agreement, there were even hopes that a substUlUe J* be found by extending the ETS market to individual US states and elsewhere Unf tunately it continued to be beset by problems reflected in the collapse of the canT price and underwent successive attempts at reform.
far
iccanu unui-i"v...-—
By 2005 it was clear that, even if the Kyoto targets were to be achieved, which Was ,Br from certain, they fell far short of what would be required to give a reasonable chance of climate stability. Above all. the large developing countries would have to participate in restricting their projected emissions. The differences in relation to energy use and levels of development within the EU are mirrored to a much greater extent across the rest of the world economy (see Table 12.2). Developing countries can claim that their per capita GHG emissions are a fraction of those existing among
TABLE 12.2	Comparative carbon dioxide emissions 2014		
Carbon dioxide in billion m.t.		% global emissions	m.t. per capita
China	105	29.5	076
USA	05.3	14.9	165
EU	03.4	09.6	06.7
India	02 3	06.5	018
Russia	01.7	04.8	12.4
Japan	01.3	03.6	10.1
Brazil	05.0	01.4	02.5
Australia	04.1	01.1	173
South Africa	04.0	01.1	02.5
ml = meine ton			
Source- European Commission Joint Research Cenire 12016) EDGAR Emissions Database lor Global Atmosphere Research. 'C02 Time Senes 1990-2014 per region/country' and 'par capita for world coumr.es hnp//edgar|rcec.europaeu/overviewphp?«^C02lsl990-2014
The Challenge of the Environment p
mem'En-9V.andC,imateChanse
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HOs have an atmospheric lifetime of up to Ion ,       Counlr>es. Further-
1 .11_____i__• ,       r     w years. <;n -
. (0tgal ip io lUO years, so there is also the
' o& CHG\ historical burden imposed upon the earth by the industrial develop-"lifS"0110'   dvanced economies. Under these circumstances the UN framework
leu1 o(     * Id not have been negotiable without agreement on the pnnciple of
^vent'00 'V°"fferenliated responsibilities and respective capabilities'. This required oinmo'lbut     ountries as well as the EU lake the lead in making emissions i
*•» dCVCl°rf cfed m the terms of the Kyoto Protocol t
"4   ^ the ^rage 5.2 per
arcntltiai inadcquate whet __________- ^"'remem to avoid a 2'C temperate*0^" effective action after 2012, when the first commitment period of Kyoto nirt'ncrcaSe ijre not only more cuts in developed-country emissions but major ,ded. w°uld rf^m (he fast-developing economies
cuts
tin
' ------------—"pea-country emissions but major
lrlbutions from the fast-developing economies of the south. Whereas in 1992 the Shid heen second only to the USA in its carbon emissions, by 2007 both had been «ed by China in terms of current (but not cumulative) emissions and by 2014 IS had widened (see Table 12.2).
In 2007 the European Council committed to a 20 per cent emissions reduction by 1020 and a 30 per cent reduction if other developed-country parties were prepared o match them, plus an internal target of a 20 per cent share for renewables. At the end of the year the Union was prominent in the negotiation of the Bali Plan of Action envisaging broad-ranging discussions to produce a new climate agreement on mitigation, adaptation, finance, and technology by COP 15, scheduled to be held in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. Most significantly, by splitting negotiations into two tracks, one on the future of Kyoto and the other on the Convention itself, US participation was ensured.
Providing the internal means to implement the EUs stated targets and timetables was regarded as critical to its continued climate leadership. Unlike the approach to Kyoto, it involved the development of new common energy policies with potential costs (Vogler 2009). It also coincided with the global economic crisis of 2007-8. On thc one hand the economic slowdown meant that emissions targets were easier to achieve, on the other it raised acute issues of competitiveness which were accompanied by worries about energy security highlighted by the gas crises in the east. The IEA (2014, 3) commented that 'in 2008 sustainabihly—notably mitigating climate change—was the key driver for EU energy policies' but 'the context of policy changed dramatically... concerns of energy security and competitiveness have become much more pressing'. This began to be reflected in the legislative process to agree the internal means to achieve the targets set in March 2007 The 'climate and energy package' (Box 12.3) wound its way through co-decision prolonged by extensive lobbying by industrial interests, who saw their competitiveness eroded by potential rises in en-"gy prices and by member states aggrieved at their treatment under the new arrangements to reform the next phase of the ETS. The final amended package was Ptoled, with some difficulty, through the December 2008 European Council by the French Presidency (sec Box 12.3).6
Tne Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and CI,
John Vogler
|   i no -
"     Z, means to achieve the EU's 20-20-20 climate and energy ,arg
SSI— — je-d in December 200B, entering lnto J* "J Si The ^elements were as follows:
. A revised ETS to commence from 2013. National allocation plans will be replaced bv a single EU-wide emissions cap. This will be progressively reduced in order to Jew a 21 per cent reduction ,n emissions by 2020 relative to 2005. The auct,0„,na of allowances will be introduced to replace the system of free allocation, although derogations from this rule were negotiated to assist some coal-dependent power generators and to counter the risks of 'carbon leakage' where foreign competitors might otherwise take advantage of relatively h,gh EU energy prices. A limited use of |omt implementation and CDM credits will continue to be allowed (Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC).
An 'effort-sharing' decision to cover emissions from transport, agriculture, housing, and waste not controlled under the ETS (which covers power generation and from 2012, aviation). Member states have agreed to binding national targets that vary according to their level of development in much the same way as the previous burden-sharing agreement. The overall 2020 target is for a 10 per cent reduction from 2005 levels but within this new EU 'bubble' there are wide variations. Denmark is committed, for example, to a 20 per cent reduction and the UK to 16 per cent, while Bulgaria is allowed a 20 per cent increase (Decision 406/2009/EC).
• There are similar binding national targets for the introduction of renewable energy sources to achieve an EU average of 20 per cent by 2020. Again there are substantial differences reflecting national circumstances: the Finnish target is 38 per cent while that for Malta is only 10 per cent (Directive 2009/28/EC).
• The promotion of carbon capture and storage technology is the final part of the package—whereby it is hoped that the carbon dioxide released by burning coal can be prevented from adding to the greenhouse effect through capture and then storage underground. This technology is as yet unproven on a large scale and is thesubiect of EU collaboration with China (Directive 2009/31/EC).
>va5
There were high expectations for the 2009 COP at Copenhagen. The election of President Obama enabled a convergence of positions with the USA at the expense of the EU's previous commitment to the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol. The objective was a comprehensive, ambitious, fair, science-based and legally binding global treaty (European Commission 2009a). The EU set out to reassert its exemplary leadership with its 20-20-20 target, plus a substantial €7.2 billion 'start-up funding' package to be provided to least developed countries before 2013.
It would be an understatement to say that for the EU the outcome of the long-awaited Copenhagen meeting was a disappointment. Without a final agreed icxi after 2 years of preparatory negotiation the USA and the newly formed BASIC
imate Change 283
-the
uth Africa, India, and China) group cut a last minute dea, ^ .binding Copenhagen Accord. In retrospect by acknowledging the
1 hrnon-™"" ° ' , —r~. „r ....Knowiedging the 2 E^lhhreshold and inviting voluntary emissions pledges from Parties the Accord d< A some foundations for the 2015 Paris Agreement. But at the time the Swed-P1" idency characterized the conference as 'a disaster' while Chancellor Merkel *h    best gloss on proceedings-'a step, albeit a small one, towards a global cli-
P"1 lecture (Egenhofer and Georgiev MM, 1). That the EU was 'the b.gge
f the Copenhagen failure' (Laidi 2010) was an opinion widely shared victim01
^commission developed a 'road map' to a competitive, low carbon economy
ade the case for the economic and energy security benefits of ecological mod
majon wrough developing 'cost efficient pathways' in key economic sectors. The
lZa"°as for an overall emissions reduction of 40 per cent by 2030, 60 per cent by
iar8el * a no less than 80 per cent by 2050 (European Commission 201 la). Accord-2o40,anano't _       ^__________________ _ ^
mgi
I ,he IEA there has already been 'strong progress' in this direction (IEA 2014,4). pally as a result of the economic downturn, GHG emissions had by 2012 decreased by 19.2 per cent and the share of renewables in final energy consumption had increased to H.l per cent (ibid.). On the other hand the ETS, beset by surplus allowances and low fuel prices, had failed to perform as intended with a 2014 carbon price oljust 6 euro per tonne, and there were continuing internal political difficulties with attempts at reform through the 'backloading' of allowances. This meant that it was national subsidies, rather than the stimulus of a high carbon price, that supported the introduction of renewables and energy saving. An attempt to incorporate international aviation emissions within the ETS also stalled. From 2012 airlines using EU airspace were to have been required to buy ETS credits to cover their emissions. However, under strong international pressure and threats of trade sanctions leading to opposition by Germany, France, and the UK, the European Parliament was persuaded to postpone the external operation of the scheme until 2017, pending a decision of the International Civil Aviation Organization to institute alternative arrangements for taxing aviation emissions (Keating 2014). In the same period, high gaspnces and relatively cheap supplies of coal on world markets had the counterproductive effect of putting old coal-buming power stations back on stream. Sufficient progress had been made towards the 2020 targets to allow the EU to enter into a second Kyoto commitment period but there were doubts about the achievement of longer term objectives. As the IEA (2014, 5) commented ...there has been a lack of integration of climate and energy policies at EU level and between EU and national Mergy policy decisions, which could not address the interplay and trade-offs between different targets and policy measures'.
The uncertain development of the EU's long-term de-carbonization strategy coined with a highly significant reassertion of EU leadership demonstrated at the 2°H Durban COP where the Union could take credit for brokering agreement on to Durban Platform'. This set of guidelines for a new comprehensive agreement
countries. It essentially
evolved both the USA, BASICS, and other developing
284
John Vogler
■ ,he .firewair between Annex I and the rest, although argumenu ' , of the Annexes and the meaning of'common but differen"'lhc
continuing relevance
resp
Sties and respective capabilities' remained On the other hand, 2020-30 would comprise contr.butions rather than cornrnu,
■ated
North-South agreement the willingness of the Union to parttcpate in a second** d of the Kyoto Protocol appears to have been crucial. Rencwi,
mitment pcnoi W
hich mandates GHG reductions by developed countries and allows beJ J transfers under the CDM, was a key requtrement of the G77 countries if th , 'al to accept participation in a comprehensive agreement. The EU, which had mistaT enly appeared to drop its support for Kyoto mark II prior to Copenhagen, was alm alone in supporting it in 2011, as Canada, Japan, and Russia refused to renew the'' participation. (Unlike some other participants in the first commitment perlod T EU had also achieved its 8 per cent reduction target.) The renewal of the Kyot0 pj tocol was formalized in the Doha Amendment of 2012 and its quantified emission reduction commitments for the EU, over the period 2013-20 were met by the targcts of the climate and energy package, where the headline goal of a 20 per cent reduction had already almost been achieved. The EU commitment was important because there was a need to conunue to reduce emissions in the period prior to the entry into force of a new climate agreement in 2020.7
The EU position in advance of the Paris COP, where an agreement for 2020 was to be concluded, stressed the need for a new Protocol under the Convention, which was ambitious, legally binding, multilateral, rules-based with global participation and informed by science' (European Union 2013) Of all the major Parties, the EU was most insistent on establishing timely and verifiable national emissions pledges sufficient to provide certainly and mutual confidence in the achievement of an ambitious agreement. After the usual internal negotiations and concessions to national energy interests, the October 2014 European Council was able to announce its Conclusions on a 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework (European Council 2014; Keating 2014). Included was a binding 2030 overall target of a 40 per cent reduction in GHG emissions, against a 1990 baseline, as the Union's 'intended contribution'. Less impressive were 'non-binding' targets of 27 per cent increases in energy efficiency and the share of renewables over the same period. This was a Union-wide target, member states refused to surrender control over iheir national energy mix.
The 2015 Paris COP 21 did not repeat the mistakes of Copenhagen, indeed the outcome was rather more successful than many had anticipated. A notable achievement was text that included reference to the aspiration to constrain global mean temperature increase to 1.5"C, something long demanded by small island developing stales. The agreement also included a new 'transparency' framework for the review of nationally determined contributions by all parlies alongside some subtle variations in what was expected of developed as opposed to less developed countries 2023 was agreed as the date for the first of regular five yearly global stocktate' on the adequacy of national efforts. This constituted a vital part of what was a
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy „. p,.
Br. and Climate Cha
a"
rurally, rather than substantively, binding agreement where ,h c
pf   ,,d that the 'nationally determined contributions' ann    'he,Secrela™ had
Wd i!I esult in a 2.7-C mean temperature increase ^ * «™«
would re*"
inge 286
til as climate negotiator
|n50mc ways the EU's leadership in the cl.mate regtme was surpris.ng. ,n dus area of £ competence, wh.ch involvestaxauor,, and energy pollcy, ™°
itat-on falls to the rotating  residency. The EU will negotiate at 28' L^l emission and 27 member states. There have been real problems in ensuring conri lty across a complex range of issues ,n successive negotiation rounds (van Schaik and , .<•-.. irwviV In order to codc Darticular mmL, r.— ■
------at zo involviri
mmission and 27 member states. There have been real problems in ensuring, Ivacross a complex range of issues in successive negotiation rounds (van Schaik and Lenhofer 1005). In order to cope, particular member states have been allowed to lead „ tssues on which they have specialized, and the working practice of the Council has hen to involve Presidencies over an 18-month cycle (Oberthur and Roche 2008). As «idi other external policy areas, coordination within the negotiation is required that ^ ^1«, up excessive amounts of time, and irritate interlocutors of the EU. The EU can appear cumbersome and there has sometimes been a lack of agility and flexibility. Clt-mle Conferences of the Parties involve long and complex negotiating sessions at official level but end with a high-level segment in which final political deals are done over outstanding issues arising from an agreed text. High-level involvement can become problematic if there are unresolved issues and attempts are made to short circuit the UN process through an informal deal. Ministers and heads of government can interfere with the EU's operating procedures. The 2009 Copenhagen COP provides evidence of the manifold difficulties faced by the Union.8 The Presidency was held by Sweden, but the appearance of heads of government Brown, Merkel, and Sarkozy tended to diven attention and they pursued their own lines of negotiation. When President Obama conferred with the EU it presented itself in the form of Commission President Barroso. Swedish President in Office Reinfeldt, and the UK, French, and German leaders. In these circumstances the previous ability of the EU to function as an entity, to supervise the negotiation of the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, and make a credible claim to climate leadership appear remarkable, but the Copenhagen conference appears to have placed too much strain on the Union's coordinating capabilities. As the Danish chair of the COP and incoming EU Climate Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard remarked: There are very important lessons from Copenhagen. In the last hours, China, India, Russia, Japan each spoke with one voice, while Europe spoke with many different voices ... A lot of Europeans in the room is not a problem, but there is only an advantage if we [all] sing from [the] same hymn sheet. We need to think about this and reflect on this very seriously, or we will lose our leadership role in the world. IPhillips 2010)
Difficulties of internal coordination were far from being the only reason for the E"'s disappointing performance in Copenhagen. Much more significant than any organizational or tactical shortcomings were profound changes in the structure of
johnVogler
.1 c«tem thai had begun to work themselves out in the n„v ** 'rrSL^cC reg-. The EU's initial rise to promtn^' * " ,„m1 nohncs depended lo a great degree on the favourable in, " 8 °bal SSSCd Z .be ending of the Cold War. EU leaders^ ined by the willingness of the countr.es or Eastern Europe to associate then! with its policies and by tie special position that it held as the largest donor of d opmcnt aid (when both EU and national programmes are counted) with a ' long-standing relationships with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of ? °' (ACP) countries. Furthermore, its role in climate politics was firmly anchored t position in the international economic structurc-the Union being second onl^ the USA in the league or carbon emitters. The abdication of the USA from its J'° cus role of environmental leadership left the field open for the EU to assert itself J to emphasize its identity as climate leader. As we have seen, this opportunity seized in the EU's successful campaign to turn the Kyoto Protocol into a function?* international regime.
However, even at the point of Kyoto ratification it was becoming evident that th underlying international structure was shifting. In general terms this has been sociated with the rise of the so-called BR1C countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China, to which South Africa should also probably be added (see Chapter 17) a( tne WTO the kind of duopoly that had previously existed between the USA and theElJ was no longer evident, reflected in the emergence of the G20. In terms of climate politics even an enlarged EU found itself in third place in terms of current carbon emissions, China having overtaken both Europe and the USA. Up until this point both China and India had been relatively quiescent in climate politics, protected by the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' formula, which did not require them to make any emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. In ihe posl-2012 discussions this was no longer a lenable assumption and the USA would, in any case never accept it. The other critical development was the re-engagement of the USA under the Obama Administration. The logic of the situation appeared to suggest thai any future climate arrangements would require a comprehensive agreement that abandoned the firewall' between Annex I developed countries and the rest. Furthermore, although the G77 and China as non-Annex I countries had previously negotiated as a bloc (and the eu often attempted lo mediate between them and the Annex 1 countries), there was now a clearer distinction between the least developed countries, likely to be the first victims of climate change, and fast-developing new economic powers of the south.
After Copenhagen came a revival of EU climate diplomacy, centred upon the Cartagena Dialogue (van Schaik 2012) which brought together 'progressive' Parties from a the main negotiating groups and provided the basis for the 2011 Durban Platoon. Th.s agreement, brokered with some skill by EU delegates, provided the havTcTi Til"1 WhlCh 2015 PanS A8reemen< vvas formulated. Commentators ElesJmTm IT EU'S rCle Was increasin8'y 'hat of a mediator (Backstrand and Sensitivity towards the development needs of the South and a
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate Change 287
l0 build bridges between them and the harder-line developed countries *>l"ng hrella Group' had long been part of the EU's negotiating repertoire. In the (the'1'
itex'
of a new agreement this was not only significants 3cZ^oiZ 'T J with the BASIC countries but also because ol an aware"!sZ 7 "
3 ™lnerable South required*" adapta"°n
S£;n;tnch government mad-maJ-diplomatic effort to ensure that Paris wou.d A where Copenhagen had Tailed and for its part the EU beean ,h.
Involved with a coalmen of h.gh ambition including the USA and wh.ch sue Jfully promoted the inclusion of reference to the l.yC urge,. Paris represented a lajor departure from the EUs previous commitment to Kyoto-like targets and fme-jesand its 'nationally determined contributions' probably represent the only fea slble way of constructing a truly comprehensive agreement. Whether it represents anything more than a symbolic success will depend upon the procedures for the encouragement of greater efforts towards de-carbonization and adaptation ,n which the EU's influence will still be of critical importance.
Conclusion
Environment and climate change have been areas in which the Union has managed to carve out for itself a position of international leadership. The foundation of this achievement was the development of the EU's internal environmental acquis, which allowed the attainment of external competences. Over the years ihe Union has been more successful than might have been predicted in the light of the problems of coordination, competence, and coherence that continue to afflict its external activities even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Climate change poses a very different challenge because of the high economic slakes involved if effective action is to be taken and because of the ways in which it impacts upon the security of the Union. Most particularly it conjoins environmental and energy policy. In the initial stages of involvement in the climate regime the EU was able to claim leadership without the assistance of an internal carbon tax and to agree the Kyoto Protocol under the rather favourable circumstances of the burden-sharing agreement. Kyoto implementation and the search for a posl-2012 successor, however, required the serious development of internal tn«gy policy in the ETS and subsequently the 2008 climate and energy package, 'he latter was only achieved with some difficulty and compromise because of the differing interests of member slates. There are evident opportunities and contractions in EU climate and energy policies and a need to fully involve the Euro-external Action Service in their pursuit. This has received belated recognition ID *« adoption by the Foreign Affairs Council of a Climate Diplomacy Action
i„,egraie the elements ^ ^ (his chapler within a new Energy n
i*««dd^S 2015a).' " "
John Vogler
Plan' (European Council 2015). The wider context is provided by
nergy security, economic competitiveness   """^l" to
(European Commissior '
The evidence in this chapter provides strong support for the thr around which this volume centres. First, it is clear that the ways in ^ ^y tnetne, evolved as a (sub)system of international relations have played a ke t ^tts tiomng its ability to operate on a broader stage. The development of "n c°n<ii-gime for environmental policymaking and the emergence of an emb"1 'n'eri,a' 'e -• —Ii«, <how in different ways the effects of the internal h i ^erm
anCeof ^tetest
"Altai
cessesc
security policy show in <
nd forces on EU external policy. Not only this, but the interaction of env,ronmf| and energy policymaking with broader processes of international relat,ons sh( the ways in which the EU system is penetrated by broader forces. This leads t0 01J second theme: that the EU has become an indispensable part of the broader J ; of regime building and negotiation in climate change and has helped to SW as well as be shaped by these processes. The picture is less clear in energy, parllJJ least because the development of institutionalized processes in that area is less ad vanced than in climate change and environmental politics more generally.
Climate diplomacy has also clearly provided an arena in which the EU is a 'power' that compares very favourably with other areas of external action.10 It pr0ved capable of executing an exemplary strategy of'targets and timetables' and took responsibility for turning the Kyoto Protocol into a functioning international agreement. This was no mean achievement when operating under shared competence. The ratification process demonstrated an ability to deploy diplomatic assets and to use trade instruments in pursuit of climate policy objectives. As the economic crisis of the European economies deepened, the experience of Copenhagen in 2009 appeared to reveal how far the EU's previous climate leadership rested upon some peculiarly favourable domestic and international circumstances. Confounding many expectations, the Union was again able to play a central role in setting the course towards a new climate agreement in Paris in 2015.
The 2016 decision of the UK electorate to leave the Union will certainly diminish the weight and significance of the EU in international environmental and energy politics. This may become particularly evident in climate negotiations where the UK. alongside Germany, has been a lead state bringing substantial diplomatic, scientific, and technical resources to the Union's collective endeavour. On the other hand, Britain cannot simply be 'unplugged' from European energy and environmental systems and real connections will persist. Here, as elsewhere, much will depend upon the forms of coordination that will be worked out between the Union and the UK in such areas as the continuation of existing environmental directives and emissions trading. The UK government will have to strike a balance between the attractions ol independent action and the enhanced power and effectiveness that come from working in consort with the Union.
Change 289
0
The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and C|imate
N° This ls als0 ,he 0358    e"er9V POhCV lArtlcle 4<'»
1 „  arauments hinge upon the interpretation of articles in ,ho , u T
2 ti ii TFEU apparently gives the Un.on and hence theCnnl     L'Sb°n T,ea,y
2,61 'Jions where the conclusion of an agreements ^ lhe "9ht ,0 <*»***
<«d» m the Treaty A proposed UNEP agrVemem "Tr°, £
^Bssisssr mean*,hat ,he Eu ?aiied :^rasss ■«£
Sample is provided by the ,973 Convention on Interna,™^aHln^,* fpecies of Wild Fauna and Flora where Un,on competence ,s clear Afte 40 years Te parties approved the Gaborone Amendment, which admits the Union as an REIO . me reference here is to the notorious 'southern agreements' of the CFP where West
4 African governments were persuaded to sell fishing rights to EU trawlers to the del -* ent of the sustainable development of their own coastal populations Both the CAP and CFP have been subject to extensive reform to render them more sustainable but both continue to damage the EU s reputation.
5 The gases are carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane, along with three additional industrial gases The CFCs are also GHGs but are separately controlled under the Montreal Protocol The Convention also covers reduction by 'sinks', but their inclusion ,s controversial if n allows avoidance of actual emissions cuts
6 The climate and energy package was sub|ect to co-decision procedures and the final details were negotiated at the level of the European Council with significant concessions being granted to Poland and other East European countries
7 |f all the pledges made by Parties under the Copenhagen Accord—including those of the Kyoto second commitment period—are taken together and fully implemented, then the effect by 2020 would be to reduce the 'emissions gap' between the present position and the required trajectory for climate safety (as calculated by UNEP 20131 by more than half, to 8 GtCO,e (carbon dioxide equivalent) Achieving this would require that conditional pledges are fulfilled and that rule changes are strictly adhered to
8 The chair of the conference was the host state Denmark, which controversially floated its own informal text (widely regarded as embodying the Union's real negotiating position!, and replaced its environment minister in the chair by its prime minister, who was himself removed in the final hours by a coalition of countries, including an EU member state
9 This was also reflected in the reorganization of the Juncker Commission in 2014. In 2010 Climate responsibility had passed from DG for Environment to a new DG for Climate Action under Connie Hedegaard. In 2014 this was merged into a DG Climate Action and Energy led by Commissioner Miguel Canete, itself part of an Energy Union protect team under Vice president Maros Sefcovii.
10 This was the conclusion of the European Council for Foreign Relations (2012. 122) that publishes an annual scorecard rating the success or failure of EU external action. The EU achieved a B+ for the Cancun COP in 2010 and a rare A- for the 2011 Durban COP
FURTHER READING
Delreux (2011) is a book length study of the EU as an international environmental negotiator, while Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler (2016) provide an up-to-date and detailed general study of EU energy policy including a chapter on its external dimensions. A number of collections on climate leadership are beginning to appear—Oberthür and Pallemaerts (2010a) along with Wurzel and Connolly (2010) are good examples. Damro [2006), Light-foot and Burchill (2004), and Vogler (2005) cover the EU in international environmental politics. Falkner (2007) considers biotechnology negotiations and Hadfield (2008a) and Youngs
cfii (2007).
John Vogler
•mi .he EU's difficult energy relat.onsh,p with Russia and other suPp,ie
120 ,0f nernat.onalleadersh.pisakeythemeexam.nedbySchreursanHTK'"^ meThlB:Ier,on andVog.er ,2006, consider this from an actor persp^> sl3l ,2010, brings together some of the latest research on EU climate POiir^^ Z useful general and historical surveys. »>•*, Bretherton. C and Vogler. J. (2006) The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd
ter 4 (Abingdon Routledge, Damro. C (2006) 'The EU and International ^Environmental Points: The Chall
edn.Ch.
Shared Competence', in K.V Laatikamen and K.E. Smith (eds). The Europear.,^ 01 the United Nations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 175-92.
Delreux. T (201V The EU as International Environmental Negotiator (Abingdon: Ash Falkner, R. (2007) 'The Political Economy of "Normative Power" Europe: EU En ^ tal Leadership in International Biotechnology Regulation'. Journal of Europ"'0^ Policy 14/4: 507-26. 6a" ^
Hadfield. A. (2008a, 'Energy and Foreign Policy: EU-Russia Energy Dynamics', in S. Sm,|h A Hadfield, andT Dunne (eds, Foreign Policy: Theories. Actors. Cases (Oxford: 0xf0,d University Press).
Jordan, A., Huitma, D., Van Asselt. H„ Rayner. T. and Berkhout, F. (eds) (2010) Qm3te
Change Policy in the European Union: Confronting the Dilemmas of Mitigation m
Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Lightfoot, S. and Burchill. J. (2004) 'Green Hope or Greenwash? The Actions ol the
European Union at the World Summit on Sustainable Development', Gieba
Environmental Change 14/4: 337^4. Oberthür, S and Pallemaerts. M (2010a) "The EU's Internal and External Climate Policies
an Historical Overview', in S. Oberthür and M. Pallemaerts (eds) with CR. Kelly, The
New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy
(Brussels: VUB Press), 27-63. Schreurs, M andTiberghien, Y. (2007, 'Multilevel Reinforcement: Explaining European Unw
Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation', Global Environmental Politics!74:113-37 Schubert. S.R., Pollak. J., and Kreutler, M. (2016) Energy Policy of the European Unw
(London. Palgrave Macmillan,.
Vogler. J. (2005, 'The European Contribution to Global Environmental Governance' Inter nationalA/fe/rs 81/4: 835-49.
Wurzel. R. and Connelly. C. (eds) (2010) The European Union as a Leader in Internationa' Climate Change Politics (Abingdon: Routledge).
Youngs. R (2009) Energy Security: Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge (Abingdon Routledge).
topics such as climate change or the marine environment Th„ r Agency is a mine of information at httP://www.eea.eUroPa «„„ * Enwonmen, nlCations on climate change can be found at the official UNFcrr ***** and ammo-whlle this and all other major environmental negotiations are JZ lm*//u"««Jnt negotiations Bulletin, which can be found at the International \nZT,
— http://www.iisd.0r9. For energy and env,ro'tUte,or finable Devei-
Negotiations bu,=u........~ ■    ■    ,uu„o at tne International Institute fa, cT™"" ^ B"m
opfT1ent site httP://www,,sd.or9. For energy and environment, SuS1a,nable tvV0 key international orgamzations. the IEA at http-//wwwi-   qL,estlons the'e are also „ww.unep.org WWW,ea or8 ^d UNEP at http://
WEB LINKS
The Europa website, https://europa.eu, provides the essential point of entry from where Enerrg!,,e t0    re'eVam partS 0f    Commission, DGs Environment, CLIMA, and w   wen as the Council and Parliament. There are also useful web pages on specie