



Effectiveness and circumvention

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Departing debate

- So do sanctions work?
- Which side of the strategic interaction of sanctions does the effectiveness of sanctions rely on more?
- Name exactly 1 improvement you would suggest to a regime you're studying.

So do sanctions work?

1. commercial liberalists

- **sufficient economic costs may induce policy changes**
- focus on heavy costs with lucrative incentives
- reality obstacles - disaggregation of target, motives outside of economy, evasion possibilities
- USSR 1990s – economic incentives successful in tying former Soviet reps.
- South Africa pre-1994 – economic coercion and potential incentives end apartheid without any military threat whatsoever
- stabilization post-CW, central Europe and Balkans economic incentives dissuaded from pursuing nationalist tendencies

2. political realists

- **no possibility of tangible influence on political goals by measures short of force**
- even strong economic incentives/punishment cannot influence target in Strategic interests
- any success can be traced to coinciding military/political pressure
- Egypt 1970s – truly vast USSR economic support, still ousted
- Zimbabwe 2003+ - heavy economic costs, 200% inflation, no change
- Cyprus – EU, US, UN heavy financial support, failure 2004 referendum

So do sanctions work?

3. conditionalists

- **international or domestic conditionalists**
- both incentives and coercive threats are more successful under specific conditions
 - *allies, small concessions, military asymmetry, authoritarian rule, etc...*
- calculations based on struggle between
- **maintaining versus losing power/status (both short and long-term)**
- maintaining power/status as we discussed with selectorate theory is different per regime, and so alters necessary costs

Authorship

- Pape 5%
- Hufbauer 33%
- Petersen 40,9
- Morgan 42%

Measuring effectiveness

- **Bite only? Behavioral adjustment only? Self-cost? Reputation?**
- what about punishing sanctions after the fact or signaling

- 4-step analysis:
 1. **relative weight of sanctions in possible response portfolio**
 2. **influence intent vis a vis the target**
 3. **expectation of impact versus domestic and reputation costs incurred**
 4. **counterfactual analysis of sanction absence (e.g. FDI otherwise)**

- Criticism of sanctions often based on absolute gains based on previously covered logics

- New assessments should follow a policy analysis framework

- Assessment altered in high-cost high-intended-impact sanctions
 - i.e. sanctions aimed at coercion still require absolute gains

- Discernment of tailoring for impact remains a measurement hurdle
- **Threats need to be considered**



Side-effects of the 1990s

- **Iraq** – worst example – more than half a million deaths due to lack of food and medicine
- **Burundi** – not UN sanctions, but comprehensive sanctions by surrounding states
 - Severe humanitarian impact, multiple amendments for humanitarian aid
- **Haiti** – strong lesson learned in targeting less developed countries as a whole
- Adverse large-scale humanitarian impacts started to subside in late 1990s

- **Aiding and creating criminalization enterprises** became a dominant issue
 - Rendering commonly traded goods illicit to trade prompts the creation of clandestine networks
 - Even the lifting or adjustment of sanctions leaves these networks most often intact

- **Unintended political effects** (persist)
 - Rally around the flag
 - Fractionalization
 - Can be self-defeating if withstood and manipulated

Sanctions as normative instruments

- As much as sanctions are a coercive tool, and they're geographical direction is almost uniform. **Can they effective normative instruments ?**
- various scholars regard sanction regimes as mere material coercion and hence **irreconcilable with normativity** (Gebert, 2013; Martin, 1992; Portela, 2010; Sakwa, 2015)
- Manners' diffusion channel of transference may involve the “**carrot and stickism** of financial awards or economic sanctions” (2002: 245).
- Lenz disagrees with such classification as he outlines that **material rewards are a form of civilian rather than normative power**, which is supported by Diez (2013: 214; 2005: 616).
- Giumelli - the “**act of sanctioning becomes more important than the costs to the target state**” (Giumelli 2013:28).
- **Sanctions can therefore be thought of as inherently carrying a normative component – the projection of „normal behaviour“**

