suspensions also had the effect that over the course of time, the view seems to have developed that individual sanctions were mostly of a symbolic nature.

Regarding the travel ban and the financial sanctions, it was also found that listing measures could create group cohesion among the targets. Being targeted meant that individuals were, or became, core regime loyalists. Specific examples of situations were found where targets experienced an impact in the form of annoyances. Yet, again, it is difficult to claim that this impact changed the behaviour of the targets.

Concerning other prevailing factors, the examination pointed to the importance of the perception of sanctions. This became most clear with regard to targeted actors' view that comprehensive sanctions were in force, while the sender claimed to have imposed targeted restrictive measures. Through the eyes of some of the listed entities, sanctions were thus seen as a kind of punishment of the people of Zimbabwe, while the sender felt that restrictive measures referred to a selective number of policy measures against specific individuals in the government. This obviously displayed a very different viewpoint regarding the source of the crisis in conflict. The importance of perception was specially noted in the Zimbabwean media. It is clear that the media played an important vehicle for targets' perceptions, advancing a sanctions narrative. The fact that the elite could advance its own perception of sanctions undermined the sanctions policy of the EU. The Zimbabwean population became convinced that the crisis was due to the EU's sanctions.

Besides the question of direct and indirect consequences of sanctions, the examination also reveals that the targets in some cases often did not see the EU's sanctions as proportional. While the sender had issued a list of official decision-makers because of their involvement in bad governance, the targets (and to some extent civil society) claimed that the sanctions were disproportionate, as they were often connected to other broader policy measures with wider negative impacts on the Zimbabwean people.

Interviews with targets revealed that there seemed to be a strong awareness of sanctions. Either consciously or unconsciously, sanctions did seem to figure in the life of targets. While sometimes they had a direct impact, they also at times had a clear psychological impact, for instance by causing frustration and uncertainty, as well as indignation.

Finally, it could be observed that the main benefit of using targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe was that it opened up the possibility of a dialogue with the target regime and listed individuals. While some measures did not cause a direct impact, or even symbolic one, they did allow the EU to engage the elite. However, it is difficult to say whether this prolonged or delayed the crisis that sanctions were actually meant to resolve. Such an observation also confirms the conclusions found in studies such as those by Cortright and Lopez that suggest that the type of impact (positive or punitive) on the targets is not as relevant as the value of actually creating a bargaining environment.[106]

---

106   See Cortright (2001): 118.

Chapter 10
Rethinking Targeted Sanctions

While diplomacy prior to the 1990s was constrained by rules and norms arising from the Cold War, the security landscape that has evolved since has made it possible for practitioners involved in political and economic statecraft to come up with new tools to address human rights abuses and challenges to peace and security. One such invention, which has now become an essential element in international relations, has been the design of targeted sanctions. Compared to the historic use of comprehensive sanctions, which were mostly state-oriented and undifferentiating in terms of coercing the ruling elite and the society of a country, targeted sanctions have deliberately been developed to be more 'ethical' and 'smart'. Actors such as the UN Security Council and the EU continue to invest confidence in the utility of this policy, convinced that its successful application can address a wide range of politically complicated issues in different geographical contexts. To date, the number of UN and EU sanctions regimes established has increased every year.

In recent years, though, the confidence vested in this policy has been somewhat eroded, especially following the many negative side-effects of the so-called war on terror that in many ways came to be associated with targeted sanctions. For instance, in a recent assessment of unilateral targeted sanctions, it was concluded that:[1]

> The impact of economic sanctions makes it clear that previous attempts …
> to apply economic sanctions against other countries have backfired … that
> sanctions used in isolation from other forms of diplomatic pressure are unlikely
> to force major policy change and may even be counterproductive.

Such conclusions obviously hint at mistrust of the sanctions tool. There are also signs of criticisms among scholars and practitioners with regard to the inability of targeted sanctions to be sufficiently focused, so that instead of achieving their goals, they in fact accentuate problems through unintended consequences. Such side-effects have also been noted in several court cases where listed entities have brought their placement on sanctions lists to appeal because of violations of their human rights. In many of these court cases, former targets have won their appeal, forcing governments to change their listing procedures. In all, this has also led sanctions scholars to suggest that targeted sanctions may be slowly beginning to enter a legitimacy crisis. While scholars sometimes maintain that targeted sanctions

---

1   House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2007).

are a policy maker's dream, there are signs suggesting quite the opposite.[2] From a scientific point of view, however, the question is how the policy has been assessed in the first place, in order to give rise to a positive or negative conclusion about its relevance.[3]

Moreover, the sanction field has in recent years has been marked by several policy innovations. For instance, much scholarly as well as policy attention has been given to technical policy development – that is, how collective security actors like the UN and the EU can improve their institutional procedures to make them more effective, especially in terms of implementation. Moreover, the focus of academic attention has also come in the form of assessment studies seeking to determine the efficacy of sanctions by looking at the outcomes of particular sanctions cases. Although organisational as well as implementation problems are acknowledged, diagnosed and even provided with policy proposal 'treatment', the efficacy of targeted sanctions is seldom studied in terms of the underlying and enabling rules and norms that shape the policy in the first place. More studies of this kind are needed in future.

This study, however, has examined some common assumptions in the sanctions literature on how best to assess the sanctions instrument. A starting point for reconsidering targeted sanctions is to define what the new policy is all about and what distinguishes this from other studies. Therefore, an alternative definition of targeted personal sanctions has been put forward, one that is more inclusive than more general definitions of sanctions:

> The implementation of targeted sanctions is a flexible and multivariate process embedded in a larger strategic context involving a sender and a target, where the decision-making, perception and interactions between these actors, during well-defined episodes in a sanctions regime, shape impact, leading to a new political outcome.

Targeted Sanctions as a Multifaceted Policy

One of the main arguments put forward in this study is that the introduction of targeted sanctions has paved the way for a new way of thought with regard to sanctions in general. Not only have new actors and issues entered the sanctions agenda, at least compared to comprehensive sanctions, but also new forms of relationships among these constitutive elements forming part of the targeted sanctions policy. It is fair to say that today, perhaps more than previously acknowledged, the imposition of targeted sanctions is a multifaceted and complex process. It is multifaceted in the sense that the nature of the policy attracts many different actors with a variety of

---

2   Craven (2002): 47.

3   At time of writing, an international consortium of sanctions scholars and policy makers around the world has begun joint efforts to assess UN targeted sanctions.

strategic interests, which are often linked. It is complex both because of the depth of the areas of application, as well as the institutional practices that are required to administrate this policy.[4] In addition, the fact that governments often tend to have high expectations of what the policy can achieve makes the policy management of targeted sanctions even more complex. All these aspects also structure the policy outcome in unforeseeable ways. None the less, while the sanctions literature recognises that sanctions are both multifaceted and complex, such intricacy is rarely the point of departure in studies seeking to determine their efficacy.

Having been in place for nearly two decades, a number of studies have broken new ground on the role and practice of targeted sanctions. Yet, despite the shift to targeted sanctions, which could have invited new thinking on how we treat and understand sanctions from an epistemic point of view, there are a number of profound problems with the ways we tend to look at the utility of this tool. In fact, it seems that the conventional way of addressing comprehensive sanctions continues in the same way when we seek to analyse the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. In view of the ontological shift that has taken place in the move from comprehensive to targeted sanctions, one would have assumed that policy makers and scholars of sanctions measures would have adapted to this. Yet this seems not to have occurred. On the contrary, conventional assessment approaches have until now continued in the same tradition.

As a result, this study has sought to question the conventional way of assessing sanctions. This has been done by illustrating the multiplicity of processes and relationships between decision-making procedures and policy consistency, by bringing forward relevant factors such as: the various goals and phases which sanctions regimes usually go through; how broader strategic paradigms tend to embed and shape targeted sanctions, and how targets themselves perceive sanctions and what role this may have. These factors, and others, will affect the sanctions outcome, and therefore need to be accounted for independently and in combination in any serious sanctions assessment. In this context, it is worth repeating that this study has deliberately chosen not to assess any single UN or EU targeted sanctions regime. Doing so would significantly change the scope and focus of the study, and engaging in sanctions assessment here is likely to be of little value to policy makers, given that their agenda may include a wider variety of considerations than such an assessment would ever be able to cover. None the less, to counter often misguided sanctions assessment approaches, the objective here has been to demonstrate, by disentangling various segments of the sanctions policy process, the kind of political complexity that occurs when applying sanctions, and how this shapes a particular

---

4   In addition to this, there are a number of enduring problems that targeted sanctions are unable to solve, for example: the fact that sanctions are always confronted with a large-scale collective action problem when implemented on the ground; the problems of dealing with the target's learning capacity and adjustments to the pressure of the sender, and the scientific problem of demonstrating causality between the application of sanctions and the political outcome. To this can be added a host of other issues not covered in this study.

sanctions outcome. For this reason, close attention has been paid to linking together conflict-level, institutional-level and sender/target-level factors of sanctions practice. Not only does such an approach offer an alternative conceptualisation of targeted sanctions, but also an alternative and refined methodological approach to how to go about understanding sanctions' effectiveness.

Refining Sanctions Assessment Approaches

Following the literature review on the shifting practice of targeted sanctions, a number of problems relating to sanctions assessment methodology and sanctions conceptualisation were identified. These related to (1) the sanctions literature's conventional reliance upon the 'case' as a unit of analysis; (2) the conventional methods used to assess sanctions regimes; (3) a reliance upon the unitary state-based approach, and (4) the problem of using scoring methods. As an alternative to such cruder methods, I offer a more refined approach, placing further emphasis upon the process within a case, by thinking more about the separate episodes it contains; the role of the strategic paradigms that enable sanctions practice, by looking at enabling strategic frameworks, and finally, the role of the sender's decision-making processes as 'shapers' of sanctions utility, by looking at both formal and informal sender practices.

Rethinking the case   Following some limitations of current sanctions assessment approaches, this study has suggested the need to reconsider the conventional notion of a sanctions case and its constitutive elements. Given the new reality-based dynamics that targeted sanctions bring into sanctions analysis, the cruder and conventional state-based approach needs to be reconsidered as in its current form, it is much to imprecise, at least if one looks at what it claims to explain. To do so, one needs to begin by rethinking the level of analysis. Instead of focusing only on official state or group behaviour, one needs to focus more closely on the persons who are being targeted. Devoting greater attention to individual decision-makers also provides for a new way of thinking strategically about the logic of a sanctions strategy. In contrast to official state-responses, listed actors can 'think', 'act' and 'feel'.

Second, once the level of analysis has been shifted, there are also good reasons to rethink the unit of analysis. Rather than thinking of a conventional sanctions case, and mistakenly assessing the utility of sanctions by evaluating the sender's stated goals against a regime outcome, one needs to think of sanctions' impact in terms of the ongoing process within such a case. In order to do so in a systematic way, we have proposed a disaggregation of cases into a number of more refined and tighter time episodes. In this way, new trends and patterns of targeting as well as impact can be determined. Each episode hence covers the main political developments during the targeted sanctions regime. Moreover, as opposed to conventional large-*n* studies or particular case studies based on static sanctions approaches, each episode reflects the sender's viewpoint on the efficacy of sanctions. The more refined these episodes are, the better they account for dynamics on the ground.

As has been discussed, a sanctions regime comprises a collection of sender 'judgements'. Each episode reflects the specific political goals that were initiated in the period before the adjustment of the sanctions list (the listing or de-listing of entities). Overall, the disaggregation of the regime into episodes provides for a more detailed and clearer sense of the contextual difficulties experienced while the sanctions played out. In addition to thinking of the sender's assessment of target behaviour, one can also evaluate the sender's perception of how well it considered its commodity-based sanctions. After all, the overall value of assigning particular cases and episodes to crises and conflicts is to make them easier to assess and compare. However, the definition of a case (and its episodes) is purely a construct, and does not necessarily reflect developments on the ground.

Enabling strategic frameworks   This study has also proposed thinking about sanctions as part of a broader strategic framework. The aim was to get a better sense of what factors shape and enable sanctions' impact. Rather than thinking of targeted sanctions as a stand-alone measure, it seems more accurate to acknowledge and take into account the larger strategic framework that enables targeted sanctions to function in a particular way. Although targeted sanctions may direct certain attention and pressure on particular actors, it is the combination with other strategic measures – that is, the overall strategic framework – that is likely to determine the outcome of both sanctions and the conflict. The need to look at targeted sanctions in a broader strategic framework follows from the observation that the policy has different degrees of impact in different contexts, despite the fact that the same restrictive measures are applied. This suggests that targeted sanctions cannot be understood in isolation from a broader strategic framework, but need to include the constant interplay between the sanctions instruments.

As noted, each sanctions regime has its own strategic and political dynamics. This makes it difficult to compare different sanctions cases simply because the rules and constraints enabling targeted sanctions rest upon different grounds. This is seldom acknowledged in comparative assessment studies. Another observation is that it is difficult to confirm that the sender, when setting up a sanctions regime, has done so with a broader strategic framework in mind. While there are on the one hand clear empirical records that show that targeted sanctions are connected to a number of other coercive policies to put pressure on a target and the target country, it is on the other hand impossible to find operative and well-articulated (official) *strategic* principles regarding how the overall approach was meant to work.

Moreover, when keeping in mind the larger strategic framework embedding sanctions, the rationale of the strategy can also be better understood, and consequently better administered. For instance, similar to the way the policy of deterrence can deter a state from engaging in a particular actions, senders can also actively pursue deterrence with regard to each listed individual. However, such a strategic approach requires much political sophistication.

In the end, the question of whether targeted sanctions are meant to work as a stand-alone measure or as part of a wider strategic approach follows a common

point of debate in the sanctions literature. In this context, it is worth recalling debate regarding what results sanctions have on their own and/or in connection with other instruments, as pursued by Pape and Elliott.[5] None the less, the policy implication for targeted sanctions is that there is a continued clear need to take a more holistic approach to examining the role of sanctions, especially when assessing sanctions regimes. Such calls are also being echoed at the UN, where officials working with targeted sanctions find the debate to be too narrow in terms of the role of targeted sanctions, and that it fails to take into account other policy measures the sender attaches to the sanctions instrument.

To sum up, whereas targeted sanctions has long been seen as an instrument to achieve political change and resolve a number of complex emergencies, targeted sanctions cannot be seen as a stand-alone measure, nor assessed in isolation.

'Black Box' Processes

One important but often under-studied area of targeted sanctions is the role of the sender's 'black box' and the effect it has on sanctions implementation. This study has made a case for the need to take institutional decision-making seriously, as the processes here are very likely to influence outcome in ways that are less widely acknowledged in the sanctions assessment literature. More precisely, it has argued that there are formal and informal rules and norms that shape sanctions policy at a very early stage, and which will predetermine the degree of sanctions impact that is to be expected when they are implemented. This argument should be contrasted with the approach that seeks to determine the efficacy of sanctions only by comparing the officially stated goals of the sender and the outcome of the sanctions regime.

An in-depth examination of the sanctions decision-making of the UN and the EU was conducted by looking at the use of travel ban and assets freeze measures applied to specific individuals. Differentiation was made between the formal and material boundaries shaping sanctions outcomes, and the informal and more subjective management of sanctions by individual officials. It was found that both formal and informal decision-making procedures seem to complement and exhaust each other during the policy process of adopting, enforcing and implementing targeted sanctions. In terms of the formal rules shaping the outcome, it was found that practitioners in the sender body often have problems ensuring that the pressure of sanctions is maintained and that measures are adapted to developments in the political situation on the ground. While targeted sanctions policies may be effective (partly following the relevance of the use of a prior threat), they have a tendency to become misplaced and less precise over time. This raises the question of the sender's flexibility. As found in this study, one explanation for this problem is that the formal rules shaping sanctions policies are often too static, and cannot

be continuously adjusted to suit events on ground. For instance, while the EU in recent years has been adopting policy guidelines (for example, to establish standard language and best practices) for the design and practice of targeted sanctions, such bureaucratic moves to ensure decision-making harmony among member state governments have come at the expense of sanctions policies not always reflecting the real problems on the ground. While a static process for designing sanctions regimes increases the degree of unity among EU member states and may lead to faster decision-making procedures, it comes at the expense of more precise and timely sanctions that truly deal with the challenges the sender and its allies encounter on the ground.[6]

For UN sanctions impact, the formal decision-making system is still very much steered by the interests of the members of the Security Council. Over the last decade or so, UN sanctions committees have increasingly polished their procedures in order to be able to respond to events on the ground. Part of this has to do with the institutional support provided by administrative units such as the subsidiary sanctions branch and the creativity of the permanent staff in co-operation with associated experts in the academic field.

Yet, while there has been an increasing awareness among the sanctions committees, especially with regard to the flexible use of targeted sanctions, there are still institutional weaknesses that seem to predetermine sanctions outcomes. As argued in this study, however, to overcome the specific problem of having a sanctions policy approach that is too static, senders should enhance its institutional capacity and invest more attention to open-ended sanctions mandates that will allow for more flexible response procedures. This includes senders ensuring that there is overall co-ordination and streamlining of the policy. As demonstrated here, desk officers working with sanctions on a daily basis usually have a great deal of leverage with regard to shaping the impact of sanctions. For example one factor that seems to explain these differences in sanctions management practices is the lack of policy ownership among those actors operating at different stages of the policy management process. This leads to different expectations for policy implementation, as well as different consequences. In fact, the question of ownership seems to be a particularly important factor in achieving target impact. In terms of the informal rules enabling sanctions, the examination suggested the need to look at the 'culture of understanding' that exists among officials of the sending body regarding targeted sanctions, and how this will shape target impact. Thus, with regard to the sender's ongoing informal rules and processes, findings suggested a need to pay further attention to the practitioner's outlook and perception of targeted sanctions. While, for instance, at the UN the formal

---

5   Pape (1998) and Elliott (1998).

6   It is interesting in this context that aspects of the formal sanctions procedures are being copied by other regional organisations. In 2010, the African Union was in the process of institutionalising a sanctions mechanism under its Peace and Security Council. In this regard, the AU is looking closely at both EU and UN sanctions management; see Eriksson (2010).

decision-making system is largely steered by the interests of the members of the Security Council, it is informally shaped by individual administrative officials. It was found that the role and creativity of individual UN officials working on sanctions have independent leverage in shaping sanctions impact. It is therefore possible to conclude that part of the explanation for sanctions efficacy involves looking at official desk officers and their management of the sanctions file. In fact, one can even argue that sanctions will not be more effective or create more impact than the sanctions file of the sending body allows. This also supports the findings of previous studies.

Furthermore, it was established in this study that officials working with the policy of targeted sanctions often demonstrate nuanced views regarding how they perceive this tool. Thus, perceptions of sanctions policy among officials contribute to the overall effect of sanctions. While these differences may not be enormous, they do have consequences for the policy outcome. Given that such nuances matter in the overall management of sanctions policy, they cannot be ignored in any serious sanctions assessment study. Considering that targeted sanctions rarely function as initially envisaged with regard to long-term crisis management or conflict resolution, one explanation may therefore be that practitioners' perceptions and management of sanctions, especially when put together, shape the policy in unexpected ways. In this regard, decision-makers play an equally important role in sanctions implementation as the many other dynamics involved in sanctions management. All this suggests that rules and norms on the sender side contribute to shaping sanctions policies, and thus particular sanctions outcomes. In particular, it seems that sanctions efficacy, or target impact, is very much dependent upon the role decision-makers are willing to play in ensuring sanctions are effective. A desk officer of the sending body can more or less make the policy either symbolic or direct in effect. While such explanations may have been pointed to elsewhere, they have never been demonstrated per se. The policy implications of this further suggest that those political leaders who seek to respond to a particular crisis therefore need to make sure that the officials engaged in adopting, implementing and administrating sanctions are well co-ordinated and streamlined, and have a flexible cognitive attitude when using targeted sanctions. In addition, the policies need to assign the necessary resources, political will, and above all, a sense of ownership of who does what. To increase sanctions effectiveness, ownership should be assigned to those units that are engaged in overseeing the sanctions process. Political leaders who wish to impose targeted sanctions need also to ensure that other actors, both public and private operators, are in full understanding of what is expected by the policy.

An interesting paradox with regard to both the formal and informal rules and norms shaping sanctions policies is that, while on the one hand the policy seems to suffer from cultural differences in personal and departmental understanding of sanctions, what they are and how they work, senders still manage to carry out their policy work relatively effectively – or at least so it seems. Why? As discussed earlier, this paradox can probably be best explained by the fact that

there is seldom a well-established and objective evaluation mechanism in place that can account for all sequences along the policy chain, bearing all its actors, rules and procedures in mind. The playing out of sanctions is simply the result of a combination of rational, irrational and random procedures and practices. Since no scale or comparative measurement is applied, it simply looks as if the policy outcome is as expected. This should be contrasted with a policy that is carried out in a similar way to a military mission, where doctrines, strategic principles, operational guidelines, procedures, decision-making systems, co-ordination and segmental ownership are in place. It should be noted, however, that the role of decision-making procedures is not unique to the adoption, management and implementation of targeted sanctions. On the contrary, it is seems to be a common factor for most policy tools operating in a similar setting and for a similar purpose. Usually, policies are adopted with a functional ideal in mind, where the policy is expected to work in a particular way. Seldom are such policies likely to work as expected, though. Neighbouring academic fields (decision-making theory, organisational theory and policy evaluation theory) bear witness to this. The decision-making and implementation involved in targeted sanctions are no exception.

In all, then, a theory of sanctions needs to include the underlying reasons why the sender is acting, since they predetermine policy outcome. The observations made here are therefore relevant to the theory of sanctions, as they add additional dimensions to the ways in which we think about targeted sanctions. The theoretical implication of this is that further research into the 'black box' of the sender is necessary to establish a deeper understanding of the factors that constrain and enable sanctions outcome.

Trends in Targeting

This study examined new data on the number of targets listed under UN and EU sanctions regimes. There were two goals in doing this. The first was to see whether the listing of entities was becoming more or less common in practice, and the secondly was to see how personal sanctions fit the strategic rationale that embedded each of these current sanctions regimes.

This study found that 1,186 individuals were subject to targeted sanctions in mid-2009. While some sanctions regimes displayed very limited sender–target interaction (for example, Uzbekistan), others regimes featured many more actions, not least in terms of the number of entities placed on the list (for example , the ICTY). In terms of listing and de-listing, there were, as expected, clear signs that UN and EU sanctions usually start by listing a rather limited number of entities, this number normally increasing over time. This illustrates that sanctions commonly work in a gradual way. One explanation for this may be that the sender has a strategy prepared to include further targets unless the official policy of the government is changed. Another explanation may be that

new actors enter the political game and need to be listed as they pose a threat to the sender and its interests.

Trends in targeting also gives further support to the notion that actors such as the UN and the EU are increasingly seeking to hold individual decision-makers accountable for their political deeds. This supports both the notion of a broader trend of humanisation in international law and politics, as well as an ongoing 'justice cascade'. Another observation is that in the majority of sanctions regimes, the sender prefers to implement both an assets freeze and a travel ban. When it chooses to impose only one of these measures, the UN seems to select travel bans rather than assets freezes.

Of the sanctions regimes currently being applied to natural entities, about half are aimed at non-state actors, while the others are directed against government members (or persons closely linked with the government). In two cases, targeted sanctions were implemented on both sides of the conflict (on both non-state and state actors). In terms of the target category that is applied when these sanctions lists are being established, there are no specific or objective criteria that run across the sanctions regimes. On the contrary, each sanctions regime is unique in this regard. Observation suggests that senders are prepared to apply a whole host of target categories if necessary. For instance, in the case of Zimbabwe, the EU has applied sanctions against target categories such as: the military, air force, targets' families, government, parliament, police, prison, election officials, central bank associates, war veterans, the media and political bureau members (ZANU-PF). New categories may be added in future episodes.

An intriguing question running throughout this study has been to what extent targeted personal sanctions actually had any impact upon those listed. Here, the argument is made that sanctions can achieve impact in two ways: direct and symbolic. One finding of this study is that some regimes randomly seem to operate symbolic sanctions, while other regimes seem more inclined to strive to achieve a more direct target impact. There are probably several explanations for this, such as lack of political will, lack of resources for implementation, or because of the sender's (and its many departments') diverging sets of administrative cultures for operating sanctions policies. However, a consequence of sometimes adopting a policy with more symbolic aims while at other times seeking to interact directly with the target is that the sending body risks undermining its legitimacy, as it may be perceived, both by insiders and outsiders, as incapable of achieving its aims. To solve this problem, senders need to develop a more refined strategy for communicating the rationale for engaging in one or the other strategy to international audiences.

In terms of using targeted sanctions as part of an operational strategic approach, there have been few signs of an explicitly stated doctrine to use targeted sanctions in interaction with other parallel and broader strategic frameworks. This is somewhat surprising. While it was clear that targeted sanctions were embedded in a number of accompanying strategies, such as neighbourhood programmes, co-operation agreements, assistance efforts, and so on (that is, sanctions were often mentioned or

referred to in such documents), there were seldom documents describing how they would be strategically applied. This gives further support to the idea of targeted sanctions being embedded within a larger strategic logic, although seldom part of operating procedures. For example, while the UNSC has imposed arms embargoes in a number of contexts, it has not co-ordinated such measures with for example ongoing military operations on the ground. If a sender instead instructed its peacekeeping forces active in the field to, let's say, work to prevent arms embargo violations, then the overall goals of the sender would be easier to achieve.

In summary, a general policy implication is that there is a clear need to think of the role of sanctions as part of a holistic sanctions approach rather than a stand-alone policy. Whereas UN and EU targeted sanctions have long been seen as instruments to achieve political change and resolve a number of complex emergencies, targeted sanctions should not be assessed in isolation. Inclusion of broader strategy would therefore improve sanctions theory in general.

Recognising Targets

In this study, a number of interviews were also carried out with individuals on sanctions lists. The starting point was to bring to the forefront some of those individuals who collective security actors of the international community have branded as posing a threat to peace, security and human rights. It was hoped that bringing the perception and behaviour of targeted individuals into sanctions analysis would lead to a better understanding of how the sanctions policy tool might work.

A general finding was that the entities targeted by the EU and UN were quite 'anonymous', in the sense that little information existed about them in the international media (for example, little is known about the targeted entities in Myanmar).[7] One explanation for this may be that targets are only 'visible' in their own local environments, and not so much on the international scene. In fact, several sanctions lists examined included individuals who had been killed or imprisoned (for example, the UN's Sierra Leone sanctions list).

Moreover, it was found that the impact of targeted sanctions on specific individuals does seem to play an important role. There were many different examples of how both travel bans and assets freezes have been 'present' in the daily life of the entities. While the findings do not necessarily suggest that sanctions achieved a behavioural change in those interviewed (making them abide by the rules of the sender), they did prove to have achieved different kinds of impact. For some entities, the impact was related to their professional and official career (which sanctions often disturbed), while other entities felt the impact privately, in terms of the strain upon relationships with their friends and families (for example, travel

---

7   However, there are a number of high-profile cases where targets have been very vocal and visible (for example, Zimbabwe and Liberia).

bans sometimes prevented targets from meeting with them). Also interesting, and perhaps more important, is that targeted sanctions also seemed to function as an annoyance, creating insecurity, stigmatisation and frustration. There were many different accounts of this in the interviews.

The interviews also gave reasons to think further about the role of target behaviour and ways to categorise it: for example, 'sobering', 'restraint', 'repentance', 'victimisation' or 'repellence'.[8] Such a categorisation fits the kind of answers provided by the targets. Yet this does not mean that their actual behaviour always changed. On the contrary, sanctions could also make targets more obstructive *vis-à-vis* the sender. Such contrary notions add to the complexity of the argument. It is also possible to categorise the political behaviour of targets according to their reactions to the sender: 'comply', 'evade' or 'do nothing'. However, the lack of data and information does not allow any systematically based conclusions – more data are needed.

The interviews conducted here, as well as an analysis of reports looking at compliance and evasion elsewhere, suggest that in the cases of Zimbabwe, Angola, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Moldova (Transdniestria) and Sierra Leone, most targets either tried to evade or do nothing, while there were only few signs of compliance. However, just because targets did not respond positively by changing their behaviour following targeted sanctions does not mean that the goals were not achieved. In fact 'doing nothing' could mean that the sender actually succeeded in constraining the target. An important aspect of targeting is that it does not always intend to achieve behavioural change, but sometimes also to constrain targets. Here it should be recognised that targeted sanctions play very different roles depending on the contexts they are intended to address. While the same types of restrictive measures may be put in place across different sanctions regimes, the outcomes vary considerably.

Finally, albeit not surprisingly, the interviews conducted revealed that targeted sanctions were seen as both 'unjust' and 'unfair'. There was often little understanding of why an individual had been put on the list. In some cases, the interviewees had their own specific explanations – such as for political reasons or because of their affiliation with other entities that might be of more threat to the sender and its interests – but entities rarely took personal responsibility for being listed. The sender was often blamed. In all, such comments reveal that sanctions were felt to be imposed on a personal basis. While senders can usually be sure that there is enough 'evidence' to impose sanctions on a target, there are also a number of entities that are innocent. Such errors contribute to making sanctions inefficient. All of this suggests a further need to look beyond the state and the group when analysing the impact of targeted sanctions.

---

8   Wallensteen et al. (2006).

Experiences from Zimbabwe and Angola

In order to give further empirical evidence for the need to rethink existing sanctions theory and assessment methodology, a closer empirical examination of the EU's targeted sanctions against the current Zimbabwean elite as well as the former UNITA leadership was made. Particular attention was paid to the kinds of episodes occurring within this case, the kinds of target categories that the sender placed on the sanctions list, the perception of targeted sanctions by the sender, the potential impact of a travel ban and financial sanctions on the targets, and the general impact sanctions had on the conflict.

In general, the examination found no correlation between the implementation of personal sanctions and the resolution of the overall crisis (conflict) which would have proven the efficacy of sanctions. On the contrary, following the introduction of targeted sanctions, economic and political deterioration continued over time in both cases. Establishing a correlation is impossible given the extreme number of direct and indirect factors that one would have to take into account. None the less, it was argued that it was not feasible to claim that targeted individual sanctions did not play any part at all. In contrast, it is possible to argue that personal listing measures limited listed entities' room for manoeuvre, and in that sense had a constant effect. One could argue that this could be beneficial in terms of conflict resolution. Concerning the perceptions of the targets, it was also observed that there was well-developed sanctions awareness among actors on the ground, both among listed entities and the larger population. Targeted sanctions seemed to have both a direct and indirect impact upon the targets interviewed.

In the case of Zimbabwe, some of the interviewees at times displayed frustration, and sometimes also indignation. If the Zimbabwean entities' behaviour was categorised according to 'comply', 'evade' or 'do nothing', most targets seemed to 'do nothing' *vis-à-vis* the EU in order to improve their situation. Another finding from the study of the Zimbabwean elite was that the policy enabled a dialogue with regime officials in a way that might otherwise not been possible. Although the sender publicly seemed to refrain from interacting directly with targeted actors, there were still several examples of indirect strategic engagement with members of the regime by listing and de-listing target categories and by making statements regarding the behaviour of listed entities.

Other such kinds of interactions included, for instance, keeping targets notified that they were on the list and what the main arguments were for their inclusion (by writing public letters to targets). While achieving a change in target behaviour is crucial from a sanctions assessment point of view, another decisive factor seemed to be the sender's ability to encourage targeted actors interested in pursuing dialogue or contact. This enabling effect of targeted sanctions has also been confirmed in studies undertaken by Cortright and Lopez, which suggest that the type of impact (positive or punitive) on the targets is not as relevant as the value

of creating a bargaining environment.[9] This also suggests that future sanctions assessment studies should take into account how senders manage to utilise such an enabling momentum, instead of over-focusing on what outcomes sanctions have led to in comparison to the initial goals. Such a capacity could be a good criterion for success.

Other findings in the examination of the Zimbabwean case include that a travel ban and financial sanctions could augment group cohesion among the targets; that targets in a number of cases experienced impact in the form of annoyances, and that a strong anti-sanctions narrative had rooted itself among the elite on the ground, which undermined the EU's sanctions policy. Findings like these suggest the need for sanctions scholars to be more context-sensitive when seeking to determine sanctions impact. It follows that there are a number of 'local' rules, norms and processes that enable or constrain sanctions.

Similarly to the Zimbabwean case, the UNITA sanctions regime was also divided into a number of distinct sanctions episodes based on the sender's adjustment of the sanctions lists. The review of the UNITA sanctions suggests, not surprisingly, that targeted sanctions did not seem to contribute directly to conflict resolution. As we saw, the violent conflict continued for many years. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that targeted sanctions were a failure. On the contrary, there are good reasons to suggest that without targeted sanctions, the situation would have been much worse, as the pressure it mounted against UNITA's operations clearly undermined its ability to pursue 'business as usual'.

With regard to the personalisation of targeted sanctions, there were several indications that both the sender and a number of targets perceived sanctions as an instrument to be imposed upon the political movement as a whole, rather than upon specific individual entities. Yet, while there was a notion that it was the group that was under pressure and not specific individuals, this did not rule out that personal experience did matter in the UNITA sanctions regime. There were several statements from former listed entities implying that they felt personally affected, not least on the psychological level. While it did not change the behaviour of those listed, it did at least seem to constrain and annoy some of them. The importance of stigmatisation because of the sanctions should therefore not be underestimated. In fact, such psychological impact was evident, and seemed to matter a great deal. Moreover, the effects of stigmatisation could be noted both at the personal and the group level. Such an impact was also likely to change over the course of the sanctions regime. The findings therefore suggest that there should be greater focus upon the political behaviour of the targeted actors. In view of the findings of this case study, it is also important to pay further attention to other ongoing sender strategies which may be equally important as targeted sanctions in constraining and coercing targets. Far too often sanctions assessment looks only at sender-related aspects and at particular

---

9　Cortright (2001): 118. See also Cortright and Lopez (2000).

sanctions implementation difficulties. The perception of the targets is crucial to the effectiveness of a sanctions regime.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Angola sanctions regime further demonstrated that when conducting sanctions assessments, there is a need to pay attention to the continuous interaction that takes place between the sender and the target during the course of the conflict. In contrast to other sanctions regimes, the Angola sanctions committee, and in particular its chairman (Ambassador Fowler), was very active in holding press conferences, issuing reports, and so on. Not only did such actions signal to the international community that the UN was watching developments on ground closely, it also communicated resolve to the targeted actors. Thus, much of the success of a sanctions regime depends upon the sanctions sending body's active and clearly signalled commitment to making sanctions effective and peace possible.[10]

10　Möllander (2009).