International sanctions need not only come in the form of coercive punishment (managed by the EEAS under the EU or OFAC under the US). Regional organizations and individual states also have access to sanctions in the form of interruption/alteration of existing incentives extended to the target.

This takes on the form of interrupting, or canceling aid, increasing tariffs, introducing capital controls, tightening banking regulations, and much more. You can easily see how these measures would overlap into the competencies beyond the EEAS or OFAC. Not all aid is however equally subject to conditionality. 

Particularly in the case of the EU, this creates a dual-track approach to sanctions which requires coordination, but if coordinated properly allows for packaging with CFSP sanctions in a more effective and versatile regime. 

To illustrate, the lecture goes through humanitarian and development aid patterns and possible coercion via their alteration and illustrates on the case of Myanmar the possible dual-track combination of measures imposed by EU bodies with vastly different mandates.