Effectiveness is by far the most frequently discussed facet of sanctions and also stands for the broadest body of literature on sanctions. The reason is quite simple, criticism draws attention, and we do not agree on what makes a sanction regime effective?

Is it complete capitulation of the target? Is it partial acquiescence? Is it no side effects? Is it fair to judge sanctions by their applied goals, their actual goals, or the actual goals while taking into account the limited number of alternative options? What are the relevant metrics?

Importantly, we aim to improve the effectiveness of all sanction regimes. If that is true, should we not make them more robust and hard-hitting instead of targeting and tailoring? After reading the texts on these facets the lecture also discusses the plethora of variables that impact the effectiveness of a sanction regime and debates the relative weight and normative impact of event hose sanctions regimes we might deem ineffective. 

The chain is only as strong as the weakest link, right? An effective sanction regime must be bulletproof, right? 

The assigned readings point to who the most typical sanction busters are, and what the effects of even a unilateral sanction regime you would not expect to work may be. And yes, the many circumvention, organized crime, grey market, point diversion, and illicit routes and methods a sanction regime is able to inspire. 

The presentation offers practical examples with illustrations of the typical manners of sanction circumvention with key terminology and descriptions of daily practice of sanction due diligence officers from banking institutions to the state apparatus. 

And because circumvention is quite undesirable, and every innovation to block it is likely to breed more innovative ways of circumvention, the lecture builds up to explaining what secondary sanctions are and why they are a very potent tool despite their problematic extraterritorial forms adopted currently.