Transitional justice JUSTIN Judicial Studies Institute Masaryk University Katarína Šipulová Bratislava, 11 December 2019 Third Wave Transitions —Huntington Linz Share – Mainwaring — (1)Transformation = reforma = transaction (2)Replacement = ruptura = breakdown (3)Transplacement = - (or ruptforma) = extrication — TJ and international law •first: domestic justice processes following regime transition •now: globalizing movement of HR: new normative expectations • •Punish v forget dilemma •Controversial stance on amnesties • • 1. Impunity 2. Accountability De facto De jure Legal Civil Administrative - forget - exil - blanket/ general amnesty - National CP - International CP - International ad hoc - International permanent - Hyberid - TRCs -Reparations -Funds -Lustration Transformation of CEE De-communization (Transitional Justice in CEE) http://image.slidesharecdn.com/democracyandregimetypes-101209223819-phpapp02/95/slide-2-728.jpg?129 1956319 CEE Transitions •vlád Communist regimes: - large level of control of social/societal life -> new regimes are not able to eliminate all networks of communist nomenklatura -Low organisation of opposition and dissent -Socialism prevails the rule of law -All state actors dominated by Communist parties -Legal order is not there to constrain the government (ideal totalitarian system) -Long duration of regimes Third Wave Transitions File:Prague November89 - Wenceslas Square1.jpg CEE - quick pace - impatient actors - uncertainty - cooperation with ComP State Round Table Elections Poland February 6, 1989- April 5, 1989 4/8 June 1989 Hungary July 13, 1989 – Sept.18, 1989 March 25/April 8, 1990 CSR November. 26,1989- January 31, 1990 8/9 June 1990 DDR December 7, 1989 – March 12, 1990 March 18, 1990 Bulgaria January 22, 1990 – May 14, 1990 10/17 June 1990 Romania January 27, 1990 – February 1, 1990 May 20, 1990 Round Table Phenomenon Transitional Justice in CEE •vlád What is the relationship between transitions and transitional justice? Torturer problem Revolved around the communist parties and their repressive apparatuses (secret services and the police) Typical mechanisms: De-Communisation •vlád De-Communisation = measures implemented by postcom countries in order to dismantle the Communist Party’s hold on society -Replacement of elites -Restoration of the RoL -Transition to multi-party system -De-politicization of police -Reestablishment of private property -Transition from planned to market economy De-Communisation •vlád Typical mechanisms: •a) criminal proceedings, •b) lustration, •c) access to secret files, •d) restitutions, and •e) symbolic condemnations of communist regimes Can you identify the retributive/restorative axis? Lustration and vetting •vlád Most frequently used and most controversial mechanism of CEE transitions “[a] broad set of parliamentary laws that restrict members and collaborators of former repressive regimes from holding a range of public offices, state management positions, or other jobs with strong public influence (such as in the media or academia) after the collapse of the authoritarian regime” - Broader sense: also opening of secret police archives and establishment of national memory institutes Lustration and vetting •vlád Purges: non-democratic practice Lustration: transitional measure, to consolidate the democracy -Typically on legislative basis - •Important particularly in the first phase of a transition, when the GOV lacks sufficient legitimacy and trust •First and harshest: CSR (wide group of targetted persons) •Germany, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Poland •However, significant differences between countries • Lustration and vetting •vlád CSR, GDR, Albania: wide-reaching cleansing Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia: truth-seeking and memory-building part. Various theories Important particularly during the first phase of transition, to establish new legitimate institutions Retributive or restorative? both elements, they are similar to strategic actors or insurance theories • Lustration and vetting •vlád Criticism: -International institutions -Infringement of fundamental rights (passive voting rights, principles of democratic regimes) -Prohibition of discrimination -Right to a fair trial -Unclear effect on democratization Strategies of Lustration Roman David 2015 Retribution – Revelation - Reconciliation Access to Secret Files and National Memory Institutes •vlád Typically complement lustration Its character changes depending on the link to lustration Access: -Files compiled and created by the secret political police -Information in the file, documentation itself -Access to targeted individual v broader public -East Germany (1990), Hungary (1994), Estonia (1995), the Czech Republic (1996), Bulgaria, Poland (1997), Romania (1999), Slovakia (2002), Lithuania (2006), and Latvia (2007). Restorative Mechanisms •vlád Reparations - a whole set of victim-oriented measures -Restitutions -Rehabilitations -Compensations -Satisfactions - -Most common in CE: rehabilitation of political prisoners, and restitutions of property Huntington •vlád Transformation: impulse originates from members of the old regime Transplacement: the old regime embarks on the journey towards democracy, but loses both legitimacy and initiative along the way – opposition reformers Replacement: removal of unreformed government in full and replacement by the opposition Incentive to prosecute? Moran •vlád X regime transition, but repressiveness of the totalitarian regime and the position of dissent in it Exit points (tolerance of emigration) and voice points (toleration of dissent) H: the more liberal the communist leadership, the more forgiving the new democratic elite X Poland Helga Welsh •vlád Distribution of power between political parties & position of local communist party before and after the transition -Weak in CR -Strong in Romania and Poland - -i.e. effect of both past and present determinants - Kieran Williams, Aleks Szcerbiak and Brigid Fowler •vlád Draw on Welsh -Divergence of lustration laws in CEE can be explained with reference to the access of the former opposition to power and their ability to create coalitions. - -Vigorous implementation of lustration (CSR, Poland, Hun) = countries that different in communist experience and transition, but had same intentions concerning lustration. - Time as a variable •vlád Sczerbiak 2002: contemporary factors: political scene, distribution of power, public opinion and mood in society at the time the mechanism is implemented Lustration are not necessarily meant to secure historical justice: might be used to solve ordinary struggles between political parties - Time as a variable •vlád Nedelsky 2004: post-comm states struggle to adopt any legislation. -How available the secret police files are -Legitimacy of the former regime & re-legitimization of Postcommunist elites -Public interest in de-communization - Time as a variable •vlád Nalepa: Skeletons in the closet -Communist parties inititially insisted on rewarding their support of democratization, but later implemented exactly the screening policies they opposed. - -Why? - Time as a variable •vlád Lavinia Stan: we should look beyond the lustration democratic political competition is crucial for explaining the paths of transitional justice in CEE 1.The role of the opposition during the transition 2.The degree to which the communist regime was repressive 3.The presence or absence of an experience with a pluralist system pre-communism - Time as a variable •vlád Crocker Supranational influence - Factors influencing a type of TJ in CEE Transitional Justice Decisions in CEE •vlád Two general hypotheses: 1.Type of regime transition and form of transitional justice 2.Distribution of power between post non-democratic elites and the incoming elites Strategies of Lustration Negative lists Positive lists Strategies of Lustration Jan Kavan case Strategies of Lustration Who should be the target? What are the core problems of lustration? Factors influencing a type of TJ in CEE Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu Clash between TJ and HR Transitional Justice introduces a different logic of punishment and reparation, often at odds with general conceptions of HR and international HR commitments Lustration: passive voting rights, employment rights Access to secret police files: right to privacy Condemnation of political parties: deformation of the free political competition Reparations: arbitrary infringement on property rights. Who is to solve these conflicts? Newly established constitutional courts Role of courts in transitions •vlád Why are elites wiling to constrain their power? Why are constitutional courts different in terms of independence, jurisdiction, competences and effectiveness? Symbolic role (Hirschl, Schwartz) •Separation of powers •Rechtstaat •Written catalogues of HR •Agents of change • • •Ramseyer •A mean to conclude longterm contracts of political parties and their voters •If a high probability of future independent parliamentary elections •If a low probability that current government easily wins next independent parliamentary elections Ginsburg – insurance theory (democratization might lead to a loss of power + CC is a guarancy for minorities’ rights) Veto player theories Constitutional court No constitutional court Democracy A B Non-democracy C D Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu How and when CCs emerge? B to A: fragmentation of party or institutional system, change of flexible Constitution needed (France, Belgium) D to C: federalism, stabilization of regime, trust (Poland) D to A: transition, change of regime C to A: path dependency Constitutional court No constitutional court Democracy A B Non-democracy C D Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu How and when CCs emerge? A to B and C to D: difficult because of path dependency A to D: Ginsburg: phases C to B: ? Constitutional Court Transitional Justice Jurisprudence Less Transitional Justice Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu Constitutional courts in TJ processes Human rights Scope of Transitional Justice 2.0 Scope of Transitional Justice Constitutional Court Executive & Legislation Thank you for your attention Katarína Šipulová katarina.sipulova@law.muni.cz Masaryk University