Transitional justice & European Union JUSTIN Judicial Studies Institute Masaryk University Katarína Šipulová Brno, 1 December 2021 Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu Transitional Justice and the European Union Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu Transitional Justice and the European Union •2015 EU’s Policy Framework on support to transitional justice • •Openly underlines the commitment of the EU to TJ processes and the fight against impunity •Common heritage •Experience of all MS •Ability of the EU to help post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies • •Yet, until 2015 no definition of TJ •Policies on ad hoc character, patchy, inconsistent Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu Transitional Justice and the European Union •1989, democratization and enlargement • •EU as an anchor (Moracsik) for post-communist countries •Post-com countries as an opportunity for the EU to consolidate democratization processes on the continent • •1993 Copenhagen Summit of the European Council: ambitious plan to overcome the burden of the divided Europe •Adoption of the very first political criteria on membership •Democracy, RoL, HR, protection of minorities, fundamental values of the Community… • •Impact on how countries democratize + how they address TJ issues •Interest to oust former communists and elites not-committed to democratic values •How to stabilise and consolidate democracies? • •Nowadays •Backsliding •Foreign-policy goals in Balkan countries (entry to Turkey/East Asia) Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Starting point •2001: proposal on Council Framework decision on combating racisim and xenophobia • •Lack of agreement •Progress only in 2007 under German presidency •Moral obligation to legislate on hate speech and racist rhetoric •Aim: to find a minimal level of harmonisation of individual criminal liability for proliferation of racist and xenophobic ideas and views •References to historical experience, Nuremberg trials, Rome Statute of ICC • •Adopted in 2008, but the negotiations uncovered deep differences among MS on the gravity of the crimes of Nazi and communist regimes • • •April 2008 European hearing on the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committee by totalitarian regimes •Common platform •Historian, lawyers, political scientists, politicians • •Should communist crimes be condemned together with Nazi crimes? •Germany is against •Does EU have a competence? •WE appears to be unsensitive towards the suffering of CEE countries • Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Starting point •2008 Stockholm Programme •Covering 2010-2014 •External relations and development policy, including transitional justice •EU institutions should support and promote EU and state activity against impunity, fight crimes of genocide and CAH, foster cooperation with ICTs, ICC in particular, etc. • • experience of MS is diverse, but EU is an area os shared values which are incompatible with such crimes • •Thre is no single blueprint for TJ (Ecouncil and MS), but UE has normative preferences (convergence towards international law) • • •Talks about using A83 TFEU as the legal basis for possible criminalisation of public condoning, denying or grossly trivializing crimes of totalitarian regimes • Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Starting point •Strongest focus: international criminal justice and ICC • •EP resolution on EU support for the ICC •Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide committed the Union to support those political leaders in transitional areas who promote and are committed to democratic values • Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Starting point •2010 Report on the memory of the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe •Painful lessons of a history marked by bloody conflict •All MS had taken measures to deal with the legacy of communist regimes’ crimes •No one-size-fits-all model •The choice of MS may differ significantly •Crucial role of NGOs • •Establishment of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience •Legal basis for possible criminalization of public condoning, denying or grossly trivializing crimes of totalitarian regimes: A 83 TFEU • Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Common Framework •1. criminal justice •covers the most serious crimes under international law and draws on the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials •2 truth seeking • the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions, and the collection and preservations of documents, archives, and other evidence of past crimes. •3. reparations •presume an acknowledgment that human rights were violated and the need to rectify this dwells in the right to remedy •4. institutional reform, guarantee of non-recurrence •focuses on the reform of institutions which were either instruments of repression and injustice, or which lack technical capacity • • •Apart from international criminal justice, very victim-centred approach • Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Common Framework •Criminal Justice and support of ICC • • Conclusions on the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in 2010 •EP resolution on EU support for the ICC • •Unwavering EU support towards ICC and fight of impunity for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes • • •Regulation 235/2014 (EP and Council) establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights - committed the EU to support those political leaders in transitional areas who promote and are committed to democratic values • •Reflected also in European Neighborhood Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy and aid programmes (PHARE, TACIT, MEDA, Development Fund, etc) • Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Common Framework •Plan to coordinate TJ policies more •Stresses domestic character of TJ and complementarity of EU engagement • •The drivers are national authorities, but they are expected to respect international norms •Criminal justice – majority of interference, a very strict approach towards cooperation with ICC • • •Core: criminal justice and individual accountability • Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Accession Conditionality Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Enlargement process and European Conditionality •Mudde-Sedelmeier and Merlinger: Eastern enlargement • •1. attempt to use the enlargement to spread HR and democratic norms •EC declarations, Phare, … •2. accession condition •Copenhagen criteria 1993 (HR and democracy) •3. normative revision of Treaties HR in the enlargement process 1. 1. •1962 Birkelbach report • • Declaration on the European Identity •Relationship of 9 EC members towards the third countries •Determination to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and f respect for human rights. • •1977 Joint Declaration (EP, Council, Commission) •To defend the FR derived from the national constitutions and the ECHR, adopted by CoE •Although protection of HR is not the main task and goal of the EC • •1978 Declaration on Democracy (EC) •First election of the EP •Objection of EC should any of the member states backslide to authoritarian government •Matthews v Doego case Copenhagen Criteria 1. 1. •Definition of fundamental values and political conditions of membership •Take over the definition of democratic character imposed by A237 EEC Treaty • •To minimize the risk of backsliding •Democracy •Rule of law •Functioning of market economy • •1998: transformed into Council Regulation EC No 622/98 •The very same year, democratic principles in Preamble and Article F TEU = new Grundnorm • • •Amsterdam: transfer of Copenhagen criteria into Article 7 •And membership criteria: Article 49 A2 Control A2 triangular protection 1. Protection of values in the institutional exercise of power (level EI); this obligation stems from the Article 2 TEU and the Charter. 2. Protection of values, with respect to member states, in the application and implementation of Union policies (member states, level MS); this obligation stems from Article 2 TEU and Article 51 of the Charter. 3. Protection of values, in relation to member states, during application of their own internal policies in areas where competences have not been transferred to the EU (national states, level NS); this obligation stems from Article 2 TEU, subject to accession conditionality. It is worth mentioning here that many member countries contest such an interpretation of Article 2 and its application over and above the competencies entrusted to the Union, because they see this as undue enlargement of the EU’s scope of authority. Rather than in official documents, such stances can be observed in the statements submitted by governments during proceedings at the Court of Justice. With reference to human rights, these countries promote a minimalist interpretation and criticise what they describe as ‘creeping competencies’. Specifically, consider the controversial discussion surrounding the application of the Charter in connection with the British, Polish, and, potentially, Czech opt-outs. See Bončková, Helena and Smekal, Hubert. ‘Fragmentace společných hodnot? Výjimka z Listiny základních práv Evropské unie.’ Současná Evropa 2010, 2, 61-81. A2 Control Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Accession Conditionality Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu EU&TJ: Accession Conditionality Posun z B do A: fragmentace stranického nebo institucionálního systému, vyžaduje flexibilní ústavy Posun z D do C: federalismus, stabilizace režimu, důvěryhodnost Posun z D do A: tranzice, změna režimu Why should we care? •Does the lack of TJ contribute to democratic backsliding? •Nalepa: selecting enforcement of TJ can be linked to democratic erosion • extreme polarisation might turn a blind eye to antidemocratic transgression • if voters are uncertain whether the candidate is a closet autocrat or ideological incumbent, they reelect him because his first term actions are identical to those of an ideological incumbent • • delayed shield of transitional rule of law • •Bates – Nalepa: personnel TJ: non-criminal forms of TJ • essential role of purges for TJ •Complex dataset on how countries address authoritarian leaders, capture delayed TJ and reversals •TJ vetting of unknown collaborators is more conducive to democratic stability than purging of top known elites: revealing secret information prevents blackmail •Vetting and pruges of known collaborators onl leads to their removal Thank you for your attention Katarína Šipulová katarina.sipulova@law.muni.cz Masaryk University