

# Definitions and trends of different types of internal armed conflict

IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Frozen Conflicts in the Caucasus

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# Structure


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- Introduction
- A taxonomy of conflict
- Conflict typology
- Ethnic conflict
- Where do we stand now and what is next?

# Introduction

- International violence is becoming less problematic than it was during the last century – more intrastate conflicts, than interstate struggles.
- From 1989 to 1996 there were 69 armed conflicts, of which only five have been between states.

# Trends in conflict I




**Figure 3.1 State-Based Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2006**

After more than a decade of uneven decline, the number of state-based conflicts being fought around the world has levelled off.

*Data Sources: UCDP/PRIO; UCDP Human Security Report Project Datasets*


# Trends in conflict II

## Trends in conflict




# Trends in conflict III

## Conflict onsets




# Is war declining?

- War is declining!
  - ① The central role of the state
    - Monopoly of violence
    - Internal peace
    - Reduced exposure to interstate war
  - ② World Wars 1 and 2 sharply diverge from the trend
    - Normann Angell (1911)  
The Great Illusion
  - ③ Key reason
    - Peace has become more profitable
    - War has not become more lethal



# Our better angels

- Identifies the same trend.
  - ① Explanations
    - The Leviathan (again!)
    - Trade and commerce (the profitability of peace again)
    - Feminization: increases respect for interests and values of women
    - Cosmopolitanism: makes it easier to identify with 'others'
    - Rise of reason and rationality
  - ② Fewer people are growing up in violent societies where they are taught that violence is acceptable, a way of life





# A taxonomy of conflict

- Who fights?
  - Governments
  - Organizations
  - Individuals
- Why do they fight?
  - Politics?
  - Economics?
  - Insanity?
- Where do they fight
  - Home or away?
- Consequences of conflict
  - How many were killed?
  - What is the time frame?

# The concept of conflict

- This word is derived from the Latin “con-fligo” which means strife.
- “Conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals”.
- Conflict is “a social situation in which minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at same moment in time an available set of scarce resources.”
- Conflict is a situation in which “actors use **conflict behavior** against each other to attain **incompatible goals** and/or express their hostility”.
- In general, conflict is understood in terms of aspirations of conflicting parties to achieve incompatible goals simultaneously.

# The concept of Conflict

- Goals are incompatible when the action of one party threatens the interests of another party.
- The complexity of conflict depends whether **tangible issues** (like recognition, security, territory, money) are more significant than **intangible aspects** like symbolic meanings that shape values and ideologies, legitimizing a certain conflict behavior.

# The concept of conflict

- Donald Horowitz: “conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals” (Horowitz 1985: 95).
- The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research defines conflict as “the clashing interests (political differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organization) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases.”

# Towards conceptual clarity

- Peter Wallensteen:
- In order to understand and provide conflict analysis, we have to focus on three major components of the phenomenon:
  - 1) actors,
  - 2) process (action), and
  - 3) incompatibility (issues at stake).

# The concept of conflict

- By combining these aspects, we arrive at a most comprehensive analysis of all possible kinds of conflict, which is a **“social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources”** (Wallensteen 2009: 15).

# Typology according to actors

- (1) **Extrasystemic armed conflict**, which takes place between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. In the Correlates of War (COW) project, this category is further divided into colonial wars and imperial wars;
- (2) **interstate armed conflict**, which occurs between two or more states;
- (3) **internal armed conflict**, in which the government of a state is in conflict with internal opposition groups without intervention from another state; and
- (4) **internationalized internal armed conflict**, when conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal groups in opposition to and with intervention from an outside state (Havard, Wilhelmsen, Gleditsch 2004: 11).

# Typology according to actors

- **Civil war**–affected states are states in which “it is almost the case that significant elements of actual or potential military power exist outside the control of the central state apparatus” (Giddens 1987).
- **Violence** is a central feature of such a conflict and the only way to establish the authority of one or the other conflicting party. Under this condition a state uses its military power to suppress rebellions challenging its authority and legitimacy. As a result civil conflict is brutish and nasty, accompanied by killing, which is “to a great extent a matter of national pride” (Misra 2008: 45).



# Typology according to actors

- Emergence of new ***non-state actors***
- Trends that have increased a range of worldwide arms trades expanded the power of multinational corporations and the growth of trans-border exchange of weapons, drugs, and people, which in turn has contributed to the formation of coalitions that have acquired the capacity to form armies.

# Typology according to actors

- first, between states;
- second, between a state and non-state actors outside of the state;
- third, between a state and non-state actors within a state; and
- fourth, between non-state actors taking place outside of the state.

# A taxonomy of conflict

## Interstate war


Figure: Interstate war



# A taxonomy of conflict

## Intrastate war


Figure: Intrastate war



# A taxonomy of conflict

## One-sided violence war

Figure: One-sided violence



# A taxonomy of conflict

## Non-state conflict


Figure: Non-state conflict



# A taxonomy of conflict

## Criminal violence

Figure: Criminal violence



## Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity

- **The COSIMO** (Conflict Simulation Model) conflict categorization belongs among the most prominent classifications; it has been developed by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (**HIIK**), aiming to grasp armed conflict from non-violent, latent conflict to violent war phases.



## Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity

- Dennis Sandole (1998):
- **Non-violent** conflict is a manifestation of conflict processes during which one party seeks to undermine the goal-seeking capabilities of another conflicting party by non-violent means, as i.e. economic sanctions, exclusion of some groups from access to power, and so on.

## Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity

- According to The Uppsala Conflict Data Program:
- **Minor armed conflicts** - conflicts with more than 25 deaths but fewer than 1000 for the year and for the duration of the conflict.
- **Intermediate armed conflicts** - conflicts with more than 25 deaths and fewer than 1000 for a year, but more than 1000 for the duration of the conflict.
- **Wars** - conflicts with more than 1000 battle-related deaths in one year.

# Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity

- Hedley Bull’s definition, which has guided research within the field of IR, defines war as “organized violence carried on by political units against each other” (Bull 1977: 184).
- Significant assumptions made by this definition elucidate the following aspects of war: first, it is fought by **political organizations** (not by any other collective actors, as for example economic corporations); second, **war is organized violence with its own rules and norms**; and third, war is **collective, not individual** (Vasquez 1993: 35).
- As the most well-known definition by famous military theorist Carl von Clausewitz claims “**war is merely the continuation of policy by other means**” (Clausewitz 2008).

## Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity

- The concept of war has been based on two primary criteria: (1) a certain magnitude of battle related fatalities (initially including only soldiers and military staff) and (2) the status of the conflicting actors. According to these scholars, the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths caused by sustainable organized armed forces differentiate war from other types of conflict (Singer, Small 1972: 8).

# Conflict dynamics

- Latent conflict,
- Manifestation of the conflict,
- Escalation,
- Dead-point,
- De-escalation,
- Resolution and
- Post conflict arrangement of relations (peace building).

# Conflict dynamics

- During the phase of latent conflict divergence of interests are perceived, but the actors are unwilling or unable to clearly articulate the existence of conflict.
- During the manifestation of the conflict at least one of the actors articulates its incompatible interests and intention to protect them at the expense of other party.
- During the escalation of the conflict both conflict parties try to achieve their goals. This phase has four sub-phases: 1. Discussion, 2. Polarization, 3. Isolation and 4. Destruction.

# Conflict dynamics

- Dead-point is a situation when neither conflict party is able to end conflict in his favor.
- De-escalation –decreasing the destructive power of conflict, a greater willingness to search compromise solutions.
- Resolution and post conflict arrangement, peace building restore relation between the parties, the objective is to restore cooperation and peace.


# Phases of violent conflict

Phases of violent conflict






# Frozen conflict



# Frozen conflict

- Michal Smentana and Jan Ludvik: “a protracted, post-war conflict process, characterized by the absence of stable peace between the opposing sides”.
- Four criteria: “it must be (a) international and (b) protracted post-war, it must have (c) core unresolved issues, and it (d) lacks stable peace.
- Under influence of internal and external factors, a frozen conflict undergoes a periodical “thawing” : toward diplomatic negotiations - “peaceful thawing” or re-escalation toward use of armed force - “violent thawing”.

# Frozen conflict



# Competing goals: typology of issues at stake in armed conflicts

- Academic research focuses on such aspects as **religion, ideology, language, ethnicity, resources and markets, dominance, equality, and territory.**
- (1) ethnic conflict, (2) conflict over political arrangements, (3) ideological, (4) economic, and (5) territorial cross-border conflict.

# Competing goals: typology of issues at stake in armed conflicts

- Each conflict differs on a range of dimension and may include ethnicity, religion, political, economic, and territorial aspirations.
- *The question is how these dimensions interrelate in the whole process of conflict dynamics and how far each contributes to armed conflict?*

# Ethnic conflict

- Ethnic conflict is a conflict in which the key causes of confrontation run along **ethnic lines, which involve some elements of ethnic identity, the status of ethnic groups, and the opportunity to mobilize violent confrontation.** At the outset of a conflict, ethnic conflict could be identified by the observable pattern of rebel recruitment, while ethnicity by itself could be a motivation to mobilize forces.

# Conflict over political arrangements

- The long-term political relationship becomes increasingly conflictive and hostile when
- (1) political change is used as a tool to mobilize masses,
- (2) there are conflicting visions about the political arrangement of a state, and
- (3) incompatibility of goals rests upon a change of political regime.

# Ideological confrontation

- Religion can turn into armed confrontation if
- (1) the religious make-up of a state involves different religious groups,
- (2) there are conflict-prone religious structures, and
- (3) religion is a politicized issue and serves as a tool in the hands of political leaders.




# Economic conflict

- Economic aspects of conflict are operationalized as follows: (1) economic decline and inequality in the economic development of different regions,
- (2) the shadow economy (smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal trade activities), and
- (3) interest to control key economic resources.

- **Irredentism** is not a state-based process; it is a movement that seeks to attain the external support and territory of the group across the existing border. The goal of this group is to add territory and population into an existing state by reason of common affinities, such as ethnic, cultural, historical, or linguistic ties (Wolff 2007).
- **Secession**, which is a process at the end of which a population group inhabiting a defined territory within an existing state has succeeded in splitting itself and its territory off from a titular state. As a result it has established an independent state of its own (Wolff 2004). Secession is a process of political divorce and the formation of at least one new sovereign unit through a formal declaration of independence.

# Conflict mapping



# Underlying and Proximate Causes

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- ▶ **Main question: Do ethnic cleavages matter for a conflict, and how?**
- ▶ Main point: Ethnic cleavages matter in combination with relative inequality between groups.

## *Underlying causes*

- *Necessary but not sufficient* conditions for conflict.
- Four types of factor:
  - i. structural;
  - ii. political;
  - iii. economic and social;
  - iv. cultural and perceptual.
- Can contribute to mobilisation of ethnic groups and impact on development of the conflict.

# Underlying and Proximate Causes (2)

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## *Proximate causes*

- Factors increasing likelihood of conflict where there are underlying conditions.
  - Internal and external factors at mass and elite level.
    - Internal elite-level: ‘bad leaders’.
    - External elite-level: ‘bad neighbours’.
    - Internal mass-level: ‘serious domestic problems.’
    - External mass-level: ‘bad neighbourhoods’.
  - Many situations of ethnic tension share similar underlying causes but **not all lead to civil war** because not all share significant proximate causes (Wolff 2006, chpt. 3).
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# Context

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A very popular claim that ethnic cleavages generate internal armed conflict

- ▶ Very popular in the 1990s (Bosnia, Rwanda etc.)
- ▶ Robert D. Kaplan's 'The Coming Anarchy' article, 1993
- ▶ Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations'
- ▶ Still extremely widespread (e.g right-wing immigration sceptics)

Main ideas:

- ▶ a) Many conflicts are driven by 'ancient hatreds' between groups !
- ▶ b) ethnic cleavages generate inter-group antagonisms !
- ▶ c) ethnic heterogeneity will lead to conflict !

This lecture will show that these claims must either be:

- ▶ Rejected, or (more likely)...
  - ▶ qualified: Ethnic cleavages matter in combination with political and economic context
-

# Concepts: Ethnic group

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- ▶ What is ethnicity?
  - ▶ What is an ethnic group?
  - ▶ First, an ethnic group needs a **common marker**
    - ▶ Religion (i.e Alawites in Syria)
    - ▶ Language (i.e French-Quebequouis in Canada)
    - ▶ Common origin or nationality (i.e Indians in South Africa)
  - ▶ Second, a group needs a **common identity**
    - ▶ The members of the group must actively identify themselves as members
      - ▶ Shared sense of belonging to that group
      - ▶ Often also common narratives relating to history etc.
    - ▶ Ethnic groups are "imagined communities" (e.g Benedict Anderson)  
(BUT, not epistemically subjective! Ethnic groups exist)
    - ▶ External attribution is often also mentioned (others must also identify the group as a group)
-

# Concepts: Ethnic group

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- ▶ What constitutes ethnic conflict?
  - ▶ The definition most of the studies stick to:
  - ▶ **'Internal conflict between a government and an organized interna challenger (Uppsala definition!) in which the challenger is defined (and defines itself) along ethnic lines.'**
  - ▶ Another common definition (from the MAR project)
  - ▶ 'Episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status'
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# Why ethnic conflict: ancient hatred and the security

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- ▶ Why do groups fight? ('onset' of conflict)
  - ▶ 1 **Ancient hatreds** (Kaplan)
    - ▶ Historical rivalries,
    - ▶ Retribution and revenge
    - ▶ Almost tautological!
  - ▶ 2 **Security dilemmas** (Posen)
    - ▶ Since groups (where the state is weak or predatory) cannot be sure that other groups are benign, and vice versa. This leads to a security dilemma where groups attack each other pre-emptively (offense is the best defense)
-

# Ancient hatreds

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- ▶ Ethnic appeals may lead to violent escalation only if a group fears that its existence threatened: **myths justifying ethnic hostility.**
  - ▶ What matters is the ability to evoke vertical escalation “**our group is in danger**” – ethnic fear.
  - ▶ The next condition, is **political opportunity**. This consist of two elements,
    - ↯ first, there must be sufficient political space (weakening or state breakdown, or support from external power)
    - ↯ second, a territorial base (for successful mobilization, ethnic groups are either territorially concentrated in some region or they have a territorial base in neighboring country).
-

# Ancient hatreds

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- ▶ Ethnic conflict involves three dynamics:
  - mass hostility,
  - chauvinist political mobilization
  - ↪ a security dilemma.

The combination and interaction of those aspects creates the spiral of escalation, if the preconditions mentioned above are present.

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# Ancient hatreds

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## Mechanisms:

- ▶ Extreme hostility has a popular mass support. The probability of conflict increases with the ethnic group's **relative demographic size**.
  - ▶ The ethnic group glorifies its **history** through a one sided interpretation of its own victories and blames losses on traitors or weak leaders. Nourishing calls for revenge contributed to creating organizational structures and culture of violence.
  - ▶ **Elites uses ethnic appeals**, promoting fear and mass hostility and mobilization for conflict.
  - ▶ A **security dilemma** arises, in which the hostile ax by the leadership on one side leads to the radicalization of the leadership on the other.
-

# Ancient hatreds

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- ▶ Ethnic symbolism – combines ancient hatreds, manipulative elites and rivalry.
  - ▶ Without perceived conflicts of interest, people have no reason to mobilize.
  - ▶ Without emotional commitment based on hostile feelings, they lack sufficient impetus to do so.
  - ▶ Without leadership, they typically lack the organization to act.
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# Ethnic Security Dilemma

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- Security dilemmas as result of ‘fear-producing environments’:
    - i. government breakdown;
    - ii. geographical isolation or vulnerability of a minority within a larger group;
    - iii. shifts in political power balance between groups;
    - iv. changes in access to or control over economic resources;
    - v. forced or voluntary demobilisation of partisan armies;
    - vi. changes in external patronage or balance of power between rival patrons.
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# Ethnic Security Dilemma (2)

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- Increased security of one group seen as coming at expense of insecurity of another; incentive for group to use force pre-emptively.
- How elites and masses **respond** to the ethnic security dilemma determines the outcome.
- Physical security, political security, economic and social security, cultural security, and environmental security.
- For leaders to mobilise followers to violence there must be 'credible evidence' of other groups' hostile intentions.

(Wolff (2006, chpt. 3), gives an overview of the ethnic security dilemma; Barry Posen (1993) was the first to introduce this. See Lake and Rothchild (1996) for wider strategic dilemmas argument.)

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## ▶ **State institutions**

- ▶ The Lijphart-Horowitz debate
  - ▶ Lijphart: Majoritarian 'winner-take-all' institutions lead to ethnic conflict
  - ▶ Horowitz: Lijphartian power sharing institutions 'reify' and harden ethnic cleavages, leading to more conflict
  - ▶ Note: Przeworski's argument about the fundamental un-democratic nature of power sharing
  - ▶ **Relative deprivation** (Gurr)
  - ▶ 'Why Men Rebel'
  - ▶ Frustrations relating to relative deprivation generate conflict
  - ▶ Relative deprivation: a discrepancy between 'the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled' and the 'goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them'.
  - ▶ This is the most developed theoretical framework
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# Opportunity theory

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- ▶ Opposing framework: **Opportunity theory** ('ethnic-grievance skepticism')
- ▶ Tilly (and Skocpol): Grievances are ubiquitous : what is needed is a minimum level of resources and organization
- ▶ Ethnic (and other) antagonisms are endemic, opportunities for conflict are not
- ▶ Ethnic grievances not important
- ▶ Focus on economic opportunities for conflict (e.g Collier and Hoeer 2004) or feasibility (e.g Fearon and Laitin 2003)



# The Economic Debate: Greed vs. Grievance

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- Recent body of work developed argument about ethnic and other civil conflicts being the result of economic 'greed'.
  - Largely developed by economists working for bodies like the World Bank.
  - Most well known are Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998 and 2000), arguing that ethnic conflict happens if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to its costs and that contemporary civil wars are largely motivated by economic greed rather than by political grievances.
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# Three „waves“ of research

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## 1. The skeptics:

- ▶ Seminal studies (on armed conflict) are Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003)
- ▶ Country-level studies, looking at civil conflict
- ▶ Using Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) as a measure of country-level ethnic heterogeneity
- ▶ General finding: Ethnic heterogeneity does not increase risk of civil war.

## 2. The horizontal-inequality wave:

- ▶ Ostby (2008), and Cederman and colleagues
- ▶ Finds that substantive inequalities (political and economic) between groups lead to more conflict
- ▶ Most research here is at the group level, using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset.

## 3. Micro-research

- ▶ For example the contributions of Lyall
  - ▶ Less interested in whether ethnic grievances matter, and more in how they matter
-

A prominent representative of grievance-skepticism": Professor Paul Collier

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# New York Times coverage of Fearon and Laitin


The New York Times Magazine

WORLD U.S. N.Y./REGION BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SCIENCE HEALTH SPORTS OPINION ARTS STYLE TRAVEL JOBS REAL ESTATE AUTOS

SOME INVESTMENTS ARE MORE STUNNING THAN OTHERS. transform your HOME. MARVIN Built around you.

IDEA LAB

## What Really Causes Civil War?



Sierra Leone, 2003. Patrolling the border with Liberia, trying to ward off rebel attacks.  
By GARY J. BASS  
Published: August 13, 2006

The commonplace assumption that a more homogeneous society is a more peaceful society certainly sounds reasonable. Surely monoethnic Japan should have an easier time maintaining domestic order than Indonesia; or Slovenia than Macedonia. After all, in a country with numerous ethnic or religious groups, politicians are easily tempted to organize factions along group lines — which can lead to rising tensions and even civil war or the collapse of the state. In 1938, Benito Mussolini warned, “If Czechoslovakia finds herself today in what might be called a ‘delicate situation,’ it is because she was not just Czechoslovakia, but Czech-Germano-Polono-Magyar-Rutheno-Rumano-Slovakia.”

Today, as Iraq spirals toward outright warfare between Sunnis and Shiites, it risks joining a lengthening list of countries that have seemingly inevitably been ripped apart by bitter sectarian hatreds: Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan and not least Lebanon, which experienced civil wars in 1860 and 1958 and from 1975 to 1990 and may face yet another one.

But what if this whole premise is wrong? Odd as it may seem, there is a growing body of work that suggests that multiethnic countries are actually no more prone to civil war than other countries. In a sweeping 2003 study, the Stanford civil war experts James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin came to a startling finding: “it appears not to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity — or indeed any particular cultural demography — by itself makes a country more prone to civil war.”

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
Love? These couples lust for laughs

- Andrew Garfield and Emma Stone return in “Spider-Man 2”
- Where the password is deco

MAY HOLIDAY SALE 8 WEEKS FREE ON A DIGITAL SUBSCRIPTION. International New York Times SALE ENDS MAY 5TH. ACE NOW

# Empirical research: The horizontal inequality wave

- ▶ The horizontal inequality wave
- ▶ Argues against looking at ELF at the country-level
- ▶ Not enough to count number of ethnic groups!
- ▶ We should look at substantive (economic and political) inequalities between groups
- ▶ Note: two crucial recent papers:
  - ▶ Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010: 'Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?'
  - ▶ Cederman, Weidmann, Gleditsch 2011: 'Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison'



# Empirical research: The horizontal inequality wave

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- ▶ Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel?
  - ▶ Core question: Does political exclusion/inclusion increase the risk of ethnic conflict
  - ▶ Introduces the EPR (Ethnic Power Relations dataset)
  - ▶ Codes all 'politically relevant' ethnic groups in the world, 1946-2005.
  - ▶ Rely on theories of relative deprivation
  - ▶ The 'polity model':
    - ▶ A government versus several contenders
    - ▶ Excluded versus included groups
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# Empirical research: Why do Ethnic groups Rebel?

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


FIGURE 1

THE POLITY MODEL WITH INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED ETHNIC GROUPS

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# Why do ethnic groups rebel

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- ▶ Independent variables:
    - ▶ Political exclusion (not being included in government, or regional autonomy)
    - ▶ Political 'downgrading'
  - ▶ Dependent variable:
    - ▶ Ethnic Armed Conflict onset: UCDP internal conflicts, where challenger 'pursued ethnonationalist aim'
-

# Why do ethnic group rebel

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- ▶ Cederman and colleagues show that politically excluded groups are more prone to conflict
  - ▶ And that groups who lose power are also more likely to rebel
  - ▶ Discussion:
    - ▶ The 'politically relevant ethnic group' criterion
    - ▶ The dependent 'ethnic conflict' variable
    - ▶ Coding 'power status'
    - ▶ The endogeneity of inclusion/exclusion (this is affected by noconflict-potential!)
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# Why do ethnic group rebel

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- ▶ Core question: Does economic inequality between groups lead to conflict?
- ▶ They look at horizontal inequality (overlapping cleavages in Rokkan's terminology)
- ▶ Test a 'grievance' argument: Relative inequality between groups lead to conflict

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- ▶ Cederman and colleagues find that groups that are poorer or richer than country average are more prone to rebel
  - ▶ Discussion:
  - ▶ This shows strong support for 'grievance explanations'
  - ▶ Potential measurement problems?
  - ▶ Causal mechanisms
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# Summary: Where are we now?

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- ▶ Summary: What do we know about ethnic cleavages and conflict?
  - ▶ Ethnic heterogeneity might not matter much in itself
  - ▶ Ethnic cleavages matter in combination with horizontal inequalities
  - ▶ Groups that are somehow aggrieved are more likely to rebel
  - ▶ This supports the „grievance explanation" for conflict
  - ▶ Denny and Walter present arguments for why cleavages that are ethnic are so potent
  - ▶ The emerging micro-literature can tell us more about mechanisms
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# What next?

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- ▶ We know more about correlations, less about causality
  - ▶ Huge endogeneity problems, almost never dealt with
  - ▶ Ethnic groups are treated as 'black boxes'
  - ▶ Ethnicity treated as 'static'
  - ▶ More work needed to establish mechanisms
  - ▶ We know little about what drives horizontal inequality
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# Challenges in conflict research

- It is critically significant to think about the **dialog between the conceptual and operational level** of our analysis.
- The problem remains **how to assess the causal impact of one factor in relation to others**. One of the possible ways for establishing the relation between operationalization and measurement lies in the case-oriented view.
- The challenge for further research is to explore not only the combination of issues at stake in armed conflict, but also the correlation and causal relationships among these aspects.

# Conflict research

- Study of each conflict requires the research of:
- 1. Background of the conflict (history of mutual relations),
- 2. Type of actors,
- 3. Character and nature of involved parties,
- 4. Reasons of conflict and
- 5. Context (the role of external actor).



# Useful Sources in Conflict Research

## **News databases**

- ❑ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ([www.monitor.bbc.co.uk](http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk))
- ❑ Factiva ([www.factiva.com](http://www.factiva.com))
- ❑ Open Source Center ([www.opensource.gov](http://www.opensource.gov))
- ❑ Keesing's Record of World Event ([www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com))
- ❑ LexisNexis ([academic.lexisnexis.com](http://academic.lexisnexis.com))

## **Reports issues by specialized NGOs and IGOs**

- ❑ Global Witness ([www.globalwitness.org](http://www.globalwitness.org))
- ❑ Human Rights Watch ([www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org))
- ❑ International Crisis Group ([www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org))
- ❑ Integrated Regional Information Network ([www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org))
- ❑

# Useful Sources in Conflict Research

## **Surveys**

- Afrobarometer ([www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org))
- Households in Conflict Network – HiCV ([www.hinc.org](http://www.hinc.org))
- World Values Survey ([www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org))

## **General country information**

- World Development Indicators ([data.worldbank.org](http://data.worldbank.org))
- UN Data ([data.un.org](http://data.un.org))
- The Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg University ([www.qog.pol.gu.se](http://www.qog.pol.gu.se))
- Gapminder ([www.gapminder.org](http://www.gapminder.org))

## **Conflict data programs**

- Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland ([www.cidcm.umd.edu](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu))
- Correlated of War ([www.correlatesofwar.org](http://www.correlatesofwar.org))
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program ([www.ucdp.uu.se](http://www.ucdp.uu.se))

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