Georgian conflicts II:
Conflict over South Ossetia
IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Frozen Conflicts in the Caucasus
Mgr. Zinaida Bechná, Ph.D.
27. 10. 2021
South Ossetia
• The South Ossetia smallest of the four
Eurasian de facto states.
• According to the 1989 census:
100,000 out of 160,000 Ossetians lived
not in Georgia’s South Ossetia
Autonomous Region, but in other parts
of Georgia.
In South Ossetia: 65,000 – 66.2%
Ossetians
Georgian: 29 000 – 29%.
Language: Indo-European group and is
distinctly related to Iranian (Farsi) but
uses the Cyrillic alphabet with Ossetian
modifications.
Religious: Ossetians and Georgians
basically share orthodox Christianity.
South Ossetia
• Tskhinvali region
• “Georgian enclave” of the Greater
Liakhvi gorge - villages populated
by ethnic Georgians were razed to
the ground by irregular militias
• The contemporary de facto state
of South Ossetia – product of a
frozen conflict or a fresh warfare?
• De facto states “informational
black holes”.
South Ossetia
• “South Ossetia” – Bolshevik’s invention
from 19th
century – referring to an area
that was the heartland of eastern Georgia
for centuries.
• The tumultuous period 1918-1920.
• April 1920 a revolt by Bolshevik-led
Ossetians: Georgian forces retaliated by
destroying 40 Ossetian villages, 5 000
victims and 20,000 – 35, 000 Ossetian
residents were forces to flee.
• April 1922 creation of SOAO.
• Ossetians – little evidence of hostility
toward ethnic rivals.
• Ossetians hostility in 1980s was
primarily a reaction against the
chauvinistic tendencies of Georgian
nationalism.
Timeline events 1918-1922
South Ossetia
• Georgian nationalism - radical, rejectionist and romantic.
• South Ossetia were seen as “ungrateful guests” on historic
Georgian soil.
• Janurary 1989 Ademon Nykhas Popular Shrine - the South
Ossetian Popular Front – Alan Chochiev.
• In the spring of 1989, the leader of Ademon Nykhas, Alan
Chochiev, published an open letter, declaring his groups
support for the Abkhazian campaign against the opening of a
Georgian branch of Tbilisi university in Sukhumi, Abkhazia.
• Ademon Nykhas – secession from Georgia and dominance
over local Goergians.
• - while Georgian nationalists – abolish South Ossetia‘s name
and autonomy.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• First clashes between Ossetians and Georgians in South Ossetia 26
May 1991, the anniversary of the declaration of Georgian
independence in 1918 clashes between irregular groups of Georgians
(encouraged by Zviad Gamsakhurdia), leading a protest caravan of
Georgian nationalists against SOAO.
• - at first it seemed an isolated incident.
• - however, in July, during the clashes over Abkhazia State
University:
-rumors that Ossetians were aiding the Abkhaz in Sukhumi,
- rumors, that armed Georgians were headed for South Ossetia.
Nationalist discourse about ancient ethnogenesis and territorial
ownership – rationalization of criminal activities, unleashing fear on
the both sides.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• South Ossetias Communist Party leader Anatolii
Chekhoev – denounces the demands of Ademon
Nykhas for union with North Ossetia.
• Ossetian militia groups : citizens killed, properties
looted, destruction and plunder of private
properties.
• Georgian press denounced the rumors about plans
for ethnic conflict.
• Ilia Chavchavadze Society issued appeals for
nonviolence and “the fraternal brotherhood of
nations.”
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In August 1989, the Supreme Council of Georgia put
forward a State program on the Georgian
Language.
• This program involved not only increased use of the
Georgian language, but also, for example, a
Georgian language test for entry into higher
education, programs for the promotion of Georgian
history, the institutionalisation of previously
unofficial Georgian national holidays, creation of
republican military units comprising only
Georgians, and the resettlement of Georgians in
areas dominated by minorities.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In September 1989, Ademon Nykhas - protesting
that the Georgian language programme was
antidemocratic and discriminatory – since
Ossetians lacked working language of Georgian.
• Georgian language street signs in South Ossetia
were defaced
• Slogans for Ossetian unification became
increasingly common.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In November – a petition was sent to the
Georgian Supreme Soviet demanding the status
of autonomous republic for South Ossetia.
• Georgian response: remove South Ossetian party
chief Chekhoev from office.
• Two days later, Georgian claim of the right of
veto USSR laws and of the right to secede – both
considered threatening by Ossetians.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• In August 1990 Georgian Supreme Soviet passed an
election law for the elections scheduled for October 28.
- Provision barring the participation of the Abkhazian
Popular Front Aidgylara and the South Ossetian
movement Ademon Nykhas.
- 4% minimum needed for representation in parliament.
- Gamsakhurdia’s victory
- Tengiz Sigua – premier
- Tengiz Kitovani – commander of the Georgian National
Guard.
Mobilization in South Ossetia
• The next month, National Congress – extremist
opposition – backed by Mkhedrioni led by Jaba
Ioseliani – a warlord, ex-convict- against the
new government.
• The trio of Sigua, Kitovani, and Ioseliani –
decisive importance in Gamsakhurdia’s and
Georgia’s future.
Armed conflict in South Ossetia
• On 20 September 1990, the South Ossetian
Autonomous Oblast declared independence as the
“South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic.”
• In response to this and as a manifestation of their
independence from Tbilisi, the South Ossetians held
elections to their parliament in December 9, 1990.
According to Ossetian sources, 72% of the population of
the republic took part in the election, which exceeds the
percentage of the Ossetian population.
• The Georgian response: within days the Georgian
Supreme Council cancelled the results of the election and
voted to abolish the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast
as a separate administrative unit within the Republic of
Georgia.
Armed conflict in South Ossetia
• December 11, South Ossetian legislature voted to
subordinate the region directly to Moscow –
independent of Georgia.
• December 12, Georgia imposed a state of
emergency on Tshkinvali.
The Spiral of Conflict: The Process of Escalation to War
• South Ossetia adopted a declaration on the “sovereignty of South Ossetia” on
September 20, 1990, which emphasized the right of self-determination of the
Ossetian people. The demands of South Ossetians at this stage included the follow
aspects:
• 1. Convert the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into the South Ossetian Soviet
Democratic Republic;
• 2. Ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to absorb South Ossetia in the Soviet
Union as an independent entity of the federation;
• 3. Request that the republics of the USSR sign a treaty of friendship, cooperation,
and mutual assistance with South Ossetia
The Spiral of Conflict: The Process of Escalation to War
• Adamia’s Merav Kostava Society and the Gamsakhurdia “Society of the White
George” – mobilized early February 1991 – total blockage of Tskhinvali.
• - blew up the a cliff block the road to North Ossetia and sniped at construction
crews, while blockading all other roads and cutting off all electricity and most
natural gas supplies to the city.
The Spiral of Conflict: The Process of Escalation to War
• “They (Ossetians) have no
right to a state here in Georgia.
The are national minority.
Their homeland is North
Ossetia ... Here they are
newcomers.”
• Gamsakhurdia claims to
abolish Ossetian autonomy.
Political Development in Georgia:
Struggle for Independence
• Gamsakhurdia’s rule embodied a
paradox typical of many young and
immature democracies: it had a strong
popular mandate but was very soon
denounced as authoritarian.
• Negative spiral of ethnic polarization ,
violence and displacement.
• Adding to the difficulties in achieving political
pluralism was the problem of ethnic pluralism.
• The Georgian national liberation movement
lacked a clear idea about how to deal with
the issues of the autonomies.
• Radicalism and aversion to compromise were
as widespread among the Abkhaz and Ossetian
nationalists as among their Georgian
counterparts.
Civil war in Georgia
Civil war in Georgia
Leaders of paramilitary groupings
South Ossetia war
• 1,000 people died in SOAO, 3
• 3, 500 wounded
• 100,000 ethnic Ossetians fled from South Ossetia and
Georgia proper, mainly into North Ossetia.
• 23,000 Georgian fled from SO
• 117 out of 365 villages burnt and destroyed
• The flow of refugees into North Ossetia aggravated
the tense ethnic situation and played a significant role
in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.
South Ossetia
• On 24 June 1992, in the Russian city of Sochi, Russian and
Georgian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze
signed ceasefire agreement.
• The Sochi Agreement also set up the Joint Control
Commission (JCC), a Joint peacekeeping Forces Group
(JPKF) quadrilateral body with Georgian, Russian, North and
South Ossetian representatives, plus participation from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
• Also Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE)
• In 1996 the parties signed a Memorandum to Enhance
Security and Confidence Building Measures and agreed to
step-by-step demilitarization of the zone of conflict and
reduction of the number of JPKF frontier posts and guards.
Timeline events 1989-1992
The Layout of the Ergneti Market in
South Ossetia
Smuglling in South Ossetia
The second phase of escalation
• Saakashvili´s major goals were to accomplish a process of transformation of
Georgian state, struggle against corruption and poverty in the country,
achieving NATO membership and territorial integrity.
• Georgia verbally emphasized its desire for a peaceful settlement of the
conflicts. The new Georgian government emphasized the need to deal with
the issue of territorial control to build a strong state.
• The first success on this way was achieved in Achara by overthrowing Aslan
Abashidze´s regime in 2004. This event meant double victory for Georgian
government:
• 1. the victory over autocratic ruler in the name of democracy
• 2. a victory in the state building process.
• After Adjara had become a part of Georgia without major international
complications or an outbreak of violence, the Georgian government started to
deal with the issue of South Ossetia.
Thes second phase of escalation
• Before 2004 there was no major deterioration of situation on the conflict
zone with South Ossetia.
• Georgians and South Ossetians were engaged in active trading across the
zone.
• Georgian government believed that the problem was only the corrupt clan
of Eduard Kokoiti ruling in South Ossetia and South Ossetians would be
willing to struggle against him.
• In 2004, Georgia launched a campaign against smuggling in South
Ossetia. Unlike expected outcome, Ossetians consolidated behind the defacto
government. That led to a crisis culminating in August 2004, when
an outbreak of armed conflicts between Georgian and Ossetian soldiers
erupted. Unlike the triumph in Achara this development indicated overall
setback and worsening relationship in the conflict zone.
South Ossetia
• Since the development in 2004,
Saakshvili´s strategy was to achieve
success through internationalization
of Georgian conflicts, NATO
membership and gaining support
of from the West.
• In July 2005, President Saakashvili
announced a new peace plan for
South Ossetia that offered substantial
autonomy and a three-stage settlement,
consisting of demilitarization,
economic rehabilitation, and a
political settlement.
• South Ossetian “president” Eduard
Kokoiti rejected the plan.
South Ossetia
• In March 2007, President Saakashvili proposed another
peace plan for South Ossetia that involved creating
“transitional” administrative districts throughout the
region.
• In July 2007, President Saakashvili decreed the
establishment of a commission to work out South
Ossetia’s “status” as a part of Georgia.
• The JCC finally held a meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia, in
October 2007, but the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed
that the Georgian emissaries made unacceptable
demands in order to deliberately sabotage the results of
the meeting. No further meetings were held.
Background information
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/cis_europe_pol_2003.jpg
Population
• 4,4 mil.
Population
•142 mil.
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/09/16/world/16georgia_600.jpg
Roki Tunnel – Only road passage from Russia to South Ossetia
Convoy of Russian soldiers by the Caucasus mountains
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Russian forces in Goergia
Conflict Analysis: Interests
Stakeholder Interests
Georgia • Return breakaway regions
• Display that territorial integrity is under threat
• Promote NATO membership
•Demonstrate Russia’s aggressiveness
South Ossetia • Demonstrate violation of human rights
• Show that Georgia is aggressive state
•Get international recognition of their plight
• Desire for independence or incorporation into Russian Federation
Russia •Undermine Georgia’s territorial integrity
•Prevent Georgia from joining NATO
• Send strong message to Ukraine
• Protect its sphere of influence
•Control of the Caucasus and its energy resources
•Promote “regime change” in Georgia? West’s recognition of
Kosovo? U.S. Missile Defense Shield?
Conflict Analysis: Interests
EU • Human rights protection
• Observance of international law
• Access to energy resources
NATO/US • Security and stability in the region
• Observance of international law
• Energy security
• Commitment to idea of democracy
•NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
Stakeholder Interests
Conflict Analysis: Actions
Stakeholder Actions
Georgia • Accusing Russia of supporting separatist movements
• Military attack on Tskhinvali, capital of South Ossetia
• Accusation of violation of human rights and ethnic cleansing
• Attack South Ossetian-populated villages in S.O.
South Ossetia • Encouraged support from Russia
• Militias attack and loot Georgian-populated villages in S.O.
Russia • Disproportionate counter-offensive attack
• Invasion of Georgian cities and ports
• Accusation of violation of human rights and ethnic cleansing
• Recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent
states
EU • Shuttle diplomacy between Russia and Georgia
• Signing ceasefire agreement, ambiguity
• Accusing Russia of disproportionate response
• Appeal of use of diplomatic means to resolve conflict
• Suspension of EU-Russia Partnership talks
NATO/US • Accusing Russia of disproportionate response
• Suspension of NATO-Russia Council
Georgian soldiers in Gori
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Tskhinvali: the Aftermath
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Timeline events 2008
The logic of armed conflicts in the
South Caucasus
• The armed conflicts in the phase of initiation
(a) – the emotional process associated with
ethnic mobilization on one hand and the
nature of incompatible goals (political) – the
escalation of the conflict (b) was ethno-
political.
• “frozen” stage (c) - manifold and involve
political, economic, territorial aspects and
unsuccessful peace building efforts.
The logic of armed conflicts in the
South Caucasus
• Re-escalation phase (d), I draw a distinction with the previous escalation phase (b).
• state is not endangered by popular movement, rather the state itself is the actor.
• The conflict in the 90s - how to define political arrangements in Georgian state; it
was more about the clashes between national projects and their legitimacy. The
conflict in 2008 was more about state borders and territorial integrity.
• radical nationalism of 80s and 90s has changed to a form of state patriotism
The logic of armed conflicts in the
South Caucasus
• The recognition of de-facto independence of
South Ossetia by Russia (e) - Georgia has
become a country without definite borders of
its own territory.
• This will lead to escalation of the conflict in
the future.
Differences between 2 escalation
phases
• The conflict in the 90s was about how to define political arrangements in
Georgian state; it was more about the clashes between national projects
and their legitimacy.
• The conflict which took place in 2008 was more about state borders and
territorial integrity. Furthermore, unlike the situation in 90s, Georgian
states demonstrated its ability to resist and survive military defeat: the
political regime maintained in power even after the conflict and continue
to function; even the armed forces reformed their ranks, without
undergoing disintegration or collapse.
• Most importantly, the Russian-Georgian armed conflict demonstrated
that the radical nationalism of 80s and 90s has changed to a form of
state patriotism, when armed confrontation is organized by states and
the clashes between regular armies.
Differences between 2 escalation
phases
• Mass mobilization which was a key factor in the first escalation phase disappeared
as a factor in the second escalation phase. Mobilization of masses, which led to the
Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, was a struggle against electoral frauds,
corrupted elites and state weakness. In the latter one, the state is not endangered by
popular movement, rather the state itself is the actor, initiating change through its
military might rather than through nationalistic appeals of political leaders
manipulating with the aspect of ethnicity.
• The conflict which erupted in 1980s was sparked by the fear from assimilation
and fear to lose cultural heritage of minor groups. This time the conflict did not
touch the hearts of Georgian and the issue of their self-identification. It was more
about defending Georgian territory and state’s borders. The issue in stake in 2008
was the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and Russia´s interests to undermine
the penetration of other powers in the South Caucasus region. In this way, we can
argue, that territorial issues, that played a primary role in the second escalation
phase were correlated with ideological aspects.
Inside South Ossetia: survey
Inside South Ossetia: survey
Inside South Ossetia: survey
Inside South Ossetia: survey
Inside South Ossetia: survey
Inside South Ossetia: survey