No peace no war: the Western
role in the Caucasian conflicts
Mgr. Zinaida Bechna, Ph.D.
IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Frozen Conflicts in the Caucasus
8.12.2021
The South Caucasus
• The South Caucasus forms the hub of an evolving geostrategic and geoeconomic
system that stretches from NATO Europe to Central Asia and
Afghanistan. It provides unique transit corridors for Caspian energy
supplies and Central Asian commodities to the Euro-Atlantic community,
as well as direct access for allied forces to bases and operational theaters
in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia.
• Projecting Western power and values along with security into Central Asia
and the Greater Middle East.
• Security assistance,state-consolidation efforts, and promotion of energy
projects.
• New-type security threats associated with international terrorism, massdestruction-weapons
proliferation, arms and drugs trafficking.
The South Caucasus
• Mikhail Gorbatchev, acting as Secretary-general of the USSR, in a
speech at the Assembly of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, on
July 1989, articulated the idea of a common European home.
• This integration process has been ongoing since 1991, first in the
OSCE, then in the CoE and for the Baltic States in the EU and NATO.
• Overall, the four institutions have sponsored a common
understanding of security, rooted in the shared values and principles
of democracy, human rights and rule of law, in the principles of
comprehen- sive and indivisible security, as well as on conflict
prevention and diplomacy, which are cornerstones of the security
community enjoyed in this geographical area.
1. OSCE
• The OSCE was formally created in 1994: the Budapest Summit - international organisation ofregional scope,
from ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’.
• Dialogueand cooperation in the post-Cold War context, especially within the so-called third basket (human
dimension), dealing with democracy and human rights that has become more visible.
• Since 1991: establishment of field offices in the three South Caucasusstates.
• In Georgia, the OSCE has played a particularlyimportant role: the deployment of a Mission, mandatedto
conduct negations, maintaincontacts, support the ceasefire and assist in the development of a politicalbase
for lasting peace in the conflict of South Ossetia.
• The mission was an important international presencein Georgia, aimed at balancingthe predominance of
Russia in the peacekeepingformats negotiated with the United Nationsin the 1990s (in the case of
Abkhazia,the CIS peacekeeping mission was also accompanied by a UN Observer Mission in Georgia,
UNOMIG).
• In 2008 Russia boycotted the renovation of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, which closed on 31 December
2008, severely limiting the internationalpresence around Georgia’s conflicts.
• The OSCE office in Baku was closed in 2014.
• OSCE provides an important layer of legitimacy and full and equal participationof the South Caucasus states
in a forum along with their European, Russian and North American partners.
2. Council of Europe
• Georgia became a member in 1999. As then Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania symbolically
stated in his address to the Parliamentary Assembly, ‘I am Georgian and therefore I am
European.’
• Membership is seen as a necessary first step towards EU accession, and for the countries
in the Caucasus was also a confirmation of the recognition by other European nations of
their European identity.
• Armenia and Azerbaijan were the last members to join in 2003.
• The European Commission for Democracy through Law : transformations in the political
systems, technical advice and information before preparing reports and strategic
documents. The CoE also provides the EU with the standards and benchmarks against
which progress is monitored and conditionality is set.
• Clear positive synergies between the EU and the CoE, as the ENP allows for the
articulation of their approaches to reforms in the South Caucasus.
• The Parliamentary Assembly (PACE): election observation and it is often used by its
member states as a site for denunciation of large human rights violations.
3. NATO and the South Caucasus
• For the South Caucasus countries, NATO membership is a divisive issue among
them and within their societies. All cooperate with NATO under the Partnership
for Peace (PfP), since the early 1990s.
• While Georgia's main foreign policy goal is to become a member state of NATO,
Armenia and Azerbaijan has a pragmatic approach, focusing on increased
cooperation, technical assistance, and exchange of experiences, access to new
knowledge.
• NATO’s regional presence has become much more contentious over the course
time. As Russia came to react more negatively to NATO regional presence in the
South Caucasus, local elites became more cautious in their cooperation with the
Alliance. Moreover, the hesitations of Western leaders in materialising the EuroAtlantic
community’s commitment to the region were visible in the refusal to
give Georgia a membership perspective to NATO and the ENP’s lack of
commitmentto membership into the EU.
3. NATO and Georgia
• For Georgia: sense of security vis a vis Russian military aggression
and occupation. Georgians believe that it also encreases chances for
conflict resolution, strengthening countries defense resilience,
including its capacity to fight cyber-attacks, terrorism, espionage and
so on.
• NATO as a way of return to Europe, deepening security and defense
sector reforms.
• For NATO: ensuring peace and stability and build resilience
against the Russian influence which promotes instability, governance
failure and violent conflicts.
3. NATO and the South Caucasus: History of
Mutual relations
• "Open Door" policy vs. "Russianfactor"
• NATO’s approach towards Georgia since the 2008 Russia-Georgia War has been following two key
principles: deepening relations with Georgia, while preventing it from joining the Alliance so as to
not provoke Russia.
• Since 2004, Georgia has actively participated in NATO-led operations and is among its top troop
contributors, regularly receiving praise for troop interoperability and combat readiness.
• In 2015, NATO and Georgia signed the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), which initiated
comprehensive assistance programs in 13 areas of defense and security-related sectors (including
the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center-JTEC).
• In 2016, Georgia also received recognition as a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner country,
providing, “all of the privileges that alliance members receive except for the collective security
umbrella”.
• Finally, NATO members also started to supply Georgia with defensive weapons and technologies
– an issue which was politically taboo for some period after the 2008 war with Russia.
Major problems between NATO and Georgia
• Georgian territorian disputes and Russia's geopolitical posture.
• The territorial conflicts are the powerful tool for Kremlin.
• "As Georgia is not a member of any security organization and its
NATO prospects remain uncertain, Moscow has attempted to lure
Georgia back into its orbit by hinting at some face-saving solutions
which could be implemented regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia
under the auspices of the Moscow-promoted Eurasian Union"
(Kakachia 2013).
• Georgia also needs a political compass or road map from its Western
partners on how to move forward with strategic patience, and
without damaging its Euro-Atlantic identity.
4. EU's role in the South Caucasus
• In 90, the South Caucasus was a “distant neighbour for the EU.
• Mutual cooperation at this time was based on regional funding programs within the
Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), the EU Food
Security Program and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), as well as Transport Corridor
Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
(INOGATE). Despite all of these programs, EU considers the South Caucasus the “region
of the frozen conflicts.”
• 2003 – year when EU thinking towards the region began to change:
• - appointment of Special Representative to the region
• - inception of the Wider Europe Initiative
• - prospect and process of EU enlargement towards the Central and Eastern Europe.
• EU – more powerful security actor – direct role in the regional conflict.
EU's role in the South Caucasus
• EU – “silent disciplining” power
• To provide security – employing the
“stabilization/cooperation/partnership” formula.
• EU-as-a-framework – export models of governance, law and policies
to its periphery
or
• EU-as-an-actor – exert its influence through negotiation and creating
incentives for the peaceful resolutions of conflict.
EU's role in the South Caucasus
• 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the former Soviet Union.
• EU’s policy – aid and assistance for post-war reconstruction (aid for
physical survival of the population, humanitarian and food aid – 84% of
total grants in 1996).
• 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement – technical areas of
cooperation, funded through TACIS national projects and TRACECA and
INOGATE.
• TACIS – transition towards a market economy and the building of
democratic institutions.
EU's role in the South Caucasus
• 2004/2007enlargements – domino-effect on EU policies towards the South Caucasus.
• By 2003 – civilian and military crisis management operations – Rapid Reaction Force, Civilian and
Military Headline Goals 2008 and 2010.
• South Caucasus – test-case where the EU could prove its credentials in civilian and military crisis
management.
• Long-term stability projection through intensified financial assistance and the European
NeighbourhoodPolicy (Action Place), the Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership (March
2009).
• The ENP, BSS and EaP:
• More enhanced relationship and contribute to the transformation to EU models of governance.
• Platforms of bilateral dialogue between the conflict parties and the south region.
4. The EU's role in the South Caucasus
• The first Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit in Prague on 7 May 2009
• leaders from the EU Member States, EU institutions and Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to
launch this new framework of reinforced bilateral and multilateral
cooperation.
• deepening of political and economic relations,
• more energy security,
• increased mobility and
• pro-democratic and market oriented reforms in partner countries.
The Eastern partnership
• The Eastern Partnership was proposed bythe European Commissionin December 2008.
• - Association Agreements (for those partners that havemade sufficient progress towards democracy, the rule of law, respect for
human rights and principles ofmarket economy, sustainable development and good governance);
• - better economic integration with the EU (with the objectiveof establishingdeep and comprehensiveFree Trade Areas),as well
as free trade amongthe partners themselves,with a longer term goal to develop a NeighbourhoodEconomicCommunity;
• - increased mobility through visa facilitation and readmission agreements (with gradual steps towards full visa liberalisation)
• - strengthened energy security cooperation,includingthrough support to investment in infrastructure, better regulation,energy
efficiency and more efficient early warningsystems to prevent disruptionofsupply;
• - improved administrative capacity of partner countries through jointlydecided ComprehensiveInstitution-BuildingProgrammes,
financed by the EU;
• - specific programmes addressing economic and social development in the partner countries,aimed at reducingdisparities of
wealth between regions which can undermine stability; - additionalfinancial support of€ 350 million for the period till 2013, plus
the redeployment of€250 million bringingthe total forthe implementation ofthe policyto €600 million.
EU's role in the South Caucasu
• After 2008: EU established a monitoring mission to Georgia and launched
an international fact-finding mission to investigate the origins and the
course of the conflict.
• After the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, EU acquired a role of a security
actor by enhancing the Russian-Georgian six point peace agreement,
supporting territorial integrity of Georgia and established the European
Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), which remains the only international
mission in Georgia.
• The EU is also engaged in the “Geneva discussions.”
• Together with UN and OSCE, the EU is also hosting the peace talks
between Russia and Georgia in Geneva.
EU and Armenia
• The main foregn policy goal of Armenia: complementarity.
• Three main premises:
• 1. reciprocity of interest with the external actors,
• 2. the indivisibility of the national interests,
• 3. non-forceful choise between partners.
• It is not a policy of balance: Armenia can pursue closer relations with
one or other actors as long as its national interests are fulfilled.
• A strategic U-turn towards the EU in 2013 over AA.
4. EU and Armenia
• Moving from assistance provider and humanitarian actor to a political one in the South Caucasus
has been a long process for the EU. Whereas EU assistance is far from negligible and carried
important political weight in a country largely dependent on external revenues it failed to
translate into political leverage over the Armenian government.
• On the one hand, the assistance carried limited conditionality, due to the reduced perspectives
for integration. This led to a focus on socio- economic recovery, grounded on the respect for
democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights, and aimed at establishing a business
climate conducive to increased investments.
• However, the scope of political reforms achieved with the PCA implementation was insufficient
to create and strengthen formal institutions in Armenia, as opposed to lingering informal ones,
surviving from the pre- vious regime.
• The outcome has been an ‘imitation of democracy’, aimed at maintaining external assistance,
crucial for the survival of the regime (and, to a certain extent, of the state), but unable to assure
more freedoms and equity within society. This has affected both Armenia’s ability to strengthen
its sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis its regional context, but also the image of the EU as a
close ally in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the region.
4. EU and Armenia
• the EU has also remained rather absent from the main hard security challenges
of the region: the armed conflicts. In Armenia the EU has been perceived as
favouring a pragmatic, interest-based approach to the region, focused on energy
and transport routes.
• Armenia has focused on the development of regional cooperation as a central
goal of the ENP. Both from a pragmatic point of view and an identity one, officials
in Yerevan hoped the EU’s insistence on promoting regional cooperation among
the three South Caucasus states would improve Armenia’s situation.
• European integration has been the only common inter- est among the three
South Caucasus states and this could prove an important tool in creating a new
regional identity, closely linked to the European values-systém. However, this is a
long-term pro- cess, which accounts poorly for regional dynamics and
competition as well as for short-term calculations, such as the ones developing
between the EU and Russia.
?
• What will happen to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, since they are
totally dependent on Russia for their political, military, and economic
survival?
• How can Tbilisi overcome the disadvantage of being a small country
with a small military with 20 percent of its de jure territory garrisoned
by its giant neighbor to the north, Russia?
Between Geopolitics and Transformation
• Today the EaP faces a double challenge:
• 1) The transformation it was meant to bring about has largely failed to materialize,
whereas a conflict with Russia for which it was not designed has come to the fore. As a
consequence, the EaP region has become more instead of less divided.
• 2) The EU’s agenda has been increasingly overshadowed and contradicted by a largely
geopolitical concern: competition with Russia.
• It did not contain instruments for supporting its partners against Russian reprisals.
• The EU’s strength tends to lie more in its transformational powers than in a capacity to
act strategically.
• the EU usually has difficulties setting and following coherent objectives, to say nothing of
responding flexibly to the interactive nature of strategy.
• In times of crisis, this condemns the EU to a reactive rather than pro-active role.
Between Geopolitics and Transformation
• Russia, following a “realist” understanding of international relations, views the conflict
as a zero-sum game for power and influence and expects its interests to be respected.
• For the EU, the EaP is more about promoting development than about geopolitical
interests. Consequently, the EU rejected the EaP as a reason for conflict. Russia, for its
part, likely misread EU communication on the EaP as assurances that EU interference in
the post-Soviet neighborhood would be limited.
• On a fundamental level, the EU’s strategic culture is built on rejecting the hierarchical
relationships of traditional power politics and spheres of influence. Instead, it aims for
cooperation that seeks common gains in terms of liberal values. This culture is what led
EU politicians to deny the legitimacy of Russian interference or even its objections to the
EaP.
• A major weakness of the EaP is thus that it was ill-equipped from the start for what
turned out to be unavoidable competition and eventual conflict with its largest neighbor
to the east.
Between Geopolitics and Transformation
• Russia, however, can provide not only considerable short-term benefits – such as
reduced energy prices and loans – to those same countries but also short-term
disincentives. These include imposing trade sanctions, limiting access to migrant
workers, negative propaganda by influential Russian media, sponsoring domestic
opposition, and, not least, raising tensions in separatist regions, supporting
armed insurgents, and sponsoring outside intervention.
• Russia dismisses EU values as a mere pretext for advancing geopolitical
ambitions, while the EU dismisses Russia’s objections as illegitimate.
• The form of the current conflict, like its causes, has been asymmetrical.
Exploiting EU weaknesses, Russia responded to EU soft power with instruments
of hard power. At the same time it developed and employed its own soft power
in the form of effective propaganda while the EU was distracted by crises over
the euro, refugees, and, finally, the Brexit referendum.
• Overall, Russia’s policies look more reactive than strategic.
Between Geopolitics and Transformation
• Russia, moreover, has been no more successful than the EU in
achieving its objectives. Only in the case of Armenia did it manage to
turn the country away from European integration and toward
Eurasian integration.
• The most important impact of Russia’s opposition to the EaP is less
direct: that the “Russian factor” has strengthened the leverage of
vested interests within EaP countries, helping these deadlock the
reform process, particularly in Ukraine and Moldova.
• Geopolitical competition with Russia has pushed the EU into
supporting pro-EU governments regardless of their real reform
records.
IOs in the South Caucasus
• Potential of IOs:
• Now war: not allowing the conflicts to re-escalate;
• Democratization: transformation of political regimes to become more democratic than they are;
• Increase chances for their economic development;
• Emphases on soft security measures: the role of civil society.
• The EU must go beyond merely supporting reforms in the EaP and effectively take
coresponsibility for them. This involves upgrading the principle of conditionality and getting
involved more directly in implementation. By stressing the importance of human resources in
state institutions and proposes concrete measures for appointing and retaining qualified
personnel and, particularly, independent leaders for key law enforcement and regulatory bodies.
Conclusion
• The security deficit and fragile peace arraignment in the South Caucasusunderlines the need for
internationalizationof conflict resolution efforts.
• The interactionbetween the EU-led security community, the regional powers in its Eastern neighbourhood,
the USA, and the pan-Europeaninstitutionsis a complex affair. There are clear dynamics reinforcing the
spread of the Europeansecurity community, namely through the promotion of a common understanding of
peace and stability,rooted in liberaldemocratic norms, human rights, and the rule of law, and on the
centrality of cooperative security, diplomacy,predictabilityandmutual responsiveness.
• The OSCE has become a site of con- testation and for exerting unilateralpower, either through the vetoing
of the organisation’swork or through its gradual marginalisation.
• NATO expansion has failed to deliver on its role as the main security provider.
• EU member states, the lack of clarity as to the nature of its engagement with the region. The EU will need
to provide clear answers to these anxieties, whereas the countries in the South Caucasusacknowledge the
EU’s approachas systemic shift in their approaches to peace and security.
• The EU has a new momentum and can contribute to revival of multilateralsecurity enggements in this
region: creation of multidimensional andcoherent approach may keep the conflicts from escalating
to “hot” wars.