Realism
T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
• Introduction: the timeless wisdom of realism
• One realism, or many?
• The essential realism
• Conclusion: realism and the globalization of world politics
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Reader's Guide
Realism is the dominant theory of international
relations. Why? Because it provides the most powerful
explanation for the state of war that is the
regular condition of life in the international system.
This is the bold claim made by realists in defence of
their tradition, a claim that will be critically examined
in this chapter. After introducing the theory of
realism, the second section will ask whether there is
one realism or a variety of realisms. The argument
presented below is that despite important differences,
particularly between classical and structural
realism, it is possible to identify a shared set of core
assumptions and ideas. The third section outlines
these common elements, which we identify as selfhelp,
statism, and survival. I n the final section, we
return to the question of how far realism is relevant
for explaining or understanding the globalization of
world politics.
T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
According to the conventional wisdom, realism
emerged victorious over idealism in the field's first
Great Debate. Writing in the aftermath of the First
World War, the 'idealists' (a term that realist writers
have retrospectively imposed on the inter-war scholars)
focused much of their attention on understanding the
cause ofwar so as to find a remedy for its existence. Yet
the realists argued that the inter-war scholars' approach
was flawed in a number of respects. For example, they
ignored the role of power, overestimated the degree to
which nation-states shared a set of common interests,
and were overly optimistic that humankind could overcome
the scourge of war. The outbreak of the Second
World War in 1939 confirmed, for the realists at least,
the inadequacies of the idealists' approach to studying
international politics.
A new approach, one based on the timeless insights
of realism, replaced the discredited idealist approach.
Histories of the. academic field of International
Relations describe a Great Debate that took place in the
late 1930s and early 1940s between the inter-war idealists
and a new generation of realist writers who all
emphasized the ubiquity ofpower and the competitive
nature of politics among nations (Schmidt 2012). The
standard account ofthe Great Debate is that the realists
emerged victorious, and from 1939 to the present many
theorists and policy-makers have continued to view the
world through realist lenses. Realism taught foreign
policy officials to focus on interests rather than on ideology,
to seek peace through strength, and to recognize
that great powers can coexist even if they have antithetical
values and beliefs. The fact that realism offers
something of a 'manual' for maximizing the interests
of the state in a hostile environment explains in part
why it remains the dominant tradition in the study
of world politics. The theory of realism that prevailed
after the Second World War is often claimed to rest on
an older, classical tradition of thought. Indeed, many
contemporary realist writers often claim to be part of
an ancient tradition ofthought that includes such illustrious
figures as Thucydides (c. 460-406 BC), Niccolo
Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78).
The insights that these political theorists offered
into the way in which state leaders should conduct
themselves in the realm of international politics are
often grouped under the doctrine of raison d'etat, or
reason of state. According to the historian Friedrich
Meinecke, raison d'etat is the fundamental principle of
international conduct, the state's First Law of Motion.
'It tells the statesman what he must do to preserve the
health and strength of the State' (1957: 1). Most importantly,
the state, which is identified as the key actor
in international politics, must pursue power, and it is
the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the
most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to
perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening
environment. The survival of the state can never
be guaranteed, because the use of force culminating in
war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. As we shall
see, the assumption that the state is the principal actor,
coupled with the view that the environment that states
inhabit is a perilous place, helps to define the essential
core of realism. There is, however, one issue in particular
that theorists associated with raison d'etat, and classical
realism more generally, were concerned with: the
role, if any, that morals and ethics occupy in international
politics.
Realists are sceptical of the idea that universal
moral principles exist, and therefore warn state leaders
against sacrificing their own self-interests in order to
adhere to some indeterminate notion of 'ethical' conduct.
Moreover, realists argue that the need for survival
requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional
notions of morality. Machiavelli argued that
these principles were positively harmful if adhered to
by state leaders. It was imperative that state leaders
learned a different kind of morality, which accorded
not with traditional Christian virtues but with political
necessity and prudence. Proponents of raison d'etat
often speak of a dual moral standard: one moral standard
for individual citizens living inside the state and a
different standard for the state in its external relations
with other states. But before we reach the conclusion
that realism is completely immoral, it is important to
add that proponents ofraison d'etat argue that the state
itself represents a moral force, for it is the existence of
the state that creates the possibility for an ethical political
community to exist domestically.
Although the advanced student might be able to
detect some subtle differences, it is fair to say that there
is a significant degree of continuity between classical
realism and modern variants. Indeed, the three core
elements that we identify with realism-statism, survival,
and self-help-are present in the work of a classical
realist such as Thucydides and structural realists
such as Kenneth Waltz.
Realism identifies the group as the fundamental
unit of political analysis. When Thucydides and
Machiavelli were writing, the basic unit was the polis or
city-state, but since the Peace ofWestphalia (1648) realists
consider the sovereign state as the principal actor
in international politics. This is often referred to as the
state-centric assumption of realism. Statism is the term
given to the idea of the state as the legitimate representative
of the collective will of the people. The legitimacy
ofthe state is what enables it to exercise authority
within its domestic borders. Yet outside the boundaries
of the state realists argue that a condition of anarchy
exists. By anarchy, what is most often meant is that
international politics takes place in an arena that has
no overarching central authority above the individual
collection of sovereign states. Thus, rather than necessarily
denoting chaos and lawlessness, the concept of
anarchy is used by realists to emphasize the point that
the international realm is distinguished by the lack ofa
central authority.
Following from this, realists draw a sharp distinction
between domestic and international politics.
Thus, while Hans J. Morgenthau argues that 'international
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power',
he goes to great lengths to illustrate the qualitatively
different result this struggle has on international politics
as compared to domestic politics ([1948] 1955:
25). A prominent explanation that realists provide
for this difference in behaviour relates to the different
organizational structure of domestic and international
politics. Realists argue that the basic structure
of international politics is one of anarchy, in that each
of the independent sovereign states considers itself to
be its own highest authority and does not recognize
a higher power. Conversely, domestic politics is often
described as a hierarchical structure in which different
political actors stand in various relations of super- and
subordination.
It is largely on the basis of how realists depict the
international environment that they conclude that the
first priority for state leaders is to ensure the survival
of their state. Under anarchy, the survival of the state
cannot be guaranteed. Realists correctly assume that
all states wish to perpetuate their existence. Looking
Chapter 6 Realism
back at history, however, realists note that the actions
of some states have resulted in other states losing their
existence. This is partly explained in light of the power
differentials of states. Intuitively, states with more
power stand a better chance of surviving than states
with less power. Power is crucial to the realist lexicon
and has traditionally been defined narrowly in military
strategic terms. Yet, irrespective of how much power a
state may possess, the core national interest of all states
must be survival. Like the pursuit ofpower, the promotion
of the national interest is, according to realists, an
iron law of necessity.
Self-help is the principle of action in an anarchical
system. According to realism, each state actor is
responsible for ensuring its own well-being and survival.
Realists do not believe it is prudent for a state to
entrust its safety and survival to another actor or international
institution, such as the United Nations. Unlike
in domestic politics, there is no emergency number that
states can dial when they are in mortal danger.
What options do states have to ensure their own
security? Consistent with the principle of self-help, if
a state feels threatened it should seek to augment its
own power by increasing its military capabilities. Yet
this may prove to be insufficient for a number ofsmaller
states who feel threatened by a much larger state. This
brings us to one of the crucial mechanisms that realists
throughout the ages have considered essential to
preserving the liberty of states-the balance of power.
Although various meanings have been attributed to the
concept of the balance of power, the most common definition
holds that if the survival of a state is threatened
by a hegemonic state or coalition ofstronger states, they
should join forces, establish a formal alliance, and seek
to preserve their own independence by checking the
power of the opposing side. The mechanism of the balance
of power seeks to ensure an equilibrium of power
so that no one state or coalition of states is in a position
to dominate all the others. The cold war competition
between the East and West, as institutionalized
through the formal alliance system ofthe Warsaw Pact
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
provides a prominent example of the balance of power
mechanism in action (see Ch. 4).
The peaceful conclusion of the cold war caught
many realists off guard. The inability to foresee the
dynamics that led to the end of the bipolar cold war
system sparked the publication of several powerful
critiques of realist theory. Critics also maintained that
T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
Since the end of the cold war, intra-state war (internal conflicts
in one state) has become more prevalent than inter-state war.
Since realists generally focus on the latter type of conflict, critics
contend that realism is irrelevant to the predicament of the
global South, which has been wracked by nationalist and ethnic
wars. But this is not the case, and realists have turned their attention
to analysing the causes of intra-state war and recommending
solutions.
Structural realists maintain that when the sovereign authority
of the state collapses, such as in Somalia and Haiti, internal
wars happen for many of the same reasons that wars between
states happen. In a fundamental sense, the dichotomy between
domestic order and international disorder breaks down when
the state loses the legitimate authority to rule. The resulting anarchy
inside the state is analogous to the anarchy among states. I n
such a situation, realist theory contends that the different groups
inside the state will vie for power in an attempt to gain a sense of
security. Barry Posen (1 993) has applied the key realist concept of
the security dilemma to explain the political dynamics that result
when different ethnic, religious, and cultural groups suddenly
realism was unable to provide a persuasive account
of new developments such as regional integration,
humanitarian intervention, the emergence of a security
community in Western Europe, and the growing
importance of non-state actors (see Chs 7, 23, and 26).
In addition, proponents of globalization argued that
realism's privileged actor, the state, was in decline relative
to non-state actors such as transnational corporations
and powerful regional institutions (see Ch. 21).
Critics also contend that realism is unable to explain
the increasing incidence of intra-state wars plaguing
the global South. As Box 6.1 discusses, realists claim
that their theory does indeed explain the incidence of
intra-state conflicts. The cumulative weight of these
criticisms led many to question the analytical adequacy
of realist thought.
By way of a response to the critics, it is worth
reminding them that the death-knell of realism has
been sounded a number of times already, only to see
the resurgence of new forms of realism arise. In this
respect, realism shares with conservatism (its ideological
godfather) the recognition that a theory without
the means to change is without the means of its
own preservation. The question of realism's resilience
touches on one of its central claims, namely that it is
find themselves responsible for their own security. He argues that
it is natural to expect that security will be their first priority and
that they will seek the means to perpetuate their own existence.
Yet,just as for states, one group's attempt to enhance its security
will create uncertainty in the minds of rival groups, which will in
turn seek to augment their own power. Realists argue that this
revolving spiral of distrust and uncertainty leads to intense security
competition and often to military conflict among the various
independent groups who were previously subject to the sovereign
power of the state.
In addition to analysing the cause of intra-state wars, realists
have prescribed solutions. Unlike many liberal solutions to civil
and ethnic wars that rest on power-sharing agreements and the
creation of multi-ethnic states, realists have advocated separation
or partition. For realists, anarchy can be eliminated by creating
a central government. And while the creation of multi-ethnic
states might be a noble endeavour, realists argue that they do not
have avery good success rate. Ethnically homogeneous states are
held by realists to be more stable and less dependent on outside
military occupation.
the embodiment of laws of international politics that
remain true across time (history) and space (geopolitics).
Thus, while political conditions have changed
since the end of the cold war, realists believe that the
world continues to operate according to the logic of
realism. The question of whether realism does embody
'timeless truths' about politics will be returned to in the
conclusion ofthe chapter.
• Realism has been the dominant theory of world politics
since the beginning of academic International Relations.
• Outside the academy, realism has a much longer history in
the work of classical political theorists such as Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.
• The unifying theme around which all realist thinking
converges is that states find themselves in the
shadow of anarchy such that their security cannot be taken
for granted.
• At the start of the new millennium, realism continues to
attract academicians and inform policy-makers, although
in the period since the end of the cold war we have seen
heightened criticism of realist assumptions.
The notion that there is a monolithic theory of realism
is increasingly rejected both by those who are sympathetic
to, and those who are critical of, the realist tradition.
The belief that there is not one realism, but many,
leads logically to a delineation of different types of realism.
The most simple distinction is a form ofperiodization
that differentiates realism into three historical
periods: classical realism (up to the twentieth century),
which is frequently depicted as beginning with
Thucydides' history of Peloponnesian War between
Athens and Sparta, and incorporates the ideas of many
ofthose included in the classic canon ofWestern political
thought; modern realism (1939-79), which typically
takes as its point of departure the First Great Debate
between the scholars of the inter-war period and a new
group of scholars who began to enter the field immediately
before and after the Second World War; and
structural or neo-realism (1979 onwards), which officially
entered the picture following the publication of
Kenneth Waltz's Theory ofInternational Politics (1979).
Table 6.1 Taxonomy of realisms
T)'pe of realism
Classical realism
(Human nature)
Structural realism
(international
Key thinkers
Thucydides
(c. 430-406 BC)
Machiavelli (1 532)
Morgenthau (1 948)
Rousseau (c. 1 750)
Key texts
The Peloponnesian
War
The Prince
Politics among
Nations
The State of War
Chapter 6 Realism
While these different periods suggest a neat historical
sequence, they are problematic in so far as they close
down the important question about divergence within
each historical phase. Rather than opt for the neat but
intellectually unsatisfactory system of historical periodization,
we outline below our own representation of
realisms that makes important connections with existing
categories deployed by other thinkers in the field. A
summary of the varieties of realism outlined below is
contained in Table 6.1.
Classical realism
The classical realist lineage begins with Thucydides'
representation of power politics as a law of human
behaviour. The drive for power and the will to dominate
are held to be fundamental aspects of human
nature. The behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist
is understood to be a reflection of the characteristics
of human beings. It is human nature that explains why
'Big idea'
International politics is driven by an endless struggle for
power, which has its roots in human nature. Justice, law,
and society have either no place or are circumscribed.
Political realism recognizes that principles are
subordinated to policies; the ultimate skill of the state
leader is to accept, and adapt to, the changing power
political configurations in world politics.
Politics is governed by laws that are created by human
nature. The mechanism we use to understand
international politics is the concept of interests, defined
in terms of power.
It is not human nature but the anarchical system that
fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity.
system) Waltz (1 979) Theory of International Anarchy leads to a logic of self-help in which states
seek to maximize their security. The most stable
distribution of power in the system is bipolarity.
Mearsheimer (2001 )
Neoclassical Zakaria (1 998)
realism
Politics
Tragedy of Great
Power Politics
From Wealth to Power
The anarchical, self-help system compels states to
maximize their relative power positions.
The systemic account of world politics provided by
structural realism is incomplete. It needs to be
supplemented with better accounts of unit-level
variables such as how power is perceived, and how
leadership is exercised.
T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
international politics is necessarily power politics. This
reduction of realism to a condition of human nature
is one that frequently reappears in the leading works
of the realist canon, particularly in the work of Hans
J. Morgenthau. Classical realists argue that it is from
the nature of man that the essential features of international
politics, such as competition, fear, and war, can
be explained. For both Thucydides and Morgenthau, the
essential continuity of the power-seeking behaviour of
states is rooted in the biological drives ofhuman beings.
Another distinguishing characteristic of classical
realism is its adherents' beliefin the primordial character
ofpower and ethics. Classical realism is fundamentally
about the struggle for belonging, a struggle that
is often violent. Patriotic virtue is required in order for
communities to survive in this historic battle between
good and evil. Two classical realists who wrestled with
the degree to which state leaders could be guided by ethical
considerations were Thucydides and Machiavelli.
Thucydides was the historian of the Peloponnesian
War, a conflict between two great powers in the ancient
Greek world, Athens and Sparta. Thucydides' work has
been admired by subsequent generations of realists
for the insights he raised about many of the perennial
issues of international politics. Thucydides' explanation
ofthe underlying cause ofthe war was 'the growth
of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in
Sparta' (1.23). This is considered to be a classic example
of the impact that the distribution of power has on the
behaviour of state actors. On this reading, Thucydides
makes it clear that Sparta's national interest, like that
of all states, was survival, and the changing distribution
of power represented a direct threat to its existence.
Sparta was, therefore, compelled by necessity
to go to war in order to forestall being vanquished by
Athens. Thucydides also makes it clear that Athens
felt equally compelled to pursue power in order to preserve
the empire it had acquired. The famous Athenian
leader, Pericles, claimed to be acting on the basis of the
most fundamental of human motivations: ambition,
fear, and self-interest (see Case Study 1).
Classical realists concur with Thucydides' view
that the logic of power politics has universal applicability.
Instead of Athens and Melos, we could just
as easily substitute the vulnerability of Machiavelli's
beloved Florence to the expansionist policies of external
great powers. In Morgenthau's era, there were many
examples where the innate drive for more power and
territory seemed to confirm the realist iron law. The
seemingly endless cycle of war and conflict confirmed
in the minds of twentieth-century classical realists the
essentially aggressive impulses in human nature. How
is a leader supposed to act in a world animated by such
dark forces? The answer given by Machiavelli is that
all obligations and treaties with other states must be
disregarded if the security of the community is under
threat. Moreover, imperial expansion is legitimate as it
is a means of gaining greater security. Other classical
realists, however, advocate a more temperate understanding
of moral conduct. Taking their lead from
Thucydides, they recognize that acting purely on the
basis of power and. self-interest without any consideration
of moral and ethical principles frequently results
in self-defeating policies. After all, as Thucydides
showed, Athens suffered an epic defeat while following
its self-interest (see Case Study 1).
Structural realism
Structural realists concur that international politics is
essentially a struggle for power, but they do not attribute
this to human nature. Instead, structural realists ascribe
security competition and inter-state conflict to the lack
of an overarching authority above states. Waltz defined
the structure of the international system in terms of
three elements-organizing principle, differentiation
of units, and distribution of capabilities. Waltz identifies
two different organizing principles: anarchy, which
corresponds to the decentralized realm of international
politics; and hierarchy, which is the basis of domestic
order. He argues that the units of the international
system are functionally similar sovereign states; hence
unit-level variation is inconsequential. It is the third
element, the distribution of capabilities across units,
that is, according to Waltz, of fundamental importance
to understanding crucial international outcomes.
According to structural realists, the relative distribution
ofpower in the international system is the key independent
variable in understanding important international
outcomes such as war and peace, alliance politics, and
the balance of power. Structural realists are interested
in providing a rank-ordering of states so that they can
discern the number of great powers that exist at any
particular point in time. The number of great powers,
in turn, determines the overall structure ofthe international
system. For example, during the cold war from
1945 to 1989 there were two great powers-the USA and
the Soviet Union-that constituted the bipolar international
system, and since the end of the cold war the
international system has been unipolar.
Chapter 6 Realism
Case Study 1 The Melian dialogue-realism and the preparation for war
© Oxford University Press
One of the significant episodes of the war between Athens and
Sparta is known as the 'Melian dialogue', and represents a fascinating
illustration of a number of key realist principles. This
case study reconstructs the dialogue between the Athenian leaders
who arrived on the island of Melos to assert their right of
conquest over the islanders, and the response this provoked. In
short, what the Athenians are asserting over the Melians is the
logic of power politics. Because of their vastly superior military
force, they are able to present a fait accompli to the Melians:
either submit peacefully or be exterminated. The Melians, for
their part, try to buck the logic of power politics, appealing in
turn with arguments grounded in justice, God, and their allies the
Spartans. As the dialogue makes clear, the Melians were forced
to submit to the realist iron law that power politics prevails in
human affairs.
A short excerpt from the dialogue appears below (Thucydides
[1 954] 1 972: 401 -7}. Note that the symbol [. . .] indicates where
words have been omitted from the original text.
ATHENIANS: The.n we on our side will use no fine phrases saying,
for example, that we have a right to our empire because
we defeated the Persians [. . .] you know as well as we do that,
when these matters are discussed by practical people, the
How does the international distribution of power
impact the behaviour of states? In the most general
sense, Waltz argues that states, especially the great
powers, have to be sensitive to the capabilities of other
states. The possibility that any state may use force to
advance its interests results in all states being worried
about their survival. According to Waltz, power is a
means to the end of security. In a significant passage,
Waltz writes: 'because power is a possibly useful means,
sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount
of it'. He adds, 'in crucial situations, however, the ultimate
concern of states is not for power but for security'
standard ofjustice depends on the equality of power to compel
and that in fact the strong do what they have the powerto
do and the weak accept what they have to accept.
MELIANS: [. . .] you should not destroy a principle that is to the
general good of all men-namely, that in the case of all who
fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and
just dealing [. . .]
ATHENIANS: This is no fair fight, with honour on one side and
shame on the other. It is rather a question of saving your lives
and not resisting those who are far too strong for you.
MELIANS: It is difficult [. . .] for us to oppose your power and
fortune [. . .] Nevertheless we trust that the gods will give us
fortune as good as yours [. . .]
ATHENIANS: Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge
of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary
law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that
we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when
it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall
leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We
are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you
or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting
in precisely the same way [. . .] You seem to forget that if one
follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the
path of justice and honour involves one in danger [. . .] This
is the safe rule-to stand up to one's equals, to behave with
deference to one's superiors, and to treat one's inferiors with
moderation.
MELIANS: Our decision, Athenians, is just the same as it was
at first. We are not prepared to give up in a short moment the
liberty which our city has enjoyed from its foundation for 700
years.
ATHENIANS: [. . .] you seem to us [. . .] to see uncertainties as
realities, simply because you would like them to be so.
Theory applied
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(Waltz 1989: 40). In other words, rather than being
power maximizers, according to Waltz, states are security
maximizers. Waltz argues that power maximization
often proves to be sub-optimal because it triggers a
counter-balancing coalition of states.
A different account of the power dynamics that
operate in the anarchic system is provided by John
Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, which is
another variant of structural realism. While sharing
many of the basic assumptions of Waltz's structural
realist theory (which is frequently termed defensive
realism), Mearsheimer differs from Waltz when
T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
it comes to describing the behaviour of states. Most
fundamentally, 'offensive realism parts company with
defensive realism over the question ofhow much power
states want' (Mearsheimer 2001: 21). According to
Mearsheimer, the structure of the international system
compels states to maximize their relative power
position. Under anarchy, he agrees that self-help is the
basic principle of action, yet Mearsheimer argues that
states can never be certain about the intentions ofother
states. Consequently, he concludes that all states are
continuously searching for opportunities to gain power
at the expense of other states. Indeed, the ideal position,
although one that Mearsheimer argues is virtually
impossible to achieve, is to be the global hegemon ofthe
international system. Yet because global hegemony is
impossible, he concludes that the world is condemned
to perpetual great power competition.
Contemporary realist challenges to
structural realism
While structural realists attribute state behaviour
to the anarchical international system, some contemporary
realists are sceptical of the notion that
the distribution of power can sufficiently explain the
behaviour of states. Since the end of the cold war a
group of scholars have attempted to move beyond the
parsimonious assumptions of structural realism and
incorporated a number of additional factors, located
at the individual and domestic levels, into their explanation
ofinternational politics. While the relative distribution
of power is recognized to be an important
influence on the behaviour of states, so are factors
such as the perceptions of state leaders, state-society
relationships, and state identity. In attempting to
build a bridge between structural and unit-level factors
(which many classical realists emphasized), this
group of scholars has been characterized by Gideon
Rose (1998) as 'neoclassical realists'. According to
Stephen Walt, the causal logic of neoclassical realism
'places domestic politics as an intervening variable
between the distribution of power and foreign policy
behavior' (Walt 2002: 211).
One important intervening variable is leaders
themselves, namely how they perceive the distribution
of power. There is no single objective account of the
distribution ofpower; rather, what matters is how state
leaders derive an understanding of the distribution of
power. While structural realists assume that all states
have a similar set ofinterests, neoclassical realists such
as Randall Schweller (1996) argue that historically
this is not the case. He argues that, with respect to
Waltz, the assumption that all states have an interest
in security results in realism exhibiting a profoundly
status quo basis. Schweller returns to the writings of
classical realists to remind us of the key distinction
that they made between status quo and revisionist
states. Neoclassical realists would argue that the fact
that Germany was a revisionist state in the 1930s and
a status quo state since the end of the Second World
War is of fundamental importance to understanding
its role in the international system. Not only do states
differ in terms of their interests, but they also differ
in terms of their ability to extract resources from the
societies they rule. Neoclassical realists argue that
states possess different capacities to translate the
various elements of national power into state power.
Thus, contrary to Waltz, all states cannot be treated
as 'like units'.
Given the varieties of realism that exist, it is hardly
surprising that the coherence ofthe realist tradition has
been questioned. The answer to the question of 'coherence'
is, of course, contingent on how strict the criteria
are for judging the continuities that underpin a particular
tradition. It is a mistake to understand traditions
as a single stream of thought, handed down in a neatly
wrapped package from one generation to another.
Instead, it is preferable to think of living traditions
like realism as the embodiment of both continuities
and conflicts. Despite the different strands running
through the tradition, there is a sense in which all realists
have a common set ofpropositions.
• There isalackofconsensusas to whetherwe can
meaningfully speak about realism as a single coherent
theory.
• There are good reasons for delineating different types of
realism.
• Structural realism divides into two camps:those who argue
that states are security maximizers (defensive realism), and
those who argue that states are power maximizers
(offensive realism).
• Neoclassical realists bring individual and unit variation
back intothetheory.
Chapter 6 Realism
�----,,.
The essential realism
The previous paragraphs have argued that realism is
a theoretically broad church, embracing a variety of
authors and texts. Despite the numerous denominations,
we argue that all realists subscribe to the following
'three Ss': statism, survival, and self-help. Each of
these elements is considered in more detail in the next
three subsections.
Statism
For realists, the state is the main actor and sovereignty
is its distinguishing trait. The meaning ofthe sovereign
state is inextricably bound up with the use of force.
Realists concur with Max Weber's famous definition of
the state as 'the monopoly ofthe legitimate use ofphysical
force within a given territory' (M. J. Smith 1986: 23).
Within this territorial space, sovereignty means that
the state has supreme authority to make and enforce
laws. This is the basis ofthe unwritten contract between
individuals and the state. According to Hobbes, for
example, we trade our liberty in return for a guarantee
ofsecurity. Once security has been established, civil
society can begin. But in the absence of security, there
can be no art, no culture, no society. The first move for
the realist, then, is to organize power domestically.
Realist theory operates according to the assumption
that, domestically, the problem of order and security is
largely solved. However, on the 'outside', in the external
relations among independent sovereign states, insecurities,
dangers, and threats to the very existence of the
state loom large. Realists attempt to explain this on the
basis that the very condition for order and securitynamely,
the existence of a sovereign-is missing from
the international realm.
Realists claim that, in anarchy, states compete with
other states for power and security. The nature of the
competition is viewed in zero-sum terms; in other
words, more for one actor means less for another. This
competitive logic ofpowerpolitics makes agreement on
universal principles difficult, apart from the principle
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign
states. But even this principle, designed to facilitate
coexistence, is suspended by realists, who argue
that in practice non-intervention does not apply in relations
between great powers and their 'near abroad'. As
evidenced by the most recent behaviour of the USA in
Afghanistan and Iraq, powerful states are able to overturn
the non-intervention principle on the grounds of
national security and international order.
Given that the first move of the state is to organize
power domestically, and the second is to accumulate
power internationally, it is self-evidently important
to consider in more depth what realists mean by their
ubiquitous fusion ofpolitics with power. It is one thing
to say that international politics is a struggle for power,
but this merely begs the question of what realists mean
by power. Morgenthau offers the following definition
of power: 'man's control over the minds and actions of
other men' ([1948] 1955: 26). There are two important
points that realists make about the elusive concept of
power. First, power is a relational concept: one does not
exercise power in a vacuum, but in relation to another
entity. Second, power is a relative concept: calculations
need to be made not only about one's own power capabilities,
but about the power that other state actors possess.
Yet the task of accurately assessing the power of
other states is infinitely complex, and is often reduced
to counting the number of troops, tanks, aircraft, and
naval ships a country possesses in the belief that this
translates into the abilityto get other actors to do something
they would not otherwise do.
A number of criticisms have been made as to how
realists define and measure power (Schmidt 2005),
many of which are discussed in later chapters. Critics
argue that realism has been purchased at a discount
precisely because its currency, power, has remained
under-theorized and inconsistently used. Simply
asserting that states seek power provides no answer to
crucial questions. Why do states struggle for power?
Surely power is a means to an end rather than an end in
itself? Is there not a difference between the mere possession
of power and the ability to change the behaviour
of others?
Structural realists have attempted to bring more
conceptual clarity to bear on the meaning of power.
Waltz tries to overcome the problem by shifting the
focus from power to capabilities. He suggests that
capabilities can be ranked according to their strength
in the following areas: 'size of population and territory,
resource endowment, economic capability, military
strength, political stability and competence' (1979:
131). The difficulty here is that resource strength does
T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
not always lead to military victory. For example, in the
1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria, the distribution ofresources clearlyfavoured
the Arab coalition and yet the supposedly weaker side
annihilated its enemies' forces and seized their territory.
The definition ofpower as capabilities is even less
successful at explaining how states have used economic
leverage to achieve their goals. A more sophisticated
understanding of power would focus on the ability of
a state to control or influence its environment in situations
that are not necessarily conflictual.
An additional weakness of the realist treatment of
power concerns its exclusive focus on state power. For
realists, states are the only actors that really 'count'.
Transnational corporations, international organizations,
and ideologically driven terrorist networks such as
Al Qaeda do not figure very prominently in the realists'
analysis ofpower. Yet, given the influence that non-state
actors exercise in world politics today, many question the
adequacy ofthe state-centric assumption ofrealism.
Survival
The second principle that unites realists is the assertion
that, in world politics, the pre-eminent goal is survival.
Although there is ambiguity in the works ofthe realists
as to whether the accumulation of power is an end in
itself, one would think that there is no dissenting from
the argument that the ultimate concern of states is
security. Survival is held to be a precondition for attaining
all other goals, whether these involve conquest or
merely independence. Yet, as we mentioned in the previous
section, a recent controversy among structural
realists has arisen over the question of whether states
are, in fact, principally security or power maximizers.
Defensive realists such as Waltz argue that states have
security as their principal interest and therefore seek
only the requisite amount ofpower to ensure their own
survival. According to this view, states are profoundly
defensive actors and will not seek to gain greater
amounts ofpower ifthat means jeopardizing their own
security. Offensive realists such as Mearsheimer argue
that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic
position in the international system. According
to this view, states always desire more power and are
willing, if the opportunity arises, to alter the existing
distribution of power in their favour. In terms of survival,
defensive realists hold that the existence of status
quo powers lessens the competition for power, while
offensive realists argue that the competition is always
keen because revisionist states and aspiring hegemons
are always willing to take risks with the aim ofimproving
their position in the international system.
Niccolo Machiavelli tried to make a 'science' out
of his reflections on the art of survival. His short and
engaging book, The Prince, was written with the explicit
intention of codifying a set of maxims that would
enable leaders to maintain their hold on power. In
important respects, we find two related Machiavellian
themes recurring in the writings of modern realists,
both of which derive from the idea that the realm of
international politics requires different moral and
political rules from those that apply in domestic politics.
The task of protecting the state at all costs (even
if this requires sacrificing one's own citizens), places a
heavy burden on the shoulders of state leaders. In the
words of Henry Kissinger, the academic realist who
became Secretary ofState during the Nixon Presidency,
'a nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility;
it cannot be compromised or put to risk' (1977:
204). Their guide must be an ethic of responsibility: the
careful weighing of consequences; the realization that
individual acts of an immoral kind might have to be
performed for the greater good. By way of an example,
think ofthe ways in which governments frequently suspend
the legal and political rights of 'suspected terrorists'
in view ofthe threat they pose to national security.
Not only does realism provide an alternative moral
code for state leaders, it suggests a wider objection to the
whole enterprise of bringing ethics into international
politics. Starting from the assumption that each state
has its own particular values and beliefs, realists argue
that the state is the supreme good and there can be no
community beyond borders. This moral relativism has
generated a substantial body of criticism, particularly
from liberal theorists who endorse the notion ofuniversal
human rights. For a fuller discussion see Chapter 7.
Self-help
In the international system, there is no higher authority
to counter the use of force. War is always a possibility
because there is nothing that can prevent a state from
using force against another state. Security can therefore
only be realized through self-help. Waltz (1979: 111)
explains that in an anarchic structure, 'self-help is necessarily
the principle ofaction'. States must ultimately rely
on themselves to achieve security. But in the course of
providing for one's own security, the state in question will
automatically be fuelling the insecurity ofother states.
The term given to this spiral of insecurity is the
security dilemma. According to Wheeler and Booth,
security dilemmas exist 'when the military preparations
of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty
in the mind of another as to whether those preparations
are for "defensive" purposes only (to enhance its
security in an uncertain world) or whether they are
for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its
advantage)' (1992: 30). This scenario suggests that one
state's quest for security is often another state's source
ofinsecurity. States find it difficult to trust one another
and are often suspicious of other states' intentions.
Thus the military preparations of one state are likely
to be matched by those of neighbouring states. The
irony is that, at the end of the day, states often feel no
more secure than before they undertook measures to
enhance their own security.
Chapter 6 Realism
In a self-help system, structural realists argue that the
balance ofpower will emerge even in the absence ofa conscious
policy to maintain the balance. Waltz argues that
balances ofpower result irrespective of the intentions of
any particular state. In an anarchic system populated by
states that seek to perpetuate themselves, alliances will
be formed that seek to balance the power against threatening
states. Classical realists, however, are more likely
to emphasize the crucial role that state leaders and diplomats
play in maintaining the balance ofpower. In other
words, the balance of power is not natural or inevitable;
it must be constructed. Case Study2 shows how the USA
sought to maintain a balance of power between Egypt
and Israel-a policy that has been called into question by
the transformation that has been under way since 2010
when mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square brought an
end to President Mubarak's forty-year rule over Egypt.
Case Study 2 Strategic partnerships with 'friendly' dictators
Muhammad Ghafari/CC-BY-SA-2.0
Unflinching American support for Israel has been one of the
most remarkable features of the post-1 945 order. What shaped
this partnership was America's empathy with a people who had
experienced genocide at the hands of the Nazis but who had
gone on to build a democratic society in a region of authoritarian
states. As an aside, influential contemporary realists have
questioned whether the near unconditional support for Israel
has become an impediment to the realization of American economic
and strategic interests in the region (Mearsheimer and
Walt 2007).
What is less well known is the strong support that successive US
governments have given to Egypt, particularly since the IsraeliEgyptian
peace treaty of 1 979. In addition to providing material
rewards for this 'cold peace', successive American administrations
took the view that stability in the Middle East was more likely to
be achieved by propping up a stable Egyptian dictatorship.
The case for building and maintaining close ties with friendly
dictators was made by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, who rose to prominence
as a fierce critic of Presidentjimmy Carter's foreign policy.
She castigated Carter for collaborating in the social revolutions
in Iran and Nicaragua, which had the consequence of replacing
'moderate autocrats' who were friendlytoAmerican interests with
'less friendly autocrats of an extremist persuasion'. Not grasping
this distinction showed 'a lack of realism' and was the main failing
of the Carter administration-according to Kirkpatrick (1 979).
In the case of Egypt, successive American administrations, from
Reagan onwards, have operationalized this distinction between
a 'moderate friendly autocrat' and an unfriendly revolutionary
regime. President Mubarak profited from this policy, as did his
clique of Army generals, party apparatchiks, and military police.
During the post-9/1 1 decade, when the USA was looking for allies
in the global war on terror, the Egyptian leadership showed itself
to be a valuable ally-not least in suppressing alleged jihadist terrorist
groups in that country. Yet, by the time of the Arab Spring,
the Egyptian people had come to despise Washington for colluding
with the hated dictator. This dynamic shows that Kirkpatrick's
distinction between friendly and unfriendly tyrants mightjust be in
the eye ofthe beholder: forthe hundreds ofthousands ofEgyptians
who tookto the streets and marched on Tahrir Square, the Mubarak
erawas anything but friendly. It is too soon to tell whether the realist
argument for aligning American foreign policy with unpopular
dictators across the Middle East will prove costly in the long run as
civil wars and social revolutions sweep away the old regional order.
Theory applied
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T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
Realists and their critics have always debated the stability
of the balance ofpower system. This is especially
the case today, as many argue that the unipolar position
of the USA has made the balance of power inoperative
(Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). It is questionable
whether other countries are willing to balance against
the USA, as structural realism would predict. Whether
it is the contrived balance of the Concert of Europe in
the early nineteenth century or the more fortuitous balance
of the cold war, balances of power are brokeneither
through war or through peaceful change-and
new balances emerge. What the perennial collapsing
of the balance of power demonstrates is that states are
at best able to mitigate the worst consequences of the
security dilemma but are not able to escape it. The reason
for this terminal condition is the absence oftrust in
international relations.
Historically, realists have illustrated the lack oftrust
among states by reference to the parable of the 'stag
hunt'. In Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz revisits
Rousseau's parable:
Assume thatfive men who haveacquired a rudimentary
ability to speak and to understand each other happen to
come together at a time when all of them suffer from
hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth
part of a stag, so they 'agree' to cooperate in a project
to trap one. But also the hunger ofany one of them will
be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within reach,
one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of
satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to
escape. His immediate interest prevails over consideration
for his fellows.
(1 959: 1 67-8)
Waltz argues that the metaphor of the stag hunt provides
a basis for understanding the problem of coordinating
the interests ofthe individualversus the interests
of the common good, and the pay-off between shortterm
interests and long-term interests. In the self-help
system ofinternational politics, the logic ofself-interest
militates against the provision of collective goods, such
as 'security' or 'free trade'. In the case of the latter,
according to the theory of comparative advantage, all
states would be wealthier in a world that allowed free
movement of goods and services across borders. But
individual states, or groups of states like the European
Union, can increase their wealth by pursuing protectionist
policies. Of course the logical outcome is for
the remaining states to become protectionist; international
trade collapses, and a world recession reduces the
wealth of each state. Thus the question is not whether
all will be better off through cooperation, but rather
who is likely to gain more than another. It is because
of this concern with relative gains issues that realists
argue that cooperation is difficult to achieve in a selfhelp
system.
• Statism is a central assumption of realism. This involves
two claims. First, the state is the pre-eminent actor in
world politics. Second, state sovereignty signifies the
existence of an independent political community, one that
has juridical authority over its territory.
• Key criticism: statism is flawed on both empirical
. grounds{challengesto state power from 'above' and
'below') and normative grounds {the inability of sovereign
states to respond tocollective global problems such as
famine, environmental degradation, and human rights
abuses).
• Survival: the primary objective of all states is survival; this is
the supreme national interest to which all political leaders
must adhere.
• Key criticism: are there no limits to what actions a state can
take in the name of necessity?
• Self-help: no other state or institution can be relied on to
guarantee your survival.
• Key criticism: self-help is not an inevitable consequence of
the absence of a world government; it is a logic that states
have selected. Moreover, there are examples where states
have preferred collective security systems, or forms of
regional security communities, in preference to self-help.
•
Conclusion: realism and the globalization of world politics
The chapter began by considering the repeated realist
claim that the pattern of international politicswars
interrupted by periods characterized by the
preparation for future wars-has remained constant
over the preceding twenty-five centuries. Realists have
consistently held that the continuities in international
relations are more important than the changes, but
many find this to be increasingly problematic in the
present age of globalization (see Ch. 1). But the importance
of realism has not been diminished by the
dynamics ofglobalization. It is not clear that economic
interdependence has made war less likely. The state
continues to be the dominant unit in world politics.
And globalization should not be seen as a process that
is disconnected from the distribution of power in the
international system.
Realists do not have to situate their theory of world
politics in opposition to globalization per se; rather,
what they offer is a very different conceptualization of
the process. Given the preponderance ofpower that the
USA holds, it should not be a surprise that it has been
one of the foremost proponents of globalization. The
corevalues ofglobalization-liberalism, capitalism, and
consumerism-are exactly those espoused by the USA.
At a deeper cultural level, realists argue that modernity
is not, as liberals hope, dissolving the boundaries ofdifference
among the peoples of the world. From classical
realists such as Rousseau to structural realists such as
Waltz, protagonists have argued that interdependence
is as likely to breed 'mutual vulnerability' as peace and
prosperity. And while questioning the extent to which
the world has become more interdependent in relative
terms, realists insist that the state is not going to
Questions
Chapter 6 Realism
be eclipsed by global forces operating either below or
above the nation-state. Nationalism, realists have continuously
reminded us, remains a potent force in world
politics.
There are good reasons for thinking that the twentyfirst
century will be a realist century. Despite efforts to
rekindle the idealist flame, Europe continues to be as
divided by different national interests as it is united by
a common good. In the Middle East, the slow and painful
process of regime change is generating significant
instability across the region, as external powers fuel
proxy wars to safeguard their own vital interests. China
continues to emerge as a serious economic and strategic
competitor to the USA: according to the influential
Economist magazine, it will be more economically powerful
than the USA by 2019. At that point, realism leads
us to predict that Western norms of individual rights
and responsibilities will be under threat. Rather than
transforming global politics in its own image, as liberalism
sought to do in the twentieth century, realism has
the intellectual resources to assert itself as a defensive
doctrine which recognizes that international relations
is a realm ofvalue conflicts, and that responsible statecraft
involves careful calibrations of interests. Above
all, realism demands that states' leaders act prudentlya
quality that has been in short supply in the early part
of the twenty-first century.
How does the Melian dialogue represent key concepts such as self-interest, the balance
of power, alliances, capabilities, empires, and justice?
2 Do you think there is one realism, or many?
3 Do you know more about international relations now than an Athenian student did during
the Peloponnesian War?
4 Do realists confuse a description of war and conflict for an explanation of why they
occur?
5 Is realism anything more than the ideology of powerful, satisfied states?
6 How would a realist explain the 9/1 1 wars?
7 Will Western governments and their institutions (such as NATO) have to become more
realist if the ideas associated with Western civilization are to survive in the twenty-first
century?
8 What is at stake in the debate between defensive and offensive realism?
9 Is structural realism sufficient to account for the variation in the behaviour of states?
1 0 Can realism help us to understand the globalization of world politics?
• T I M D U N N E · B R I A N C . S C H M I DT
Further Reading
For a general survey of the realist tradition
Guzzini, S. (1 998), Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy
(London: Routledge). Provides an understanding of the evolution of the realist tradition.
Smith, M. J. (1 986), Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press). An excellent discussion of many of the seminal realist thinkers.
Walt, S. M. (2002), 'The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition', in I. Katznelson and H. V.
Milner (eds), Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton). An
exposition of the realist tradition from one of its leading proponents.
Twentieth-century classical realism
Carr, E. H. (2001 ), The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919- 1 939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations (London: Palgrave). An important critique of liberal idealism.
Morgenthau, H.j. (1 948), Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf). A foundational text for the discipline of international relations.
Structural realism
Keohane, R. (ed.) (1 986), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press). This
collection of essays includes key chapters by Waltz, an interesting defence of realism by
Robert Gilpin, and powerful critiques by Richard Ashley, Robert Cox, and J. G. Ruggie.
Mearsheimer, j. (2001 ), The Tragedy ofGreat Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton). This is
the definitive account of offensive realism.
Waltz, K. (1 979), Theory ofInternational Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley). This is the
exemplar for structural realism.
Neoclassical realism
Rose, G. (1 998), 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', World Politics, 51 :
1 44-72. An important review article that is credited with coining the term 'neoclassical
realism'.
Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. M., and Taliaferro, J. W. (eds) (2009), Neoclassical Realism, the State,
and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A comprehensive survey of
neoclassical realism.
Zakaria, F. (1 998), From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins ofAmerica's World Role
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Puts forth his theory of state-centric realism.
Online Resource Centre
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resources on this chapter topic at www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/baylis6e/