Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global
environmental change
Elinor Ostrom a,b,
*
a
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, United States
b
Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, United States
1. Introduction
Many problems conceptualized as ‘‘global problems’’ are the
cumulative result of actions taken by individuals, families, small
groups, private firms, and local, regional, and national governments.
A pressing global problem faced in the contemporary world
is reducing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by
individuals and organizations around the world that cumulate
to increase the threat of major climate change. Solving this
problem requires collective action. To avert this global threat,
many actors at diverse levels need to make costly decisions to
reduce GHG emissions. Everyone benefits from reduced emissions
even if they do not contribute any effort themselves (Cole, 2008;
Sandler, 2004). As analyzed by distinguished policy analysts,
reducing the threat requires an enforceable global treaty (Carraro,
2003; Nordhaus, 1994; Wiener, 2007).
Major debates exist in the policy literature related to climate
change over key issues that need to be resolved to achieve efficient
and fair mechanisms at a global level. One relates to the
responsibility of developed countries for the current and
immediate future levels of CO2 in the atmosphere (Botsen et al.,
2008; Dellink et al., 2009). This is related to who should bear the
primary burden of paying for solutions and the resistance of
developing countries to participate at the same level as those who
created the threat in the first place (Najam et al., 2003; Posner and
Sunstein, 2008). Other debates relate to whether various ‘‘remedies’’
proposed to reduce carbon sequestration contribute or do not
contribute to helping solve other environmental concerns. One
puzzle is whether deforestation contributes to climate change
primarily through releases of CO2 to the atmosphere or whether
changes in land cover, evapotranspiration, and cloud cover are as
important and must be taken into account when planning
afforestation efforts (Bala et al., 2007).
These are difficult questions. An enforceable agreement among
the major emitters of GHGs will take a long time to develop. Given
the lack of an enforceable international agreement to reduce GHG
emissions, just waiting and doing nothing can defeat the
possibilities of substantial remedy in time to prevent a major
disaster.
In addition to the problem of waiting too long, ‘‘global
solutions’’ negotiated at a global level, if not backed up by a
variety of efforts at national, regional, and local levels, are not
guaranteed to work well. While the level of CO2 and other GHGs in
the atmosphere may be relatively uniformly distributed at a
megascale, the impacts of climate change differentially affect
localities and regions by their geographic location, ecological and
economic conditions, prior preparation for extreme events, and
past investments.
Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 550–557
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 10 May 2010
Received in revised form 8 July 2010
Accepted 9 July 2010
Keywords:
Collective action
Polycentricity
Climate change
Multiple scales
A B S T R A C T
The 20th anniversary issue of Global Environmental Change provides an important opportunity to address
the core questions involved in addressing ‘‘global environmental’’ problems—especially those related to
climate change. Climate change is a global collective-action problem since all of us face the likelihood of
extremely adverse outcomes that could be reduced if many participants take expensive actions.
Conventional collective-action theory predicts that these problems will not be solved unless an external
authority determines appropriate actions to be taken, monitors behavior, and imposes sanctions.
Debating about global efforts to solve climate-change problems, however, has yet not led to an effective
global treaty. Fortunately, many activities can be undertaken by multiple units at diverse scales that
cumulatively make a difference. I argue that instead of focusing only on global efforts (which are indeed a
necessary part of the long-term solution), it is better to encourage polycentric efforts to reduce the risks
associated with the emission of greenhouse gases. Polycentric approaches facilitate achieving benefits at
multiple scales as well as experimentation and learning from experience with diverse policies.
ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
* Correspondence address: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis,
Indiana University, 513 North Park, Bloomington, IN 47408, United States.
Tel.: +1 812 855 0441; fax: +1 812 855 3150.
E-mail address: ostrom@Indiana.edu.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
0959-3780/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.004
Further, while many of the effects of climate change are global,
the causes of climate change are the actions taken by actors at
smaller scales. The familiar slogan ‘‘Think Globally but Act Locally’’
hits right at the dilemma facing all inhabitants of the world. To
solve climate change in the long run, the day-to-day activities of
individuals, families, firms, communities, and governments at
multiple levels must change substantially. Many who need to
change their behavior, however, have not yet accepted their need
to act in a different manner. They are waiting for an agreement at a
global level before taking action. As discussed below, this is slowly
changing, however, as more actors are learning about ways to
reduce their own costs over time while taking actions that reduce
the emission of GHGs.
The conventional theory of collective action predicts, however,
that no one will voluntarily change behavior to reduce energy use
and GHG emissions; an external authority is required to impose
enforceable rules that change the incentives for those involved
(Brennan, 2009). Analysts call for new global-level institutions to
change incentives related to the use of energy and the release of
GHGs (see Miller, 2004; Stavins, 1997). Given the presumption that
collective-action problems that have global effects must primarily
be ‘‘solved’’ by legal actions of a global authority, several questions
need to be addressed as analysts undertake the next round of
research on climate change. They include:
1. Is the conventional theory of collective action the best theory for
analyzing how to reduce the threats of massive climate change,
and, if not, what changes need to be made?
2. Are only global benefits generated from efforts to reduce GHG
emissions, or are further benefits produced at multiple scales?
3. Would a polycentric approach be an improvement to the
analysis of climate policy over exclusive reliance on proposing
global solutions?
4. Are actions already being taken at less than global scale to
reduce GHG emissions and can these cumulate to reduce the
threat of major climate change?
5. When multiple governments and other organizations are
involved in reducing GHG emissions, does that generate major
leakages, inconsistent policies, inadequate certification, gaming
the system, and free riding?
I will address each of these questions in the following sections
of this article.
2. The conventional theory of collective action
The term ‘‘collective action’’ refers to settings where decisions
about costly actions are made independently but outcomes jointly
affect everyone involved. If independent decision makers seek only
short-term material benefits, they do not achieve feasible outcomes
that yield higher returns for all who are involved regardless
of whether they make costly contributions. Participants posited as
maximizing short-term material benefits and making independent
choices are not predicted to achieve this outcome (Lichbach, 1996;
Schelling, 1978; Vatn, 2005). Without externally imposed regulations
at the global scale, the conventional theory predicts that no
one will reduce emissions (Brennan, 2009).
The applicability of the conventional theory is considered to be
so obvious by many scholars that few questions have been raised
regarding whether this is the best theoretical foundation for
making progress toward reducing the threat of climate change (but
see Morgan, 2000; Victor et al., 2005). Two grounds exist, however,
for doubting whether sole reliance on the conventional theory of
collective action is the best scientific strategy. The first is the
weakness of empirical support for the conventional theory of
collective action related to small- to medium-size environmental
social dilemmas. The second is the existence of multiple benefits at
small, medium, and large scales in addition to the reduction of
GHGs at a global level that has been of primary concern in the
academic and policy literature.
2.1. The lack of empirical support for the conventional theory of
collective action
In a recent book, Poteete et al. (2010) review the empirical
support for the theory of collective action related to environmental
problems. They examine the evidence generated by in-depth case
studies, meta-analyses of cases, large-scale comparative field
studies, laboratory experiments, and agent-based models. While
many instances of free riding are observed in the array of empirical
research, a surprisingly large number of small- to medium-scale
groups facing collective-action problems do cooperate (Agrawal,
2002; Baland and Platteau, 2000; Dietz et al., 2003; McKean, 2000;
NRC, 2002; Ostrom et al., 1994; Schlager et al., 1994). Thus, before
analyzing efforts to reduce the threat of massive costs related to
climate change, it is essential to update the theory of collective
action so that future policies are not made on the basis of a theory
that appears to be obvious, but whose predictions regarding
universal non-cooperation are not supported.
2.2. Updating the theory of collective action related to climate change
For future analyses of how individuals relate to natural
resources at multiple scales, an updated theory of collective action
needs to be based on a behavioral theory of human action and a
recognition of the importance of context in affecting levels of trust
and reciprocity of those involved. Further, the application of this
theory to climate change also needs to examine whether smallerscale
externalities exist from the use of energy by individuals and
firms that form a different foundation for future actions.
Since behavior in social dilemmas varies substantially across
individuals as well as across settings, updated theoretical efforts
depend on a behavioral theory of the individual (Camerer, 2003;
Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008) as well as on
structural features of the particular dilemma that affect the
likelihood of voluntary cooperation or relatively high levels of
compliance with official rules. A behavioral theory of the individual
assumes that individuals do not posses perfect information but are
capable of learning as they interact in a particular setting.
Individuals are boundedly rational and do seek benefits for self
but vary in their other-regarding preferences and norms about the
appropriate actions they should take in particular settings (Cox
et al., 2007; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1992; Sen, 1977; Simon,
1955).
The capability of those involved to gain a reputation for being
trustworthy and reciprocate others’ efforts to cooperate with their
own cooperation turns out to be a central characteristic of settings
where moderate to high levels of cooperation are sustained
(Milinski et al., 2002; Poteete et al., 2010; Rothstein, 2005). To
achieve its objectives, any policy that tries to improve levels of
collective action to overcome social dilemmas must enhance the
level of trust by participants that others are complying with the
policies, or many will seek ways of avoiding compliance. The
crucial factor is that a combination of structural features leads
many of those affected to trust one another and to be willing to
take an agreed-upon action that adds to their own short-term costs
because they do see a long-term benefit for themselves and others
and they believe that most others are complying.
The problem of collective action does not disappear once a
policy to deal with an externality is made by a government. Even
government policies need to rely to a great extent on willing
cooperation by citizens. When citizens approve of a government
E. Ostrom / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 550–557 551
policy and think they should comply, and this view is complemented
by a sense that the government policy is effectively and
fairly enforced, the costs of enforcement are much lower than
when citizens want to evade the policy. Trust that government
officials are objective, effective, and fair is more important in
enabling a government policy to work than reliance on force
(Rothstein, 1998, 2005).
3. Are only global benefits generated from reducing GHG
emissions?
GHG emissions are the result of an extraordinarily large number
of actions taken at multiple scales. Decisions within a family as to
what forms of transportation to use, what car to purchase, and
what investments to make regarding power consumption within
their home affect not only the family budget but also the amount of
GHGs released into the atmosphere. Similarly, decisions within
business firms affect their budget as well as emissions.
Communities that have established power networks that
enable households to invest in solar power to be used for
household energy needs and, when not needed, contributed to a
larger power network can reduce local energy costs and GHG
emissions. Investments in better waste disposal facilities also
generate local benefits as well as help decrease global emissions.
Efforts to reduce pollution levels in large metropolitan areas focus
on both total energy use and emissions of particulates and thus
generate benefits at a metropolitan level as well as globally. Given
that many of the actions generating GHG emissions are taken at
multiple scales, activities that are organized at multiple scales
generate benefits to those who act, ranging from households,
farms, and cities at a local scale to regions within a state, states,
regional units that cross state boundaries, and the globe (Kates and
Wilbanks, 2003).
4. A polycentric approach
Over the last half-century, colleagues associated with the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana
University have developed the concept of polycentric systems for
the analysis of collective-action problems involved in the provision
of diverse public goods and services. Given that multiple benefits at
diverse scales are generated from efforts taken to reduce GHG
emissions as discussed above, polycentricity is a useful analytical
approach for understanding and improving efforts to reduce the
threat of climate change.
During the 1950s, massive criticism was leveled at the existing
governance arrangements in metropolitan areas across the United
States and Europe because of the large number of small-, medium-,
and large-scale government units operating in the same metropolitan
area. Many scholars thought that the high number of
governments serving an area was evidence of a chaotic system
(Friesema, 1966; Gulick, 1957). Ostrom et al. (1961) introduced the
concept of polycentricity in their effort to understand whether the
activities of a diverse array of public and private agencies engaged
in providing public services in a metropolitan area were chaotic or
potentially a productive arrangement:
‘‘Polycentric’’ connotes many centers of decision making that
are formally independent of each other.. . . To the extent that
they take each other into account in competitive relationships,
enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or
have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the
various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may
function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable
patterns of interacting behavior. To the extent that this is so,
they may be said to function as a ‘‘system’’. (1961, pp. 831–32)
Studies of water industry performance were carried out in
California during the 1960s (Ostrom, 1962; Weschler, 1968).
Substantial evidence was found that multiple public and private
agencies had searched out productive ways of organizing water
resources at multiple scales and simply the presence of multiple
government units without a clear hierarchy was not chaotic.
Next, we studied the impact of governance arrangements in
multiple cities for policing in a series of case comparisons of police
departments serving similar neighborhoods within a metropolitan
area. We never found a large department policing numerous
neighborhoods that outperformed smaller departments within the
same metropolitan area in regard to direct services to citizens. We
found that while many police departments served the 80
metropolitan areas included in our next study, duplication of
specific services by more than one department to the same set of
citizens rarely occurred (Ostrom et al., 1978). We also found that
the ‘‘most efficient producers supply more output for given inputs
in high multiplicity metropolitan areas than do the efficient
producers in metropolitan areas with fewer producers’’ (Ostrom
and Parks, 1999, p. 287).
Polycentric systems are characterized by multiple governing
authorities at differing scales rather than a monocentric unit (see
Ostrom, 1999). Each unit within a polycentric system exercises
considerable independence to make norms and rules within a
specific domain (such as a family, a firm, a local government, a
network of local governments, a state or province, a region, a
national government, or an international regime). Participants in a
polycentric system have the advantage of using local knowledge
and learning from others who are also engaged in trial-and-error
learning processes. As larger units get involved, problems
associated with non-contributors, local tyrants, and inappropriate
discrimination can be addressed and major investments made in
new scientific information and innovations. No governance system
is perfect, but polycentric systems have considerable advantages
given their mechanisms for mutual monitoring, learning, and
adaptation of better strategies over time.
Polycentric systems tend to enhance innovation, learning,
adaptation, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants,
and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable
outcomes at multiple scales, even though no institutional
arrangement can totally eliminate opportunism with respect to
the provision and production of collective goods (Toonen, 2010).
Enabling citizens to form smaller-scale collective consumption
units encourages face-to-face discussion and the achievement of
common understanding. Creating larger collective consumption
units reduces the strategic behavior of the wealthy trying to escape
into tax havens where they could free ride on the contributions of
others. Further, creating polycentric institutions related to climate
change helps to fulfill the ‘‘matching principal’’ in international law
that problems involving multiple levels (e.g. global, national,
regional, and small scales) should involve contributions at each of
these levels (Adler, 2005).
Some readers will ask, What is the relevance of the polycentric
approach for the analysis of global public goods? The initial
relevance of the polycentric approach is the parallel between the
earlier theoretical presumption that only the largest scale was
relevant for the provision and production of public goods for
metropolitan areas, and the contemporary presumption by
some scholars that only the global scale is relevant for policies
related to global public goods. Extensive empirical research found,
however, that while large-scale units were part of effective
governance of metropolitan areas, small- and medium-scale units
were also necessary components. An important lesson is that
simply recommending a single governance unit to solve global
collective-action problems—because of global impacts—needs to
be seriously rethought.
E. Ostrom / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 550–557552
As discussed above, instead of the benefits derived from
reducing GHGs existing only at the global level, multiple benefits
are created by diverse actions at multiple scales. Potential benefits
are even generated at a household level. Better health is enhanced
by members of a household who bike to work rather than drive.
Family expenditures allocated to heating and electricity may be
reduced when investments have been made in better construction
of a building, reconstruction of existing buildings, installation of
solar panels, and many other investments that families as well as
private firms can make that pay off in the long run. As more
information is provided about these small-scale, but cumulatively
additive, benefits, one can expect further efforts to be undertaken
that cumulatively and significantly reduce GHG emissions.
5. What efforts to reduce GHG emissions are actually being
taken at less than a global scale?
If the polycentric approach is relevant for reducing the threat of
disastrous climate change, it is necessary to ask what efforts to
reduce GHGs are already being made at multiple scales. It is not
possible to do a full inventory in this article of all ongoing projects
across the world at multiple scales. What I can do is focus on some
of the projects that have been organized by local and state
governments in the United States, and discuss some of the
European efforts to reduce emissions substantially.
5.1. Local-level efforts and alliances to reduce local-level externalities
Local-level efforts to reduce GHG emissions involve decisions
regarding buying fuel-efficient cars, using other means of
transport, using solar and wind power facilities, and insulating
buildings within urban areas. ‘‘Buildings use 40% of the primary
energy supplied in the United States, and more than 70% of all
generated electricity, primarily for heating, cooling, and lighting’’
(Gershenfeld et al., 2010, p. 1086). Dietz et al. (2009) have
identified 17 actions that can be taken within a home or a business
facility that can cumulatively have a major impact on carbon
emissions (see also Fuller et al., 2009; Gardner and Stern, 2008;
Laitner et al., 2009; Vandenberg and Steinemann, 2007). Retrofitting
buildings to add insulation, solar photovoltaics, and more
efficient heating systems is an important strategy that can be taken
at a local level and will actually generate a long-term savings to the
family or firm that takes such actions in energy costs as well as
reducing GHG emissions.
Methods for developing reliable city-scale GHG inventories
have been developed and tested (Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010;
Ramaswami et al., 2008). They are being used by many of the large
number of cities across multiple countries that have pledged to
reduce GHG emissions consistent with the Kyoto Protocol. In the
United States alone, the mayors of 1026 cities have now joined the
U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement to
reduce GHG emissions by at least 5% relative to 1990 levels (U.S.
Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement, 2010).
Cities and electric utilities have started to initiate a variety of
‘‘green’’ efforts. Some local utilities in the United States are now
actively finding ways of reducing energy consumption by
developing local monitoring systems that are then reported on
the bills that customers receive (Kaufman, 2009). Using various
forms of competition among households and groups, and feedback
on who is doing the best at reducing energy use, is a strategy for
reducing emissions that is being adopted by college campuses.
Oberlin College, for example, tried out several methods of
motivating dorm residents. In a rigorous evaluation of this effort,
Petersen et al. (2007, p. 16) found that ‘‘the introduction of
feedback, education and incentives resulted in a 32 percent
reduction in electricity use.’’
Mayors of large U.S. cities are also banding together to discuss
actions to reduce carbon emissions that can be taken locally, and if
taken jointly can have a much bigger effect. In October 2005, 18
large cities sent representatives to London to examine actions that
could be taken at a municipal level; to reexamine various urban
policies that could be revised, including their own purchasing
policies; and to discuss ways of encouraging more investment in
climate-friendly technologies in their cities. The mayors viewed
the results of the £8 congestion charge imposed by London on
vehicles that drive within the city’s central zone during business
hours, from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m.1
In October 2008, a merger of this network of large U.S. cities
with the Clinton Climate Initiative was arranged to create the C40
Cities Climate Leadership group, whose members from Africa, Asia,
Europe, Latin America as well as the U.S. have jointly pledged to
reduce emissions in each of their cities to meet or even improve on
Kyoto standards. In addition to the London meeting in 2005, C40
Large Cities Climate Summits have been held in New York City in
2007 and in Seoul in 2009. In June 2010, the Mayor of Berlin hosted
a C40 Workshop on ‘‘Strategies for Highly Efficient Cities.’’ These
meetings enable extensive exchange of information about multiple
policies adopted to reduce emissions. The Clinton Climate
Initiative has also allocated $5 billion to the global Energy
Efficiency Building Retrofit Program, which is generating help to
individual cities as well as technical information available to all
members as well as anyone who searches the Internet.2
Thus,
many city governments and community organizations have
recognized that actions at a local level are a major source of
carbon emissions and that a need exists to tackle these locally.
5.2. State-level projects in the United States
California was one of the first U.S. states to pass major
legislation—the ‘‘Global Warming Solutions Act’’ in 2006. The act
requires drastic reductions from major industries including oil and
gas refineries and utility plants.3
The Colorado legislature passed
State House Bill 08-1350, signed into law in 2008, to enable local
municipalities in Colorado to finance approved building improvements
and property owners to pay off capital investments made to
decrease their use of fossil fuels for heating and electricity through
repayments over 20 years. In July 2007, Florida Governor Charlie
Crist brought together government, business, and scientific leaders
from across the state to discuss what actions could be taken by
Florida to address climate change issues. At the conclusion of the
meeting, several executive orders were signed to set out targets for
reducing GHG emissions and to change the building code to require
increased energy efficiency in new construction.4
Efforts are also being made among some of the eastern U.S.
states to develop carbon markets (Rabe, 2004, 2007). The Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), joined by 10 states in the
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, plans to reduce CO2 emissions from
the power sector by 10% by 2018.5
Furthermore, RGGI is one of the
first cap and trade, market-based efforts in the United States
aimed at reducing GHG emissions by auctioning emission
allowances and investing the proceeds in various forms of clean
1
A Wikipedia article on the ‘‘London congestion charge,’’ an extensive
compilation of information from London’s transportation division and many news
broadcasts and articles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_congestion_charge;
accessed May 4, 2010), reports that between 2003 and 2006, the CO2 level in the city
fell by 20% as a result of reduced traffic levels, better traffic flow, and improved
vehicle technology. The speed of traffic flow and the reliability of bus schedules
have also been improved.
2
http://www.c40cities.org/ (accessed July 5, 2010).
3
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, California Assembly Bill 32.
4
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/climatechange/ (accessed May 4, 2010).
5
http://www.Rggi.org (accessed July 4, 2010).
E. Ostrom / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 550–557 553
energy technologies and the creation of green jobs in each state.
The eighth auction occurred on June 9, 2010. This experiment has
generated substantial information about the efficiency of such
auctioning strategies as well as leading to a reduction of GHGs in
all 10 states.
5.3. European efforts
In Europe, various innovative interventions tend to combine
local, national, and European levels (see Bulkeley and Kern, 2006).
Matrak (2009) provides an excellent overview of the multiplicity of
national, regional, and local actors involved in planning activities
related to reduction of GHG emissions in England. This collaborative
planning provided essential background for the development
of a new polycentric system—the Westmill Co-Op wind farm—
which was successfully established after the involvement of many
local, regional, and national actors in both the private and public
sectors. Matrak’s study provides an excellent example of a
polycentric system that led to enhanced power generation without
contributing further GHGs.
At a regional level, the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS) was developed to reduce the economic costs of
meeting the EU’s Kyoto target of 8% CO2 reduction by 2012. Around
12,000 large industrial plants in the power generation, iron and
steel, glass, brick, and pottery industries in Europe are included,
but not the transport sector. Operators of these facilities receive
emission allowances that are good for a 1-year period. If after
verification an allowance is not fully used by the assigned operator,
the unused portion may be sold to other facilities that have not met
their assigned target.
5.4. Can actions taken by multiple units cumulate to reduce the threat
of climate change?
While the actions to reduce GHG emissions already taken have
not yet generated a major reduction of emissions across the entire
globe, the result of these efforts is slowly cumulating. Furthermore,
most of the units involved are major actors related to GHG emissions
and can be expected to increase their contributions over time. The
performance of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, for example, has
led to substantial reduction of emissions within the EU. The official
data issued by the European Environmental Agency (EEA) in 2006
show that the EU members who had signed the Kyoto Agreement
were able to achieve a 2% cut in CO2 emissions in 2005 compared to
1990 levels. GHG emissions were projected to decline further by
2010 compared with 2004 levels (EEA, 2006, Sections 8 and 9).
In addition to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the RGGI
scheme described earlier, three additional trading schemes have
been established. A further development of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Treaty operates in the United
Kingdom and involves a large number of firms. The World Bank has
also created the Prototype Carbon Fund, which is similar in form to
the CDM and invests in carbon-reducing projects primarily in
developing countries. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)
program has been established for firms to trade credits based
on their own voluntary emission cuts (Victor et al., 2005).
The State of California is not only the twelfth-largest emitter of
GHGs in the world, but it is now one of the leading governments to
adopt policies related to climate change (Engel, 2006). The
California ‘‘Global Warming Solutions Act’’ of 2006 is aiming for
a 25% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 through requiring
drastic reductions from major industries, including oil and gas
refineries and utility plants.6
The California Air Resources Board is
charged with developing a market-based cap and trade program to
implement the policy (Goulder, 2007). This program is essentially a
local version of the CDM advocated in the Kyoto Protocol.
That the mayors of over 1000 U.S. cities have pledged to reduce
GHG emissions by at least 5% relative to 1990 levels, as discussed
above, is also an indication that local efforts are cumulating. It is
not just a few local and regional bodies that are taking aggressive
steps toward a reduction of GHGs. The attention given in the press
to some of the initial steps taken by individual cities and states in
the USA, and the effort of the EU to reduce emissions, has led many
others, including not-for-profit organizations, to search out ways
of reducing emissions while also gaining some localized benefits
from these efforts.
In addition to the actual reductions of emissions that have been
achieved recently, considerable experience has been gained with
the use of diverse mechanisms. All of the voluntary efforts involve
organizations that would in any case be involved in the actions
needed to fulfill a global treaty requiring specific cutbacks of global
emission. While the treaty would be signed by national governments,
each country would need to develop internal policies
involving its own government units, industry, and citizens to take
actions that cumulatively generate the reductions agreed upon.
6. Does the number of actors working on climate change
generate perverse outcomes?
One of the criticisms leveled at current efforts to reduce GHG
emissions is that too many projects and activities are operating at
multiple scales without effective support of a global treaty (Betsill,
2001). It is important that we examine some of the key problems
that have been identified as plaguing efforts to control GHG
emissions. Recognition of problems is essential to start serious
efforts toward finding methods to reduce them. The problems
raised most frequently are leakage, inconsistent policies, inadequate
certification, gaming the system, and free riding.
6.1. Leakage
One of the problems frequently identified with subnational
projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions is leakage. Two types
of leakage can occur from policies adopted at less than global scale:
leakage between locations and market leakage (Ebeling, 2008, pp.
49–51). Leakage between locations occurs when an activity that
would have occurred in X location is shifted to Y location because
of a climate change project that occurs in X location. The EU-ETS
and RGGI efforts to reduce emissions from industrial producers
may, in some cases, simply shift the emissions that would have
been produced in Europe or the United States to a developing
country that has less stringent policies on GGH emissions or none
at all. For example, the EU-ETS program may be responsible for
shifting production to countries that allow a free-for-all where the
costs of production may be lower, but carbon is still emitted in the
production of chemicals and in the transportation of the chemicals
to European locations (Chomitz, 2002; Sovacool and Brown, 2009).
Similarly, farmers who are forced to leave a location due to a treeplanting
project may simply move to a new location and cut down
the timber located there unless they must make commitments that
will be carefully monitored.
Market leakage refers to the changes in the price structure that
may occur as a result of restrictions placed on harvesting from
forests. Such restrictions reduce the volume of timber and other
forest products generated in one area. This stimulates an increase
in the prices of these products. If everything goes well, higher
prices encourage the intensification of agricultural and forest
production in other areas, and they do not stimulate more
deforestation. ‘‘In a less favorable scenario, particularly when landuse
regulations are poorly enforced, higher prices provide an6
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Calif. Assembly Bill 32.
E. Ostrom / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 550–557554
additional incentive to clear forests for timber or agriculture
elsewhere, thereby reducing the net benefits of the climate
mitigation project’’ (Ebeling, 2008, p. 50).
6.2. Inconsistent policies
Closely related to the problem of leakage is the problem of
inconsistent policies. Industrial firms that are trying to develop
new technologies to reduce GHGs may find it costly when policies
vary in different regions. Potential sales of new technology are
limited to those areas where the technology fits the policies
adopted, and these areas may not be large enough to generate
substantial sales warranting the investment in new technology.
6.3. Inadequate certification
For policies adopted at any scale that provide diverse rewards for
projects that reduce GHG emissions, there is a need for skilled
personnel to certify that the project does indeed reduce ambient CO2
by some specified amount over a defined time period. A very active
new industry of ‘‘global consultants’’ has emerged. While many
consultants do have good scientific training, the greatly increased
need for certification has generated opportunities for some
unqualified contractors to earn money in the new ‘‘certification
game.’’ Sovacool and Brown (2009, p. 14) report on one study that
evaluated 93 randomly chosen CDM projects and ‘‘found that in a
majority of cases the consultants hired to validate CERs [Certified
Emission Reports] did not possess the requisite knowledge needed
to approve projects, were overworked, did not follow instructions,
and spent only a few hours evaluating each case.’’
6.4. Gaming the system
It is also feasible for some actors to adopt strategies that take
advantage of current carbon credit trading systems, including the
CDM, that include credits for ‘‘reducing’’ emissions of six Kyoto
Protocol gases. Wara (2007) examined the distribution of CDM
projects and noted that only one-third of emission reductions
involve lowering CO2 or reducing energy production. Instead, ‘‘the
largest volume of credits, almost 30% of the entire market, come
from capturing and destroying trifluoromethane (HFC-23)’’ (Wara,
2007, 595), which is a by-product of manufacturing refrigerant
gases. The emitters of this gas ‘‘can earn almost twice as much from
CDM credits as they can from selling refrigerant gases’’ (Wara,
2007, 596). Thus, some firms appear to have started to manufacture
HFC-23 primarily to obtain credits in a carbon market without
significantly reducing a gas that produces CO2.
6.5. Free riding
Whenever actions taken by some individuals or organizations
benefit a larger group, a risk always exists that some participants
will free ride on the efforts of others and not contribute at all or not
contribute an appropriate share. At the current time, there are
many government and private entities at multiple scales that are
increasing their GHG emissions substantially—especially in the
developing world—without adopting any policies to reduce their
emissions in the future. This is a major problem. And current
debates over who caused the great increase in the presence of
GHGs in the atmosphere in the first place and thus who should be
paying the most in the future are legitimate debates.
7. Concluding thoughts
The intent of this article has been to explain that a polycentric
system for coping with global climate change is emerging and is
likely to expand in the future. This development is not consistent
with the conventional theory of collective action that predicts that
actions taken to reduce a joint risk are unlikely to occur without an
externally enforced set of rules. As a result, many analysts have
presumed that an enforceable global agreement is the only way to
address the threat of climate change. There is no question that an
international treaty is a major step that needs to be taken as soon
as international leaders can agree on a variety of pressing issues
related to responsibility for past and future emissions and the most
effective future rules. But instead of focusing entirely on this vital,
but missing step, it is important to recognize the evolving
polycentric system both for its strengths and weaknesses.
Regarding the conventional theory of collective action, empirical
research has documented multiple settings where participants have
made tough efforts to achieve a variety of collective benefits.
Repeated findings of studies of commons around the world
successfully challenge the conventional theory prediction that
those directly affected are helpless and cannot themselves take
actions that address a problem of collective action. What we have
learned from extensive research is that when individuals are well
informed about the problem they face and about who else is
involved, and can build settings where trust and reciprocity can
emerge, grow, and be sustained over time, costly and positive
actions are frequently taken without waiting for an external
authority to impose rules, monitor compliance, and assess penalties.
While the global commons is dramatically larger than the many
local commons that have been studied, discussions within the
family and with neighbors in a community about actions that can
be taken locally to reduce GHG emissions are important factors
leading to the potential for positive change. Local discussions and
meetings generate information about the unrecognized costs of
individual, family, and business activities as well as potentially
lead to a change in the preferences of individuals involved and
about the expected behavior of others. As a result of this
communication, some actors adopt a sense of ethical responsibility
for their own carbon footprint. Through these discussions and
reading about efforts by multiple actors to reduce GHGs,
individuals may recognize that they can achieve benefits as a
result of taking costly actions that combine with the actions of
others to reduce the threat faced by all. Even without major taxes
imposed on energy at a national level, families that decide to invest
in better insulation and more efficient furnaces and other
appliances, to join a carpool whenever feasible, and to take other
energy-conserving actions do save the family budget over the long
run. They may face high up-front investments to achieve some of
these benefits, but there are potential benefits to be achieved at a
household level. Similarly, the discussions held among mayors and
other political leaders at local, state, and regional levels enhance
their knowledge of policies they can adopt and how linking with
others increases the benefits and impact of their actions.
Self-organized, polycentric systems are not a panacea! There
are no panaceas, however, for complex problems such as global
warming. Besides the general benefits that a polycentric system
can generate, there are also threats as briefly discussed above.
Some of these threats would also exist in any worldwide system
developed as a result of a global treaty. As expected, free riding is
an important threat to a system that evolves without the presence
of an enforceable treaty. One should also expect, however, that
actors who are not convinced of the importance of reducing carbon
emissions would attempt to free ride even if a global treaty were
successfully negotiated.
Given the complexity and changing nature of the problems
involved in coping with climate change, ‘‘optimal’’ solutions for
making substantial reductions in the level of GHGs emitted into the
atmosphere are only a dream. A major reduction in emissions is,
however, needed. The advantage of a polycentric approach is that it
E. Ostrom / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 550–557 555
encourages experimentation by multiple actors, as well as the
development of methods for assessing the benefits and costs of
particular strategies adopted in one setting and comparing these
with results obtained in other settings. A strong commitment to
finding ways of reducing individual emissions is an important
element for coping with climate change. Building such a
commitment, and trusting that others are also taking responsibility,
can be more effectively undertaken in small- to medium-scale
units that are linked together through diverse information
networks.
We need to recognize that doing nothing until a global treaty is
negotiated maximizes the risk involved for everyone. Rather than
only a global effort, it would be better to self-consciously adopt a
polycentric approach to the problem of climate change in order to
gain benefits at multiple scales as well as to encourage
experimentation and learning from diverse policies adopted at
multiple scales.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Dan Cole, Eric Coleman, and Jimmy Walker for
very useful comments on earlier drafts of this article and a 2009
World Bank report on this topic as well as the anonymous
reviewers for this journal who provided very useful comments. I
also want to thank Patty Lezotte and Joanna Broderick for the
excellent editing and the National Science Foundation and the
MacArthur Foundation for support of this research.
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