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# The Possibility of Peace: Israeli Public Opinion and the Camp David Accords

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The Possibility of Peace:  
Israeli Public Opinion and the Camp David Accords

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An Honors Thesis  
Submitted for partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for graduation with honors in History  
from Hamline University

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– Introduction –

Since the signing of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, the path to peace has been a topic of debate and research. Scholars have debated many facets of the agreement: its effects on international relations and the balance of powers in the world war, the regional political implications of Egypt's recognition of Israel, the repercussions of the lack of a final path to autonomy for the Palestinian people, the consequences of making peace for the leaders of the countries involved—particularly for Egyptian President Sadat and US President Carter who took a domestic lashing after the signing of the agreement. But what many scholars have disregarded thus far is the public sentiments and opinions regarding the peace. No scholarship exists yet on the change of public opinion in Israel during the peace process and how the public opinion was shaped by events in the peace process to ultimately desire peace with a country that was once Israel's primary enemy.

Analyzing public opinion can reveal other considerations about the peace process that have not been previously considered. The Prime Minister of Israel, from David Ben-Gurion to Benjamin Netanyahu, is responsible to the citizens of Israel, especially in matters that deal with the national security of the state. As Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir found out after the elections of December 1973, if a party and its leaders become weak on national security they are bound to lose favor in the public's eye. After the Labor government mishandled the lead up to the Yom Kippur War, a traumatic event in Israeli history, they were eventually voted out of power by the voters in Israel because of their weakness on defense. The public pressure was so strong on Golda Meir that she resigned only one month after being elected because of her involvement with the mismanagement of forces before the war in 1973.

So it is surprising that in such a short time, from the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 to the signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978, Israel and Egypt—former regional enemies—would be able to sign a framework for peace; a peace which has remained until this day. Previous research tells us what international political forces were at play to allow Israel and Egypt to come to terms on peace. Research also exists on the domestic political considerations that allowed for peace; but one important aspect of the domestic conditions that is often missing from research is the public opinion that supported the Government of Israel to sign a peace agreement with its biggest rival. Though examining Israeli public opinion surveys from the time would indeed help provide understanding of public sentiments on peace, this resource is limited because opinion polls ask targeted questions on narrow issues in order to gauge public opinion on very specific issues rather than on overall public feeling.

An alternative to public opinion polls is newspaper editorials. Editorials are a space for newspaper editors to write an opinionated column on important issues facing the newspaper's audience. These editorials can provide key insight into the different perspectives on peace, and could enhance the overall understanding of when and why the public supported the various initiatives throughout the peace process between Israel and Egypt. Editorials also have limitations to their resourcefulness for examining public opinion.

Newspapers in a free and democratic press often maintain a certain political perspective that resonates with their audience; for example, many liberals in the United States prefer to read the *New York Times* while conservatives tend to prefer publications like the *Wall Street Journal*. The same principle is true in Israel. In order to capture a wide swath of different perspectives within the greater Israeli public opinion, it is important to select several papers, each of which represents a different political perspective. This will provide a diverse collection of political

ideologies which will tell a more complete picture of the public opinion in Israel. Several major publications from the time represent a large portion of newspaper readership in Israel, and also represent the various political perspectives. *Haaretz* represented the political right during the 1970s and was the most widely-circulated, independent, conservative newspapers in Israel; *The Jerusalem Post* editors, under the same ownership as the *Haaretz* group, had a very similar political perspective to *Haaretz*; *Maariv*, the most widely circulated newspaper in Israel for decades represented the moderate political perspective in Israel during the given time; and *Davar*, the mouthpiece of the Labor party—the ruling part from 1948-1975—represents the left-leaning political ideology and was the most popular of many newspapers editorializing on the left end of the political spectrum.

In order to achieve a better understanding of the sentiments of the Israeli public, the original Hebrew versions of the selected editorials columns were translated into English and analyzed. These translations will, to the extent allowed, maintain the tone, message, and vocabulary used by each newspaper to evoke their various opinions on the major issues of the time. In addition to selecting papers from more than one political perspective, to gauge a change in the public opinion over time, it will be important to read editorials from various events throughout the time period between Israel's last war with Egypt and the Camp David Accords. Five major events that occurred during this time period would serve as good points at which to analyze public opinion: the Yom Kippur War itself, specifically the third day of the war when the US authorized an airlift that enabled Israel to mount a counterattack towards the Egyptians and Syrians; the day the disengagement agreement (of armies) between Egypt and Israel was approved by the Knesset—the first major act of the Knesset after the end of the war; the visit of President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977, a monumental day in the history of Arab-Israeli

relations; the days leading up to the Camp David Summit; and the last day of the peace conference—the last two periods were chosen in order to gauge the change in opinion during the accords process. Combined, these different newspapers, as analyzed at the various points throughout the peace process, can paint a picture of the public opinion during the time and can help explain the nuanced changes in the public opinion about peace with Israel over time.

There are limitations to these newspaper articles as well. While old documents the world over are rapidly becoming digitized, not all documents receive priority for digitization. As is such, varying editorials from the newspapers are available in different formats. While the entire collection of *Davar* newspapers is available for free on the internet, *Maariv* editorials are nearly all available for free on the internet—with the exception of the year 1977, which was inaccessible in physical format due to monetary and time constraints. *Haaretz* and *Jerusalem Post* editorials were both available on micro-film throughout the time period.

Time constraints were the greatest obstacle to this research. Translation takes a great deal of time as finding the precise words or phrases necessary for translation takes a great deal of knowledge, or time with a dictionary and thesaurus. Therefore only one editorial of each event was selected from the time period and only one paper representing each political perspective was selected in order to allow for thorough and accurate translation of the articles.

So as to understand the landscape within which this research is conducted an integral part to the following paper is the examination of previous scholarly work on several aspects of the peace process including the research produced on: the Israeli press—of which there is very little—the Yom Kippur War and its implications, President Sadat's visit to the Knesset to give a speech calling for peace, and the Camp David Summit. Understanding the previous work of scholars will help define the importance of the gap this research intends to fill in the field.

These scholarly works, and subsequently the editorials that will be examined, would be of little value without a comprehensive understanding of the context within which the events from the Yom Kippur War through the Camp David Accords occurred. It is important to understand the political and social conditions that helped shape the public opinion of the time. This will not only provide an understanding of the specific events during the peace process but also will more richly inform the understanding of the events and conditions that influenced the peace efforts and how why the public held the opinions it did regarding each of the five events.

After laying the foundation of knowledge of the context and previous research on the peace process it will be necessary to analyze, in depth, the nuanced differences in public opinion as well as the changes in public opinion over time. The newspaper analysis will focus on two different changes during the process: the change in opinions represented within each newspaper's editorial column, and the differences between the various political perspectives in Israel. These differences will enlighten the changes in overall public opinion when considered together.

#### **– In Search of Publius –**

As a defining event in the course of Middle East history, the Camp David Accords have been the focus of study for scholars across a host of disciplines. The groundbreaking agreement between Egypt and Israel has been the center of such scholarship because of its very existence. Anwar Sadat's surprise visit to Jerusalem and the Israeli Knesset in November 1977 stunned public officials and private citizens the world over. After thirty years of hostility and four major confrontations it would have seemed unlikely that Egypt and Israel would engage in direct diplomacy—much less likely peace negotiations—to bring such a violent era between the two states to a close.



The forty years since the Camp David Accords have witnessed the development of a wide field of research on the topic. A great deal of this scholarly work has focused on the regional and international implications of the peace process between two bitter rivals in the Middle East. Since the conclusion of peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel, scholars have addressed such topics as leadership decision making in the negotiations process, shifts in distribution of power in the region after the Accords, the development of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty's effect on the prospect of future peace in the Middle East. While such analysis is indeed necessary for understanding the magnitude of the Camp David Accords on an international level, an important underlying perspective is repeatedly passed over by almost all writers in the field: the role of public discourse in the peace process. This perspective has, until now, been largely unaddressed as a part of the analysis of the Camp David Accords.

Each scholar offers their own perspective on the forces that drove both Egypt and Israel towards peace after the Yom Kippur War. Yet no scholar has examined the role of public discourse in the peace making process leading up to Camp David. While it is impossible to know what conversations private citizens had about that process with Egypt, newspapers offer a unique, representative public perspective on the path to peace through close reading of editorial and opinion columns in major Israeli newspapers.

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### *Newspapers: Understanding the Israeli Press*

Understanding the structure, ideology, and importance of the press within Israel is imperative to this paper. While freedom of the press in Israel is apparent, it is important to understand distinctions between the freedom of the press there and freedom of the press as it is

understood in the west. The special circumstances surrounding the founding of Israel and the ethnic nature of the state provide a different kind of press freedom than is commonly understood in the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Oren Meyers, an Israeli journalist and scholar of the history of Israeli journalism, provides a comprehensive overview of the history of Israeli journalism which began well before the state was founded in 1948. In his article “Israeli Journalism in the State’s Formative Era,” Meyers explores the foundations of the journalism profession in Israel, discusses theories of professionalism in journalism, sources of journalistic authority, differences between good and bad journalism, and the development of reporting standards in Israel.

The modern Hebrew journalism movement began in Europe in the late nineteenth century. The presence of the great Jewish journalists Theodor Hertzl, Zeev Jabotinsky, and Moshe Sharrett as well as the growing support for Zionism among European Jews created an ideal environment for reviving the Hebrew language. Nahum Sokolov—widely considered the father of Hebrew journalism—tied Hebrew journalism to the Zionist movement early in its history. Sokolov felt compelled to use his profession to support the Zionist movement, to assist in the revival of the Hebrew language, and to combat opposition to Zionism. Hebrew journalism’s close proximity to, and support of, the Zionist movement instilled a distinctly political sense of purpose to Hebrew news reporting. In order to assert political efficacy as a minority wherever they lived, Jews often sought careers in journalism in order to contribute to the political dialogue of their respective countries—indirectly influencing the political process through discourse.<sup>2</sup>

This sense of political efficacy through journalism was carried with the Jews who immigrated to Israel in the several waves of Jewish immigrants to Israel in the first two decades

of the twentieth century. New European Jewish immigrants brought with them an array of different aspects of culture and society when they came to Israel—journalists brought with them their decidedly political writing focus and style.<sup>3</sup>

In his honors thesis “The Role of the Press in Shaping a New Middle East,” Freeman Poritz analyzes articles from several Israeli newspapers (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, *The Jerusalem Post*, and *Haaretz*) to define the role of the press in Israel, and to elucidate the unique position of the press to stimulate public dialogue on topics of national concern. Every newspaper in Israel, independent or otherwise, targets its base audience with a unique editorial perspective. While these editorial views differ, they all share the common goal of garnering support for their political outlook. Poritz argues that newspapers have a special place in influencing the public opinion through editorials because they not only present the news, but interpret the news from a specific political perspective, thereby explaining for their readers how to interpret the developments of the peace process. Poritz also argues that newspapers played a special role in shaping Israeli public opinion by elaborating on the different political opinions held in the country in the period following the Yom Kippur War and considering the actions of the governments in Israel and Egypt through a political lens.

*Maariv*, one of Israel’s most widely read daily newspapers, was founded in 1948 by a number of former editors and journalists from *Yedioth Ahronoth*—Israel’s first daily Hebrew newspaper. From its inception through the mid-1970s, *Maariv* was the most widely circulated newspaper in Israel. The paper has been classified as centrist in its political persuasion.<sup>4</sup>

*Maariv*’s first editor Azriel Carlebach (1948-1956), was an opponent of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion’s Mapai party, a leftist political party which later merged with the Labor Party of Israel. The paper’s second editor Arie Dissenchik (1956-1974), who was a founder of the Betar

movement—a right leaning national youth movement started in Eastern Europe in the 1920s and relocated to Israel in the 1940s—held similar editorial views to his predecessor. Dissenchik and Betar influenced many of Israel’s future right-wing leaders—including Prime Minister Menachem Begin—in their youth. Shalom Rosenfeld (1974-1980), *Maariv*’s third editor, made few changes to the paper but realigned the editorial view of the paper to a more moderate position. Under Rosenfeld’s guidance *Maariv* experienced its highest circulation numbers due to the decline in readership among the party newspapers and the foreign press. By the end of the 1970s, though, *Maariv* would lose some of its readers to rival *Yedioth Ahronoth*.<sup>5</sup>

*Haaretz*, one of Israel’s oldest newspapers, was founded in 1918 by a German-Jewish immigrant. The paper began with very small circulation among mostly immigrant Jews. Slowly, the paper began to gain readership and 30 years after its founding, *Haaretz* was recognized as one of the most influential papers in Israel. Though the paper has never enjoyed top circulation numbers it has proven itself to be one of the most influential papers, not for the size of its readership but for the composition of its readership. Israeli political leaders, both at home and abroad read *Haaretz* for its professional journalistic style and wealth of prominent journalists. Many describe *Haaretz* as the New York Times of Israel—while not everyone in Israel reads the paper, it is recognized by many as the most influential print media outlet in the country.<sup>6</sup> *Haaretz* occupied a “liberal but nonpartisan” editorial viewpoint under Editor Gershom Schocken, who served in his position for 50 years. Under Schocken’s editorial guidance *Haaretz* was critical of every government, including those governments in which his own Progressive Party was a coalition member. The analytical role of *Haaretz* gave the newspaper a distinct center-right leaning for much of Schocken’s tenure. Though editorial opinions of the paper varied depending

upon subject matter and time period, the paper's viewpoint tended to favor a right-wing stance during the last years of Labor party rule, and the subsequent takeover by the Likud in the 1970s.<sup>7</sup>

*Davar* was the mouthpiece of the Israeli Labor Federation for more than 70 years. Though the paper was established before the founding of the Israeli state, the paper expounded the views of the leftist political movement and its leaders. In fact, for much of the 1930s and 1940s *Davar* was known as the official paper of the *Yishuv*.<sup>8</sup> After the establishment of the Israeli state ruling Labor Party officials used the paper to publish essays and official positions, giving the paper a decidedly leftist editorial perspective. Several former prominent Israeli political leaders including Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett and third Israeli President Zalman Shazar were reporters for the paper. *Davar* suffered declining readership beginning in the mid-1960s. Readers began to move away from party papers in favor of more secular, independent newspapers like *Maariv* that challenged government positions and offered differing opinions on important issues, rather than one party line as was the practice at party newspapers.<sup>9</sup> Under Hannah Zemer's editorial lead, the paper had a brief rebound during the mid-to-late 1970s. Zemer introduced a refreshed political lens to the paper. Though still leftist, Zemer's editorial style was critical of Labor Party policy and leadership.<sup>10</sup> In addition to its refreshed perspective the paper introduced new supplemental publications targeted at specific audiences—these features, in part, assisted *Davar's* brief mid-70s resurgence.<sup>11</sup>

Israeli newspapers played a crucial role during the era between the Yom Kippur War and the Camp David Summit. During this period, Israeli television was in its beginning years and most people got their news from newspapers or the radio. But the only sources of independent news—that is, news not published by the state via television or radio—were newspapers. Newspapers both delivered in-depth reporting on current events and insightful editorials on the

most controversial stories of the time, many covering the negotiations process between Egypt and Israel from October 1973 through September 1978.

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*Egypt-Israeli Relations between 1973 War and Camp David Accords*

Howard Sachar's opinion on the Camp David Accords centers on the similarities between Israel's and Egypt's political development, as presented in his book *A History of Israel, Volume II: from the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War*. The comparable trajectories of political development in Israel and Egypt are the result of shared experiences under imperialist British rule. The independence movements in each country were separated by just four years and were a consequence of the decline of British power. Out of these shared experiences, though, developed two starkly contrasting states; Israel, a democracy with strong threads of socialist influence, developed strong state institutions and a free society which promoted social and economic progress and political dialogue between government institutions and the public. Egypt on the other hand, a presidential republic with heavy influence from Arab socialism and Arab nationalism, developed strong state institutions and a stratified society which limited economic and social progress and engaged in weak political dialogue between the public and government institutions.

Stark differences between the respective governments arose. They clashed time and again throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Sachar argues that after two particularly traumatizing wars—the Six Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973—each state gradually moved towards peace in the 1970s. Peace became a politically beneficial move for the Israeli government and the ruling coalition formed by the Likud party; but also an economically and militarily savvy move for the Egyptian government. The return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt

increased foreign direct investment and thus economic opportunity. Returning military control of the Sinai also reestablished pride and honor in Egypt's military capabilities as the exchange was seen as a victory for the Egyptian military, President Sadat, and the country after defeat at the hands of Israel in 1973.<sup>12</sup>

Charles Liebman's 1993 essay "The Myth of Defeat: the Memory of the Yom Kippur War in Israeli Society," discusses how the Yom Kippur War is remembered as a tragedy for many Israelis. Although the results of the war suggest it was a victory for Israel, they were nonetheless caught off guard by the sudden onslaught of war. Examining the war through a sociological lens, Liebman explains that societies construct myths around traumatic events to make sense of them. The myth around the Yom Kippur War describes a tragedy because Israel ultimately lost land it had occupied in order to make peace with Egypt. Additionally the IDF was caught off guard by an attack from Egypt and Syria—shaking Israelis' belief in the superiority of their military forces. The author argues that the myth explains the Yom Kippur War in the greater context of a Jewish historical narrative of persecution and exile—one developed over millennia of Jewish existence.<sup>13</sup>

In an article published on the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the first Sinai agreement titled "Turning Point on the Road to Peace," Louise Fischer discusses the years between the Yom Kippur War and the interim agreement between Israel and Egypt at the second Sinai summit in 1975. The author notes that the original agreements between Egypt and Israel established many of the key positions in the final peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978. Key stances on demilitarizing the Sinai and its border zones, formal diplomatic recognition, and discussions about the status of the occupied territories were all discussed at length and initial positions from each country were exchanged. Fischer describes in thorough detail the extent of Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy campaign. Many authors agree with Fischer that Secretary Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy efforts facilitated future peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel. In fact, Fischer states that without Kissinger's efforts during the key time after the Yom Kippur war, no peace agreement would have been made.<sup>14</sup>

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*Camp David – Sep. 1978*

Professor, author, and diplomat Shlomo Avineri wrote prolifically on Israeli foreign policy, both regional and global. Avineri discusses the Camp David Accords and the fallout from the historic event in his article "Beyond Camp David." Avineri makes the central claim that the circumstances which brought rise to the peace process at Camp David center on the key point of recognition. The most crucial turning point towards peace for Avineri was Sadat's surprise visit to Jerusalem. One of Israel's main sticking points for peace negotiations was formal recognition of the Jewish state's right to exist. By making his surprise trip to Jerusalem, Sadat did what no other Arab leader would do at the time—extend a diplomatic hand both to recognize Israel, and to offer up an initiative for peace. Avineri critiques the ruling Likud coalition led by Menachem Begin for their handling of the peace negotiations. Instead of washing their hands of the Palestinian territories once and for all—a left-wing stance that Avineri clearly holds—Begin and the Likud party ensured that Israel would have a presence in the territories long after the normalization of relations with Egypt. Avineri's critique, published in the early 1980s, harshly criticized Begin's word choice when drafting the agreements on the Palestinian territories. Instead of a roadmap to creating a future Palestine, Begin's loose language left the treaty open to nearly any interpretation one could read into it—including Begin's view of a permanent Israeli



military presence in the territories. Although Avineri provides a fresh perspective on the Camp David Accords, he commits the same reductionist flaw as other authors in the field.<sup>15</sup>

A. Paul Hare and David Naveh wrote a short article, “Group Development at Camp David Summit,” analyzing the Camp David Accords from the perspective of problem solving strategies. While most scholars assign credit to all three leaders—President Jimmy Carter, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and President Anwar Sadat—with their efforts in peace negotiations, Hare and Naveh give most credit to President Jimmy Carter, and his knack for creativity in bargaining, with the success of the Camp David Accords. Hare and Naveh use group problem solving theories to understand the tactics President Carter used to bridge the gap between Israel and Egypt. While most think Carter, Begin, and Sadat were the three primary negotiators at Camp David, a vast amount of work was completed by a drafting team comprised of President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and legal counsel from both Israel—Aharon Barak—and Egypt—Osama el-Baz.<sup>16</sup> Carter is not only responsible for creating the drafting team, but also astutely hand-picking its members. El-Baz and Barak were chosen specifically for their knowledge of their respective leaders’ positions in the negotiations. Both El-Baz and Barak were renowned legal scholars with extensive backgrounds in mediation in their home countries, and as such were identified by Carter as excellent candidates for the drafting team.

Although all three political leaders share responsibility for creating a lasting peace between Israel and Egypt, there is no doubt that Hare and Naveh believe that Carter deserves more recognition for his creativity and forward thinking under such intense international pressure. Though Hare and Naveh delve into the specific negotiation tactics at Camp David, and extend large credit to the political leaders involved, their analysis is reductionist with regards to other important aspects of peace negotiations; especially the opinions and influence of domestic

audiences in Israel and in Egypt. Investigation into this omission is warranted because without approval from constituents at home it is hard to believe that Israel would have been able to ratify a peace treaty with Egypt. Similarly in Egypt, without Israel's biggest concessions in the peace process—including military and civil withdrawal from the Sinai, and planning for future negotiations with Egypt regarding autonomy of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza—there would have been no chance for peace with Israel. As Hare and Naveh define it, the perception of a culture war—or war of ideology—between Jewish-democratic Israel and Arab-socialist Egypt serves as an example that Egyptian society indirectly influences foreign policy matters only when a universal public opinion exists.<sup>17</sup>

The Israeli public, as Sachar suggests, was in search of peace with its Arab neighbors since the end of the War of Independence in 1948. Whichever political party managed to achieve a peace agreement with an Arab country would benefit greatly. Military aid to Egypt decreased and economic support from the Kremlin dwindled as the Soviet Union (Egypt's most influential international ally) dealt with uprisings in several Soviet bloc countries, forcing the Egyptians to look elsewhere—eventually to the United States—for military and economic support. While Sachar provides a detailed overview of the Camp David Accords process from beginning to end, his research is centrally focused on the institutional development of the government in Israel, and from an international relations perspective, Sachar focuses heavily on the international motivations for diplomatic relations and less on domestic motivations. Sachar gives little credit to the social and economic upheavals in Egypt in the 1970s as factors influencing Sadat's peace initiative with Israel.<sup>18</sup>

The book *Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada* addresses the Camp David Accords, specifically detailing events during and immediately following the

Accords in September 1978. Authors Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler write that although the normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt in the years following the Accords went according to the agreement, the implementation of the whole agreement—both portions as signed and agreed upon in September 1978—was not as successful. For six months following the signing of the Camp David Accords, Israel and Egypt continued to work closely together to craft a formal peace treaty with a schedule for the withdrawal of Israeli military personnel and civilian settlers from the Sinai Peninsula, the normalization of international relations, and the exchange of recognition and mutual respect. While peace plans moved along according to the proposed schedule, Lesch and Tessler note that both Israeli and Egyptian citizens and leaders held suspicions of the other country's sincerity and motives for peace.

Unlike many authors in the field, Lesch and Tessler address public opinion on the issue of peace between Egypt and Israel. The authors analyzed the influence of public opinion in both Egypt and Israel by analyzing speeches in the Knesset and the Egyptian parliament, specifically looking for any mention of the public's desire or opinion on negotiations over the final status of the Palestinian territories. While the Israeli government's official position on independence for the Palestinian territories was a modified form of autonomy rather than independence, many Israelis—both right and left—disagreed with the government's stance and openly opposed it—as mentioned in a few speeches by Knesset members. The Egyptian government, on the other hand, suppressed all opposition from the public to its decisions on the territories and remained flexible when dealing with Israel regarding timelines and benchmarks for the peace process. According to Tessler public dialogue on major foreign policy events elicits a government response—either repression (Egypt) or steadfastness in the face of broad-based opposition (Israel). This shows a

correlation between public dialogue and the Israeli government's foreign policy decisions; but less of a correlation in Egypt.<sup>19</sup>

In his work *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining*, Shibley Telhami argues that the Camp David Accords were initiated because of a gradual shift in international military and economic power between the late 1950s and the 1970s; forcing Egypt to look for a super power alliance—breaking its pattern of semi-nonalignment. Telhami uses international relations theories to investigate the reasons why the Camp David Accords, and subsequent peace treaty, were finalized with the specific provisions provided therein. Telhami argues that Israel's form of decentralized government, whereby politicians and public officials are more accountable to public opinion via direct elections, lends itself well to ideal bargaining power than does Egypt's. The Egyptian government, a highly centralized system in which one leader makes most governmental decisions and policies with little to no accountability to the public will is not conducive to ideal bargaining power. The state which lacks consent from the public policy proposals have less bargaining power as they have no responsibility to uphold the public will in negotiations. The United States' form of government—a moderately decentralized system in which public officials and politicians are accountable to public will is suited for ideal bargaining position.

Telhami also found the individual bargaining styles of the major leaders—Sadat, Begin, and Carter—had a great effect on the outcome of the Accords. Telhami cites Sadat's lack of attention to detail and tendency to over-trust his opponent as justification for Egypt's poor performance at Camp David. Likewise Telhami found that Begin's strong bargaining skills and ability to manipulate the other players involved were reasons the Accords were more favorable to the Israelis. Telhami argues that Israel's continued possession of the Gaza Strip and the West

Bank, regardless of the Camp David agreement to begin state-building processes, allowed them to come away from the Accords victorious. Carter, Telhami discovered, was too detail oriented, was relatively partial to Egypt over Israel—“more Arab than the Arabs”—and did not have enough political leverage to force Israel’s hand to make more concessions.

Telhami, like others in the field, fails to address the views of the Israeli or Egyptian publics and their sway in the politics of their respective countries. The author describes government institutions that engage in discourse with the public and those institutions’ level of accountability to their respective public. While correctly identifying locations of public discourse—such as the media, public forums like town hall events and coffee shops, and interpersonal communications—Telhami neither explores the effects of discourse on government action generally, nor on the Accords specifically.<sup>20</sup>

Ben D. Mor in *Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion the Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution*, argues that in conflicts that extend over a long period of time public opinion has a strong effect on foreign relations and peace initiatives. Extended rivalries have sociological and emotional effects on the public. These sociological effects make any initiative to resolve the conflict more difficult. Foreign policy officials must garner public support for peace lest they risk disrupting public support for their administration, “if decision makers seek to reorient the state’s relationship with a long-standing opponent, it is necessary ‘to prepare the home front from a winning to a conciliatory mentality.’”<sup>21</sup> Not only does Mor show that a country’s leaders must reorient the public mindset, but those leaders must have the ability to influence public opinion. Though Mor addresses the relationship between government and the public—the government has influence over public opinion—he does not investigate the mechanism with

which the government asserts its influence over the public because such mechanisms vary from country to country.<sup>22</sup>

– **From Trauma to Treaty** –

*The Yom Kippur War – Oct. 1973*

In a surprise attack on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, Egypt—in concert with Syria—launched the beginning of the Yom Kippur War on October 6, 1973. The Yom Kippur War, or the October War, was waged as a result of the consequences of the Six Day War of 1967.

The 1967 War was ultimately a product of the Cold War between the US and the USSR. The United States was embroiled in an escalating proxy war in Vietnam. At nearly full deployment, the US military was ill prepared to come to Israel's defense if it were to become entangled in another conflict as it was in 1956. The USSR took advantage of the US military's engagement in Vietnam as an opportunity to further aggravate the United States and its weary President. According to what was later determined to be false Soviet intelligence, Israel was precipitating a military buildup near the Golan border with Syria. Having recently signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt, Syrian officials relayed the Soviet intelligence to Egyptian military leaders immediately. In response, President Nasser and the Egyptian army took action to halt the alleged Israeli military movements in the north. Nasser commanded the Egyptian army to move to points near the Israeli border in the Sinai Peninsula, and ordered the Egyptian Navy to halt any Israeli sea traffic leaving or entering the Gulf of Aqaba.

When Egypt blocked Israeli trade through the Straits of Tiran—a casus belli to both Israel and the US—Israeli foreign diplomats called for the US Navy's sixth fleet to reopen the Straits with force to allow for free passage of Israeli ships.<sup>23</sup> The US response shook the Israeli

diplomats. President Johnson, under tremendous pressure trying to deal with civil unrest at home and an increasingly difficult war in Vietnam, told Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that the US would not provide assistance unless Israel was struck first. Israeli military officials took Johnson's message to heart. They feared that if they waited for the Arab armies to strike first it would mark the end of their fledgling state so they took it upon themselves to strike preemptively. Israel launched an attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967 across the Egyptian Sinai border. Two days later, Israel would be forced into a war with Jordan in Jerusalem; and on June 9<sup>th</sup>, Israel would be pulled into yet another battle, with Syria in the Golan Heights, after the Egyptians reported to the Syrians that they were making gains in the Sinai.<sup>24</sup>

In a show of force, Israel took only six days to invade Arab territory on all three fronts and occupy land from each country. From Syria, Israel captured the Golan Heights, a small mountainous region that borders on the far northeastern tip of Israel. The capture of the Golan Heights was a strategic victory for Israel as the border was pushed beyond the mountains and hills from which the Syrian army could launch attacks to the valley in Israel below.<sup>25</sup>

In Jordan, Israel was able to annex East Jerusalem and to capture the West Bank. The annexation of East Jerusalem reunited the city for the first time since Israeli independence in 1948 when the city was divided between East and West, controlled by Jordan and Israel respectively. Israel also occupied the West Bank. Some Jews refer to the West Bank by its Biblical name(s) Judea and Samaria, originally part of the ancient kingdom of Israel; it was also considered to be a complete territorial unit as part of Palestine by the British near the end of Ottoman rule. These names reference the idea of Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel, which stretches from the Red Sea to Lebanon, and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.<sup>26</sup>

On the Egyptian front Israel achieved its largest land grab as a result of the short conflict. In six days, Israel was able to occupy the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, as far west as the Suez Canal. The Gaza Strip is yet another portion of land considered to be part of Eretz Israel by some Jews—though not for religious reasons. While the Israeli government had no intention of annexing Gaza into the State of Israel, the Gaza region has been historically inhabited by Jews since the time of the ancient Israeli kingdom.<sup>27</sup> The IDF established military posts at the edges of the newly captured territories in order to deter further attacks that may be launched into Israeli territory, effectively creating a buffer zone between Israel and her Arab neighbors.<sup>28</sup>

While attacks from Israel's neighbors did not cease in the years between the Six Day War and the October War, the newly occupied lands created a buffer zone that made it harder for attacks to reach the heart of Israeli territory where major Israeli population centers are located (Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem). Tensions between Israel and surrounding Arab states rose throughout the six years between the two wars.<sup>29</sup> The political and military stalemate after Israel's territorial gains put the Arab countries in a position to attack again if they wished to regain their lands without negotiations. This key point was utilized by the Israeli government in order to encourage their Arab neighbors to come to the negotiating table.<sup>30</sup>

A little known war between Egypt and Israel, which some claim was no war at all, was the Attrition War, waged between 1967 and 1970. President Nasser's intention with the war, undertaken by Egypt and Syria against the invading IDF, was to show Israel that occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights was an economically and militarily poor decision. Unlike previous wars between Egypt, Syria, and Israel the Attrition War was not undertaken with tanks and scores of soldiers. Rather, this war was undertaken by Egypt and Syria's military posts



stationed along the western side of the Suez Canal and the eastern side of the Golan Heights, respectively.<sup>31</sup>

At the conclusion of the Six Day War, Lieutenant Generals Chaim Bar Lev and Yeshayahu Gavish advocated for a static mobilization of forces along the eastern side of the canal. Their thought was both militarily and economically motivated. In order to keep the costs of holding the Sinai to a minimum, and ensure the Egyptians would not attempt to retake it through force, Bar Lev recommended the IDF install many small military posts on the canal to monitor Egyptian military movements and report them to the central IDF command for action when necessary. This action would, ideally, prevent a large scale mobilization of Israeli forces—a tremendously expensive undertaking for Israel—by deterring Egypt from crossing the canal.<sup>32</sup>

Rather than pursue another potentially devastating military endeavor against Israel, Egypt would attempt to slowly bleed the Israeli army on the Bar Lev Line, and hopefully the Israeli economy, to the point where Israel would be forced to pursue yet another aggressive military strike or concede defeat in the Sinai, “Nasser’s strategy was to inflict a level of casualties that would be unacceptable to the Israeli people or to escalate the conflict so Israel would have to mobilize for an extended period of time. Nasser believed that military and economic considerations would compel Israel to withdraw its forces behind its pre-1967 borders.”<sup>33</sup> Rocket bombardments and commando raids on established Israeli military defense posts across the canal were the primary method of attack in the war. The Egyptian military believed that if Israel was forced to continually replenish its military personnel and supplies in the Sinai—which proved to be economically difficult in the past—it would force Israel to retreat from the Sinai, and return to its original 1948 border.<sup>34</sup>

At war's end in 1970, both sides claimed victory over the other. The Egyptians claimed a moral victory for having withstood Israeli counterattacks and keeping the Israeli Army and Air Force from attempting to cross the canal. Israel claimed a military victory for successfully holding their position on the eastern side of the canal and sustaining fewer casualties than the Egyptian aggressors. While Israel claimed victory in the conflict, it led to military complacency that would cost it dearly in the 1973 conflict between the two countries. The Bar-Lev line left Israel with a false sense of self-confidence in its defense against future attacks from Egypt that led Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to underestimate the threat of an Egyptian attack in 1973.<sup>35</sup>

In August 1973, military leaders from Syria and Egypt met secretly to begin planning a joint attack against Israel in order to regain their lost territories; but each country had different goals and reasons for regaining territory. While Syria lost a relatively small and economically insignificant portion of land to Israel in 1967, Egypt lost a large segment of land to Israel; more importantly Egypt lost control of the Suez Canal—a vital source of revenue to the Egyptian government.<sup>36</sup> Egypt found itself in an even greater economic squeeze at the hands of the Soviet Union which reduced its support for the Egyptian military in 1970. The loss of revenue from the Suez Canal only compounded economic problems for Egypt. Egyptian leaders concluded that retaking control of the Suez Canal was their only option to regain lost territory and provide economic relief to a cash strapped Egyptian government.<sup>37</sup> A looming attack was proven imminent when thousands of Soviet military advisers and their families were evacuated from Cairo.<sup>38</sup>

In one of their most successful joint military efforts, Syrian and Egyptian military officials managed to plan an attack on Israel without alerting the IDF intelligence office to their

intentions.<sup>39</sup> Though IDF intelligence signaled that an attack from Arab countries was likely, the strength of intelligence was such that IDF decision makers chose not to mobilize troops on the borders. It was not until less than 24 hours before the attack began that IDF intelligence received credible evidence of an imminent attack from Egypt and Syria.<sup>40</sup> Every decision to mobilize Israel's reservist military was made with great caution. "Calling up reservists took them away from their jobs, and the proportion was so great that the economy faltered with each call-up," the reserve nature of the Israeli military makes calling up reserve troops a heavy economic decision.<sup>41</sup> Most Israeli reserve officers hold jobs during times of peace and they are only called up during times of aggression or warfare. Therefore, when reserve forces are required to respond to attacks, Israel must pay a hefty economic price resulting from a decreased work force and the high price of conducting military operations.<sup>42</sup> Facing yet another possible attack, Israeli officials requested assistance with bringing the military tension between herself and Egypt to an end. The US responded by telling Israel that if they were to attack first, as they had in 1967, they would fight this war alone—joining another war, while trying to end the war in Vietnam, would not have been in the interest of the US. Fearing increased isolation from their most important ally, Israeli officials apprehensively resisted another preemptive strike.

In the first days of fighting, Egyptian forces were able to cross the Suez Canal and retake control for the first time in six years. This was possible due to the position of Soviet missiles along the Suez Canal. The position of these Soviet missiles created an 8 mile zone of air protection east of the Canal. Sadat and his military advisors knew they would only be able to maintain their position if they had air superiority; so the Egyptian army advanced to a point just within their Soviet missile buffer zone.<sup>43</sup> Likewise, Syrian forces had been able to push Israeli forces nearly back to their original 1948 positions outside the Golan Heights.<sup>44</sup> Egypt and Syria's

original plans were to retake by force those lands which were lost to Israel in the Six Day War. Though Syria followed through with this plan, Egyptian military leaders changed course after the beginning of their campaign. After securing control over the Suez Canal, Egyptians decided that rather than attempting to force Israeli troops back to their border in the Negev Desert they would stop at the point eight miles east of the Suez Canal—the distance Soviet anti-aircraft missiles would reach past the Suez Canal. Israeli air superiority was such that the decision to move forward without the protection of Soviet anti-aircraft weapons made little sense to Egyptian officials.<sup>45</sup>

Egyptian air superiority at the outset of the war was a deciding factor in the Egyptian Army's ability to cross the Suez Canal in such great numbers. The surprising and devastating nature of the start of the Yom Kippur War is often blamed on Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. In May 1973, Dayan had suggested—based on Mossad intelligence—that Israel move to full scale mobilization in expectation of an attack from Egypt. No such attack ever materialized. When similar reports surfaced again in October, Dayan was skeptical of their credibility and likely contributed to his hesitation to mobilize troops for an attack in the Sinai.<sup>46</sup> The first two days were characterized by heavy Israeli and Egyptian losses. Tens of thousands of Egyptian soldiers made their way across the Suez Canal by the second day of the war. Their fortifications were strong enough to prevent an Israeli military penetration back to the Canal. On the third day of the war there was a breakthrough for the Israelis. Syrian advances had been eliminated and Israeli forces were only 30 miles from the Syrian capital. After sustaining heavy losses including over 35 tanks the IDF made advances that put them back within “several miles” of the Suez Canal, and in a position to start to push the Egyptian army back across the Canal.<sup>47</sup>

One week into the war, Israel continued to keep Egypt to just a few miles east of the Canal. On October 13<sup>th</sup>, reinforcements began to arrive on the Egyptian front with the hopes of pushing further to the east to capture the bases at the Mitla and Gidi Passes—the location of two passages through the mountains to the eastern portion of the peninsula. After one of the biggest tank battles in world history—over 2000 tanks in total—Israel was able to maintain control of the bases at Mitla and Gidi. Running desperately low on supplies, Israeli politicians and military officials pleaded with the US for assistance.<sup>48</sup> While Egypt and Syria were continually restocked by their Arab allies and the Soviet Union Israel relied almost solely on the United States for arms support. Having just emerged from the Vietnam war battle fatigued and resistant to renewed military engagement elsewhere, the US Congress and the American people were at first hesitant to come to Israel's aid. Secretary of State Kissinger explained to the American people that the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria would surely need to be met with an American airlift for Israel. Ultimately, on the 13<sup>th</sup> of October, President Nixon authorized a massive airlift of munitions and weapons from the US mainland, through Portugal—the only country between the US and Israel that would allow US aircraft to land and refuel—and on to Tel Aviv.<sup>49</sup> Some Israeli scholars believe that if it were not for the US munitions airlift in the middle of the Yom Kippur War, Israel would not have survived the war.<sup>50</sup>

In a decisive move on October 16<sup>th</sup> that would decidedly tip the scales of the war in Israel's favor the IDF conducted a maneuver to cross the Suez Canal in order to take out Soviet missile bases on the western bank and regain the upper hand in the war. Under the cover of night the first Israeli troops landed on the western banks of the Canal at 1:35am. By 8:30am the IDF had successfully landed on the east side of the Canal, captured a seven mile area west of the proposed bridge crossing, and taken out the first of several Soviet missile bases. At midday the

IDF had reached a point fifteen miles west of the Canal and destroyed another missile base. Alarm began to mount in Cairo as 20 IDF tanks were headed towards the Egyptian capital, destroying Egyptian tanks and missiles in its wake. The Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian military, General Saad el-Shazli, was removed from his post by President Sadat. At the same time on October 16<sup>th</sup> Sadat was meeting with Chairman Kosygin to request a meeting of the UN Security Council in order to broker a cease-fire agreement.<sup>51</sup>

At this point in the war, halfway through the eighteen day scourge, tensions and nerves ran high among both political leaders and the public in Israel. This war, unlike any of the three previous wars Israel had fought with its Arab neighbors, was particularly damaging to the Israeli public's psyche for many reasons. Israel had already sustained (and would continue to sustain) a high number of casualties as a result of the war; the territorial loss after the decisive victory in the 1967 Six Day War; the sudden and unexpected nature of the attack shook the Israeli public's faith in the country's politicians and the IDF while also destroying the public's sense of safety after the swift and total victory in 1967; and finally the interference of the US and USSR inhibited Israel's ability to inflict a crushing defeat on the Arab armies.<sup>52</sup>

Critical dialogue began berating the IDF and the Labor party leaders for their mishandling of the war. Soldiers and private citizens alike detested the utter unpreparedness of the government for the attacks on October 6<sup>th</sup>. In an interview with an international reporter during the war, an unidentified IDF officer said, "I tell you, when the war is over, then the struggle will begin inside Israel. We were really eroding before the war. The fat around us, it was awful. Thank God the Arabs did not wait for another two or three years or our alertness might have been completely eroded away...after the war, we shall build a new Israel!"<sup>53</sup> Just as in

1967, Israel faced an existential threat. The public and many military personnel took the government's lack of preparedness as a sign that political change was necessary.

Late on October 18<sup>th</sup>, two days after the bridgehead had been established a portable bridge had been moved across the Sinai Peninsula to the Canal in order to allow the IDF to move across the Canal en masse to continue the destruction of Soviet missile bases to allow the IDF to regain air control over the Canal. Fighting would continue for the next several days as meetings between the world's superpowers began in order to negotiate a cease-fire. On October 20<sup>th</sup> the IDF, which was already in intense fighting with Egypt's 3<sup>rd</sup> Army on the eastern banks of the Canal, surrounded the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army by outflanking Egyptian troops on the western banks and laying siege to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow the same day to meet with General Secretary Brezhnev to begin constructing a peace deal, but it would be days before a final deal was reached. While Brezhnev was telling Kissinger that a cease-fire was needed in the Middle East, Chairman Kosygin was telling President Sadat that the USSR was preparing to send Russian ground troops to Egypt to help reinforce Egyptian positions. In response, Kissinger announced that if the USSR were to send troops to Egypt and Syria, the US would respond by sending its own ground troops to Israel.<sup>54</sup>

In Israel, Defense Minister Dayan and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon were reassuring the Israeli public that the government was in "no hurry" to negotiate a cease-fire and that the IDF had "ample time" to subdue the attack from Egypt and Syria.<sup>55</sup> After meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev, Secretary Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv to meet with Prime Minister Golda Meir to obtain her consent for a US-USSR negotiated cease fire agreement between Israel, Egypt and Syria. Meir gave her consent, and Kissinger returned to New York to call a meeting of the UN Security Council on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Security Council

passed Resolution 338 which called for an immediate end to hostilities between the warring parties “on the basis of the line of the front.”<sup>56</sup> By the 22<sup>nd</sup>, nearly all Soviet ground-to-air missile sites had been dismantled and the IDF was making a run for the port city of Ismailia in the south on the West side of the Canal. 6:52pm on October 22<sup>nd</sup> was the officially negotiated time the cease fire was to be implemented. By 9:00pm, IDF radio reported that fighting had not ceased. While the Prime Minister Meir and the Labor coalition had endorsed the UN cease fire, the Likud coalition—led by future Prime Minister Menachem Begin—opposed the cease fire, stating that Israel should not recognize a cease fire while Egyptian forces remained on Israeli territory east of the Canal. After an additional day of fighting, and another call from the Security Council for both sides to put down their weapons, the war was finally over at 1:00pm on October 24<sup>th</sup>.<sup>57</sup>

All told the Israeli military lost over 2,500 soldiers—but no civilians—in eighteen days of fighting. Egypt had lost well over 10,000 troops and Syria over 3,500. In addition to the mass casualties sustained during the war, a psychological barrier was broken between Israel and Egypt. For Israel, the country’s sense of military superiority and invincibility was eviscerated. The Egyptians were able to breach the Bar-Lev line and regain territory it had lost in the 1967 war—the first time Israel had lost any territory to an enemy. Additionally, the Egyptians had regained the honor they lost during the humiliating defeat in 1967; the military success of regaining territory in the Sinai had proven to the Egyptian people that their military was capable of repelling Israeli forces and forcing Israel to the negotiating table over the Sinai. The domestic consequences of the war would reverberate throughout Israeli society for decades to come. The end of the war would signal the end of the Labor Coalition’s monopoly on control of the



country's government since its founding in 1948, and would eventually lead the country towards a lasting peace agreement with its greatest enemy.<sup>58</sup>

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*Postwar negotiations – Nov. 1973 to Sept. 1974*

After aggression between the parties in the Yom Kippur War ended, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger began his famous “shuttle diplomacy” campaign between the capitals of Egypt, Israel and Syria. Secretary Kissinger saw the cease fire agreement as an opportunity to solidify a peace agreement in the Middle East. Though each country had agreed to stop firing upon one another, Egypt and Syria remained adamant in their opposition to direct negotiations—a significant hurdle to Kissinger’s hopes of a peace deal. To get around the obstacle, Kissinger decided that instead of calling the leaders of each party together to negotiate a final peace agreement in Geneva, he would travel between the capitals of each country carrying with him messages from each party to share with the others. Kissinger established himself as a messenger between diplomats, physically undertaking the diplomatic process between capitals in order to expedite a peace deal in enough time to keep all the parties at the table before peace would again become out of reach.<sup>59</sup>

For weeks Kissinger traveled back and forth between leaders. His ultimate goal was to convene a conference in Geneva where all parties to the Yom Kippur War would negotiate final terms to officially end the state of war and start creating a framework for a comprehensive peace initiative for the Middle East. Kissinger was able to secure attendance in Geneva from Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian leaders at a conference convened and co-chaired by the United States and Soviet Union; but noticeably absent were representatives from Syria. President Hafez al-Assad, arguably the most entrenched of the Arab leaders, never agreed to direct one-on-one

negotiations with Israel to establish peace.<sup>60</sup> According to Kissinger, however, during his shuttle diplomacy efforts Assad confided that although he was not willing to engage Israel in one-on-one talks, he was partial to the idea of group negotiations between Israel and her neighboring Arab states.<sup>61</sup>

In January 1974, after three months of diplomatic efforts trying to draw each party to Geneva without preconditions, representatives from Israel, Jordan, and Egypt convened a meeting with the US and Soviet Union. The result of this conference was the Sinai I Agreement. Sinai I established initial military disengagement conditions for Israel and Egypt in the Sinai. According to the agreement, Israel would withdraw her forces to a line 10 miles from the Suez Canal, abandoning all posts and removing all military equipment and installments.<sup>62</sup> In Israel's place, UN peacekeeping forces would fill the gap to ensure that peace endured in the region.<sup>63</sup>

Over the next nine months, Israel withdrew forces from the final ceasefire line and moved east five kilometers to the established Sinai I agreement line—the area which had been held by Israel since the 1967 war—relinquishing control of posts to UN peacekeeping forces.<sup>64</sup> In June 1974, Kissinger was also able to secure agreements from Israel and Syria in which Israeli forces would withdraw from the Golan Heights and UN Peacekeeping forces would take their place—ensuring that Syrian militants would not be able to continue their war of attrition against the Galilee and northern areas in Israel.<sup>65</sup>

During the Knesset election of 1973—postponed from October to December 31<sup>st</sup> due to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War—the Labor coalition was able to maintain its hold onto power. The political picture was beginning to change in Israel with the results of the election on December 31<sup>st</sup>. Even though Labor held onto power, they lost many seats to more conservative parties, this election would mark the end of an era of total Labor rule in Israel. Though the party

remained in power, the reputation of its leaders, especially its top military leaders, was detrimental to the party over the next several years.<sup>66</sup> For nearly three months, no agreement was made on a ruling coalition for the government. The Rafi faction of the Labor coalition, led by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, called for an all-party government coalition because of the significance of the political actions the new Knesset was about to undertake—namely, pursuing peace with Egypt. Two months into the coalition-building process, Yitzhak Rabin called upon the Labor Party Central Committee to solidify a coalition without incorporating the Likud party.<sup>67</sup>

Weeks later the final report from the Agranat Commission's investigation into the government's unpreparedness before the 1973 war was released.<sup>68</sup> The political aftermath sounded the death knell for the Labor party. Golda Meir resigned as leader of the Labor party and made her exit from the Israeli political arena. Many high ranking military leaders including Southern Front General Shmuel Gonen, Director of Army Intelligence Eli Zeira, and Chief of Staff to Golda Meir, David Elazar were also relieved of their posts. Notably, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was not recommended for dismissal by the Agranat Commission, though he would resign shortly following Yitzhak Rabin's rise to the position of Prime Minister.<sup>69</sup>

Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin attempted to negotiate a final separation agreement between Egypt and Israel three times between January 1974 and September 1975 in order to move on to permanent peace negotiations.<sup>70</sup> Finally, in September 1975 after another round of discussions in Geneva the Sinai II Agreement established the continued removal of Israeli forces eastward. This time the IDF relinquished one third of the Sinai Peninsula to UN peacekeepers. The lines established in the Sinai II Agreement would hold until the final peace deal between Egypt and Israel was signed in 1979.<sup>71</sup>

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*President Sadat's visit – Nov. 1977*

The years during the disengagement process were marked by tense relations within Israel and Egypt. Though both sides were working to establish a longer lasting peace, the domestic political situations on both sides were not conducive to the process. Throughout 1976 Egypt dealt with several monetary fluctuations due to its foreign currency holdings and enormous trade imbalances. Faced with harsh austerity measures forced upon it by the International Monetary Fund, on January 18, 1977 the Egyptian government announced cutbacks on government subsidies for a wide variety of products including sugar, flour, rice, cooking oil, cigarettes, and beer. Riots broke out in cities across Egypt protesting the austerity measures. With each passing day negotiations for peace looked more appealing to Sadat because war was even less tenable in light of Egypt's performance in the 1973 war, as well as the financial strain the country was experiencing.<sup>72</sup>

The domestic situation in Israel was not much prettier. The government was under harsh criticism from the press and the public in the years following the Agranat Commission Report. Increased military spending—devoted to maintaining order in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, and to the disengagement efforts in the Sinai and Golan Heights—crippled the Israeli economy and forced high inflation rates for several years. The Labor party in particular was blamed for this circumstance.<sup>73</sup> Their inability to act decisively on intelligence before the 1973 war forced Israel to take part in costly disengagement efforts that may not have been necessary if the government had mobilized earlier and reacted to Egyptian and Syrian military build-up before the war.<sup>74</sup>

Internal strife and disorganization coupled with the horrible blunder of the 1973 Yom Kippur War spelled the loss of Labor party control in Israel. In the three-and-a-half years since the end of the war, the Labor government had neither managed to revive its policies nor its institutions and leaders. To make matters even worse Minister of Housing Avraham Ofer and established Labor party member Yaakov Levinson were accused of financial corruption.<sup>75</sup> Eventually the scandals forced both men to commit suicide during the investigations process in 1977. Scandal after scandal left the Labor party battered and barely able to cling to power. In March 1977, the end of Labor rule was all but decided upon. In an article released by the Washington Post, and carried by the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, details of secret bank accounts held by Prime Minister Rabin's wife were revealed. Rabin's wife was setting money aside in a bank account while Rabin was the Israeli Ambassador to the United States—ultimately the accounts were discovered to be an oversight, not corrupt financial practice. Another small religious scandal eventually forced Yitzhak Rabin to resign power and call for elections to elect a new government.<sup>76</sup>

The May 1977 elections would prove to be a defining moment in Israeli history. For the first time since Israel's independence in 1948 the government would not be in the hands of the Labor party—the party of the founding father of Israel David Ben Gurion and military hero Moshe Dayan.<sup>77</sup> After 30 years under the Labor party's guidance, the Israeli government had accomplished many goals set out in its early days. It survived many large waves of immigration from the Arab world, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, four wars with its Arab neighbors, and constant attack in wars of attrition since 1956; but financial scandals and mismanagement during an hour of peril in 1973 forced Labor out and allowed the Likud party and its leader Menachem Begin to seize power and create a ruling coalition.<sup>78</sup>

In its fifteen point platform during the 1977 election, the Likud party advocated staunch positions on many areas; negotiations with the Arab states were no exception. Begin advocated for no concession “on the soil of the homeland,” calling, in fact, for increased military entrenchment, and more civilian settlements, both urban and rural.<sup>79</sup> The homeland—historic Judea and Samaria, or today the West Bank—was considered by many in the “rigid nationalist” camp to include the West Bank because it was part of the area under the original tribes of Israel thousands of years before. The area holds special religious significance to Jews as well. Hebron, which is located in the West Bank, is one of the holiest sites in Judaism. In addition to being the birth place of King David, the patriarchs of the Jewish people—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—were buried in Hebron, augmenting the area’s historical significance.<sup>80</sup>

Under the auspices of new Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski efforts were renewed to bring Egypt and Israel to the negotiation table for final peace talks on the Sinai Peninsula. After several attempts to convince the Labor led government in Israel to return lands for peace, Carter had to switch his attention to the more conservative Likud government in search of peace. Begin made no promises to Vance in the early months of the new government, citing the “grave danger” posed by a Palestinian “entity” west of the Jordan River. Begin preferred that the West Bank—or as he called it Judea and Samaria—become part of the state of Israel and that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan be turned over to the Palestinians for their own state.<sup>81</sup>

In August 1977 Begin showed signs of softening his position on concessions. Similar to his predecessor Yitzhak Rabin, Begin said Israel would not withdraw from the Golan Heights, nor was he interested in discussing territorial withdrawal in the West Bank or Gaza. However, on the Sinai Begin was considering “significant territorial withdrawal” in exchange for peace

negotiations with Egypt. Begin recognized, as Rabin had before him, that the key to success in negotiations was to remain in lockstep with the United States diplomatic team. Though the chasm between Egypt and Israel seemed nearly unbridgeable with regards to Palestinian autonomy, Secretary Vance saw room for compromise and an eventual peace deal in the Sinai.<sup>82</sup> Begin wanted to keep negotiations on Sinai moving forward to keep American—and Egyptian—attention off of the Palestinian problem, and Israel's continuation of settlement building in the West Bank. Sadat, under increasing pressure to alleviate economic and social unrest in Egypt, became favorable to direct negotiations with Begin without the participation of the other Arab countries. On September 16, 1977 Sadat's desires became known to the Israelis through a secret meeting between Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Tuhami.<sup>83</sup>

By November, Sadat's intentions were to become publicly known. In an address to the Egyptian Parliament on November 6<sup>th</sup>, Sadat announced his wish to speak to the Israeli Knesset, "I am willing to go to the ends of the earth for peace. Israel will be astonished to hear me say now, before you, that I am prepared to go to their own house, to the Knesset itself, to talk to them."<sup>84</sup> Sadat's speech was met with utter disbelief in Israel. Many government leaders believed Sadat's words were merely false piety, that he was using rhetoric to score political points with Washington and that he did not truly stand behind his words. In response, Menachem Begin announced that if Sadat truly desired a visit to the Knesset he would be welcomed. An official invitation was relayed via United States diplomatic cables to Sadat, who officially accepted the invitation and planned a visit for the 19<sup>th</sup> of November.<sup>85</sup>

President Sadat's reception by the government leaders and the public of Israel was nothing short of an historic psychological breakthrough. People flooded the streets of Jerusalem

cheering, waving flags and rejoicing, for this was the first time an Arab leader had visited—and thereby recognized—the State of Israel. Surely, the people believed, if an Arab leader was willing to give de facto recognition to—by virtue of visiting Jerusalem—the Israeli state, a peace treaty was within reach. The leaders greeted each other with peaceful words. Sadat’s first words to Begin were “No more war. Let us make peace,” and Golda Meir, the former Prime Minister during the Yom Kippur War, greeted Sadat by saying “we’ve been waiting for you a long time.”<sup>86</sup> After landing at the airport in Tel Aviv, Sadat checked-in at his hotel, prayed at the al-Aqsa mosque at the Temple Mount, and the next day he addressed the Knesset. To the surprise of many Sadat declared the end of war between Israel and Egypt, “Tell your sons that the past war (1973 Yom Kippur War) was the last of wars and the end of sorrows.”<sup>87</sup> Sadat’s visit broke down the psychological barriers that had historically blocked the path to peace. Sadat proved to the Israeli people, and to his own people, that he was interested not only in regaining lands lost to Israel in 1967 but he was also interested in genuine peace and the opening of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state—something no other Arab leader had ever considered.<sup>88</sup>

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#### *Camp David Accords – Sep. 1978*

In the months between the Egyptian President’s visit and the Camp David Accords, several attempts were made to take advantage of the groundbreaking initiative offered by Sadat; but each effort subsequently failed. In order to save the peace process and to bring Egypt out of the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, US President Jimmy Carter called upon the leaders of Egypt and Israel to join him at a Summit Conference in the US in order to design a framework for a comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East. On September 5, 1978, Prime Minister Begin and his negotiating team were the first to arrive at Camp David. As they landed at



the small airstrip nearby, President Carter and his wife awaited them on the tarmac. Quickly swept away into sequestration President Carter escorted his guests to their cabins on the Camp David grounds. Everyone at the Accords summit would stay in cabins on the premises so as to stay away from the prying eyes of the media. No members of the press were invited to the Accords process. Carter wanted the leaders of Israel and Egypt to feel comfortable expressing their true positions to one another without feeling obligated to stick to talking points for their audiences at home.<sup>89</sup>

For several hours Begin and Carter conversed openly with each other on a range of topics not including peace or the accords process. President Sadat and his negotiating team arrived a short time later and were again escorted by President and Mrs. Carter to their cabins on the Camp David grounds. Having had little time to settle in, Sadat was pulled aside by Secretary of State Vance to President Carter's personal cabin where he met Prime Minister Begin and President Carter to discuss the official procedure of the accords, after which negotiations began. Carter started the negotiations with a meeting between himself, Secretary of State Vance, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin. Each party was allowed time to lay out their positions on a host of issues uninterrupted by the others. Carter wanted to ensure that each leader had the opportunity to make their positions perfectly clear from the outset. Begin began the discussions.<sup>90</sup>

In no minced words, Begin assured the group that his positions had changed little since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem the year prior. While Israel was ready and willing to return the Sinai Peninsula in return for an agreement of peace with the Egyptians the other territories captured in the Six Day War were to remain off limits in the negotiations at Camp David. The historic lands of Judea and Samaria, to Begin and his party, were historically integral to the Land of Israel.

Like the issues in the West Bank, the Palestinian problem was to remain unaddressed at the Camp David summit. In Begin's eyes, the accords process was an opportunity to build a bilateral peace agreement with Egypt, as facilitated by the US and President Carter; but not to settle disputes with the other Arab countries not represented at the summit. Beyond these restrictions everything else was up for discussion: permanent non-aggression, the determination of final borders between Israel and Egypt, the status of Jerusalem which had been reunited in 1967, the passage of Israeli ships and cargo through the Suez Canal and Red Sea without problems.<sup>91</sup>

President Sadat was of the same vein of reasoning as Begin. His negotiating positions had changed little since his visit to the Knesset in the previous November. Sadat insisted upon the full military and civilian withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, both of which had been under Egypt's control from 1948 to 1967, as well as all other Arab territories including the Golan Heights and the West Bank. As Sadat had made perfectly clear, his intention at the accords was to both make peace with Israel bilaterally, but also to begin negotiating a final peace deal between Israel and her other neighbors—mainly with the Palestinians. Sadat's main motivation behind peace with the Palestinian population was his view of himself as the leader of the Arab world.<sup>92</sup> Though he was shunned by many of his Arab counterparts, and was kicked out of the Arab League, Sadat recognized the power and size of Egypt as a significant and influential force that could help bring about peace, with or without the help of the other Arab countries. Regardless, Sadat came to the peace conference in the mindset that he was representing each and every Arab state in the region.<sup>93</sup>

The first three days were hardly successful. In separate meetings with Begin and Sadat, President Carter asked the respective leaders to present their entourage's proposals for concessions in the negotiations; but what Carter found when he asked this question was anything

but compromise. The President had invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David under the stipulation that both parties would arrive without preconditions for negotiations, ready to seriously discuss concessions both sides would be willing to take. On one hand, Sadat presented his proposal replete with stipulations that were sure to be rejected by the Israeli delegation; on the other hand, Begin offered areas in which he would be able to compromise—but laid out demands the Egyptians were to fulfill before the Israelis could agree to a settlement.

Sadat demanded that: the Israelis return all land occupied in 1967, extend the right of return to all Palestinians or compensate them; pay for the damage to military and civilian property in the 1973 war; pay for the oil Israel mined after it discovered oil in the Sinai; remove all settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai; and assist in building the Palestinian state within 5 years of the signing of a peace treaty with Egypt. Begin would agree to almost none of this. He demanded that Israeli settlements remain in the Sinai;<sup>94</sup> Israel would be allowed to maintain security installments on its eastern borders both in the Golan and the West Bank; Egypt would assist in normalizing relations including an exchange of diplomats; Egypt would agree to a demilitarized Sinai if Israel would demilitarize its border with Egypt; and Egypt would allow Israeli ships and goods to flow through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran unimpeded.<sup>95</sup>

The meeting ended abruptly with the exchange of expectations from both countries. Sadat recommended that he and his party leave in order to get familiar with the camp and discuss the Israel's demands. The Egyptian delegation left Carter's cabin for a walk around the facility, except Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel—Anwar Sadat's Foreign Minister and close trusted legal counsel—who returned to his cabin in a fury. Kamel became enraged upon Begin's presentation of Israeli positions on the peace deal, "The Israeli attitude rests on an erroneous racist belief, which dominates their thinking and governs their behavior—namely, that they are God's Chosen

People. Accordingly, whatever they believe, their rights transcend the rights of others.”<sup>96</sup> Kamel, offended by the Israeli’s ‘sense of entitlement,’ would remain through the end of the Accords process, but was not a signatory to the document. His resentment for Israel stemmed from his country’s experience in the 1967 and 1973 wars. Egypt sustained heavy casualties during both wars—and through neither had they managed to regain all the territory they had lost to Israel. This damaged sense of national dignity was not exclusively held by Kamel but also by vast swaths of the Egyptian public who felt they lost their national prowess during the Six Day War.

Equally disgruntled on day three was Prime Minister Begin. After Sadat presented Egypt’s carefully crafted framework for peace, Begin returned to his cabin enraged, “[They] address us as if we are a defeated nation...they demand we pay compensation for damages incurred by Egyptian civilians, I would like them to know that we also claim damages from them!”<sup>97</sup> By this point in the negotiations Sadat—angered by Prime Minister Begin’s outright rejection of his framework for peace—was threatening to leave Camp David and thereby end the peace talks, and Begin was preparing to return to Israel decrying Sadat’s initiative as insincere. In order to save the talks, Carter asked the parties to remain at Camp David while he and his team crafted a new strategy that would appeal to both sides.

For the next two days President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski created a new plan for finalizing a peace between Egypt and Israel. Because the two men were clearly unwilling to make concessions to the other, Carter decided that instead of trying to plead with the leaders to make peace he would attempt to threaten them into making peace. Carter began his attempts with Prime Minister Begin. In order to encourage concession from the Israelis—mainly on the point of the Sinai settlements—Carter said a future defense agreement between the United States and Israel would be reconsidered if Israel did not

show flexibility in negotiations.<sup>98</sup> The President spoke to Sadat in a similar manner. In order to bring Egypt closer to Israeli positions Carter reminded the Egyptian President that the status of any future military and economic assistance offered to Egypt relied on the results of the Camp David Accords. These threats combined with a detailed agreement—crafted by neither the Israelis nor the Egyptians but by the Americans, a neutral third party—formed the bulk of Carter’s new strategy to forging peace between Israel and Egypt. Carter’s original outline for comprehensive peace covered many wide-ranging issues:

- An end to war.
- Permanent peace.
- Unrestricted passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.
- Secure and recognized borders.
- Diplomatic recognition and an exchange of ambassadors.
- Phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula.
- An end to blockades and boycotts from both countries.
- Abolition of the Israeli military government in the occupied territories.
- Full autonomy for the Palestinians.
- Determination of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza strip within five years, based on UN Resolution 242.
- Withdrawal of Israeli military into specified security locations.
- A prompt and just settlement of the refugee problem.
- Definition of the final status of Jerusalem.
- An end to Israeli settlements in Sinai.
- No new Israeli settlements or expansion of existing ones in the occupied territories until all negotiations are complete.
- Formal signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt within three months.<sup>99</sup>

In an about-face that likely saved the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, Carter backed away from some of the key elements of the comprehensive peace agreement he originally envisioned. In his first—of 23—proposed framework documents at Camp David, Carter amended several key provisions in order to appease both leaders. Instead of demanding the withdrawal of all Israeli settlements in Sinai—a key point Carter knew Begin would focus on

exclusively—the new framework called for a halt to expansion of Israeli settlements and small border changes based on the 1967 armistice lines. Carter intentionally kept issues such like settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the final decision on the West Bank and Gaza out of his initial proposals in order to draw on some compromises from both Begin and Sadat. At the end of the sixth day, the American team presented their proposal to Begin, Ezer Weizman, and Moshe Dayan. While Weizman and Dayan initially agreed to review the document and counter with their own proposals the following day, Begin insisted on addressing the issues he saw immediately upon receiving the American proposal. Begin demanded that all references to UN Resolution 242 be removed and that any mention of Palestinian autonomy be corrected to reflect Israel's final say in all future Palestinian political initiatives—Carter took issue with Begin's demands and became enraged. Carter asked the Israelis to continue to review the document and said they must accept some compromise if they ever wished to come to an agreement.

Day seven was devoted to presenting the American proposal to the Egyptian delegation. The proposal was met with an equally obdurate attitude from the Egyptians. “Clearly contaminated by Israeli attitudes,” Sadat outright rejected the American proposal as it did not provide provisions for complete Palestinian autonomy. Sadat argued that while he and his delegation were at liberty to be flexible on security issues and matters of free passage through the Suez and the Straits of Tiran, he did not have the authority—nor did he have the will—to make a comprehensive agreement on the Palestinian issue without the support and participation of the other interested Arab states.<sup>100</sup>

By day eight, Carter had finally devised a strategy he hoped would save the talks and push the delegations towards real progress. Instead of creating one comprehensive peace deal to appease all parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Carter suggested two separate, but linked

agreements. One agreement, “A Framework for Peace in Sinai,” would exclusively deal with Israel and Egypt’s disputes in the Sinai Peninsula. The other agreement, “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” would create a framework to finalize a comprehensive agreement between Israel and all of her Arab neighbors while establishing rights and autonomy for the Palestinians.<sup>101</sup> Carter’s newest plan pleased Begin, but he would not indicate as much until the end of the Accords; but the new plan worried Sadat, who though separating the two agreements allowed Israel to obtain the security measures it desired without having to come to a final agreement on the Palestinian issues.

To reinforce his new strategy, Carter asked that alternative representatives from each delegation be selected in order to make progress. Each meeting Carter held with both Begin and Sadat ended in anger, frustration, and intransigence. Aharon Barak was selected to represent the Israeli interests in negotiations and Osama el-Baz was selected to represent the Egyptian delegations interests.<sup>102</sup> Throughout days ten and eleven intense negotiations that covered all the major points of disagreement were discussed. Carter, Baz and Barak shuttled back and forth between their respective colleagues and returned with any suggested changes or concessions from their delegations. Ultimately, a final peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was blocked by one issue that both sides refused to concede—the Israeli settlements in the Sinai. Amounting to a total of 2,000 inhabitants across thirteen villages, a seemingly minute issue prevented a final agreement between Egypt and Israel. Begin argued that without the presence of such settlements, nothing would deter the Egyptians from crossing the Suez and making war with Israel again; this fact, he claimed, would prevent him from ever dismantling a single Israeli settlement. On the other hand, Sadat said he could never agree to a final treaty which allowed Israeli settlers to remain on occupied land.

Day twelve, what would be the second-to-last day of the Camp David Accords, was a monumental day in negotiations. Carter confronted both Sadat and Begin with the prospects of what each stood to lose if they could not find a way to reach a final agreement.<sup>103</sup> Faced with the fact that Israel might sour relations with the US—its only major international ally—and increasing pressure from the Israeli public to finally bring peace to the war-fatigued nation, Begin agreed to language that would ultimately place the fate of Israeli settlements in Sinai in the hands of the Knesset rather than making such a declaration himself. Begin's intransigence on the Sinai settlement issue had blocked the finalization of a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel. Now the pressure was on Sadat to help close the negotiations. With Begin's assurance that he would allow the Knesset to decide the fate of the Sinai settlements, Sadat hesitantly agreed to allow the separation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations from a larger settlement agreement on the Arab-Israeli conflict—a concession that would eventually cost Sadat his life.

Finally, after two weeks of intense negotiations fraught with threats and heated arguments, Israel, the United States, and Egypt exchanged formal letters acknowledging their agreement to both frameworks drafted by the United States. Israel and Egypt would work together to establish a timeline for withdrawal of their forces from the Sinai Peninsula; Egypt and Israel would normalize relations and allow the free flow of trade through international waterways; the Israeli Knesset would take up the issue of Israeli settlements in Sinai within two weeks of the finalization of negotiations at Camp David; and Egypt would agree to recognize Israel and agree to keep the Sinai demilitarized. The second agreement for a comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East was left vague however. Carter's desire to tackle such controversial topics as the status of Palestinian refugees; the final status of Jerusalem; the establishment of final borders; the structure and eventual powers of a Palestinian state; and



Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories were left for open for discussion at a future date. To this day, the second framework agreement has never been finalized between Israel, the Palestinians, and the rest of the Arab world.

The Israeli public opinion on peace negotiations fluctuated and differed throughout the time between the Yom Kippur War to the Camp David Accords. From no discussion of peace during the Yom Kippur War, to considering peace with the disengagement agreement, to believing peace to be just around the corner, Israeli public opinion was dynamic and responsive to events related to the security and territorial integrity of the nation. In order to understand the different aspects and perspectives of public opinion in Israel, one can look to newspapers as repositories of public opinion and discourse. Examining editorials of newspapers that represent diverse political perspectives can bring to light the nuanced changes in public opinion about the peace negotiation process. Editorials can also help track public opinion over time because newspapers, typically, maintain the same political view over time, reading the differences in tone and vocabulary between editorials of the same paper can shed light on changes in opinion for each major political perspective left-leaning, moderate, and right-leaning.

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### *The Press in Israel*

The 1967 war fundamentally altered the way Israelis perceived their country's status in the Middle East and on the international stage.<sup>104</sup> Journalism, especially newspaper journalism, was of great importance during the Six Day War. While some Israelis turned to radio for their news beginning in the late 1950s, a large majority of citizens relied on print newspapers for their daily news updates, among them the most popular were Maariv, Haaretz, Yedioth Ahronoth, Davar, and The Jerusalem Post.<sup>105</sup> Newspapers provided comprehensive daily coverage of the

war effort including reports from the battlefield, on domestic preparations and mobilization to help the war effort, coverage of official government statements and updates on the war, and analysis from leading experts on politics in Israel. As such it is important to understand the effect newspapers had on informing the people of Israel about the war.

Understanding the perspective and editorial opinion of writers during the war period will help provide an understanding of the information and analysis Israelis were receiving about the war and the government's handling of the aftermath. With the understanding of Israeli journalists' writing opinions it becomes easier to recognize how Israeli public opinion during the war and the period following the war was shaped. Newspapers in Israel play a special role in the public sphere because many newspapers were responsible for disseminating widely held political opinions, which were applied analytically to the events of the time.<sup>106</sup>

An editorial from the first day of the war that appeared in the daily newspaper Davar—the official newspaper of the ruling Labor coalition—shows the poetic style journalists used to convey their messages, “The IDF in all divisions and ranks is well-trained and coordinated as a result of a prolonged and continuous effort – better than ever before – thanks to the far-sighted investments invested by those in charge of the defense system in the past years. Army command is experienced and resourceful at all levels – and it is the army of the people.”<sup>107</sup> Although reporters in Israel attempted to remain objective in their reporting, even allowing government censorship of published content in the early decades of the state, emotions and subjective opinions showed through in some articles—especially with regards to the many wars as a result of Israel's short but storied history with its neighbors, “We will be safe in our righteousness and united in our ranks. We will stand in the knowledge that we can only rely on ourselves – because all of our efforts for a political solution bore no fruit. We will encourage much sympathy from

enlightened thinkers in different parts of the world for the many struggles in front of us. We will stand with them, emboldened by their identification with us as our Jewish brothers. We will meet the test.”<sup>108</sup>

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### *The Proliferation of Israeli Journalism*

The institutionalization of professional practices and censorship was fundamental to the establishment of credibility in the domestic Israeli media. For example, the Editors’ Committee, established well before the founding of the Jewish state, was created by political leaders to disseminate information to the editors of Israel’s daily newspapers that the government wished to keep secret. While the committee was primarily used to keep military information away from the public eye, the government used the committee to help assist the creation of a new Israeli culture by cherry-picking information it saw as detrimental to the Zionist cause and formation of a new Israeli society. The committee also served more traditional censorship purposes such as preventing the dissemination of military information that enemies might be able to use to locate Israeli targets.<sup>109</sup>

In 1963 members of the National Federation of Journalists, the Editors Council, newspaper owners, and the public came together to establish the Israeli Press Council—a body charged with holding the Israeli press accountable to their standards of journalistic integrity. Endowed with power to censure newspapers and journalists for violating journalistic codes of ethics, the Israeli Press Council was a mechanism by which the public could ensure the freedom of the press, “the operating principles of the [Israeli Press] Council were imbedded in the concepts of public accountability: the press is the public’s tool in its quest for establishing the accountability of various authorities, and the council is the public’s tool for establishing the

accountability of the press.”<sup>110</sup> While the press held the government accountable for its actions, the Press Council held the press accountable for its own actions. The creation of such a council emphasizes the paramount importance the press still plays in both informing the public and opining on current events.<sup>111</sup>

While the press was primarily focused on “opinion-making” during the first two decades of its existence in the State of Israel, a shift occurred in the mid-1960s that transformed the purpose of reporting in Israel’s news outlets, “...Israeli journalism was becoming more focused on reporting, while it provided less in-depth analysis.”<sup>112</sup> Disagreements about the sources of such a shift exist today. Many party-affiliated journalists saw the decline in in-depth analysis of current events as a result of “revenue-seeking” journalism (a pot-shot aimed at private, independent newspapers); but most private-affiliated journalists saw the decline as a result of “rigidity and predictability” in party-affiliated newspapers.<sup>113</sup>

With the proliferation of Israeli television news, in addition to already existing radio news Kol Yisrael, Israeli newspaper reporting underwent a transformation during the 1970s. Because print media had to compete with television news, a new-comer to the reporting business in Israel, circulation numbers and the clout of print media in Israel declined.<sup>114</sup> Many newspaper organizations changed both physical and ideological components of their papers in order to attract more readers and regain significance in the changing world of media in Israel. Under editor Hannah Zemer’s leadership, Davar—a left-leaning newspaper affiliated with the Mapai and Labor parties—took a more critical editorial slant and re-devoted its mission to reporting major news events, rather than analyzing news events.<sup>115</sup>

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*Israeli Journalism and the 1967 War*

A more extensive look at the editors of the major Israeli newspapers during the time of the 1967 war will provide a richer understanding of how public opinion was shaped during and after the war. An editor's view on an event's importance and their analysis of those events permeates throughout the paper. From the placement of articles in the paper, to the views expressed in the editorial column, to the determination of which stories get covered, editors have an agenda that sends a message about the value the editor places in certain stories and their views on those stories, "...the main task of journalists is to select socially 'marked' events out of a never ending flow of occurrences, place those events within a context, and construct around them a meaningful continuum...[and] the documentation of the present and the interpretation of the past."<sup>116</sup>

Hannah Zemer, editor of the leftist newspaper Davar, served in her role for twenty years from 1970-1990. In her time as editor, the paper introduced widely popular new features like a weekly magazine insert for youth, more space devoted to editorial and opinion pieces, comedic and artistic publications in additional sections of the newspaper, and much more.<sup>117</sup> While she was associated with the Mapai and, later, the Labor parties, she maintained a strong commitment to more objective reporting and editorializing than her predecessors at Davar.<sup>118</sup> Zemer's sharp-tongued, critical political commentary was a departure from the party-line, generally agreeable tone of the previous editors of Davar. Their kowtowing to Labor positions on most issues did not sit well with Zemer as evidenced by the critical tone evident in many of her editorial columns on politics during the 70s and 80s.<sup>119</sup>

Gershom Schocken, a heavy weight by Israeli journalistic standards, was the editor of Haaretz newspaper for 51 years. Schocken's association with the Progressive Party in Israel

shown through in the paper's "liberal yet nonpartisan" editorial view.<sup>120</sup> Schocken was an editor with an experience unlike any other editor in Israel. Schocken's newspaper, Haaretz, was Israel's first non-party-affiliated newspaper, for which he served from the pre-state (1939) period until well into the post-state period (1990).<sup>121</sup> Schocken witnessed a great shift in the role of the media—especially the newspaper—in Israeli society. During the first two decades of statehood, Israeli's media was dominated by the party newspaper system, in which all major parties owned, staffed, and operated a daily or weekly newspaper. In order to spread their ideology and inform party members about important party information, party newspapers were fundamental to the political and social development of Israeli society. Schocken, for his part, utilized his editorial post in a critical way; without the burden of party affiliation and heavy-handed party editorializing Schocken was free to critique the government, even when the ruling coalition included his own party, the Progressive Party.<sup>122</sup>

Schocken used his critical editorial style to draw in a large group of readers who were leaving party newspapers in droves during the 1970s. As party papers became mired in dense and wordy stories with "flowery, poetic language," independent newspapers were free to run stories that enticed more readers with simple everyday language; and as such, the life of the political party newspaper in Israel had met its end. The split between the first and second eras in Israeli journalism can be defined as the era of party papers and the rise of independent media.<sup>123</sup> The rise of a second era of Israeli journalism was demarcated by the quasi-critical nature of the press. While the press did not hold itself to the responsibility of keeping government and party officials responsible for their actions, the papers did take it upon themselves to find their political niche upon which their editorial lines would criticize or stand behind the actions of the government. Party papers found themselves at odds with their original ideals of the responsibility of the press

and the new demands of media consumers—deliver the party message and facilitate intraparty dialogue, or cover stories that critique the government and its actions.<sup>124</sup>

Starting after the 1967 war the Israeli press began to undergo major changes. At the same time that party papers began their long steady decline into extinction, newspaper editors and reporters started taking on a more critical view of the Israeli government. Many criticized the government for its handling of the diplomatic crisis that precipitated the 1967 war, especially Prime Minister Levi Eshkol.<sup>125</sup> Authors differ on Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's performance during the conflict. Some historians, like Michael Oren, found fault with Dayan's indecisive nature during the war, changing his position on issues from day to day.<sup>126</sup> Before the 1967 War, few newspapers published articles criticizing the government—especially not during the war. While no major newspapers directly criticized the government's action, the aftermath of the war brought articles aimed at faults with the Israeli government, and particularly the Labor coalition's management of the government.

Cracks in the Labor coalition system that were exposed after 1967 were eventually tested to their limits in 1973 after the outbreak of the surprise Yom Kippur War in October, widespread criticism from the left and right was directed at the Labor party after the Yom Kippur war for their mistakes leading up to Yom Kippur.<sup>127</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, an independent English-language newspaper which today editorializes with the right side of the political spectrum, often took a critical tone when addressing stories related to the government. Throughout the late sixties and early seventies when the paper was owned by the Histadrut,<sup>128</sup> *The Jerusalem Post* took a more favorable view of the government—essentially lobbying less harsh criticisms. This policy changed, however, after the change in government from Labor to Likud leadership. After printing scathing criticisms of the Labor government near the end of that coalition's claim to

power, the *Jerusalem Post* under Editor Ted Lurie adopted a less critical tone when Menachem Begin and the Likud coalition came to power.<sup>129</sup> While Lurie often advocated a critical view of the government in the last years of his tenure with the *Jerusalem Post* (1955-1974), the newspaper's general political stance was aligned with a center-right perspective. After Lurie's sudden death in 1974, the newspaper was sold to the Hollinger Group in 1976, a Canadian publishing house, and adopted a more solidly right wing perspective, around and after the Camp David summit.<sup>130</sup>

After the war of 1967, a false sense of security fell over Israel. It was believed that because of Israel's swift and decisive victory over the Arabs, the 1967 War would serve as a reminder of Israel's power—especially its ability to fight wars without direct assistance from a superpower. It would take six years, until the traumatic experience of the Yom Kippur War, for the Israeli government to realize that it depended up its superpower ally the United States more than had been previously recognized. Without a key airlift of ammunition during the middle of the war, Israel may have been hard pressed to achieve the outcome it obtained during disengagement processes in 1974.<sup>131</sup>

The sloppy work of the Yom Kippur War, or as some journalists likes to call it “the Debacle,”<sup>132</sup> permanently changed the role of the press in Israeli society. Abandoning their previously favorable opinions towards government positions and actions, the Israeli press adopted a more critical role as a check on government control of information. Danny Bloch, a reporter and later an assistant editor at Davar explained, “I don't accept the idea that the role of the press is to keep up morale. Its major role is to deliver accurate information, expose the truth, *criticize* and sound warnings. The role of the press today is to make every effort to open



additional paths to independent sources of information, so that we will not be dependent on one source that is not prepared to reveal everything.”<sup>133</sup>

The Israeli press experienced a transformative phase during and after the 1967 Six Day War. While criticism was not widely practiced during or immediately after the war, newspapers and their editorial lines began to take on more critical voices on government related stories. Harsh critiques of the government, and general suspicion of the Israeli government was the general tone of most newspapers after the Yom Kippur War well into the 1980s when Israel’s print media took on additional competition in the cable news industry, when newspapers started to decline in their societal influence. The 1960s and 1970s were evolutionary years for the Israeli newspaper industry. Transformations in professional values and beliefs, particularly relating to government information, lead Israeli newspapers to adopt critical editorial lines and to become more secular, and free of party control. Regardless, the surviving newspapers continued to reflect the many political perspectives, and espouse the diverse opinions of the Israeli public.

**– Reading Between The Lines –**

Newspapers serve as a unique source for public opinion and discourse, especially during times of political upheaval and change. Reviewing newspapers is especially useful when examining political events because major political actions are often the center of many news stories and deeper, more critical analysis in opinion pieces and editorial columns. Newspapers also serve as a repository of public opinion and discourse. In the days before Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, platforms for mass public discussion on major issues were limited – most of the public utilized the press in order to espouse their political opinions and beliefs in the form of commentary, opinion, editorial, and letters to the editor.

Examining the editorials of newspapers in Israel provides accessible, representative insight into Israeli public opinion during a time period in which many Israelis relied on newspapers as their primary source of news consumption – and therefore their principal source for analysis and discussion of major political developments, cultural phenomena, and social movements. The nature of the Israeli media provides an easy framework with which to capture a diversity of political opinions held by the public between the Yom Kippur War and the Camp David Accords. Analyzing editorials from several papers which represent different political perspectives held in Israeli society will help capture public opinion on events between 1973 and 1978.

Reading these editorials carefully – paying attention to the changes in tone, message, and political perspective – will reveal whether there was, as many scholars suggest, a momentous, and abrupt change in public opinion towards peace with Egypt after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem or if there was a more gradual change in public opinion over that same period. Focusing analysis on editorials will explain the how Israeli public opinion changed regarding peace with the Egyptians. Five major political events related to the peace would serve as good points of reference to track the change of public opinion over time, The Yom Kippur War in 1973, the approval of the disengagement agreement by the Knesset in 1974, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the time immediately preceding the Camp David Accords, and a point at the end of the peace negotiations at Camp David.

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### *Yom Kippur War*

The first event for which newspaper editorials were chosen for analysis was the Yom Kippur War, specifically the third day of the Yom Kippur War. This day was an especially

important day for Israel during the war as this was the first day in which they were able to gain back position that was lost to the Egyptians at the outset of the war. Additionally, the United States authorized a military and civilian aid airlift to Israel to counterweight the lines of military support the Soviet Union was directing towards Egypt and Syria. The supplies would reach Israel on day four and five, just before ammunitions stockpiles were completely depleted.

Israeli public opinion was unified at this point of the war. Israelis were universally supportive of the mobilization effort, and would eventually become critical of the government for not taking action quickly enough. Though the public opinion was universally supportive, the various newspapers examined reflected very different tones when discussing the ongoing war effort. A *Haaretz* editorial—*Haaretz* represented the right wing ideology during the 1970s—from the third day of the war takes a very realist stance on Israel's defensive efforts and the war that was rapidly unfolding. The editors expressed their view that the US and Russia were not interested in intervening in the war but would rather, "leave it to the Middle East to determine the struggle amongst themselves... the regional powers will be given the [responsibility] to find the balance based on the relative real powers between them."<sup>134</sup> Clearly the right leaning political perspective believed that Israel had a right to use its military force to repel the offensive attacks by Egypt and Syria and that the super powers had not right to intervene in such a regional conflict.

A *Jerusalem Post* article takes a different perspective from the right side of the political spectrum, focusing attention on the internal war effort and the international community's incredulity toward the war. This editorial, interestingly, points out that the Israeli government "knowingly allowed [the Egyptians and the Syrians] to launch the attack and which [they] admit to launching the attack."<sup>135</sup> The previous war had been fought with Israel striking the first blow

in the war. This language seems to imply the *Jerusalem Post*—again a newspaper with an editorial line aligned with the opposition party—thought the government knew Egypt and Syria would strike first and knowingly allowed them to cause the first strike. Similar in tone to the *Haaretz* article, this editorial defines the war in such terms that Israel’s counter attack is justifiable regardless of what the international community says because they were not the aggressors, and therefore are allowed to respond without international intervention.

The moderate newspaper *Maariv*, published two short editorial pieces that were very similar in nature to both the *Haaretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* editorials. *Maariv* most explicitly explained the view that Israel was not the aggressor in this Yom Kippur War and should not be treated as such on the international community. The tone of the *Maariv* editorial also takes on a more existential, alarmed tone compared to the *Jerusalem Post* article, describing the war as such, “the dominant feeling was that we were in a war of existence, a war of life or death, this time, though we still are in the defensive stage there is no doubt—not at home nor abroad—that we will win.”<sup>136</sup> *Maariv*’s message remained virtually the same as the messages of *Haaretz* and *Jerusalem Post*, but took a more solidly patriotic stance against the attack by Egypt and Syria, firm in the belief that Israel would again rise from war victorious.

The *Davar* editorial from the same day is the only editorial examined that differed in message on the third day of the war. *Davar* editor Hillel Danzig directed the editorial to the working and middle class of Israel; geared toward both religious and secular audiences. Danzig offers considerations the Egyptians did not deliberate when executing their attack on the holiest day in Judaism, “The concentration of the majority of citizens in the synagogues and in their homes, and the absence of vehicular traffic on the roads – eased the work of recalling the draftees more than in any regular work day and any normal transportation day.”<sup>137</sup> Danzig points

out that the Egyptians thought that Israel would have been caught off guard, allowing their forces to make additional advances that they otherwise could not have made if the IDF was able to mobilize more quickly. On the contrary, Danzig argues, the fact that few people were working and the absence of daily traffic allowed the IDF to mobilize more quickly—allowing the opposite of what the Egyptians expected to occur.

While the papers occupying the center and right of the political spectrum (*Maariv*, *Haaretz*, and *The Jerusalem Post*) were more firm in rhetoric and tone while focusing on the military aspects of the war effort, *Davar*—on the left of the political scale—appealed to the civilian aspect of the war effort. The divergences in editorials on the Yom Kippur War represent the relative differences in approach to political issues among the political parties in Israel. The ruling Labor Coalition included religious parties, which likely influenced the mention of the religious considerations surrounding the war effort. Therefore, *Davar*, the Labor Party's newspaper, emphasized religion in their editorial whereas the other papers had no major religious base to appeal to.

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#### *Yom Kippur War Disengagement Agreement*

Three months later, the mood in the country had changed dramatically from strong, patriotic arguments in support of the public and the IDF to discussions on the merits of the disengagement agreement and the prospects for future normalization of relations. Each of the four papers addressed the final Knesset debate on whether to approve the disengagement agreement (Sinai I Agreement) with Egypt from different perspectives. While *Haaretz* chose to discuss the composition of the governing coalition—and the necessity for a broad coalition of the political parties to approve of such an agreement—*Maariv* and *The Jerusalem Post* chose to

editorialize about the content of the agreement, and *Davar*, expressing views of the more dovish members of Israeli society, chose to publish an editorial discussing the opportunity the disengagement agreement provided for pursuing a broader peace with Egypt.

The *Haaretz* editorial from January 23, 1974 discusses the Knesset debate on the disengagement agreement and comments on the necessity for the alignment of a broader government coalition to approve of such a historic agreement. *Haaretz* reflects the opinions of the right wing when calling upon the Labor coalition to invite members of the Likud bloc to join the government and have a say in the final terms of the agreement,

“as far as there is a dispute between the two parties, it does not revolve around the size of the territories that should be returned. Rather about what would be gained in return. If this is the case it is important that decisions on these matters would be accepted by large numbers of the public’s representatives. It is possible that such an agreement would be harder to achieve among Likud members and easier among MAFDAL and independent liberals.”<sup>138</sup>

*Haaretz* goes as far as to say that the Labor negotiators had done little in attempting to persuade Likud to join the government following the election in late December 1973. The only time they were included, according to the editorial, was “in the demand of the MAFDAL (the religious party in the Labor coalition) to establish a national emergency government,” which would force decisions to be made by a government composed of the major political parties, thereby inviting Likud, the second largest political party, into the decision making process.<sup>139</sup> It is evident that the editorial perspective of *Haaretz* remained very right-leaning, reflecting doubt in any disengagement agreement that is not accepted by a wide majority of the public’s representatives in the Knesset.

In contrast, *The Jerusalem Post* editorial from the same day is dedicated to the content of the disengagement and the debate on it in the Knesset; focusing mostly on the different political perspectives espoused during the debate. Much of the editorial represents a change in position

from a patriotic tone to one cautiously hopeful for future peace between Egypt and Israel. The editors concede that while the government was constitutionally permitted to sign the agreement without Knesset approval but they also say that government leaders should have sought the approval of the Knesset prior to officially signing the agreement. In a shift to a slightly more moderate position, *The Jerusalem Post* criticized the opposition party's lack of proposed alternative to the agreement which was signed by government officials the week before, saying, "neither Mr. Begin nor the Likud's new defense spokesman, Mr. Ariel Sharon, offered the House a set of proposals which could be put up alongside the government's actions and policies as a feasible alternative."<sup>140</sup> The editorial continues the shift towards a more moderate perspective, from a more right-leaning one during the Yom Kippur War, by also promoting cautious optimism in light of the new agreement with Egypt, "the disengagement agreement, if it results as planned in the normalization of life in the Canal region, would give the sides a first taste of peaceful coexistence at least in this limited area. And this may hold out some hope of further progress."<sup>141</sup>

Likewise, *Maariv* editors chose to write about the content of the disengagement agreement with Egypt. The editors' note that the agreement was presented differently to the Knesset between the signing of the agreement by the Prime Minister and the approval of the agreement by the Knesset. The *Maariv* editorial points out that this agreement was only possible due to a drastic change in the Egyptian position on negotiations with Israel; but notably missing from such the initial agreement was the commitment from the Egyptians to reopen the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping traffic. The editorial emphasizes cautious optimism when considering the prospects for future settlements with Israel,

"the Egyptian willingness to open the canal does not appear in the agreement signed by the parties. There is not a trace of such an intention, and even more –

such a commitment. If this is the justification [for acceptance], and hope is based on it, and it is the foundation for optimism, then it has to be emphasized that it is not a part of the agreement; it is part of the clarifications that were given by the US Secretary of State to the Israeli government in regards to the intentions of the Egyptians... If indeed [Knesset approval] is based completely on what is not in [the agreement], then it will be necessary to wait and see if what is not in it will come true just as Israel's commitment is written in express language."<sup>142</sup>

Though the editors hint at the prospect for more comprehensive peace with Egypt in the future, they warn that any commitments that are absent from the written agreement cannot be taken as a given unless they are included in the written agreement. The views in this *Maariv* editorial from January 23, 1974 show a shift from the more confrontational tone seen in the editorial from the Yom Kippur War that lambasted Egyptian aggression and supported the strength and courage of the IDF.

Of the editorials examined on the approval of the disengagement agreement, the one from *Davar* represents the greatest shift in perspective towards peace; in fact, this editorial is the only one examined from the time that explicitly states the collective desire of Israelis for peace with their neighbors in Egypt. While the editors' column represents a shift towards peace, like the others, *Davar* also advocates cautious optimism towards the agreement, "The power of Israel, which has been shown again in the Yom Kippur War, has enabled us to make this first leap towards the realization of our underlying aspirations – the desire for peace. The decision of last night, the first political act imposed upon the eighth Knesset, is an expression of the desire and willingness that exists in Israel to exhaust every opportunity for realizing this ambition."<sup>143</sup>

It is apparent, that contrary to popular belief, a shift in public desire to pursue peace with Egypt had already begun shortly after the end of the Yom Kippur War. All four editorial columns that address the disengagement agreement debate in the Knesset on January 23 either hint at or state an outright the desire for peaceful coexistence with Egypt. This runs contrary to



previous scholarship on the peace process between Egypt and Israel which generally states that President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was the defining moment when Israeli public opinion shifted favorably towards a peace agreement with Egypt, rather than maintaining a state of aggression.

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*President Sadat's Visit to the Knesset*

Previous scholars are not wrong when they state that a clear shift in public opinion occurred when President Sadat announced his intention to speak in front of the Knesset about engaging in direct negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement to end, once and for all, the state of war between Israel and Egypt. Editorial columns from *Davar*, *Maariv*, and *The Jerusalem Post* reflect a significant shift in public attitude toward peace with Egypt after President Sadat visited Jerusalem and spoke in front of the Knesset about opening direct negotiations for comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world. Each of the newspapers declared the event "historic" and expressed the significance of the shift of Israeli public opinion towards a peace agreement. There exist some differences in perspective between the newspapers on President Sadat's visit and his call for direct negotiations, but by-and-large all the papers agree that the President's visit signaled a psychological breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

In the most dramatic shift in political stance between the disengagement agreement in January 1974 and the Egyptian President's visit in November 1977, the *Haaretz* editorial column's political perspective changed from a moderate-right perspective to what appears to be an almost left-leaning interpretation of President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. The newspaper's editorial perspective changed drastically, from cautioning the public to not be too hopeful for further progress towards peace to a strong belief that Sadat's visit signifies a rare and

historic opportunity: “We should exploit this desirable time to promote the cause of peace. In the meetings between the guest and his hosts we must lay the foundation blocks on which the house of peace is built. We must assume that Anwar al-Sadat wants peace with us, and respect the sincerity of his intention especially given the opposition that his initiative is raising in some parts of the Arab world.”<sup>144</sup> The editorial goes as far as to advise the Prime Minister to rethink his usual political ideals in favor of undertaking an historic peace initiative writing, “to Menachem Begin, even the most obstinate opposition to the division of [Judea and Samaria from] Israel will believe that, at the end of the day, it is necessary to separate between historical-religious ideal and between the imperative regional and international political reality.”<sup>145</sup> This change in political perspective is especially surprising because of *Haaretz*’s disposition towards the Likud—a result of Schocken’s distaste for the Labor government at the end of its reign—whereas in this editorial the paper takes the opportunity to take a more moderate-liberal stance on Sadat’s peace initiative.

The same day, *The Jerusalem Post* published an editorial similar to the tone and message of the *Maariv* editorial. Though still adhering to a moderately right wing ideology, the editors recognize the historic nature of Sadat’s visit by calling for both sides to do away with their old dogmas and intransigent positions on negotiation in order to acknowledge Sadat’s courageous step in recognizing Israel and speaking before the Knesset. The column explains that, “by his symbolic initiative, President Sadat has provided persuasive evidence that as far as he is concerned, he is prepared to transform this existential dispute into a more commonplace contention over legitimate differences of interest which are amenable to solution through compromise.”<sup>146</sup> Here the newspaper explains that the fundamental problem underlying the conflict, the existential threat posed to Israel by her neighbors appeared to have been eliminated,

at least from Egypt. In light of the historic nature of the event, the editorial reiterates the importance for the Prime Minister of Israel to engage the President of Egypt and to take his initiative seriously before the opportunity passes to make peace, challenging the usually moderate, unaligned views of the paper, “but beyond the pomp and circumstance of the official reception...there lies the overwhelming question whether Premier Begin is ready to take on Sadat... Today, Premier Begin is facing his moment of truth, and it comes much earlier than anyone had a reason to expect. President Sadat has staked his political career, perhaps his life, on Begin’s agreeing to play along. He should not be disappointed.”<sup>147</sup> This perspective represents a great shift from the tone of *The Jerusalem Post* editorial from January 1974 in which the editors caution against over-optimistic expectations for peace. This editorial, in fact, questions the willingness of the right wing Prime Minister’s to compromise for peace.

In a political commentary more reminiscent of the left wing paper, *Davar* published an editorial that was similar in tone and message to the *Haaretz* and *The Jerusalem Post* articles. The editorial describes the jubilation with which Sadat was greeted at Ben Gurion Airport and notes that it is important to remember that his initiative should be met with a similar sort of courageousness by the Israelis,

“If President Sadat took it upon himself the risk that is in his trip to Israel—and it should be assumed that this was a calculated risk—it encumbered upon us that he could see for himself that Israel’s longing for peace is expressed not only with the respect and sincerity that we showered him with here. But with the political approach that will open real dialogue and settlement. The eyes of the whole world are currently fixed on Jerusalem; and those who aspire to peace in the Middle East—in contrast from the parties that want to continue to build the conflict—expect that Israel will know to respond with daring toward daring.”<sup>148</sup>

The *Davar* editors espouse a left wing position on the initiative of the Egyptian President. The column implies that the President of Egypt’s actions were bold and courageous in the face of opposition and isolation from his colleagues in the other Arab nations; and because of that

courageousness, Israeli officials, specifically Prime Minister Begin, should respond with the same kind of courage. While this editorial does not go as far as to question Prime Minister Begin's willingness to compromise, it does caution that the path between Sadat's visit and a final peace agreement would be long and difficult, but that every opportunity should be seized in order to pursue the virtuous goal of peace.

Previous scholars are correct in assessing the political weight of President Sadat's visit, though the analysis that public opinion changed suddenly and drastically following President Sadat's visit is inaccurate. While the Israeli public extended a tremendous outpouring gratitude and approval for the Egyptian President, the longing for peace was not jump-started after the visit of President Sadat to Israel, it had begun shortly after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as is evidenced in the editorials from January 1974. It is therefore prudent to continue to assess whether public opinion changed after President Sadat's visit.

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### *Beginning of Camp David*

Ten months passed between Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords, the two countries had little to show for it. Neither had made any clear compromises towards a peaceful settlement, mostly hampered by the UN Resolution 242, which called for the territorial withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 borders in all territories. It is evident, when analyzing the editorial pieces from the days before the Camp David Accords, that public opinion in Israel had again switched to a more cautious and pessimistic view towards peace.

The editorial from *The Jerusalem Post* from September 1, 1978 shows the shift of public opinion of the right wing political perspective towards skepticism. Much of the article is spent recalling the peace process that led to the Camp David Accords. The parties had agreed to open a

line of negotiations in November 1977 when Sadat visited Jerusalem, but in that time, the editors write, there was little to no progress made on concessions from either country. It was during this time that President Jimmy Carter invited each leader to join him for a separate peace conference at Camp David in the United States; “The basic idea of the historic encounter in Jerusalem last November was, for once, Egypt and Israel would try to resolve their differences among themselves, face to face, without benefit of outside intercession, and possible imposition. This attempt has not been crowned with much success.”<sup>149</sup> In the eyes of the conservative political view, the peace process that followed Sadat’s visit was unproductive at most, primarily because of the Egyptian President’s intransigence on meeting again with Prime Minister Begin without the presence of a US mediator.

To *The Jerusalem Post* editors it seemed that it was not the idea of formal political relations, fresh economic opportunities, or social exchange which stood in the way of the peace agreement, but rather the prospect of a comprehensive Middle East peace deal, which President Sadat desired but that Prime Minister Begin vehemently opposed. Going into the negotiations the goal of the Egyptians was to extract a final agreement for the Palestinian people as well as the Egyptians—the problem with such a proposal is that Israel would prefer to create a separate peace agreement with each of its neighbors separately in order to provide the most favorable conditions of security of the Jewish State,

“Israel will not endorse a formula for Palestinian self-determination. Yet both Egypt and Israel agree that the Palestinians must, as a practical matter, be allowed the means to assert themselves politically, but not in an independent state. This is the American position, too. The question is, where should the Palestinian frontier be drawn? Egypt, acting as a custodian of Arab interests, will not underwrite a formula for territorial compromise... [So what is ultimately necessary] is that Egypt and Israel agree, as a matter of principle, that a permanent border should be negotiated for the West Bank, taking account of the legitimate security interests of all parties.”<sup>150</sup>

Without the prospect for security for all parties, the editorial continues, the peace talks will not bear fruit, and any party to reject such a plan would surely be responsible for scuttling the talks at Camp David. Regardless of the state hurdles to peace, the column concludes, it would be foolish for either party to write off the necessity of the Camp David Summit as the imposition of international will on a regional conflict, which had, until the Camp David Summit, been entirely unproductive in reaching a peace framework. Though pessimistic because of the great obstacles that would need to be overcome at Camp David, *The Jerusalem Post's* outlook on peace was still slightly hopeful for a more comprehensive agreement between the parties, denoting a shift in public opinion back toward the conservative political ideology.

The moderate newspaper *Maariv* editorialized in much the same fashion as *The Jerusalem Post* ahead of the Camp David Summit. The editorial of September 1<sup>st</sup>, 1978 projects a reserved, pessimistic hope for the peace conference at Camp David. *Maariv* editors chose to focus on the preparations of the Egyptians ahead of the summit conference. Because the state of Egypt controlled the Egyptian press from the top down, Sadat took advantage of the short time ahead of the summit in order to “prepare himself an alibi” in case of the failure of the talks. The Editorial projects the idea that even before the Camp David conference was set to begin, the Egyptians were preparing for the failure of the negotiations because of unacceptable Israeli positions—especially regarding the Sinai; a more pessimistic outlook on the negotiations than the Israelis,

“The chief newspapers of Egypt and Radio Cairo already tell – even before the preparation work on conference halls in the resort near Washington was completed – that the Israeli government brings with her programs that cannot be accepted by the Arabs... If all these propaganda maneuvers are a psychological warfare ahead of the summit – so be it. However if they include a hint of Sadat’s expectations for the summit and the positions that he would take, then there is a fear that indeed the leader of Egypt will need the alibi that he prepares for himself.”<sup>151</sup>

It is clear, that according to those on the right and in the middle of the political spectrum in Israel had their hopes for a grand peace agreement worn down in the ten months between Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the start of the peace summit at Camp David. While still holding out hope, it seems as though the Israelis (as well as the Egyptians) were bracing for the aftershocks in case of the failure of the negotiations.

As with the past several events examined, *Davar* advocated a different political line than the right wing and moderate newspapers in the country. The paper took a more optimistic perspective of the peace negotiations and Camp David discussions. The tone of the column is decidedly more optimistic than the other editorials, declaring that “citizens of the country, regardless of different perspectives, will accompany the Camp David conference, with hope and prayer that the Prime Minister, and his entourage who represent Israel at the triangle summit conference indeed will succeed in this historical event, and that the chance for permanent political agreement in the region will be promoted.”<sup>152</sup> This decidedly more optimistic tone can be explained by the Labor party's willingness to compromise more readily on the territorial issues regarding the peace negotiations. Prime Minister Begin's views on territorial concessions were stated clearly before the negotiations began, and as he stated on numerous occasions, his positions on concessions in the Sinai and Judea and Samaria were unlikely to change, “without going into the other details, it can be said that the differences in approach are focused on the territorial sanctity of Judea and Samaria, which is not accepted by the entire nation. Success or lack of success of these negotiations could be affected by these different of views.”<sup>153</sup> The *Davar* editors point to the territorial issues as the primary reason the peace negotiations might fail. This, they say, would likely come as a result of conservative intransigence on territorial concessions—mainly because of the belief in including Judea and Samaria in the territory of Israel.

Public opinion in the period prior to the Camp David Accords as seen through these editorials had become less optimistic about the prospects of achieving a meaningful peace deal with Egypt. *The Jerusalem Post* and *Maariv*, representing the right wing and moderate political perspectives, espoused generally pessimistic opinions about the potential of the Camp David Accords. While not writing the peace effort off entirely before it had even begun, *The Jerusalem Post* did not express high hopes for the Camp David summit in light of Begin's strong and established positions on territorial concessions that would be possible from Israel, while *Maariv* expressed the same concerns citing Sadat's demand for complete autonomy for the Sinai and occupied Palestinian territories. The *Davar* editorial also displayed some skepticism in the potential for the talks to be successful for the same reasoning as the *Jerusalem Post* editorial – because of Begin's territorial intransigence. These shifts in public opinion, though not abandoning the hope for peace, certainly express a pessimistic view of the prospects after ten months of little to no progress in negotiations.

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#### *End of Camp David*

The *Jerusalem Post* article from the final day of the Camp David summit on September 17, 1978 expresses a shaky hope that the peace conference will ultimately be declared a success once the final agreement from the conference is made public. The editorial focuses on the impediments that blocked a comprehensive final peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, placing blame primarily on President Sadat for having to kowtow to the leaders of the Arab world – though he was never officially recognized by them as their representative at the Camp David summit.

“While reports from the conference have been sketchy at best, there have been indications that Mr. Begin sought to accommodate this US desire, but that Sadat



did not consider these measures of compromise adequate for his purposes. Undoubtedly, there has been a narrowing of Sadat's room for maneuver since that time last November when his plane touched down so dramatically in Israel. In negotiating over the future of the West Bank and Gaza he is no longer negotiating for Egypt, but for others, like Hussein, whose approval he needs."<sup>154</sup>

The crux of the negotiations was on the eventual fate of the West Bank territory – for which Egypt sought autonomy on behalf of the Palestinian people, and for which a segment of the Israeli population believed was part of the territory of the state of Israel. If matters were to be resolved regarding the West Bank, the only way to reach a comprehensive agreement was if King Hussein of Jordan were brought into the negotiations; but in light of King Hussein's repeated rejection of invitations to join the peace negotiations the hope for a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement remained dim. The tone of the editorial is unhopeful for a successful outcome; the ultimate goal of a comprehensive peace does not appear to have been reached. From the stand point of Prime Minister Begin's pre-negotiation positions, the final agreement would be a success – with the only remaining thorn being the removal of settlements in the Sinai Peninsula, for which he fiercely advocated throughout the summit conference. The political view of this editorial adheres closely to the right wing perspective in Israel on the summit conference. All told, conservative Israelis defended the Camp David summit as a success, primarily for having maintained the territorial sanctity of Eretz Israel.

A *Maariv* editorial from September 17<sup>th</sup>, 1978 strikes a decidedly neutral tone on the final day of the Camp David conference, declaring the summit neither a success nor a failure. The column focuses on the efforts of President Carter and his team to attempt to force the two sides to come to an agreement, using procedural mechanisms to pull the Egyptians and Israelis towards common ground. The editors make their neutral stance resoundingly clear by stating that, “We shall not get carried away, therefore, especially now – shortly before the end of the

conference – in the pessimistic speculation wave of the American media as to the final outcome. We accept at face-value the words of the White House spokesman that the decision to end the conference today ‘does not come as a result of despair,’ and only add to them the analysis – which is realistic in our humble opinion, that it does not come as a result of enthusiasm.”<sup>155</sup>

The editors go on to conclude that by declaring the conference over, Carter is putting the final steps of the process upon Sadat and Begin – expecting them “to go above and beyond the norm” – in order to fulfill the goal of the summit conference and not bring disappointment to the historic peace initiative undertaken at Camp David. The editors’ neutral stance reflects the general political views of the paper and the views of much of the public, as they waited to learn more about the details of the process of the negotiations and the final written agreement.

The editors of *Davar* express the disappointment felt by many on the left side of the political spectrum in Israel at the projected outcome of the conference. The Camp David summit appeared to have been a let-down that fell short of accomplishing its goals, not finalizing a “‘framework for peace agreement’ – another name for a declaration of principles – but ‘a framework for further negotiations.’”<sup>156</sup> The column continues with a quote from conference spokesman, Jody Powell, expressing that the conference was not ended in despair but out of necessity to keep the process moving forward – for continuing with no deadline in mind would have dragged the negotiations out indefinitely. The editors found no hope in Powell’s statement that the conference had achieved a breakthrough in negotiations, regardless of not having reached a comprehensive agreement, “When the details of the conference’s processes will be known, it will be possible to analyze the personal weight of Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at key stages of the negotiations triangle. The three leaders will have to convince their target audiences that they are not guilty in what appears at this time – at least in

part – to be the failure of the summit.”<sup>157</sup> The column expresses grief with the fact that the peace conference was ended without the major concessions that were needed to be given by both sides of the dispute and in that sense the conference was a failure. It would now be up to the three leaders to return to their countries and explain the results of the conference and why such a framework was reached. The perspective of *Davar* in this editorial showcases the high hopes for which the left-wing in Israel had for the summit conference with Egypt in the United States. The hope was that President Carter could impose upon the leaders an agreement which would be amenable (enough) to both sides so that their country’s publics would accept the agreement. But having walked away from the conference with only an outline for peace and a commitment to continue the negotiations, to *Davar*, Carter’s peace conference was ultimately a failure. The shift on the left side of the spectrum is a result of the high aspirations the liberal bloc had for bringing peace to the war torn region.

The final day of the conference produced mixed opinions among the Israeli public. Those on the left were disappointed by the inability of the parties to finalize a comprehensive agreement, while those on the right were satisfied that Israel was able to accomplish its goal of peace with Egypt without also committing to a binding comprehensive solution to the Palestinian autonomy question. The more neutral factions of the public withheld judgment on the Accords until more information would be shared on the process details and the specific terms agreed to in the framework. These views represent shifts on all three fronts of public opinion, the pessimistic view of the left before the conference became more pessimistic on the final day in light of the potentially disappointing outcome. The moderate and right wing political opinions both showed a slightly improved opinion of the peace process shifting from slightly pessimistic at the outset of the summit to neutral or optimistic on the conference’s final day.

– Conclusion –

All in all, the public opinion in Israel regarding peace with Egypt showed multiple changes beginning shortly after the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Contrary to popular belief, public opinion in Israel began to shift favorably toward peace well before President Sadat's visit in November 1977. Editorials from *Davar*, *Haaretz*, *Maariv*, and *The Jerusalem Post* all mention or elude to the desire in Israel for peace with Egypt, though each newspaper varies in certainty on whether peace would be achievable. The politically moderate and left-leaning factions in society held more optimistic opinions about the future of a peace agreement—as expressed in the editorials of *Davar* and *Maariv* respectively. This view maintains the political view of the Labor coalition that was attempting to restore its reputation after being woefully underprepared for the attack on Yom Kippur. It was thought that only by pursuing, and subsequently achieving, peace would the Labor government be able to hold on to power after losing many seats in the Knesset following the December election.

The politically right-leaning segment of society was less optimistic for peace, preferring to discuss the lack of a broad-based coalition to approve the disengagement agreement—because they had reservations about some of its provisions. This perspective makes sense considering Likud was in the opposition during the disengagement talks. Their desire to be included in the decision on approval of the disengagement is evident in the *Haaretz* editorial from January 1974. The views of each political perspective express a varying desire for peaceful coexistence with Egypt; negating previous assumptions that only after President Sadat's announcement of his trip to Israel did public opinion in Israel favor peace.

The most dramatic change in Israeli public opinion about peace with Egypt, however, occurred around the time of President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The editorial views on President

Sadat's visit stand in stark contrast to the rhetoric present in the same editorial columns during the Yom Kippur War. On the third day of the war the people of Israel were filled with fear; the enemies had advanced across the lines the IDF established after the Six Day War in 1967. Each of the four editorial columns expressed patriotic sentiments, their steadfast support of the IDF soldiers, and a reminder that Israel did not start, but was within its rights to finish, the Yom Kippur War without international intervention; a strongly pro-Israel overtone. The mindset of the public was at a state of war against Egypt. Certainly Israel did not desire war with Egypt in the Sinai, but an attack on the holiest day and a violation of the armistice line from 1967 required a response. The security of the Jewish state could not be breached on its holiest day without a counterattack.

Four years later, President Sadat flew to Israel to open negotiations for a permanent peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. The previous far-off hope of peace during the disengagement of forces became a real peace when Sadat, the first Arab leader to extend a hand of recognition to the state of Israel, flew to Israel to speak to the Knesset. There was, no doubt, a significant shift in public opinion in favor of peace after Sadat's speech; but this shift happened in a series of public opinion shifts on peace beginning after the Yom Kippur War. The public began expressing desire for peace after the acceptance of the disengagement by the Knesset, though the country was still divided on the prospects of achieving peace. Only after Sadat's visit did the whole country rally around the idea of peace because of the historic nature of the occasion and because of the first-of-its-kind offer Sadat was proposing to the Israelis.

After Sadat's visit, the countries started and stopped several rounds of indirect negotiations under the auspices of Jimmy Carter's Geneva Peace Plan—conducted through the UN—there was no progress from the last separation of forces agreement towards an amenable

peace. Frustrated by the lack of progress and action after Sadat's speech, Israeli public opinion began to wane on the viewpoint of peace. A chasm appeared in the factions supporting peace, but under varying demands. One segment of the public, the religious right, held a firm belief that the West Bank—Judea and Samaria—was integral the Land of Israel and therefore should become part of the Jewish state.

The other portion of the public believed the land should eventually, regardless of the form of government there, be given to the Palestinian people. The views on peace from the many political perspectives in the country remained favorable to peace up to the Camp David Accord, but their tone about the content became more critical and skeptical about the "kind" of peace they would get with Egypt—a cold peace or a warm one. By the last day of the Camp David Summit conference there had been little change in Israeli public opinion compared to before the conference. The opinion on the prospective outcome of the Camp David summit was the center of the discussion on the final day of talks. While the right wing was more favorable to the agreement, citing its provision of separate agreements between Israel and Egypt and the plan for facilitating Palestinian autonomy, the left wing criticized the agreement claiming that the result of Camp David was merely a plan to continue negotiating rather than a plan to implement peace.

The findings here are significant for they impact the context within which the government of Israel was operating. Begin held firm in his position on not relinquishing control of the West Bank because his segments of his coalition demanded it, he himself believed in the territorial integrity of the West Bank, and public opinion would support it. Likewise, we now understand that mismanagement of security issues in Israel, such as the mishandling of the preparation for an attack before the Yom Kippur War, can influence public opinion enough to remove a ruling government from power like the Labor party in 1977.

The fluctuation of public opinion on peace is significant because it explains what events can sway public opinion during the peacemaking process. Grand gestures for peace, like Sadat's visit to Jerusalem have great impact on swaying public opinion. The sincerity of Sadat's intentions were clear when his plane landed at Ben Gurion Airport, and the Israeli people took that message to heart—evident in their wide spread support for direct peace negotiations with Egypt.

The fluctuation also points to the fact that stalling efforts over technical issues can sour Israeli public opinion about the prospects of a peace deal. After ten months of little progress after Sadat's visit to the Knesset, the Israeli public was beginning to lose faith that a deal could be struck. By the end of the Camp David Accords, the public generally accepted the framework for peace, but for varying reasons took issue with some of its contents including the demolition of Israeli settlements in the Sinai and the lack of a plan for future Palestinian autonomy.

Now there is an understanding of how public opinion can either support or sway government actions; but what remains for further study is how public opinion changed following the signing of the comprehensive peace deal in March 1979. With a more detailed and refined agreement, public opinion surely changed following the Camp David summit frameworks for peace. This research would be especially insightful because it could help explain what aspects of the peace deal were harder to win public opinion support on, and which aspects of the deal were easy to gain public support. All of these insights can give further insight for peace negotiations today, explaining why past attempts to reignite negotiations between Israel and the Arabs have failed.

## Notes

*Historiography*

1. Freeman Poritz, "The Role of the Press in Shaping a New Middle East: Egyptian-Israeli Relations from 1977-1979 as seen through the Headlines/News Articles, Opinion Pieces and Editorials of Three Major Israeli Newspapers: *The Jerusalem Post*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and *Haaretz*," (honors thesis, University of British Columbia, 2009), 13.
2. Oren Meyers, "Israeli Journalism during the State's Formative Era: between Ideological Affiliation and Professional Consciousness" *Journalism History* 31, no. 2 (2005): 88-90.
3. *Ibid.*, 90.
4. Poritz, "The Role of the Press," 11.
5. "Maariv," National Library of Israel, *Historical Jewish Press*, accessed January 20, 2015, [http://web.nli.org.il/sites/JPress/English/Pages/maariv\\_test.aspx](http://web.nli.org.il/sites/JPress/English/Pages/maariv_test.aspx).
6. Poritz, "The Role of the Press," 39-42.
7. Peter B. Flint, "Gershom G. Schocken, Dies, Editor of Israeli Newspaper for 50 Years," *New York Times*, December 24, 1990.
8. "Davar," National Library of Israel, *Historical Jewish Press*, accessed January 20, 2015, <http://web.nli.org.il/sites/JPress/English/Pages/Davar.aspx>.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Danny Rubinstein, "Hanna Zemer," *Jewish Women: a Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia*, last modified March 1, 2009, <http://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/zemer-hanna>.
11. "Davar," National Library of Israel.
12. Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel, Volume II: from the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War* (New York: Oxford UP, 1987).
13. Charles Liebman, "The Myth of Defeat: the Memory of the Yom Kippur War in Israeli Society," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (1993).
14. Louise Fischer, "Turning Point on the Road to Peace: the Government of Yitzhak Rabin and the Interim Agreement with Egypt (Sinai II)," *Israel Studies* 19, no. 3 (2014): 55-80.



15. Shlomo Avineri, "Beyond Camp David," *Foreign Policy*, no. 46 (1982).
16. Paul A. Hare, and David Naveh, "Group Development at Camp David Summit, 1978," *Small Group Development* 15, no. 3 (1984).
17. Ibid.
18. Sachar, *A History of Israel*.
19. Ann Mosely Lesch, and Mark Tessler, *Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada*, Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989.
20. Shibley Telhami, *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords* (New York City: Columbia UP, 1990), 51.
21. See *Context* endnote 80 below.
22. Ben D. Mor, "Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: the Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 2 (1997): 199.

#### *Context*

23. The closing of the Straits of Tiran was consequentially a *casus belli* to Israel and the United States. After the Suez War in 1956—in which Egypt blocked all Israeli sea traffic from passing through the Suez Canal—President Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. He assured Israel that if the Straits of Tiran were to be closed to them the US would use force to reopen them.
24. William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Israel and the Peacemaking Process* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1981), 19; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 6-7.
25. "The Yom Kippur War/October War," *The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a Social, Political, and Military History*, 2nd ed. 2008, 1109; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 2.
26. "Yom Kippur War," 1109.
27. Ilan Troen and Shay Rabineau, "Competing Concepts of Land in Eretz Israel," *Israel Studies* 58, no. 2 (2014): 163.
28. Ibid.
29. "Yom Kippur War," 1109.
30. Ibid., 1111.

31. Quandt, *Camp David*, 21.
32. Robert S. Bolia, "Israel and the War of Attrition," *Military Review* 84, no. 2 (2004): 47
33. Ibid., 48.
34. Ibid., 47.
35. Bolia, "Israel and the War of Attrition," 48; Martin Gilbert, *Israel: a History* (New York: HarperCollins, 1988), 455.
36. Bolia, "Israel and the War of Attrition," 50-51.
37. Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1990* (London: Routledge, 2002), 44.
38. "Yom Kippur War," 1114.
39. Howard Blum, *The Eve of Destruction: the Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 134; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 19; Walter J. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War: the 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift that Saved Israel* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002), ix.
40. "Yom Kippur War," 1112.
41. Uri Bar-Joseph, *The Watchmen Fell Asleep: the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War and its Sources* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), 253.
42. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 13.
43. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 13-14; Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: a Personal Account of the Egypt-Israeli Negotiations* (New York: Random House, 1981), 49.
44. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 36; Bolia, "Israel and the War of Attrition," 48; Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 439-40.
45. Dai Richards, 52:00.
46. "Yom Kippur War," 1116; Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 36; Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 440.
47. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 30-32.
48. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 440-42; Blum, *The Eve of Destruction*, 220.

49. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 443.
50. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 130.
51. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 130; Blum, *The Eve of Destruction*, 224; Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 444.
52. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 444-49.
53. Charles Liebman, "The Myth of Defeat: the Memory of the Yom Kippur War in Israeli Society," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (1993): 399-400.
54. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 454-55.
55. *Ibid.*, 456.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*, 457.
58. *Ibid.*, 457-58.
59. *Ibid.*, 458-61.
60. Quandt, *Camp David*, 30.
61. Dayan, *Breakthrough*, 54.
62. Quandt, *Camp David*, 32.
63. "Yom Kippur War," 950.
64. Dayan, *Breakthrough*, 55.
65. *Ibid.*, 57; "Yom Kippur War," 953.
66. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 468; "The Sinai Peninsula: the Years of Conflict," *New York Times* (New York, NY), Apr. 26, 1982.
67. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 464.
68. *Ibid.*, 465.
69. *Ibid.*, 464. The Agranat Commission was the name given to the commission formally tasked with investigating the government response and preparations for the Yom

Kippur War; the report would recommend the dismissal of many high ranking military officers but not the removal of any elected representatives.

70. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 464; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 3-4.
71. "The Sinai Peninsula," Apr. 26, 1982.
72. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 467-68; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 10-12.
73. Janice G. Stein, "Pre-negotiation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: the Paradoxes of Success and Failure," *International Journal* 44, no. 2 (1989), 414, footnote 8.
74. *Ibid.*, 415.
75. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 475; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 6.
76. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 475.
77. *Ibid.*, 476-77.
78. *Ibid.*, 488.
79. Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 24.
80. Troen, "Competing Concept of Land," 165.
81. Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Hour* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988): 48-49.
82. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 481; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 35.
83. Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 26-28.
84. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 482-83.
85. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 487; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 46.
86. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 488; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 47.
87. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 489.
88. *Ibid.*
89. Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 50.

90. Lawrence Wright, *Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014): 49-50.

91. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 493.

92. Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 61.

93. Wright, *Thirteen Days in September*, 57.

94. *Ibid.*, 54.

95. Wright, *Thirteen Days in September*, 62; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 61.

According to Begin's proposal, although Israelis were willing to allow total Egyptian autonomy over the Sinai, Israeli settlements were to remain in Sinai and left under the jurisdiction of the UN.

96. Wright, *Thirteen Days in September*, 65; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, 68.

97. Wright, *Thirteen Days in September*, 71.

98. *Ibid.*, 89.

99. *Ibid.*, 152-55.

100. *Ibid.*, 180-86. Sadat feared that if he made any concessions on behalf of the Palestinians without the consultation or participation of the other Arab states he would be labeled a traitor to the Arab cause and would be shunned by the Arab world. While he was willing to make a deal that addressed Egypt's relations with Israel, he could not in good faith honor an agreement that finalized a proposal for the future of Palestinians, including the status of Arab Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the final governmental status of the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, Sadat demanded that Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai—including the military and civilian settlements—be swift and total, not phased and gradual. These terms, he claimed, were non-negotiable.

101. *Ibid.*, 190-92.

102. Ahron Barak was an Israeli legal scholar, Israeli Supreme Court Justice, and former Israeli Attorney General. Osama el-Baz was an Egyptian legal scholar, professor of law at the University of Cairo, and one of Sadat's closest legal advisers. They were chosen to join the drafting committee because of their legal expertise and intimate knowledge of their delegations' positions in the negotiations process.

103. *Ibid.*, 223-64. Carter first warned Sadat that if he abandoned negotiations and returned to Egypt without a peace agreement, "It [meant] first of all an end to the relationship between the U.S. and Egypt. It would mean an end to the peace keeping effort for which [Carter] had worked so diligently... And last but not least, it will mean an end to the deep friendship

[Carter] and [Sadat] had cultivated.” The next day, Carter warned the Israelis that should they scuttle his peace initiative by returning without a deal he would blame the failed talks on Begin’s stubbornness and total unwillingness to discuss the withdrawal of Israeli settlements in Sinai—even though he had secretly been given the go-ahead from Tel Aviv to concede the settlements issue by Ariel Sharon the chief architect of Israel’s settlement program.

104. Gilbert, *Israel: a History*, 393.

105. “Maariv,” National Library of Israel.

106. “Maariv,” National Library of Israel; “Davar,” National Library of Israel.

107. “We Will Stand the Test,” *Davar Newspaper* (Tel Aviv, Israel), Jun. 6, 1967. In Hebrew: "אנו נעמוד במבחן, דבר (תל אביב, ישראל), 6 יוני 1967." See the appendix for original article in Hebrew and translated article in English.

108. Ibid.

109. Meyers, “Israeli Journalism,” 18.

110. Ibid., 94.

111. Ibid., 94-95.

112. Ibid., 95

113. Ibid., 95-96.

114. Oren Meyers, “Memory in Journalism and the Memory of Journalism: Israeli Journalists and the Constructed Memory of Haolam Hazeh,” *Journal of Communication* 57, (2007): 720.

115. Danny Rubinstein, “Hanna Zemer,” *Jewish Women: a Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia*, last modified March 1, 2009, <http://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/zemer-hanna>.

116. Meyers, “Memory,” 721.

117. Rubinstein, “Hanna Zemer.”

118. “Davar,” National Library of Israel; Yoram Peri, *Telepopulism: Media and Politics in Israel* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004), 81.

119. Rubinstein, “Hanna Zemer.”

120. Peri, *Telepopulism*, 75.

121. Ibid., 81.

122. Ibid., 83.

123. Ibid. Peri describes the different eras of newspapers as having had distinct identities. The era of the political party newspaper (1948-1970), was an era where political party newspapers dominated the media. “The party paper has to educate and guide its readers in one direction. A revolutionary party and its paper cannot become a forum for endless discussion that does not lead to decisions and disciplined action,” 83-4.

124. Ibid., 86.

125. Caspi, *In/Outsiders*, 19.

126. Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Presidio Press), ch. 8.

127. Caspi, *In/Outsiders*, 74.

128. The Histadrut was the Labor Coalition, which was on the left side of the political spectrum in Israel.

129. Ibid., 77-78. Ted Lurie served The Jerusalem Post as Editor from 1955-1977.

130. Angela Deines, “Jerusalem Post Provides Daily Newspaper in Hebrew,” *Newsmax*, August 28, 2014.

131. Boyne, *The Two O’clock War*, 17.

132. Peri, *Telepopulism*, 88.

133. Ibid., 86-7. Bloch’s commentary appears in an editorial published by Davar in 1974; emphasis added.

#### *Primary Analysis*

134. “A Comfortable Hour to Exploit,” *Haaretz*, October 8, 1978.

135. “A Different War,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 8, 1973.

136. “The Difficult Path to Victory,” *Maariv*, October 8, 1973.

137. Hillel Danzig, “The Yom Kippur War,” *Davar*, October 8, 1973.

138. “Deterioration in the Coalition-Building Process,” *Haaretz*, January 23, 1974.

139. Ibid.

140. "The Knesset Anti-Climax," *Jerusalem Post*, January 23, 1974.

141. Ibid.

142. "Obligation and Guidance," *Maariv*, January 23, 1974.

143. "The First Political Action of the Knesset," *Davar*, January 23, 1974.

144. "Let's Not Miss an Hour of Opportunity," *Haaretz*, November 20, 1977.

145. Ibid.

146. "The Moment of Truth," *Jerusalem Post*, November 20, 1977.

147. Ibid.

148. "Responding to Courage with Courage," *Davar*, November 20, 1977.

149. "Open Minds at Camp David," *Jerusalem Post*, September 1, 1978.

150. Ibid.

151. "Sadat Prepares an Alibi," *Maariv*, September 1, 1978.

152. "The Consensus and the Controversy," *Davar*, September 4, 1978.

153. Ibid.

154. "Marathon Ends," *Jerusalem Post*, September 17, 1978.

155. "A Deadline Forced Solution," *Maariv*, September 17, 1978.

156. "From the Summit, No Compromise," *Davar*, September 17, 1978.

157. Ibid.



## Appendix

1. Editorial column from Davar newspaper on June 6, 1967.

## אנו נעמוד במבחן

נו מכל עבר. ואשר כבר ביר מה הראשון הושגו בה הישגים גדולים, וחילות האויר של המדינות התוקפות הוכו קשות — כאשר כושר התכנון וחבי צוע של צה"ל וכושר הלחימה של טייסיו וחיליו משמשים מגן איתן לעם. אך עדיין אין זו עת לברך על המוגמר, עדיין אנו בעיצומה של המערכה. עדיין אין אנו זקוקים לכל כוחנו חבט חוני והנפשי כדי לעמוד במבחן.

נעמוד בו בטוחים בצדקתנו ומלוכדים בשורותינו. נעמוד בו מתוך ידיעה שלא נותר לנו אלא לסמוך על עצמנו — מפני שכל מאמצינו לפתרון מדיני לא נשאו פרי. נעמוד בו מעודדים מן האה"דה הרבה שמגלים חוגים באו"ר רים ורחבים בחלקי עולם שרבים ורבים למאבק החתגוננות 7011.

נעמוד בו, מחוקקים בהודרה חם אתנו של אחינו היהודים. נעמוד במבחן.

אלא שמצבנו היה חמור, אילר לא יכלו להתבסס שני מקורות העליונות האלה על לחם החוק הצבאי של אימון וציוד.

צה"ל על כל זרועותיו וחיליותיו הוא צבא מאומן ומחואם היטב, כתוצאה ממאמץ ממושך



ורצוף. הוא צבא מצוייד היטב — טוב יותר מאי פעם בעבר — בזכות השקעה מרחיקת ראות שהשקיעו הממונים על מערכת הבטחון בשנים עברו. הוא צבא עם פיקוד בעל נסיון ותושיה בכל הדרגים — והוא צבא של העם.

עוד יסופרו תולדותיה של המלחמה הזאת שפתחו בה עלי

מ. ד. / ובכו, מלחמה. לא מלחמה שרצינו בה, ולא מלחמה שפתחנו בה — אבל מלחמה שמוכנים היינו לעמוד במבחניה, בטוחים בכושרו של צה"ל לסכל את מזימות אויבנו ולהביס את תוקפנו.

חילי ישראל יצאו אתמול למערכה שנכפתה עלינו. הם יצאו עם חנשק החשוב ביותר של צה"ל שאין כמוהו לצבא של מצרים, ולא של ירדן ולא של סוריה: ההכרה המושרשת עמוק בלב מפקדים וסקודים בצה"ל שהם מנהלים מלחמת החתגוננות מובהקת, שהם גלח מים על קיום העם הזה — והם חייבים לנצח לא מטעמי יוקרה, ולא למען הרחבת גבולות לתר עלת כלכלית, ולא כדי להשתלט על מישור, אלא מפני שאת גפשו מבקשים.

זהו אחד ממקורות עליונותו של צה"ל, ואליו מצטרף המקור השני החשוב של עליונות האדם תלוחם גם בהשכלה ובידע.

## 2. Translation of article in Appendix 1.

“We Will Stand the Test” – Davar – 6 June 1967 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

So, war. Not a war we wanted, not a war we started – but the war in which we are willing to stand the test, confident in the ability of the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) to foil the conspiracies of our enemies and defeat the attackers.

Israeli soldiers came yesterday to a battle that was forced upon us. They came with the most important of IDF weapons, unparalleled by Egypt’s army, and Jordan’s and Syria’s: recognition is rooted in the IDF commanders and officers, if they manage defensive war, they will be battling for the existence of this nation – and they were told they had to win not for reasons of prestige, not for expansion for economic benefit, and not to take over something, but because our souls desire it.

This is one of the IDF’s sources of superiority, and it joins a second important source of human superiority in education and knowledge. But our situation was a bastard, it cannot be based on both of these top sources, on them the military law of their training and equipment.

The IDF in all divisions and ranks is well-trained and coordinated as a result of a prolonged and continuous effort – better than ever before – thanks to the far-sighted investments invested by those in charge of the defense system in the past years. Army command is experienced and resourceful at all levels – and it is the army of the people.

More will be recalled on the history of this war we have opened from all sides. And on the very first day great accomplishments were achieved, and the air forces of the countries that attacked were severely beaten – like the rest of the planning and implementation capacity of the army, the fighting ability of pilots and soldiers was used to protect them. But it is not yet time to finish the task, while we are in the midst of battle. We still need all our strength and mental trust to meet the test.

We will be safe in our righteousness and united in our ranks. We will stand in the knowledge that we can only rely on ourselves – because all our efforts for a political solution bore no fruit. We will encourage much sympathy from enlightened thinkers from different parts of the world for the many struggles in front of us.

We will stand with them, emboldened by their identification with us as our Jewish brothers. We will meet the test.

3. Editorial column from Haaretz newspaper on October 8, 1973.

תנסיבות המדיניות הסובנות את המלחמה שישראל מגולח  
 עתה נגד מצרים וסוריה אינן בלתי נחזות לנו מיסודן. יתכן כי  
 התחלטה שלא לצאת למלחמת-מצע עולה לנו בהגדלת המחיר שעלינו  
 לשלם בשעות הקרב כדי לחסל את התישבים והתחלתיים שהצבאות  
 הפולשים וכו' להם בוכות היוזמת שהנשארה בידיהם; אך מבחינת  
 התוצאה הבין-לאומית יש מישקל לעובדה כי הפעם נאלצו משקששי  
 הארצות, שאינם השודים במשוא פנים לטובתנו, לדחוק כי המצרים  
 המסורים היו אלה שתצו את קודי הפסקת האש.  
 נשיא ארצה"ב הודיע לד"ר קיסינג'ר לפעול למען השגת הפסקת  
 האש, אך פעילותו של מינוסטר התוך האמריקאי לא הרבה עד כה  
 מתועם ונזהלים אשר השיגרה הדיפלומטית מודה עליהם לגבי  
 השלב הראשון של מאמץ כות את התנצחות של כפת מיוחדות הצי  
 הששי אין לפרש כמחוחה של אותה כלפי מדינות צרב התוקפות את  
 ישראל. וכן תוצאת רוב היוצעים הסובייטיים ממצרים וסוריה על משה  
 שחזיתיהם, פרמחות על אי רצונה של בריחה להיות מעורבת במלחמה  
 מצרית-סורית נבדנו.

נראה איפוא כי יש מעין הבנה הודית בין שתי מעצמות העל להגיע  
 במורה התיכון להבריע את התמודדות בינם לבין עצמם; והרי תמיד  
 טענו כי זה מה שדרוש: שיתון לכוחות האזוריים למצוא את שיתוי  
 המישקל על סמך יחסי הכוחות האמיתיים שביניהם, ופירוש הדבר  
 כי הסובייטים אינם מסייעים ולא יסייעו באופן פעיל למצרים ול-  
 סוריה. לא נוכל לקוות לנסיבות נחזות יותר.

מכאן שעלינו לנצל את ההודמנות אשר יתכן כי תחלוף, ואת  
 הזמן העומד לרשותנו, שאינו בלתי מוגבל. מטבע הדברים, השלב  
 של קרבות בלימה קשה במיוחד. ואם כי הכוחות המוגבלים שעמדו  
 בפרץ נגד גייסות הפולשים רשמו דעי כבוד רבים בספר תולדות  
 הלחימה של צה"ל, יהיה עלינו לעשות מאמץ עילאי כדי לקצר,  
 ככל שרק ניתן, את משך הזמן הצריך לחלוף עד שנוכל לעבור  
 לשלב של התקפות-נגד מרוכזות. היום תתבנס עצרת הארצות; ברי  
 טניה וגרמניה המערבית תבעו לכנס את מעצת הבטחון; השעון  
 הפוליטי כבר התחיל לתקתק, ואין להגיה כי הסובייטים המעוניינים  
 שלא להיות מעורבים בפעילות צבאית, ימנעו ממצרים וסוריה את  
 תמיכתם המדינית; ותוצאת סא"ס מאתמול מצביעה על כך. כל זה  
 עלול להשפיע, בסופו של דבר, גם על מנהיגי ארצה"ב.

ליבנו יוצא אל חילינו בחזיתות. בהם אנו בוטחים שיעשו את  
 המלאכה, עד הדיפת אחרון הפולשים. הממונים עליהם חייבים לדעת  
 כי המאמץ העליון שהצבא נתבע לעשותו, מתנהל בתוך מישורת  
 מדינית מסוימת. יש לנצל את השעה הנחמה בטרם תחלוף.

הארץ, 8 באוקטובר 1973, "שעה נחה שיש לנצלה"

#### 4. Translation of article in Appendix 3.

“A Comfortable Hour to Exploit” – Haaretz – 8 October 1973 – translation by Daniel Gerdes

The political circumstances surrounding the war that Israel conducted against Egypt and Syria are not fundamentally uncomfortable for us. Maybe the decision not to conduct a preemptive attack cost us a higher price to pay on the battlefield - in order to end the initial achievements that the invading armies won for themselves - thanks to the initiative that was left in their hands; but from the international reverberations there is weight to the fact that the UN Observers, that are not suspected of bias in our favor, were forced to report that the Egyptians and Syrians crossed the ceasefire line.

The President of the US instructed Dr. Kissinger to act for the cease fire agreement. But the actions of the American Foreign Minister (Secretary of State) should not be considered, up to now, outside the routine diplomatic procedures usually implemented towards the first phase of the power effort. The movements of the [US Navy's] Sixth Fleet cannot be interpreted as a gesture of sympathy to those Arab states which want to eliminate Israel, the same goes for the removal of the majority of Soviet advisors and their families from Egypt and Syria. This hints at the reluctance of the Soviets to be involved in an Egyptian-Syrian war against us.

It seems, therefore, that there is a sort of mutual understanding between the two Superpowers to leave it to the Middle East to determine the struggle amongst themselves; and it was always claimed that this is what is needed: that the regional powers will be given the (responsibility) to find the balance based on the relative real powers between them, and this means that the Soviets do not aid and will not actively give aid to Egypt and Syria. We cannot hope for more favorable circumstances.

Consequently, we need to exploit the opportunity which may perhaps pass, and the time we have at our disposal is not unlimited. From the nature of things, the phase of the holding battles was especially difficult. And even though the limited forces that stood in breach against the invading troops wrote many honorable pages in the history book of IDF fighting, we will have to make a super great effort in order to shorten as much as possible the amount of time required to pass before we can move to concentrated counter attacks. The UN General Assembly will convene today; Britain and West Germany demanded to convene the Security Council; the political clock already began to tick, and we should not assume that the Soviets who are not interested in being involved in military operations, will withhold from Egypt and Syria their political support. The removal of the SAS missiles from yesterday points towards that. All this might have an influence eventually also on the leaders of the US.

Our hearts go out to our soldiers on the fronts. In them we have confidence that they will do the job until they repel the last invaders. Those who are in charge of them need to know that the super effort, that the army is asked to do, is conducted within a certain political framework. We should exploit this opportune hour before it passes.

5. Editorial column from Jerusalem Post newspaper on October 8, 1973.

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## A DIFFERENT WAR

A NEW term has entered the lexicon: "The Yom Kippur War." A new term, a new war, a different kind of war: different from the Six Day War with its 20 days of buildup followed by six days of a relatively systematic campaign; different from the Sinai Campaign of 1956 and from the long, see-sawing 1947-48 war.

For the first time in our brief history, a war launched by the enemy which we knowingly allowed him to launch and which he admits having launched. A war being fought far from our, and close to the enemy's, population centres. A war for which we started mobilizing our reserves, the bulk of our fighting forces, bare hours before the enemy attacked with all his forces — a mobilization which was continuing in the 24 hours and longer that our relatively small regular forces were engaging the enemy in bitter, largely successful holding battles. Even as these words are being read our reserves are only barely finishing aligning themselves and setting out to meet the enemy. It is a war in which we are in the unusual situation of finding so much of the "international community" non-plussed: they cannot get themselves to express sympathy and

support for us as they did when they saw prospects of our defeat and destruction, yet they cannot — except the Russians for their own reasons — condemn us as aggressors, for this time the aggressors have proudly condemned themselves.

It is a war the point of whose conclusion cannot be predicted with the degree of precision that the conclusion of the 1956 and 1967 wars could. For this time we are not driving towards any geographic line as we were driving then. This time it is the enemy who wishes to drive forward, and our sole intention is to utterly prevent him from doing so. We don't know yet just how many hours will pass before we have persuaded him once again to give up his intention of sacrificing tens of millions in his "holy war" to destroy.

This requires of Israel's civilians the same quiet, patient determination that our soldiers display. Perhaps after yesterday's shopping hysteria, this quiet patience will be restored and the civilian front — which has seen an outburst of volunteering enthusiasm reminiscent of the days before the Six Day War—will match in its own way the spirit and sense of national responsibility exhibited by our soldiers on the front lines.

6. Editorial column from Maariv newspaper on October 8, 1973.

# התרדה לשלום איהרה

ביום הראשון של המלחמה, כשהיומא היתה כולה בידו הערבים וכוחות מצריים וסוריים אדירים הפתקרו על החירות הי- קטנות והמצצבים הדלילים המנינים על קווי הפסקת האש, לא דיבר איש על הי- צורך לבנם את מוקצת הפנתון כדי לי- צוות על הפסקת האש.

רק ביום השני, כשהצבאות הערביים גבלמו במרבית הגזרות, וכוחות המילואים הראשונים שלנו הגיעו אל תחזיתות ואינו את יום הי- כוחות, בתעוררו המדינות לפעולה בריסניה וגרמניה המערבית החליטו שצריך ליוום כיי- גום דחוף של מועצת הבטחון. איטליה קראה למדינות השוק האירופי לפעול במשותף כדי להגיל את השלום. הגנטיא ניכסון נתן הוראה דחופה לשר החוץ שלו הגרי קיסינג'ר לבקש יש-בם של המועצת.

הראגה הזאת, שנתעוררה בכירות מדינות המערב ברגע שהערבים הגיעו אל מיצוי כל היתרונות שיכלו להשיק מתקפת-הפתע שי- להם, רצויה מאד-מאד לקאהיר ולדמשק. זאת היתה, מלכתחילה, המטרה המדינית של הי- מלחמה החדשה אשר בה מתחל.

הן לא הישלו את עצמן שיוכלו לנצח את ישראל. הן לא האמינו שיוכלו להחזיק לאורך ימים בשטח כלשהו מעבר לקווי הפסקת הי- אש. הן קיחו לדבר אחד בלבד: שיהיו להן, בכוח יומתן ופתאומיות התקפתן, הישגים ראשונים; ושאת ההישגים האלה יוכלו לי- קיים בידות על ידי מה שמועצת הבטחון הצוהה על הפסקת אש כדי ברגע שבו יהיו כוחות צה"ל שרוכים להתקפת נגד.

הרבר הזה, שהמצריים והסורים מיהלים לו, לא יקום ולא יהיה. ממשלת ישראל הכהירה, מרינע שהצבאות הערבים פתחו במיתקפתם, שהמלחמה הזאת תסתיים כמינורם של תפול- צים, ולא בצווים של ארנן האומות המטרי- חיות.

התקופנות המצרית והסורית לא תזכה ב- פרסים בינלאומיים, והמצב בתחזיתות לא יוקי- פא ברגע שהערבים צפויים למסלה מוחצת. אחר שלב הבלימה של תפלישה הערבית יבוא שלב התקפת הנגד הישראלית; ואם האומות המאוחדות גורסות שהתקופנות הערבית אינה מסכנת את השלום אבל ההתגוננות הישרא- לית היא המחייבת התערבות בינלאומית דהרי- מה, יוזה עלינו להבטור להן כי זאת גישה חד- צדדית הגדחית על ידי הממשלה והעם בישראל דחיה מוחלטת וגפוררת.

לז אנחנו החלפנו מתי תגחיל המלחמה, אבל אנחנו נתלים מתי ת פ ת י י מ. הארץ לא כנע את ה- יקפנות הערפית; אין לו כל זכות מסורית למנוע את התקפת-הנגד הי- ישראליית.

# הדרך הקשה לנצחון

זו הפקם — במלחמת יום הכיפורים — הדרך לנצחון היא קשה יותר, ארוכה יותר ועקובה מרם.

וזאת משתי סיבות:

העדסנו הפעם לא להכות באכזות האוייב מכת-מנע והשארנו בידיהם את יחמת-הנת- לת-המלחמה. היה זה שיקול קר — מסעמים מדיניים וגם הממשלה שתחליטה על כך וגם צה"ל, שהתפלה עלי מעמדת-המלחמה, כשי- הוא נתון בשלב ראשון של הקרבות במצב של התגוננות ובליתם כוחות האוייב — ידעו יפה כי השלב הראשון יהיה הקשה ביותר. המחיר יהיה יקר יותר, אך הנצחון גדול יותר. לא רק מנקודת-ראות מדינית צבאית: הי- אוייב ילמד לקח, כי גם כשהיותמה בידו, אין בכוחו לנבחר על ישראל.

גם ילמד, כי אין בידו, לשחרר ככות מה שנקלח בכוחו, אלא מלחמה זו רק תגציה שליטתה של ישראל בשטחים, שהם רצו לשחררם, וכי דרך המימם תהיה עכשיו קשה יותר. כי מלחמת-יום-הכיפורים חסמה — עם היריות הראשונות — הרבה אופציות לשלום. וקנית: מבחינה צבאית וכלכלית לא יוכלנו לרכו בגבולות, במשך שש שנים ומעלה למן מלחמת ששת הימים, כוח גדול שיעמדה ביחס כלשתו לריכוזים האדירים של האוייב בכחי- אדם ובציוד. לכן היה המערך הישראלי נחות ביחס למערכות האוייב, ומלכתחילה היה בניו לתפקידו בלימה והתגוננות בשלב הראשון של חידוש-האש בזומת האוייב.

ואמנם אנו נתונים בשלבים האחרונים של מערכת-הבלימה, ובעוד הכתומת בקו הראי- שון של התחזיתות בדרום ובצפון עומדים ב- קרבות קשים, כדי להגוף את כוחות האוייב אל הקחים, שמשם פתחו במלחמתם — צרי- כים כוחות המילתאים, שגויסו והוכאו לחזית, למכת-הנגד.

התפתחות צבאית זו היתה צפויה מיד ב- הישמע הירית הראשונה.

זו היתה התערבה, שהשמיים עד הכפתון כשקרי-שקתיים אחרי פתיחת הסעריכה; וזו היתה זעריפת השיקור הקליון, כשי שהצגית לפני הממשלה כשהחליטה להימנע מסכנת- מיק.

לכן צריך הציבור לראות את מלחמת-יום- הכיפורים מנקודת-ראות זו, השונה משתי הי- מלחמות זאחרונות — מלחמת-קדש ומלחמת-י ששת-הימים. בשתי המלחמות זאחרונות פתי- תנו בתקפה וכמכת-מנע; ואילו במלחמה זו, שנכתתה עלינו, יבוא שלבי-התקפת רק עם פיתם שלב הבלימה התתגוננות.

אך כמו בשתי המלחמות הקודמות יתגולל שלב התקפתם, בעמדת-ינו שולשים שליטה מוחלטת בשמי ידית הקרבות.

לשומת מלחמת ששת הימים, כשגם בישראל וגם בשלום-היהודי והלא-יהודי — שלטה הי- הרגשת, כי אנו שרויים במלחמה על קיומנו, מלחמה לחיים או מות, הרי הפעם — אין שעדיין אנו עומדים בשלב הבלימה, אין פסק בלבו של איש — לא בבית ולא בחוץ — כי נצח נצחה, ונכה את האוייב שוק על ירך.

המלחמה הקשה נמשכת, אך כופה אינו כומל כפסק. ההוא לא יבוא על פי החלטת מועצת- הבטחון אלא בידו החייל הישראלי.

## 7. Translation of article in Appendix 6.

“The Concern for Peace is Too Late” – Maariv – 8 October 1973 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

On the first day of the war, when the initiative was entirely in the hands of the Arabs, and the huge Egyptian and Syrian forces stormed the small units and the sparse defense posts on the cease fire line, nobody talked about the need to call a meeting of the Security Council in order to demand a cease fire.

Only on the second day, when the Arab armies were blocked in most areas, and our first reserve forces arrived in the front and balanced the power, the states rose to action. The countries of Great Britain and West Germany decided that there was a need for an initiative to call together the Security Council. Italy called on European Union countries to act together in order to save the peace. And President Nixon urgently instructed his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to ask for a meeting of the Security Council.

This worry, that was awoken in the capitals in the West once the Arabs reached the peak of the advantages that they could produce from their sudden attack, was very, very desirable to Cairo and Damascus. This was, from the beginning, the political goal of the new war which they had started.

They did not delude themselves that they could defeat Israel, they did not believe that they could hold the areas beyond the cease fire lines for long. They hoped for only one thing: that they would have, with their initial power and surprise attack, the first gains; and that these gains would be able to remain in their hands, upon which the Security Council will order a cease fire just as enemy forces prepare to counterattack.

This thing that the Egyptians and the Syrians hope for will not advance and will not be. The Israeli Government has made clear, from the moment the Arab armies opened their campaign that this war will end with the expulsion of the invaders, not by the orders of the United Nations.

The aggressions of the Egyptians and the Syrians will not win international prizes, and the situation on the borders will not be frozen in the moment the Arabs expected a crushing defeat. After the phase of containment of the Arab invasion there will be an Israeli counterattack; and if the United Nations asserts that the aggressions of the Arabs is not risking peace, but the Israeli defense is the one that obligates an international intervention, we will have to clarify to them that this one sided approach is rejected by the Government and people in Israel, an absolute and total rejection.

We did not decide when the war will start, but we will decide when it will end. The UN did not prevent the Arab aggression, and they have no moral right to prevent an Israeli counterattack.

“The Difficult Path to Victory” – Maariv – 8 October 1973 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

This time—in the Yom Kippur War—the path to victory is harder, longer, and bloodier. And this for two reasons:

We preferred this time not to strike the enemy armies preemptively and left in their hands the initiative of starting the war. It was a cold consideration - for political reasons and also the government that decided on that, and also the IDF that the burden of war was put upon it while it is in the first phase of the battles in a condition of defense and restraint of the enemy forces—

they knew well that the first phase of battle will be the hardest. The price will be more expensive but the victory will be greater. Not only from a political and military perspective: the enemy will learn a lesson that even if the initiative is in his hands, he doesn't have the power to win against Israel.

And also will learn, it isn't in their hands to "liberate by force what was taken by force," on the contrary this war only will preserve the control of Israel in the areas that they wanted to [control], and the negotiation path will now be more difficult because the Yom Kippur War blocked with the first shots the opportunity for peace.

Second: from both military and economic reasons we were not able to concentrate forces for six years and more since the Six Day War, great powers that will stand in proportion to the concentration of huge enemy manpower and equipment. Therefore the Israeli formation was inferior in comparison to the enemy formation and from the beginning was built to stop and defend in the first phase of the restarting of the fire in the enemy's initiative.

And indeed we are in the final stages of containment and while the front line forces in the north and south lines stand in difficult battles to repel the Arab armies to the lines from which they began - reserve forces that were drafted are preparing for a counter attack.

This military development was expected immediately after the first shot was heard. This was the estimate that the Defense Minister declared an hour or two after the start of the campaign; and it was the estimate of the central command, as it was presented to the government when they decided to avoid preemptive strike.

Therefore the public needs to see the Yom Kippur War from this perspective, different from the two previous wars—Kadesh War [1956 - the Suez Crisis] and the Six Day War. In both recent wars we started the attack with preemptive strikes; whereas in this war, that was imposed upon on us, the attack phase will come only at the end of the defense and restraint phase.

But as in two previous wars, we will conduct the attack phase when our aircrafts control completely the skies of the battlefield.

Compared to the Six Day War, when in Israel, in the Jewish world, and also the non-Jewish world—the dominant feeling was that we were in a war of existence, a war of life or death, this time, though we still are in the defensive stage there is no doubt—not at home and not outside—that we will win, and cripple the enemy forces.

The difficult war continues, but there is no doubt how it ends. And it will not come according to the UN Security Council but from the hands of the Israelis.



8. Editorial column from Davar newspaper on October 8, 1973.

הכנסת ובבתיהם, וכן היעדר תנו"ע  
עת רכב בכבישים — היה בהם  
כדי להקל את מלאכת הגיוס יר"ת  
חר מאשר ביום עבודה וביום תח"ב  
בורה רגיל.

יתכן, איפוא, שהשבון יום הי"ב  
כיפורים בתכנון האויב היה מוט"ב  
עה ביסודו ולא השתלם לעומת  
הזעם שתכסיס זה עורר לא רק  
בעולם היהודי אלא גם בקרב  
אנשים אחרים המגנים הפרה זו  
של קדושת החג הגדול.

ואם יום הכיפורים הוא בדרך  
כלל היום המאחד את יהודי הי"ב  
עולם הרי כוחו של יום כיפורים  
זה ודאי יעלה מבחינתו זו על כל  
יום כיפורים אחר ולא יפול מ"ב  
כוחה המעורר, המאחד והמלכד  
של מלחמת ששת הימים.  
הלל דנציג

## קדושת שבת שבתון

הרבה תפילות התפללו יהודים  
בכל הדורות בימי הכיפורים הי"ב  
רכים שעברו על עמנו, אבל תפיל  
לה זו שתתפללו יהודים על חוף  
ימת של יפו ביום הכיפורים הזה  
יש לה ייחוד.

מכל בתי הכנסת בתל-אביב הם  
נאספו, יחד עם אחיהם שלא היו  
בבית-כנסת. קריאות טלפוניות אס"ב  
פו מאות בעלי רכב מיחידת "רכב  
מתנדב" שחבריה רוכב בגיל גבות,  
לאחר כל שירות צבאי.

יהודים אלה הפרו, כמובן, את  
קדושת יום הכיפורים ובאו למפגש  
עם רכבם, כדי למלא את חפ"ב  
קידם, הם באו עם רכבם ועם  
הרגשת "היום ונורא הזה" בלבם.  
משהתברר להם שיש להמתין  
ולחמתין עד שישלחו אותם ל"ב  
מקום שבו זקוקים להם (ובעיקר  
לרכבם...) סידרו מיניה וביה מני

# דברים

## "מלחמת יום הכיפורים"

נראה שהשם "מלחמת יום הי"ב  
כיפורים" — שנשמע לראשונה  
במוצאי החג בפרשנותו של הי"ב  
הרצוג — ייכנס להיסטוריה כמו  
"מלחמת ששת הימים".

זה שלא יהיה אופיים של הי"ב  
קרבות בימים הקרובים, בחירת  
יום הכיפורים על-ידי האויבים הי"ב  
ערביים לסודו התקפתם המסור  
לבת תישאר סימן מובהק של הי"ב  
מלחמה הרביעית שהמדינות הי"ב  
שכנה כמו על ישראל.

זוהי מלחמת התקפה יזומה ו"ב  
מלחמת הגנה טובהקת מצדנו.  
מתכנני ההתקפה עשו חשבון פ"ב  
שוט: ביום צום זה תשושים  
אזרחי ישראל והייליה יותר מאשר  
בכל יום אחר, אך גראה שהתו"ב  
קפים שכתו שני גורמים:

\* אמנם, הצום הוא גורם להתשה  
גופנית, אך יש ביום הכיפורים  
מזון רוחני המחזק את גפשו של  
האדם היהודי הממוצע יותר מאשר  
כל יום אחר בשנה, והכוונה לא  
רק לתמונים שהתפללו בבתי הי"ב  
כנסת, אלא גם לאלה שישבו  
בבית ובחיק הטבע ונהנו מהיום  
משקט ביותר, מיום המנוחה הי"ב  
מוחלט במדינה.

\* ריכוז רוב האזרחים בבתי

9. Translation of article in Appendix 8.

“The Yom Kippur War” – Davar – 8 October 1973 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

It appears that the name “Yom Kippur War” – that was first used after the holiday in the commentary of Chaim Herzog – will go down in history like the (term) “Six Days War.”

No matter what the nature of the fighting in the coming days, the choice of Yom Kippur by the Arab armies for their combined attack date will remain a sure indication of the fourth war that the neighboring countries forced upon Israel.

This was an initiated attack war, and a clear defense war on our part. Planners of the attack made a simple calculation: in this day of fasting, Israeli citizens and soldiers will be more exhausted than on any other day. But it seems the attackers forgot two factors:

\*Indeed, the fasting is causing physical exhaustion, but in Yom Kippur there is a spiritual food, which strengthens the soul of the average Jewish person more than on any other day in the year. And (this) refers not only to the masses who prayed in the synagogues, but for those who were in their house and in the outdoor and enjoyed the quietest day, from the day of absolute rest in the country.

\*The concentration of the majority of citizens in the synagogues and in their homes, and the absence of vehicular traffic on the roads –eased the work of recalling the draftees more than in any regular work day and any normal transportation day.

It is possible, therefore, that accounting for Yom Kippur in the enemy planning was fundamentally wrong, and did not pay off compared to the anger that this tactic aroused, not only in the Jewish world but also among other people who condemn this violation of sanctity of the great holiday.

If Yom Kippur is usually the day that unites the Jewish world, the power of this Yom Kippur certainly will in this respect, be stronger than every other Yom Kippur, the alarm will not fall short from the arousing, unifying and uniting power of the Six Days War. – Hillel Danzig

10. Editorial column from Haaretz newspaper on January 23, 1974.

# הדרדרות במשא ומתן הקואליציוני

מאת מתי גולן

אנשים כשמהה אליהו, אריה דולי צין ואולי אפילו שמואל תמיר.

מה גם שלפחות בעתיד הקרוב לא צפויות עילות למחלוקת הרות משמעות. אם נכונה ההנחה, וכיום אין סיבה להניח אחרת, כי השותף העיקרי לשיחות יזובה, לפחות ב" חודשים הקרובים, תהיה מערים, הרי שהפעם בין עמדות רוב אנשי הליכוד והמערך הוא מינימלי. גורלו של מדבר סיני משוחרר מן המש" קל הנטימנטלי שיש ליהודה ו" שומרון.

במידה שקיימת מחלוקת בין שתי המפלגות אין היא מתמקדת דווקא בכמות הששהים עליהם מותר לו ותר אלא בתמורה שיש לקבל עבור רם. ואם אמנם כך הדבר הרי רצוי וחשוב, כי ההחלטות בעניינים אלה יתקבלו על דעתם של כספר רב ככל האפשר של נבחרים העיבור.

ייתכן שיהיה קשה יותר להשיג הסכמה על נושאים אלה אבל ה" ליכוד למשך אצל המסדר ול"ע אולם כאן לא מדובר בהקמת חב" רה כמשלתית או בכנייה שיטה כלכלית. כיום אין ישראל יכולה להרשות לעצמה את הלונסוס שלה ממשלת חיים קלים ואיחוי המדינה ודאי היו רוצים לדעת, כי ההכרעות בעתיד יתקבלו לאחר בדיקת כל הזוויות ושיתוף מירב הענדות ש" הנבחרים מייצגים.

## כלי כותרות מפוצצות

המאמץ היחיד שנעשה עד כה לשיחות הליכוד במשא ומתן הקו" אליציוני התבטא בדרישת המפד"ל להקמת ממשלת חרום לאומית — אולם אם אמנם היו ראשי המפד"ל כנים ותקיפים בדרישתם זו, הרי היו מעמידים אותה כתנאי להמשך המגעים. כיוון שלא עשו כך, נתינו שלמעשה ברור היום, כי יילכו גם לממשלה מצומצמת, קשה להשי" חתר מן הרושם, כי הדרישה אי" נה יותר ממס"שפתיים להשקית ול" השתיק את זבולון המר ויהודה בן" מאיר.

ייתכן כי לו הסכימו ראשי המע" רך לשאת ולתת עם הליכוד היו בגלים, כי שותפות קואליציונית ביניהם אינה בלתי אפשרית. ואו יכולות היו המפלגות הדתיות להצ" טרף, אולם כבלי להעמיד דרישות שאין השעה כשרה לתן. אין, לכן, צורך בכותרות מפוצצות כמו כמ" שלת ליכוד או ממשלת חרום. אולם בהחלט יש מקום לשאוף ליצירת בסיס פרלמנטרי רחב ככל האפשר לממשלה הנכנסת.

כך חייבים כל השותפים למלאכת המרכבה לשנות דפוסי מחשבה נוק" שים ומיושנים.

שכן, אם יש כיום למנהיגי ה" מפלגות חובה ממשית כלפי בוח" ריהם הרי היא מתרכזת בשאלות הנוגעות לקיומה ועתידה של מדי" נת ישראל ועל אלה חייב להתמקד המשא ומתן הקואליציוני.

ואפשר היה אחרת לו השוחררו ראשי המערך מן העמדה, כי עם הליכוד אי אפשר. עמדה זו גובעת מן ההכרה, כי בעיצומו של משא" ומתן להסדר באזור לא ייתכן לשתף בממשלה גורמים שאינם מוכנים לפשרות טריטוריאליות. הכרה זו לא היתה משוללת בסיס עובדתי לו היה מדובר במשא ומתן עם גוש חרות ליברליים. בגוש זה אמנם היה רוב למנחם בגין ואנשיו והיה מקום להנחה, כי שותפות אתם פירושה טירפוד ועידת יזובה עוד לפני ש" נכנסה לשלב מעשי.

אולם את מקום גח"ל חפשי הלי" כוד ובכך נשכח למעשה הבסיס העובדתי וההגיוני מעמדת המערך. בתוך הליכוד נוצר גוש של הלי" ברלים-מרכז החופשי-רשימה ממלכ" תית, שאנשיו דוגלים במפורש וב" מצדדו בנכונות לפשרות. לגוש זה 22 חברים בתוך הליכוד לעומת 17 אנשי תנועת החרות.

הטענה הנשמעת מכיוון המערך, כי למרות זאת בנין הוא הקובע בליכוד אינה יותר מהיאחזות בח" ררך שנודע לבטל מלכתחילה את אפשרות צירוף הליכוד לקואליציה. שכן, מי שרוצה בכך יזכר, כי גם ההכרעה על פרישת גח"ל מן ה" ממשלה נפלה על חוזה של קול ומכאן מותר להסיק שבעניינים בע" לי אוסי לאומי עליון עשוי למצוא עצמו בנין במיעוט בליכוד, אם עמדותיו לא יתקבלו על דעת שר" הפיו.

## קטביות עמדות

איש לא חושד, אמנם, בליברלים, במרכז החופשי ובע"מ, כי נכר" נותם לפשרות מקרכת אותם לדעו" הו של, למשל, ליובה אליאב, אי" לס גם בתוך המערך עצמו ניהו למ" צוא קטביות של עמדות ודעות. כך, למשל, אין זה ברור כלל, כי דעותיו של פנחס ספיר יוצרות פער כאשר מעמידים אותן מול דעותיה של ראש הממשלה יותר מאשר הן עומדות מול עמדותיהם של הליברלי" ואם מצליחים גול" דה וספיר, ולא כל שכן דיון, למצוא נוסחה משותפת, קשה להבין מדוע לא יוכלו להשתלב בנוסחה זו גם

כאשר עוקבים אחר המתרחש ב" ישבע" בשבתות האחרונות נדמה כאלו קיימת גח"ל שתי מערכות" הלי" במרכז" אחד" סיפוי אינטנסיבי בעניינים הנוגעים בע"י פור נפשה של האומה, ושהם חול" דה של מלחמת יום הכיפורים. ענ" ינים אלה, ברור לכל, לא הסתיימו עם החתימה על הסכם הפרדת ה" כחות. רק תמים יאמין, כי השטח שבין מעברי המיתלה והגידי לבין תעלת סואץ ישיבע את רעבונם של המצרים. אדרבא: הרבה יותר סביר להניח, כי תיאבונה של קהיר יגבר עתה משנוכחה לדעת, כי ניתן ל" השיג באמצעים מדיניים מה שק" שה, או בלתי אפשרי, להשיג ב" אמצעים צבאיים. לכן יש לצפות לכך שלאחר תקופת רגיעה קצרה יחודשו ההצעים לקידומו של הס" דר כולל באזור.

במצב עניינים זה, המחייב גיוס כל המשאבים הנפשיים והשכליים למאמץ עליון, אנו עדים, מצד שני, לחזיון שלמראתו אני כרוגש ל" תים צורך לצבוט את עצמי כדי להשתכנע שאין זה חזיון-שוא. הנה יושבים להם עסקנים-נכבדים, ב" ינהם חברי ממשלה בכירים, ובמר" כז דיוניהם להקמת הקואליציה עוב" דות שאלות מלחמת יום הכיפורים כאילו ריחפה מעליהם, וכך מאל" צים אותנו לעקוב טוב, כאילו דבר לא קרה, אחר הדרמה של המגעים בשאלות נוקבות כמו חוק למניעת הונאה בכשרות, מיהו יהודי, סטטוס קוו וכיוצא באלה.

## ממשלה צריך ההרכיב

כשלעצמן דאי שיש לשאלות אלה התיבות לא מעשה לגבי חלק ניכר של הציבור, אפשר גם לטעון כי החיים חייבים להימשך, והחיים כוללים גם שאלות מסוג זה. ובכל זאת — הפעם, כך נדמה, נעדר מרגומנטים אלה אלמנט ה" שכנוע הפנימי, אי אפשר לראות את הנרשאים המעסיקים את מנהלי המר"ם הקואליציוני בבנותק מן ה" מציאות החדשה שנוצרה במדינה. באותה מידה אי אפשר לקבל את הטענה שהמשיכות החיים מחייבת עיסוק גם בשאלות אלה, כאשר עם המשכיות, צורתה ואפיה, מ" הווים נרשאים לדיון גורלי. אולם כמשלה, כמובן, צריך ל" הרכיב והשאלה היא האם אפשר לעשות זאת אחרת. לדעתי לא רק אפשר אלא גם צריך. אולם לשם

## 11. Translation of article in Appendix 10.

“Deterioration in the Coalition-Building Process” – Haaretz – 23 January 1974 – Translation by Arie Zmora

Watching the events in Israel, it seems, that there are two parallel systems of living: on the one hand - an intensive dealing with issues crucial to national security, a direct result of the Yom Kippur War. These issues were not resolved in the agreement of the separation of forces. Only a naïve person will believe that the territory between the Mitla-Gidi passes and the Suez Canal will satisfy the hunger of the Egyptians. Moreover, it seems that the appetite of the Egyptians will further increase as they realize that they can achieve via political means what they could not get via military means.

Therefore, it can be expected, that after a short hiatus, pressure will be renewed to bring an overall agreement to the region. Under these circumstances, which require the utmost mobilization of mental and analytical skills, I see a vision that is perplexing. We are forced to review the coalition building negotiations where the major drama moves along crucial issues like: preventing deceit in Kashrut, who is a Jew? status quo, etc.

### *A Government Needs to be Constructed*

On its face, these issues are important for part of the public. One may argue, life goes on, and it requires dealing with these issues as well. And yet, there is not real conviction in arguing these points. Those who conduct coalition-building negotiations cannot conduct them with disconnect from the new reality created in the country. At the same time, one cannot accept the argument that as life goes on, it requires dealing with these issues [Kashrut, who is a Jew, etc.] when the very coexistence, composition, and its nature are subject to a crucial debate.

And yet, a government needs to be put together and the question is can it be done differently? In my opinion, not only is it possible, it is mandatory. But in order to do it, the partners for the coalition-building need to change dated and rigid habits of thought.

If the leaders of the parties had an obligation to their electorate, they concentrate on issues to the existence and the future of the state of Israel. On these [issues] the negotiations for coalition-building should concentrate.

It could have been done differently, if Labor's (Marach) leaders were able to free themselves from the position that, with the Likud, it is impossible. This position rises from the realization that during negotiations for an overall agreement in the region it is forbidden to include in the government, partners who are opposed to territorial concessions. This realization would not be without merit if the negotiations were with the bloc of Herut-liberals. In that bloc there was a majority to Begin and his men, and there was a point to assume that partnership with them means sabotaging the Geneva Conference before it reached its phase of implementation.

However, in place of GAHAL [Herut-liberals] we have the Likud, and the basis for the Labour assumption lost its grounds. Inside the Likud a war bloc was created, Mercatz Hofshi – (Free Center) – national list. Their members clearly support compromise. This bloc has 22 members inside the Likud vis-à-vis 17 members in Herut. The argument that Begin is the determining factor in the Likud is just an excuse which means to prevent any possibility of bringing the Likud to the coalition. As one may recall, the decision on withdrawal of GAHAL from the government was decided on one vote. Therefore it is possible to assume that, on matters of the highest national security concern Begin may find himself in the minority with Likud, if his positions will not be accepted by his partners.

### *Polarized Positions*

No one suspects that among the Liberals, Mercaztz Hofshi, and BAAM there are individuals close to Luba Eliav. And yet even in the Marach (Labor) one can trace polarized (diverse) points of view. It is totally unclear if the gap between the view of Pinhas Sapir and the Prime Minister is different than between him and the Liberals' points of view, and if Sapir and Golda can overcome differences, let alone Dayan. It is hard to understand why they cannot accommodate others like: Simha Ehrlich, Aryeh Dulzin, and even Shmuel Tamir. This is especially true, in the near future there are no major issues that require heart-breaking decision making.

If it is assumed – as is the case – that the major partner for the Geneva talks, at least in the coming months, is Egypt, then the gap between most of the positions of Labor and Likud is minimal. The fate of the Sinai Desert is free from the sentimental burden associated with Judea and Samaria.

As far as there is a dispute between the two parties, it does not revolve around the size of the territories that should be returned. Rather about what would be gained in return. If this is the case it is important that decisions on these matters would be accepted by large numbers of the public's representatives.

It is possible that such an agreement would be harder to achieve among Likud members and easier among MAFDAL and independent liberals. However, here we are not dealing with a government corporation or the economic system. Israel today cannot afford easy solutions, the citizens of the country clearly want to make sure that decisions in the future would be made after examinations of all angles with cooperation and input of most of the positions of the public's representatives.

#### *No Bombastic Headlines*

The only effort made so far to include the Likud in the coalition negotiations is reflected in the demand of the MAFDAL to establish a national emergency government – but if it was that the chiefs of MAFDAL were firm and honest in their demand – then they would have put it as a condition to the continuing of the negotiations. Since they did not do this, and because in fact it is now clear that they will go into a small government, it is hard to shake the impression that the requirement does not go beyond paying lip service to quiet and silence Zebulon Hammer and Yehuda Ben Meir.

It is possible that if the heads of Marach agreed to negotiate with the Likud they would have discovered that the coalition partnership between them is not impossible. And then the religious parties could have allowed them to join, but without imposing demands that the hour is not right for them. There is not, therefore, a need for bombastic headlines like Likud or emergency government, but certainly there is every reason to strive to create a broad, parliamentary basis as broad as possible for the incoming government.

12. Editorial column from Jerusalem Post newspaper on January 23, 1974.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1974 • VOL. XLIV, No. 14002

## The Knesset anti-climax

THE marathon debate in the Knesset yesterday on the disengagement agreement was something of an anti-climax. The terms of the agreement had already been published and the Likud had ensured that its objections and reservations were common knowledge too.

The Prime Minister's statement was intended to put Israel's present position on record, and to submit the disengagement agreement for the approval of the Knesset. Arguably this approval might have been sought before Israel signed the accord, despite the fact that the present government had been legally and constitutionally empowered to go ahead and sign. Moreover the Prime Minister told the House that Dr. Kissinger was asked to inform the Egyptians that the agreement would be brought before the Knesset this week.

More memorable than the invective and rhetoric which yesterday's debate produced from all sides of the chamber was a quiet question which Defence Minister Dayan addressed to the Opposition Leader. What, he asked, did Mr. Begin suggest. Neither Mr. Begin nor the Likud's new defence spokesman, Mr. Ariel Sharon, offered the House a set of proposals which could be put up alongside the government's actions and policies as a feasible alternative.

Mr. Begin did not even attempt to do so. He rehearsed his well-worn if all too justified criticism of the government's pre-war optimism, and he accused the ministers of continuing

to lull the nation into groundlessly optimistic assessments of Arab intentions.

Mr. Sharon said Likud had a plan but that the government refused to listen to it. But he did not spell out Likud's idea. He made do, in his maiden Knesset speech, with again warning that Israel was forsaking the most vital military advantage it possessed in the defence of the Sinai Peninsula.

As a military strategist and veteran officer of note, Mr. Sharon's words merit attention. But his insistence that Israel remain in full military array 10 kilometres from the Suez Canal would effectively preclude — as Mr. Dayan pointed out — any chance of Egypt agreeing to reopen the waterway and restore normal civilian life to the Canal Zone.

Mr. Sharon's arguments contribute nothing towards reconciling the positions whereby Egypt rejects Israel's views on an overall settlement (presumably it would reject Likud's views too if these were known), rejects too any plan for a partial settlement which does not give it full control of the Canal, and at the same time engages in a renewed war of attrition.

Even Likud must realize that there can be no overnight transition from deep hostility to full peace. The disengagement agreement, if it results as planned in the normalization of life in the Canal region, would give the two sides a first taste of peaceful coexistence at least in this limited area. And this may hold out some hope of further progress.

13. Editorial column from Maariv newspaper on January 23, 1974.

לפי ההסברים שנתן ד"ר קיסניגר בשבוע  
לנושינגטון, היו דברים מסוימים ששני ה-  
צדדים לא היו מוכנים לומר אותם בפומבי,  
ומכל שכן — להתחייב עליהם בהסכם פור-  
מלי. אבל הם היו מוכנים לומר אותם לצד  
שלישי, מתוך הבנה שאותו צד שלישי יגלה  
אותם בצורה דיסקרטית לצד שכנגד. הכוונה  
המצרית לפתוח את התעלה היתה אחד ה-  
דברים האלה.

מכחינה פורמלית אין הכוונה הזאת  
קיימת אלא כהתרשמות של ד"ר קיסניגר  
מן העמדות המצריות. הוא רשם התרשמות  
זו, יחד עם כמה אחרות, במסמך שנתן  
בידי ממשלת ישראל. אולם במעשה זה לא  
היב את המצרים, ולא את עצמו או את  
ארצות הברית. התערכה שממשלת מצרים  
מתכוונת לעשות מעשה מסויים — אין עמה  
כל ודאות שאמנם ייעשה המעשה.

ההסכם זכה לתמלול ברוב מדק בגנות.  
אולם קרוב המעשי הכוונות אשר עמו ייבחנו  
פקוד הדישום מספר. אם אמנם פלי-קולו מ-  
מסמך על מה שאין בו, כי אז יהיה צורך  
להמתין ולראות אם מה שאין בו יונשם  
באמתה מדה פמו התחייבות הנסיגה של יצי-  
ראל הכתובה בו בלשון מפורשת.



## ההתחייבות והכוונה

הכנסת סמכה אתמול את ידה על הסכם  
הפרדת הכוחות בין ישראל ומצרים לאחד  
שדוברי הממשלה הגנו עליו בנקימה ש-  
היתה באופקת הרבה יותר מזו שבה הוצג  
ההסכם כמדף לחתימתו.

אם בתחילה תואר כנצחון מדיני של  
ישראל שנתאפשר על ידי שינוי גמור  
שחל בעמדת מצרים, אתמול הוצג כסך  
הכל כדבר המוב פיותר שאפשר היה  
להשיג בתנאים הקיימים, והשינוי הי-  
מובהק בעמדת מצרים לא מילא עוד  
תפקיד במינוחה של הממשלה.

הגימק העיקרי שנשמע אתמול בוויכוח  
בכנסת היה, שנכונות המצרים לפתוח את  
התעלה ולשקם את הערים שעל גדותה היא  
היוצרת את ההרגשה כי פני קאהיר לשלום.  
שר הכטחון אף הוסיף כי אי אפשר יהיה  
להם למצרים לקיים גשרים על התעלה ל-  
העברה מהירה של כוחות שריון, אם תתנהל  
בה תנועת ספנות, ואולם הנכונות המצרית  
לפתוח את התעלה איננה מופיעה בהסכם  
שנחתם על ידי הצדדים. אין בו זכר לכוונה  
כזאת, ומכל שכן — להתחייבות כזאת.  
אם זה הצידוק, ועליו מבוססת התקווה,  
והוא הגותן יסוד לאופטימיות, כי אז יש  
להרגיש שאין הוא חלק מן ההסכם; הוא  
חלק מן ההבטחות שנתן שר התוך האמ-  
ריקני לממשלת ישראל ביחס לכוונותיהם של  
המצרים.

14. Translation of article in Appendix 13.

“Obligation and Guidance” – Maariv – 23 January 1974 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

The Knesset gave its blessing yesterday to the disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt after speakers for the government defended it in a tone that was much more restrained than when the agreement was presented around the time of its signing.

If in the beginning it was portrayed as a political victory of Israel which was made possible by a complete change that happened in the Egyptian position, yesterday it was introduced as the best possible thing that could be achieved in existing circumstances, and “a distinct change in the position of Egypt” no longer played a role in the government’s argument.

The main argument that was heard yesterday in the debate in the Knesset was, that the willingness of Egypt to open the canal and to rebuild the cities on [the Suez Canal’s banks] is what creates the feeling that Cairo is heading towards peace. The Defense Minister added that it will not be possible for the Egyptians to maintain bridges over the canal for the rapid transfer of armored forces, if shipping traffic is to be conducted. But the Egyptian willingness to open the canal does not appear in the agreement signed by the parties. There is not a trace of such an intention, and even more – such a commitment. If this is the justification, and hope is based on it, and it is the foundation for optimism, then it has to be emphasized that it is not a part of the agreement; it is part of the clarifications that were given by the US Secretary of State to the Israeli government in regards to the intentions of the Egyptians.

According to the explanations given by Dr. Kissinger on his return from Washington, there were certain things that both the parties were not ready to say to each other in public, and all because – not to commit themselves to a formal agreement. But they were ready to say them to a third party, with the understanding that the third party will reveal them discreetly to the opposing party. The Egyptian intention to open the canal was the first of these.

From a formal point of view there is not this intention like Dr. Kissinger’s impression from the Egyptian’s intentions. He wrote this intention, along with numbers of others, in a document that was given to the Israeli Government. But this action is not owed to the Egyptians, to himself, or to the United States. The evaluation that the Egyptian Government intends to do from a certain method – with no certainty will become the action.

The agreement yesterday won a firm majority in the Knesset. However, the values and intentions that inform [the Knesset] will be tested in several ways. If indeed it is based completely on what is not in it, then it will be necessary to wait and see if what is not in it will come true just as Israel’s commitment is written in express language.



15. Editorial column from Davar newspaper on January 23, 1974.

## האקט המדיני הראשון של הכנסת

הכנסת סמכה אמש את ידה על ההסכם המצרי-ישראלי להפי' רדת הכוחות, שעליו התמה הממשלה בשבוע שעבר, ובכך ניתן האות להתחלת ביצועו של ההסכם מחרתיים. הדיון המדיני הממושך — והנרגש לעתים — שקדם להצבעת האישור לא העלה הרבה נקודות חדשות בטיעוני מחייבים ושוללים, וכשם שמתלך הוויכוח היה צפוי פחות או יותר, כך היה צפוי הרוב הגדול של הכנסת החדשה, שהצביע בעד ההסכם. אולם נראה לנו, שאולי יותר מתמיד טיקפה התמיכה הפרלמנטרית, שבה זכתה הממשלה הפעם, את הלך-רוח השורר בקרב הרוב המכריע של העם בישראל לגבי הערכת ההסכם שנחתם בקילומטר ה-101.

העריכה זו אינה מתעלמת כלל מן העובדה שההסכם אינו כולו יתרון מבהינה ישראלית ושאינו ספק, כי תיאר רטית אפשר היה לשרטט קווים טובים יותר מאלה שעליהם הוסכם למעשה. אך ראייה מפוכחת של המציאות שנוצרה אחרי המלחמה ושיקול הסיכויים המסתמנים למניעת התחדדות האש ולהסדרים, הם שהביאו את ישראל ליטול את הסיכון המהושב שבהסכם זה להפרדת הכוחות. כשמדובר ב"סיכון מהושב" אין לשכוח את המשמעות המתחייבת מן הצירוף: בעוד המלה "סיכון" מציינת בעיקר את הווייתורים על עמדות שבמקרה מלחמה היו עשויות לתת לנו יתרון רב, הרי המלה "מהושב" פירושה, שלמרות ויתורים אלה מעמד ישראל נשאר איתן ואין הווייתורים כרוכים ביצירת מצב של נהיתות צבאית.

כוחה של ישראל, שהוכח שוב במלחמת יום הכיפורים, איפשר לנו לעשות זינוק ראשון זה לקראת מימוש שאיפתנו היסודית — השאיפה לשלום. ההחלטה מאמש, האקט המדיני הראשון שהוטל על הכנסת השמינית, היא ביטוי לרצון ולנכונות הקיימים בישראל למצות כל סיכוי להגשמת שאיפה זו.

16. Translation of article in Appendix 15.

“The First Political Action of the Knesset” – Davar – 23 January 1974 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

The Knesset gave the blessing last night to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement to separation of forces, which the government signed last week, and the signal was given to start the execution of the agreement the day after tomorrow. The extended – and often emotional – political debate that preceded the confirmation vote does not raise a lot of new points in the arguments of those who are for or against, and the procedure of the debate moved on as was more or less expected, so was it expected that likely the vast majority of the Knesset would vote in favor of the agreement. But it appears to us, that perhaps more than ever the parliamentary support, which the government won this time, reflected the prevailing mood among the vast majority of the people of Israel about the value of the agreement at kilometer-101.

This assessment does not ignore the fact that the agreement as a whole is not all an advantage in terms of the Israeli view and that no doubt, that theoretically it was possible to draw better lines than those in fact agreed to. But the sober view of reality that was created after the war and the consideration of emerging prospects of preventing the renewal of fire and arrangements brought Israel to take the calculated risk of this agreement for separation of forces. When it comes to “calculated risk” do not forget the necessary meaning of the combined words: while the word “risk” indicates mainly the concessions on positions that in case of war they might give us a significant advantage, the word “calculated” means, that despite these concessions, the status of Israel remains strong and no concessions involve creating a situation of military inferiority.

The power of Israel, which has been shown again in the Yom Kippur War, has enabled us to make this first leap towards the realization of our underlying aspirations – the desire for peace. The decision of last night, the first political act imposed upon the eighth Knesset, is an expression of the desire and willingness that exists in Israel to exhaust every opportunity for realizing this ambition.

17. Editorial column from Haaretz newspaper on November 20, 1977.

## בל נחמיץ שעת כושר

ביקורו של נשיא מצרים מכוטט אחת המכשלות — אם לא המכשלה העיקרית — שעמדה עד כה על דרך ההידברות בין העולם הערבי לבינינו: הרחיקה הכלל-ערבית מלהתייחס אל מדינת ישראל כאל אחת ממדינות האזור שאין לערער על זכות קיומה. היענותו המיידית להזמנת ראש הממשלה היא בעלת משמעות כפולה — הודות לסמליה היא מיטתה את התמונה הפוליטית מיסודה. לכן אין גוזמה בחיזור הביקור כמאורע „היסטורי“.

אך אין די בהתפעלות מסמני הטכס, ורהיבו את הלב ככל שירחיבו, יש לנצל את שעת הרצון כדי לקדם את עניין השלום. במיפגשים בין האורה לבין מראהיו צריכים להניח את הדבכני היסוד שעליהם יוכל לקום בניין השלום.

עלינו לצאת מן ההנחה כי אנוואר אליסאדאת רוצה בשלום אתנו, ויש להעריך את כנות כוונתו במיוחד על רקע ההתנגדות שיוזמתו מעוררת בחלקים מסוייכים של העולם הערבי. אנו רוצים מים לסנינו כי סאדאת הרגיש לפני נסיעתו כי אין הוא מוסמך לדבר אלא בשמה של מצרים, אך נטיב לעשות אם נביא בהשבון כי גם בתור נשיא מצרים הוא רואה את עצמו קשור לעולם הערבי הרחב יותר. ככל שבעותיה המיוחדות במינו של ארצו קרובות ביותר ללבנו — אנוואר אליסאדאת לא יוכל ולא ירצה להינתק מהמחנה הערבי הכללי שהוא שואף להיות מוכר כמנהיגו.

טוב תעשה איפוא הממשלה אם תדון אתו על מלוא הבעיות העומדות ותלויות בין ישראל ומדינות ערב. אנו רשאים לצפות ממנו שיגלה נכונות לדון בכלן חוד הבנה אינטרסים של בני שיתוף הישראליים. במיוחד עליו להבין כי אש"ף איננו יכול להתקבל על דינו כשכן: לא בדרך של כינון מדינה שליטת בשטח ארץ ישראל, כפי שהוגדר בשעתו על ידי המנדט הבריטי, אפשר לספק את האינטרס הביטחוני החיוני שלנו.

מאידך מגיעה עתה גם השעה שבה הממשלה שלנו חייבת לכלכל את צעדיה בכיוון שיאפשר לנשיא מצרים לשוב לארצו כמנהיג ערבי אשר מסוגל לעשות לפתרון הבעיה הפלשתינית. לנשיא מצרים שבה לירושלים, שנאם בכנסת, שהתפלל בכנסת אליסאדאת ובכך התעלם מהתעמולה נגד איחוד העיר תחת שלטון ישראלי — למנהיג ערבי כזה יש לומר בלי כחל וסרק שאין אנו רוצים לאורך ימים לקיים את שליטתנו על יותר ממיליון ערבים ביהודה, שומרון ורצועת עזה. ממשלת ישראל תוכל לומר — וצריכה לומר — לנשיא מצרים כי היא מסכימה — תוך שינוי הקווים של הסכמי שביתת הנשק משנת 1949, עד כמה שהבטחון שלנו מאפשר אותו — לעיצוב של גבולות קבע אשר יסאירו את רוב הפלשתינאים מחוץ למדינת ישראל, כך שיוכלו, תוך שיתוף עם בני עמם שכירדן, לבטא את זוהתם הערבית-פלשתינית.

הדרך צריכה להיות פנויה עתה להסדרים „בכל הגזרות“ שי יקלו על מצרים להתמסר לטיפול בבעיותיה הפנימיות, מבלי שתהרס צורך להקדיש חלק מוסרז מביטאביה לחזקת צבא ולהכנות למלחמה מתודעת. ממשלת ישראל, כפי שהוקמה בעקבות הבחירות לכנסת הלאומית, חלקה דיהל כלל להרים ולתת/ נשלה להיכנות השלום — דהיינו: כדי לנהל מדיניות של פליחה לא-יסטוראלית בחלקי הארץ שהם, שכמה בהינות, הרגישים ביותר, למר כנחה בנין יאמינו גם מתנגדיה הכריזבים ביותר של חלוקת הארץ. כי בסופו של דבר נחוצ להפריד בין אידיאל היסטורידתי לבין הכוח של מציאות פוליטית אזורית ובינלאומית. מפלגות האופוזיציה, שמנהיגיהן טענו בשעתם כי אין לממשלותיהן בסיס ציבורי ופוליטי מנטארי רחב דיו, לא יוכלו שלא לתמוך בהחלטה אמיצה של המכר שלה אשר שני שליטים מהכנסת מלוכדים מאחוריה.

בל נחמיץ שעת כושר. מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית ומכר קראטית אשר אויביה יתספרו אתה, ראויה למחיר הכיור בוותרת על שלמות הארץ.

## 18. Translation of article in Appendix 17.

“Let’s not Miss an Hour of Opportunity” – Haaretz – 20 November 1977 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

The visit of the Egyptian President collapsed one of the obstacles – if not the main obstacle – that had been standing on the path of dialogue between the Arab world and us: Pan-Arab hesitation to refer to the State of Israel as one of the countries in the region that her right to exist should not be undermined. His immediate response to the Prime Minister’s invitation has a dual significance – thanks to its symbolism it fundamentally changes the political picture. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration in describing the visit as “historic.”

But it is not enough in mere admiration for the ceremonial signs as astoundingly as they excite the heart. We should exploit this desirable time to promote the cause of peace. In the meetings between the guest and his hosts we must lay the foundation blocks on which the house of peace is built.

We must assume that Anwar al-Sadat wants peace with us, and respect the sincerity of his intention especially given the opposition that his initiative is raising in some parts of the Arab world. We note that Sadat stressed before his departure that he is not authorized to speak only on behalf of Egypt, but we will do better if we take that into account, even as Egypt’s President he sees himself linked to the Arab world. As the peculiar problems of his country are close to his heart – Anwar al-Sadat cannot and will not want to break away from the general Arab camp of which he wants to be recognized as the leader.

The government, therefore, will do well if they discuss with him all the problems that exist and stand between Israel and the Arab states. We may expect for him to reveal a willingness to discuss all of them, with the understanding of the interests of the Israeli negotiators. It must be especially understood that the PLO cannot be accepted by us as a neighbor: there exists no way of establishing a third state in the Land of Israel—as defined at the time by the British Mandate—that can provide for our essential security interests.

On the other hand now comes, too, the time our government has to calculate its steps in the direction that will enable the Egyptian President to return to his country as an Arab leader who is able to solve the Palestinian problem. To the President of Egypt, that came to Jerusalem, that gave a speech to the Knesset, and that prayed at the al-Aqsa mosque and thus ignored the propaganda against the reunification of the city under Israeli rule – to such an Arab leader we have to say without any embellishments that we do not want, in the long run, to have control over the more than one million Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government can say – and must say – to the President of Egypt that it agrees – while changing the lines of the armistice agreements of 1949, so far as our security allows it – to the design of permanent borders which will keep the majority of the Palestinians outside the state of Israel, so that they will be in cooperation with their own people in Jordan, to express the Arab-Palestinian identity.

The path should now be clear to arrangement “on all settings” that will make it easy for Egypt to dedicate to take care of its internal problems, without feeling the need to devote excessive parts of its resources to maintain an army and prepare for a new war. The government of Israel as established following the election of the ninth Knesset, is strong enough to give her contribution to making peace – namely: for running a policy of territorial compromise in the parts of the country that are the most sensitive from several points of view. To Menachem Begin, even the most obstinate opposition to the division of Israel will believe that, at the end of the day,

it is necessary to separate between historical-religious ideal and between the imperative regional and international political reality. The opposition countries, which their leaders argued in the past that their governments do not have a wide enough public and parliamentary basis, will be able not to support a courageous decision of the government that two thirds of the Knesset are united behind.

We should not miss this opportune hour. The state of Israel as a Jewish democratic state, because her enemies will compromise with her, is worth the price that is bound to concession because of the “country’s unitedness.”

19. Editorial column from Jerusalem Post newspaper on November 20, 1977.

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## Moment of truth

AS AN HISTORIC Saturday night gives way to the dawn of a new day the warm hearts must be joined by cool minds to consider: what next?

When Sadat began his initiative a week ago Wednesday, his earth-shaking proposal, buried in a speech before the Egyptian National Assembly, announced his willingness to come to Jerusalem to argue the Arabs' traditional case before the Knesset.

In his interview with Walter Cronkite of CBS on the presidential plane last night, President Sadat seems to have broadened his horizons considerably by declaring his readiness to conduct substantive peace negotiations in Jerusalem. Sadat seems to have been justly encouraged by the enthusiastic Israeli reaction to his overtures.

As he filed by the reception line at Ben-Gurion Airport last night, he could be heard saying to Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur, "You see, I wasn't bluffing," and to Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, "Don't worry, it will be allright." The worldwide enthusiasm which Sadat's arrival has generated would seem to have confronted the Israel Government with an urgent need to prove that Israel's historic demand for face-to-face talks with Arab leaders as a *sine qua non* for effective peace talks was not a bluff.

President Sadat is too much the realist to expect Israel to yield on its basic positions out of gratitude for the courage and wisdom he evinced as the first Arab leader to break the ice and the taboo on direct talks with Israel. One may expect that Israel's leaders will prove equally realistic in understanding that a mere ritualistic reiteration of ideological positions no longer suits the new situation that has been created overnight.

But one must be as exact as possible in assessing what has changed and what has not; or at least, not yet. The profound intractability of the Arab-Israeli dispute has always derived from the fact that it was not solely a dispute over territory, economic interests or political control — all issues subject to compromise. The Arab side had made the dispute an existential one challenging — often by means of brutal warfare — Israel's national existence and the physical existence of her citizens.

By his symbolic initiative, President Sadat has provided persuasive evidence that as far as he is concerned, he is prepared to transform this existential dispute into a more commonplace contention over legitimate differences of interest which are amenable to solution through compromise. At the moment, however, it is extremely difficult to discern how large a segment of the Arab camp, and especially among the other confrontation states, President Sadat can lead into joining him in this historic transformation.

Sadat would not, needless to say, be here now without Begin's graciously prompt response to the President's offer that he be invited to address the Knesset. Were it a matter of scoring points before the tribunal of enlightened world opinion, the parties would by now be roughly even.

But beyond the pomp and circumstance of the official receptions, and the beaming smiles and the thunderous applause of crowds in the streets, there lies the overwhelming question whether Premier Begin is ready to take on President Sadat.

What could the Premier say in this matter that would be consistent with his dearly held beliefs — and the Likud platform — and yet keep the door open for further talks? Not very much, it seems. That is why even some cabinet members are reported to be urging Mr. Begin to reconsider some of his old dogmas, in the light of radically changed circumstances.

Today, Premier Begin is facing his moment of truth, and it comes much earlier than anyone had reason to expect. President Sadat has staked his political career, perhaps his life, on Begin's agreeing to play along. He should not be disappointed.

Israel still possesses most of the bargaining chips. It is not duty bound to give them away for nothing, or for mere scraps of paper, which may be even worse. But neither can it decline to play them. For that is what negotiation, Israel's byword, is all about.

20. Editorial column from Davar newspaper on November 20, 1977.

## להשיב בתעוזה על תעוזה

אמת הדבר, אסור לנו לבנות מערכת ציפיות מוגזמת; אסור לנו לצאת מהנחה כי העוונות המדינית של נשיא מצרים מבטיחה מאליה פתיחתו של עידן השלום, ובוודאי יש מקום לחששות נוכח הצלילים הצורמים ממדינות ערביות שונות המלווים את הביקור הדרמטי הזה ואשר אינם משאירים מקום לספק שיש בהם מחנה גדול השואף לטרפד בכל האמצעים את יוזמתו של הנשיא סאדאת.

עובדה זו לא נעלמה גם מעיני הישראלים השורה, שאף הוא מבין כי עדיין רב המרחק בין פריצת המחסום הפסיכולוגי לבין כינון השלום, והכל מודעים גם לכך כי טרם חלפה סכנת הידרדרות והתלקחות.

ואף-על-פי-כן עולה התקווה על הפיכחון, ובלב כולנו ובתודעת כולנו נחרת עמוק הרושם העז של המעמד המרגש במל התעופה בן-גוריון אמש, שכל בית בישראל צפה בו. גם לאחר כל מה ששמענו וקראנו עד לאותו רגע על הצפוי ומשמעותו, הרי החוויה הבלתי-אמצעית כמו המחישה לנו בפעם הראשונה את המימד ההיסטורי של האירוע.

הנשיא סאדאת ובני פמליתו מאישי הממשל, וכן העתונאים הרבים מעצבי דעת הקהל המצרית שבאו לסקר את המאורע, יוכלו להיווכח כי קבלת הפנים החמה לנשיא סאדאת לא היתה רק פרי הכרעה מדינית ומצוות טקס, אלא משקפת את רתשי-הלב של תושבי ישראל.

גם אם המסגרת של מפגש היסטורי זה איננה מאפשרת מו"מ קונקרטי רוצים אנו לקוות כי יחזק את הרגשת האורח שיש טעם למו"מ ויש סיכוי להצלחתו גם מבחינת המתיר הסריטוריאלי שישראל מוכנה לשלם בעד השגת השלום.

אם קבל עליו הנשיא סאדאת את הסיכון שבמסעו לישראל — ויש להניח שהיה זה סיכון מחושב — מן הראוי שיוכל להיווכח כי כמיהת ישראל לשלום מתבטאת לא רק בכבוד וביקר שאנו מרעיפים עליו כאן, אלא בגישה מדינית שתפתח פתח ממשי להידברות ולהסדר. עיני כל העולם נשואות בימים אלה לירושלים, ואלה המייתלים לשלום במזרח התיכון — להבדיל מן הגורמים הרוצים להיבנות מהמשך הסכסוך — מצפים שישראל תדע להשיב בתעוזה מול תעוזה. דבר זה אנו חייבים בראש ובראשונה לעצמנו, כצורך חיוני שלנו.

אנו מאמינים כי החובה הזאת שלא להתמיץ שעת כושר, מקובלת על הרוב הגדול של העם בישראל — והוא היסוד לתקווה כי תקויים התפילה הנישאת בלב כל אחד מאיתנו — התפילה כי ראשונות המעמד הזה, על כל מרכיביו רוויי המשמעות המדינית והפסיכולוגית, תהא תחילת פרק חדש ביחסים וראשית דרך אל השלום המיוחל.

## 21. Translation of article in Appendix 20.

“Responding to Courage with Courage” – Davar – 20 November 1977 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

It is true, we should not build a set of exaggerated expectations, we should not depart from the assumption that the political courage of the Egyptian President promises the opening of an era of peace. And certainly there is a place for suspicion because of the shrill sounds from different Arab countries accompanying this dramatic visit, which they do leave no room for doubt that they have a big camp that aspire to torpedo the initiative of President Sadat by all means.

This fact does not disappear from the eyes of an ordinary Israeli: that even he understands that a great distance exists between the breaking of the psychological barrier and between establishing the peace. And everyone is aware that the danger of deterioration and rekindling [of hostilities] still exists.

And nonetheless hope rises above the sobriety. And in our heart and in our conscience is deeply etched the strong impression of the historic event at Ben Gurion Airport last night. Every house in Israel watched it. Also after all that we have heard and all that we have read up to that moment, on what would be expected and its significance; after all, the unmediated experience almost realized for us the historic magnitude of the event.

President Sadat and his entourage of government personalities, and also the many journalists that are forming the Egyptian public opinion that came to report the event, will be able to witness in their own eyes that the warm welcome of President Sadat was not only the fruit of the political decision and of ceremonial protocol. But it reflects the heart-felt-feelings of the citizens of Israel.

Even though the frame of this historic meeting does not allow for concrete negotiations we would like to hope that it will strengthen the visitor's feeling that there is an impetus for negotiation and that there is a chance for its success, also from the aspect of the territorial price that Israel is ready to pay for achieving piece.

If President Sadat took it upon himself the risk that is in his trip to Israel—and it should be assumed that this was a calculated risk—it encumbered upon us that he could see for himself that Israel's longing for peace is expressed not only with the respect and sincerity that we showered him with here. But with the political approach that will open real dialogue and settlement. The eyes of the whole world are currently fixed on Jerusalem; and those who aspire to peace in the Middle East—in contrast from the parties that want to continue to build the conflict—expect that Israel will know to respond with daring toward daring. This thing we have obligated first and foremost to ourselves, as our essential need.

We believe that this obligation is to not miss an opportunity. This is accepted by a large majority of the people of Israel—and is the foundation of hope that will be the prayer carried in all of our hearts—the prayer that this first status, all its components rid of political and psychological significance, will be the beginning of a new chapter in relations and a first-step to the aspired peace.



## 22. Editorial column from Jerusalem Post newspaper on September 1, 1978.

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## Open minds at Camp David

HE IS HEADING towards Camp David, Premier Begin assured his party Wednesday night, "with a confident heart and a clear conscience."

Some, at least, of his countrymen, it is fair to suggest, are looking forward to the tripartite summit with more doubt than confidence. Many of them, too, are less than certain that the loss of opportunities for peace during the past nine months has been due solely to the obstreperousness of Israel's adversaries and to the vacillation of its friends.

The fact that next week's meeting will be taking place on U.S. soil is, of course, the result of Mr. Sadat's refusal to confer directly with Mr. Begin again, except under American auspices, as suggested by Mr. Carter; and to Mr. Begin's acquiescence in what could rightly be described as a wilful show of Egyptian intransigence.

It is, however, arguable that the road from the King David need not have taken Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat to Camp David at all.

The basic idea of the historic encounter in Jerusalem last November was that, for once, Egypt and Israel would try to resolve their differences among themselves, face to face, without benefit of outside intercession, and possible imposition. This attempt has not been crowned with much success.

For the time being, U.S. "good offices" remain essential to the diplomatic process. The only consolation, to both Egypt and Israel, is that, for the time being, the Soviet Union is being kept out of the picture.

The Egyptian-Israeli joint exploration of peace prospects has been a voyage marked by strange twists and turns, near-wins followed by bad misses, and supposedly opening gambits revealed to be well-nigh immovable postures. Thus Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat are going to Camp David not to conclude an agreement, but simply to make a fresh stab at one.

It is, of course, good to know that the Israeli delegation to the talks will be coming there, as Mr. Begin and Mr. Dayan put it, with open minds. Open minds will be required of the Egyptian team as well, or the discussions will be doomed from the start.

The preview of the Egyptian proposals to be tabled at Camp David has not been very promising. The twin notions of complete Israeli withdrawal and self-determination for the Palestinians do not represent an especially novel package, but as a travesty of Resolution 242, that text hallowed by universal consent, they make a perfectly destructive duo.

Behind it is the aphorism said to have been coined by the Hashemite monarch but recently employed, in his talks with Israelis, by the Egyptian President, that Israel must make a choice of peace or territory; that it cannot have both. The necessity for such a choice does not, however, derive from the terms of 242; except in the sense that the claim of right to exclude any front from the obligation of withdrawal has no warrant.

Yet to buttress his own unwarranted claim Mr. Sadat has downgraded the enormous concession he has wrung out of Mr. Begin — evidently as a condition of his very coming to Jerusalem — in Israel's acknowledgment of Egyptian sovereignty over the entire Sinai.

For his part, Mr. Begin has felt constrained to dismiss as mere words Mr. Sadat's revolutionary act, for an Arab leader, of publicly recognizing Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state — and, moreover, offering to establish fully fledged peaceful relations with it. The military case for the entire West Bank under political Israeli control, titled autonomy, would be hard to reconcile with the idea of peaceful, open frontiers with Egypt — and by implication, with Jordan, too.

Mr. Begin's — or is it Mr. Dayan's? — only recent contribution to a new momentum has been the idea of a permanent partial peace. But this is only a slightly dressed up version of an ambitious proposal broached by Mr. Rabin back in 1975, and flatly turned down by Mr. Sadat. A more modest version is enshrined in the Sinai II pact, fiercely criticized by Mr. Begin as leader of the Opposition.

This, then, since they are in on the act anyway, may be the time for the Americans to help the parties out of their present immobility.

What Mr. Carter could say to Mr. Sadat and Mr. Begin is roughly this: Israel and Egypt are divided by words; remove the words, and a measure of agreement arises. Israel will not endorse a formula for Palestinian self-determination. Yet both Egypt and Israel agree that the Palestinians must, as a practical matter, be allowed the means to assert themselves politically, but not in an independent state. This is the American position, too.

The question is, where should the Palestinian frontier be drawn. Egypt, acting as a custodian of Arab interests, will not underwrite a formula for territorial compromise. That is not, however, necessary, in the American viewpoint. What is necessary is that Egypt, and Israel, agree, as a matter of principle, that a permanent border — which has never existed — should be negotiated for the West Bank, taking account of the legitimate security interests of all parties.

The party that will reject such a programme — which is, essentially, what was already suggested in the Vienna document — will be surely held responsible for the breakup of the talks. And while it is foolhardy to portray Camp David as the last hope of Middle East peace, it is irresponsible to waive the threat of failure in advance as immaterial.

23. Editorial column from Maariv newspaper on September 1, 1978.

עתוניה הראשיים של מצרים ורדיו קהיר כבר יודעים לספר — עוד לפני ש-נסתיימו אפילו עבודות הכשרת אולמות-הוועידה במחנה הנופש שליד ושינגטון — שממשלת ישראל מביאה אתה תוכי-ניות שלא יוכלו להתקבל על דעת הער-בים, ולמעשה לא חל כל שינוי בעמדת ישראל, וכיוצא באלה ניהושים והשערות שתכליתן שקופה ביותר: להושיב את יש-ראל על ספסל הנאשמים עוד לפני ש-נעברה „עבירה“ כלשהי.

אם כל התמריצים התעמולתיים הי-אלה הם בגדר לוחמה פסיכולוגית לקראת הפיסגה — ניהא. אך אם יש בהם לרמוז על ניסיונותיו של סאדאת מן הפיסגה ועל העמדות שהוא עתיד לנקוט בה, כי או יש לחשוש שאיגום יודקק שליש מציי-רים, לאליבי שהוא מכין לעצמו.



## סאדאת מכין אליבי

במיטב הספונטניות המאורגנת שוטפות עתה את עריה השונות של מצרים הפג-נות-התמיכה בנשיא סאדאת, ערב צאתו לוועידת-הפיסגה ב"קמפ דייוויד".

המפגינים נושאים כרזות ודגלים, ועל גבי חלק מהם מתנוססות כתובות מצויי-רות בדם. רוחן הכללית של ההפגנות הל-לו היא חיוק ידיו של הנשיא בתביעותיו כלפי ישראל.

אירוניה של הגורל, או אם תרצו, תע-תועיה של הדמוקרטיה מול המשטר הי-סמכותי ההד-מפלגתי (למעשה) המצרי — שגם בישראל צפוינו לו בסוף השבוע, כלומר לקראת יציאת המשלחת לוועידת-הפיסגה, הפגנה גדולה — מטעם התנועה „שלום עכשיו“ — סביב ועידת הפיסגה, ואף בה יתנוססו כרזות שבעקיפין, ובי-וודאי לא מתוך כוונה רעה, חלילה, יחזקו את ידיו כל הלוחצים על ממשלת ישראל. אולם הפגנות-התמיכה ה„ספונטניות“ בעריה של מצרים הן רק העמוד האחד של האסטרטגיה המצרית לקראת הפיסגה בקמפ דייוויד. העמוד השני של אותה אס-טרטגיה — שאושרה כנראה אמש ע"י מועצת הבטחון הלאומי — הוא המאמרים ודברי-הפרשנות שמתפרסמים עתה בכלי-התקשורת המצריים — ואף זאת, כמרי-בן, במיטב המסורת של ז'נרליסיטיקה ה„מאורגנת“ והמודרכת מלמעלה — ש-בעוד מועד מכינה לסאדאת את האליבי למקרה (או לקראת) כשלון הוועידה.

24. Translation of article in Appendix 23.

“Sadat Prepares an Alibi” – Maariv – 1 September 1978 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

In the best tradition of organized spontaneity, demonstrations in support of President Sadat flood now the different Egyptian cities on the eve of the conference at the “Camp David” summit.

The demonstrators carry banners and flags, on some blood painted inscriptions are written. The general spirit of these demonstrations is to strengthen the hands of the President in his demands against Israel.

The irony of fate, or if you want, the mockery of democracy in the face of the one party, in fact, authoritarian Egyptian regime – is that in Israel this weekend is expected to be a large demonstration by “Peace Now” about the summit conference and in it there will be placards – that indirectly and without any malicious intention, will strengthen the hands of those who put pressure on the Israeli government.

But the “spontaneous” solidarity rallies in Egypt’s cities are only one page of Egyptian strategy toward the Camp David summit. The second page of the same strategy – apparently approved yesterday by the national security council – is the articles and commentaries currently published in the Egyptian media – and this of course in the best tradition of the organized journalism controlled and directed from the top – which prepares ahead of time for Sadat an alibi in case of (or towards) the failure of the conference.

The chief newspapers of Egypt and Radio Cairo already tell – even before the preparation work on conference halls in the resort near Washington was completed – that the Israeli government brings with her programs that cannot be accepted by the Arabs, and in fact there was no change in Israel’s position, etcetera, and guesswork and speculation their aim is transparent: to put Israel on the defensive bench even before committing “an offense” of some sort.

If all these propaganda maneuvers are a psychological warfare ahead of the summit – so be it. However if they include a hint of Sadat’s expectations for the summit and the positions that he would take, then there is a fear that indeed the leader of Egypt will need the alibi that he prepares for himself.

25. Editorial column from Davar newspaper on September 4, 1978.



## הקונסנזוס והמחלוקת

ביחס לעיתוי, ניתנת האמת להיאמר כי נאמרו של ראש הממשלה לאומה, שעות אחדות אחרי ההפגנה, היה בו כדי לפזר את הספיקות האלה.

אחד ממקורות הכוח של ישראל, כלפי פנים וכלפי חוץ, הוא בשמירת הדמוקרטיה בה, על אף תנאי המצור. ביטוייה של דמוקרטיה זו אינם יכולים לפגוע במעמדה, אלא אך לחזקו.

## מחירה של מדיניות גלובאלית

לפי ידיעות שטרם אומחו, אך מתקבלות על הדעת, מחישה כעת ברה"מ ברכבת אוירית ציוד צבאי מגוון לווייטנאם. הרבר קשור כמובן בהתרפת הסכסוך בין ווייטנאם הקומוניסטית לבין סין הקומוניסטית.

יש להביא בחשבון שווייטנאם הצטרפה באחרונה לי "קומקון" — הארגון הכלכלי של המדינות הקומוניסטיות ב-ראשותה של ברה"מ, וברור שהצטרפות זאת — שבאה בעקבות הסכסוך עם סין והפסקת הסיוע הכלכלי הסיני לווייטנאם — מטילה עומס נוסף על כלכלת ברה"מ ועל כלכלת ארצות הדמוקרטיה העממית החברות בקומקון.

נכונותה של ווייטנאם לכונן יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ארץ

ה"ב, ולהיטותה לקבל סיוע טכנולוגי וכלכלי מארה"ב, אימ"פריאליסטית", מוסברות, לפיכך, לא רק ברצונם של שליטי האנזי הקומוניסטים להשתחרר מתלות חד-צדדית במוסקווא, ברור שהיתה גם הסכמה של ברה"מ — בלית ברירה — להי"דוק קשרים פוליטיים וכינון יחסים דיפלומטיים בין האנזי לוואשינגטון. שכן, ברה"מ אינה מסוגלת לבררה, ואפילו לא יחד עם בעלות בריתה באירופה, לשאת בעול שיקומה וקידומה הכלכלי של ווייטנאם הקומוניסטית בעלת אוכלוסין של חמישים מיליון.

הסכסוך הווייטנאמי-סיני המאלץ את ברה"מ להגדיל את ממדי הסיוע הצבאי לווייטנאם ממחיש ביתר שאת את מלאך כובד הקרבנות, אשר העם הסובייטי חייב לשלם עבור המדיניות הגלובאלית של הקרמל.

אורחי המדינה ללא הבדל השקפה ילוו את ועידת קמפ-דייביד בתקווה ובתפילה כי ראש הממשלה ובני פמלייתו המייצגים את ישראל בוועידת הפיסגה המשולשת אכן יצליחו במעמד חשוב זה, וכי יקדם בו הסיכוי להסדר מדיני של קבע באזור הזה.

התקווה המשותפת הזאת מבוססת על מידה לא מעטה של קונסנזוס לאומי, והוא מעוגן בהכרה כללית כי שלום עדיף על נצחון, אך גם על הכרה כללית כי התנאים בחלק עולם זה מחייבים להבטיח אינטרסים בטחוניים חיוניים של ישראל בצורה מוחשית גם במסגרת שלום. במלים אחרות, נוסף להסדר גאות של יחסי שכנות תקינים, דרושים גם הסדרי בטחון פסיים וטריטוריאליים. יש בקונסנזוס הזה כדי לחזק את עמדתה של המשלחת הישראלית בפיסגה, ומן הדין להבליטו ערב כינוסה. אין פירוש הדבר שלא קיימת בישראל מחלוקת עקרונתית על מידת הויתורים שמותר לישראל להסתכן בהם למען שלום. מבלי להיכנס לפירוט יתר, ניתן לומר כי הבדלי התפישה ממר קדים בקדושה הטריטוריאליית של יהודה והשומרון, שאיננה מקובלת על העם כולו, ההצלחה או אי-ההצלחה של המו"מ עשויים להיות מושפעים מהבדלי-תפישות אלה.

נשאלת השאלה, האם מבחינת החובה הפטריוטית, יש להדגיש בישראל ערב הפיסגה רק את המוסכם או גם את השונה? נראה לנו כי טשטוש המחלוקת, משיקולים פטריוטיים, יהיה בו משום המימות, שהרי הדברים אינם בגדר סוד. אך יהיה בו גם משום משגה מדיני-דווקא מאותם שיקולים פטריוטיים. הדברים אמורים כאן בהקשר להפגנת "שלום עכשיו" ב-מוצאי שבת. ההסתייגויות שגשמעו בחוגים שונים של האופוזיציה מן העיתוי שנקבע לה מדגישות את העובדה עד כמה תנועה זו איננה נתונה להכוונה מפלגתית כלשהי, אלא מהווה ביטוי אוטנטי של ציבור גדול ומגוון, רובו ככולו צעיר, המבקש להפעיל את זכותו הדמוקרטית להשפיע למען קו מדיני מתון. ההגיון אומר כי נסיון כזה צריך לעשות לפני ההכרעה ולא אחריתו. ככל שאפשר להבין ולכבד גם את הספיקות שהיו

26. Translation of article in Appendix 25.

“The Consensus and the Controversy” – Davar – 4 September 1978 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

Citizens of the country, regardless of different perspectives, will accompany the Camp David conference, with hope and prayer that the Prime Minister, and his entourage who represent Israel at the triangle summit conference indeed will succeed in this historical event, and that the chance for permanent political agreement in the region will be promoted.

This shared hope is based on a good measure of national consensus, and it is anchored in a general recognition that peace is better than a victory, but also a general recognition that the conditions in this part of the world must [also] ensure the essential security interests of Israel, concretely even in a framework for peace. In other words, in addition to a more proper arrangement of normal neighborly relations, physical and territorial security arrangements are needed. This consensus must strengthen the position of the Israeli delegation to the summit, and should be emphasized on the eve of its gathering.

This does not mean that there is no dispute in Israel over the extent of concessions which Israel allowed to risk for peace. Without going into the other details, it can be said that the differences in approach are focused on the territorial sanctity of Judea and Samaria, which is not accepted by the entire nation. Success or lack of success of these negotiations could be affected by these different views.

The question remains whether, in terms of patriotic duty, should there be emphasis in Israel on the eve of the summit on the agreements or also on the disagreements? It seems to us that the blurring of the dispute, from patriotic considerations, would be naïve because these things are not a secret, but it will be also a political mistake from the very same patriotic reasons.

These things are said here in connection with a demonstration by “Peace Now” on Saturday night. The reservations that were heard in various circles of the opposition about the timing that was set for it highlights the fact of how this movement is not subject to any party guidance, but is an authentic expression of a large and diverse public, mostly young men, that wants to exercise its democratic right to advocate for a more moderate political line.

Logic says that an attempt like that should be done before the decision, and not after. As much as it is possible to understand and respecting the doubts in regard to the timing, the truth has to be said, that the Prime Minister’s speech to the nation a few hours after the demonstration, diffused these doubts. One of Israel’s sources of power, internally and externally, is in preserving democracy in which, despite the siege conditions, expression of democracy is no longer able to undermine its status, but rather strengthen it.

27. Editorial column from Jerusalem Post newspaper on September 17, 1978.

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## Marathon ends

THE END of the Camp David summit conference has now been announced. From the statement issued by the White House spokesman yesterday it was not possible to deduce whether the conference would come to be termed a success or a failure. But certainly it appears that enough differences remain in the positions of Israel and Egypt to have prevented the type of breakthrough that President Carter — and with him the parties — sought to achieve.

From the start it was plain that the crux of the matter was the West Bank and Gaza. The U.S. hoped that it would be able to stretch Mr. Begin's autonomy plan sufficiently to achieve a formula that would bridge the gap with Sadat. Israel would relinquish elements of control — without an explicit commitment to withdrawal — which could in turn be viewed by Sadat as leading eventually to Arab gains that would be tantamount to withdrawal.

While reports from the conference have been sketchy at best, there have been indications that Mr. Begin sought to accommodate this U.S. desire, but that Sadat did not consider these measures of compromise adequate for his purposes.

Undoubtedly, there has been a narrowing of Sadat's room for manoeuvre since that time last November when his plane touched down so dramatically in Israel. In negotiating over the future of the West Bank and Gaza he is no longer negotiating for Egypt, but for others, like Hussein, whose approval he needs. To negotiate by proxy for a line-up which leads from Hussein, to Saudi Arabia, and eventually to Damascus means exposure to demands that go beyond the mutual interests of Egypt and Israel.

This linkage to which Sadat appeared subject at Camp David has confounded the talks throughout.

President Carter, in staking his power and prestige in such a totally unprecedented and remarkable manner, was apparently confident that Hussein could be brought into the ambit of whatever agreement could be reached at Camp David. Perhaps that confidence was not wholly misplaced. But it would appear that if there is to be a breakthrough, Hussein will have to be brought more directly and intimately into the negotiating process. So far he has been reluctant to commit himself. Unlike Sadat, the status quo in the Middle East does not threaten his regime or position.

Therefore after Camp David, whatever the advances made or the differences that remain, further peace efforts will require a more concerted American attempt to nudge Hussein from his present role. So far he has been permitted to keep his powder dry.

If there is to be progress that too will have to change.

28. Editorial column from Maariv newspaper on September 17, 1978.

הנשיא קארטר הזעיק בסוף השבוע לקמפ דייוויד את סגנו מנדייל, וכנראה שבכוחות משותפים הפעילו לחץ על שני הצדדים ללכת זה לקראת זה, כדי לאפשר לנשיא ארה"ב להופיע בסיום "קבל עם ועולם", אם לא בבשורה "האבמוס פאצם" (יש לנו שלום), הרי לפחות ב"הודעה המבטיחה המשך ההידברות, במסגרת כלשהי.

כדי למנוע סחבת והתדייגויות נוספות על כל תג ועל כל אות, כששני הצדדים חוזרים מן הסתם בפעם המאה ואחת על עמדותיהם, הציבו האמריקנים מועד לגמר המירוץ: היום או לכל היותר מחר.

אם לא הצליחו או אפילו לא ניסנו (עד כה) לכפות על ישראל ועל מצרים פתרון כולל או חלקי לפחות, ביקשו ר"ה הצליחו לכפות נ"ה ל: תחילה על ידי עצם קביעת הוועידה המשולשת בדרג הגבוה ביותר והמסגרת לדיונים (במתנה) הנופש המבודד, תוך כדי הוצאת כליי התקשורת אל מחוץ לגדר) ועתה — על ידי קביעת מועד הנעילה.

יש להניח, כי הנשיא קארטר ועוזריו, מהמרים על כך, ששני אורחיו יעשו מעל ומעבר ליכולתם הרגילה, כדי לא להנהיל לו אכזבה ומשלך.



## פתרון המועד הכפוי

סימנים רבים מעידים שהיה זה הנשיא קארטר, אשר במה על שני עמיתיו, לפיככה קמפ דייוויד את מועד סיום הוועידה.

נראה כי הדבר נעשה כמאמץ גואש של הרגע האחרון, לאלץ את שני הצדדים — נשיא מצרים מזה והראש ממשלת ישראל מזה — להסכים לניסוח או לניסוחים אשר יאפשרו להציל את הוועידה מהתימוטטות — דבר שהיה מהווה לא רק מכה אנושה לסיכויי המשך ההידברות בין הצדדים, אלא גם ליוקרתו של נשיא ארצות הברית.

לא נרחיק מעבר לזה בספקולציות. ב"שבוועים האחרונים — מאז החלה הפיסגה — גמנעו מלהתנבא על סיכוייה, גם מחוסר מידע מוסמך, וגם משום שלא היה טעם בנבואות, כאשר המו"מ היה בעיצומו, ולא רק כל יום, אלא כל שעה עשויה היתה להביא עמה התפתחויות חדשות.

לא ניסחף, איפוא, במיוחד עכשיו — זמן קצר לפני נעילת הוועידה — בגל הספקולציות הפסימיות של כליי התקשורת האמריקניים באשר לתוצאה הסופית. אנו מקבלים כפשוטם את דבריו של דובר הבית הלבן שהחלטה על סיום הוועידה היום, "לא באה כתוצאה מיאוש", ורק נוסף עליהם הערכת — ריאליסטית ל"עגיות דעתנו, שהיא לא באה גם כתוצאה מהתלהבות...

29. Translation of article in Appendix 28.

“A Deadline-Forced Solution” – Maariv – 17 September 1978 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

Many signs indicate that it was President Carter who forced his two colleagues to the Camp David Summit on the timing of the end of the conference.

It seems this was done in a desperate, last minute effort forcing the two sides – the Egyptian President and the Prime Minister of Israel – to agree to a language or formulation that will enable the summit to be saved from collapse – which would constitute not only a mortal blow to the prospects of continued dialogue between the parties, but also the prestige of the President of the United States.

We will not go far beyond that in speculation. In the last two weeks – since the start of the summit – we failed to predict the chances, because of a lack of qualified information and because there was no point in prophecy, when negotiations were at their peak, that not just every day but every hour might have brought with it new developments.

We shall not get carried away, therefore, especially now – shortly before the end of the conference – in the pessimistic speculation wave of the American media as to the final outcome. We accept at face-value the words of the White House spokesman that the decision to end the conference today “does not come as a result of despair,” and only add to them the analysis – which is realistic in our humble opinion, that it does not come as a result of enthusiasm.

President Carter called on the weekend to Camp David his deputy (Vice President) Mondale, and apparently they together put pressure on both sides to walk toward each other to allow the US President to proclaim at the end “to the world” if not in the gospel of “Habemus Pacem” (we have peace), at least in a declaration promising continuation of the dialogue in some framework.

To avoid delays and additional litigation on each tag and each letter, which both sides repeat probably for the 101<sup>st</sup> time on their positions, the Americans put the final date (deadline) of the race: today or tomorrow at the most.

If they have not succeeded, or have not even tried (so far) to force upon Israel and Egypt a solution complete or in part, at least they wanted and were able to force procedure: first by the fact of deciding to convene the tripartite summit on the highest level and the framework of its discussions (in the secluded resort, while keeping the media outside the fence) and now – by setting of the closing date.

It can be assumed, that President Carter and his aides, are betting that the two guests go above and beyond the norm so as not to impart upon him disappointment and failure.



30. Editorial column from Davar newspaper on September 17, 1978.

## דבר היום

### מהפיסגה — לא לעמק השווה

רק היום יתפור הערפל האופף את הרי קטוקטין ותתברר תוצאת ועידת הפיסגה בקמפ־דייוויד, אך כבר עתה אפשר להעריך כי מה שנראה ערב הפיסגה כהישג המינימום היה בימים האחרונים להישג המקסימום: לא עוד מסגרת להסדר שלום — שם אחר להצגת עקרונות — אלא מסגרת להמשך המשאומתן.

האם הושחתו לריק כמעט שבועיים קדחתניים של שיחות בין קברניטי ישראל, מצרים וארצות־הברית? דוברו של הנשיא קארטר ושל הוועידה כולה, ג'רדי פאוול, אמר אתמול כי הוזלטה על קטיעתה השרירותית של הפיסגה כטרם מציאת פשרה אינה תוצאה של ייאוש, אבל גם תקווה רבה קשה לגלות בהחלטה זו. ההנחה התמימה כי די בהסכמת שני הצדדים לסכמוך המזרח־תיכוני, להפסיק לירות ולהתחיל לדבר, כהגדרת שר החוץ האמריקאי לשעבר רוג'רס בעת מלחמת ההתשה, נמצאה שוב רחוקה מן המציאות. איזורים וחקירתם של כל הנושאים בקמפ־דייוויד, כדברי פאוול, לא הספיקו להבאת ישראל ומצרים לעמק השווה.

לאחר שיוודעו פרטי־הפרטים על מהלכי הוועידה ניתן יהיה לנתח את משקלם האישי של הנשיאים קארטר וסאדאת ושל ראש הממשלה בגין בשלבי־המפתח של המשאומתן המשולש שלושת הקברניטים יאלצו לשכנע את קהלי היעד שלהם כי לא בהם האשם למה שנראה בשעה זו ככשלונה — לפחות החלקי — של הפיסגה. קארטר התפנה כמעט לחלוטין מעסקיה של אמריקה ויזקרתו, שבהעלאתה הבטיח ראש הממשלה בגין לסייע, לא תנסוק עתה כפי שקיווה סאדאת חייב בדין־יחשבון למצרים ולעולם הערבי. בגין יצטרך לעמוד בפני ציבור ישראלי שיקש לוודא אם אמנם תבונה בסחונות ופכחון מדיני, לא עיקשות אידיאולוגיות, הדריכו את צעדיו.

31. Translation of article in Appendix 30.

“From the Summit – No Compromise” – Davar – 17 September 1978 – Translation by Daniel Gerdes

Only today the fog surrounding the Catoctin Mountains will dissipate and the result of the Summit Conference at Camp David will become apparent. But even now it is possible to evaluate that what seems, on the eve of the summit, as a minimum achievement, became in recent days the maximum achievement: no more “framework for peace agreement” – another name for a declaration of principles – but “a framework for further negotiations.”

Is in vain destroyed almost two weeks of intensive talks between the leaders of Israel, Egypt, and the United States? The spokesman for President Carter and the whole conference, Jody Powell, said yesterday that the decision of the summit’s arbitrary severing prior to finding a compromise is not the result of despair. But also, great hope is hard to find in this decision. The naïve assumption that both parties to the conflict in the Middle East are in agreement “to stop shooting and start talking” as defined by the former US Secretary of State Rogers during the “war of attrition,” was again far from reality. Airing and investigating of all the issues at Camp David, according to Powell, was not enough to bring Israel and Egypt to terms.

When the details of the conference’s processes will be known, it will be possible to analyze the personal weight of Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at key stages of the negotiations triangle. The three leaders will have to convince their target audiences that they are not guilty in what appears at this time – at least in part – to be the failure of the summit. Carter who almost cleared all his time from working on America’s business and his prestige, which Prime Minister Begin promised to support, will not take off as he had hoped. Sadat owes an explanation to Egypt and the Arab world. Begin will have to face the Israeli public wishing to verify if indeed the security and political clear-headedness, not ideological obstinacy, guided his steps.

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