

## **Cultural Policy in the Korean Wave: An Analysis of Cultural Diplomacy Embedded in Presidential Speeches**

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This article examines the changes and developments of the Korean government's attitude to the Korean Wave, connecting with the notion of cultural diplomacy. It investigates presidential speeches and statements as well as other governmental documents between 1998 and 2014 because they represent and establish guidelines applying to cultural policies. By analyzing presidential statements with the notion of cultural diplomacy, it explores the government's reinterpretation of this transnational, hybrid cultural content into national products, thereby appropriating them as tools of improving national images. Throughout the research, this article connects presidents' viewpoints with their subsequent cultural policies, thereby finding fundamental perspectives framing cultural policies vis-à-vis the Korean Wave.

*Keywords: Korean Wave, cultural policy, soft power, cultural diplomacy*

Having started out with Korea's *K-pop*, MAMA today has become cosmopolitan in its content, available to 2.4 billion people around the world. It also represents the success of the creative economy on the global top where culture has stimulated a burgeoning creative industry. (Park, 2014d)

In 2014, a Korea-oriented music award festival called the 2014 Mnet Asian Music Awards (MAMA), which was hosted by CJ E&M—a Korean media conglomerate—was held in Hong Kong. A number of Korean popular music (so-called *K-pop*) celebrities, including EXO, Girl's Generation, and 2PM, performed in front of thousands fans. While the festival culminated in the *K-pop* performances, an unusual event took place—Park Geun-hye, the president of Korea, gave a video message celebrating this cultural event.

Her opening statement at MAMA 2014 provided a focal point related to the Korean Wave—which refers to the rapid growth of domestic cultural industries and the exports of domestic popular culture to the world—also known as *Hallyu*. (Since a Korean soap-opera, *What Is Love*, recorded ratings of 4.7% in China in 1997, the Korean government has tried to make Korean pop culture one of the global cultural

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standards.) However, MAMA was the first major popular cultural event in which the nation's president appeared (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2013). Considering that this event was broadcasted live across 16 countries, her speech indicated the ostentation of the nation's cultural industries and their leverage to regional communities.

Apart from the president's statement, the government engaged in this "corporate" event. The Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) sponsored the awards in exchange for hosting exhibitions of 57 Korean cultural enterprises. Such engagements confirm the government's intention to support Korean cultural industries and their popularity in global markets as well as imply the government's willingness to expand *Hallyu* as an industrial, transnational, cultural flow with Korean values.

The case of MAMA clarifies the significant role of popular culture in strengthening the national brand, which influences the development of the nation's economic power by affecting purchasing behaviors of foreign consumers. In addition, by favorably impressing foreign citizens, cultural products and events contribute to expanding the nation's political leverage. Such impacts convince government to support cultural events as a diplomatic means—as a way of public diplomacy (Melissen & Cross, 2013).

The role of government has become a major element for the growth of cultural industries, as it has developed its own distinguishable cultural policy based on state-developmentalism. Since the early 1960s, Korea has advanced one of the strongest state-led developmental models, which has pursued a top-down and export-led economy. Although the government has adopted and developed neoliberal reforms since the early 1980s—which reduced the government's intervention in many parts of society—the government has not entirely given up its crucial role and has continued to develop its state-led cultural policy, as in the national economy (Heo, 2015; Jin, 2016).

This article examines the changes and developments of the Korean government's approach to *Hallyu*. It uses the notion of cultural diplomacy and soft power because they are connected with this cultural trend, as recent presidential statements indicate. It historicizes presidential statements in relation to *Hallyu* because they represent and establish guidelines applying to cultural policies. Then it examines how and to what extent their perspectives on *Hallyu* given in the presidential speeches have influenced the government's cultural policies in practice. Finally, it identifies the implication of their speeches to domestic audiences, thereby examining the implication of improvements on the national image.

### **Understanding Cultural Diplomacy in the Korean Wave**

The notion of cultural diplomacy has progressively evolved, and policy makers and politicians in many countries have increasingly engaged in the realm of culture over several decades. As Kozymka (2014) points out,

the classical notion of cultural diplomacy entails culture as a component of traditional diplomacy, and it had been mostly confined to the promotion of one nation's culture abroad to strengthen relations with other nations, to enhance cooperation or to promote national interest. (p. 9)

In other words, cultural diplomacy is commonly defined as “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding” (Cummings, 2003, p. 1). In the early 21st century, this notion of cultural diplomacy has been considered as one of the most significant public diplomacies because culture is a field of international relations in its own right as much as a tool of foreign policy. This suggests that “culture is not just as the arts, but in its broad definition, as reflected in the growing recognition of culture’s role in promoting human development, fostering intercommunity dialogue and understanding, building peace, and broadening education” (Kozymka, 2014, p. 9).

More specifically, “cultural diplomacy is seen as a subset of public diplomacy or the operation of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals, to combat stereotyping, develop mutual understanding, and advance national reputation and relationships across the border” (Mark, 2009, pp. 9–15). As Dizard (2001) points out, public diplomacy tends to focus on promoting the ideas and values of one society to another through cultural programs and information (cited in Erickson, 2012). However, cultural diplomacy is not driven solely by the idealism of mutual understanding. A new development is reflective of shifts in cultural policy toward conceiving culture as a resource (Yúdice, 2003). In particular, Nye (2004) focuses on “soft power” in his understating of cultural diplomacy. For Nye, the exchange of ideas is key to his concept of soft power, conceptualized as “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” (2004, p. 5; also cited in Erickson, 2012). It is a more complex concept than simply influencing people. He points out that “threats are [also] useful to influence people to act in ways that align with one’s desires. Soft power, rather, is attractive power, inducing an active change in people’s preferences that in turn change their actions” (Nye, 2004, p. 6). It implies that nation-states use culture in global politics through actualizing cultural policy as “display.”<sup>1</sup>

As Korean popular culture goes global in the early 21st century, it signifies the Korean Wave’s potentiality as a set of soft-power resources that may have a significant and complex impact on cultural diplomacy as well as on trade, tourism, the academy, and other national interests across various contexts (Nye & Kim, 2013). Therefore, Nye and Kim argue that “Korea needs to pay more attention to soft power” (2013, pp. 31–32) as one of the most significant cultural diplomacy strategies, as other countries, in particular, the U.S. government, has used the film industry as a resource. Indeed, Nye (2004) claims that

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<sup>1</sup> In terms of the discourse of cultural policy as “display,” Williams (1984) distinguished “between cultural policy as ‘display’ and cultural policy ‘proper’” (cited in Varga, 2013, p. 826). As Varga (2013, p. 826) explained, the main objective of cultural policy “proper” is “the governmental management of materialized artistic expressions and their circulation in civil society, which is achieved by measures of subsidizing and public patronage of the arts and administered by arts councils and ministries of culture that typically emerged in the second half of the 20th century. In addition to such explicit political measures in intervening in cultural practice—which has since become the key concern of cultural policy studies (McGuigan, 2004, cited in Varga, 2013, p. 826), Williams has emphasized another group of less explicit cultural policy instruments that are often overlooked as political measures of public policy in the cultural arena.” In this regard, what Williams (1984) argues is that “cultural policy measures in modern societies are not concerned with cultural policy ‘proper,’ but rather with ‘display,’ which aims at unifying the nation-state and upholding the symbolic legitimacy of a particular social order” (cited in Varga, 2013, p. 826).

soft power co-opts people rather than coerces them, and soft power is the ability to entice and attract. In addition, as Nye and Kim (2013) point out,

the soft power of any country rests primarily on three resources: 1) the attractiveness of its culture, 2) its political values, when it lives up to them at home and abroad, and 3) its foreign policies, when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority. (p. 32)

Of course, the notion of soft power has been criticized for not presenting a structured theoretical framework for this theory. Several theoreticians have questioned how to measure soft power and how to define it (G. Lee, 2009; Vasilevskytė, 2013). In particular, it is critical to understand that the culture's attractiveness can be used by the government to legitimize its political power, which may result in negative consequences.

Korea has faced a particularly challenging task in creating a positive national image despite its spectacular economic development and success (Elfving-Hwang, 2013; R. Kim, 2011). Under this circumstance, the government has certainly developed the growth of *Hallyu*, primarily because "popular culture has become a potentially important resource for soft power diplomacy, transcultural collaborations, dialogues and struggles to win hearts and minds of people" (Nye & Kim, 2013, p. 35). It has advanced the articulation and legislation of cultural policy and the promotion of cultural industries, with a renewed focus on culture and nation branding as an essential component of foreign policy (Nye & Kim, 2013). As G. Lee (2009) explains,

the Korean wave is [itself] not soft power, but is one of Korea's many soft resources. Possessing soft resources does not guarantee automatic conversion of the soft resources into soft power. Therefore, one needs to come up with very refined and sophisticated strategies on how to mobilize one's soft resources to achieve certain political and economic goals and national interests. When such efforts are realized and positively influence the achievement of the goals, then one can say that soft resources are being translated into soft power. (p. 134)

In fact, as Elfving-Hwang (2013) explains, until the early 1990s, "Korean outward-projecting state-led cultural engagement had by and large consisted of various forms of cultural exchanges, such as promoting Korean cultural products through autonomous agencies that are state or privately funded" (p. 15). Although the government changed its effort to use culture as resources, Cho (2005) explains that this export "was not driven by the government's drive to promote a certain image of Korea, but rather grew out of the necessity to explore new export markets in the wake of the Asian financial crisis after 1997" (p. 148). As the government has supported the development of cultural industries since the late 1990s, the key concern for policy makers was "to transform the Korean Wave into a sustainable source of income" (Cho, 2005, p. 160).

In opposition to cultural policies of the 1990s, emphasizing commercial imperatives, cultural policies since the mid-2000s have been intertwined with considerations of soft power and how Korea increasingly posits itself as a developed, postindustrial middle power with an important role to play on the

global stage, both as an economic and a cultural power. In this regard, the government has also sought to enhance

Korea's image as a reliable and developed business partner and to create an image of a dynamic and developed country with which advanced countries can aspire to do business. Within this context, the success of Korean popular culture (*Hallyu*) outside Korea has become another welcome tool for cultural engagement. (Elfvig-Hwang, 2013, p. 15)

As such, while cultural diplomacy in tandem with soft power has been part of each government, there are some significant shifts in each government's priority and policy standards. Through this examination of the *Hallyu* phenomenon using cultural diplomacy in tandem with soft power, we hope to illuminate some of the complexities inherent in examining the Korean Wave as it has manifested—and continues to manifest—in Korea.

### Research Methodologies

In this study we aim to explore implications of the Korean government's cultural policies related to *Hallyu*. By analyzing the government's interpretation of this cultural booming, we try to find ideological appropriations of cultural policies. To examine those translations, we use two major qualitative methodologies, both textual analysis and discourse analysis. Most of all, we analyze texts of presidential remarks that mentioned *Hallyu*, because presidential statements represent executive power. By searching for the keyword "*Hallyu*" in the Presidential Archives and in *Cheong Wa Dae's* (the presidential office of Korea) Internet archive, we identified 74 remarks from 1998 to 2014.

As a result of this text analysis, we classified those findings into three categories—cultural industries, soft power, and cultural exchange/diversity, as Table 1 indicates. The first category represents the traditional viewpoint of the Korean government, which views this cultural popularity by estimating direct economic profits and industrial prospects. On the other hand, presidential remarks connected to the second and the third categories regard this phenomenon as a way of improving the national image so that it links to key objectives for developing cultural diplomacy (Kaneva, 2011; Varga, 2013). This research includes Nye's (2004) concept of soft power as a main theoretical background for connecting speeches with the notion of cultural diplomacy. Finally, we investigate statements from the viewpoint of cultural exchange and diversity to stress the emergence of a new nondominant popular culture that diversifies the environment of producing, circulating, and consuming cultural contents. Cross-border dialogues are important in developing cultural diplomacy because they aim at dispelling foreign countries' concerns about harming their own industries (Iwabuchi, 2015). Considering the importance of popular culture in shaping national identity, this attitude strongly affects foreign relations.

We then explore discourses that construct presidential statements. We employ Fairclough's (2010) notion that the aim of analyzing discourse is to understand the interpretation of particular texts with their underlying logics connected to society's meaning structure. Basically, he refers to discourse as a way of representing the text with a particular perspective. In this regard, interpreting the text is bound to

broader discourse practices and sociocultural practices that produce, distribute, and consume the meaning of text. Such practices are made by relations between texts and their meanings that are strongly bound to hegemony struggles. By exploring discourses underlying cultural policies, one is expected to uncover the process of justifying unequal interests surrounding policies.

To understand discourses that construct the Korean government's policies on *Hallyu*, we use newspaper articles and government reports for searching logics giving influence to presidents and top authorities who design cultural policies. While explaining each administration's stance on interpreting *Hallyu* with speeches, we combine the analysis of presidential remarks with a number of cultural policies that were implemented during each president's term. Analyzing cultural policies includes governmental reorganizations, laws and regulations, and cultural activities sponsored by the government.

After exploring discourses of the Korean government's *Hallyu* policies with presidential remarks, we explain the increasing portion of cultural politics within governmental policies with the notion of cultural diplomacy. Our findings will shed light on the current debates on the role of the nation-state amid neoliberal cultural policies.

#### **Analysis of Presidential Speeches on *Hallyu*, 1998–2014**

Admitting that the Korean Wave phenomenon primarily started in 1997, right before Kim Dae-jung took political power in 1998, we analyzed presidential speeches between 1998 and 2014. Table 1 provides the historical changes of the major categories in which presidents have been emphasizing *Hallyu*. Analysis of presidential speeches on *Hallyu* implies two major trends. On the one hand, it proves that presidential remarks on the popularity of Korean pop culture have been steadily increasing. This tendency especially became predominant during Lee's term. In contrast with his two predecessors, Lee used this term 38 times while in office, which far exceeded those of both Kim's (seven times) and Roh's (nine times) statements combined. The trend continues to Park Geun-hye. She has already spoken this term 20 times since being sworn in to office in February 2013.

According to Table 1, presidential speeches cited the term *Hallyu* has been increased. At first, Kim Dae-jung used this term in less than 1% of his total addresses. However, following the growing popularity of the cultural boom in Asia, his successors have spoken the term *Hallyu* more often. While Roh spoke *Hallyu* in nine official addresses during his tenure, President Park—who just finished the first year of her term of office as of 2014—used this term in more than 20 speeches. Such an increase indicates that both presidents and their administrations engage in the discourse of *Hallyu* connecting with their policies.

More specifically, 56 remarks are connected with the cultural diplomatic perspective—which regards exporting cultural contents as an extension of the nation's political and economic influence in the international society. While Kim and Roh stressed *Hallyu* from the industrial perspective, mainly emphasizing either boosting cultural industries or exporting more Korean products, Lee tended to highlight *Hallyu* in the context of cultural diplomacy—building national brand power, raising national image, and underscoring the global boom of becoming more acquainted with Korean culture. So far, Park has mixed these two perspectives.

**Table 1. Hallyu in Presidential Speeches.**

Presidents (number of his/her total speeches)	Cultural industry	Soft power	Cultural exchange/ cultural diversity	Others	Total	<i>Hallyu</i> speech- to-total ratio
Kim Dae-jung (855)	6	1	0	0	7	0.8%
Roh Moo-hyun (797)	4	1	3	1 <sup>a</sup>	9	1.1%
Lee Myung-bak (819)	7	22	8	1 <sup>b</sup>	38	4.6%
Park Geun-hye (incumbent, 122)	9	6	4	1 <sup>c</sup>	20	16.3%
Total	26 (35.1%)	30 (40.5%)	15 (20.3%)	3 (4%)	74(100%)	

<sup>a</sup>Roh mentioned *Hallyu* during his special lecture as an example for highlighting the role of democratic regimes in improving industrial competitiveness, especially ICTs and cultural industries (Roh, 2007, para. 74).

<sup>b</sup>During his weekly radio address, Lee spoke of "*Hallyu* stars" who had supported Japan's recovery from the Tohoku Earthquake (M. B. Lee, 2011, para. 10).

<sup>c</sup>While praising the police's criminal investigation tactics, Park said "*Hallyu* in administrative sectors" during her speech for the 69th anniversary of the establishment of National Police (Park, 2014c, para. 8).

However, none of presidents significantly expressed the importance of cultural interchanges or preserving cultural diversities. Only 15 presidential statements concerned *Hallyu* with cultural multiplicities. Reflecting Korea's state-led and top-down economic and cultural policies, these presidential speeches are crucial because they work as guidelines to the continuity and change of each government's major cultural policies in tandem with *Hallyu*.

### **Cultural Policies in the Pre-Hallyu Era Until 1997**

In Korea, the first systematic attempt to construct national cultural policy was "the first five-year cultural development plan" made in 1974, under the management of the Ministry of Culture and Public Information. Although there were several significant measures, such actions focused on preserving cultural heritages and traditions (Yim, 2002). The major direction of the Fifth Republic, established in 1981, was not much different from the previous Park Chung-hee regime that considered culture as parts

of the national arts. However, the Chun Doo-hwan regime stated cultural promotion as a national duty in its constitution (Ministry of Culture and Tourism [MCT], 2001). However, many plans, such as *Kookpoong* (National Spirit)-81, during this period were aimed at securing the regime's legitimacy because it seized power by force (MCT, 2001).

After the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the Korean government recognized the importance of culture in the era of globalization. President Kim Young-sam demanded cultural competitiveness with the notion of globalization and the emergence of the information society, as his address delivered at the Seventh Conference for the Promotion of New Economy stated (Y. S. Kim, 1994, para. 3). During the same year, "the government launched an official *segzehwa* (globalization) policy as a way of actively responding to external pressures imposed by the U.S. and to survive in the new world of infinite global competition" (S. Kim, 2000, pp. 2-3). In practice, upon taking office his administration proposed a five-year plan for cultural development. Kim's emphasis on development of cultural industries, including the information technology sector, could be exemplified throughout his speech celebrating the Culture Day in 1995:

We live in an era in which culture holds sway over the destinies of nations. The advent of the Information age and the knowledge industries made the cultural competence equal to national competence. (Y. S. Kim, 1995, paras. 3-4)

The changing milieu surrounding the media sector drove Korea's media and cultural policies. During this period, technologically, Korea's media and cultural environments experienced dramatic changes—cable television service and the first communications and broadcasting satellite was launched. Therefore, the government recognized the importance of information and communications technologies, thereby enacting the Framework Act on Informatization Promotion and established the Committee for Informatization Promotion (H. D. Lee, 2012). Along with technological developments, Kim Young-sam demanded the media industry strengthen its international competitiveness, which can be exemplified in his address delivered at the commemoration of launching satellite broadcasting service in 1996:

We are living in the era of borderless broadcasting. With the development of new information and communication technologies, broadcasting industries have to face unlimited competitions. As a leading nation of the global broadcasting industry, we have to globalize our broadcasting services. We must improve not only technologies but also international competitiveness of television contents, thereby triggering the globalization of broadcasting and image industries. (Y. S. Kim, 1996, paras. 14-18)

Indeed, Kim's administration regarded cultural development as a new way for national development. In this regard, it designed policies aimed at stressing cultural welfare, the *Volkgeist*, and the globalization of Korean culture. Kim's ambitions toward cultural globalization meant exporting cultural contents to foreign countries. For instance, in 1997 the Korean government established 10 Representative Korean Cultural Symbols including *Hangeul* (Korean alphabet), Buddhist temples, and Taekwondo. Then, these cultural symbols were widely accepted and promoted through PR activities by the government (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005).



Of course, the issue of developing cultural industries during Kim's government did not play a major role in advancing cultural values. However, his administration's emphasis on cultural policies was a turning point of the nation's cultural policy, which viewed culture with the notion of economic profitability. Previously, the ultimate purpose of the government's cultural policies was to control the domestic audience by emphasizing traditional values and delivering pro-governmental propagandas in many ways, including censorship and import regulations. Such changes in promoting culture as an industry continued with his successor, Kim Dae-jung, who also supported *Hallyu*.

***Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003):  
Viewing Hallyu as a New Horizon of the National Economy***

The first official presidential statement mentioning *Hallyu* was in 2001, when Kim Dae-jung gave an opening speech during the Third Conference of Tourism Promotion (D. J. Kim, 2001a). While stressing the importance of boosting the tourism industry as a new economic growth engine and the best among industries, he spoke about *Hallyu* as the head of state for the first time. This stance was underlined again when he said *Hallyu* started to rise in East Asia and he would encourage cultural industry as a "chimney-less key industry" during his speech celebrating the National Liberation Day (D. J. Kim, 2001b, para. 57).

His speech showed that the Korean government's initial perspective on *Hallyu* was strongly based on an economic logic. The core of Kim's point of view vis-à-vis this newly emerging boom of Korean culture in the Asian region could be seen in his address at the conference of promoting growth industries:

We should develop *Hallyu* in the direction of making this as lasting and beneficial for our economy. In detail, we should constantly create contents in music, soaps, movies, animations, games, and characters. In 2003, the size of creative cultural industry will grow up to \$290 billion, which is bigger than the size of the semi-conductor market—which is estimated at \$280 billion. Such prospects suggest that we must concern cultural contents which create high-added value without big investment while improving our national image. (D. J. Kim, 2001c, para. 1)

Although he sometimes viewed *Hallyu* as a mechanism of raising national strength, Kim's perspective on *Hallyu* was mostly confined to it being a way to boost cultural industries. In fact, during his incumbency, the government expanded the budget for the cultural sector, appropriating approximately \$0.9 billion, which was more than 1% of the national budget in 2000, and extended it to \$1 billion in the following year. An increased portion of this budget was mainly invested in supporting cultural industries (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism [MCST], 2013). For example, his government created a \$125 million fund to promote Korean cinema between 1999 and 2003 (Kang, 2002, p. 19). Regardless of the size of the funds, it was enough to show the government's willingness to create policies favorable to the film industry (Jin, 2011). This implies that Kim's regime developed and executed several significant cultural policies to support emerging cultural industries.

In short, along with the emergence of *Hallyu*, Kim's administration launched institutional initiatives for incubating and supporting indigenous cultural industries. However, as Kim's speeches

indicate, this approach was based on neoliberal market logic. The governance criteria of neoliberal administrations were based upon productivity and profitability, or, in other words, on business norms (Brown, 2006; Jin, 2014). This attitude was accompanied by the neoliberal rearrangement of governmental policies in the aftermath of recovering the nation's economic crisis in 1997–98, and by the restructuring of the nation's industrial structure in favor of service industries.

***Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008): Connecting Hallyu With Cultural Diversity***

As did his predecessor, Roh also emphasized the role of *Hallyu* in relation to the industrial perspective. However, during his presidential term, his stance of understanding this cultural phenomenon showed the possibility of various interpretations, including the viewpoint of mutual cultural exchange and cultural diversity. For instance, Roh's first statement in reference to *Hallyu* was highlighting the role of cultural exchange between Korea and China during his state visit to China. By pointing out both *Hallyu* and *Hanfeng* (a growing popularity of Chinese culture), he tried to express the mutual friendship between the two countries. Although he used this term in China, it is still worth noting that it was the first time that nation's president viewed *Hallyu* in the context of cultural exchange and sharing diversities, not from an industrial point of view. The following are his views on *Hallyu*:

Cultural exchanges between two countries are expanding, as expressions such as *Hallyu* and *Hanfeng* represent. Such interactions serve as a momentum for deepening mutual understanding and expanding the base of cooperation. (Roh, 2003a, para. 9)

There seems to be a lot of excitement these days about learning Chinese and its culture. You can see Chinese products all over the place, and can hear Chinese announcement in metros. Also, our youngsters are fond of Chinese movie stars like Zhang Yimou, Gong Li, and Leon Lai. I also heard Chinese people have a lot of interest in *Hallyu*. Many people enjoy Korean pop songs, movies, and television dramas, and recently Kimchi. (Roh, 2003b, para. 14)

Most of all, Roh's administration represented cultural policies with the concept of Creative Korea, which was modeled on the British and the United States' creative programs that regarded culture as an "incubator of creativity." The goal of this plan was to create a new culture based on exchanging various types of cultures, thereby preserving and improving cultural diversities in East Asia (MCST, 2013). For instance, in 2004, the government initiated a project called Hub City of Asian Culture—Gwangju, which aimed to make Gwangju the city of cultural exchange, research, education, and enjoyment by 2023. This indicates that Roh's administration showed considerable interest in developing cultural diversities.

During his presidency, the government continued to connect this cultural popularity with industrial perspectives. Indeed, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2004) identified the government's major role as a coordinator in the era of the knowledge-based economy by complementing market competitions in creative cultural industries and by supporting foundations of pure arts that contributed to future cultural industries. The following statement, which celebrated Trade Day, supported such stance;

I will vitalize raising exports from service industries, notably the marine transport industry and creative cultural contents industry. I will establish legal bases upon which to have financial and insurance benefits as equal as merchandise exports. I will reinforce supporting systems in marketing in order to expand service exports. Such exports on high value-added industries will create jobs with good qualities. (Roh, 2005, para. 19)

Paradoxically, Roh's awareness of culture and cultural industries based on cultural diversity was rather flexible, which could be identified with his policy on the screen quota system. This system, which made movie circulators to guarantee the screening of Korean movies, had contributed to the growth of the Korean film industry. However, the United States demanded the abolishment of this regulation as a prerequisite for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiation. In spite of Roh's personal political inclination to mid-left, he gave up his political stance. Indeed, during his luncheon meeting at *Cheong Wa Dae* in November 2004, with entrepreneurs attending the Korea-U.S. Business Conference, he said that "the Korean government thinks that it is time to solve the screen quota issue and there should be more discussions between the Korean and the U.S. film industries" ("Time to solve the screen quota issue," 2004, para. 1). Thus, his government decided to reduce the quota from 146 days per year to 73 days a year (Jin, 2014). Still, it launched a new public film fund to support Korean cinema since 2007, partially for supporting independent film producers who pursued cultural diversity.

While a number of cultural policies during Roh's administration regarding the Korean Wave were inherited by his predecessor, Roh's stance on this cultural booming represented his liberal perspective. Compared to other presidents, who saw *Hallyu* with self-centered point of views, Roh relatively connected this term with cultural diversity, which focused more on mutual exchange while preserving equalities among each culture. He stressed this approach to domestic audiences, reviewing the development of Korean cultural industries as a result of the nation's democratization, which accelerated diversity (Roh, 2007, para. 74). Considering his political history as a human rights lawyer, such results suggest that president's personal political background affects to cultural policies.

#### ***Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013): Combining Hallyu With National Prestige***

After the transfer of political power from liberal to conservative in December 2007, newly elected president Lee extended the notion of *Hallyu* to traditional culture and heritage from the nation's long history. While giving his inaugural speech, he demanded the industrialization of culture with the modernization of traditional culture and the advancement of the culture and arts industries, along with developing creative contents industries. In the same vein, he frequently used the term *Hallyu* and its growing popularity as a method of improving national image. Lee's administration wanted to differentiate itself from the previous liberal-progressive Roh administration in the cultural sector (Jin, 2014), which means that the Lee government planned to develop *Hallyu* for the enhancement of national image, in addition to the growth of the national economy

More specifically, Lee shifted the rhetoric of internationalization toward nation branding in conjunction with the Korean Wave. As a former businessman who served as a CEO of Hyundai Group, Lee recognized the importance of branding and PR. In this regard, he established the Presidential Council on

Nation Branding in 2009, a supervising organization devising plans for increasing brand value. This council developed the slogan Global Korea, a campaign orchestrated by the government in close association with a number of business conglomerates including Samsung, LG, and Hyundai-Kia Motors and major entertainment companies, such as SM, YG, JYP (Ih-Prost & Bondaz, 2014). In fact, the quotes Lee gave during the speech celebrating the 45th anniversary of National Broadcasting Day focused on defining the role of *Hallyu* in strengthening national prestige:

Korean broadcasts have already become worldwide, and the diffusion of *Hallyu* exemplifies their fruits of past history. With broadcast contents which edge up to Asians and beyond the region, we enrich our national branding and national image. In addition, our broadcasting channels which transmit all over the world gives national pride to Korean businessmen and overseas Koreans. (M. B. Lee, 2008, para. 9)

During his tenure, in the context of cultural diplomacy and the promotion of Korean culture as a way of increasing international leverage, his administration designed a number of policies for strengthening cultural power. For example, in 2012, it launched a bureau under the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism for promoting *Hallyu*, which was the first time that the government used this term to name a governmental branch.

An interesting point is that Lee started to combine *Hallyu* with soft power. As Nye (2004) argued, this phrase means the ability to get what you want through attraction via culture, values, and foreign policies rather than coercion or payment. In this regard, Lee constantly emphasized the role of culture in building up national power with culture and putting emphases on globalizing Korean culture. During the first year of Lee's administration, the government highlighted culture as a criterion of national competitiveness and a sine qua non for improving the national brand, thereby strengthening the ability of public diplomacy and giving positive impressions to foreign people, and improving enterprises' images overseas (MCST, 2009). In this regard, his use of the term in this perspective outnumbered its use in other categories. He constantly connected *Hallyu* with the national brand in many presidential statements, regardless of the characteristics of the events. For example, his speech during the Seoul Forum 2012, an annual seminar hosted by *Seoul Economy Newspaper*, showed this direction:

I believe that it is a great opportunity for us to communicate with foreign people and to move their hearts through *Hallyu*. We have to think seriously about how to improve *Hallyu* as representing Korean value, as a sustainable engine for national development (M. B. Lee, 2012, para. 4)

Throughout his tenure, Lee stressed the importance of *Hallyu* as a core mechanism of soft power, and he related it to national brand power and national competitiveness that are linked to concepts of cultural diplomacy. Also, Lee was highly concerned about expanding *Hallyu*'s range to other cultural sectors such as fashion and food. For instance, Kim Yoon-ok, the first lady, had a special interest in connecting Korean food, including kimchi, with *Hallyu*. Directly after his inauguration, his administration presented a task plan report about the globalization of Korean foods, and a taskforce for the mission was

founded in May 2009. This taskforce became the Korean Food Foundation in the following year. Lee addressed his opinion about globalizing Korean food on a television talk show in September 2008:

I have a special interest in introducing Korean foods as healthy foods so that Koreans can spread all over the world. Thereby we can expand the scale of *Hallyu* not only (popular) culture and arts, but also food culture. (M. B. Lee, 2009, para. 103)

However, one must understand that the stance of Lee's administration was not much different from the previous liberal administration in terms of its emphasis on economic imperatives. Regardless of its emphasis on national image, the overall goal of Lee's government was to develop the national economy through the institutionalization of soft power. His perspective on *Hallyu* with cultural diplomacy underwent a slight variation with his replacement, Park Geun-hye.

***Park, Geun-hye (2013–2018): Fusing Hallyu With Creative Economy and Soft Power***

During her inaugural speech, president Park announced that "cultural enrichment" would be one of four administrative priorities during her presidency. As one of her major policy tasks, she promised to increase prosperity for Korean culture with many policies such as increasing government spending on culture, up to 2% of the budget of the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism and legislating a framework act on culture (Jin, 2014). She also established the Presidential Committee for Cultural Enrichment to consult with cultural artists about her cultural policies. Specifically, among 10 tasks comprising cultural enrichment, at least two tasks—promoting cultural diversity and cultivating creative cultural industries for "Korean Style"—were related to *Hallyu*. However, by this time, conjoining her emphasis with the notion of creative economy, her stance on *Hallyu* has focused more on promoting industrial gains and soft power than on supporting cultural diversity.

As past presidents did, Park also emphasizes the role of *Hallyu* in the context of economic profits, particularly with the notion of "the Creative Economy," which means the convergence between traditional industries and information and communications technologies, thereby becoming a new growth engine of the national economy. The following address was delivered by Park, exemplifying her standpoint regarding *Hallyu*, which is based on industrial perspectives. During her opening statement during the 2014 World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, she said,

We use the expression Korean Wave to describe the widespread enthusiasm for Korean culture. Today, that wave is spreading rapidly across the globe. When Korean music recently paired up with YouTube, it became a global sensation. *K-pop*, Korean dramas and films are being greeted here and there and creating new added value. When the cultural values of each country are brought together with IT technology, the possibilities for generating greater added value become truly limitless. Indeed, this is another key attribute of the creative economy. The companies that are welcomed around the world are those that have successfully combined various cultural contents with new technology. (Park, 2014a, paras. 52–55)

As a result of her emphasis on the role of ICTs in expanding *Hallyu*, her administration has promoted the convergence between Korean cultural contents with ICTs. For example, it has sponsored several concert halls including SM Town and KT K-Live in Seoul for hosting *K-pop* virtual concerts, using three-dimensional holograms. It also has planned to export Korean Web-toon, which means cartoons distributed via the Internet, to overseas markets, notably the U.S. (MCST, 2015; Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning, 2015).

While Park stresses *Hallyu* for reviving the national economy along with the concept of the Creative Economy, she also recognizes the role this cultural phenomenon as a tool of heightening national image, as Lee did. The opening statement for celebrating the Fifth Asian Leadership Conference held in Seoul in 2014 is an example of viewing *Hallyu* as a way of expanding the nation's power in international society:

Looking back on our past seven decades of division, the Republic of Korea accepted liberal democracy and market economy, overcame the Korean War and following security threats, and became the country which has the 8th largest trade volume in the world. Beyond economic logics, *Hallyu* has become an international cultural trend sharing hearts and friendships. (Park, 2014b, paras. 9–10)

In this regard, while maintaining existing cultural policies—such as protecting intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, of Korean cultural contents—Park's administration also has developed cultural diplomatic strategies. For instance, in 2015, armed with a budget increase of more than 25%, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism plans to open more Korean Cultural Centers and King Sejong Institutes overseas, where Korean cultural content has gained popularity, notably, constructing the Tourism and Cultural Center in Paris (MCST, 2015). Although Park has just entered her fourth year in office and still has more than a year of presidency, Park's viewpoint of *Hallyu* seems to highlight industrial perspectives so far, while she also succeeded Lee's strategies—connecting *Hallyu* with cultural diplomacy. As Anholt (1998) pointed out, nation brand is a concept stemming from marketing. It is defined as the way in which a nation is perceived by foreigners, notably in their degree of positive opinion and trust at the evocation of the said nation (Ih-Prost & Bondaz, 2014). As such, it is clear that Park Geun-hye's point on *Hallyu* has been a nexus of the enhancement of national image and marketing strategy in the name of the creative economy.

### Conclusion and Discussion

In this article we analyzed the ways in which several Korean presidents have interpreted *Hallyu* through presidential speeches between 1998 and 2014, to find the aims that connect the Korean Wave phenomenon with cultural diplomacy. Although there are several key implications, it is crucial to understand that more than two thirds of their remarks were on this cultural issue. They focused on either an industrial perspective or cultural diplomacy and soft power rather than cultural diversities or exchange, in spite of the growing size and impact of *Hallyu*. In particular, the recent conservative administrations have developed their cultural policies to use *Hallyu* as soft power. These results suggest that the

implications of the Korean Wave have been based on expanding the nation's international leverage, thereby seeking export expansion and cultural values.

As Aronczyk (2013) points out, national culture and its cultural products become basic materials of constructing the "national brand," and this implies that cultural assets are still important in the transnational arena when representing each nation-state. Nation-states have constantly transformed national culture and reconstructed national identity as reflecting transnational cultural and economic flow (J. Lee, 2012). In addition, the growing power of culture in developing the economy also justifies the government's engagements (Hesmondhalgh, 2013). Thus, notwithstanding recent changes of viewing cultural industries and their contents as "transnational" or "culturally hybrid," it is still premature to conclude that the power of nation-states is declining. Like the example of Korea indicates, governments engage in cultural industries as a major stakeholder and exert its influence to market players, because the cultural industries and the Korean Wave have become major parts of the national economy.

In cultural industries, the Korean government has developed a distinctive style of neoliberalism with Korean uniqueness because Korea's cultural policy has been deeply rooted in developmentalism. Either liberal or conservative, administrations structurally developed state-led developmental principles while advancing the logic of neoliberal agendas. Since the Kim Young-sam administration, all successive governments have especially developed their cultural policies in the name of economy imperatives. Regardless of their prior political directions, administrations have not much considered cultural diversity, and their goals in supporting the Korean Wave are mainly economic imperatives.

Also, policy directions of presidents, either liberal or conservative, seem to be significant, as a number of addresses about *Hallyu* commonly direct nation's cultural policies. The government has continued to capitalize *Hallyu* in that it combines *Hallyu* with cultural diplomatic policies overseas and maximizes its cultural impact. On the one hand, it has assisted cultural industries with financial aids and institutional supports. On the other hand, it has run various cultural initiatives—such as hosting *K-pop* concerts, and establishing King Sejong Institutes that teach the Korean language—in many countries where *Hallyu* gained popularity (Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange, 2014). The government has especially developed the nexus of cultural policy between economic imperatives and cultural diplomacy, emphasizing soft power. This means that the government has materialized cultural products through their subsidies and legal supports for the national economy while advancing cultural products for the enhancement of national image.

Meanwhile, it is also significant to acknowledge that cultural policies under different regimes from the late 1990s and the present have shown several important differences, in particular between liberal and conservative governments. In the Korean Wave tradition, liberal administrations between 1998 and 2008 had primarily pursued economic imperatives alongside cultural industries.

However, conservative administrations have mainly appropriated *Hallyu* as soft power, to brand the nation-state in the global society. In other words, they have used *Hallyu* as a main mechanism of cultural diplomacy so that they can expand the nation's power. Lee and Park's administrations have emphasized soft power as a tool to further materialize digital technologies and popular culture for the

national economy. In addition, they have tried to cultivate the nation's power through *Hallyu* as a way of expanding its leverage. Such intention can be explained with the notion of cultural diplomacy, which aims to take advantage of cultural products for disseminating new images of the nation, thereby strengthening its international influence, as Otmazgin (2008) argued.

To conclude, the Korean government, in particular, conservative administrations, has developed the Korean Wave as soft power in tandem with the national economy. It has not advanced *Hallyu* as a separate area, solely focusing on the increasing role of popular culture for the enhancement of national image, but has developed it as part of the national economy because the government believes that the growth of the national economy supported by the Korean Wave would be able to work as both hard power and soft power. The role of soft power developed by *Hallyu* in the Korean context, therefore, provides not only new theoretical implications emphasizing the nexus of soft power and hard power but also new policy implications, focusing on the increasing role of the nation-state in the realm of popular culture in the era of neoliberalism.

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