FURTHER READING

- **Enloe, Cynthia (1989), *Bananas, Bases and Beaches: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, London: Pinter.** This is in many ways one of the most important readings of feminist international relations. Enloe was amongst the first to pose and answer the question 'Where are the women in international politics?' Enloe alerted us to the fact that women occupy multiple roles in security, diplomacy, trade and local and regional politics.
- **Enloe, Cynthia (2000), *Maneuvers*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press.** Professor Enloe continues her mission of uncovering the effects of militarization on women in a global context. She argues that women everywhere are affected by the presence and ethos of military institutions and the processes of militarization. Security of the female individual and community is compromised and undermined by the needs of the military.
- **Steans, Jill (1998), *Gender and International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press.** A clearly stated analysis of how women and men have related to the state, war and the international system. Links gender to nationalism, the construction of citizenship and explores in detail the various arguments over whether women are fit to fight. Also looks at women and development issues.
- **Tickner, Ann (1992), *Gender in International Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press.** A feminist analysis of the existing major theories of International Relations. Includes interesting and clear analysis of feminist thinking on subjects such as ecology. Especially useful on security.
- **Van Crevald, Martin (2001), *Men, Women and War*, London: Cassell and Co.** A provocative and lively account which argues against women as suited for the tasks of war. The author argues that women should not be engaged in the business of national security and war.

IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- **www.uswc.org** Connects US women working for rights and empowerment and links them with the global women's movement.
- **www.womenwarpeace.org** The United Nations Security Council in its October 2000 resolution on Women, Peace and Security noted the 'need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls'. This website is the response to this. It is a portal that provides data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls.
- **www.womenwagingpeace.net** This website provides details of the Initiative for Inclusive Security, a network established in 1999 that enables women from around the world to connect with one another and have an impact on decision makers.
- **www.dcaf.ch/women** Women in an Insecure World is part of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and has as its main objective the empowerment of women as security sector actors.

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for lots of interesting additional material: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins/

6 Human Security

PAULINE KERR

Chapter Contents

- Introduction: intellectual and empirical purpose
- Is human security a valuable analytical and policy framework?
- Reconciling tensions
- Human security and state-centric security
- Utility for practitioners
- Conclusion

Reader's Guide

This chapter examines the concept of human security and its role within both security studies and the policy community. It argues the concept is a recent development of earlier human-centric arguments, which propose that people ought to be secure in their daily lives. The label 'human security' came into currency in the mid-1990s and now serves several useful purposes, the most important being to highlight some critical issues, especially intra-state political violence, that are not included in the state-centric paradigm that presently dominates discourse. The concept of human security does not challenge the relevance of state-centric arguments in so far as these concern the protection of the state from external military violence of a realpolitik nature. However, the human security concept does show that state-centric realism is not a sufficient security argument in that it does not adequately address the security of people inside states from political violence. It therefore does not deserve to be the dominant understanding of security. In the contemporary context the concept of security should encompass properly functioning states and their people. But so far attempts at conceptually reconciling or converging arguments about the security of the state and people are underdeveloped and vulnerable to criticism. From a practical perspective the concept of human security receives mixed responses from the policy community: some practitioners adopt both state and human-centric approaches, others reject the human security approach, and others misuse it to justify policies that have other motives. The chapter concludes with a summary of the concept's likely future in the conceptualization and practice of security.

Introduction: intellectual and empirical purpose

The idea that people ought to be secure in the conduct of their daily lives is neither new nor surprising. A human-centric focus continues to drive the very old political philosophy of liberalism, which places people and the individual at its epicentre and prescribes some necessary conditions, such as freedom and equality, for people to be secure. Likewise, the tradition of liberalism within the discipline of international relations focuses on broad normative visions that aim to ensure that people will be secure, such as through the adoption of universal human rights. International relations' sub-discipline, security studies, and its critical security school, often place the security of people at the centre of its critique of state-centric and military security. Indeed, these arguments by critical security scholars for deepening and broadening the idea of security are driven to a large extent by a vision of the conditions that ought to pertain for people to be secure.

This long philosophical and political human-centric tradition has only recently included a concept labelled 'human security'. The term apparently had its origins in policy statements emanating from the United Nations in the mid-1990s and in particular the 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Report (1994). In this document 'human security' is described as a condition where people are given relief from the traumas that besiege human development. Human security means 'first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities' (1994: 23). Ensuring human security requires a seven-pronged approach to address economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political security. This particular understanding of human security is categorized as one of the broad definitions and is the basis for division about the meaning of human security, which we will explore in the next section.

In the meantime it is useful to ask why the concept has come into centre stage at this time and what purposes it serves within the discipline and empirically. The point to remember about concepts is that, like theories, they are developed to serve a purpose, or several purposes, and some do so more usefully than others. So, what purposes does the concept of human security serve and are they useful? Going back to the recent origins of the term, the UNDP coinage can be seen as a post-Cold War attempt to focus attention on the issue of development, or more precisely human development, so as to move human and financial resources towards poverty relief and away from simple GDP economic indicators of development and the all-consuming Cold War military and traditional security agenda. If this was the purpose then it is ironic that today there is even more attention on political violence, albeit within the state and in the context of development, with the result that more resources are being directed towards the crisis side of conflict management and less towards preventing the root causes, such as poverty. The most recent manifestation of this is the focus on managing international terrorism through military means at the expense of preventing global poverty as a problem independent from, albeit sometimes related to, terrorism.

The focus that the concept of human security puts on the nexus between conflict and development is nonetheless very useful and important. Empirical observations and several data-collection studies reveal the significance of that nexus. Conflict since the mid-1990s overwhelmingly takes place within the borders of developing states, not between states. These borders frequently surround what is often called disrupted states where governance is failing often because there is conflict among armed groups—sometimes between the government and rebels, and sometimes between competing rebel or social groups. Caught in between the warring parties are countless civilians, many of whom are women and children. Disturbingly, the main perpetrator of violence against civilians is frequently the ruling regime and state actors such as the police and military. The significance of the nexus between development and conflict is not just that it raises ethical issues about human suffering but that its frequent outcome, so called state failure, has dire local, regional and global effects (see Think Point 6.1 on the nexus between conflict and development in Africa).

The development of the human security concept also highlights the view that the threats to humans, as well as to state entities, are changing and increasing. These changes have spurred the debate about the meaning of security and the arguments for its broadening and deepening. Apart from violence within the state, there are non-military threats of environmental degradation and the effects of global warming, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian flu, and people movements (refugees and internally displaced peoples). Like internal violence, these transnational issues have serious local, regional and global effects.

From a normative perspective the concept serves to highlight the importance of good global norms. Human security is a motivation for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the Ottawa Treaty, and the International Criminal Court. Human security often serves as an umbrella norm for various treaties and conventions which aim to protect vulnerable people from persecuting actors, notably the state. Developing good global norms is not only important for moral and ethical reasons but also because, as most democratic countries illustrate, they serve to enhance state and international security.

The concept of human security even serves to support some realpolitik interests. Sukhre suggests that Canada and Norway were strong advocates of human security not least because the concept could assist their lobbying efforts during the early 1990s to gain a seat as the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (2004: 365). The concept can serve other types of realpolitik interests, as we will see later in the chapter.

Notwithstanding the point that human security can serve some realpolitik issues it is apparent from Chapter 2 that human security is quite different from state-centric security. State-centric security is focused on protecting the state from external military threats via the threat (deterrence) and use of

THINK POINT 6.1

The nexus beteen conflict and development in Africa

- Today most wars are fought in poor countries.
- By the start of the 21st century more people were being killed in Africa's wars than in the rest of the world combined.
- Most of the world's armed conflicts now take place in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are particularly difficult to avoid, contain or end. Prospects for peace have been harmed by a combination of pervasive poverty, declining GDP per capita, reduced aid, poor infrastructure, weak administration, external intervention, an abundance of cheap weapons and a bitter legacy of past wars.
- Moreover, violent conflicts in Africa exacerbate the very conditions that gave rise to them in the first place, creating a classic 'conflict trap' from which escape is extraordinarily difficult. Sustaining peace settlements is a major challenge in many African post-conflict countries.

Source: Human Security Centre (2005), *Human Security Report* 2005. Oxford: Oxford University Press and online at www.humansecurityreport.info

military force. Infringements of the principle of sovereignty are a central justification for the use of force. It is usually said that in state-centric arguments the state is the referent object of security whereas in human-centric arguments people are the referent object.

KEY POINTS

- The human-centric tradition, which emphasizes the desirable human conditions for people to be secure, now includes the concept of 'human security'.
- Concepts are tools and human security is no exception. The label of human security developed in the mid-1990s serves to highlight several issues in world politics: for example, concerns about human development, the nexus between development and conflict, the increasing number of transnational threats, the growing normative humanitarian agenda and even realpolitik interests.
- The main purpose that the concept serves is to focus attention on the fact that most of these issues have serious local, regional and global effects and are not included in the state-centric position—the dominant argument about security.

Is human security a valuable analytical and policy framework?

The proposition in the above discussion is that the concept of human security raises issues about the security of people that are not part of the dominant state-centric argument of security. However, even if this is the case, does the concept provide an analytical and policy framework that can challenge state-centric positions and should it be the dominant argument? Answering these questions requires an examination of the concept: its meaning according to the different schools of human security and the analytical relationship between these schools. It also requires an examination of the state-centric schools of thought and a comparison of human and state-centric arguments.

This section makes three arguments: first, that there are major differences between the schools of human security which raise questions about its prospects as a framework for challenging the dominant argument; second, that it is possible nonetheless to reconcile these differences and develop an analytical framework; third, that this framework has the potential to challenge the realist state-centric school by showing that it is a necessary but not sufficient security argument. However, that said, the human security is itself a necessary but not sufficient argument.

Tensions between the schools of human security

Human security, according to its advocates, challenges the traditional state-centric view that the state is and should be the primary object, or referent, of security. For the advocates, human security is the end and state-centric security is the means to that objective. But what does human security actually mean? Putting aside differences between state-centric and human-centric positions for the moment, the meaning of human security is contested by the different schools of human security. While all the advocates agree that people are the referent object they are divided over the type of threat that should be prioritized, or securitized. The dispute over prioritizing threats has divided advocates into the narrow and the broad schools.

The narrow school

Mack, a proponent of the narrow school, argues that the threat of political violence to people, by the state or any other organized political actor, is the proper focus for the concept of human security. The definition that Mack and his institution, the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia, support is that human security is 'the protection of individuals and communities from war and other forms of violence' (Human Security Centre: 2005). Mack acknowledges there are many other threats to people apart from systematic violence. However, his emphasis on conceptual clarity and analytical rigour involves treating many of these other threats as correlates of violence; for example violence correlates with poverty and poor governance (2004: 367). For Mack, there is advocacy value in expanding the security agenda to include the broad agenda below but that doing so has analytical costs. This narrow definition has been simplified as 'freedom from fear' of the threat or use of political violence and is distinguished from the broad definition below which is labelled 'freedom from want'.

The broad schools

The broad schools argue that human security means more than a concern with the threat of violence. Human security is not only freedom from fear but also freedom from want, which is the focus of human development in the UNDP Report mentioned earlier. Moreover, according to some, human security goes beyond freedom from want in underdevelopment and involves other human freedoms and values. For example, Thakur and his institution, the United Nations University in Tokyo, hold that 'human security is concerned with the protection of people from critical life-threatening dangers, regardless of whether the threat are rooted in anthropogenic activities or natural events, whether they lie within or outside states, and whether they are direct or structural' (2004: 347). Human security is ' "human centred" in that its principal focus is on people both as individuals and as communal groups. It is "security orientated" in that the focus is on freedom from fear, danger and threat' (2004: 347). Thakur attempts to install some limitations to the broad school by referring to life-threatening situations which have become crises and by putting those which are not crises onto the broader development agenda. An example of the even broader definition of human security is one proposed by Alkiri. Alkiri, who was a member of the 2003 Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, argues that the objective of human security is 'to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that advance human freedoms and human fulfilment' (2004: 360). Thakur defends these broad conceptualizations on the grounds that although analytical rigour may be lost there is value in having inclusive definitions.

The broad definitions of human security certainly receive the most criticism and often provide the grounds for critics to dismiss the entire concept. Paris, for example, claims human security 'encompasses everything from substance abuse to genocide'. From this perspective, the problem is that the number of causal hypotheses for human insecurity are so vast that frameworks for research and policy are difficult to formulate. Paris dismisses the whole concept as being 'inscrutable' (2004: 371), a strong condemnation considering that, in the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the word means 'impossible to understand or interpret' (2004: 371).

Differences over means

Debate about the types of threats which should be included in the definition has of course implications for the means for enhancing human security. The means for the broad school are the same as those proposed in various UNDP reports, for example the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report (2005). However, because the broad school also includes definitions that go beyond the development agenda

to include threats to 'vital core of all human lives' and since these can be quite subjective and variable, the means are equally variable. The broad school comprising threats to human development and particularly the very broad threats to 'vital core of all human lives', appears to have no common factor that connects all the different threats, except that each is perceived as a threat to people. Thus the means for the broad school will depend on whatever the threat is perceived to be and are therefore limitless. However, because the narrow school is connected by the common focus on the threat of political violence to people the means are directed at managing that threat. A wide variety of economic, social, and political proposals are found in the literature on managing internal conflict and transnational violence.

The means issue is further complicated by arguments over the role of the state and the appropriate agents of human security. In many situations the state is the perpetrator of violence and of other threats to its people's security and is therefore the problem, or a major part of the problem. Such behaviour by the state is often taken to be synonymous with the state-centric position on security. From this perspective, human security is hard, even impossible, to achieve if the state remains the major actor in world politics.

This perspective raises important issues about the role of the state as a means to human security. It is certainly the case that some states are at the heart of human insecurity. But there are several other issues to consider. First, because some states wilfully behave badly does not mean that all states should be dismissed as actors and that all state-centric positions work against human security; second, pragmatically, states continue to have the main material assets for logistically delivering human security; third, in reality state-building towards better states continues to be the objective of the major global institutions including the UN, and many NGOs and civil society groups; fourth, realistically, comprehensive normative change does not occur quickly and thus adopting a hands-off states and policy approach is not helpful in the short term when there are many current crises in which people need immediate relief from atrocities. Hence it is necessary to deal with the immediate situation while still pursuing long-term change. For that reason it is necessary to engage in a direct way in a policy agenda for human security. It is also necessary to involve a variety of actors—institutions of global governance, non-state actors, civil society and states—in addressing the narrow and broad agendas. Nonetheless, scepticism about the state's capacity to deliver and reform remains and hence the division over means continues to be a divisive issue.

Another major difference over the means to human security concerns the place of humanitarian intervention using military means in situations where systematic violence within a state is the cause of human insecurity. This is a debate that takes place between state-centric advocates and the schools of human security as well as between the schools. Realists warn human security advocates that intervention for humanitarian purposes runs the risk of prolonging warfare and therefore the long-term suffering of large sections of the population, particularly refugees. Realists also warn that, from their perspective, the principle of sovereignty has helped to prevent inter-state war and indiscriminately overriding it through intervention using force has costs for international security.

From the human security perspective humanitarian intervention also raises questions about the principle of sovereignty, the state, and international stability. Although realists may be correct that adherence to the principle of sovereignty may help to explain recent international stability it is also the case that in an increasingly inter-connected world, international stability and order will depend on human security inside states. As Hampson and others have argued, states cannot be secure if their citizens are not (2004: 350). At the international level, widespread human insecurity inside states has spill-over effects on states and people in neighbouring and distant regions. For example, in the sub-Saharan African region internal conflict has dire local, regional and global consequences. In these cases humanitarian intervention with the objective of establishing states with human security values is a source of international stability. Indeed, this connection between international peace and stability and establishing human security is one of the major justifications for the UN's support for intervention.

However, if intervention is justified on the grounds of promoting or restoring international stability then it may prioritize conflicts that are seen to have strategic implications and not those that may be more deadly and violent. Hence, the positive connection between human security and international order is not necessarily a satisfactory criterion for assessing whether or not humanitarian intervention is justified. If the priority is to establish human security then humanitarian intervention using force should be a logical choice regardless of the international dimension. This raises more questions about the proper criteria for assessing why and when intervention using force is justified. Perhaps the best guidance is offered in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) *The Responsibility to Protect* (2001). It argues that state sovereignty implies that the primary responsibility for the protection of people from serious violent harm lies with the state itself. If the state is not willing or is unable to do so then 'the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect' (2001: xi). The report establishes six criteria for military intervention (see Background 6.1) and emphasizes the role of the United Nations and regional organizations as the key actors. The norm of responsibility is mentioned in an increasing number of policy documents. However, regardless of the guidelines offered in the report, the external use of force for protecting human security of others remains a contested ethical issue.

BACKGROUND 6.1

The responsibility to protect: principles for military intervention

(1) THE JUST CAUSE THRESHOLD

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or immediately likely to occur, of the following kind:

A. large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of either deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or

B. large-scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether it is carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

(2) THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

A. Right intention: the primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multiple operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

B. Last resort: military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.

C. Proportional means: the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.

D. Reasonable prospects: there must be reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse that the consequences of inaction.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect*. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre: XII. (Note that principles (3) and (4), which are not listed here, concern the Right Authority and Operational Principles respectively.)

Furthermore, even if the principles in the ICISS report are logically sound, it appears to be of decreasing practical guidance of late, if the lack of action taken in 2004–05 Darfur crisis is any indication (Williams and Bellamy 2005). In addition, politically, the responsibility to protect is not widely accepted by developing countries as determining operational policy, notwithstanding the agreement in the *Draft Outcome Document* produced at the 2005 World Summit by the General Assembly to accept it as nevertheless valuable (2005: 27–28). For most G77 states human security requires implementing the development agenda by the state, with help from international donors and organizations, and the continuation of unconditional sovereignty. Making sovereignty conditional is seen as yet another example of powerful Western states setting the rules of world politics and justifying an excuse for intervening in the internal affairs of recently decolonized states. Hence, the focus of the narrow school of human security on internal violence and intervention on those grounds is often not acceptable to developing states, beyond rhetorical endorsement.

In conclusion, the means for addressing human insecurity as violence will involve a range of measures and actors and their roles will continue to be contested. Regardless of critics' concerns about the role of states, properly functioning states will be indispensable actors, not least because the intervening military and police force, albeit in blue berets, will have the assets and human resources to provide immediate security from violence. The key actors for reconstruction, once security is assured, will be global institutions, local and international NGOs and civil society groups.

KEY POINTS

- There are tensions between the different schools of human security about the meaning of, threats to and the means to human security.
- The narrow school focuses on threats of violence, often called freedom from fear; the broad school focuses on threats arising from underdevelopment, often called freedom from want; and the very broad school focuses on threats to other human freedoms.
- The means to human security are also contentious, with divisions over the role the state and the justifications for humanitarian intervention using force.

Reconciling tensions

In principle the above discussion illustrating the divisions between the different schools of human security raises questions about the concept's capacity to challenge the dominant state-centric argument about security. However, this section argues that it is possible to develop analytical and policy frameworks based on both the narrow and broad schools which show that there are important connections between them.

The framework focuses upon (i) human insecurity as political violence and (ii) the causes of human insecurity as political violence. To use social science language, human insecurity as political violence (the narrow school) is the dependent variable. The many causes of human insecurity as political violence include the problems of underdevelopment (the broad school) and these are the independent variables (see Figure 6.1).

There are several analytical advantages to this formulation. First, the connections between the two schools are quite clear. Second, the causal links can be multifactorial and inter-connected: for example,

Figure 6.1 Conceptual framework



threats of poverty and disease and poor governance are two interconnected causes of political violence (see Figure 6.1). Third, causality can be a circular dynamic: for example, not only can poverty and poor governance cause political violence, it can work the other way as well, that is, political violence can cause poverty and bad governance (see Figure 6.1). Fourth, because this conceptual framework identifies the problem of violence and its causes it provides a sound basis for policy (see Figure 6.2). Importantly, it shows that crisis management of violence requires both immediate action in terms of diplomacy and, failing that, intervention. Plus at the same time it requires crisis prevention measures from the broad development agenda. Proper management requires policies that address the narrow school's focus on violence and the broad school's focus on development. Each type of policy is equally important.

This framework helps to overcome many of the tensions between the schools and it may satisfy some of the critics. It will not, however, please those human security advocates who want to include the very broad agenda of protecting the 'vital core of human lives' as human security. And it will frustrate those who want to include non-violent issues, such as horizontal inequality or people movements, as the dependent variable unrelated to violence. Finally, there is still the question of whether or not it is a framework that can challenge the dominant state-centric security argument.

KEY POINTS

- One way of reconciling the different schools and developing a framework is to focus on the nexus between the narrow school's focus on violence and broad school's focus on human development.
- Taking the narrow school's focus on political violence as the dependent variable and the broad school's focus on human development as the independent variable provides a policy framework for understanding causality and policies for crisis management and prevention.
- But, is this a framework that can challenge the state-centric argument of security?



Figure 6.2 Policy framework

Human security and state-centric security

Having explored the debates showing the tensions with the human security argument and the possibility of reconciling the narrow and broad schools it is now possible to compare this human security framework with the state-centric arguments and question the respective value each has for our understanding of security. The argument in this section is that the state-centric concept of realism and the human-security concept are necessary but not sufficient security concepts. If this is the case then it appears both arguments are needed for understanding security.

Different threats

Realism is a necessary security argument. It provides several theories that address an important set of threats to the survival of the state and territory. These theories assume that the state and territory are the key referent objects and that external threats of a military nature are the most important. Empirically realism is certainly relevant in situations such as South Asia and the Middle East where there are military threats to states. Realists argue that this type of situation is a constant possibility for every state in the world and that history proves this is a valid concern. Arguably realism also implies that, even if the referent object is the state, protecting the state from military threats has the effect of protecting its people.

Although necessary, realism is not a sufficient security argument. It acknowledges the threat of outside military violence but ignores internal violence (along with other broader threats). Realism's focus just on the external threats to the state has failed to deliver security to many people inside states, a situation which is normatively objectionable to most people and makes the state, the referent object of realism, vulnerable to both external and internal threats. Moreover, internal threats are more common today than external military threats and contribute to the problem of state-failure which undermines international security, a key concern for realism. If realism is an argument for concentrating on state-centric security then it needs to canvass a wider range of threats to states' survival and international peace and stability.

Human security is also a necessary but not sufficient argument. Although it focuses on threats to people—95% of all battle deaths are caused by internal conflict—it ignores external military threats. While only 5% of battle deaths are the result of inter-state war if weapons of mass destruction are ever used the consequences will be horrific. Ironically, the focus of human security on internal and transnational violence and malfunctioning states is more likely than realism to lead to better governance of states and hence to enhanced international stability. That said, the primary objective of human security is not to enhance state-centric security per se but rather to ensure that people do not suffer from those versions of state-centric security that ignore internal violence and its causes.

Different views about sovereignty

Realism is also not sufficient because it ignores the centrality of internal violence and the contractual nature of sovereignty which is evident in Hobbes' version of state-centric security. Although realists claim the Hobbesian political tradition as their own they avoid some key tenets. The first is that Hobbes' state-centric position was based on the argument that security is concerned with protecting the state from threats of violence and 'warre' from within. The second is that Hobbes' state-centric position is also opposed to malfunctioning states and to leaders/sovereigns who are violent to their citizens. Hobbes' view of legitimate state-building rests on the sovereign's contract with the people to provide them with security from internal threats, in exchange for their cooperation and acknowledgement that the sovereign/state is the legitimate arbiter of the use of force. Third and most important, Hobbes suggests that people may resist if their sovereign threatens their lives and if the sovereign does not protect them (1914: xxi). Hence sovereignty is conditional on the provision of protection for the people. In ignoring the contractual nature of sovereignty which Hobbes supports, realism leaves the impression that it has reified the state at the expense of its people.

By contrast many human security advocates, although not drawing on Hobbes, endorse a contractual arrangement, that sovereignty is conditional on providing protection. Already discussed is the 2001 report by the ICISS which points out that sovereignty is not an unconditional right and that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens. This argument is frequently made in statements issued by the United Nations, most recently in the *High Level Panel Report* (United Nations 2004) and the Secretary General's response, *In Larger Freedom* (United Nations 2005) and most significantly, the *Draft Outcome Document* from the 2005 World Summit (United Nations 2005: 27–28).

This comparison between the state-centric and human security arguments suggests that both have positive and negative attributes. Realism is one version of the state-centric position, and is relevant for understanding some important threats to the state but not all of them. Realism's state-centric focus, unlike Hobbes' state-centric position, fails to acknowledge that security concerns internal violence and malfunctioning states and that sovereignty is conditional. Moreover realism fails to explicitly address if its focus on the state is at the expense of the people within. Human security, on the other hand, does address these issues. However, it fails to address the threats that realism elevates and some schools fail to accept that some state-centric positions have positive effects for human security. Overall, the conclusion is that realism is relevant but flawed and hence does not deserve its dominant position. The question that now arises from this discussion is, if both state-centric and human security arguments are necessary but not sufficient, does an understanding of security require both?

In the contemporary context both are needed

The contemporary context is one in which many many people are vulnerable to a wide range of threats. Perhaps the most vulnerable are those in situations where governance is failing and the state

is either unwilling or unable to provide protection. This situation, of vulnerable people and failing states, has serious local, regional and global effects. In an interdependent and globalized world everyone is a stake-holder in human security. It is also a world in which overall the least vulnerable people live in states which act responsibly to their citizens. This suggests that some states are performing reasonably well, albeit not perfectly, and that for the present the state, in principle, can play a role in protecting its people. It is also a world in which other actors—global institutions, NGOs and civil society—do not have the capacity to perform important tasks currently conducted by properly functioning states; for example, creating and distributing wealth. Moreover, many of these organizations are themselves open to criticisms: for example, for their lack of representation, accountability and questionable implementation of measures that support human security. Finally, it is a world in which many states are vulnerable to other states' conventional military forces and weapons of mass destruction. If the current context is one in which people and states are vulnerable then it follows that, depending on the situation, security entails both human security and state-centric security. However, state-centric security is the means to human security, not an end in itself.

Conceptually, in the case of properly functioning states, the proposition has already been made that state-centric and human-centric arguments of security are both necessary but not sufficient. Lodgaard helpfully draws out the conceptual dimensions of this proposition. His starting point is that both arguments provide the 'concepts that security policies will be organised around' in the future (2000: 1–2). He proposes a reconceptualization of security as a 'dual concept of state security and human security'—the former involving defence of territory and freedom to determine one's own form of government and the latter involving people being free of physical violence (2000: 1–6). Lodgaard's approach can be elaborated into a fuller proposition in which there are not only dual referent objects (people and state), but also internal and external threats to both, and in which the means to security in each case involves a variety of measures, both the use of force and non-military measures (Kerr 2003). Nonetheless, these attempts at conceptualizing security in terms of both arguments are embryonic and abstract and there is much more work to be done to make it a clear and convincing argument. But it is a step in the right direction.

KEY POINTS

- Realism is one school in the state-centric argument and it plays an important role in highlighting an important set of historic threats to the state.
- Human security belongs to the human-centric tradition and it plays an important role in highlighting a wide variety of threats to people's security.
- Realism ignores a variety of threats that can undermine the state (its unit of analysis) and the conditionality of sovereignty. It is also unclear about its ultimate purpose regarding the protection of people. This casts doubt, not on the relevance of realism as a security concept, but on its position as the dominant concept.
- Human security addresses some of the gaps in realism and adds an important normative dimension, but is itself a necessary but not sufficient security argument given the contemporary context.
- Although in principle this suggests that both state-centric and human security are needed for an understanding of security there is much to be done to consolidate the conceptual foundations of this proposition.

Utility for practitioners

Up to this point the discussion has explored the conceptual dimensions of human security and its role within security studies. In doing so, reference has been made to the concept's capacity for policy guidance and the argument being made up to this point is that, despite the critic's claims that the concept is not useful for policy guidance, it is possible to develop a framework that is. However, the question now raised is does it offer guidance and in what way is it valuable?

Once again scholars disagree in their answers about the utility of the concept. Hubert argues that empirically it was the foreign policies of some particular states that led academics to develop and elevate the concept (2004: 351). Canadian and Norwegian foreign policies starting in the 1990s are cited as evidence for this view. That is, the concept was a response to existing practice and moreover its mandate continues to guide many states, for example those belonging to the Human Security Network. The 2003 report *Human Security Now* compiled by the Commission for Human Security offers additional guidance and encouragement to states to adopt policies of human security. From this perspective human security is operationalized, providing sound guidance and being implemented. However, Suhrke makes some different observations, arguing that there is a decline in interest in the concept as a foreign policy theme in the policies of the original promoters, Canada and Norway, and other supporters (2004: 365). Furthermore, the Commission on Human Security had little impact and the Human Security Network has a membership of just 13 states (Suhrke 2004: 365) and none of them are major players in world politics.

Several case studies on the utility of human security for policy makers, undertaken by Kerr, Tow and Hanson, suggests that the practitioners in these cases adopted the narrow human security agenda when a crisis of human insecurity in another state was perceived to be a threat to their own state's national interests (2003: 102). For example, Australia's intervention in the Solomon Islands in 2003 took place when Australian policy makers perceived that violence there had reached a crisis point and threatened Australia's national security interests. The Howard government, while not referring to the concept of human security, nonetheless adopted much of its humanitarian law and order agenda as the basis for intervention with the aim of making Australia more secure.

Another case study, on the US invasion of Iraq, demonstrates that, although the US intentions for invasion were always vague, when the post-invasion period descended into chaos the US elevated the human security agenda as a justification for the war in Iraq, arguing that the US aim was to rescue the people of Iraq from the human insecurities caused by Saddam Hussein. However, tellingly, even then the US did little to restore law and order through implementing policing and justice measures—key elements of the narrow school's policy agendas. This suggests that the rhetoric, but not the implementation, of human security was used by US policy makers when a crisis of human insecurity was perceived to undermine their state-centric interests.

From the perspective of practitioners in many developing countries, human security is a quite subversive concept. As already mentioned, the narrow version is often seen as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of de-colonized states and impose Western values and changing ideas about sovereignty. In the Asia-Pacific region several states champion the broad school's understanding in development terms and the broader non-military transnational threats of environmental degradation and diseases such as HIV/AIDS and SARS. However, there is little support for the narrow

school's emphasis on violence inside the state and human rights. At the non-state level in the Asia-Pacific, however, there is growing advocacy for the narrow school's focus on violence.

Finally, the human security framework is a useful diplomatic framing tool for practitioners in the UN. The connections between conflict and human development are central statements in many UN policies: for example, the *2005 Human Development Report* (2005) and the 2005 Secretary General's, *In Larger Freedom* (2005), which was his response to the High Level Panel Report, and the *Draft Outcome Document* from the 2005 World Summit (2005). Among the positive outcomes of these policy objectives is the decline in internal violence since the mid 1990s which is largely explained by UN and international activism in peace operations (see Think Points 6.2 and 6.3).

THINK POINT 6.2

The decline in global political violence

- Nearly 700,000 people were reported killed in the wars of 1950; in 2002 the figure was just 20,000.
- International wars now make up a tiny fraction of all conflicts. They started to decline in the 1970s as increasing numbers of anti-colonial struggles came to an end.
- The number of military coups and attempted coups per year has been dropping for more than 40 years. In 1963, there were 25 coups or attempted coups, the most since the Second World War. In 2004, there were only 10 coups. All of them failed.
- The number of genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians plummeted 80% between their 1988 high point and 2001, despite the horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica.
- The 1990s also saw a dramatic drop in the number of international crises, often the harbingers of war. International arms transfers, defence budgets and armed forces personnel also dropped, while refugee numbers declined along with armed conflicts.
- Wars are not only less frequent today, they are also far less deadly. The average number of battle-deaths per conflict per year has been falling unevenly since the 1950s. In 1950, the typical armed conflict killed 38,000 people; in 2002, only 600—a 98% decrease.
- Between 1994 and 2003 reported human rights violations declined modestly in five out of six regions of the world. The real decline may well have been greater.

Source: Human Security Centre (2005), *Human Security Report 2005*, Oxford: Oxford University Press and online at www.humansecurityreport.info

KEY POINTS

- There is disagreement about the extent to which the human security concept is adopted by practitioners.
- On the one hand it appears that despite the rhetoric there is limited implementation of the human security agenda by states but on the other hand the UN's active involvement in peace operations aimed at addressing freedom from fear and want is one of the reasons why there is a decrease in internal conflict.
- In general, state practitioners appear to refer to or implement the human security agenda when it serves their material interests.

THINK POINT 6.3

Explaining the decline in political violence

- In the early 1990s, with the Security Council no longer paralysed by Cold War politics, the UN spearheaded an explosion of conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding activities . . . [This] unprecedented surge in international activism . . . included:
  - A six-fold increase in the number of preventive diplomacy missions (which seek to stop wars from starting) mounted by the UN between 1990 and 2002.
  - A four-fold increase in peacemaking missions (those that seek to stop ongoing conflicts) over the same period.
  - A seven-fold increase in the number of 'Friends of the Secretary-General', 'Contact Groups' and other government-initiated mechanisms to support peacemaking and peacebuilding missions between 1990 and 2003.
  - An eleven-fold increase in the number of regimes subjected to economic sanctions between 1989 and 2001. (Sanctions can be used to pressure warring parties to negotiate and help stem the flow of war resources.)
  - A four-fold increase in the number of UN peace operations between 1988 and 2004.
- Peace operations in the 1990s were not only more numerous than previously, they were also far larger and more complex that those of the Cold War era.
- And they made a real difference. A recent RAND Corporation study found that two-thirds of UN peacebuilding missions were successful—a better success rate than that of the US. They were also cost-effective. The UN's 17 peace operations cost less to run for a whole year than the US spends on Iraq in a month.
- The single most compelling explanation remains the upsurge of international activism which followed the end of the Cold War.

Source: Human Security Centre (2005), *Human Security Report 2005*, Oxford: Oxford University Press and online at www.humansecurityreport.info

Conclusion

The final question to be asked concerns the future prospects of the human security concept in security studies and in the policy community. The argument in this chapter is that the concept contributes to understandings of security by showing that realism, the dominant state-centric security argument, is necessary but not sufficient, and should not be the dominant understanding of security. Because human security makes people the referent object it puts the onus on realism to explain why the state is the referent object if it is not a means to people's security. Unless the ultimate purpose of state-centric security is the security of people then the relevance of the state is questionable, and likewise state-centric security arguments. In this way the human security concept will continue to usefully highlight the point that the relationship between the people and the state and the role of sovereignty is at the centre of understandings about security.

This suggests that in the future the human security concept will continue to flourish in academic circles and in the teaching curriculum. At this level, the relationship between the state, people and sovereignty remains a robust debate and there is a normative impetus to improve the conditions for people. If this continues to be part of the job

description of academics and students then the future of the concept is assured. There is a great deal of research to be done on human security: for example, on the cross-disciplinary triangular relationship between security, governance and development; and on the connections between the schools of human security. As Thomas points out, 'the ultimate test of the utility of the concept lies in the extent to which policy makers and scholars can draw out the interconnections between these two streams of concern' (2004: 354). Continuing and expanding the quantitative and qualitative databases on human security are other important areas of research. Regular editions of the *Human Security Report* published by Oxford University Press are essential to sustain. There are many text books yet to be written that will provide teachers and students with much needed curriculum guides and materials.

However, at the level of practice, despite agreement that we live in an interdependent world shared by billions of stakeholders in human security, the future of the concept is less rosy. In the first place the key actor in world politics, the US, is preoccupied with terrorism. US leadership under the present George Bush administration is failing to inspire confidence in many quarters of the world that others' security matters to the US and that security is indeed interdependent. US leadership is not setting adequate human security standards at home or abroad and that augurs badly for the human security agenda.

In developing countries the main perpetrators of human insecurity will continue to resist changes that will enhance human security because the short-term gains from holding political and economic power are too seductive. Appeals to recalcitrants will have to continue through the argument that short-term benefits are fatal for long-term survival of governing elites and the state. Diplomacy using the human security framework and hard data showing that human security and a moral conscience is in their interests should be the primary approach. Failing that, intervention following the ICISS and the UN's World Summit principles may be necessary, even though the recent record for proper intervention in Darfur is not encouraging.

It remains up to the United Nations to continue to provide leadership on human security. Despite the urgency for reform of the UN, the institution has nonetheless been instrumental in helping to reduce the incidence and scope of internal violence through peace operations. Data shows that since the mid 1990s there is a dramatic global decline in the scope and incidence of battle-related deaths from internal conflict. (See Think Point 6.2 on the decline in global political violence and Think Point 6.3 on the explanations for the decline.) Also important in reducing conflict is the continuing role of regional organizations, such as the African Union, despite many problems. NGOs and civil society groups continue to be essential actors in the decline of violence, despite the need for better accountability. Finally, the role of properly functioning states will continue to be central to improving human security.

The most significant imperative for continuing to elevate the concept of human security is that ordinary people living in the midst of political violence naturally enough want security. In public opinion polls conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and published in a 2005 RAND Corporation report, two-thirds of the Afghan population believed security is the biggest problem facing the country. Some 37% of the population perceived the biggest security problem as violence. A further 29% saw poverty, the economy and jobs as the next biggest problem. Of less importance were other issues such as education, electricity, roads, and buildings (from 6% to 9% of the population rated these as security problems (2005: 94). In the same publication the results of a series of polls conducted in Iraq during 2004 provided further confirmation that 'security remained the main concern of Iraqi citizens' (2005: 165). Other research on people living in violence and who are also poor shows that their strongest wish is to be secure from violence. Everyday people everywhere want human security. States and other actors have the responsibility to provide it for ethical reasons and for the common good of us all.

QUESTIONS

What is security? Is human security important and if so why?

Can human security and state-centric security be reconciled conceptually and in practice, if so how?

Should humanitarian intervention using force for the protection of people from large-scale atrocities be conducted if it endangers international stability? Should the international community intervene in Chechnya? If not, why not?

Should the international community intervene in situations such as Darfur in 2005? If not, why not?

Is human security a concept that guides state's policies? If not, why not?

Is human security measured by the number of battle-related deaths?

What are the problems with the framework proposed in this chapter?

What is the relationship between governance, security and development? HS -> better govern... -> stability -> security -> developme...

What are the local, regional and global effects of human insecurity?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the concept of human security?

FURTHER READING

■ **Collier, P. (2003), *Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press**. Provides an economic view of the causes of civil war and proposals for an agenda of global action.

■ **Hampson, F.O. *et al.* (2002), *Madness in the Multitude*, Toronto: Oxford University Press**. Presents a strong argument for understanding human security as a global good.

■ **Human Security Centre (2005), *Human Security Report*, Oxford: Oxford University Press**. The most important quantitative and qualitative contribution to the analysis of global trends in human security.

■ ***Security Dialogue* (2004) 35/3.** A special edition of the journal which provides a very good overview of the debate about human security from many of the main participants.

■ **Thakur, R. and Newman, E. (eds.) (2004), *Broadening Asia's Security and Discourse Agenda*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press**. A critique of the state-centric paradigm from the perspective of a very broad understanding of human security.

■ **Thomas, C. (2000), *Global Governance, Development and Human Security*, London: Pluto Press**. Focuses on the issues of governance and development that are central to human security.

■ **United Nations Development Programme (2005), *UNDP Human Development Report 2005*, Oxford: Oxford University Press**. Analyses of the problems of human development around the world.