riie European Union's Security and Defence Policy: The Quest for Purpose j0/^o/i Howorth 342 343 Introduction: EU security and defence in the context of international relations European security and defence in theoretical perspective From foreign policy coordination 10 a European security and defence policy European military operations and capacity; the rhetoric and the reality 349 2003: The EU becomes a 'military' actor 349 Riding patterns, defence budgets, änd^ployabiluy 352 7* «v»T 346 The generation of European military capacity Cooperation, planning, and intelligence Development of strategic vision The 2003 European Security Strategy and its sequel The European Global Strategy and Brexit Conclusion 355 357 359 359 360 361 NOTES FURTHER READING WEB LINKS 362 362 364 s hapten is Uni°n (EU) a °0ncerned with the ways in which, since the late 1990s, the European actor- albeitattemPted t0 emerge as an increasingly autonomous security and defence *'th bv». ..°ne that focused overwhelmingly on overseas missions connected not expedi 'tiona ■V warfare but with crisis management and embryonic nation 342 jolyon Howorth 107r^in7by jewing the theoretical approaches to the emergence of thi rJgnif'can. security challenges. It then examines the implicates for interna(. J Ions o, the EU's overseas ,nterven,ions. both as a rnihtary and as a civ,llan CrJ lagemen, entrepreneur. Finally, it assesses the implications of the Lisb Z the 2016 European Global Strategy (E6S) (European Union 2016) for the fcJ development of Europe's security and defence policy, in the context of new and seri. ous security threats in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods. It offers some ^ thoughts on the implications of Brexit for European security. Introduction: EU security and defence in the context of international relations The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence (Article 24/1. Treaty on European Union) On paper, the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, seem both clear cut and very ambitious. Foreign policy, security policy, and, eventually, defence policy are, it appears, to be progressively coordinated and even integrated. Of the 62 amendments to the existing treaties that were introduced by Lisbon, no fewer than 25 concern the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). All of them were designed to strengthen Ell coordination. Indeed under Lisbon, ESDP is rebranded as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), further underscoring the stated objective of commonality in the EUs approach to international relations. The major innovations of Lisbon were the creation of two senior EU positions: President of the European Council and High Representative (HRVP) for Foreign Affairs and Secuniy Policy, the latter post doubling up as Vice President of the European Commission The first incumbents, respectively Belgium's Herman Van Rompuy and the UK's Caih-enne Ashton, ultimately failed to exercise clear authority in the teeth of opposition from the member slates. Van Rompuy's successor, former Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, fared no better, whereas the new HRVP, Italy's former foreign minister Fed-erica Mogherini, immersed herself energetically in the challenging task of devising a global strategy for the EU. We will evaluate her performance at the end of this chapter. This ongoing tension between the collective interests of the EU on the international stage and the specific interests of a handful of (essentially large) member** Tne European Union's Security and Defence Policy:The Quest for Purpose ^tutes -he P-F^J^JZ£2n CSDP WhV * «he member The' notion of a CFSP was first floated in February 1990. The EU, since the early IP t0 lhC lr0Ubk f°fKreatlng hr1Su"Pr°file EUr°Pean °mcials a"" Pursuing a tal commonality of objectives J they remain determined to exercise their ov his over foreign and security policy? tTClgnr* . _____is_. n____J ._ - iq70s had been attempting to generate a common foreign policy-mamly in the L of European Political Cooperation (Nuttall 1992). The Western European Ln (WEU). which, since its creation in 1955, had Iain almost dormant, had been "activated' in the 1980s (Deighton 1997). Its Ministerial Council asserted in Octo-^ l987 (hat 'the construction of an integrated Europe will be incomplete as long as jt does not include security and defence'. The main institutions of WEU (the Coun-c,|and the Secretariat) were relocated in 1992 horn London to Brussels to enhance coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some European slates—through the WEU—sought to create a European Security and Defence Iden-„,y from inside NATO, but any notion of an autonomous EU role in the held of security (let alone defence) remained virtually unthinkable for most of the 1990s. And yet, beginning in 1999, after the groundbreaking Franco-British summit in Sainl-Malo,1 the EU progressively sought to develop an autonomous capacity in security and even—at least on paper—defence policy. This involved the creation of an entirely new set of Brussels-based institutions and an intensive political quest for greater and more usable EU military and civilian capacity for deployment in overseas crisis-management missions. Between 2003 and 2016, the EU engaged in no fewer than 36 overseas missions (as we shall see). This seemed to portend a revolution in ihe trajectory of CSDP. The aim of this chapter is to place the overall impact of these missions not only in the context of changes within the EU and the international arena, but also in the context of thinking about security and defence policies in International Relations (IR) more generally. It begins with a review of the ways in which IR theory might approach the reality of and the questions raised by CSDP Next, it explores the continuing challenges facing EU security and defence policies in terms of resources and institutions, particularly in the context of tensions between Brussels and the national capitals. It also explores the prospects for operational implementation of an EU security and defence policy. Finally, the chapter turns its attention to the longer term, and to the elaboration of a strategic vision for the EU European security and defence in theoretical Perspective ^e role of the EU as an international actor on the global stage over the past 15 years «8 become one of the most widely analysed of all the EU's policy areas. From a situ-a,i°n in the early decades of European integration in which foreign policy was relation of European studies, we have witnessed the bu; Jolyon Howorth is perceived as a unique type of international actor and behaviour. Traditional academic theories, Ew°pean inie. have had difficulty in explaining the existence of CSDP Most theorists gralion, have naa uiu.^",......r—— = « ",cunsts, from most schools, have long suggested that, whatever other policy areas might ^ " come under the aegis of European integration, security and defence would not be among them. Indeed, what most theorists over the years have focused on and plained' is the absence of CSDP (Ojanen 2006,58-60; Howorth 2014,190-3). in the case of IR theory, none of the existing schools seems to come close to explaining the 'CSDP effect'. Structural realism, so long the dominant force in US 1R theory CWalu 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), has no convincing explanation for the phenomenon whereby sovereign slate actors pool their sovereignty and, apparently ignoring the rules or the Westphalian system, elect to intervene in the internal affairs of neighbouring—or even in some cases quite distant—sovereign countries. For structural realists, state actors alone can engage in security and defence—that is, military—activities, either individually or as part of a military alliance. A body such as the EU, in this conception, is theoretically incapable of engaging in security and defence policy Indeed, Mearsheimer (2001, 392-6), gives little credence to European integration and tends to assume, on the contrary, that the EU, as a result of the end of the Cold War, will go 'back to the future' and revert to the type of nationalist rivalry we saw in the 19th and early 20th centuries. CSDP is, in any case, little studied by structural realists for the simple reason that it does not fit into their vision of things. The principal explanation offered for the EU's behaviour—that it is 'balancing' against US dominance (Walt 2005; Posen 2006)—is not hard to refute (Howorth and Menon 2009). Other scholars from within the realist family tend to see European integration as a standard process of interstate bargaining with a view to furthering the national interests of member states. This school, among scholars of European integration, is known as intergovemmentalism. Stanley Hoffmann argued 50 years ago that integration could only take place in policy areas where stale gains constantly outweighed losses. This, he predicted, would not and could not be the case in the area of'High polities', of which defence was the ultimate example (Hoffmann 1966). This approach was taken to its ultimate theoretical conclusion by Andrew Moravcsik(1998), who argued that although actors other than just states—social actors of many types—can bargain at the international level for more rational policy coordination, ultimately, key decisions will always be taken by states. Once again, foreign, security, and defence policy is regarded as the prime policy area where coordination (let «1°* integration) will not happen. Recently, a new theoretical approach has been foig« that seeks to explain why states are prepared to bargain with one another °verB5U^ such as security and defence policy while keeping the supranational uistituliotf the EU at arm's length. This 'new intergovernmentalism' (Bickerton. Ho « ■ The European Union's Security and Defence Policy:The Quest for Purpose , puetter 2015a) reflects changes in the way national preference fan. « , 3Irred in .he post-Maastricht era. While governments ar CZ^T faking at EU level, they resist any further delegation of fonal institutions. Moreover, the traditional institutions of supranational^ u is aIg„ed, have by and large accepted the dominance of intergovernmental policv-shaping P«ctices. This approach can help explain the (nevertheless still strictly hm-lteJ) phenomenon of CSDP The other main school of European integration theory ne0-func.ionalism, consciously excluded from its key processes of spillover the en |jr£ field of foreign and security policy-considered as the las. bastions of sovereignty (Haas 1958). Neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on trade and economics as the twin pillars of inlerdependence and soft power (Keohane and Nye 1972,1977), while offering useful interpretations of the purely civilian actor the EU used to be, has its work cut out uying to explain why the EU chose to don the accoutremenls of military power. Neo-liberal approaches are, at one level, geared to explaining the absence of war and the presence of peace in complex multilateral settings. Their focus on soft power is informed by a belief that military instruments have been over-analysed in IR and that the significant aspects of the present are the features of attractiveness and exempla-rity of which the EU is a model (Nye 2004). These approaches appear to lend themselves awkwardly to the analysis of CSDP, a policy area which at first glance seems to run against the grain of neo-liberal theory. On the other hand, supranationalists are also hard put to come to terms with a European reality in which the main actor in their mtegrationist system—the European Commission—has little more than a bit pan to play in CSDP (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 2001). As with the realists, neo-liberals and supranationalists have tended to neglect or eschew analysis of [his key policy area, whose very existence poses a challenge to the bases of their theoretical approach. To the extent to which the recent wave of constructivism has addressed these issues, it has been to suggest that international relations can be understood in more value-based or normative terms (rather than as a simple clash of interests), and that in this sense EU security integration is theoretically unproblcmatic. Where neo-realists and neo-liberals insist that states have more or less fixed preferences dictated unchanging factors such as the international system or national interests, con-stuctivists have insisted that those preferences are in fact socially constructed toough forces such as identity, ideas, normative beliefs, and socialization—which are in a state of constant evolution. Initially, constructivists seemed, for the most part, «"newhat ill at ease with the EU, Two of the major tomes of construcnvUt theory (Katzeristein 1996; Wendt 1999) fail even to look at the EU as such. Constructivism since the mid-1990s, succeeded in broadening national concepts of security zan' Waever, and de Wilde 1998), with the result that there has been some meas-"re 0f convergence between neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches on the one hand \ lhe ncwer. sociologically derived theories of international relations on the other Smith 2000). The past decade has seen a veritable outpouring of construcuvisi 346 Jolyon Howorth scholarship on CSDP which has finally begun to offer valuable theoretical i raw r^^oUcy area (Berenskoetter 2005; Tofte Mew 2006; M.rand 2008; Davis Cross 2011 Kurowska and Breuer 2012; 2012b lorgensen el al 2015; M. Smith, Kcukeleire, and Vanhoonacker 2016)' ^" 1„ one of the earliest stud.es of CSDP, 1 coined the concept of 'supranat,onal, governmental,sm' (Howorth 2000. 36 and 84). By that 1 meant the phenometl(, whereby a profuston of agencies of intergovernmental^ take root in Brussels " through d.alogue and socialization processes, reaction to 'events', and a host of rZ dynamics, gradually create a tendency for policy to be influenced, formulated and even driven, from within that city. This is close to the idea of Brusselsization' Uscd by other commentators (Nuttall 2000; Allen 2004). Governments, often againsl their wishes, are constantly being forced in directions they had not anticipated. Eu-ropean statesmen, even the most powerful, have demonstrated repeatedly thai na" tional institutions are inadequate to the task of driving forward a coherent European response to the external environment. New European institutions and agencies have recendy popped up like mushrooms to fill the gap (Davis Cross 2010; Howorth 2010,2012; ME. Smith 2017). Policy legacies and preferences—the extent to which long-standing approaches remain valid—are likewise factors to which even the most powerful statesmen have been forced to submit. Above all, discourse—the ability to change preferences by altering actors' perceptions and articulation of the available options—has proven to be a powerful factor in driving forward the CSDP process (Howorth 2004; Schmidt 2008, 2010). Policy preferences which, only a few years previously, would have seemed unimaginable to many a leading actor have in recent years and in this crucial policy area rapidly been embraced, developed, and integrated into the mainstream. However, the specific trajectory taken by CSDP has been overwhelmingly attributable to events'. Since November 1989, and especially since 9/11, 'events' have run ahead of the capacity of politicians and statesmen—even strong ones—to determine their precise course. In the area of security and defence, events have also ridden roughshod over most of the established theories of European integration. From foreign policy coordination to a European security and defence policy By the turn of the 21st century, the EU had begun to ride roughshod not only over 1R theory, but—more importantly—over its own previous diffidence in the field of security and defence. It now sought to generate a European security and defence policy, which, as it arose from the Saint-Malo declaration of December 1998. explicit called for the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force Two important explanatory sets of variables underlie the EU's move towards for Purpose 347 The European Union* Security and Defence Policy:The Que8t <0ming ■ secUrity dfnCe Tf I firS' set-«°genous factor* fTthe shifting tectonic plates of the international system ,n the aftermath of the 5 War. The second set-endogenous factors-drives from the mtemal dynam-f the European project. '^hen the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, i, brought down with it a Euro-mc reading of international relations that had been unquestioned since the tIy of Westphalia in 1648. The very discipline of IR was built around analysis of rTopear. conflicts. All of that came to an end in 1989. For the USA and for much of rest of the world, the 'dawn of peace in Europe' (Mandelbaum 1996) shifted the 'oniinent to the margins of the international radar screen where it featured as little more than a blip. In particular, the focus of policymakers and military planners in Washington. DC switched to Asia, to the Gulf, to the Middle East (Clinton 2011). Europe, for the time being at least, was simply no longer a problem. The corollary to this realization was that tens of thousands of US troops were not optimally employed sitting around in bases in Germany preparing for a war that would never happen. The security of the European continent should logically be delivered through Europe's own resources. This was the earliest affirmation of CSDP as a subset of the mternational system. Why was this so problematic? The new crisis management missions of the 21st century required specific kinds of assets, especially force projection. The USA possessed them; the Europeans did not. Europe suffered from a capabilities gap' (Hill 1993a). While the Europeans discussed ways to convert their Cold War, defensive militaries into useful—projectable—instruments, it seemed sensible that they should seek access, through NATO, to available US assets that would allow d,em—temporarily—to plug the capabilities gaps between their past and their future. This would take the pressure off US forces more urgently needed elsewhere, and would allow EU forces, pending their professionahzation and modernization, to take over peacekeeping missions in areas such as the Balkans where the USA had no identifiable interests. Two powerful exogenous forces then combined to galvanize that seriousness of EU purpose; the prospect of US military disengagement from Europe and the re-emergence of insecurity and instability on the EU's periphery. From the Balkans to North Africa and from the Caucasus to Ukraine, not to mention the Arctic, the 1990s and 2000s seemed to pose a succession of major security challenges to the EU. The second set of explanatory variables behind CSDP stems from the dynamic processes unleashed within the EU itself by the developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s. However long delayed may have been the Union's embrace of actor-ness', there was never any doubt that the European project was a political project. Its fundamental objective was the resolution of a double conundrum; how to bind to-K«her the fates of Europe's core nations in a way that would both render intra-Euro-P«n war unthinkable and maximize European influence in the outside world. As European integration gathered speed in the late 1980s, impelled by the single market Pr°j«t, by plans for a single currency, and by the Schengen process, the domesuc lor«s behind foreign policy convergence meshed with those suggesting the need for 348 Jolyon Howorth n,v Dolicy autonomy. These dynamics were intensified after the fa„ f gTear;C by he growing awareness of the strategic changes pjj* lhc Berlin Wall by t ^ ^ £urope * by "^edrEuropean secur.ty challenge in the 1990s was twofold. ^ ed rethinking the complex relationship between the EIJ llse,f The mimci whlchseveralmem^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ „ ,e ur membership to be effective), and NATO (which many analysts ^ declanng mor.bund if not obsolete). a ser.ous EU in security or military capacity that would allow the Union to assume responsibility for crisis nT agemenl tasks. At a meeting in Petersberg, near Bonn, in June 1992, the WEU ^ defined three such tasks: 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'. The latter might even include war fighting such as the Kosovo operation of 1999—that is, 'high-end Petersberg tasks'. The EU's initial attempt to meet these challenges involved us,nf, the good offices of the WEU to work with NATO in generating European Combined Joint Task Forces (Temff 2003, 39-59) drawing on earmarked NATO troops (Howorth and Keeler 2003). This involved the so-called Berlin Plus' arrangements whereby the EU could enjoy 'assured access to NATO planning', presumed access to NATO assets and capabilities', and a pre-designated Europeans-only chain of command. This awkward process proved unsatisfactory in several ways. First, the WEU was too insignificant a body to be entrusted with the major political responsibility for oversight of European military operations. Second, the unresolved nature of the political relationship between the EU and WEU failed to demonstrate who owned the process. Third, the mechanics of Berlin Plus proved extremely difficult to nail down. By the spring of 1998 (as the Kosovo crisis began to erupt), Tony Blair, whose first year in office had been dominated by domestic politics, began to look seriously into security issues. A group of senior officials in Whitehall, liaising with their opposite numbers in Paris, had come up with a solution to the EU-WEU-NATO trilemma (Howorth 2004). Since the inadequacies of WEU were clearly a large part of the problem, they suggested that that organization, whose 50-year treaty base was up for renewal in 1998, should be scrapped. The EU should take on direct political responsibility for deciding on and overseeing military operations. And, in the hypothesis (which the experience of Kosovo rendered increasingly likely) of an EU-only operation in which the USA wanted no part, it should develop autonomous forces in order to escape dependence on complex borrowing arrangements such as Berlin Plus. That was the rubicon crossed by Tony Blair at the historic summit meeting with Jacques Chirac in Saint-Malo in December 1998. CSDP appeared to be emerging as an increasingly autonomous subset of the international system. Saint-Malo raised a number of challenges with which the EU collectively and die member states individually have been grappling ever since. The institutional implications were rapidly resolved and the EU successfully implanted in Brussels a raft « for Purpose 349 The European Union's Security and Defence Policy:The Quest . Ddies-the HR for the CFSP (HR-CFSP: Javier Solana) and hie A 55i - c™„« (BC) i. member state's permanent representation in Brussels- the EI I Mir, T MOW Staff (HUMS) comprising some 150 senior officers fromt'l Union- Th* institutional nexus modelled largely on NATO, rap,dly demonstrated ability to work relatively well (Dijkstra 2013; M.E. Smith 2017) 'Ve Problematic was the resolution of the EU's working relationship wtth NATO and in particular the involvement in CSDP of non-EU NATO members such as Tur' w and Norway. Turkey was particularly disturbed by the CSDP project for two ma.n reasons. First, while Turkey had been fully involved in intra-European secunty discussions as an associate member of the WEU from 1992, under CSDP ,t was abruptly excluded. Second, this was all the more unpalatable for the Turks in that most scenarios for armed conflict and crisis management in the European theatre were situated in the south-eastern parts of the continent, which Turkey regarded as its own backyard. In particular, Ankara reared the use of CSDP military assets to intervene in Cyprus in support of Greece. Turkey therefore decided, in spnng 2000, to block the entire process by threatening to veto the transfer to the EU of those indispensable NATO assets without which the EU could hardly embark on any military operation. It took almost 3 years of high-level negotiations to reach an agreement acceptable both to Ankara and to Athens (Haine 2003,136-40; Tofte 2003) On 16 December 2002, the EU and NATO issued a 'declaration on [C]SDP', announcing iheir strategic partnership and asserting that, while the EU would ensure 'the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within |C]SDF, NATO, for its part, would guarantee the EU 'assured access to NATO's planning capabilities'. These arrangements are often referred to as Berlin Plus'. However, in practice, they remained something of a dead letter, and relations between CSDP and NATO remain essentially dysfunctional (Howorth 2009). This did not prevent the EU from embarking on its first military missions in 2003, when CSDP came of age. European military operations and capacity: the rhetoric and the reality 2003: The EU becomes a 'military' actor The CSDP is best understood not in terms of institutions or of capacity, but in terms of what it does. Between January 2003 and mid-2016, the EU engaged in no fewer tan 36 overseas 'crisis management' missions. That is what CSDP does and, ipso kcio, what it is. That broad generalization conceals a complex pattern of military Jnd civilian deployments, the balance of which has shifted significantly over lime; favour of the latter. In 2003, the EU embarked on its first four overseas missions 350 Jolyon Howorth including two police missions and .wo military missions and In 2004 i, ,a bio*:* ever military mission. Operat.on EU force Althea (EUFOR Al,hea) J ed "ä and Hercegovina. Thus, three of the first five missions were military m,SSlonf> early statistic gave a misleading impression of the real footprint of CSDp 0 ,' Thai further strictly military missions were mounted between 2004 and 2016 c with a total of 29 missions winch, while not being 100 per cent •c,vi[ian.°mparcd basically Ton-military". Geographically, no fewer than seven of the CSDp'J*'*a" have been in the former Yugoslavia, and 18 in Africa. Of the remaining 11 1 ^ other', five have been on the EUs Eastern border (three in Georgia andr^* Ukraine and/or Moldova). Two have been in the Palestinian Authority, for wh'*° ln EU assumed special responsibility decades ago. The final three missions have k one-offs—a police mission in Afghanistan, and a rule-of-law training m,^ " Iraq, both symbolic of the EUs solidarity with the USA after 9/11, and a brief0" ^ monitoring mission in Indonesia (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane 2009). Any 0bI geographical analysis of these missions would have to conclude that the overwľľ* ing majority of them have been in the EUs immediate neighbourhood and Afn e -t this extent, it is clear that the EU is a regional actor, but one which frames re ri I conflicts and desuibilization in a broader globalizing context. The launch date of these missions also tells an interesting story (see Table 15 i) Founeen of the total number of CSDP missions were launched in the firsi 3 (2003-5). A further 12 missions were started in the following 3 years (2006-$) Only one—rather minor—mission was launched between 2009 and 2011 whereas eight new missions were mounted between 2012 and 2014. All but one of those more recent missions were in Africa, the other being an advisory mission in Ukraine The initial emphasis on the Balkans was both obvious and correct, given the need 10 stabilize a sizeable geographical area situated inside the borders of the EU itself an area, moreover, which had been formally declared in June 2003 as being destined eventually to join the Union (Pnfti 2013). The emphasis on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has attracted six missions, is easily understood in that that country is probably the least stable and the most violence prone of any in Africa It was in a state of continuous civil and interstate war from 1996 to 2003 and has been nven ever since with insurgency and conflict. It is estimated that as many as 5.4 million people may have died (Prunier 2009; Autesserre 2010). The absence of new initiatives at the turn of the decade is easily explained in terms of the onset of 'mission fatigue' around the time of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. By then, the EU had launched 26 missions in 5 years, and many member states were also involved in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is significant that, since 2012, the Sahel has become the dominant focus for CSDP missions. It has become the new stomping ground Tor al-Qaeda whose activities (hostage-taking—mainly of Europeans—assassinations, trafficking in people, drugs, and weapons, and terrorism) were affecting societies and politics from Mauritania to Chad (Chiwis 2016). ln 2015, EU Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) was launched, a naval military mission to tackle human trafficking of African migrants across the Mediterranean. The the European Union's Security and Defen <=e Poli ^ Quest for Pu ^BLM^^^^^stcount^ rPose 35| Africa Balkans 3 (BiH + FYROM - 2) 1 (DRC) 1 (BiH) 0 0 3(DRC-2 + Darfur) 2 (FYROM + Kosovo) 1 (DRCl 0 1 (Kosovo) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Totals 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 (DRCl A (DRC, Chad, Guinée-Bissau, Somalial 0 1 (Somalia) 0 3 (Niger, Horn, Sudan) 2 (Mali. Libya) 2 (Mali & CAR) 1 (EUNAVFOR Med) 1 (EUTM-RCA) 18 Ji 226,634 Norway 6,850 1,455 1.37 Turkey 8,347 105 1.16 *"*»■ Internal»™,, Insimjte for Stmtegic Studies 12016, 484-90I, ©Taylor & Francis, www tandfonline com 354 Jolyon Howorth TABLE 153 VVorfdmiJ^ ire ZUlb fmintrV Expend.Smillions $ per capita % of GDp (^0 U11 l i y 1. United States 597503 1,859 3 33 106 145,832 128 2 China 81.853 2,949 12 95 3, Saudi Arabia 878 4. UK 56.244 2 05 51,605 362 4.18 5 Russia 38 47956 22 6. India 702 46,751 193 7 France 41.013 323 100 B. Japan 454 9. Germany 36.686 109 10. South Korea 33,460 681 2.40 11. Brazil 24,260 119 135 12. Australia 22,764 1.001 183 13. Italy 21,552 348 1.18 14. Iraq 21,100 569 12.78 15. Israel 18,597 2,310 6.22 16 Iran 15,862 196 3 81 17 Canada 14,007 399 0 89 18. Poland 10,308 267 2 14 19. Taiwan 10,257 438 198 20 Spam 10,754 223 0.88 21 Netherlands 8,901 525 1.19 22. Norway 5.510 1,058 1.39 23 Sweden 5,261 537 109 24 Greece 4,729 439 2 45 Source International Institute lor Strategic Studies (2016, 484-90), ©Taylor & Francis, vwvwtandfonlmecom falling. In 2008, ihe collective EU defence budget was equivalent to the combined defence budgets of the eighl next biggest defence spenders (China, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, South Korea, and Australia: -S289 billion), which include all the 'rising powers'. In 2015, it was dwarfed by those powers, China and Saudi Arabia alone spending more than all EU member slates put together. The EL' gets very little bang for its euros. Out of that considerable overall 'defence' outlay, the Tne European Union's Security and Defence Policy^ Quest fo, P(jrp . „ve been attempting to fund 28 separate armies, 24 air forces and J l t^L jus. three countries in the EU (France, the UK and r for over 60 per cent of the comb.ned EU28 defence ^Z"^ - the trio, the four nations alone contribute over 70 per cent of the any " .c*.nim"iu">' *------------' ""*"i"**1115 Qetence budeei imh,..,,,. £1 -Us (at -S10 bUl.on) in f.fth p.ace ou, of the EU28. (and not just the smallest ones) are simply cheap r.ders. The avera/e defenc iose 355 P\ % defence expenditure. The only one of the new accession sta, , m.l>«ry clout is Poland. whlch has tnpled ,ts defence budge, ln the oas .--1 ranks (at -J10 billion) in fifth place out of the Fina ice* c(aiiwi,w"-' * —*iic average '^lurc of the 15 lowest-spending EU member states (who collectively account 5 per cent of the 'EU budget') comes to just S822 million. That «less than 1 dekncc budge, of the Ivory Coast. One might ask exactly what those nation L believe they are buying with their money, ln the vtew of one lead.ng expert ,ch of the money the EU spends each year on defence 'is simply wasted' (Witney JJJ) NATO's benchmark for defence expenditure is 2.0 per cent ofgross domestic roduct (GDP). Only the UK, Poland, Greece, Estonia, France, and Cyprus ap-Proached or exceeded that mark in 2015. The overwhelming majority of EU NATO •^bers are devoting between one-half and one-quarter of that target The case for ^pnalization is overwhelming and long overdue. ^Some progress has been made. Emerging out of the Cold War, the first practical necessity for most EU member states was to abolish conscription and organize professional military forces capable of being usefully deployed (Gilroy and Williams 2007). In 2005, when the first edition of this book was published, of the armed forces of the EU27, only seven were fully professionalized, the others relying to varying extents on conscripts. By 2015, that picture had changed significantly, with only su EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and Greece) continuing to retain conscription for specific political-cultural or geostrategic reasons. There are almost 1.9 million European troops 'in uniform'. Of that number, about 10 per cent (190,000) are adequately trained for serious peacekeeping missions, and of those probably a maximum of 50,000 could be used for high intensity conflict. Factoring in the requirements of rotation, the number falls to a maximum of 20,000 who, at any given moment, are genuinely usable in serious military missions (Venusberg Group 2004, 27). ln 2007, only 64,134 military personnel from the EUs27 member stales were deployed on missions—a total of 3 per cent of the available manpower (Giegerich and Nicoll 2008). By 2013, that number had dropped to 58.000 Clearly, at a time when serious threats continue to accumulate around the EUs periphery, CSDP remains a project that is seriously suboplimal. The generation of European military capacity tathe EU has progressively mounted a range of overseas missions, the need for greater diversity in the Petersberg tasks has been recognized. The Lisbon Treaty, Ufider Article 43(1), saw the CSDP missions as henceforth covering: 'joint disarnm-"loi! operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tosiis. 356 Jolyon Howorlh a ^arpkccpine tasks, land! tasks o(combat force*,, . pan sinki in taÄSSline Goal (HHG), estab.tshed at the European Cou„cll jecember 1999, was conceived as a broad force catalogue' frorn drawn appropriate resources for a range of hypothetical Europe W0U,a "JE he ordinal three levels of Petersberg tasks. The forcc Sie for one year under the EU flag. By 2004, it was already clcar ^ new sustainaDie ioi •j^ j™~----- mat ih, HHG was simply not being met. At the European Counctl on 17 June 2004,, ' ■t-hcadlinc goal 2010-was adopted. Building on the HHG, the headJin, 2010 committed the Union to be able by 2010 to respond to a crisis with target—headlines"'"**'" • - ' ■"■"u,,ne end ommitted the Un.on to be able by 2010 to respond to a crisis with rap,, decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of cris„ management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Un.on. Signify steps were taken, including the establishment of the European Defence Agency' 2004, and the designation of force packages at high readiness based on ba„le group' units of around 2,000 soldiers, capable of high-intensity warfare in descrl jungle, or mountain environments (Lindstrom 2007). Although the baule-group formations (many of them multinational) were drawn up and have since 2007 been on standby for their 6-month stint, to date none has been deployed on a single mission. This reflects a serious inability among the EU's member states to agree on sending soldiers into combat missions (Hennon 2010). The European Council's Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities' of 11 December 2008 stated that the EU should develop the capability of mounting a number of missions simultaneously; two major stabilization and reconstruction operations; two rapid response operations of limited duration, an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals; a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; plus about a dozen CSDP civilian missions of varying formats. Since those targets were set, the EU has in reality come nowhere close to meeting them, despite the growing threats around us periphery. One innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty was permanent structured cooperation, a procedure designed to encourage member states to coordinate their military capacity in a variety of ways. Article 42(6) calls for; 'Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework (Biscop 2008). To date, however, this clause has never been invoked Indeed, progress remained so slow that a special European Council was convened in December 2013, under the banner of'European Defence Matters'. The HRVPwas charged with reporting back to the Council in June 2015 on the challenges and opportunities facing the Union in foreign and security policy, and this report (Mis-siroli 2015) led directly to the preparation of the EGS of June 2016. We will return for Purpose 357 jiť European Union's Security and Defence Policy:The Quest ^menl,nthi7,usion'M^ k place in para". CooPe ration, planning, and intelligence asters approach' icffbef ,r states, including the large ones, accept the necessin, „r ,„t has been cooperation among geographically close and Kb. 7T8 " oL referred to as the dusters approach'. On 5 JUK concluded a Treaty on Defence and Security CoopT^S S Id recognition in both London and Pans that these two would-be global pl£ J permanent members of the UN Security Council could only continue to asp" global player status if .hey combined their military efforts in a number of h.Lv ;,egicscctors:a.rcraftca^ * technology- unmanned aerial vehicles, expeditionary forces, and eventually combat Ciiuwetf' ■ / —---^i muu eventually systems (Jones 2011; Menon 2011). In recent years, there has also been in-„stve cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, five " unlnes with very different relations to NATO and the EU (Bailes 2006).' The Nor-*£ Defence Cooperation has also been extended to the three Baltic countries, which Me created an integrated naval minesweeping force, the Baltic Naval Squadron lBALTRON), and which are dependent on allied support for the control of their al5pacc(Molder2011). A third example is offered by the Benelux countries which have a long tradition of cross-border cooperation. The Belgian and Dutch navies share an integrated command and feature common training and maintenance operations. At the level of governance, education, training, control of the Benelux anspace and other matters, cooperation has been successful. This particular cluster of countries is also deeply interested in extending cooperation to both France and Germany (Biscop el al. 2013). A fourth example of a cooperative cluster is that of the Visegrád countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia). While the driver of this experiment is probably as much NATO as the EU (these countries wish to demonstrate their loyally as US allies), the range and variety of cooperation projects is encouraging. In June 2012, a broader grouping of Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia formed the Central European Defence Cooperation initiative (Kurowska and Németh 2013). It is unclear how coherent this grouping might prove to be given the rather different agendas of the Czech Republic, which locuscs massively on NATO, and Austria, which clings to its neutrality. Finally, there is much ongoing cooperation between France, Germany, and Poland in the context olihe Weimar Triangle' (Adebahr 2011) and also, increasingly, between Portugal "nd Spain (Joint Statement 2013). 358 jolyon Howorth Operational planning 1 wncc of any significant EU planning capab.hly and in partfcuUa 0f,, a:dC Headers (OHQ) has long been seen as a major yj^ C eX-m of CSDP CBiava 2009) France has co«y sought 1o Jj* Z facility (in the name of empowering and au.onomiztng CSDP) and lh J* ^ajyconsltendy opposed i, (arguing tha, this woul tlupW e** > aalues a, NATO, and that CSDP should prioritize civilian planning ^ dd value) Germany has hidden behind this stand-off to avoid taking any d conscious that it has misgivings about Frances military ambitions for the EU and I lts own different reasons, not unsupportive of the UK's somewhat dteir,genu * port Of civilian planning (Simon 2010). By early summer 2011, a signify, > of EU member states was determined to forge ahead. A status report' on QSot,J. tainmgaproposalontheOHQ.wasputbyt^ 18 July, but the measure was angrily vetoed by UK Foreign Secretary William HagUt A year later, a group of 11 foreign ministers, including those from all the large C0Ul) tries except the UK. issued a report in which, alluding darkly to the OHQ issue, called openly for'more majority decisions in the CFSP sphere [...] t0 prevent ont single member state from being able to obstruct initiatives" (Future of Europe Group 2012). In mid-November 2012, the 'Weimar Five, citing the launch of several new CSDP missions in Africa, including one planned for Mali, wrote "We are convinced that the EU must setup [...I true civilian-military structures to plan and conduct missions and operations' (Waterfield 2012). The issue remained blocked as laleas summer 2016. Intelligence Intelligence is a domain that goes to the very core of slate sovereignty. Attempts lo develop some formal EU intelligence-sharing agency (or even procedures) have been bedevilled with suspicion and mistrust (Muller-Wille 2004). Small states with no intelligence-gathering facilities of their own resent their dependence on the large states. Large EU states that do gather their own national intelligence are reluctant to share it fully either with one another or (still less) with smaller stales. The result is that the EU has to make do with whatever scraps of intelligence its member states are prepared to give it. There are two main intelligence operations in the EU, the Intelligence Analysis Centre, which is a branch of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the EUMS's Intelligence Division (Duke 2014). The former involves 70 lo 80 analysts from all member states, working 24/7. It feeds intelligence, garnered from agencies around the world, to the Council, via the PSC. The Intelligence Division, which is the largest single component of the EUMS, involves several dozen senior officers working in three main branches: Policy, Requirements, and Production, supplying focused intelligence reports for the purposes of operational planning and early warning (Antunes 2007). These agencies liaise with and receive data Irom the EU's Satellite Centre in Torrejbn, Spain. The European Union's Security and Defence Polic¥;The ^^ ^ ^ lir-ni arrangements are encouraging, but for the EU to Tfe -gating facility of its own would require lw* JT* * *™» « be for the large member states that enioyZ * Values .0 agree to pool the results in a C * - US-imP°S£d T 1 r, r™8 ^ *" WUh EU P--rsTh" idd be an even greater leap forward and. after Brexii, seems unthirLle (Svend * ,009; Clark 2012). February 2015, many of these developments were reviewed ,n a major policy ' from the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS 2015) which called lor the flon of a 'European Defence Union-a project that had first been floated m 003 The mam recommendations of this report by a panel of top-level former offi-I and politicians covered the need for a strategic upgrade, reform of Institutions __J f..nAir-in thp intrnrliirtirM-i j-*f n ------- All lh15 undet out -------- 6 «fB-uc, reiorm ol institutions ,nd funding, the introduction of a European semester' for member x budgets, and a galvanization of industrial and technological capacity. s leans logically to the question: What arc the political ambitions of the EU CSDP? To what extent, and in what ways, does the EU aspire to the third of iiiors' perspectives: the attributes of power? Development of strategic vision The 2003 European Security Strategy and its sequel The European Security Strategy (ESS), approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003 (European Council 2003), was an initial attempt to think through the broader political objectives behind CSDP. It aimed lo harmonize the different views of the member states without falling into lowest-common-denominator rheto-nc The document, entitled A Secure Europe in a Better World', identified five key threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, and regional conflicts. It drew attention to the root causes of world poverty and global suffering, and stressed the 'complex' causes behind contemporary international terrorism. It recalled the destabilizing effects of regional conflicts such as Kashmir, the Great Lakes, and the Korean peninsula, all of which feed into the cycle of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, state failure, and even international criminality. The very complexity of these issues, the document asserted calls for an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world' (Biscop 2005; Dann-reuther and Peterson 2006; Biscop and Andersson 2008). However, the 2003 document was hardly a statement of the EU's strategic purpose, ll focused on responding to security challenges posed by 'new' threats and saw the EU response over-whdmingly in terms of crisis management, international institutions, multilateralism. 360 Jolyon Howorth , and development aid. An attempt to update the dociim XodS tp J - EU's overall approach (Biscop ^ Howorth, and G.egench 2009)' The European Global Strategy and Brexit U was no. until the special European Council meeting in December 2013 tW new HRVP Fedenca Mogherim, was charged with drafting a new EGS document ftT siroll 2013) The Council remit specifically asked her to assess the impact of cha„te in the global environment and to report to the Counc.l on challenges and opp0llu nines' for the EU ansing from that shifting global context. Despite scepticism ,„ some areas about the political value of a document that all EU member sia.es can find.. possible .o sign (Menon 2012), .he way Mogherin, wen. about th.s task offers some reason for optimism. The mos. imporiant factor was that she appeared to be asking the correct questions. Not, 'How do we export our values to the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods?', but, 'What can the EU realistically hope to achieve ln these neighbourhoods given the massive changes they have recently undergone? The EGS document was published as this volume was being prepared for publica-non and it coincided with the UK's Brexit decision to leave the EU. Time and space allow for only the briefest assessment of these two potentially game-changing developments. The EGS differs in several respects from the 2003 ESS. Where the ESS was bold, confident, and even occasionally hubristic, the EGS is realistic, modest, and constructive. It offers useful guidelines to the implementation of key policy preferences Space allows me to focus on only two of them: strategic autonomy and regional involvement Strategic autonomy is arguably the central key phrase in the EGS. It appears no fewer than seven times in the text. This echoes the message from Washington thai has remained constant for a decade: Europeans must take over greater leadership in their own neighbourhood. The significance of the EGS is that this issue, first raised at Saint-Malo, is being kick-sianed all over again—at precisely the moment when the Warsaw summit of NATO (July 2016) announced a'new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership' (NATO 2016). The implication is clear: the EU will acquire autonomy through and via NATO rather than in competition with u A. the same time, a more realistic approach to .he Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods is announced. Instead of bold assertions about 'normative power' and the export of European values' to Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia, we learn of the need to generate resilience' among the suites of the neighbourhood. The enhancement of'resilience' emerges as the main statement of the EU's responsibility in the neighbourhood—which has been extended all the way into Central Asia and Central Africa. There is also a clear recognition that regional regimes (African Union, Arab League, the Sahel G-5, Economic Community of West African States) are probably more significant partners and actors in their own parls of the world than the EU itself. They understand the regional dynamics more closely than docs Brussels Tne European Union's Security and Defence Policy:The O "est for Purpose i5in order. Indeed, the EGS explicitly states that 'We will not sm commentators on the security implications of Brexi, offered radicallv onn J;;. For one. the departure of the UK would make no M^l^ Iw because Britain has progress.vely taken a back sea. in this po|lcy arM >J ^Uandbecause^ nother. » would make Im.e difference precisely because the UK will remain a Z Za ,n European security via NATO (Menon 2016). For yet another. ,t would Z 5 »»°* CSDP l°f COmC TVn T (BTUeS 2 2°16)- °"C ,hln815 The security challenges facing the EU will not change as a result of Brexit. What will have „ change is .he EU's relationship with the UK. The nature and direction of that change will have massive bearing on the future of CSDP 361 Conclusion CSDP is a strange political phenomenon. Traditional 1R theorists have difficulty understanding the acquisition, by a grouping of sovereign nation slates in an international subsystem, of the accoutrements of collective decision-making over security and defence policy. Constructivist scholarship helps explain the phenomenon in icrms of identity, ideas, and discourse, but it fails to pay due account to the powerful historical forces that have driven the new policy area since the end of the Cold War. Those forces derive from a new strategic focus on the part of the USA, from a reasser-uve Russia, and from the generalized chaos that has struck the Middle East and North Africa since 2011. They also stem from a new globalized international order in which failed states are more problematic than powerful ones, human security is as significant as state security, underdevelopment in the Global South is a source of direct concern for the well-being of the industrialized north, the deployment of naked military power is increasingly perceived as being of limited usefulness, and in which the major challenges concern environmental harmony, regional stabilizauon, crisis management, conflict prevention, counterlcrrorism and counterprohfcralion The most appropriate instruments with which to address these challenges arc of the softer' type—multilateral bargaining, institutional capacity, the forces of international law, civilian nation-building assets, humanitarian relief. The EU possesses ihese attributes in abundance and, once it begins to think strategically (as opposed " "actively) about its long-term objectives in an emerging multipolar world and the *ay in which it can deploy its considerable assets to help meet those objectives, it be able to bring much to the collective table. jolyon Howortn 21st century tnroug» i ir _____iKj> Tnnel c,, aetise0 centurj. through tradmon ^ - =Q «1 interest is deeply ooted Ye ,„„ *Ut" natio TVTTs » S that can multiply their own global influence. tha' ■ g. It always lucidly, presided over the emergence ofa c^ S^SKi has seen greater .importance and impact accrue to U remains to be seen whether they can learn to ahgn thetr own nariona. ^ with the overall European .merest. NOTES 1 Th,s summit constitutes the b.flhplace of the ESDR the Predecessor of CSDPThe, of the Saint-Malo declaration of 4 December 1998 is published, along with other (X Documents of ESDR in Rutlen 12001. 8-91 2 In fact, the decision to introduce these features was laken at the European Council ,„ Amsterdam (19971 3 Norway and Iceland are members of NATO but not of the EU. Sweden and Finland are members of the EU, but not of NATO. Denmark is a member of both organizations, but has an opt-out from CSDP 4 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels 11 December 2008 https //www consilium.europa eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/ 104630 pdf FURTHER READING There has been a huge literature on ESDP/CSDP since the first edition of this book appeared in 2005 The annual volumes of Core Documents produced by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). as part of their Chaillot Papers series (http// www iss europa eu/publications/chaillot-papers/), are an invaluable source. Nine volumes have been produced, the last one being Chaillot 117 (Gliere 2009). In addition, in 2009, the EUISS produced two major books to mark the tenth anniversary of ESDP: Grevi, Helly. and Keohane (20091 and de Vasconcelos (2009). Three major overviews, offering quite different perspectives, are to be found in Howortn (2014). Jones (2007), and Merand (20081. On the ESS, see Biscop (2005) and Biscop and Andersson (2008) On the EGS. see Missiroli (2015) and a special issue of the Internatiom! Spectator (Tonne 20161 Good constructive accounts, offering insights into both security culture and institutions are Meyer (2006), Giegench (2006), and Davis Cross (2011) Onlhe development of military capacity, see Giegench and Nicoll (2008) On the changing international rote of the EU as a security actor, see Ganzle and Sens (2007), Tardy (2009), and Gross (2009). A volume of theoretical articles was published as a special issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies (Bicxerton, Irondelle, and Menon 2011). The European Union's Security and Defence Policy:The Qu est for Purpose 363 Irondelle, B., and Menon, A (2011) 'Security Co-operation Beyond the gjdWftoO, " £U's Common Security and Defence Policy', Journal of Common Mar- Hodson, D„ and Puetter, U (eds) (2015a) The New Intergovernmental*™ Dickert00, ^ ^___„,»i*n.r •* University s,gte3 and Supranational Actors in me Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford Oxford press)- Biscop. S. (2005, The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Posivve Power (Aldershot Ashgatej. Biscop, S and Andersson, J.J (eds) (2008. The EU and the European Security Strategy (London Routledge) Dav,s Cross, MX (2011) Security Integration in Europe: HowKnowledge^ased Networks 9re Transforming the European Union (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press) de Vasconcelos, A. (ed.) (2009) What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020? 2ndedn (Pans: EUISSI Dijkstra, H. (2013) Policy-Making in EU Security and Defence: An Institutional Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Gänzle, S. and Sens. A.G. (eds) 12007) The Changing Politics ot European Secunty: Europe Alone? {London: Palgrave). Giegerich, B (20061 European Security and Strategic Culture (Baden Baden: Nomos) Giegench, B. and Nicoll, A. (2008) European Military Capabilities Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies) Gliere, C. (2009) 'EU security and defence: Core documents 2008. Vol.lX', Chaillot Paper, No.117 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies). Grevi, G., Helly, D., and Keohane, D. (2009) European Security and Defence Policy The First 10 Years (1999-20091 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies). Gross, E. (2009) 77ie Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Howortn, J. (20121 'Decision-making in Secunty and Defense Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-governmentalism?', Cooperation and Conflict 47/4 (December): 433-53 Howorth, J. (2014) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Jones, S.G. (2007) The flise of European Security Cooperation ICambndge: Cambridge University Press). Kurowska, X. and Breuer, F. (eds) (2012) Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action (London: Palgrave). Merand. F. (2008) European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Meyer, CO. (2006) The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union (Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan) Missiroli, A. (ed.) (2015) Towardsan EU Global Strategy: Background. Process, References (Pans: EU Institute for Security Studies). Sjursen, H (ed.) (2012b) The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Quest for Democracy (London: Routledge) Jolyon Howorth Smith M E. (2017) Europe's Common Security and Defence Poi!Cy: c tpelnvsl timing, snö Institutional Cnznge (Cambridge: Cambndg,^ Pressl Tardy, T. (ed.) (2009) European Security in a Global Context (London: Routledge| Tonne, G (ed I (2016) 'Special Core on the EUGS', Special Issue of the Interna^ tatorb'iß. WEB LINKS Two key websites give wide access to most aspects of CFSP/CSDRThe Eu --J'opeanCounci s„e at http://vvvvw.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aSpX?ld=18ost-Lisbon developments: policy dynamism and institutional developments The EU's answer to global security challenges 366 368 372 375 The EU as a global coumerterronst actor: still a paper tiger' EU external migration policy The EU and global cybercnmirrality Conclusion NOTES FURTHER READING WEB LINKS I Summary Since the end of the Cold War, the internal-external security nexus, namely the links between formerly distinct concepts under the Westphalian approach to international relations, has become increasingly relevant.This chapter reviews the development of the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) that has evolved from a side product of European economic integration to a complex and dynamic policy area. Although since the LisbonTreaty the European Union (EU) has considerably expanded its internal and external security tools and competences, the EU's global influence in this area is constrained by normative, national, institutional, policy, and legal challenges. The rapid evolution of global security challenges-such as counterterrorism, migrant and refugee flows, and cybercriminality- means there is a need for continuous