What it means to change lanes: Actions, emotions and wayfinding in the family car*

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate how the sequential organization and settlement of disagreements comes to shape, and be shaped by, navigation. Using extracts of in-car interaction, we examine the gestalt of projectable aspects of road travel, car movements, and driver-navigator talk. Navigation when accomplished without maps relies on making sense of streets, landmarks, and signs, activities that are displayed through passengers and drivers giving directions to each other, alongside embodied references to passing roadside features and the movement of the vehicle. More broadly, "finding the way" is bound up with the social relationships between passengers — in particular families caring for one another and showing their epistemic and emotional stance on particular matters. To examine this we draw on existing conversation analytic work on epistemics, stance, and emotion to explore the potentially argumentative character of direction-giving and direction-receiving and how this comes to be combined with the task at hand.

Keywords: driving; conversation analysis; wayfinding; epistemics; emotion

1.   Introduction

Families know their way around their world as families, their shared knowledge of places and routes binding them together. Many of us will remember our experiences as children sitting in the backseat of the family car while our parents debated with rising passions the quickest way to get from one part of town to another. Perhaps many of us are now those parents — claiming to know a better way, making accusations, being criticized for the insufficiency of our directions, gritting our teeth as we make a U-turn in busy traffic, and other troubles that go with driving in the family car. In the research on navigation, however, these familiar situations in which navigation takes place have often been overlooked. Navigation, even where it is placed into a group setting (Hutchins 1993), continues to be treated as a problem of the intellect puzzling

through charts and maps. It is perhaps the absence of groups like families in navigation research that explains a lack of attention to its emotional aspects.

In research based on models of mental spatial representations, the family's familiarity with the layout of their neighborhood has usually been treated as two or more individuals consulting two or more cognitive maps instead of the knowing we have "as we go" (Ingold 2000: 239). As should already be clear from thinking about families in cars even for a moment, that we know where we are going as we go does not result in an absence of agreements and dis-agreements, disputes, and resolutions. Instead we come upon how family members display their stance in relation to the route they are taking and their stance toward one another. In this article we will document and describe a fam-ily's wayfinding as a matter of standing and understandings. Each of which are then versed and reversed through the relationship between directional talk and ordinary features of the road system. We will examine how the way is found in the braiding of conversation's sequential organization and the journey's on-ward orientations (Haddington 2010; Nevile 2004; Psathas 1991).

Ingold (2000) provides an invaluable start to rethinking wayfinding beyond the shadow cast by the concepts of mental maps and spatial cognition (e.g., Golledge 1999; MacEachren 2001; Roy 2005). In describing human move-ment through a landscape Ingold makes a clear break from a long tradition of cognitive modelling, arguing that how we find our way through the *familiar* is quite unlike how we explore the *unfamiliar*. When a family goes down to their local supermarket they do not unfold the map, apply their compass and look for landmarks on the horizon. Nor do they scan the environment for indicators, consult their mental spatial representation, plot an optimizing A-B route and set off executing the plan. The family's habitual navigation in the world is something quite different to planned map-based spatial navigation. Routes to the supermarket go unquestioned and overlooked, a family expects that it can get other things done *on the way* rather than having to *work out the way*. As the family drives to the supermarket they find themselves instead *in* traffic, weav-ing *between* potholes, caught *in* a downpour, noticing a new cafe opening up, and all manner of other environmental possibilities.

When we are finding the way with others the relationships between those in the car reshapes how we navigate. In our earlier work on in-car interaction we studied drivers who car-pool and share their car rides to work, travelling the same route on a daily basis. We found that car-sharers formed a distinct inti-mate relationship through being with each other every day — something that bears many resemblances to being members of a family with daily exposure to one another's moods, stories, troubles, and successes (Laurier and Lorimer 2012). In particular, car-poolers take any departure from their usual route as an "accountable matter." The route that car-poolers took to work was agreed upon, carefully established through learning shortcuts, getting caught in slow

moving traffic, the character of particular roads as more or less dangerous or aggressive, and so on. Any change to that route would be justified or explained. In our data the criteria used for route selection became visible when routes had to be changed because of roadworks or there was a requirement to pass by another place, and when a new route was suggested that route would be evaluated in terms of the car-sharers' standing toward one another as commuters.

Similarly, for families, most of the time the route goes uncommented upon, just as correct turns at junctions can be taken as correct by an absence of response. It is when *difficulties* with a route arise that the unsaid becomes said (Haddington 2010) and it is an instance of one such difficulty that we examine here.

2.   Approaching semiosis

Our connection to more traditional semiotic concerns is through an ethnomethodological and conversation analytic turn toward social semiosis and away from more formalist semiotics (McHoul 1996). In such an approach analysts no longer establish and interpret the relationship between sign and object, instead, they investigate the logics of signification as they are realized through practical activities — such as the assignment of color in a chemistry lab (Goodwin 1997). Two particularly pertinent earlier articles, which draw on wayfinding examples, show how the reading of signs is embedded in and only intelligible through an understanding of the sequence of activities in which it occurs, whether it is simply "getting there" (Sharrock and Anderson 1979) or "being seen to read the signs" as part of identifying what sort of legitimate person one is within a space (McHoul 1984).

Within conversation analysis (CA), Schegloff (1972) carried out a significant study of the uses of place terms. In that early work he provided a sketch of the relationship between formulating place and navigation that was taken up later by others in the field. Psathas and Henlin's ethnographies of cab drivers preceded Schegloff's study and is intriguing as a proto-CA ethno-inquiry into "locating activities" using the case of the dispatch order (Psathas and Henslin 1967). Psathas's later work (1986, 1991) differentiated between "how to get to" and "where are you" sequences, the former generally producing complex steps to be followed and the latter often being dealt with through one place formulation. Wayfinding draws not only on the linguistic resources highlighted by Psathas, but also the multimodal communicative resources of gesture, artefacts, and spatial arrangement (Goodwin 1986; and see also Norris 2004). Havilland, by defamiliarizing conventions of directional gestures through anthropological work in the languages of Zinacantan (Haviland 2005), Tzotzil (Haviland 2000), and Guugu Yimidhirr (Haviland 1998) revealed background assumptions underlying left and right in both speech and gesture.

More recently, these CA studies have been supplemented by a number of authors with an interest in gesture, body orientation, and environmental features

in situations where participants are mobile. Through examining situations where unacquainted pedestrians seek directions, Mondada (2009) brought out the preliminary work that is required to establish a shared orientation relative to the surrounding city (see also Laurier and Brown 2008). It is only once gaze and bodily indexicals, such as left and right, are aligned that direction-sequences can be initiated. Closely related to the analysis that we will present, Haddington and Keisanen (2009) show how features of car journeys occasion route negotiations and provide temporal boundaries that require negotiation to be undertaken. Following Haddington (2010), we aim to describe direction-giving and wayfinding as forms of social semiosis in the midst of a mobile road environment. To this we add an examination of the *affective* qualities of wayfinding. Even in offering directions or choosing a route it is an area ripe with possibilities for disagreement and blame, and in our earlier work we have attended to the preparatory work oriented around sharing responsibility for route selections (Brown and Laurier 2005; Laurier and Brown 2008). What we will tease apart later in the article is what happens when wayfinding goes wrong. What is also of interest in examining such a moment is whether there are qualities that occur that are particular to the family rather than commuters or friends. Moreover when the relationship-generated categories of family members meet those vehicle-generated categories of driver and passenger there is further interest in how entitlements and responsibilities shift and move between them on a moment-by-moment basis. From Goodwin's work on family disputes it becomes also clear that shifts in what he calls participation frameworks also restructure affect (Goodwin 2007).

The episode we will present comes from a three year project "Habitable Cars: the collective organization of private travel" (Laurier et al. 2007). During the project we collected over one hundred hours of video recordings of journeys made by different social groups in cars. The groups were a contrasting mix of car-poolers, families, and friends. We used a follow-and-film approach: the project ethnographer would spend a week travelling with each car learning about its occupants' routes, elements of the history of each group of travellers and asking various other questions inspired by the particularities of each journey. At the end of the week a pair of camcorders were handed over to the travellers and they were asked to record half a dozen of their typical journeys over the next week. Many of the groups recorded a great deal more than six journeys, retaining the camcorders for up to a month. For a fortnight or more, after the DV tapes were returned, the project ethnographer then sifted through the footage provided by the project participants selecting up to sixty clips per vehicle for further detailed analysis. These clips were returned to the participants on DVD to secure their informed consent for re-use in data sessions, conference papers, and academic publications.

From the corpus of these clips assembled by the project a number were selected for transcription according to conversation analysis conventions

(Jefferson 1984) and more detailed analysis during data sessions (Heath 1997). The latter allow for the repeated viewing of fragments of various human practices in order to begin to describe the witnessable social orders to be found there (Lynch and Bogen 1996). Where some practitioners of conversation analysis emphasize gathering together large collections of instances to look for recurrent features of talking together (Have 1999), our approach has been to dwell on only a handful of data fragments. Indeed, in this the interests of brevity in this paper we focus on just one extract. The demands of presenting audio-visual materials in sufficient detail for analysis that tracks talk, gestures, objects, and environment require more space, so the same solution works here of tracking one episode rather than gathering a collection of comparative instances. However, as we hope the reader will discover it is a particularly rich fragment.

3.   Failures in family wayfinding

The family that we will join here are at a classic occasion for a family argument. They have taken a detour around the center of London to avoid the Congestion Charging Zone. At the outset, Jess, the mother, confidently claimed knowledge of a "right turn" that would allow them to travel a route between two hospitals avoiding the "Zone." The journey between two hospitals is being made in order to track down the belongings of a chronically-ill grandmother. The reason and responsibility for the journey thus connects in a particular fashion to each occupant of the car through a familial logic — in particular morally locating Jess because the grandmother is her mother. Part of the background to what is happening is also that Jess has, by dint of living closest to the hospitals, become the primary carer for her seriously ill mother. Most of the visits to grandmother in the old and new hospitals were done using the family car.

   From the outset of this journey, a key question for Jess and Steve (the father) was the existence of "the right turn" that could be made to connect to the hospital. Steve although having expressed skepticism over the existence of this right turn, has nevertheless continued driving the family along the route. After a lengthy discussion earlier, Jess has an increased stake in finding "the right" that she had been so certain about. One of the questions that travelling together in the car as a family produces is the potential categories in play — in this case father/driver/route-follower and mother/passenger/navigator. These categories are not definitively decided, rather they are potential categories made relevant in talk, though here we will not be focusing on settling which of those are in play.

   The family, having successfully skirted the congestion charging zone, arrive at the road in question, at which point, of course, they will discover whether they can turn right or not. Jess in the front passenger seat, says *be careful* and, almost as she says this, the car drives past a right turn. Jess rejects that turn as being the correct right and they continue up the road. As they progress it

becomes less and less likely there is another right turn that they can take. Having been certain of her route Jess faces the impossibility of making such a right turn. At the top end of the street there is a barrier in the middle of the road that prevents any possibility of a right turn. Jess who has been looking less and less confident gets upset. For Steve, his early doubt about a right turn has seemingly been vindicated and this now leads to a situation ripe for blame, score-settling and more. The route was not one they had both known and been confident about, it was Jess' route — in turn Jess holds the responsibility of having taken them on a route that she either misremembered or which had always been impossible. A simplistic reading from the outside would be to see Steve vindicated and Jess shown wrong. Events point otherwise, when Jess' claim collapses and she becomes upset, Steve steers both her — and the car — out of trouble. In doing so we begin to catch elements of how the family exists in its intimacy, its long histories of faults and forgiveness and its caring for and of its members. From the transcripts what we can pursue more closely is how, in this specific case, a number of complex actions, emotions and emergent features of wayfinding are related to one another.

Let us start with tracking the course of Steve's sensitivity around the projected "way-failure" back to the beginning of their search for the right turn (the location of the video grab is marked with a "[*]" [in red] in the transcripts that follow and overlap with "+"):

```
1    J:    Right be car[eful]
2                      +
3    S:               [xxx]
4
5    J:    It's
6
7    J:    yeah
8
9    J:    a little bit fu[rther up]
10                        +
11          ((Steve lifting hand up from gearstick))
12
13
```



```
14
15
16          S: (([*]points out his window)) [It wasn't that one there]
17          was it
18                                          +
19                                          [((( Jess leaning forward to
20                                          look across))
```

Jess reins in their attention to this immediate section of road, *be careful*, (line 1) the road thus becoming a territory of concern. Almost immediately Steve points out a right turn (emerging in line 11 and completed in 16). There are several points to note about this. First, that we have divergent perspectives on the road. Jess is scanning the distant road ahead, while Steve immediately begins glancing over to the right hand side of the road. Where one might want to say that this is a feature of the car's architecture because the driver is looking out of his side of the front window and then the side window itself, what is possibly more important here is that Jess knows where her right turn is and is already looking toward that area. Steve, meantime, is taking the instructions at their word and identifying candidate right turns. Second, the tense used to refer to the opening: not "isn't" but *wasn't* (line 16). The change of tense comes not even with having passed the exit — it is still on the right. Yet it is done with an acute sense of the braking and indicating distance required to take the right in question. The exit is seen as an object whose status is generated by its relationship to their driving. It is not just "a road" that is being talked about here, but "an exit," that the car could be maneuvered onto. Third, Jess' *a little bit further up* (line 9), which would have aligned Steve with the correct zone ahead to be examining, was too late. Steve was already moving to point out the turning to the right that they are approaching using his gearstick hand. This is the hand that will most likely catch the attention of the passenger, his other being too peripheral. Jess turns her head a little toward that side, and by the visibility of her attending to his side of the car, Steve can now comment on the environmental feature and its surrounds:

(2)


```
21

22
23
24      J:      [*] E:hm ((now looks further up street)) (2.0) No don't
25              [think so
26
27      S:      [Might've] been coz that's right hand (1.0) turn
28
29      J:      Dunno how far down I came out ((looking around out
30      passenger window)) Not this far down I don't think
31
32      ((S looks across and J follows))
```

Jess then leans forward and across Steve, craning her neck to look deeper into the right hand turn as they pass it. In leaning in she creates something close to a "body torque" (Schegloff 1998) that will eventually have to be released. Aside from positioning herself in this recognizably temporary state, it is done so that she can peer into Steve's candidate road exit. Along with what category of looking is being produced (e.g., peering versus glancing), it is the *sequencing* of the peering that interests us here. Jess' body torque uncoils (line 24) as she moves back into her standard seating position as a passenger. In her uncoiling, Jess, while still leaning forward though no longer across Steve, does a second peer at the road ahead. This second look right after the first is visibly surveying the road ahead in comparison to the now passed right turn. All the more so given that Jess while doing so is holding off a conclusion by using the questioning-continuer *ehm* and only on completing the survey of the road ahead does she say *no don't think so* (lines 24–25). Her peerings gather in the perspectives required to be able to say it is not. Here, already, her epistemic claims have weakened from a definite *a little bit further up* (line 9) to *don't think so* (lines 24–25).

The nature of car travel in urban road traffic means that we are constantly pushed on and cannot pause nor retrace our steps easily in the way that we can on the pavement. The family is kept moving along the road and cannot return to this first right hand turn to reconsider. The onwardness of traffic also means that even as Jess is rejecting the first right as not the one that she remembers, the forward movement of the traffic brings them to another street going the wrong way (see also Haddington and Keisanen 2009). How Steve deals with Jess' weakened rejection of the turn is by providing a directional formulation — *that's right hand turn* (line 27), which provides a match with Jess' route as provided during her earlier directions.

Dunno how far down I came out (line 29) is placed at a moment when the traffic is slow and they have the opportunity to look around without moving any further. Yet the road has not brought them fresh perspectives on the situation. This surveying is again linked to Jess being able to say *not this far down* (line 30). Ingold argues for the importance of the structuring of perspectives in wayfinding and here, perhaps, we have the persistent absence of a remembered perspective which would then link into the sequence of perspectives that Jess is able to recall. It is a property of memory that it can be tied to reaching a location which delivers a perspective that matches what the person can recall. Prospectively we can say "I will recognize it when I'm there" or we find ourselves walking around an area for a while before suddenly we say "there it is!" Instead Jess and Steve edge a little further up the road and have come upon two visible features of the road-scape — a no-entry and a long set of railings down the middle of the road which prevent turning right.

(3)


```
36
37
38      J:      ((cranes neck looking toward railings and right hand side
39      [•]))  [Although I'm wondering if it was
40                     +
41              [((biting fingers and looks with Simon at one-way street
42      to immediate right))
43
44      S:      °I reckon it probably was you know° ((S continues to look
45      at that road))
46
47      J:      Do you think
48
49      S:      Yeah
```

It is here where Jess' certainty unravels further. Having looked around and not been able to offer any noticings about where they are, she now switches from an uncertain rejection to a reconsideration of that exit as possibly having been the one she took.

The car here provides for the sort of side-by-side alignment noted by Mondada (2009) as key in undertaking direction-giving. Yet at the same time certain views are relatively restricted or/and obstructed because of traffic's visual properties, the car's fixed seating and the passenger and driver themselves blocking one another's views. In the above transcript, Jess is craning her neck (line 38) in order to gain the perspective of the driver. The camera's view in the video still is roughly the view of the passenger relaxed in their seat. Stretching up allows Jess to see along the fence a little farther, and to draw conclusions about which "right" is which. Her next turn-beginning *although* (line 39) thus gains its sense from following after her inspection (line 38), which has provided fresh evidence of the impossibility of the right turn, even if not of a feature or landmark that she can recollect. Just by itself, a second visual inquiry of the surroundings provides the warrant for a revised statement to be made. Added to this in the moving car there can be greater or lesser visual access to the buildings, trees, and streets surrounding the road we are on as we travel further along it.

What follows Jess' second thoughts is an agitated biting of her fingers (line 41). She also looks in alignment with Steve (line 42) at the street exit the car is

currently sitting beside, this is a street they cannot enter either due to the fence, so their gaze is settled upon an impossible right turn rather than continuing to search for other options. Steve's response (lines 44–45) is intonationally softened although this time matched with Jess' and thus coming to an agreement about having missed their right turn.

What happens next is closely related to the opening up of the view down the middle of the road as the car drives another hundred meters or so forward. It has been travelling beside the railings that continue to extend into a vanishing point.

(4)


```
50
51
52      S:      [•]I'm  pretty  sure  you  can't  throw  a  right  up  here
53              ((looks across to J))
54
55      J:      ((continuing to bite nails)) Tch fh:
56
57      S:      So we've got a problem now
58
59      J:      ((looks up right-hand-side of street with S)) (1.0)
60              Tch (2.0)
61
62      S:      ((leans and looks to other side of road)) Yeah no right
63              turn [(((S starts indicating and moving wheel))
```

In extract 4, the car has moved alongside the central railings that preclude right turns. Steve has given them one look before saying *I'm pretty sure* (line 52). The sense of marking out how much anyone can see and thus what their epistemic claims are is reminiscent, if in a scaled-down sense of, classic studies of visual access and knowledge claims in airport organization (Goodwin and Goodwin 1996). In those studies, where there is a spread-out ground-crew with differential visual access to what was happening across the landing strips, gates, and apron, there was an ongoing need to mark out what each can plainly see, and what can be inferred, what is based on someone else's view, and so on. In the above extract, Steve shifts from claiming some degree of certainty about the absence of a right exit to certainty (lines 62–63). Similar to the inspections being done earlier, the car has moved forward another hundred meters and he can finally see the traffic lights at the end of the fenced road section that have a no-right-turn sign at their base.

Between those shifts in his claims to certainty Jess continues to be anxious and provide no amended proposals as to where the right could be, or instruc-

tions, or anything else. Again Steve's *we've got a problem now* (line 57) handles the absence of the right hand turn, not as assigning blame to Jess, but rather uses *we* to gather them together and perhaps shift himself into place as a potential agent of an upcoming solution. His phrasing of who the problem belongs to as *we* not "you," is of course not beyond Jess making further inferences — yet it does still remain a problem that was generated by her wayfinding. However we suggest here that it is Steve *as* driver who is pursuing a response from Jess *as* navigator. After re-iterating — *I'm pretty sure you can't throw a right up here* (lines 52–53) — though now with an increase in certainty over the absence of the right turn Steve only gets a note of dismay from Jess. His upshot is formulated in such a way that he still does not say what should be done, or indeed appropriate blame for the "problem." Jess could still offer a solution, however she provides instead a further marker of her distress by only making a muted tisk (line 60).

In his last turn in Excerpt 4, Steve's self-confirmation — *yeah no right turn* (lines 62–63) — warrants a departure from the driver-navigator pairing of Jess and Steve. The lane change is a significant action for a number of reasons because, first it stops them being boxed into the right hand lane, second, it ends the search for the right hand turn and, third, it is initiating a new driving course of action that has yet to be established. The delivery of the self-confirmation is economical, thus it also expresses the rapid response needed to change lanes in the approach to a box junction at traffic lights. If we imagine some alternative expressions here: *we can't throw a right* or *I can't bloody throw a right*, each of these continue the previous fruitless search and tend toward a complaint and potentially an argument. What we do see here instead is how his close-packed turn at talk, which is also tightly coupled with indicating and beginning to maneuver the car (see comparable moves in Haddington 2010), is directed toward a new course of action.

In a situation we are all surely familiar with, facing the mundane reality of the road system (Pollner 1987), Jess restates that what now appears not to be possible was once done.

(5)

```
63        S:    ((leans and looks to other side of road)) Yeah no right
64        turn [((S starts indicating and moving wheel))
65             +
66        J:   [But we did ((looks around road ahead))
67
68        S:    You can't °there's no right turn° ((bringing car into
69        other lane)) So I'm [going to just go]
```

Preceded by her nail-biting and in the face of the absence of the once certain right turn, Jess now expresses distress and puzzlement in its emphatic tone — *but we did* (line 66) — as Steve shifts lanes. Her claim fails, once again, to

provide new directions to the driver, attending instead to the undercurrent of inferred error or, indeed, blame. Of pertinence to what will happen in a moment she remains oriented to the road ahead, searching for that "right" even if it is now a last-chance look. Her claim also shifts to its remaining ground, that is no longer of an epistemic nature and is now trimmed down to an accomplishment. Steve's work is cut-out here because he has to both change lanes and then attend to Jess' distress. Under other less time-pressed circumstances perhaps he might have been able to supply scenarios through which Jess could have made a right hand turn, as she continues to claim, and thus avoid a family argument. Indeed, Steve shifts to the present tense preface, which is one that contrasts with Jess' past tense and also marks a direct conflict here. As Steve says — *You can't* (line 68) — Jess responds with a crestfallen expression, which, while visible from the camera's perspective, is quite lost on the driver:


The crestfallen look prefigures what will come. Meantime, Steve reiterates his account for the lane-changing actions by dint of which a right does not exist *there's no right turn*. An account that is about to provide an upshot in terms of what he will do next when:

(6)

```
69        other lane)) So I'm [going to just go]
70                             +
71        J:             [OH JUST GO home, go home]
72                             +
73        S:                              [no no]
74
75        J:    NO GO HOME
76
77        S:    I'll go left and back round (2.0)
78
79        S:    Yeah ((looks across at J)) Coz then you'll have lights in
80        your favour won't ya ((looks across at J again))
81
82        J:    [Well I just need to get to the bottom of this
83              +
84              [((waves envelope))
85
86              [((S looks across))
```

In the upshot, the shift in agency, already of course established by the lane-change, is marked with an *I* (line 69). However, before Steve can add what his next course of action will be, Jess does an overlapped cut-off (line 71) and seemingly instead gives up the whole mission with: *OH JUST GO home, go home*. Although she appears, from a literal interpretation, to be giving up, she does this in a contextually-sensitive fashion by belatedly providing directions (*home*) to the driver. These directives are, then, the response that his previous reports on the absence of their next step in the journey had been expecting. There is something more subtle and complex happening here though. If we examine the video-still below: as her turn begins Jess looks-away from the road, shifting her whole head toward the passenger side while raising and wav-ing her hand in frustration. If we recall her earlier leaning and craning, these were body postures arising in and out of the requirement of navigating. Her shift in bodily orientation then is a significant shift in her stance toward the wayfinding itself as a task (similar to Goodwin 2007). In as much as one can within a car, she is backing-off from it. Where in the midst of cooking in the kitchen one might raise one's hands and walk away from the cooker shouting *oh just phone the pizza delivery company*! here her gestures are tailored toward what can be done within the car-space and what can be seen by the driver. The hand that expresses this frustration is the one that is in the middle of the car and thus the one that is visible to the driver (Nevile 2007). If we look at the video-still again we can see her other arm remains un-moved on the passenger window-frame.

(7)

71
72
J: [OH [*] JUST GO home, go home]

73
74
75
S: [no no]

Expressive in their pitch of Jess' despair at having lead the family up a blind alley, the formulation of place — *home* — is one that re-ignites "family" as the group struggling to find a way through the city. *Home* is a place formulation identifiable to, and by them, as family members (Schegloff 1972). Using *home* collects them all as a family even as it also marks its opposition onward and is the place where the mum, as distressed family member, would want to retreat to. The spontaneity of this emotional occurrence is evident in the timing of its interruption of Steve's proposal before he has finished. By following the preceding course of action we can see how this upset does not come out of nowhere. Although this is apprehensibly how she feels at this moment, it is a feeling that comes after a stepwise progression first from confidence as she began with *be careful*, (line 1) then to nail-biting agitation and finally nail-biting withdrawal. Throughout Steve has been displaying his orientation to her changed emotional displays and tailoring his epistemic claims toward a non-confrontational stance.

   Given that it is publicly available that an upset is in the offing, it should be no surprise to us that Steve does not take Jess' directive literally and head home. Along with being pre-figured, her distressed instructions, when they do arrive, are an "extreme case formulation" of what to do next. In other words, she is not providing anything that could be taken as a reasonable next step in reaching the hospital, all the more so because within the journey itself as unit, they have almost completed it. After driving for several miles around the center of London, their final destination, the hospital, is only a block away. Here the extreme case formulation is being used in an unusual fashion against its issuer. One of Pomerantz's (1986: 219) identified uses of extreme case formulations is to "counter challenges to the legitimacy of complaints, accusations, justifications, and defenses." While Jess is succeeding in countering the lane-change as a potential accusation she uses it against herself (and to some extent the father and daughter) in its outcome. Were they to go home Jess would be the one who stands to lose most by this action since it is her trip. Her directive is thus also analyzable in terms of how it affects those in the car differently. Clearly for the husband and daughter there is only a limited loss because it is not really their trip that is being given up. It is Jess as the primary carer for the grandmother who would suffer were her directive to be acted upon by Steve. We can imagine the atmosphere on the journey home should he have taken her at her word.

   What Steve does is to mark a repair with *no no* (line 75 above). This is a repair that then attends to Jess having taken his lane-change as abandoning her directions, giving up on her as a navigator and, of course, an accusation that she had been wrong all along. Once he has the floor: *I'll go left and back round (2.0) Yeah. Coz then you'll have lights in your favor won't ya* (line 77 in the transcript excerpt 6). Steve is able to repair the sense of the lane change from a criticism of Jess' directions to being about doing a road maneuver that allows

them to take the right after all. There is a marvelous adjustment in what then
follows to a more explicit support and encouragement of Jess in the switch
from *I* to *you* in saying the traffic lights will be in *your favor* (line 80 below).
It is striking because it combines helping Jess to see the good side of having to
do an extra maneuver with simultaneously handing agency for the journey
back to Jess by switching from *I* to *you*. Should Jess come back at this point
Steve will return to being merely the driver again, following directions. Be-
cause the car is at rest he is also able to turn to Jess to pursue a response:

(8)

```
79      S:    Yeah ((looks across at J)) Coz then you'll have lights in
80            your favour won't ya ((looks across at J again [•]))
81
```



```
82
83
84
85      J:    [Well I just need to get to the bottom of this
86            +
87            [((waves envelope))
88
89            [((S looks across))
```

Jess shows her understanding of having been made responsible for the journey
again by restating why she has asked them to make this trip in the first place
and indeed placing that responsibility outside of her direct desires by waving
the envelope. The envelope that contains the list of items lost between the hos-
pitals and that has indeed been the reason for the journey.

   As we leave the family sitting at the traffic lights in London let us remind
ourselves of the short journey we have taken with them. We have revisited how
we read signs, treating looking at them as an action that is thoroughly inter-
woven with the unfolding of sequences of other actions. A sign is looked for
by the driver, at a certain point it is found and at that point it provides a basis
for his next move. More centrally to the issues here we have seen how route

epistemics shift from certainty to uncertainty to a bare recall of actions accomplished (*but _we did_*) in the ongoing inspection of the road environment. This gives us the grounds to understand aspects of the particularities of the car as a device for seeing from and being propelled by. In its movement it generates projectable sequences of the environment ahead and behind. If we compare it to how we can move through a city as pedestrians or as a passenger on a bus these are quite distinct. Indeed the most dramatic contract would be with the orienteer in an open landscape with not even a path to follow. Finally we have here a small yet rich instance of the accountability of a driver's actions when collaborating with a passenger who is also a family member.

4.   Conclusion

To return to our opening arguments around the nature of navigating the familiar by those who are also familiar to each other, we can begin to see that Ingold (2000), while providing a valuable critique of cognitive psychology, perhaps starts to miss the human relationships lived out in wayfinding. Moreover that there may also still be navigational puzzles that remain even in familiar territories. What we have been reminded of in the episode, and which is central to this article, is that wayfinding often fails although in a manner that is not cataclysmic. We think we know how to get from the supermarket to the train station but find ourselves stuck in a dead end. We are happily driving along a country road toward our favorite picnic site when we realize we have driven past it. We take the usual route to work forgetting that it is closed because of roadworks. Even when we are alone we may start cursing ourselves or shouting aloud about the absurdity of the road system. With our loved ones, as we noted when we began, this can easily descend into angry recriminations, but often will not.

In an article on family arguments Goodwin (2006) shows to useful ends for those who continue to assume the omnirelevance of the car as a space for interaction within it how the fact that people are in a car on a journey has limited relevance to the matter at hand:

For parties involved in the dispute, faced with the task of building, sustaining, and arguing for their positions, while countering the proposals of others, the detailed structure of the talk in progress is a far more relevant and consequential environment for action than the SUV they are sitting in, the freeway, and the landscape that is passing by. (Goodwin 2006: 449)

In the larger project out of which this article arises (Laurier et al. 2007) there are numerous incidences where this is indeed the case. In fact, the time spent

in conversations that arise out of, and are related to, driving and the journey is greatly outweighed by other matters. However these situations still do occur regularly enough and are of great consequence because so much of the research on way-finding on foot or in the car appears to excise it from the social units and activities in which it is embedded. In contrast to Goodwin's analysis the journey here is relevant to and provides a resource for the task of building, sustaining, and arguing for positions. As we have seen, the movement of the car itself plays a key role in the argumentative and discursive moves underway.

What we have also opened up in the article is the place of affect in wayfinding, which is again perhaps surprisingly overlooked given the likely emotional contours of getting lost and the disputatious possibilities of direction-seeking and direction-giving. Jack Katz (1999) in his sociological study of the emotions opened up in the moments of rage between drivers and other drivers on the road, laying out the affective qualities of actions such as tailgating and how they lead to outbursts on the roads of Los Angeles. Here we take that emotional life of driving *inside* the car. As Katz noted, although emotions rise up and overwhelm us with their violence, there is a logic to their occurrence. What we have sought to do here is show how the known-in-common grammars of the emergence, rise, and fall of distress helps the parties involved in the situation both try to head them-off or calm them down. If and when someone does get upset over the trouble during wayfinding, their degree of dismay can also be considered as reasonable or not in terms of the circumstances of their arousal.

If we consider emotion as situated then we are taking the reverse perspective on Austin's felicitous conditions. For Austin, these were the many conditions that had to be in place before a speech act such as "I bet" could be felicitous in accomplishing its action. Here our play is instead upon whether there are conditions in place that justify felicity or infelicity. However, as Cavell (2005) points out there is no necessary link between conditions and feelings as there was with conditions and speech acts. When we are in the realm of the passions, any conditions for success of an emotional act, such as "I must declare myself (explicitly or implicitly) to have standing with you (be appropriate) in the given case" (Cavell 2005: 181) can be denied, questioned, dismissed or postponed. That this does not happen in the situation we have looked at is because the mother and father affirm their standing with one another. It is in its own small way, and if only for a short while, a happy ending.

Note

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