Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe
Author(s): Helga A. Welsh
Source: Comparative Politics , Jul., 1994, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Jul., 1994), pp. 379-394
Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University
of New York
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/422022
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Political Transition Processes in Central and
Eastern Europe
Helga A. Welsh
What has been termed the "third wave"' of democratization culminated in the unexpect
domino-effect fall of Communist political regimes in the central and eastern Europ
countries and the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991.3 In the wake of these extraordinary e
much scholarly attention initially focused on the various causes of regime change in
former Soviet bloc. Other studies placed major emphasis on the prerequisites
democratization: socioeconomic development and the roles of civil society and pol
culture.4 More recently, the consequences of regime change5 and the comparability
regime transitions in eastern Europe to other regions of the world have been given gre
attention.6
As Przeworski points out, studies on regime transitions can be loosely grouped into
categories, macro-oriented studies which focus on the objective conditions of re
transformation and studies that concentrate on political strategies and choices.7 This ar
falls into the second category.
One of the underlying assumptions of much of the literature on transitions has been
the mode with which new regimes are created has important implications for the stabili
the newly emerging polyarchies. Modes of transition are usually distinguished accordin
the process through which incumbents are replaced by opposition forces. Roughly, one
differentiate between transitions from above (transformation/transaction/reform), transiti
from below (replacement/breakdown/rupture), and transitions where regime and oppos
play a roughly equal role in system transformation (transplacement/extrication) . Dahl
argued that a "disproportionately large number of the stable-high-consensus polyar
seem to have come about ... by peaceful evolution. "9 In a similar vein, Karl and Schm
suggest that the "mode of transition from autocratic rule is a principal determinan
whether democracy will emerge."'9 They argue that the most successful transition
implemented by pact or imposition in which the incumbent rulers remain at least part
control of political development and contrast them to transition by reform or revolu
They caution, however, that the experiences in central and eastern Europe might su
different findings with regard to the utility of modes of transitions and emphasize tha
different classifications are ideal types.
Using the example of central and eastern Europe, this article approaches the stud
transitions by deemphasizing the role of modes of transition and instead emphasizin
changing modes of conflict resolution in the transition process from authoritarian regim
polyarchies. I argue that, independent of the mode of transition, the concept of bargain
crucial in understanding transition processes. The argument is based on the assumption
the "bargainers need to reach some settlement but, at the same time, wish to settle on t
favorable to themselves." I Joint decision making can take a variety of forms across na
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Comparative Politics July 1994
settings, but, as Przeworski puts it, "democracy cannot be dictated: it emerges from
bargaining.'" The absence or failure of bargaining efforts may impede progress toward the
emergence and consolidation of polyarchic political systems.
The emphasis on different negotiation patterns also contributes to a better understanding
of the transition process. It allows us to distinguish between different stages in the transition
process without having to rely solely on particular events such as founding elections. I
propose that different stages in the transition process are defined by different modes of
conflict resolution. In this approach, the successful transition process toward democratic
political rule involves three stages. First, liberalization of the authoritarian regime is
accompanied by declines in the use of command and imposition as the prevailing modes of
conflict resolution. Second, as the transition proceeds to extrication from the old regime and
institutionalization of a new political system, bargaining and compromise emerge as the key
features in decision making. Finally, consolidation of the transition is distinguished by the
increasing dominance of competition and cooperation as the prevailing means of conflict
resolution.
First, I summarize some of the major characteristics of transition periods. The second
section proposes a framework for analyzing regime transformations by looking at changing
modes of conflict resolution. The third section analyzes similarities and differences in
transitions by outlining negotiation patterns in the countries of central and eastern Europe. I
conclude by suggesting that the transition process has entered a new stage once bargaining is
replaced by competition as the prevailing mode of conflict resolution.
Transitions
Problems of Definition The interval between an authoritarian political regime and a
democratic one is commonly referred to as the transition period. The beginning is marked by
the dissolution of the authoritarian regime, which often is identified with first signs of mass
mobilization, the end by the establishment of a new form of government that gains
legitimacy through democratic elections.'3 It is reasonable to assert that transitions have
beginnings and that they must have ends, but their fluidity makes clear demarcation
difficult.
However, the dissolution of an authoritarian regime often starts well before signs of
dissatisfaction manifest themselves publicly, and the election of a new government is not the
end of the transition period. Emphasis on the date of the first democratic election after a
period of authoritarian rule oversimplifies the transformation of political systems and
reduces it to the act of voting and to the transfer of power at the central level. Regime
change, however, involves changes at many other levels of the political system-for
example, at regional and local levels-and in decision-making procedures.'4
Of course, the demarcation of stages within the transition process is not new, but
operationalization of the different categories is difficult. Rustow, for example, distinguished
three phases in the transition process. His preparatory phase features the polarization of the
main political actors, followed by a decision phase in which some crucial elements of
democratic procedure are institutionalized. The final phase of a transition is the period
during which politicians and the electorate are "habituated" to the new political rules.'5
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Helga A. Welsh
The most common distinction is made between liberalization and democratization.
Whereas liberalization is a controlled opening of the political space, democratizationis,
extrication from the authoritarian regime and constitution of a democratic oneprocess
that subjects different interests to competition, that institutionalizes uncertainty
Just as it is difficult to outline the exact time frame for periods of transition, it is diffic
to describe different modes of transition. Indeed, the confusion about how one should lab
the different transition modes in eastern Europe is great and contributes significantly t
general problem of concept misformation in political science. The confusion relat
particular to the use of the term revolution in describing the developments in centra
eastern Europe. The goal of transforming the political order is central to most definition
revolutions; however, there might be considerable discrepancies between the original int
and the final political outcome of mass action.
Characteristics of the Transition While there are individual, national variations with
regard to the speed, methods, and players involved in transitions, they have a number of
features in common.
First, transition periods are characterized by the need to address certain crucial issues
under rather urgent time constraints. For example, institutional arrangements regarding the
future distribution of power and the requirements for "founding elections" command
immediate action."7 Thus, transition periods are times of accelerated change. After long
periods during which major political, social, and economic changes have been postponed or
blocked, a growing impatience of the population arises which intensifies the apparent need
for change.'8 In central and eastern Europe, this impatience became evident in the pressure
to schedule "founding" elections at times when most opposition forces hardly had time to
organize and overcome the Communist Party's monopoly of access to and distribution of
information. From the very beginning it is imperative to institutionalize change since
dissatisfaction and nostalgia for certain aspects of the old regime may slow down the process
of reform and enhance political polarization. Some of the major issues in the process of
transition are addressed in Table 1.
Second, transition periods are characterized by great uncertainty with regard to both the
process and the results. During a transition no one knows who will win or lose in both the
distribution of political and economic power and personal well-being. In addition, even if
there are agreements on the goals of economic and political transformation, the processes
leading to the achievement of these goals vary considerably. Once initial euphoria has
subsided, it becomes clear that the prospects for achieving and sustaining polyarchy are
different among countries in the region. Disturbing signs of governmental instability,
stalemates in decision making, the emergence of violent protests, and war involving
different ethnic groups, as in the former Yugoslavia, reinforce the notion that the process
and the outcome of transitions from different forms of authoritarianism are not linear and are
often marred by insecurity and uncertainty. In other words, the collapse of authoritarian rule
may result in a variety of outcomes.19
Third, previous authoritarian structures are altered during a transition period by the
rapidly expanding range of political actors and the need for political communication among
them. Typically, there is consensus on some goals but discord on methods and procedures.
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Comparative Politics July 1994
Table 1 Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe: Main Issues of Conflict Resolution
Political:
* reform of electoral system
* reform of structure of government (including issues of
decentralization)
* selection of new political elite
* development of institutions of interest articulation and interest
aggregation (e.g., political parties, interest groups)
* constitution writing
* prosecution and purge of communist party officials and members
of security apparatus
* restitution of past injustices
* reform of media sector
Economic:
* macroeconomic stabilization (e.g., reform of monetary and fiscal
policies)
* price reform (e.g., price liberalization, currency convertibility)
* structural reform (e.g., privatization, trade liberalization)
* institutional reform (e.g., reform of legal and banking systems)
* educational reform (e.g., management training)
In 1989, restrictions on political activities for nonsanctioned political groups a
organizations ceased to exist and resulted in the resurrection of civil society. T
institutionalization of political parties and movements was a dialectical process: on the
hand, a highly diversified political landscape emerged; on the other hand, broa
anticommunist sentiment united the opposition.20
Fourth, transitions are elite-centered. Independent of whether regime change has b
initiated from above by political elites or from below by the masses, the terms of transit
are settled by emerging elites, not by the public.2' Mass mobilization is short-liv
demobilization and retreat to the private sphere follow.22 In central and eastern Europe, w
its long history of intellectual dissidents and politicians, the gap between the political eli
and the masses reinforced disillusionment and distance between the rulers and the ruled. In
addition, as Burton, Gunther, and Higley have pointed out, the extent of structural
integration at the level of communication and influence and value consensus regarding the
mode of political conduct are crucially important once the transition has ended and the
process of consolidation begins.23
Last but not least, transitions involve bargaining. Whereas popular mobilization often
creates the conditions for the extrication from authoritarian regimes, in "the second phase of
the redemocratization process elite bargaining and accords become the key."24 This
sequence seems to hold true even in cases where negotiation has been previously neglected.
For example, it is often assumed that revolutionary transitions lack the element of
negotiation; one could argue the same for externally imposed transitions. These assumptions
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Helga A. Welsh
apply only if one limits the concept of negotiation to "old" versus "new" political forces.
However, negotiations may take a variety of forms depending on the political environment.
In summary, periods of transition are characterized by a number of specific features which
aim at both change and consolidation. These features help us understand the complexities
and challenges of transition but are also instructive in understanding the character of the
process. This article addresses one particular issue of transition, conflict resolution.
Transitions and Conflict Resolution
Generally, we distinguish among three major means of conflict resolution: command an
imposition, bargaining and compromise, and competition and cooperation. Although the
modes are clearly present in all political systems, their relative significance varie
considerably. In authoritarian political systems conflict resolution is based largely upo
methods of command and imposition that take the form of rule by decree, force,
exclusion and the mutual denial of legitimacy. Alternately, competition, accompanied b
cooperation, lies at the heart of pluralist politics.25
Recent transition periods suggest that the end of extrication and the institutionalization
polyarchy are delimited by the dramatic decline of command and imposition and the increa
in bargaining and compromise; the introduction of democracy is as much a matter
procedure as it is a matter of substance. Bargaining and compromise are not entirely absen
in authoritarian regimes; even in the past they have been recognized as increasing
important features in authoritarian political systems. For example, corporatist strategi
involving coalitions of special interest groups within the state where access to participatio
is state-controlled are a common feature of left- and right-wing authoritarian regimes.
Similarly, in pluralist political systems competition is moderated by cooperation whic
promotes persistent bargaining and compromise. While bargaining in authoritarian regime
is state-initiated and state-controlled and aims at the protection and consolidation of powe
bargaining in pluralist political systems is competitive, diverse, but grounded in a politi
climate that nurtures mutual trust and cooperation, which are seen as important
preconditions of the voluntary distribution and regularized transfer of power. In contrast
bargaining in times of transition is aimed at the peaceful passage of power; it is born out
necessity, and the number of actors as well as the issues under discussion is limited.
Bargaining in Central and Eastern Europe Bargaining, negotiations aimed at reachin
compromises at the greatest advantage to each participating party, can take a variety
forms (including ad hoc meetings) but more often takes place in an institutionalized settin
In central and eastern Europe, the stage of "bargaining and compromise" was characteriz
by three particular features: the so-called round table, broad-based (maximum-winnin
coalition governments, and "conglomerate" parties.
One specific feature of the transitions in central and eastern Europe was the emergence o
round tables in which representatives of the old Communist political system discussed t
terms of transition with representatives of the opposition. In some countries, members of
political and social organizations who were closely aligned with the ruling Communist Part
participated in the negotiations. In East Germany and Poland the mediating role of th
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Comparative Politics July 1994
churches was evident in their continuous role in the round table negotiations; in Hungary a
number of independent observers, including church personalities, also attended some of the
round table negotiations.
The main goal of the round tables was similar in all countries: to set the terms for the
creation of a reformed or new political system. Decisions regarding dates and terms of
democratic elections, changes in the constitution (for example, deletion of the provisions
that guaranteed the leading role of the Communist Party),27 and the dismantling of the forces
of domestic suppression (state security, workers' militia) had to be made. Finally, round
tables led to or were responsible for the choice of transitional governments. Because it was
commonly understood that central and eastern Europe had to undergo dual transitions that
encompassed political and economic institutions, both items were discussed. However, in
the end the results of the round table discussions were confined largely to the political
realm.28 In the context of the literature on negotiation, this type of bargaining is generally
described as integrative: there are two major parties and several issues to be negotiated, the
negotiation process runs through stages, the parties' interests are not clearly defined at the
beginning of the negotiations, and conflict is never absent.29
Round table negotiations combined public with secret negotiations, and one of their
trademarks was the exclusion of public discourse. In all cases, there was a high level of
mutual dependence on the bargaining relationship; round table negotiations were entered
into out of political and economic necessity. In Poland, urgent and drastic economic reforms
could no longer be postponed; in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria large
segments of the public had become highly politicized and demanded major political and
economic reforms. The opposition saw the round table arrangements as a way to control the
incumbent government, to raise the visibility of opposition forces since, with the exception
of Solidarity in Poland, the opposition had always been fragmented, rather elitist, and thus
isolated from the public at large, and to initiate the process of democratization. The mandate
of the round table representatives was self-imposed and exclusive, and its legitimacy was
indeterminate since it was not based on elections.
With the exception of Hungary and Bulgaria, one overriding feature of round table
negotiations involved power-sharing, attempts to reconcile the past division between "us"
and "them," and their aim was to make compromises acceptable to both sides. These
negotiations opened up channels of political participation for the hitherto excluded
opposition groups and allowed outgoing administrations to "save face." Power-sharing
emerged because the Communists were no longer able to govern without the active
participation and support of oppositional forces. For a variety of reasons, the opposition in
Hungary and in Bulgaria (until December 1990) rejected formal power-sharing
arrangements: the sense of defeat of the Communists was less acute in these two countries,
and the inability of the Communists to continue their rule independent of other political
forces had to be further exposed.
Although the methods and goals of power-sharing were similar across national settings,
the time frames during which round tables were active, the particular political environments,
and the resulting bargaining strengths of the parties varied to a fair degree. Bargaining
schemes differed with regard to tactics and the perceived power of the negotiating partner.
Generally, loss of authority by the incumbent political parties continued during the
negotiations, and the perception of bargaining power shifted from the incumbents to the
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Helga A. Welsh
opposition forces. The ongoing reassessment of bargaining strength had important
implications for the roles of opposition groups which evolved throughout the period of
negotiations.30
During this time, substantial differences in institutional settings-the length of
negotiations, the range of participants, and the number of meetings--were also evident. In
Hungary, fifty main delegates and more than 500 experts came together in two main
committees, twelve subcommittees, and two supplementary committees and negotiated in
roughly 1,000 documented meetings or talks over a period of three months.31 In East
Germany, the "Central Round Table" met sixteen times from the beginning of December
1989 to the middle of March 1990. In addition, there were sixteen working committees, as
well as a steering committee and numerous smaller ad hoc committees; altogether 276
members and advisers took part in the activities of the "Central Round Table."32 In
Romania, however, the so-called round table negotiations encompassed only two sessions
(see Table 2).
In central and eastern Europe, roughly four forms of negotiation emerged. They
emphasize different aspects of the process but are not mutually exclusive. Negotiations
started because of the shared perception between regime and opposition that the severity of
the political and economic crises demanded joint approaches to problem solving. While the
political forces in Poland agreed to a gradual opening based on power-sharing, the
Hungarian opposition opted instead for an immediate transition to democracy without formal
power-sharing arrangements. In this form of transition, competitive strategies almost
immediately followed the opening of the political space.
The most common form of negotiation evolved from the concept of control and resulted in
power-sharing. In this arrangement, which was adopted in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and
East Germany, negotiations started with the initial intent of controlling the Communist
Party, evolved into power-sharing, and resulted in a substantial decline, if not defeat, of the
power of the Communist Party. In contrast to the first setting, mass mobilization played a
crucial role in the willingness of the ruling elites to enter negotiations with opposition forces.
Finally, negotiations took place in Romania with the intent of replacing the old system but
without substantial power-sharing among the new political elite. The limited role of
bargaining and compromise is yet another indicator that tAe transition to polyarchy was
severely hampered in the Romanian case.
Table 2 Central Round Table Negotiations and National Elections in Central and Eastern Europe
Duration of Date of
Country Round-Table Negotiations National Elections
Poland 6 Feb. 1989-5 Apr. 1989 4/8 June 1989
Hungary 13 June 1989-18 Sept. 1989 25 Mar./8 Apr. 1990
CSSR 26 Nov. 1989-31 Jan. 1990 8/9 June 1990
GDR 7 Dec. 1989-12 Mar. 1990 18 Mar. 1990
Bulgaria 22 Jan. 1990-14 May 1990 10/17 June 1990
Romania 27 Jan. 1990-1 Feb. 1990 20 May 1990
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Comparative Politics July 1994
Negotiation as Reform In many ways Poland set the stage since it was the first country in
central and eastern Europe that engaged in round table negotiations. In addition, the
experience of negotiation was not new to the political actors in Poland. Members of the
Polish United Workers' Party as well as of Solidarity had the experiences of 1981 to draw
from. The fact that the negotiations in 1980-81 failed and led to the introduction of martial
law weighed heavily on the negotiating partners; the experience of 1981 was not to be
repeated in 1989.
The resulting compromise initially clearly favored the Communist party and its coalition
partners: they were guaranteed a majority in the Sejm, the lower house of the parliament. In
addition, it was understood that the opposition would not impede the election of General
Jaruzelski as president and that matters of defense and internal order would remain in the
hands of the Communists.33
However, the demoralizing blow to the Communists in the June and July 1989 elections
to the upper house of parliament seriously undermined the results of the round table
negotiations. Solidarity was forced to take over governmental responsibility, a contingency
for which it was unprepared. At one point Lech Walqsa confirmed that his intentions had
been quite different: "I wanted to stop at the conquests of the round table, make a pause and
occupy ourselves with the economy and the society. But, by a stroke of bad luck, we won
the elections."34
After the electoral defeat of the Polish United Workers' Party, people questioned the need
to adhere to an arrangement that was made under different domestic and international
circumstances. The round table agreement preserved important elements of political power
for former Communists and, in the eyes of many, ultimately became an obstacle toward
faster consolidation of democratic rule.35 The power-sharing arrangement did advance and
facilitate the introduction of one of the more progressive "shock therapies" in the transition
from a centralized to a market-oriented economy. However, even this aspect of
policymaking has been drawn into question not only by subsequent governments but also by
scholars.36 Nevertheless, the round table agreement made possible the peaceful transition to
a pluralist political system at a time when power-sharing in Communist political systems
was a novelty. In addition, the diffusion effects of these developments on other countries in
the region can hardly be overstated.
Negotiation and Competition In Hungary, the major opposition forces advocated the
concept of "one-step transition to democracy," that is, they rejected the power-sharing
formula employed in Poland.37 Although the opposition forces were fragmented, they were
able to agree on a common strategy and were helped by a faltering Communist party that had
split into two rival wings. In March 1989, nine major opposition groups formed the so-called
Opposition Round Table, convincing at least the more reform-minded members of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) that the strategy of "divide and conquer"
toward the opposition had failed. The goal of the Opposition Round Table was to create the
conditions for a peaceful transition to democracy, but the Communist party leadership
insisted on giving economic issues equal standing in the negotiations. "Their original idea
was to make economic discussion a condition for political concessions. . . . By late July,
following a by-election which returned the first opposition MP to Parliament, it also became
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Helga A. Welsh
clear that both the policy of concessions and the plan of making democracy a gift from above
were of limited potential."38 In contrast to Poland, Czechoslovakia. and East Germany. the
opposition forces refused to enter any transitory governmental power arrangements.39
Although bargaining and compromise did not extend to institutionalized power-sharing
arrangements, they were the prevailing decision-making mode for the duration of the
National Round Table. The National Round Table set the terms of the transition (which
included the specifics of the upcoming elections and consensus regarding major legislative
proposals)40 and united the opposition. even if only for a few months. during which
settlements of far-reaching political significance were achieved.
Negotiation: From Control to Power-Sharing In Bulgaria. the German Democratic
Republic, and Czechoslovakia, the Communist political leadership started the process of
liberalization only after the pressure of popular mobilization left no alternative. The
Communists reacted, rather than acted, in response to the turmoil in their countries. and the
initiative for the institutionalization of round tables came from the political opposition.
Although to differing degrees. opposition forces in all three countries were still in their
infancy and needed the support of round table negotiations to gain status and public
visibility. Opposition groups saw their roles initially in terms of vetoing Communist policy
initiatives, later expanding into shaping policy decisions. In East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, opposition groups gradually eroded the bases for Communist party
participation and entered coalition governments of "national unity" and "national
responsibility" in which Communists and noncommunists shared power until elections in
spring 1990. The political initiative moved from the old to the new political forces: indeed.
in the case of Czechoslovakia a reversal in power positions occurred even before the
scheduling of democratic elections.
Bulgaria's Communist Party met emerging opposition from a united front. but the
independent opposition was relatively weak. lacked organization, and needed to gain
independence and visibility. As in Hungary. the inequality between the two negotiating
partners led to an arrangement based on necessity which precluded genuine power-sharing.
More than in other countries, the threat or use of strikes and walk-outs and the refusal to
enter into a new round of talks unless certain issues were resolved became standard
negotiation tactics and continued to undermine the strength of the Bulgarian Comm
Party from the initial phase of transition until the June 1990 elections. For example. onl
threat of a general strike at the national level led to the inauguration of round table ta
January 1990, and only on March 12. 1990 was a formal agreement regarding the role o
round table concluded.
The resulting transitional government in Bulgaria was exclusively a caretaker governmen
without the participation of the opposition forces.4' Even after the June 1990 election
which resulted in a small margin of victory for the Communists. there were many fut
efforts to form a coalition between the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Union
Democratic Forces. Finally the stalemate was broken when the opposition forces within the
Union of Democratic Forces agreed to enter into a power-sharing government. On Decembe
29, 1990, a government was created in which the then-renamed Bulgarian Socialist Part
held eight positions, the Union of Democratic Forces three. and the Bulgarian Agrarian
National Union two, while four went to unaffiliated experts.
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Comparative Politics July 1994
Negotiation by Dictate Negotiation in Romania did not follow any of these patterns, and
the dialogue between newly emerging political forces was never officially termed a round
table (although the term was widely used in the media). There were no negotiations between
old and new political forces, at least not in the usual juxtaposition of Communist Party
versus opposition. The old Romanian Communist Party died with Ceausescu, and although
members of the opposition were included in the Council of the National Salvation Front
(NSF) and later in the Provisional Council of National Unity, the clear majority of NSF
members precluded any meaningful bargaining. As Weiss and Heinrich point out, the
leaders of the National Salvation Front saw themselves as executive organs of the revolution
who enjoyed considerable political backing. The other newly emerging political forces were
fragmented and were never able to gain an equal footing in the negotiations.42
In the May 1990 elections the National Salvation Front emerged as the clear winner and
was able to form a government without participation of the highly diverse opposition forces.
A first offer to the opposition to participate in the government came in April 1991.
However, the resulting coalition government was aptly termed a pseudo-coalition; the major
opposition forces refused to join the government by Petre Roman because it did not entail
any guarantees of power-sharing.43
The Development of the Political Party System
Another feature in power-sharing arrangements involved creation of so-called umbrella
organizations, conglomerate parties, or movement parties. These terms were used to
describe political organizations which combined a variety of different political groups and
political parties in a loose movement without a structured program or institutionalized
structure. The pent-up desire for political participation resulted in an unprecedented
proliferation of political parties and movements. Mushrooming numbers of political groups
and parties were counterbalanced by the antiideological and anticommunist stance of the
opposition movement. On the one hand, members of the emerging opposition rejected any
kind of overt ideology and often even the very concept of party-building; on the other hand,
they created new organizations which-just as the despised Communist parties-tried to
appeal to all sectors of the population, that is, "all political interests were submerged in the
name of the higher interest" of opposing the Communist party.44
Whether to unite or to run on separate tickets was conditioned, among other things, by the
anticipated strength of the Communist party and the emerging opposition political forces.
Where the Communist party was perceived as united and strong and the opposition as weak,
oppositional unity was essential. Where the Communist party split into two or more rival
political parties, as in Poland and Hungary, the need to ban together diminished.
As a result, a number of powerful political alliances emerged in central and eastern
Europe in 1990. The Union of Democratic Forces combined major but, in terms of political
spectrum and membership strength, rather diverse elements of the opposition in Bulgaria;
the Civic Forum and Public against Violence did the same in Czechoslovakia.45 Although
the origins of Solidarity differ from those of the opposition forces in other central and
eastern European countries, the sense of unity of the oppositional forces initially prevailed in
Poland as well. In East Germany, efforts to unite major opposition groups failed largely
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Helga A. Welsh
because of the early entry of West German parties into the electoral campaign. In particular,
the refusal of the Social Democratic Party to join an opposition alliance forestalled a similar
arrangement in East Germany. Still, a number of electoral alliances, in particular the
victorious Alliance for Germany, aimed at combining different political groups under one
umbrella.
One major exception to this form of power-sharing is Hungary. As early as 1988, the
opposition enjoyed relatively more freedom of organization but was limited to the urban
middle class. As Batt points out, "their creation was largely the product of elite initiatives.
rather than the mass pressure that was so important in the original formation of Solidarity,
the Civic Forum, and the Public against Violence."46 However, the opposition remained
divided and confident of its victory over an increasingly weak Communist party that had
split into two major factions.
Initially, the anticommunist umbrella was enough to continue electoral alliances into
governmental alliances, even after the elections in 1990. Power-sharing governments still
prevailed. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany the broad-based power-sharing governments
of the first transition period led to maximum-winning coalitions. In view of the
enormous tasks ahead, broad consensus was needed, and competition was limited almost
exclusively to former Communists. In Bulgaria, power-sharing arrangements were initially
rejected by the oppositional Union of Democratic Forces, and a coalition government was
not formed until the end of November 1990. In Poland the power-sharing arrangement
between former members of the Polish United Workers' Party and Solidarity gradually
disintegrated up to the elections of October 1991. In the months following the 1991
elections, the government struggled repeatedly to form viable coalition cabinets: a coalition
of seven parties was able to maintain a stable majority in the Sejm, the Polish parliament,
from July 1992 to May 1993. New elections were set for September 1993.
In Hungary, the incumbent caretaker government was replaced by a coalition of three
parties, with the Hungarian Democratic Forum as its core. A coalition between the two
largest parties, the Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats, was declined by
the former. However, the element of compromise came to the fore once more: on April 29,
1990, the two major political parties concluded a pact in which major elements of the
distribution of power were negotiated.47 In particular, this pact involved the choice of a
member of the Alliance of Free Democrats as president, the Free Democrats, in turn, agreed
to a revision of some laws which, according to the round table agreements, had previously
required a two-thirds majority.48
However, problems inherent in the lack of an established party system have subsequently
taken their toll. Lack of party tradition, party identification, party programs, and
institutionalized structure became major obstacles to efficient decision making. These
problems are particularly important since the structures of government in central and eastern
Europe are based on the model of western European parliamentary systems which rely
heavily on party identification and party discipline. Effective policymaking is possible only
with the support of a majority in parliament.
By 1991 transitions entered a new stage in most countries. Political groups and
organizations felt the pressure to develop their own political profiles and their independent
organizational and membership bases. Slogans had to be replaced by substantive political
programs and transformed into policy actions. Conflicting interests started to surface, and
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Comparative Politics July 1994
competition for personal and political power came to the fore. In these circumstances,
parties proliferated, and competition among them increased, contributing to early elections
in most central and eastern European countries. In Poland in the fall of 1991, more than 100
political parties existed, of which twenty-two were able to register national lists; twenty-nine
parties achieved representation in the parliament. The high degree of party fragmentation has
fostered intransigence and delimitation, which in turn has undermined elite consensus, a key
variable in democratic consolidation.49
Only the Hungarian government seems to have been able to finish its original term of four
years, despite the fact that here also the party landscape is far from established.50 Indeed,
lack of cooperation in the coalition government dominated by the Hungarian Democratic
Forum (HDF) has led to the walk-out of ten of the members of the Independent
Smallholders' Party, including its chairman. Competition as the prevailing mode of conflict
resolution already characterized the Hungarian political scene by the time of the 1990
elections and has continued since then.
In Czechoslovakia, the Civic Forum split into two independent parties, and some
members joined other parties and movements. The division of the Public against Violence
into two parties led to the collapse of the republican government in Slovakia. By virtue of
party split-ups, the six political groups originally represented in the Czechoslovakian
parliament grew to fifteen by mid 1991 and almost twenty by the end of the year. The
parliament became fragmented and deeply divided along party lines.
However, the proliferation of parties did not necessarily coincide with party
identification. At the beginning of 1992, only eight of the twenty ministers in the Polish
"government of experts" belonged to the coalition parties. Another indication of the
weakness of party organization-and the perceived need to stay above partisan
politics-was the official nonpartisan character of the presidents of Romania, the former
Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
Although the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria has also suffered a series of
individual and group defections, some of which resulted in the formation of new political
movements and parties, so far the presence of the strong Bulgarian Socialist Party helped
keep their ranks together.5' Although its composition is far from stable, the Union is well on
its way to becoming a permanent feature of the Bulgarian political landscape.
In Romania opposition forces also remained divided, thus contributing to a resounding
victory of the National Salvation Front. In 1990 none of the opposition parties was able to
gather more than 7.2 percent of the national vote. A first effort to unite the opposition forces
resulted in the formation of the National Convention for the Establishment of Democracy
(NCED) on December 15, 1990. In spring 1991 personal ambitions seem to have been the
major motivation in the decision of one of its key players, the National Liberal Party, to
leave it. However, in subsequent elections during 1992 the Convention was able to garner
major parts of the electorate. The opposition was helped by developments within the
National Salvation Front; personal rifts and diverging opinions regarding the speed of the
transition led to its split into two movements by late March 1992. As one observer noted, in
1992 political life in Romania was characterized by "increasing confusion and
fragmentation. Hardly a day passes without a split in, or an expulsion from, one of
Romania's 140-odd registered parties."52
In many cases, disagreements over the methods and process of transformation turned into
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Helga A. Welsh
personal power struggles. Lines of division can be drawn between former dissidents and
emerging career politicians of "old" and "new" origin and according to positions in the
vertical and horizontal distribution of power. For example, the battle over constitutional
rights between the head of government and the head of state has been intensified by
constitutional uncertainties but also by personal animosities and political differences. The
power struggles between Lech Walsa and several prime ministers in Poland, between Ion
Iliescu and Petre Roman in Romania, and between Arpaid Gancz and J6zsef Antall in
Hungary are cases in point. In Czechoslovakia much of the struggle for influence initially
involved former federal president Vaclav Havel (now President of the Czech Republic) and
Vaclav Klaus, first minister of finance and later Czech prime minister.
The emergence of competitive strategies was a logical step from extrication to
consolidation. Further progress toward democratic consolidation may be substantially
influenced by how the skills of bargaining and compromise were employed during the
second phase of the transition, either as singular strategies or as a more deeply ingrained
behavioral pattern in which conflict resolution is the outcome of competition accompanied
by cooperation.53
Conclusion
All modes of transition entailed the element of negotiation. Different negotiating patterns
were a crucial part of the first stage in the transition process; only when the revival of the old
system ceased to be a viable option did negotiation give way to competitive modes. This
change was illustrated in the shift from conglomerate parties to competitive parties and from
overarching (maximum-winning) to minimal-winning coalition governments. Most
important, with the exception of Romania, where the negotiation phase was short-lived and
dominated by one group, negotiation facilitated the peaceful and organized transition from
authoritarian to democratically constituted political systems.
I have suggested that bargaining and compromise lie at the heart of the transition process.
I argued that the transition to democracy is also a transition in the modes of conflict
resolution and that the examples drawn from central and eastern Europe are indicative of
transition processes in other settings as well. The first stage in the transition to democracy is
characterized by the switch from command and imposition to intense bargaining and
compromise. Once the transition enters the stage of consolidation, bargaining and
compromise decline in favor of more competitive modes of conflict resolution. In countries
where elite bargaining and compromise are largely absent or limited in their outreach, the
successful completion of the transition may be slowed down or jeopardized.
While bargaining and compromise contributed to the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power and the institutionalization of pluralist political structures in central and eastern
Europe, further progress toward the consolidation of these emerging democracies has been
hampered by unresolved issues of power distribution and, to some extent, by conflictual
elite attitudes. Many of the current problems in the region--governmental instability, ethnic
conflicts, political apathy--can be traced at least partly to the premature eclipse of
bargaining and compromise in conflict resolution. Further progress toward democratic
consolidation, however, is dependent on both competition and cooperation.
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Comparative Politics July 1994
NOTES
I would like to thank David Gibbs, Michaela W. Richter, John P. Willerton, and three anonymous rev
critical reading and many thoughtful comments, and Jan Thompson for her valuable help in preparing the m
The article was written while I held a visiting appointment at the University of Arizona.
1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:.Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Unive
Oklahoma Press, 1991); Samuel P. Huntington, "Democratization and Security in Eastern Europe," in Pet
ed., Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy (New York: Institute for East-West Securit
Occasional Paper 16, 1990), pp. 35-49.
2. Timur Kuran, "Now Out or Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," in
Bermeo, ed., Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltim
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, 1992), reprinted from World Politics, 44, (October 1991).
3. For the purposes of this article, central and eastern Europe encompasses Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia pr
division into two separate states, the former German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
4. See, for example, Zbigniew Rau, ed., The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Valerie Bunce, "The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europ
Policy Journal, 7 (Summer 1990), 395-430; Jan Zielonka, "East Central Europe: Democracy in Retr
Washington Quarterly, 14 (Summer 1991), 107-120.
5. Liszl6 Bruszt, "Transformative Politics: Social Costs and Social Peace in East Central Europe," East
Politics and Societies, 6 (Winter 1992), 55-72. Much emphasis has been placed on the transformati
centralized planned economies. See, for example, Michael Keren and Gur Ofer, eds., Trials of Transition
Reform in the Former Communist Bloc (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992): Christopher Clague and Gordon C. R
eds., The Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1992)
6. Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," in
ed., pp. 113-138; Barbara A. Misztal, "Must Eastern Europe follow the Latin American Way?," A
Europdennes de Sociologie, 33 (1992), 151-179: Bart van Steenbergen, "Transitions from Authoritarian/T
Systems: Recent Developments in Central and Eastern Europe in a Comparative Perspective," Futures, 2
1992), 158-172; Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Karl, "The Types of Democracy Emerging in Southern a
Europe and South and Central America," in Peter M. E. Volten, ed., Bound to Change: Consolidating Dem
East Central Europe (New York: Institute for East West Studies, 1992), pp. 42-68; Terry Lynn Karl and P
Schmitter, "Modes of Transitions in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Soci
Journal, 128 (May 1991), 269-284; Adam Przeworski, "Spiel mit Einsatz: Demokratisierungsproze
Lateinamerika, Osteuropa und anderswo," Transit: Europdische Revue, 1 (Fall 1990), 190-208.
7. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe a
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 95-99.
8. For a summary of the different terms used in analyzing the nature of regime change, see Huntington, T
Wave, p. 114.
9. Dahl, p. 41.
10. Karl and Schmitter, p. 280.
11. Samuel B. Bachrach and Edward J. Lawler, Bargaining: Power, Tactics, and Outcomes (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1981), pp. IX, 4; H. Peyton Young, "Negotiation Analysis," in H. Peyton Young, ed.,
Negotiation Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
12. Przeworski, Democracy and Market, p. 80.
13. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 6.
14. Mih~ly Bihari, "Change in Regime and Power in Hungary (1989-1990)," in Kurtin S~ndor et al., eds.,
Magyarorszdg Politikai Evkinyve (Budapest: Okon6mia Alapitv~ny-Economix Rt., 1991), p. 33.
15. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative Politics, 2 (April 1970), 337-363.
16. Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds.,
Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 63. See also Tsuyoshi
Hasegawa, "The Connection between Political and Economic Reform in Communist Regimes," in Gilbert Rozman et
al., eds., Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional Variations (Washington, D.C. and Baltimore:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 63-67.
17. "Time as a tactical resource" is discussed by Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on
Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
392
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Helga A. Welsh
18. Nikolai Genov, "The Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe: Trends and Paradoxes of Social
Rationalization," International Social Science Journal, 128 (May 1991), 336.
19. Emanuel Richter asserts, for example, that in former Communist-governed societies the term democracy will be
used less as a standard of participation but "will become more and more formalized and will provide the institutional
framework for a political system that serves the demands of economic progress, of the welfare potential of the state,
and of international stability and peaceful change." Emanuel Richter, "Upheavals in the East and Turmoil in Political
Theory: Comments on Offe's 'Capitalism by Democratic Design?'," Social Research, 58 (Winter 1991), 898. See
also John Gray, "From Post-Communism to Civil Society: The Reemergence of History and the Decline of the
Western Model," Social Philosophy and Policy, 10 (Summer 1993), 26-50.
20. Cf. Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics and Society, 20
(March 1992), 7-50.
21. See Michael G. Burton and John Higley. "'Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review, 52 (June 1987),
295-307.
22. Cf. Piotr Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," Studies
Comparative Communism, 24 (September 1991), 306-307.
23. Michael Burton et al., "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in John Higley an
Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridg
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 10.
24. Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," Comparative Politics, 24 (April 1992), 276. T
notion of negotiation is emphasized in a number of recent articles on regime transitions in regions other than cen
and eastern Europe. Cf. Joseph M. Colomer, "Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way?," Americ
Political Science Review, 85 (December 1991), 1283-1302; Terry Lynn Karl, "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution
Foreign Affairs, 71 (Spring 1992), 147-164. In Africa, the emergence of national conventions has become a trademar
of recent transition processes. See Richard Joseph, "Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom," in Larry Diamond an
Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993),
pp. 314-16.
25. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not," in Diamond and Plattner,
eds., pp. 41-43.
26. The role of corporatism in East European politics is stressed by David Ost, "Towards a Corporatist Solution in
Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," East European Politics and Societies, 3 (Winter 1989), 152-174, and Grzegorz
Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," British Journal of
Political Science, 21 (July 1991), 293-298. Andrds Nagy, " 'Social Choice' in Eastern Europe," Journal of
Comparative Economics, 15 (1991), 266-283, emphasizes the elimination of competition and the role of bargaining
and compromise in the economic planning process in Communist political systems.
27. For an important discussion of the role of round tables in constitution making, see Jon Elster,
"Cons.titution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea," Public Administration, 71
(Spring-Summer 1993), 169-217.
28. Robert Weiss and Manfred Heinrich, "Der Runde Tisch: Konkursverwalter des 'realen' Sozialismus: Analyse
and Vergleich des Wirkens Runder Tische in Europa," Berichte des Bundesinstituts fiir ostwissenschaftliche and
internationale Studien. 4 (1991), 10.
29. This definition of integrative bargaining is derived from I. William Zartman, "Common Elements in the Analysis
of the Negotiation Process," Negotiation Journal, 4 (1988), 37-38; and Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of
Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 131.
30. A particularly good example of the changing role of the round table is provided by Uwe Thaysen, Der Runde
Tisch, oder: Wo blieb das Volk? Der Weg der DDR in die Demokratie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990).
31. Liszl6 Bruszt, "1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary," Social Research, 57 (Summer 1990), 365-387.
32. Thaysen, pp. 99-103.
33. For a detailed account of the agreement, see Radio Free Europe (Polish Situation Reportl6), 7 April 1989, and
RAD Background Reportl67 (Poland), 26 April 1989.
34. Cited in Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 79.
35. The negative consequences of the round table agreements are emphasized by Wojtek Lamentowicz, "Dilemmas
of the Transition Period," Uncaptive Minds. 2 (November-December 1989), 19-21. See also Bartlomiej Kaminski,
"Systemic Unterpinnings of the Transition in Poland: The Shadow of the Round-table Agreement," Studies in
Comparative Communism, 24 (June 1991). 173-190; Jan T. Gross, "Polen nach der Revolution: Die Marginalisierung
393
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Comparative Politics July 1994
des Politischen," Transit: Europaische Revue, (Winter 1991-92), 69-78. For a different point of view, see Irena
Grudzifiska, "Post-Communist Resentment, or the Rewriting of Polish History." East European Politics and Societies,
6 (Spring 1992), 146.
36. See, in particular, Adam Przeworski, "Economic Reforms, Public Opinion, and Political Institutions: Poland in
the Eastern European Perspective," in Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira et al.. Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A
Social-Democratic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). pp. 132-198.
37. Bruszt, "1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary," p. 371.
38. Andris Boz6ki, "Democracy across the Negotiating Table," The New Hungarian Quarterly, 33 (Spring 1992),
65. See also AndrBs Boz6ki,. "Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable," East European
Politics and Societies, 7 (Spring 1993), 276-308.
39. Ldiszl6 Bruszt and David Stark, "Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to
the Politics of Competition," in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1992), pp. 13-71.
40. See Peter Hardi,. Constitutionalism and Political Change in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Institute of
International Affairs Policy Paper Series No. 1, January 1990).
41. For a classification of transitional governments, see Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz, "The Role of Interim
Government," Journal of Democracy, 3 (January 1992), 73-89.
42. Weiss and Heinrich, pp. 29-30.
43. Michael Shafir, "Romania's Tortuous Road to Reform," RFE/RL Research Report, 3 January 1992, pp. 97-98.
44. Stephen White, Communist and Postcommunist Political Systems: An Introduction (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1990), p. 155.
45. For example, at the time of the June 1990 elections the membership of the Union of Democratic Forces totaled
sixteen political parties and groups. See Kjell Engelbrekt, "Cracks in the Union of Democratic Forces," Report on
Eastern Europe, May 17, 1991, pp. 1-5, and Rada Nikolaev, "The UDF's Members and Groups with Observer
Status, Spring 1991," Report on Eastern Europe, May 17, 1991, pp. 5-8.
46. Judy Batt, East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,
1991), p. 55.
47. Peter Gowan asserts that this pact was the indirect outcome of western reactions to the victory of the Democratic
Forum. According to him, the relatively poor election results of the Free Democrats-the party that advocated a swift
change to western-style market economics-resulted in the immediate withdrawal of financial backing for Hungary. In
turn, this withdrawal was said to have led to offers by the winning Democratic Forum to negotiate. Cf. Peter Gowan,
"Western Economic Diplomacy and the New Eastern Europe," New Left Review, 182 (July-August 1990), 77.
48. Attila Agh, "The Year of Incomplete Changes," in SAndor et al., eds., pp. 19-20; see also Mihaly Simai,
"Hungarian Problems," Government and Opposition, 27 (Winter 1992), 56.
49. See Higley and Gunther, eds.
50. Kathrin Sitzler, "Parteiensystem und Gesellschaft in Ungarn: Stabiles Parteiensystem oder Krisensituation?,"
Siidosteuropa, 41 (1992), 171-187.
51. Avram Agov, "The Blues, The Reds, and the Greens," Uncaptive Minds, 4 (Winter 1991-92), 105-114.
52. Dan Ionescu, "Another Front for Romania's Salvation," RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 33, 21 August 1992,
17-23.
53. Thomas A. Baylis emphasizes this point when he concludes that the new elites in eastern Europe "have not
learned to employ the subtle mix of confrontational rhetoric and accommodative practice that typifies democratic
politics in the West." Thomas A. Baylis, "Plus I(a Change? Transformation and Continuity among East European
Elites," Revised paper at the Twenty-fourth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of
Slavic Studies, Phoenix, November 19-22, 1992, p. 20.
394
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