The framing of unconventional natural gas resources in the foreign
energy policy discourse of the Russian Federation
Petr Ocelík a,b,n
, Jan Osička a,b
a
Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University, Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic
b
International Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University, Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic
H I G H L I G H T S
 We examine the image of “unconventional gas” in Russian foreign energy policy discourse.
 Two main frames (reliable supplier and triumphant natural gas) were identified.
 Two main argumentation schemes (economic and environmental) were identified.
 The “unconventional gas” is defined as a mistaken and inferior source of energy.
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 25 November 2013
Received in revised form
15 February 2014
Accepted 4 April 2014
Available online 30 April 2014
Keywords:
Unconventional natural gas resources
Russian Federation
Foreign energy policy
a b s t r a c t
The advent of unconventional resources of natural gas has altered the order on global as well as
continental gas markets. With rising liquidity, the position of established dominant suppliers is eroding.
We focus on the initial response of Russia, the leading supplier of natural gas to Europe, to the new
situation, building the research on unit-level constructivism and discourse analysis. We use frame
analysis to reveal what image of unconventional resources was constructed in Russian foreign energy
policy discourse (FEPD) in the period between 2009 and 2011, when the “unconventional revolution” did
not yet have any sharp contours. We conclude that in Russian FEPD the unconventionals are considered
as a distinctive and inferior source of energy compared to conventional natural gas. Emphasis is put on
their economic irrationality and environmental hazards. The bottom line of the discourse is the idea that
there is a choice between conventional and unconventional sources, with this choice being framed as
one between good and bad, or right and wrong.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The recent disappearance of the U.S. market from the global
LNG trade has re-routed LNG flows towards Europe and Asia.
Hence, the conventional gas suppliers who had dominated the
three continental markets until 2005 are now under significant
pressure from both commodity-to-commodity and gas-to-gas
competitors. Their initial reactions varied—on the North American
market, many majors and independents have acquired small
companies pioneering the extraction techniques or have pursued
their own projects in order to cut out as large a chunk of the
unconventional production as possible. Acquisitions made by
Chesapeake in the last five years may serve as a good example.
Meanwhile, Qatar has kept confident about the firmness of the
Sales and Purchase Agreements it signed mostly with its Asian
buyers (Kanady, 2012), and on the European front, Moscow long
hesitated before it publicly admitted the very existence of this
challenge (Khvostunova, 2013).
This article aims to evaluate the initial stages of formation of
the Russian position towards the new sources. The following text
examines the framing of the unconventional gas resources (UNG)
in the foreign energy policy discourse of the Russian Federation.
The article deals with the following central research question:
How are the UNG framed in the foreign energy policy discourse
of the Russian Federation in years 2009–2011?
Utilizing the concept of foreign energy policy, we build on the
work of Balmaceda (2013, pp. 61–93), Liuhto (2010), or Shadrina
(2010). We define foreign energy policy (FEP) in accordance with
Shadrina (2010): p. 14 as “a system of views on the content,
principles and main areas for energy cooperation with other
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Energy Policy
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.006
0301-4215/& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
n
Corresponding author at: Masaryk University, Department of International
Relations and European Studies, Faculty of Social Studies, Joštova 218/10, 602 00
Brno, Brno, Czech Republic. Tel.: þ42 0606717711.
E-mail addresses: petr.ocelik@gmail.com (P. Ocelík),
osicka@mail.muni.cz (J. Osička).
Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109
countries.” The foreign energy policy discourse (FEPD) is then
understood as a particular social representation of FEP that is
shaped by texts and talks (see Fairclough, 2000). The research is
exploratory oriented, since we do not account for framing effects,
i.e. the consequences that specific frames have for actors’ identities
and actions, nor for frame-building processes, i.e. the interplays of
actors and actor-structure interactions which give rise to specific
frames (see Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011). The analytical
focus is thus not on “why a particular outcome was obtained,” but
rather how these discursive structures are socially constructed
(see Doty, 1993). The objective of the article is to show how the
“UNG issue” is framed in a given discourse.
2. Literature review
Current literature dealing with Russian energy policy is divided
into two branches according to different ontological assumptions.
It can be argued that the vast majority of existing research is
theoretically embedded in ontologically materialistic geopolitical
(For example: Ebel, 2009; Petersen and Barysch, 2011; Zhiznin,
2010) or market approaches (For example: Binhack and Tichý,
2012; Černoch et al., 2011; Finon and Locatelli, 2008; Noël, 2008).
Literature grounded in ideational ontology is traditionally
concerned with concepts such as “identity” (Brooks and
Wohlforth, 2006; Williams and Neumann, 2000), the “search for
international recognition” (Tsygankov, 2006; Neumann, 1996)
mediated by domestic perceptions and debates (Tsygankov and
Tarver-Wahlquist, 2009), the Russian “place in the World” (Light,
2003), or the nature of “relations with the West” (Tsygankov,
2006) and how they are perceived by the Russian citizens
(O’Loughlin, 2000). Energy analyses building on ideational ontology
also exist, although they are considerably less common.
Shadrina (2010), for instance, demonstrates how the Russian
behavioral pattern towards different regional partners shifted in
order to be perceived as a more “reliable, mature, or businesslike
partner.” Kortunov (1998) analyzes mutual perceptions of Russia
and Central Asian states in order to map Russian endeavors to
“unlock Central Asian and Caucasian energy assets.” Monaghan
(2007), in turn, focuses on what the “Energy Superpower” status
stems from, and questions the popular notion of Russia holding
such status. Kratochvíl and Tichý (2013) explore the dominant
interpretations of the EU–Russian energy relations by using discourse
analysis.
With regards to shale gas, materialistically grounded texts
dominate the current literature. They mostly deal with issues such
as the impact of shale gas on North American, European, and Asian
gas markets and consequently on Russian market share outlook
(Actagon Research Institute, 2013; Melling, 2010; Medlock et al.,
2011), or they elaborate on the likely development of emerging
global LNG market under the new circumstances (Rogers, 2012;
KPMG, 2011; Jaffe and O’Sullivan, 2012). Some also combine what
are possibly the two biggest threats Gazprom faces now: the
European Commission legal probe and shale gas development, to
see where the company might find itself in the months and years
to come (Sartori, 2013; Riley, 2012; The Economist, 2013).
Ideationally grounded literature on this matter is at the
moment practically non-existent. To a limited extent it is covered
by Aalto (2010) who argues that the change Russian energy sector
is likely going to undergo in the near future is a part of a bigger
(energy) paradigm shift stemming from the clash between material
forces represented by path dependency and inertia in usage of
fossil fuels and ideational forces represented by political and
societal efforts to develop a more harmless energy industry. His
structuralist article nevertheless only scratches the surface of the
phenomenon. The research on Russian perception and/or framing
of shale gas is still out there to be done. Commentary on particular
statements of various actors of Russian energy policy and industry
can be found in both Russian (ITAR-TASS, 2013) and Western
(Kravchenko and Shiryaevskaya, 2013) media, but their overall
image remains scattered and incomplete. The work done by
Khvostunova (2013) is so far closest to what could have been
done on the issue. Unfortunately, the publishers’ format did not
allow her to build a more robust analysis on solid theoretical and
methodological foundations.
3. Theory
In accordance with Wendt's (1999) constructivism, we assume
that social world is chiefly “made of and driven by ideas.” These
ideational structures shape actor's social identities, thus forming
their beliefs and interests and consequently their behavior. The
structures are at the same time reproduced as emergent products
of routinized actors’ interactions (Searle, 1995). Complementary to
Wendt (1999) who is primarily interested in the systemic level of
analysis, we focus on the domestic level drawing on “unit-level”
constructivism1
literature (especially Hopf, 2002; Weldes, 1996).
Katzenstein et al. (1996) made a strong case for inclusion of the
“unit-level” factors when focusing on domestic social and legal
norms enabled the explanation of variation of identity, interest
and action across states (Reus-Smit, 2005: p. 200). Hopf (2002,
p. 22), argues that foreign policy actors’ identities are largely
construed domestically and understanding of other states is consequently
possible only through the actor's self-understanding. Similarly
Weldes (1996, p. 280), maintains that policy makers can
engage in international politics only due to concepts which arise
from the meanings produced in their domestic context. An actor's
ability to imagine certain courses of action is thus possible only
because certain kinds of social actors and relationships, background
meanings, metaphors and analogies, such as the “Russian threat,”
“the bridge between the East and West,” or the “Cold War” are
already present in a given “cultural stock” and carry a specific (and
negotiated) meaning (Doty, 1993: p. 298; Weldes, 1996: p. 284).
Hopf (2002, p. 6), uses the concept of social cognitive structure
which “establishes the boundaries of discourse within a society”
and is created by competing discursive formations. This situatedness
within the interrelated discursive formations then shapes
actors’ understanding of themselves as well as Others.
This line of reasoning is consistent with well-developed constructivist
variants of frame analysis (For example: Entman, 1993,
2003; Goffman, 1974; Johnston, 1995; Steinberg, 1998; for a
conceptual overview, see Scheufele and Iyengar, 2011; Van Gorp,
2007). The process of articulation2
, i.e. the construction of temporarily
fixed meanings by establishing chains of connotations
among different linguistic elements, as described by Weldes (1996,
p. 284), is close to the central idea behind the concept of frame.
Snow and Benford (1992: p. 137) define a frame as “an interpretative
schemata that signifies and condenses the ‘world out
there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations,
events, experiences, and sequences of action in one's present or
past environment.” Entman (2003, p. 417), offers a widely accepted
conceptualization of framing: “Framing entails selecting and highlighting
some facets of events or issues, and making connections
1
Reus-Smit (2005): p. 200 defines the unit-level constructivism as the inverse
of systemic constructivism. Instead of focusing on external, international domain,
unit-level constructivists concentrate on domestic factors, i.e. the very factors
which are bracketed by Wendt.
2
The following part of this process involves the interpellation of the subjects.
Specifically, a particular social identity is taken up from a nexus of social relations.
Different identities then correspond with different representations of the world
and consequently with different interests (Weldes, 1996: pp. 287–289).
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–10998
among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation,
and/or solution [italics in original].” The more culturally resonant
frames are, i.e. the more they are “noticeable, understandable,
memorable, and emotionally charged [italics in original],” the more
formative they are (ibid.: p. 417). The persuasiveness of a frame is
typically fostered by argumentation schemes which connect the
representations provided by frames to agent's action via agent's
practical reasoning (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2013: p. 86). We
understand “argumentation schemes” as “stereotypical patterns of
reasoning” which are a part of the frame (Reed and Walton, 2005,
p. 19). They have more of a “rhetorical or persuasive function than
a logical function” (Walton, 1996: pp. 8–9).
As shown above, a frame analysis is useful mainly as a tool for
uncovering frames that shape and promote specific understandings
of the world. Thus, framing is a policy-making activity itself.
This can be even more important in the case of energy related
issues which are – in contrast to e.g. human rights agenda –
typically seen as exclusively technically and economically defined
and thus reducible to “hard data”. This analytical position helps us
to reveal tacit assumptions, judgments and beliefs upon which any
policy discussion rests. We assume that disagreements about the
nature and future role of the UNG between Russia and countries
like USA or Poland result from different world-views (and consequently
different framings of the issue), not from politicallyneutral
divergences of “hard data” analyses.
4. Methodology
Since we are interested in discursive construction of the UNG
issue, this research is methodologically based on a discourse
analysis (see e.g. Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Wood and Kroger,
2000; Wodak and Meyer, 2001). In general, discourse analysis
rejects the positivist assumption according to which language
mirrors and neutrally describes objects in the world (Fierke,
2004: p. 36). On the contrary, the use of language is always social
and constitutive. As Hansen (2006, p. 16), argues, things – objects,
subjects, states, living beings, and material structures – acquire
meaning and a particular identity only through their construction
in language. In this context, making a discourse analysis essentially
means looking closely at the text and reconstructing how the
language is used to establish and maintain meanings. At the
operational level, we define a discourse as an inter-related body
of texts patterned by certain (primarily semiotic) structural
features. These structural features can be revealed through a frame
analysis (details in Section 4.1). Thus, discourse can be seen as an
ideational space which contains a number of interrelated frames
covering different policy issues.3
As mentioned, we are primarily interested in issue of the UNG
and we do not make any assumptions about the number of
applicable frames. Thus, the goal we pursue is to uncover how
the UNG are framed within the Russian FEDP: specifically, (1) what
characteristics, naming, collocations, tropes etc. are associated
with the UNG; (2) what types of relations exist between these
semantic elements; and (3) what argumentation schemes are
related to the UNG. These three partial objectives correspond with
three stages of a coding process: open, axial, and selective coding
(for more details, see Section 4.1) which are used for frame
(s) identification. The analysis is carried out solely on the textual
level and we do not account for other aspects of the framing
process.4
The unit of analysis is a frame, whereas the units of
observation are selected textual sources (see below). The research
aims to extract, describe, and evaluate frame(s) which define
(s) the UNG issue in Russian FEPD. Analytical focus is on frames
in official sources of discourse (see Hansen, 2006: pp. 66–67),
although we do not limit our search to official state documents
only (see Section 4.2). While the research has not been carried out
with a particular social goal in mind, neither we incline towards
objectivism in a sense that there is reality “out there” waiting to be
discovered by an “aside-standing researcher” (Holden and Patrick,
2004: p. 5; Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: p. 22). We gather and
interpret data in accordance with the assumptions and procedures
outlined in Sections 3 and 4.
4.1. Research method
Frame analysis is used as a discourse analysis method concerned
with dissecting the ways in which an issue is defined,
evaluated and problematized, as well as with the effects this has
on broader discussion of the issue (Hope, 2010). The frames are
reconstructed through the following procedure. First, we “open
up” the text in order to uncover the concepts and meanings it
holds. The open coding decomposes the text to segments (coding
units) which are labeled by codes that interpret them. In this way,
the data are reduced and sorted out into distinctive sets of codes.
These codes are further developed with regard to wider and
deeper context (Given, 2008: p. 581). The coding logic is semantic.
More precisely, we are interested in the ways in which the
meaning of the UNG is being created; that is, what lexemes5
the
UNG is being associated with and in what manner these lexemes
contribute to the meaning in which they are used.6
Second, by
comparing and merging particular codes, summarizing categories
are formed, which concentrate the meaning of the related codes
into a single more general concept. Categories are further developed
through dimensions, i.e. attributes which are characteristic of
them and which can acquire different values. Third, the character
of the relations between codes and categories as well as variation
of categories across dimensions is defined during the axial coding
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998: p. 123–125). Since our research objectives
are different (exploration, not theory generation), we do not
use the standard “coding paradigm” of grounded theory (as
defined in Strauss and Corbin, 1998: chap. 7), but a modified
catalog of relations as defined in the ATLAS/ti. software (2010),
Version 6.2.). Fifth, according to the character of identified relations,
we further develop the meaning of given codes and
categories, and specify their role in the formation of a given frame.
Compared to axial coding, here we look for broader and deeper
patterns, not particular relations. Thus, selective coding allows us
to determine not only how the issue of concern is made “visible”
and what meanings are in this regard important (which corresponds
with functions of problem definition and cause
3
As Van Gorp (2007): p. 70 points out, there is “an explicit distinction between
issues and frames” since one issue can be defined by multiple frames, and the same
frame can cover different issues. The UNG issue thus can be seen a discursive nodal
point whose meaning is re/constructed through interacting frames and, more
generally, discourses. The articulation is thus an attempt to fixate the nodal point
(issue), i.e. to embed it into a specific nexus of meanings (see Diez, 1997).
4
According to Van Gorp (2007): p. 64, framing involves the interplay between
the “textual level (frames applied in the media), the cognitive level (schemata
among the audience and media makers), the extramedial level (the discourse of
frame sponsors; discussed below), and, finally, the stock of frames that is available
in a given culture”.
5
A lexeme is a basic unit of the lexicon (vocabulary) referring to all forms of a
certain word or phrase.
6
Coding reliability was strengthened through repeated close reading of the
texts as well as periodical consultations among the authors and the coder. The
labeling of codes and structuring of their interrelations was during this process
accordingly revised. Coding validity was fostered in the same fashion. Additionally,
conclusions and interpretations given by the authors were supported by
direct quotations from the corpus. Thereby we demonstrate consistency of the
interpretations with available data (see Wood and Kroger, 2000: pp. 163-178).
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109 99
identification), but also the “argumentation schemes” that promote
specific evaluation and solutions, (which correspond with
functions of moral judgment and treatment recommendation)
(Entman, 2003: p. 417). For that purpose, the frames are graphically
represented as semantic networks (see Minsky, 1975: p. 212).
The semantic network consists of nodes (codes and categories)
and relations between selected nodes. The relations in such a
network assert the semiotic character of a given relation or partto-whole
properties (Trehub, 1991: p. 99).7
Finally, the dominant
argumentation schemes are reconstructed from the coded data
and semantic networks. For data processing and visualization, we
used the analytical software ATLAS/ti. software (2010), Version
6.2.).8
The analytic framework is represented by Fig. 1.
4.2. Data
The population under study is defined as the totality of
ideational objects represented by lexemes in issue-specific texts
and talks. The data have been drawn from the following textual
sources: (1) official state documents, (2) official documents, interviews
and announcements of the Gazprom Company, and also
(3) Russian internet and printed media (for details, see References)
between the years 2009 and 2011. By “initial position” we mean
the position developed between the time when U.S. unconventional
production started to affect other markets (2009) and the
renegotiation of long-term contracts between Gazprom and its
European counterparts (2012). We consider this renegotiation as
an adjustment of Gazprom's export strategy and therefore also as
tacit acceptance of the change the North American unconventionals
have brought about. In accordance with Doty (1993,
p. 303), we assume that “the discourse(s) instantiated in these
various documents produce meanings and in doing so actively
construct the ‘reality’ upon which foreign policy is based.” This
discursive space is not limited to the realm of official government
institutions, since the reception and reproduction of the official
foreign energy policy statements is determined by their “fit” into a
broader social–political context (ibid.: p. 303).
For these reasons we include not only the official state documents,
but also textual sources (2) and (3). The influence of
Gazprom on decision-making in external energy relations is
well-documented from various positions (Cornell and Nilsson,
2008; Kazantsev, 2010; Sartori, 2013; Woehrel, 2009)—even the
collocation “Gazprom's foreign energy policy” has occurred
(Russian Analytical Digest, 2008). Gazprom's and the government's
actions have been closely intertwined since 2000, when
the state regained de facto control over the company (Baev, 2008).
The role of other natural gas companies during the period
concerned was very limited. As Balmaceda (2013: p. 72) points
out, Gazprom's monopoly refers not only to its export monopoly
inherited from the Soviet Ministry of Gas Industry, but also to the
company's intentional blocking of new producers from entering
the domestic gas market. These factors translate into Gazprom's
influential position in policy-making. The inclusion of media then
deepens the assessment of official discourse hegemony through
the indication of media responsiveness to critical evaluations, or a
reiteration of the official position. Importantly, policy-making is
dependent not only on the formal or official authority, but also on
knowledge of a particular issue (Hansen, 2006: pp. 7 and 55). The
FEPD is thus partly shaped and reshaped by the media coverage of
the issue. Since we are interested neither in framing effects nor in
frame-building, the other potential sources of data (such as popular
culture sources, memoirs, textbooks, etc.) have not been included.
Consequently, the sample frame has been compiled on the
basis of a search of the selected keywords9
(see Entman, 1993:
p. 52) in the aforementioned publicly available sources.
Since the sample frame is of relatively small size, due to the
recent emergence of the issue as well as by its specificity, all cases
were included in the sample (corpus). For that reason, we have not
been using theoretical saturation as a strategy of data collection.
The data corpus consists of 20 texts in English and Russian
languages (for details, see References). The text dating from the
earliest period is Energy strategy for the period up to 2030 (Russian
Department of Energy, 2009) and the article Российский газ
скоро никто не будет покупать? (Will almost no one be
buying Russian gas?) (Аргументы и факты, 2009), also dating
from October of the same year; the majority of the texts then dates
to 2011. Table 1 indicates that the UNG represent a new issue in
the foreign energy policy discourse of the Russian Federation,
whose relevance has been limited so far. The minimal space, which
the UNG get in the aforementioned strategic document Energy
strategy for the period up to 2030, supports this claim; likewise, the
UNG issue is only marginally mentioned in the remaining conceptual
documents of the Russian Department of Energy.
5. Analysis
In this section, we identify and interpret frames through which
the meaning of the “UNG issue” is established. As noted, a frame
can be viewed as a specific arrangement of categories, codes and
their interrelations that constitute the message conveyed by the
frame. The core of the message is represented by categories whose
meaning emerges from a set of codes and their interrelations. The
frame analysis is divided into three parts according to the main
issue areas: (1) the self-presentation of Russia (Russia as a reliable
supplier), (2) the view on conventional natural gas (Triumphant
Natural Gas), and (3) the view on unconventional natural gas
(Mistaken Unconventional Resources). The section concludes with
an extraction of the main argumentation schemes, i.e. main
patterns of reasoning present in the frames. Whereas the frames
provide a complex depiction of the issue concerned, the argumentation
schemes connect general ideas (such as environmental
responsibility) through conclusion rules (such as pre-cautionary
principle) with the conclusions (such as a rejection of unconventional
resources).
5.1. Russia as a reliable supplier
The first frame is built around two categories: reliable supplier
and The Century of Natural Gas. The first category included (reliable
supplier) sums up the ways in which the position of Russia as a
7
Moreover, quantitative indicators are measured in terms of absolute
frequency and degree centrality (see Appendix A). “Absolute frequency” indicates
the number of occurrences of a given code in the corpus; “degree centrality”
indicates the number of connections that a given code has with other codes.
Whereas absolute frequency tells us about the importance of the code (based on
assumption that prevailing codes contribute to the meaning constitution more
substantially), the degree centrality can be interpreted in terms of influence (based
on assumption that interconnected codes mutually contribute to the meaning
constitution). These quantitative indicators are considered as additional tools of
analysis.
8
Atlas.ti (http://www.atlasti.com) is computer software primarily used for
qualitative data analysis. Atlas.ti enables users to organize their text, graphic, audio,
and visual data files into a project file called a Hermeneutic Unit (HU). An HU can
be used to organize coding, memos, and findings associated with these files. Atlas.ti
provides also search features, query and visualization tools (Creswell, 2007: p. 166;
for more information see Friese, 2011).
9
Shale Gas (Сланцевый газ), Tight Gas (Газ из плотных пород), Sand
Gas (Газ уплотненных песчаников), Coalbed Methane (Метан угольных
пластов), Unconventional Gas (Hетрадиционный газ), Unconventional Gas
Resources (Hетрадиционные источники газа).
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109100
natural gas supplier is presented. As shown in Table 2, the key lies
in the triplet of following codes: Prospective NG, Prospective
Supplier and Stable Russia. The first code asserts physical abundance
of high quality energy resources (Prospective NG), a necessary
condition for strengthening Russian position on the world
energy markets (Prospective Supplier); the third code emphasizes
stability as a defining feature of Russian statehood (Stable Russia).
The remaining codes (Diversification and Foreign Investment) make
the representation of Russia as a reliable supplier more credible.
Mutually supportive relations between the codes then increase the
robustness of the core idea, i.e. Russia as a reliable supplier.
The stability image (Stable Russia) is constructed through the
comparison of the stable political and security situation in Russia
with the instability typical of traditional producers in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region. This construction is evident
in, for example, this segment of Gazprom CEO Alexej Miller’s
(2011a) statement:
Political crises in North Africa and the Middle East, the war in
Libya and suspended oil and gas deliveries from this country
caused changes in the approach to the energy supply risks
assessment.
The question is clear: Does Europe need another Libya to
reduce its dependence on Russia?
In contrast, Russia and Gazprom, respectively, represent a
proven and predictable partner (Gazprom, 2010, 2011d):
I want to say that for more than 40 years of gas supplies to
Europe we have never violated our contractual obligations,
fully and timely supplied the required gas volumes to our
consumers.
The USA has understood that it may get rid of the dependence
on the unfavorable regimes. These are, mainly, the Middle
Eastern regimes that traditionally supplied LNG to the North
American market.
For Europe it is a real blessing that it has such a powerful
neighbor with such conventional gas reserves. Exploration of
non-conventionals may end with no results, as experience of
certain countries shows. So let's live in peace and friendship
and contribute to strengthening Russia’s contacts and ties with
the European Union and Ukraine.
Weaknesses of the Russian energy sector such as low energy
efficiency or infrastructural insufficiencies, as recognized in the
Energy Strategy, are at the international level considered as an
opportunity for export growth. Accordingly, an ambitious goal of
nearly 50% natural gas export increase is set in the document (see
Russian Department of Energy, 2009: Appendix A). Two remaining
codes, Diversification and Foreign Investment, further strengthen
the image of Russia as a reliable supplier (Miller, 2011b). Gazprom
Fig. 1. Analytical framework, Source: The Authors.
Table 1
Number of selected texts sorted by year and sources.
Source: The Authors.
Year Number of selected texts sorted by sources
State institutions Gazprom Media Total
2009 1 0 1 2
2010 1 3 2 6
2011 1 9 2 12
Total 3 13 5 20
Table 2
Reliable supplier category summary.
Source: The Authors.
Category: reliable supplier Characteristics Scalea
Codes Diversification {5b
-3c
} (Political) Stability 3
Foreign investment {2-2} (Resource) 2
Prospective NG {15-3} Potential
Prospective supplier {19-2}
Stable Russia {18-4}
a
The “dimensional extent” is determined by the position on the 7-degree
semi-quantitative scale (À À À, À À, À, 0, þ, þ þ, þ þ þ) recoded as (À3, À2,
À1, 0, 1, 2, 3). For example, value 3 (political) stability means that Russia is being
characterized as a very stable political regime in the Russian foreign policy
discourse. The placement of a given category on the scale is the result of an
analytical decision of the researcher.
b
“Code frequency” indicates the frequency of its appearance in hermeneutic
unit (absolute frequency) (see Friese, 2011: pp. 25–26).
c
“Degree centrality” of the code indicates the number of its associations with
other objects in a hermeneutic unit (in our case, with other codes and categories).
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109 101
is depicted as an expanding company with global reach and
diversified portfolio of activities as well as transition routes.
The foreign investments serve as an evidence of this development
and underline the international recognition and competitiveness
of the company. In this context, Russian supplies represent the
way for overcoming the current state of extreme uncertainty on
the energy markets, but they also offer a long-term solution by
providing sufficient supply of energy resources. Contrary to a
series of skeptical estimations regarding Gazprom’s productive
capabilities (see for example Mäkkinen, 2010), the image of
Prospective Supplier has been set, which has so far not completely
developed its potential; this was clearly indicated by Miller (2011b)
in another statement:
Great efforts have been taken lately on streamlining the
geological exploration system in Gazprom. Structural changes
are underway—the Company is consolidating its onshore
exploration activities performed in Russia and abroad. The cost
management system in exploration has been improved,
exploration efficiency indicators are introduced with due consideration
for the value of growing physical reserves, their
commercial value, role and place in ensuring the mid-term and
long-term gas balance.
At the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that Europe is
losing the privileged position of being the only key consumer
market, as supported by references to the exporting diversification
via LNG terminal and supplies to East Asian markets (Gazprom,
2010; Miller, 2011b; Russian Department of Energy, 2009):
Gazprom has many advantages – long-term rules of play; no
risks, neither technological nor economical [sic – economic].
The question is whether this stability and confidence in future
will be heavier on the scale than the adventurous attempts to
find an alternative to conventional gas.
There is no doubt the beginning of gas deliveries to China along
the “western route” will become a new reference point in the
history of the Russian Unified Gas Supply System development.
At the same time, the proportion of European energy markets
in the total volume of Russian energy export will steadily
decline due to export diversification to Eastern energy markets
(China, Japan, Republic of Korea, other countries of the AsiaPacific
region).
The second category (The Century of Natural Gas) defines the
position of natural gas in the context of the changing structure of
energy markets. As shown in Table 3, the category emerges from
the following codes: Prospective NG (read further for more details),
Dangerous Nuclear Energy, and Uncompetitive Renewable Resources.
The first code, which belongs also to the previous category, asserts
physical abundance of high quality energy resources as a condition
that allows a transition towards “natural gas based” world energy
market. This change is explained through the other two codes as
the only logical outcome, since the competing resources – nuclear
and renewables (RNW) – are described as inherently problematic;
coal, which is not mentioned at all, does not fit into this vision as
well. Thus, The Century of Natural Gas is seen as a product of two
trends: (1) strengthening of Russia as a supplier and strengthening
of natural gas as an energy resource and (2) insufficient competitiveness
of alternative resources (primarily RNW). Analogy is
drawn with the “golden era” of oil in the second half of the
Twentieth Century. The upcoming era of natural gas is then
inevitably associated with the dominant position of Russia. The
categories of reliable supplier and The Century of Natural Gas
therefore reinforce each other (see Fig. 2).
As mentioned above, competing resources, whether nuclear
power or RNW, are then considered as either dangerous (events in
Fukushima) or uncompetitive (RNW as well as UNG); incentives to
their development are therefore political, not economic, in their
nature (Kirilov, 2011; Gazprom, 2011d):
For instance, the March earthquake in Japan and the subsequent
tragedy with Fukushima 1 Nuclear Power Plant strongly
affected the market not only due to the breakdown of some
energy capacities, but rather due to the large-scale environmental
collapse provoked by these events. As a result, many
energy consumers changed their opinion of the nuclear power
industry. And this involves other global systems as well. The
public opinion is nowadays focused on environmental and
energy safety issues that can be met using, first of all, conventional
energy sources with natural gas as the top-priority.
…[I]f some time ago the European Union could afford itself to
provide large subsidies for alternative energy, today we see that
the situation has changed and the amount of subsidies is
reducing rapidly. That’s why power energy prospects didn’t
seem to look good with the existing subsidies, but, anyway, at
present, in the post-crisis period, they seem to be even more
problematic than before. That’s why we consider the 20th
century to be the age of oil and the 21st century—the age of
gas. Gas is surely the key fossil fuel, which will dominate the
European Union energy balance in the medium and long term.
I’m sure about it.
The unfavorable economic situation thus only underscores the
non-viability of the EU’s plans to switch to the decarbonized
energy sector and the inevitable strengthening of the role of
natural gas in the energy mix of the EU at the expense of not
only traditional fossil fuels, but of RNW as well.
5.2. Triumphant natural gas
The Triumphant NG category emerges from a series of codes
that highlight “virtues” of natural gas (such as availability, safety
and competitiveness) and its irreplaceable position within the
energy sector. As shown in Fig. 3, the definition of natural gas is
apodictic, whereas the construction of the category Mistaken UNG
(details in the following subsection) is more complex and combines
the meanings which are produced through opposition to
“traditional” or “conventional” natural gas.
The argumentation that supports greater usage of “conventional”
natural gas is fairly consistent across texts, and while
portraying the natural gas, we usually meet the Prospective NG
code. The following brief segment of the interview with Stanislav
Tsygankov, general director of the Severnefte Gazprom Company,
demonstrates the full span of the meanings usually associated
with natural gas (Kirilov, 2011):
This situation proves our words that we have been proclaiming
for many years now: natural gas remains the most efficient,
environmentally friendly, clear both for producers and for
consumers and, most importantly, the safest energy carrier.
Its safety may be evaluated not only in terms of an individual
Table 3
The Century of Natural Gas category summary.
Source: The Authors.
Category: The Century of Natural Gas Characteristics Scale
Codes Prospective NG {15-3} Availability 3
Dangerous nuclear energy {1-1} Safety 3
Uncompetitive alternative resources {5-1} Competitiveness 3
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109102
business entity or a household, but rather on the global scale –
by counties and state alliances such as the European Union.
In this context, natural gas has been and will in the foreseeable
future remain [the] number one energy resource associated
with stability, demand and development prospects for the
global gas industry as a whole and our company in particular.
Natural gas is associated with attributes such as efficient, ecological,
transparent and safe. Natural gas produced from unconventional
deposits is then considered as distinctive, a different source of
energy in relation to the “conventional” or “traditional” natural gas.
The antagonistic position of both categories is evident, since codes
which determine them are formulated as dichotomies: Clean NG vs.
Environmentally Risky UNG, Established NG vs. Mythical UNG, Prospective
NG vs. Unprospective UNG, and so on. This opposition is
consistent; “conventional” natural gas and UNG do not have a single
code in common (see Fig. 3). Stressing the distinctiveness and
competitiveness of the UNG enables the problematization of its
position within The Century of Natural Gas image, which is inextricably
connected to “traditional” natural gas. While characteristics such
as efficiency, eco-friendliness, availability, and so forth are represented
as simple and evident facts, the code good gas highlights the
segments of the text which carry an explicit normative message
(Miller, 2011a):
Fig. 2. Semantic network: reliable supplier and The Century of Natural Gas, Source: The Authors.
Fig. 3. Semantic network: Triumphant NG vs. Mistaken UNG, Source: The Authors.
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109 103
Shale gas production development in America enthusiastically
regarded by many experts has an adverse effect on Europe so
far. “What brings the competitiveness—a newly discovered
cheap energy resource or still subsidized renewable power
generation?” The answer is evident and it will not cheer
European taxpayers.
Of course, by no means we are calling for a turn back in the
course of history. But we want to highlight that the critical
mass of factors has already been reached allowing to reconsider
the European sense of good and bad, the structure of the
optimal fuel and energy balance and the prioritization of the
energy policy in a changing environment.
A choice between conventional and unconventional natural gas
resources is understood here as a choice between the right and
wrong (good and bad). Consumer countries are faced with a key
(and moreover moral) dilemma, which will decide whether they
will head towards stability and prosperity, or towards uncertainty
and decline.
5.3. Mistaken unconventional resources
As mentioned above, the category Mistaken UNG is constructed
through opposition to the superior natural gas. Thus, it rests on a
number of codes (see Table 4) that attribute inferior qualities to
UNG and seriously problematize its position within the energy
sector. This inferiority results from multiple factors such as
environmental risks, geological uncertainties or economic unviability
which imply that a correction of all the deficiencies is de
facto impossible. The codes Costly UNG and Mythical UNG (see
Table 4) are the most frequent ones; they both have in common
the reference to the irrationality of UNG usage. The development
of UNG is here represented as a purely political decision directed
against common sense stemming from the allocating efficiency of
the market which cannot be outwitted (Kirilov, 2011):
There is common sense as it relies on the economics that are
impossible to outwit. And there is the policy that is often
detached from real market demands, but willing to meet the
interests of this or that country.
The mythical quality is attributed to UNG by, for example,
making the analogy to unsuccessful bio-fuels, or to the metaphor
of the speculative bubble explaining the temporary success of the
UNG. Just as the real estate bubble was enabled by the rise of new
financial instruments which hid the real value of the assets, the
UNG bubble is enabled through provisional (hedging) investments,
which cover the actual (meaning high) costs of extraction. It is,
therefore, only the matter of time when that situation will be
corrected; meaning, waking up to reality (Gazprom, 2011d; Natural
Gas Europe, 2011):
As for shale gas—it is an international PR campaign, well
planned by mass media. There are plenty of those campaigns
—global warming, biofuel, I can give other examples.
It’s very hard for shale gas producers to stop dreaming. We can
say that shale gas production reminds one of riding a bicycle: if
you stop pedaling, you fall. Hedging is the second explanation—
your revenues allow you to meet your costs and you are
allowed to survive for a certain amount of time until your
situation improves.
The momentary success of UNG was explained primarily through
the specific nature of the North American market. Reproduction of the
“quiet revolution” in Europe is considered to be unfeasible. Even here,
UNG will not go beyond the level of a supplementary resource.
Generally, UNG is marked as a prospective resource only in association
with the North American market, Russian UNG supplies, and local
usage of UNG. The usage of UNG is also brought into relation with the
following conditions, defining the codes Geological Uncertainties,
Technological Shortcomings, Environmentally Risky and Insufficient Regulatory
Framework. All these characteristics further strengthen the
element of uncertainty and a lack of potential of the UNG (Gazprom,
2010, 2011c):
It is obvious that serious conclusions on the prospects for shale
gas production development are premature. The phenomenon
is young and has no “deferred result” when you can estimate
long-term consequences. Will this factor become so influential
to make a considerable impact on the global markets and the
global energy policy, or will it remain just a regional phenomenon?
This will be clear at least in five years.
The production of shale gas is associated with significant environmental
risks, in particular, the hazard of land surface and underground
water contamination with chemicals applied in the
production process. This fact already caused the prohibition of
shale gas development and production in France…
Shale gas production projects feature a number of technological
and commercial peculiarities. These are a large scope of production
drilling, a sharp drop in production volumes in the first years, a
constant need to move to new development areas, consume
significant volumes of water, and substantial environmental risks.
There are also several cases in which the development of UNG is
associated with the threat to the Russian position on the market; both
direct and indirect influence is mentioned. A direct threat (first
paragraph) is associated with concerns that the Russian share would
get smaller on the consumer market, while indirect (following two
paragraphs) ones are related to the ongoing pressure of long-term
contracts and their relation to oil and growing competition in general
(Natural Gas Europe, 2011; Gazprom, 2010):
Komlev said he had read in a Polish newspaper that Poland
could become a second Norway. “I started to imagine what
would happen with our long term contract with Poland,
expiring in 2022, which is for delivery of 11 billion cubic meters
per year. I can imagine Poland would break relations with
Russia, and start production of shale gas.”
Shale plays in Europe have not been investigated so far. There
are two most common, though opposite, opinions. According to
Table 4
Triumphant NG and mistaken UNG categories summary.
Source: The Authors.
Category: triumphant NG Characteristic Scale
Codes Clean NG {9-1} Availability 3
Good NG {3-1} Safety 3
Established NG {2-1} Competitiveness 3
Cheap NG {3-1}
Prospective NG {15-3}
Category: mistaken UNGf
Characteristics Scale
Codes Destabilizing UNG {5-2} Availability -1
Costly UNG {32-2} Safety -1
Mythical UNG {27-1) Competitiveness -3
Environmentally risky UNG {20-1}
Uncertain UNG {3-1)
Uncompetitive UNG {9-2}
Unprospective UNG {6-8}
Wrong UNG {2-1}
f
Code prospective UNG (see Appendix A) is almost at all cases brought up into
relation with the specific position of the North American market and with Russian
UNG potential.
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109104
the pessimistic opinion, shale gas reserves account for a half of
the onshore gas reserves being developed in Europe. While the
optimistic opinion states that these reserves are commensurate
with the conventional gas reserves in the operating fields and
reach a half of all the discovered but not developed conventional
gas reserves. The deposits could be large enough for
Europe to repeat the US experience….
In this situation Russia should in any case think of how to
maximize the profit from gas exports to Europe. One of the
options is to change the gas pricing mechanisms by detaching
the formula from oil derivatives. Meanwhile, it is most likely
that the amount of gas supplies to the European market well be
maintained. Another option is to keep the price formula intact
with a high probability of reduction in supply amounts. In
order to select the best option, it is necessary to carry out
serious analysis based on the market development scenarios
and the actions of other market players.
Nevertheless, the likelihood of any threat to Russia is associated
with the list of arguments (mainly economic) that raise doubts
about the UNG potential, and, by the same token, the threat itself.
5.4. Argumentation schemes
In this section, we examine the prevailing schemes of argumentation.
The economic argumentation was identified as the
dominant scheme, while the secondary line of argumentation is
defined environmentally.
5.4.1. The economic irrationality scheme
Syntax of the economic argumentation includes the definitions
of (1) conditions on the energy markets and macroeconomic
conditions in general, (2) characterization of UNG, (3) intervening
conditions of UNG development and (4) outcomes of possible
development of UNG.
Causal conditions (1) are associated with the beginning of The
Century of Natural Gas and with the potential of Russian production,
against which there is the uncertainty associated with
unconventional resources. The development of UNG is associated
with a specific situation on the North American market. The UNG
market is considered to be immature, and the success of UNG in
the USA thus must be perceived with great skepticism (Gazprom,
2010; see also Правосудов, 2010 [Pravosudov]).
It is important to understand that even the USA being a pioneer
in this area, has been dealing with non-conventional gas
production, in general, and shale gas, in particular, for a
number of recent years only. This business is the youngest
one in the world practice, it lacks production experience. In
fact, the talks of the “shale gas revolution” are based on 3 to
4 years of operations in a single field—Barnett Shale, being the
first one to be developed. Operations in other fields were
launched later and still fall behind the leader in terms of
production volumes.
The major characteristic of UNG (2) is its uncompetitiveness,
which is caused by higher costs along the entire logistic chain
(Gazprom, 2011c):
Shale gas production projects feature a number of technological
and commercial peculiarities. These are a large scope of
production drilling, a sharp drop in production volumes in
the first years, a constant need to move to new development
areas, consume significant volumes of water, and substantial
environmental risks. Moreover, the prime cost of shale gas
production in USA is rather high, and it is several times higher
than the prime cost of conventional gas production in other
world regions, including new fields in Russia. These factors
predetermine the role of shale gas as a local resource offsetting
the lack or absence of conventional gas in regional markets.
Within the intervening conditions (3) we find, on the one hand,
political motivation for the development of these resources, and
on the other, circumstances which further decrease UNG usage
potential, such as the absence of a regulatory framework, technological
shortcomings, and so on (Natural Gas Europe, 2011;
Gazprom, 2011c).
…Poland has to think twice before moving into this direction,
especially if the decision is about politics and not the costs of
shale gas production.
It was highlighted that apart from environmental, juridical
limitations exist dealing with the peculiarities of land and
subsurface ownership rights, consumption and utilization of
water as well as high population density. Besides, Europe
presently lacks for the equipment required for shale gas fields
development.
The outcomes (4) of potential development of UNG are then
associated with destabilization of the energy markets and of losing
competitiveness in general. In this context, if economically sound
conventional production is not promoted, the costs of this “irresponsible
experiment” will be borne by taxpayers. EU member states stand
before a decision that will have a considerable impact on which course
they will further take. The choice between unconventional and
“traditional” (Russian) natural gas is, therefore, the choice between
uncertainty and prosperity. This message has been intensified by the
means of suggestive dichotomy; i.e. a seemingly necessary “choice”
between two alternatives. Russian natural gas is thus depicted as a
necessary condition for the economic development of the EU.
5.4.2. The environmental hazard scheme
When compared with the dominant economic scheme, the
environmental argumentation is a less complex; it is based on
simple identification of UNG with a “standard listing” of environmental
risks. The technique of incomplete argumentation was
identified, when only the arguments of the extraction critiques
were considered. This contrasts with the context of environmental
impacts of natural gas extraction in Russia domestically10
and,
generally, the sensitivity of the Russian society towards environmental
issues (Jorgensen, 2008). The following statements are
extracted from Gazprom (2011d), and (2010).
…[E]veryone knows about the problems related to technological
and environmental aspects of shale gas. It is an unacceptable
way of development for Europe.
Europe faces a number of challenges in shale gas production.
Exploration work in shale gas fields requires drilling of numerous
wells, which may be quite difficult in densely populated
Europe. Environmental issues may emerge as well. Even a low
risk of ground water pollution may lead to a ban on shale gas
production. However, one should not forget that a lot of
promising shale gas resources are located in the countries most
dependent on Russian gas supplies – in Poland, Hungary and
Ukraine. Their desire to become independent from gas imports
may surpass all the negative factors.)
10
According to estimations, between 15 and 50 bcm of natural gas is burned in
Russia per year (Ladehaug and Loe, 2012). In terms of energy, the Russian economy
is among to the most intensive worldwide and is distinguished by a high rate of CO2
per capita as well as CO2/GDP (IEA, 2011a).
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109 105
Similarly to the economic argumentation, here we also find the
assumption that, despite clear and “rational” arguments against
launching the extraction, some countries will, on the basis of “irrational”
motivation (i.e. reduction of dependence on Russian supplies),
persist in struggling to develop of UNG. It is noteworthy that these
references to the irrational efforts to reduce the dependence on
Russian supplies are – together with outcomes of UNG development
in the USA (deflection of LNG supplies) – the only points at which the
development of UNG was framed geopolitically (in contrast, it is
geopolitical framing of UNG development through the concept of
supply security that is dominant in Poland).
6. Conclusions
The research objective was to show how UNG has been framed
within the Russian foreign energy policy discourse in the initial period
of its development. As demonstrated, the UNG issue has been framed
through two frames (for summary, see Table 5). The first frame is built
upon the image of Russia – a reliable supplier characterized by
political stability, and the importance and potential of its conventional
reserves, as well as the know-how and capital power of the Russian
gas sector – in a changing energy market environment which
structurally has shifted towards more extensive use of natural gas.
Rival suppliers are then characterized as either unstable and
problematic regimes (MENA countries), or like producers whose
exporting potential is limited; in case of UNG producers, typically
due to economic and technological reasons. The momentary success of
U.S. production is explained at best as a one-off and short-lived
anomaly and at worst as a speculative bubble with clandestine
political backing. The second frame is defined by the binary opposition
of natural gas and unconventional sources, whereby “conventional”
natural gas is associated with attributes such as efficient, ecological,
proven and safe. The meanings are constructed primarily through the
“juxtaposition between a privileged sign on the one hand and
devalued one on the other;” i.e. through the negative process of
differentiation (Hansen, 2006: p. 17). UNG is thus presented as a
qualitatively different and inferior source of energy, which is seen as a
malign deviation on an otherwise well-functioning natural gas
market.
The sources differentiate in their approach towards the UNG. While
Gazprom holds the most skeptical position (e.g. Gazprom, 2011d;
Miller, 2011a), which does not allow for more significant (and more
lasting) impacts, the media (see Аргументы и факты, 2009;
Комсомольская правда, 2011; Николаев, 2010; Новая газета,
2011) mention potential geopolitical consequences of the UNG development
(especially in the context of a strengthening of the negotiating
position of consumer countries), which can be seen as an embryonic
marginal frame. State documents (Russian Department of Energy,
2009, 2010, 2011) express an opinion on UNG that is somewhere in
Table 5
Identified frames and argumentation schemes.
Source: The Authors.
Functions
(Problem) definition Cause identification Evaluation Solution
Frame I Demand for energy in the
EU is increasing
The EU does not have sufficient domestic
energy sources
Russia is a reliable, stable partner
whose position is becoming
stronger
Energy policy must follow economic, not
political, reasoning
Energy markets undergo
structural changes
Alternative resources cannot
accommodate these needs in an
economically viable and/or safe manner
The utilization of Russian
conventional sources is
instrumental for the EU’s
economic growth
As a consequence, the EU should foster its
trade exchange with Russia—the
economically rational and morally
responsible policy choice
Political instability impedes
functioning of markets
Political considerations turn the EU to the
suboptimal choices
The shift to alternative resources
including UNG is economically
irrational, thus ideologically
driven
Environmental
considerations are
important
The momentary success of UNG
on North American market is
unreplicable
Frame II Natural gas (NG) and
unconventionals are two
qualitatively different
energy sources
The technology of NG extraction is proven,
safe and effective
NG is abundant, efficient and
clean source—no other source
has all these qualities
NG is an energy source for the prosperous
future
Geological, technological, and
environmental shortcomings of UNG
extraction are common
UNG is an inferior source defined
by a number of deficiencies
The choice between NG and UNG is
ultimately a choice between good and bad
The momentary success of UNG on the
North American market is given by its
specifics, subsidies, and speculative
investments
Argumentation schemes
Economic irrationality Environmental hazard
Structure of energy markets shifts towards increased usage of NG AND Russian NG has
an irreplaceable position AND
Environmental considerations must be taken seriously AND
UNG is an inferior source defined by number of deficiencies AND UNG are defined by a number of environmental risks AND
UNG development is ideologically-driven OR technologically-economic conditions of
UNG development are unfavorable
Environmentally-friendly alternative (NG) is available
-UNG development leads to market distortion subsidized by the taxpayers -UNG extraction leads to unnecessary and unreasonable environmental
destruction
P. Ocelík, J. Osička / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 97–109106
between these two poles and bring up the potential of domestic
unconventional resources.
As shown, the initial reaction of the Russian Federation is framed in
a clearly negative, distrustful manner. The frames present two alternative
futures. First, there is an optimistic scenario where Russia, a
rational and pragmatic great power, acts as a reliable partner and
dominant supplier on the natural gas market(s). Second, a pessimistic
scenario depicts the deepening economic crisis of the European
market caused by politically driven, and thus economically irrational,
decisions such as transition towards alternative sources of energy,
including unconventional gas resources. In contrast to Russia itself, the
image of the implicit Other (be it particular European countries, the
European Commission, the U.S., or energy companies) is constructed
through attributes of ideology, irrationality, irresponsibility, etc.
The evaluative function of frames (Entman, 2003: p. 417) is then
expressed by two dominant argumentation schemes, economic and
environmental. The economic argumentation is the dominant one
and is based on a self-understanding of Russia as mentioned above.
In this context, it is either a “Russian century of gas,” in which natural
gas overtakes the position of oil as the “blood of the economy,” or
distorted, gradually deteriorating energy markets with serious consequences
for the economy as a whole. The “choice” between good
natural gas and bad unconventionals, understood as the choice between
right and wrong, is presented as inevitable. “The century of
gas” (CoG) can be seen as an analogy of “the golden age of oil” corresponding
with economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s. A comparison
of the Russian and the IEA (2011b) variants of the CoG argument
could bring valuable insights into the differences between producer’s
and consumer’s perceptions of energy markets’ future development.
The environmental argumentation is more focused on the Western
or European environmental awareness; more precisely, the Russian
perception of the Western identity. The eventual development of
unconventional gas resources is then portrayed as a betrayal of these
very principles.
In general, pragmatically- and technocratically-oriented arguments
prevail. The wrong move towards UNG is not connected with any
substantial security consequences and is seen as a threat for the
taxpayers’ money, not for the states’ sovereignty. This is in accordance
with Shadrina’s (2010, pp. 158–163), findings about the shifts in
Russian behavioral patterns on particular energy markets; in the case
of the EU from a reassuring supplier defined by its proven history of
commodity trade to a reliable partner defined by an emphasis on its
modernization program, its investment climate improvement, and its
increased institutionalization (Russia’s accession to WTO, the Russia–
EU strategic partnership, the Russia–EU energy dialogue). The geopolitical
codes are thus pushed out to a peripheral position.
In the near future, the sharp linguistic distinction between
conventional and unconventional natural gas will likely prevail.
Considering the possible policy implications of such a distinction,
it is remarkable that the Russian adaptation and mitigation policy
measures can be distinguished according to the same division line.
With regards to adaptation policies, Russia will continue to
struggle for its endangered positions in continental Europe. We
have already observed how long-term bilateral contracts—the
cornerstone of the Russian “traditional natural gas” export policy,
have been renegotiated to reflect the shift towards buyer’s market
after 2010. Regarding the unconventionals, Russia could be
expected to mitigate further losses by supporting the environmental
opposition against shale gas that emerges all over Europe.
Moreover, in countries where the natural gas sector is controlled
by the government we can expect that Russians would pressure to
include non-shale policies into the wide portfolio of intergovernmental
deals that often result from gas deliveries contract renewal
negotiations.
As for further research, the mapping of the initial position on
the issue is a necessary precondition for further explanatory
efforts, be it the framing effects (see Vliegenthart and van
Zoonen, 2011) or particular policy outputs. Comparative studies,
i.e. mapping of UNG framing e.g. in Poland, U.S. or other involved
countries, is another promising area of research. The same analytical
framework can be applied on subsequent developments in
the Russian position. A number of questions raises here: are the
identified frames still in a dominant position, can new frames be
identified, how has the construction of UNG changed in the
context continuing shale gas boom etc.? Similarly, the scope of
the research can be broadened to interrelated issues such as
antitrust investigations of Gazprom (Riley, 2012), Russian market
liberalization and the rise of the independents (Henderson, 2005),
Russian relations towards key business partners (Shadrina, 2010)
and so on.
Acknowledgments
The text was prepared within the specific research project of
the Department of International Relations and European Studies
“Contemporary Issues of European and International Politics”
(MUNI/A/0754/2012) and with the support of the International
Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science, Masaryk
University as well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech
Republic (grant project 09/02/11). The authors would like to thank
the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions
to improve the quality of the paper as well as to Tatiana
Kardošová for assistance with data collection and coding. Fig. 1 has
been drawn using free online diagramming application Draw.io
(2013).
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.006.
References
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