Article
Journal of Asian and African Studies
45(3) 309–325
© The Author(s) 2010
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DOI: 10.1177/0021909610367767
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Corresponding author:
Oluwatoyin O. Oluwaniyi, Department of History and International Relations, College of Humanities,
Redeemer’s University, Mowe, Ogun State, Nigeria.
Email: otoldo_olu@yahoo.com, toyin97@yahoo.com
Oil andYouth Militancy in Nigeria’s
Niger Delta Region
Oluwatoyin O. Oluwaniyi
College of Humanities, Redeemer’s University, Nigeria
Abstract
This study explores the myriad of reasons responsible for the role of the youth in violence in the Niger
Delta region. Based on data drawn from primary studies of community youth groups in four oil-rich
communities in Bayelsa and Rivers States and secondary sources,findings reveal that community youth revolt
over socio-economic and political deprivation arising from oil exploitation and exploration by multinational
oil corporations in collaboration with the Nigerian state. These deprivations and marginalization have
transformed youth from merely engaging in community protests to militancy with deleterious consequences
threatening the security of the region.
Keywords
environmental degradation, militancy, Niger Delta region, oil, youth
Introduction
Since Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, it has been embroiled in a myriad of crises
perceived within the contexts of equity, access to oil resource and power, self determination, ethnic
autonomy, decentralization of a hegemonic federal power, and citizenship rights in terms of
the relationship between ethnic majorities and minorities (Obi, 2006: 2). However, the crises are
more evident in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, where years of oil exploitation and exploration have
resulted in degradation of the environment, the deprivation of livelihoods earned through farming
and fishing, neglect, impoverishment, injustice, and ultimately, general environmental insecurity.
These problems have resulted in frustration, anger, social tensions and activism. In the face of
pervasive crisis in authority, oil-producing communities have been forced to fall back on group
(ethnic) loyalties in the region. Though many groups, including that of women, have been formed
to accentuate struggles in the form of protests, agitations and violence, youth have appeared as the
major site of the struggles.
With the discovery of oil in 1956, the Niger Delta region, which hitherto was known for its
agricultural export of palm oil, rose in significance in Nigeria’s crude oil political economy with
export earnings increasing from 1 per cent in 1958 to almost 98 per cent and about 90 per cent of
310		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
the government’s total revenue in the 1990s (Akande, 2008; Ebeku, 2001: 1–3). Paradoxically,
while the state and oil companies have continued to profit enormously from oil production, the
rural population from where oil is produced has benefited the least from its wealth. While oil in
itself is central to the history of industrial capitalism, its discovery and extraction in Nigeria’s
Niger Delta region has ushered in a miserable, undisciplined, decrepit and corrupt form of ‘petrocapitalism’
(SDN, 2006; Von Kemedi, 2006: 1). Environmental pollution, resulting in brackish
swamp forests and rivers, depletion of agricultural resources on land and the death and extinction
of aquamarine resources, gas flares, and acid rain, impacting negatively on the health and physical
lives of the region’s inhabitants, have dislocated local communities, culminating in the impoverishment
of the populace and insecurity of the environment from which they gain their livelihoods
(Adetula, 1996: 20–21; Gary and Karl, 2003; Hazen and Horner, 2007; HRW, 1995, 1999; Obi, 1997;
Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 3–5; Olojede et al., 2000).
While peaceful efforts were made by oil-producing communities to attract attention to the
problems encountered through oil political economy, they were always met with repression by
the state in collaboration with the oil companies, leading to the deaths of people and destruction
of property. Hence, this has created a generation of youth, who do not only feel embittered but
have become militant in their approach to seeking justice against the state’s military approach.
The trend of events has succeeded in transforming the region into the most heavily militarized
state in Nigeria.
To this end, this study is guided by the following questions. Who is a youth and why is the
notion of ‘youth’ central to this study? Why are the Niger Delta youth at the forefront of the Niger
Delta struggle? How do they mobilize themselves against the state and oil companies? Is their
mobilization an organized routine or anomic, and what influences their mobilization and activities?
How does the state respond to youth militancy in the region and what are the consequences
of its reactions to peace in the region? The following sections seek to answer these pertinent questions.
Beyond having a working definition of a ‘youth’, especially from the Niger Delta’s perspective,
this article analyses factors responsible for youth’s militant involvement in the region’s
violence. It deconstructs the criminalization of youth, and points out the dichotomies in the system
that have prompted militancy in the youth. It examines the modes of youth mobilization and
activities, and explains the role of the government in the environmental struggle. Finally, this
study concludes and suggests, among other variables, that the political will to actually develop the
region, especially, oil-rich Delta communities is a sine qua non to peace and security in the Niger
Delta region.
Conceptual Clarification
The stereotyping of youth as miscreants, and their involvement in negative actions such as disrupting
the state’s affairs, especially in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, has prompted examination of who
the youth are and the reasons for their negative construction in the public space. The definition of
a youth is, historically, a contested concept, relational and situated in a dynamic context taking into
consideration its complexity as a permeable category identified within the social milieu. This complexity
has resulted in the categorization of the concept as a site for particular and localized framings
of human agency constituted by various intersecting and contested discourses, much of which
relies on seeing the youth as a deviant group.
Youth definition transcends biological or chronological age due to social and cultural variables
such as gender, religion, class, economy, responsibilities and ethnicity, which play an important
role in defining who is a youth or not (Durham, 2000: 116). Lukose (2000) makes a useful
Oluwaniyi	 311
contribution here when he describes ‘Youth’ as the essential precondition to adulthood and the
indefinite postponement of maturity. No wonder therefore that as part of youth description in
Africa, youth is attained through status and behaviour rather than biological age. This is in contradiction
to the United Nations perception of a youth. To the United Nations (1985), a youth can be
perceived as someone between the ages of 18 and 24, irrespective of status and behaviour.
Interestingly, in Nigeria and most parts of Africa, quite an appreciable number of adults (considering
the stipulated age described by the UN) consider themselves as youth based on their socioeconomic
strengths and weaknesses to the extent that often unemployment and poverty turn them
to ‘adult-youth’.
Youth is a social construction arising out of the political, socio-cultural, institutional and economic
dynamics of a society that needs to be fully interrogated in order to understand the milieu
within which it operates. Naturally, youth create and recreate their roles, either positively or negatively,
depending on changing conditions within the environment in which they survive. But generally,
youth are seen as the most agile, active, resilient survivors and ever ready to bring about social
transformation, either peacefully or violently, in order to achieve a desired future. Hence, they are
always associated with or drawn into protests, violence and war as witnessed in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, to mention but a few (Abdullah and Bangura, 1997; Furley, 1995;
Honwana, 1999; Oluwaniyi, 2005; Richards, 1996). This fact cannot be denied in the context of
past experiences of youth engaging in violence when they perceive themselves as excluded from
the distribution of socio-economic and political resources and opportunities that they regard as
their rights in society. Corroborating this argument, Gore and Pratten (2003: 213) and Blackman
(1998: 38–56) describe youth as the spearhead of contemporary political contests between the politics
of identity and citizenship. They navigate the agitation through militancy or violence for (re)
distribution of resources in their favour, protest exclusion and resist the theft of what they consider
their natural heritage.
In Africa, young people constitute the majority of the population at the centre of societal interactions
and transformation, yet they are often placed at the margins of the public sphere and major
political, socio-economic and cultural processes (Honwana and de Boeck, 2005: xii). When feelings
of economic repression, frustration, and despondency about the future are coupled with
perceptions of ethnic repression and religious persecution, youth become easily susceptible to
sparks of violence and they are predisposed to engage in low-intensity conflicts in order to draw
attention to their plight (BBC, 2002; McIntyre, 2003; Momoh, 2000). Hence, the place of the youth
within a given mode of production, and their level of exclusion from the state social surplus, influences
their participation in politics. El-Kenz (1996), supporting these arguments, posits that youth
explore cycles of violence as the only way of responding to socio-economic problems, which the
state is unable to resolve, whether in a spontaneous or organized way. It is therefore, not too surprising
that youth are constructed by other agencies as a ‘problem’ or a ‘lost generation’ (Cruise
O’Brien, 1996) or the creatures of nightmares, social impossibilities and existential angst (Comaroff
and Comaroff, 2005: 22–23). In some cases, impoverished youth are always available to be
exploited to act as perpetrators and victims of the production of violence. However, this is not to
stereotype youth, based on highlighted perception, as always violent. They can also be perceived
in a positive light as leaders of tomorrow (Obi, 2006).
Though literature on youth in Nigeria is relatively scanty, the available literature explains the
incidence of youth violence in Nigeria as a microcosm of the general crisis of youth marginality in
Africa (Albert, 2003; Momoh, 2000; Obi, 2006). But while this crisis has degenerated into armed
conflicts in other parts of Africa, Nigeria has witnessed low-intensity conflicts. In Albert’s analysis
of youth and conflict in Nigeria, he perceives youth that participate in violent conflicts in Nigeria as:
312		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
Frustrated young school leavers who feel let down by their leaders. While the youths live in abject poverty,
their leaders flaunt their affluence … in most cases, these youths see violent conflicts as economically
enterprising as politicians in Nigeria deliberately create conflicts and employ frustrated, unemployed
youths, providing the resources (financial and arms) for the escalation and intractability of conflicts.
(2003: 23)
Youth form themselves into sub-cultures in order to create a social identity to create space for
engagement in social formations and associations that are often legitimated by long-standing traditions
that lay claim to autonomy from the state. In Nigeria, various youth groups exist, and sometimes
are trapped within ethnic and religious colourations, as portrayed by the yandaba gangs in
Kano, the Oduduwa People’s Congress (OPC) boys in Lagos, the Egbesu boys in Bayelsa and the
Bakassi boys in the Eastern part of Nigeria. However, this category of youth in Nigeria fully
emerged since the watershed of economic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a key factor
in Nigerian political discourse. Due to various negative socio-economic and political conditions,
the category of youth, which is locally conceptualized as relatively transitory in its parallel to the
age-grade system, as against Marx’s description, has crystallized into an extended social category
over time. It is in this light that the conflict pitting the state and oil multinationals against the Niger
Delta youth over the extraction, degradation, marginalization and deprivation from the resources
on their land that has benefitted other parts of the country is studied.
A disturbing aspect of the youth’s description in the Niger Delta region is the fluidity of their
ages. While those in the age category 17–35 are referred to as youth in the context of the region’s
crisis, it is common to read and hear in the media about those in the age bracket 50–60 as participating
in the conflict. This confusion prompted a clarification of the term, ‘youth’. From interviews
with youth groups in the Otuasega, Peremabiri, Kegbare Dere and Bille communities in the Niger
Delta region, it was realized that a youth is ‘any member of the Niger Delta community who feels
strongly about participating in the struggle to liberate the region from the Nigerian State and the oil
multinationals’.1
As far as the interviewees, mostly youth, in the Niger Delta were concerned, there
is no age limit to the definition of a youth. Youth can be seen as any man or woman, boy or girl,
who has the strong desire or ability to give selfless service to the struggle without the expectation
of any reward, and their participation in the struggles does not connote the notion that they are
delinquent. As stated by Jonjon, the Ijaw Youth Council leader:
You see in most of our general protests, there is no age barrier. A man of 60 years could still decide to join
the younger ones to go on a protest. During the regime of Babangida, he announced that the then Rivers
State was pregnant and was going to give birth to a lot of children. To us, we thought we were going to
get more states and more local governments, but that did not happen. Angrily, what we did was to block
the East–West Road. The people who did this were not just those in the age bracket of 15–16 but those of
the age of 50, women, including married women, and educated people also participated by blocking the
roads that led their communities to the highways.2
Though young people are the majority of those involved in violent confrontations because they are
more agile, the involvement of older people in the struggle is very common, and it is a manifestation
of the extent of the marginalization, frustration and impoverishment indigenes pass through in
their various communities. Therefore, the participation of older people is an indication of the support
given to the youth in order to create a strong and formidable team against oppression in the
region. This interest further symbolizes group politics against environmental insecurity.
Oluwaniyi	 313
The youth culture in the Niger Delta region is synonymous with the perceptions of youth in other
parts of Nigeria. What is important here is that youth militancy is engendered by their awareness that
huge sums of money are being made from the Niger Delta region through oil exploration, while
indigenes’ benefit can only be calculated in form of the hydrocarbons emitted, degradation and gas
flares, unemployment and impoverishment. However, this activity should not portray youth in the
oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta region as warmongers, rag tags, criminals, or even permanently
restive, rather they should be seen as rational youth who are only reacting to years of marginalization
and who desire justice, and economic and political empowerment. Their power is gained
through group identity. For most youth alienated from access to the resources gained from oil, localized
collective identities, such as the localized community youth groups and cross-community
groups including purely militant groups, have emerged as important sites and means of laying claim
to deprived rights. Youth groups are always very distinct, vocal and vibrant.
Methodology
To carry out this study, two communities each were selected in both states. In Bayelsa State,
fieldstudy was carried out in Otuasega, Ogbia local government and Peramabiri, Southern Ijaw
local government. In Rivers State, focus was on Kegbare Dere in Gokana local government and
Bille in Degema local government using a questionnaire on 50 respondents in each community,
and in-depth interviews with youth, women and traditional chiefs in all the communities based on
purposive sampling approach. Out of 200 questionnaires administered, 183 questionnaires were
returned and analysed with the use of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). At this
juncture, it is instructive to state that the emphasis of this study centres on the popular community
youth groups in the region. Of note is that questions were not centred on militant youth but youth
generally because of the sensitive nature of the areas and the fear that respondents might either
avoid answering questions pertaining to their militia group status or might provide wrong answers
just to satisfy the researcher.
Findings
In analysing the questionnaire, it was observed that the ages of respondents ranged from 17–40
years while the majority of the respondents were between 24- and 30 years of age. Interestingly, all
the respondents were coincidentally of the male gender. Questions, which sought to know respondents’
educational qualifications reveal that out of 183 respondents, 11 per cent were graduates, 37
per cent represent secondary school leavers, 36 per cent were primary school holders, 7 per cent
were school drop-outs and 9 per cent never went to school. Out of the 11 per cent of the higher
institution graduates, 85 per cent went to polytechnics and 15 per cent went to the University of
Science and Technology as well as other universities. The question on the inability to continue with
education shows that lack of money served as a major hindrance for their inability to access as well
as finish education, but others felt that the inability to get well-paid employment opportunities
contributed. But to some respondents, they filled ‘still in school’.
Analysis of respondents’ occupations provides more shocking revelations about the future of
the Niger Delta youth. Out of the total respondents, 58 per cent had one or two forms of employment
opportunities, while 21 per cent were still scouting for jobs and 21 per cent were still students.
Out of the 58 per cent who were employed, only 17 per cent were employed into white collar jobs,
ranging from teaching to clerical jobs, 47 per cent were into businesses ranging from tailoring,
314		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
commercial bus driving, motorcycle riding (Okada), contract jobs with oil companies and fishing,
and 32 per cent lacked any productive employment but sit at home or are always available at
salons. Further questioning reveals that most of the youth in the more permanent jobs were not paid
on time. This phenomenon makes it difficult for an average youth in those communities to survive
except for a very few of them who have benefited from community leadership positions. When
disaggregated by age, almost 93 per cent were in the age range of 25–34, 3 per cent were in the age
range of 15–24 and 3 per cent were over 35 years of age.
It becomes imperative at this point to analyse arguments raised by interviewees as responsible
for engendering and increasing youth militancy in their oil-producing communities in the Niger
Delta region.
Youth and Militancy in the Niger Delta Region:A Discussion
The crisis of development experienced in the oil-rich region set against the wealthy resources that
have benefitted the state leadership that seeks rents from oil corporations, has a strong correlation
with the militancy pursued by marginalized community youth. Some of the structural and precipitating
factors identified by the women’s groups, elders and most importantly, the youth groups as
facilitating youth violence in oil-rich Niger Delta communities include the following.
Lack of SocialWelfare and Infrastructure
Actually, the issue of youth militancy arose due to marginalization from the MNCs and their allies. What
we have realized is that the mineral resource that is taken out of this place has been quite enormous for
us to have been transformed like Texas. But we are still living in shanty areas.3
An analysis of reasons why youth are involved in the region’s conflicts shows that socio-economic
facilities are totally lacking. Youth respondents decried the state of social amenities in their communities.
It is disappointing to note that up until now, Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State (mainly
Ijaw domain) has not been connected to the national grid. On a visit to some of the streams in
K-Dere in Rivers State and Otuasega in Bayelsa State, it was shocking to note that clean water is a
luxury in most of these communities, a condition worsened by the environmental practices of oil
companies, causing oil spills in fresh water and underground aquifers. Due to the fact that the
Niger Delta is made up of a network of creeks and rivers that flow into the Atlantic Ocean, an oil
spill in one locality spills over into other communities. The result is the brackish water people have
to contend with for drinking and laundry purposes. In Otuasega, it was revealed that the community
sourced drinking water from the brackish river until Shell, which has been operating for over
40 years and whose camp is a stone throw from the community, provided a bore hole for the community
in 2004 after series of protests.4
A major contradiction, which seems difficult to reconcile
is that whereas oil companies that are situated within oil-producing communities have access to all
basic and social facilities, inhabitants in the oil-producing areas lack such luxury and have had to
engage oil companies in protests before being provided with basic amenities. In Kegbare Dere, no
pipe-borne water existed throughout the period of 35 years that Shell operated in Ogoni land.5
Currently, the effluents discharged into fresh water sources contain high amounts of toxic materials
such as mercury or Benzo[a]Pyrene (Benzopyrene),6
with a high concentration of 0.54 to 4ug
per litre, which is far above the World Health Organization (WHO) recommendation of 0.7ug/1 for
Oluwaniyi	 315
drinking water.7
The concentration of this chemical is higher in fish and other aquatic creatures
because of the sediments they feed on. People who in turn feed on these marine creatures automatically
take in higher levels of the cancerous chemical. The resultant effect has been interpreted by a
community youth leader as:
Whether we agitate or not, we are dying silently. In a situation where your environment is polluted, what
you inhale is gradually killing you. There is no community that is exempted from gas flaring and acid rain.
If we agitate or not, we will still die, so why won’t we sacrifice our lives for the few who will live?8
In spite of the glamour that ‘beclouds’Shell camps, the living conditions of indigenes are hardly
an advertisement for the presence of oil companies in such areas. Most of the houses in these communities
are built with mud and thatched, like pre-colonial structures. One would not expect such
low level of development in oil-rich areas. The most unfortunate of the four communities is K-Dere
in Gokana, Bomu oil fields, Ogoniland. Though Shell began operations there in 1958, and it has 57
out of the 96 oil wellheads in Ogoniland, the living conditions are utterly dismal as there is no sign
of modernization in the community.
Pollution of water by oil spills in these communities affects their professions as fishermen and
farmers, therefore, leaving the people with no positive and productive engagement. The creeks are
the economy of the people in the oil-producing Niger Delta, but due to the extraction of crude oil
and the passage of pipelines across farms and houses, creeks have been blocked. Therefore, it has
become difficult for farming and fishing to take place as before. Sometimes, when the oil pipelines
are hot, the crude oil sweats, and when the sweat gets into the water, fish suffocate and die. As a
result, most fishermen hardly catch enough fish to sell in order to earn sustainable livelihood, and
even when they finally succeed, the catches (and the fish) remain very small. Oil spills have also
affected the quality and prices of farm products in the markets. But despite the challenges faced by
these people, they still embark on fishing and farming as sources of survival in their communities.
In Otuasega and Peremabiri, the inhabitants complained of the disappearance of some species
of cocoyam and plantain resulting from the effects of pollution and gas flares on farmlands.
Unfortunately in most cases, compensation is not paid for oil spills, the passage of pipelines over
farmlands, and the destruction of farmlands. When such compensation is paid, they are only paltry
sums that could not cover for the years of planting of affected crops. For example, N10 is paid for
a stem of cassava affected by oil spill or the acquisition of land. This attitude aggravates frustration
and consequently leads to conflict.
The display of wealth by oil workers in the presence of females in host communities faced with
deepening poverty, has increasingly led to prostitution in those area. According to interviewed
respondents, it is normal in the oil-producing communities for most single and married women to
turn into camp followers. Young women are invited to the oil camps at nights as prostitutes and in
the mornings, they return to their homes.9
There is no gainsaying arguing that the money earned
from prostitution is used in alleviating the sufferings of their families. However, to an Otuasega
youth leader, ‘young men are not happy with this development because they perceive it as a hindrance
to getting their future wives’. This phenomenon has turned a lot of young girls in host communities
into victims of the HIV/AIDS scourge. As the Ijaw Youth President said:
In fact, the young women in the host communities cannot control themselves because of the money the
people display and they go into prostitution. That is why when you take proper statistics of HIV/AIDS in
Nigeria, you will see that the Niger Delta has got the highest rate of infection.10
316		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
The economic challenges faced by indigenes from oil exploration and exploitation of their land,
such as bad harvests on crop yields, invariably mean that the majority of parents or guardians cannot
afford school fees for their wards, therefore resulting in high drop-out rates in oil-producing
communities. Children drop out of school for one or more years to make money, engaging in some
trade, and resume when they have enough to pay school fees and purchase uniforms and books. At
the end, most students spend up to ten years or more in school in a situation where they would be
expected to spend six years. To David who was a school teacher at the time of interview,
illustrated:
Since my parents did not have money to send me to school, it was difficult finishing secondary school. I had
to do a shift every year by staying one year in school and the next year outside school. I spent my one
year outside school farming, selling the yields and saving money for next session in school. Therefore, I
spent close to 11 years in secondary school and this is the lot of most children even today. That is why you
see most of the so-called students looking very aged for their classes and for those who are ashamed to
continue with their education because of the age, they drop out and find something to do for themselves.11
Usually for the majority of the youth who struggle to complete the Ordinary Level school certificate,
education ends there. In spite of the difficulties faced by students in host communities, Shell,
for example, gives only four scholarships to secondary school students and two scholarships to
university students, which is terribly inadequate.12
In Ogoni land, including Kegbare Dere, Shell
did not institute a scholarship programme for the host communities before its eviction from
Ogoniland. Though oil companies provided a six-classroom block there (which is not enough), it
is not equipped to meet basic educational standards. For example, there is no science equipment or
library, therefore culminating in poor educational outcomes. On 11 October 2004, about 70 students
of theAmalgamated Imotel Students Union, comprising students from the Imiringi, Otuasega
and Elebele communities in the Kolo Creek besieged Shell’s camp at Kolo Creek LGA. The agitation
was due to Shell’s insensitivity to their plight. They protested, carrying a mock coffin covered
with white linen at the front. The students demanded scholarship awards based on quota system,
the establishment of libraries and science laboratories in the communities and sponsorship of educational
programmes.13
Health facilities are inadequate to meet the burgeoning needs of a population demanding good
health care. From observation of the four communities visited and sets of interviews, the cottage
clinics provided by oil companies in host communities lack state of the art facilities. While oil
companies provide the structures, maintaining them is always outside their immediate concerns.
In fact, in K-Dere and Otuasega, doctors and nurses are hardly present at the clinics and when
they show up, it is very brief. Moreover, in most cases, drugs are not available, hence, most
patients are referred to bigger hospitals in the cities for treatment. This is against the background
of the availability of the state-of-the-art medical facilities in oil camps less than 5kms from host
communities.
A major concern for most of the youth and other groups interviewed in the four communities is
the rate at which gas flares have destroyed their communities. Respondents revealed three major
consequences of gas flares on the communities. First, gas is flared throughout the day and night to
the extent that with the brightness of the flares, there is no difference between day and night.
Invariably, host communities inhale fumes arising from flares, therefore putting them at risk of diseases
such as eye problems, difficulty in breathing (lung problems) and cancer. Second, the gas
flared also destroys roofing sheets turning them into brownish sheets. Moreover, the flares affect
Oluwaniyi	 317
trees in their farmland, destroying their fertility, and consequently, the yields of farm produce. In
spite of all these challenges, facilities are not available to cushion the effects of the potential
dangers.
Denial of Employment Opportunities
Economically, in spite of the oil revenues derived from the Niger Delta region, majority of the
inhabitants in oil-producing communities are not employed in the oil companies there. There was
a strong consensus among youth groups during interviews about the inequality and injustice
embedded in gaining white collar jobs in oil companies. They all concurred that employment
opportunities are heavily skewed towards youth outside oil-producing rural communities. For
those employed from host communities, only a few of them occupy managerial positions. To the
youth, the major Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa) dominate the oil industry while
the minority ethnic groups suffer environmental degradation, impoverishment, and total neglect.
The ‘lucky’ indigenes employed, occupy positions as cleaners of oil installation facilities, pipeline
security personnel and temporary contractors whose appointments terminate at the completion of
those contracts. According to Kime, an elder in the Supreme Egbesu Assembly:
Outside the foreigners, the next category of people that manage the gas and oil industry are Igbos, and
Yorubas. The oil companies will call us for interview, we will do it, and when we pass the interview, they
will now say that we have to go through aptitude test. I know that nobody surmounts a Shell aptitude test
without an insider giving him or her an insight of what the aptitude test will look like ... But our people
do not have the privilege. So they use the aptitude test to fail our children. So, in terms of employment,
our children are not employed, while children from other ethnic groups are, especially the westerners are
employed and put in managerial positions. But our people would not have bothered if the environment
was still safe for us to do the things our forefathers were doing.14
For the contractors, wages are extremely meagre. As at May 2005, Shell contractors were being
owed about six months’ salaries. Rather than provide permanent employment opportunities for
youth in those oil-producing communities, Shell prefers to implement a programme known as the
‘Sit at Home’ allowance. In Otuasega, Peremabiri and Bille, youth are paid to prevent them from
disrupting oil operations and attacking industry workers and facilities. According to respondents,
Shell gives 50 youths in host communities the opportunity to sit at home and earn N30,000.00 per
month N30,000.00 per month (at the rate of N1,000.00 per day). Apart from its negative impact on
those youth who now depend on such allowances and do not intend engaging in developing the
productive skills necessary for getting out of poverty, it has also triggered conflicts among youth
in neighbouring communities who feel sidelined from the largesse. Unfortunately, allowances are
used by most youth on non-productive ventures such as purchasing television sets, radios, videos,
alcohol, and womanizing. In Otuasega, youth in the neighbouring communities are fairly represented
in the sharing of these benefits,15
but in Peremabiri and Bille, inequality in the sharing of oil
benefits has precipitated bloody conflicts among the youth of the two communities over the years.
Afinding from the field that seems discouraging is the proliferation of alcohol joints in some of the
host communities visited, except in Kegbare Dere. Quite a number of youth patronize these joints,
drinking and smoking instead of engaging in productive work. Through inquiries, it became clear that
since there are no white-collar jobs or contract jobs with oil companies or even available land to
engage in farming as was the case prior to environmental degradation, they sit at home all day, waiting
318		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
for their own share of the free allowances as well as an invitation by oil companies for contract jobs.
When such opportunities are absent, they become frustrated and protest their dismal conditions.
Demand for Resource Control
The issue of economic inequality in the Niger Delta brings to the fore, the unbalanced nature of
revenue allocation in Nigeria. During most interviews in the four communities, one issue reechoed,
that is, the deliberate attempt by the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria, supported by the
oil-dependent state, to maintain an unholy alliance with multinational oil corporations, and with
the paraphernalia of force, to subjugate the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. To most respondents,
during the colonial and immediate post-colonial agricultural boom period, revenue allocation to
the regions was based on derivation principle. But the derivation method changed with the discovery
of oil. Beyond the inequality perpetrated by the state, oil companies have their offices and
headquarters outside oil-producing communities while they pay taxes to the states where their
headquarters are located. This approach suffices that taxes are paid to states where oil is not
extracted and exploited, and utilized to develop those states to the detriment of the oil-producing
communities. Therefore at the heart of militancy is the inequality revolving around the sharing of
the proceeds from the sale of crude oil explored from their ancestral land.
Non-Fulfilment of Memorandum of Understanding
A major factor sparking violence in host communities is the non-fulfilment of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) by oil companies in their areas.16
In Otuasega, Peremabiri and Bille, the
failure to honour the terms of the MOUs after several appeals, sparked off conflicts between the host
communities’youth groups and the oil companies. Otuasega youth cited conflicts that occurred first
in 1999 between youth from the three communities making up the Kolo Creek, including Otuasega,
and Shell over the environmental consequences of oil exploitation. The peaceful demonstration
started as early as 4.00 am. The youth blocked Shell’s camp gate and presented their demands,
which resulted in the merciless treatment of some of the youth by the police invited to quell the
protest, through beating, arrest and torturing of the youth. Second, in March 2005, the Otuasega
community youth group also revolted against Shell over non-fulfilment of an MOU, which revolved
around electricity via gas turbine to the community. From the early to mid-1990s, K-Dere was host
to a pocket of protests within the Gokana local government area due to its proximity to the Shell
site.17
Though peaceful, the youth were at the forefront of these conflicts over the failure of Shell to
fulfil MOUs. For example, to the paramount ruler in Kegbare Dere:
The youth were at the forefront of the struggle in Ogoniland. Just imagine a multi-million naira company
like Shell that came into this community since the 1950s and was not able to create anything one can
pinpoint to as being done by Shell. The youth had to revolt.18
With the resumption of Shell’s activity in Ogoniland, K-Dere youth protested against Shell in a bid
to know their stakes in the new arrangement of oil extraction.
Illegal Deals between Chiefs and Oil Companies
Another factor precipitating and exacerbating violence in the Delta region is the making and concretization
of deals between chiefs in oil-based communities and oil companies. According to
Oluwaniyi	 319
respondents in Bille and Peremabiri, intra-community conflict between chiefs (paramount and
others) over oil compensation is very prevalent in both communities. Being a host community supposedly
has its own benefits as oil companies operating in certain communities are expected to
give compensation, implement development programmes and provide contract and sometimes permanent
jobs in the communities, especially in this era of Global MOUs. But oil companies negotiate
such agreements with individuals whom they identify as community representatives, notably
the top traditional leaders or chiefs, in a divide and rule tactic.
The realization of the subversion of goals and plans by elders in oil-rich communities, who are
most often corrupt and frequently collected bribes from oil companies to the detriment of the overall
interests of the community, trigger jealousies and generate tensions and violence between the
chiefs and youth. This system of divide and rule aims at weakening traditional society and turning
de facto community leadership into an all-comers affair, including youth factions. Respondents in
Peremabiri asserted that due to youth’s attack on chiefs’lives in 1997, the paramount chief’s throne
was vacated, leaving the youth to take over the governance of the community.19
In recent times,
while intra-community conflicts have reduced, inter-community conflicts between Peremabiri and
its neighbours have intensified over the sharing of compensation.
While youth in the four communities started their agitations in the early 1990s, due to the total
negligence of the oil-rich communities, their modes of mobilization and operation have since
become more organized.
Youth Militancy: Mobilization and Modes of Operation
in the Niger Delta
The focus of this section is on the processes of youth’s involvement in protests against oil companies.
More importantly, it analyses ways and means in which youth are mobilized for protests and
militancy against oil corporations in a bid to gain national and international attention to their plight
in the region. Based on interviews (administration of questionnaires, face-to-face interviews and
FGDs), it was revealed that there are different modes of operation utilized by the youth groups in
their communities, however, they all share similar characteristics.
In relation to mobilization, participation in community youth groups is completely voluntary,
however, participation is considered an obligation for every youth residing in the community. The
class of youth cuts across every educational, age and status divide. Youth meetings are held in every
community, and at the regional level. In the latter context, representatives from Otuasega, Peremabiri
and Bille attend the Ijaw Youth Council where all activities at the local level are coordinated, and
policies which impact on all the Ijaw youth in the region are transmitted to them. In K-Dere, its
youth group also has a broader ethnic youth group known as the Ogoni Youth Council, which coordinates
all the activities of the youth in Ogoniland, including K-Dere.
Youths meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of urgent concern in their areas, especially as
they relate to degradation, failure to implement MOUs, deprivation and neglect by oil companies,
in addition to other relevant community issues. Based on the outcomes of their meetings, their
needs are presented to oil companies. Sometimes promises are made by the oil companies concerned
and at other times, they are ignored. ‘At the expiration of the deadline, we would re-inform
them but they would not respond. Maybe they love conflicts and crisis, we don’t know, and then
we would strike’.20
On Wednesday 6 July 2005, the Ijaw youth in Bille closed down the flow stations in the Bille
community of Degema, a few days after they had issued a warning to SPDC. To the youth in the
320		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
area, the decision to shut the oil wells was taken as a result of the total neglect of their area by
SPDC after 47 years of oil exploration, exploitation and production there. They demanded resource
control, improved conditions of living and employment opportunities for the youth in Bille.21
In
August 2005, there was another protest sparked by the non-response to July’s demands. According
to a Bille youth leader, ‘Violence is the only language Shell understands and the youth of this community
are bent on shutting down every Shell flow station in Bille if it fails to heed to our requests’.22
From 1998, youth in Peremabiri began to protest against Shell, that had began full operation in
1963. In this host communities, youth were not at first militant, but years of neglect and marginalization
at the hands of the oil companies brought about militancy. According to Michael (the
former Community Development Committee (CDC) chairman in Otuasega), ‘In our relationship
with SPDC, if they do not do what we want them to do, we are forced to be violent with them’.23
In Otuasega, information about the right time to get the company’s attention is usually filtered
through a contract staff. Youth are then mobilized to march to the camp as early as four in the morning.
Gates leading to the camps are locked in order to debar the oil companies’ staff from their
offices, and oil wells are locked. They block the road leading to Shell camps, stopping their operations
and presenting their demands until they are met.
Beyond community groupings, the failure of oil companies to fulfil MOUs has sparked the
formation of social militant groups in which most of the community youth take part. Even though
69 per cent of the respondents agreed that they are members and hold meetings with some militant
groups, such as the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA), the Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND), and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) to mention but a few, they all
refused to reveal the groups they identified with.
Analysis of the question concerning the reasons youth join militant groups reveals that almost
73 per cent joined to identify with the sufferings of oil-based communities, 26 per cent joined
because it is normal to join a social group, and 1 per cent did not respond to the question. This
shows that even though militancy is now the norm, the original purpose was to draw national and
international attention to the injustice perpetrated by government on their communities. Some of
the militants’ activities include hostage-taking, seizure of boats, and killing of oil workers, and the
wave of militancy has increased due to the influence of small arms and light weapons (SALWs)
such as AK-47s, shotguns, handguns, dynamite and rifles. These modern weapons are used simultaneously
with local weapons such as cutlasses, spears, machetes, knives and traditional charms.24
Findings on how they source and accumulate these sophisticated weapons reveal that politicians,
wealthy elites and sometimes traditional rulers influence and encourage the youth, as well as purchase
weapons for them to use against oil companies. Another form of accumulating weapons
mentioned by respondents is through funds realise from illegal bunkering activities. Most importantly,
oil company’s illegal act of bribing community youth against damaging and shutting down
oil wells, has created a new source of funding for acquiring arms.25
At this point, it is pertinent to
note that unscrupulous criminals are taking advantage of genuine militancy by community youth.
By committing crimes, ranging from kidnaps to ransom-taking in the region, distinguishing criminals
has become more complex as new thesis emerging posits the possibility of militants resorting
to criminal activities to fund their objectives.
Navigating Peace in the Niger Delta Region
The response of the government has been a mixture of peace and militarization, or carrots and
sticks, as the case may be. The ‘sticks’ have been in the form of the state’s militarization of the
Oluwaniyi	 321
Delta region, for example in the destruction of Ogoniland, Odi, Odiodioma, to mention but a few,
and the establishment of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) whose role has been to clamp down
on the level of ‘criminality’ and eliminate ‘criminals’ or ‘rag tags’.26
But this strategy has yielded
more violence than expected and has spurred armed groups to consolidate their commitment to
making the region untenable and ungovernable, thus increasing the level of social and economic
insecurity of the Delta environment.27
For the meantime, peace still remains an elusive project in
the Delta region.
The ‘carrots’are in form of institutions created to engender peace and development, and assuage
the effects of oil exploitation. Some of the recent institutions include the Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC), which has been starved of funds28
and mired in corruption; the controversial
Niger Delta Technical Committee whose White Paper has not been made public since the submission
of its report, and the creation of the Ministry of the Niger Delta.29
Unfortunately, there has
been no sustainable commitment on the part of government to make the strategies work, due to
corruption, indiscipline and the patronage system (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 18). These attitudes
were revealed in the way the federal government compromised its stand on ending gas flaring
by 1 January 2008. Beyond these institutions, the federal government instituted the Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme on 25 June 2009 with the aim of first granting
amnesty to militants, and collecting arms, demobilizing and developing the Niger Delta generally.
However, the success of this programme depends on several tenets, which include a clear
conceptualization of ‘amnesty’, the transparency of the government at all levels, the provision of
adequate funds for militants’ rehabilitation, the total commitment of the government to make it
work while removing every form of militarization from the region, and the immediate concrete
development of the region itself.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, it will be realized that environmental degradation resulting from oil exploitation
for over 50 years, and clamour for resource control, autonomy, and improvement in socio-economic
lives, are at the heart of youth militancy in the oil-producing communities, and the resultant internal
instabilities. The inability of the government and oil companies to readdress these problems
culminated in the graduation of community youth from mere engagements of sporadic protests at
the community level to more popular engagements worsened by the formation and activities of
militant groups that profess the interests of the poor oil-producing communities.
Addressing such issues entail guaranteeing environmental security in the Niger Delta. At
this point, the major challenge in resolving conflict and building peace in the conflict-ridden
Niger Delta lies not in the militarization of the region but in bringing key leaders or stakeholders
(the Nigerian state, the oil and gas industry and oil-rich communities) together to persistently
dialogue on the way forward. In other words, there should be a long-term process of collaborative
capacity building designed to resolve the issues at the core of the insurgency and counterinsurgency,
and to build the capacity of such stakeholders to work together and implement
strategies that will reduce poverty to the barest minimum. This alternative should also include
ensuring that host communities are, in practice, at the mainsteam of policies affecting the management
of oil and gas resources. This option will serve as a starting point for peace, security
and co-existence to be achieved in the Niger Delta region in particular and Nigeria in general.
Other measures include bringing back the legal framework aimed at protecting host communities
from oil companies’ extractive processes. This does not infer that international and domestic laws
do not exist, but governments have been tolerant of oil companies’ practices due to their own
322		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
selfish interests, neglecting the negative consequences of such processes on oil-rich host communities.
Hence, laws and regulations adopted to regulate the oil industry’s operations must be
strictly adhered to (including gas flaring and pollution), and punishments meted on recalcitrant
companies. In addition, adequate compensation should be made to individuals and communities
for land use and pollution, in a transparent manner devoid of the divide and rule tactics associated
with most oil companies there. As part of encouraging social capital in the region, youth should be
economically empowered, both in the oil and non-oil sectors in order to create positive alternatives
to militancy.
Government needs to take practical and holistic measures to diversify the economy. The end
result will be a reduction on over-dependence on non-renewable oil and gas resources. Moreover,
this measure will strengthen the economies of non-oil producing states by lessen their overreliance
on federal government’s allocations based on oil profits realized from oil-producing
states, and therefore, lessen political and economic inequity.
Of all these recommendations, political will remains the most important instrument for achieving
peace and justice in the Niger Delta’s oil politics. This recommendation brings to the fore the
clear gap between theory and practice, or policy initiation and policy implementation. Government
must not be seen as making grandiose policies for the region, and oil companies must not only be
seen as signing Global MOUs with host communities. Rather efforts must be geared towards having
the will to implement such policies. Though the DDR programme is ongoing and aimed at
realizing this intent, what is of utmost importance is that achieving results is a long-term process
not just a one-off event. The will must be devoid of inept and corrupt leadership, which has been
the bane of governance in Nigeria as a whole today, but must entrench justice, equity, transparency
and good governance. Furthermore, in realization of this goal, the DDR programme must holistically
include the communities which have suffered total neglect, alienation and injustice over the
years and not just concentrate on militants. Failing these, institutional fixes as well as militarization
of the region will further entrench the region in more violent attacks and reprisals that will end up
threatening the basis of Nigeria’s unity.
Notes
  1.	 Most youth groups resonated this definition during interviews.
  2.	 Interview with Mr Jonjon, the Ijaw Youth Council leader on the 4 April 2005 at the IYC Centre, Yenagoa,
Bayelsa State.
  3.	 Interview with Richard in Peremabiri, Bayelsa State on 21 May 2005.
  4.	 Focus Group Discussion with youth group and Community Development Committee (CDC) members in
Otuasega community on 5 April 2005.
  5.	 Interviews with youth and women’s group leaders in Kegbare Dere on 19 May 2005. I was taken round
the village, including the oil polluted river. The two pipe-borne water systems utilized by the community
were installed by individuals and not the state or Shell.
  6.	 Benzopyrene’s chemical name is known as Benzo[a]Pyrene and it has the chemical formula is C20
H12
.
The chemical is a five-ring polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon that is mutagenic and highly carcinogenic. It
is found in coal tar, automobile exhaust fumes, tobacco smoke and charbroiled food. Benzopyrene causes
genetic damage in lung cells and disrupts the normal process of copying DNA, which may lead to cancer.
  7.	 In the chemical sciences, ug means a microgram and 1000 ug equals 1 milligram. In other words, the
presence of Benzopyrene in drinking water is much higher than the recommended maximum amount.
  8.	 Interview with Mr Jonjon, IYC President.
  9.	 These young girls are affected by the paradox of wealth and poverty, and therefore, easily deceived by the
Oluwaniyi	 323
display of beautiful and modern jeeps by oil workers who come around the communities to invite girls to
their camps.
10.	 Interview with the IYC President on 5 April 2005. In agreement with the IYC President, the CDC Public
Relations Officer in Otuasega, Nelson Kokunu Adams confirmed that two young girls in Otuasega died
of AIDS in the community.
11.	 Interview with David Collins, a Secondary School teacher in Otuasega on 30 April 2005.
12.	 Interviews with youth and elders in Focus Group Discussions in Otuasega and Peremabiri.
13.	 Interview with comrade Wisdom Illaili at Yenagoa on 5 April 2005.
14.	 Interview with Mr Kime, an elder in the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA) and a member of the Ijaw
Youth Council in Bayelsa State on 4 April 2005.
15.	 The Kolo Creek includes three communities namely, Otuasega, Elemele and Imiringi. According to
Christian Igbedon, Otuasega Youth leader, two youths from each community are paid N30,000.00 each
for the period of three months after which it is rotated again among other youths in the communities for
the same period. This practice is done to avoid conflicts that may arise from oil compensation sharing
among host communities and their neighbours.
16.	 MOUs are general statements, which are indicative of the compromises of all sides/parties establishing
that certain agreements have been reached in terms of engagement and relationship between two or more
parties. MOUs are legal in some cases and in others, it signals a gentleman’s arrangement between two or
more parties committed to peace. The parties are expected to voluntarily honour the terms of the MOU.
17.	 Interview with the Kegbare Dere’s youth leader, Ledor Mene and women’s leader, Nwindee Namon on 7
May 2005.
18.	 Interview with the paramount ruler of Kegbare Dere, Chief Bandi Sunday Piri-Gberesun on 7 May 2005.
19.	 Interview with Basil Young in Peremabiri on 22 April 2005.
20.	 Interview with Bille youth leader, Socrates Dokubo on 26 May 2005.
21.	 During the July crisis, the Rivers State Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs,
Clapton Ogolo, had to intervene in order to reach a ceasefire agreement.
22.	 Interview with Bille youth leader, Socrates Dokubo on 26 May 2005.
23.	 Interview with Mr Michael, Otuasega’s former CDC Public Relations Officer, on 7 April 2005.
24.	 Discussions with youth groups across the four communities.
25.	 Interviews with Mr Kime and Mr Jonjon on 4 April 2005. Revenue from this source is used to buy
weapons and to fund the survival of the youth involved in the struggles.
26.	 Criminality to the Nigerian state and the JTF in this sense means the acts of oil theft, kidnapping of
oil workers, expatriates and indigenes, hostage taking and blowing up of pipelines, among others. The
criminals signify the ‘militants who are involved in the acts of “criminality”’. The focus of the JTF
include Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers States.
27.	 Nigeria’s crude oil exports have declined more than 20 per cent since late 2005 when militants began their
campaign. As at 13 September 2008, Nigeria has lost 280,000 barrels daily of its output to attacks in the
Niger Delta region (see Business Day, 2008).
28.	 The 2009 federal government allocation to NDDC fell from N41.3 billion in 2008 to N29.5 billion, and
as at June 2009, the allocation has not been awarded to NDDC for it to implement its capital projects in
the Niger Delta.
29.	 The Ministry of the Niger Delta has been wrapped in various controversies since its initiation, starting
from its choice of location (Abuja), the Minister to be in charge, the coalition of its terms of reference
with the NDDC, and even the political will behind its set-up.
324		 Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(3)
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Oluwatoyin O. Oluwaniyi (PhD, University of Ibadan, Nigeria) is a lecturer at the Department of History and
International Relations, College of Humanities, Redeemer’s University, Nigeria. She has published articles in
journals and contributed chapters in edited books about African conflicts and child trafficking with a focus on
Nigeria.