

Export-led growth

China in the World Economy, autumn 2022

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- 6) Did China's private sector originate is a program of privatization?
- 7) What was the purpose of the obligation of foreign investors to form joint ventures?

Today

- Continuing reforms in the 1990s and 2000s – export-led growth
- The fallout from the 2008 Financial crisis
- The rise of Xi Jinping and China's technological ambitions

Return to reform and opening up

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- **Return to a pro-market policy**, but with more **cautious approach** than in the 1980s – fear of another Tiananmen

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- **Higher taxes in for rural farmers and entrepreneurs** > more inequality between cities and villages
- Increased rural illiteracy!
- Resources invested in urban areas

Return to reform and opening up

- Focus on **advanced technologies + large projects + foreign investment + export**

Return to reform and opening up

- **Sophisticated infrastructure** – high speed trains connecting major cities

Return to reform and opening up

- **Sophisticated infrastructure** – high speed trains connecting major cities
- Some SOEs transformed into **joint-stock companies**, but **the Party usually retains the controlling voting block**
- = **hybrid ownership** – difficult to interpret who makes decisions

Return to reform and opening up

- Industrial policy

Return to reform and opening up

- Industrial policy — „**national champions**“ – **support of highly advanced companies such as Huawei** – attempts to push them to the global cutting edge

- „**Industrial policy** is defined as the **strategic effort by the state to encourage economic transformation, i.e. the shift from lower to higher productivity activities**, between or within sectors.“
- x **trade policy** – attempts to **influence import and export**

- **Industrial policy** - takes place **within a country** (subsidies, tax break, grants, privileged access to loans...)
- **Trade policy** – takes place **at the border** – tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade

- > China is far more active in industrial policy

Return to reform and opening up

- „**Letting go of the small**“ – small companies can be privatized and left to their own devices
- If they go bankrupt, who cares?

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- > Chinese foreign investment is based on state-owned capital!

Return to reform and opening up

- Problems – **large rate of investment, relatively small growth of consumption**

Return to reform and opening up

- Problems – **large rate of investment, relatively small growth of consumption**
- = huge growth, but you can't enjoy its fruit, new wealth is immediately reinvested

Export-led growth

- Focus on foreign **direct investment (FDI) and export** – integrating China into the world economy


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- x 1980s – mostly homegrown growth
- FDI = **source of foreign technologies**
- Push to attract investors – **financial incentives, offer of access to China's already huge market**

FDI as a percentage of GDP



Export-led growth

- **New special economic zone – Shanghai**
- **> centre of economic activity moves into the Yantze delta**

Regional shares of China's exports.

	1978	1995	2005	2010	2016
Southeast	16%	<u>45%</u>	36%	34%	36%
Lower Yangtze	35%	21%	<u>38%</u>	42%	37%
Northeast / North Coast	40%	22%	18%	17%	15%
Rest of China	9%	11%	7%	8%	<u>13%</u>

China Major Rivers Map



Return to reform and opening up

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- Sometimes outright IP theft

Return to reform and opening up

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indifference to small businesses**

Return to reform and opening up

- > **support for large state or semi-state companies + foreign capital; indifference to small businesses**
- > **best strategy for Chinese companies – get incorporated in Hong Kong, then do business in China as a foreign company**

Reforms to the „ordinary“ foreign trade

- Last time – **special** economic zones

Reforms to the „ordinary“ foreign trade

- Last time – **special** economic zones
- Now – reforms to the **normal trade regime**
- = the rest of China
- From 1980s onwards

Ordinary trade

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- **The FTC system was only completely abolished in 2004, after entering the WTO!**

Table 16.1

Chinese exports: Share of total by firm ownership.

	1995	2005	2016
State-owned enterprises	<u>66.7%</u>	22.2%	10.3%
Foreign-invested enterprises	31.5%	<u>58.3%</u>	43.7%
Private domestic firms	<u>0.2%</u>	14.7%	<u>43.6%</u>
Collective and other	1.5%	4.8%	2.4%

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- > **give the central government a part of the foreign exchange**, keep the rest as use it to do more business

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
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- > **FTCs as middlemen**

Ordinary trade

- **Gradual devaluation of the RMB**

USD to RMB



Ordinary trade

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- **Separate foreign exchange market** – foreign trade companies could exchange money and ignore the official rate


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
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- Which one was lower?

RMB to UDS




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
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- = „Let’s respect the collective wisdom of the market“
- The rate was competitive and led to a more or less balanced trade
- **Under floating, the rate would appreciate because of growing exports**
- = as China became more competitive, the rate should have gone up

Ordinary trade

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USD to RMB



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- + „**real depreciation**“
- The **price level** in China rose more slowly than in the US and most other capitalist countries

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
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- > **Chinese goods became relatively cheaper**

Real appreciation / depreciation


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Real appreciation / depreciation

- If your **exchange rate is stable AND you have lower inflation** than a partner country, your currency is undergoing a real depreciation
- > your goods become more competitive > you export more
- **As if you devalued the currency**




USD to RMB



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- > **undervaluation, huge trade surpluses!**



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- Abandoned because of the **1997 Asian Financial crisis**

Special economic zones

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- More importantly – **entire coastal region** opened for „**export-processing**“
- **Raw materials given to Chinese companies (often TVEs) for assembly and processing**
- **Formally no trade, no FDI!** – investment was only allowed in SEZs

Special economic zones

- > due to proliferation of export processing + reforms to ordinary trade, **SEZs gradually became less special**

The 2000s – continuing export-led growth

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- **Progress from textile exports to electronics**

The 2000s – export-led growth

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- **China's most capitalist moment** – after entering the WTO in 2001

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- Exports and imports – **5 % of GDP each in 1978**
- World average is about **20 % for each**
- **China reached this level by 2001**, its exports continued to soar after entering the WTO
- 2006 – **exports stood at 35 % of GDP, imports at 30 % > 65 % together**
- In the United States, the **sum is around 20 %!**
- = China was already far more opened than the world average or comparably large countries!

The 2000s – export-led growth

- **2009 – largest exporter in the world**
- **2011 – largest manufacturer**
- **2012 – largest GDP by purchasing power parity**

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= China finally overcame its problem of financing imports
- **> accumulation of foreign exchange (mostly dollars)**

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- **Keep it as a reserve – a precaution against a monetary crisis**

The 2000s – export-led growth

- What is China going to do with all this foreign exchange?
- **Keep it as a reserve – a precaution against a monetary crisis**
- Anxiety after the **Asian monetary crisis of 1997**


How a monetary crisis works

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- - China does have a fixed exchange rate – the yuan was first tied to the US dollar, since 2005, it is pegged to a basket of currencies

USD to RMB



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- If they fail **> increased interest rates to stop the capital flight > drop of domestic credit > domestic recession**

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- Did anything like this ever happen in Czechia?
- Yes, in **1997!**

How a monetary crisis works

- China fears this scenario, so it keeps large reserves of foreign currency
- > if you sit upon a huge pile of dollars, you can defeat a speculative attack
- Actually, you can **deter it**

The 2000s – export-led growth

- What else can you do with foreign exchange?
- = you don't use it to buy imports, you don't want to keep it as reserves

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- **Foreign investment** – purchases of Western companies; **Belt and Road Initiative**

The 2000s – export-led growth

- **Major exporter of advanced technology products already by 2005!**
- = laptops, mobile phones, scanners, cameras, medical equipment

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- Hu leadership – continuation of previous policies
- **More resources devoted to social spending** – healthcare, education, alleviation of rural poverty

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- **Growth continued at breakneck speed – over 10 % a year – even though the base was already quite large**
- = biggest story of the decade; **the West overlooked it**

- Next time:
- The return of industrial policy
- The fallout of the 2008 Financial crisis
- The rise of Xi Jinping and the US-Chinese trade war