The Suez
A Crisis of Regional Power


Background



Background cont.



Decision



Impact
As Eisenhower had feared, the Suez Crisis also increased Soviet influence over Egypt.
Khrushchev’s intervention on the side of Egypt placed the Soviet Union as the natural friend of
Arab nations.
It emboldened Arab nationalists and spurred the Egyptian President Nasser to aid rebel groups
seeking independence in British territories across the Middle East.

Crisis
In the early 1950s, Egypt violated the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement and
blocked Israeli ships from passing through the Suez Canal, a major international waterway.
It also began to block traffic through the Straits of Tiran, a narrow passage of water linking the
Israeli port of Eilat to the Red Sea.
This action effectively cut off the port of Eilat -- Israel's sole outlet to the Red Sea and Indian
Ocean. Closure of the Suez Canal and the Tiran Straits damaged Israel's trade with Asia.
Palestinian Arab fedayeen launched cross-border infiltrations and attacks on Israeli civilian
centers and military outposts from Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Arab infiltration and Israeli
retaliation became a regular pattern of Arab-Israeli relations.

Crisis
The U.S. pressured Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory. United Nations forces were stationed
along the Egyptian-Israeli border to prevent an Egyptian blockade and deter cross-border
infiltrations. I
srael declared that if Egyptian forces would again blockade the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, it
would consider this a casus belli

Crisis
The situation in the Middle East was particularly precarious.
Between protection of Israel and an interest in good relations with the Arabs, President Eisenhower
had to maintain a careful balancing act. Israel represented America’s most definite ally in the
Middle East.
The Arab countries were appealing because of the vast source of potential energy under their
territory. The problem was the mutual hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Eisenhower tried to
walk a fine line and remain friendly with both areas.

Crisis
President Eisenhower’s efforts to please all the people all the time, some were always
disappointed.
To the Arabs, Israel was an abhorred neighbor that was unquestionably allied to the United States.
No doubt Arab resentment and distrust of the US formed around this point.
By spouting standard anti-American propaganda, the Soviet Union appeared to sympathize with the
Arabs and thus gained a foothold in the Middle East.

Action
Israel was not concerned with the canal per say, but rather with gaining unhindered passage to Port
Elat - through the Straights of Tiran -and ending the terrorist attacks in Israel. Peres noted that
both of these goals were achieved.
Israel’s impressive advances across the Sinai provided Prime Minister Ben-Gurion with a bargaining
chip when the cease-fire was enacted.
This enabled him to obtain Nasser’s guarantee that the Straights would remain open and the
Fidaiyyun attacks would end, in exchange for returning the Sinai.

Conclusion
The fear of Soviet influence in Egypt in the United States was real.
The USSR was always the primary concern. From America’s perspective the Soviet Union was the Cold
War - remove it and the problems ended, subdue Communist influence and the free world was safe.
One can be positive then that the Cold War, in some way, influenced Eisenhower in his reaction to
the Suez Canal Crisis.
The United States was against the Anglo-French military initiative and harshly criticized the
actions of France, England, and Israel.

Crisis questions
1.Was Israeli actions necessary or could they have avoided the military action?
2.Was there a benefit for the Americans?
3.Does Rational Choice theory help explain the Anglo-French-Israeli actions?