



VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS (VNSEA)

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BSSb 1105 International Security Policy

25/9/2023



VNSA - General Info

- Primary, secondary, and tertiary conflict actors
- Intrastate, Interstate, and Non-state/Sub-state conflicts
- Violent Non-State Actors:
 - a) use violence to achieve their goals
 - b) are not integrated within formalized state structures
- Violence that involves violent non-state actors is often described as unconventional
- Violent non-state actors involved in a low-intensity conflict may prefer the status quo over negotiation and mediation because their power is much lower

Typology of War Participants

- 1. Members of the armed forces according to international law:
 - *Combatants* – members of regular or irregular armed forces
 - *Non-combatants* - not intended for combat duties (medics, clerics).
- 2. Civilians
- Real fighters in modern wars:
 - a) Conventional soldiers/army
 - b) Insurgents, guerrillas and rebels/partisans
 - c) Terrorists
 - d) Mercenaries, PSC/PMC
 - e) Foreign volunteers
 - f) Warlords
 - g) Child soldiers
 - h) Paramilitary units and death squads
 - i) Militias

Factors Affecting the Rise of VNSA

- End of Cold War and the emergence of a globalized world
- Socioeconomic factors and absence of goods
- Repressive politics
- Poverty and income inequality
- Weakness of security institutions
- State collapse
- Individual explanations (rural vs. urban, age, education, socio-economic status, unemployment, socio-psychological level)

VNSA Typology according to Williams

- Rebels/Insurgency
- Militia
- Paramilitary units
- Terrorist groups
- Warlords
- Criminal organizations and gangs
- Motivations and purpose
- Strength and scope
- Funding and access to resources
- Organizational structure
- Role of violence
- Relationship between VNSA and state
- Functions of VNSAs for members and supporters

VNSA Typology according to Ezrow

- Insurgencies
- Warlords and Marauders
- Paramilitary units
- Terrorist Organizations
- Private military companies
- Organized crime and gangs
- Motivation
- Strategy and tactics
- Funding and access to resources
- Organizational structure
- Scope and power
- Victims
- Legitimacy and popularity

Table III.1 Types of Violent Non-state Actors and their Key Characteristics

Group	Motivation	Strategy and tactics	Key group threatened/ victim	Organizational structure	Scope and power	Legitimacy and popularity
De facto state	Political: set up a state	Provide state services and armed defence; hold territory	State	Tightly organized; hierarchical	Very powerful; territorial control	High legitimacy
Political organizations with militant wings	Political: influence policy	Provide party platform and armed defence	State	Tightly organized; hierarchical	Somewhat powerful	High legitimacy; public support
Insurgency	Political: varies	Mostly armed conflict; hold territory	State and society	Somewhat tightly organized; somewhat hierarchical	Somewhat powerful; some territorial control	Some legitimacy
Terror organization	Political: varies	Engage the media; psychological warfare; kill civilians	Society	Tightly organized; somewhat hierarchical	Not powerful	Little legitimacy
Terror network	Political: amorphous	Engage the media; psychological warfare; kill civilians	Society	Cellular/loose; somewhat hierarchical	Not powerful	Little legitimacy
Marauding rebels	Economic/ opportunistic	Loot and pillage; kill civilians	Society (state may have already collapsed)	Loose	Not powerful; temporary control of some towns or villages	Little legitimacy
Warlord	Economic/ opportunistic	Loot and pillage; predation	Society (state may have already collapsed)	Somewhat organized around charismatic warlord	Somewhat powerful; some control over territory	Little legitimacy
Organized crime	Economic/ opportunistic	Corruption, crime and violence	State, society, individuals	Tightly organized; formerly hierarchical, now flatter hierarchy	Very powerful; some territorial sphere of influence; may control transactions and flows of goods	Little legitimacy
Gang	Economic/ opportunistic	Petty crime and violence	Individuals and society	Somewhat loose; somewhat hierarchical	Not powerful but becoming more dangerous	Little legitimacy
PSC	Economic/ opportunistic	Gun-for-hire; earn profit and maintain stability	State, other violent non-state actors	Tightly organized; hierarchical	Somewhat powerful but does not control territory	Little legitimacy
Paramilitary	Economic/ political	Armed conflict; possibly hold territory	State, other violent non-state actors, individuals	Tightly organized	Somewhat powerful; sometimes controls territory	Little legitimacy

VNSA Typology according to Schneckener

Table 1: Types of Armed Non-State Actors

	Change vs. Status Quo	Territorial vs. Non-Territorial	Physical vs. Psychological Use of Violence	Political/Ideological vs. Profit-Driven Motivation
Rebels, Guerrillas	Change	Territorial	Physical	Political
Militias	Status quo	Territorial Non-territorial	Physical Psychological	Political
Clan Chiefs, Big Men	Status quo	Territorial	Physical	Political
Warlords	Status quo	Territorial	Physical Psychological	Profit-driven
Terrorists	Change	Non-territorial	Psychological	Political
Criminals, Mafia, Gangs	Status quo	Non-territorial	Psychological	Profit-driven
Mercenaries, PMCs/PSCs	Indifferent	Territorial	Physical	Profit-driven
Marauders, 'Sobels'	Indifferent	Non-territorial	Psychological	Profit-driven

Insurgency

- The primary raison d'être of these groups is to achieve some political goal
- Territorial control
- Strategy - irregular attacks and war of attrition
- Hierarchical structure, in recent years there has been decentralization
- A threat to the legitimacy of the state
- Four basic types: **liberationist, separatist, reformist/revolutionary, and religious/traditional.**

Summary Points

- Insurgencies have often been mistaken for terrorist groups.
- Insurgencies are much more powerful than terrorist groups, but they are also more constrained.
- Insurgencies often use terrorism as a tactic, but their primary strategy is to engage in armed struggle and to win over the hearts and minds of a constituency.
- Insurgencies have had to change how they fund themselves due to losses in state sponsorship.
- Insurgencies that want to secede from their host state and have control over a defined territory become de facto states.

Insurgency

**Insurgencies that commit acts of terrorism
(hold territory)**

Boko Haram (Nigeria)

IS (Syria and Iraq)

FARC (Colombia)

Al-Shabaab (Somalia)

Taliban (Afghanistan)

PKK (Turkey)

LTTE (Sri Lanka)

Naxalites (India)

Haqqani Network (Afghanistan)

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
(Philippines)

Shining Path (Peru)

**Terrorist groups
(do not hold territory)**

ETA

Baader-Meinhof Gang

Weather Underground

Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)

Red Brigades

Aum Shinrikyo

Abu Nidal Organization

Abu Sayyaf

Jemaah Islamiyah

Japanese Red Army

Egyptian Islamic Jihad

Terrorist Organizations

- A deliberate form of politically motivated violence
- Lack of territorial character
- Low threat to state legitimacy (very little public support)
- Strategy - psychological impact, shock a wide audience, attacks mainly on civilians
- Structure - currently mainly network
- Arquilla a Ronfeldt (2001) - Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy
- Zelinsky a Shubik (2008) - hierarchy, franchise, venture capital, brand



Chain network




Star or hub network



All-channel network


Figure 3.11 Basic types of networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt).

Trends of Contemporary Terrorism



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
1	Afghanistan	8.822	↔
2	Burkina Faso	8.564	↑ 2
3	Somalia	8.463	↔
4	Mali	8.412	↑ 3
5	Syria	8.161	↑ 1
6	Pakistan	8.160	↑ 3
7	Iraq	8.139	↓ 5
8	Nigeria	8.065	↓ 3
9	Myanmar (Burma)	7.977	↑ 1
10	Niger	7.616	↓ 2
11	Cameroon	7.347	↑ 1
12	Mozambique	7.330	↓ 1
13	India	7.175	↔
14	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.872	↑ 2
15	Colombia	6.697	↓ 1
16	Egypt	6.632	↓ 1
17	Chile	6.619	↑ 1
18	Philippines	6.328	↓ 1
19	Chad	6.168	↔
20	Kenya	6.163	↔
21	Iran	5.688	↑ 5
22	Yemen	5.616	↓ 1
23	Türkiye	5.600	↔
24	Indonesia	5.502	↔
25	Israel	5.489	↑ 5
26	Thailand	5.430	↓ 4
27	Togo	4.915	↑ 49
28	Benin	4.840	↑ 23

Trends of Contemporary Terrorism - Africa



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Warlordism

- Primarily economically motivated violence
- Strong territorial character
- Hierarchical structure - headed by a charismatic leader
- A threat especially to weak states
- Strategy - marauding terror, unpredictable and random violence

Summary Points

- Warlords and rebels emerge in states that are failing or have collapsed; they emerge in post-conflict zones.
- Warlords and rebels offer few political benefits and mostly prey on their populations.
- Warlords and rebels undermine state legitimacy but have no ability to administer.
- Warlords and rebels create tremendous security and instability though they claim to offer protection.
- Warlords and rebels have an interest in prolonging a low-intensity conflict to take advantage of the war economy.

Organized Crime and Gangs

- Economic motivation
- Often transnational
- Hierarchical and network structure
- Strategy - use of violence to achieve economic goals, attempt to avoid media attention, violence especially in times of uncertainty
- The effort to subvert the structures of the state - they do not want to completely destroy the state

Summary Points

- Organized criminal groups are capable and complex organizations.
- Gangs have evolved and become much more violent and powerful, but they are not as sophisticated as organized criminal groups.
- While gang members are incredibly young and seek out gangs due to a need for camaraderie, organized criminals are often older and more skilled.


Organised Crime - Definition

- OCG defining characters according to Šmíd:
 - a) hierarchical structure/organisation
 - b) business continuity
 - c) corruption
 - d) violence
 - e) illegal activity
 - f) penetrating economic markets
 - g) membership exclusivity
 - h) non-ideological
- Mafia - type of OCG, arbitration of disputes/illicit agreements between criminals, political dimension.
- Gang - territorial character, less sophisticated methods and activities.
- Syndicate - illegal businesses on a larger, also international scale.

Typology of Organized Crime Groups


- **UNODC defining features:** structure, size, activities, level of transborder operations, identity, level of violence, use of corruption, political influence, penetration into the legitimate economy and level of cooperation with other organizations.

■ A) Standard Hierarchy



- Single leader
- Clearly defined hierarchy
- Strong systems of internal discipline
- Known by a specific name
- Often strong social or ethnic identity
- Violence essential to activities
- Often have clear influence or control over defined territory


B) Regional hierarchy



- Single leadership structure
- Line of command from centre
- Degree of autonomy at regional level
- Geographic/regional distribution
- Multiple activities
- Often strong social or ethnic identity
- Violence essential to activities


Typology of Organized Crime Groups

■ C) Clustered Hierarchy




- Consists of a number of criminal groups
- Governing arrangement for the groups present
- Cluster has stronger identity than constituent groups
- Degree of autonomy for constituent groups
- Formation strongly linked to social/historical context
- Relatively rare

D) Core group



- Core group surrounded by a loose network
- Limited number of individuals
- Tightly organized flat structure
- Small size maintains internal discipline
- Seldom has social or ethnic identity
- Only in a limited number of cases known by a specific name

■ E) Criminal network




- Defined by activities of key individuals
- Prominence in network determined by contacts/skills
- Personal loyalties/ties more important than social/ethnic identities
- Network connections endure, coalescing around series of criminal projects
- Low public profile – seldom known by any name
- Network reforms after exit of key individuals

Global Organized Crime Index – Measurement and Typology

FIGURE 1.1

Criminality indicators



Criminal Actors

- ▲ CA1. Mafia-style groups
- ▲ CA2. Criminal networks
- ▲ CA3. State-embedded actors
- ▲ CA4. Foreign actors

Criminal Markets

- ◆ CM1. Human trafficking
- ◆ CM2. Human smuggling
- ◆ CM3. Arms trafficking
- ◆ CM4. Flora crimes
- ◆ CM5. Fauna crimes
- ◆ CM6. Non-renewable resource crimes
- ◆ CM7. Heroin trade
- ◆ CM8. Cocaine trade
- ◆ CM9. Cannabis trade
- ◆ CM10. Synthetic drug trade

Scoring thresholds – criminality

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
NON-EXISTENT TO LITTLE INFLUENCE			MODERATE INFLUENCE		SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE		SEVERE INFLUENCE		

Private Military Companies

- Economic motivation
- Territoriality is related to the type of task/contract
- Hierarchical structure
- Strategy - they do not have long-term strategies, it always depends on the contract
- Can threaten the state's monopoly on the use of violence, ineffective as a long-term solution
- Executive Outcomes, Blackwaters/Academi, Wagner Group
- United Nations Mercenary Convention 2001 (The convention extends on the Geneva Conventions Protocol I which in Article 47(1) states that a mercenary cannot be a lawful combatant or prisoner of war)
- Mercenaries: foreigner, independence – not a member of the army, economic motivation, obscure recruitment, short-term/ad hoc tasks, engaged in combat
- Military Providing Firms, Military Consulting Firms, Military Supporting Firms

Paramilitary units vs. Pro-government militia

- Typology of Pro-government militias: Competition, Provider and Emergency.

	Paramilitary Forces	PGMs
Government link	Official	Semi-Official, Informal
Functions	Regular and Irregular Activities	Rather Irregular Activities
Autonomy	Low	High
Example	National Gendarmerie, France	Janjaweed, Sudan

Thank you for your
attention