Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994): 448-467
RHETORICAL EXPERIMENTATION AND THE COLD WAR, 1947-1953: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONALIST APPROACH TO PROPAGANDA
Shawn J. Parry-Giles
Despite renewed interest in the study of propaganda, little attention has been paid to the actual discourse disseminated by America's international propaganda program. The focus of the new propaganda scholarship centers instead on more "public" communication released or delivered in the United States or allied countries, including advertising, education materials, films, political campaigns, or newspaper cartoons.1 Even J. Michael Sproule, well known for his study of propaganda, focuses on ways it is defined and studied rather than on the actual propaganda disseminated abroad by the United States Government.2 Such studies that examine only preliminary strategies without also analyzing the propaganda itself, provide an incomplete understanding of propaganda's complexity and its effects.
This lack of attention to America's international propaganda is brought about in part by limited access to these materials. In 1948, when America's first peacetime propaganda program gained its legalized status through the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, lawmakers wanted to prevent the government from propagandizing its own people,3 blocking access to such potentially controversial material. Thus, stringent policies were enacted to allow the scripts to be examined only by "press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and stations" along with members of Congress.4 Even today, researchers gain access to these historical transcripts by perusing archival libraries.
Examining America's international propaganda not only provides new insights into how the United States Government practiced the art of propaganda, but also into the rhetorical strategies employed during America's Cold War with the Soviet Union. Justified as an instrument to aid American efforts against its Cold War enemy, congressional leaders and presidential administrations sought to define and refine propaganda strategies while simultaneously defining and refining American Cold War tactics. Just as few scholars have examined the government's international propaganda, few have fully addressed the impact of Cold War messages directed exclusively toward an international audience,5 despite the significant impact these messages had on the country's credibility abroad.6 To that end, an analysis of America's propaganda strategies functions as a synecdoche of American rhetorical experimentation in the early years of the Cold War. For America's international propaganda and its Cold War rhetoric, some of the most important audiences resided abroad.
Specifically, this study analyzes the congressional deliberations over America s
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first peacetime propaganda program from 1947 through 1953. Also examined are specific examples of American propaganda disseminated to foreign audiences during this time period. The early stages of the debate can be identified as a period of naivete, when political leaders assumed that by simply teaching the world about America and its democratic values, the United States would win the Cold War. Realizing that communism's tenets proved persuasive, political officials began disseminating a rhetoric of hysteria, reflecting the paranoia of McCarthyism in the latter years of the Truman administration. Such a rhetoric communicated the fragility of democracy and subsequently empowered the communist message by acknowledging its potency.7 When the Eisenhower administration entered office, however, a more psychologically-based strategy was crafted. During this stage of the "war," American propagandists became more sophisticated about the need to link propaganda to specific policies, identifying those policies with the aspirations of foreign peoples. While determined to celebrate the tenets of democracy, Eisenhower attacked communism, but in a much more covert and subtle manner.
The rhetorical miscalculations of the Truman administration can be explained in part by its attempt to inculcate a culturally-based ideology abroad.8 After realizing that a celebration of democracy created resentment among international peoples, the Truman administration countered with an equally ineffectual rhetoric driven by an American conception of communism. Such rhetorical mishaps would not be surprising to many propaganda scholars who maintain that the practice of propaganda is culturally based. Philo C. Wasburn argues, for example, that "all [propaganda] broadcastfs]. .. derive their meaning from the political culture in which they are embedded,"9 while Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell observe that "how propaganda is developed, used, and received is culturally] specific."10
While useful in explaining the rhetorical miscues of the Truman administration, these culturally-grounded theories of propaganda fail to account for the enhanced success of the Eisenhower administration's propaganda approach. These propaganda breakthroughs resulted from the development of an interculturally-sensitive rhetoric that was more audience driven than institutionally based. Such an approach represented a tactical shift to a propaganda less reliant on a community-based ideology. Ultimately, this internationalist approach was designed to move the United States ahead of its formidable foe in the ideological conflict between democracy and communism.
The analysis of this case also answers a peculiar problem concerning the cross-cultural impact of ideology. Michael Calvin McGee purports that ideology is culturally driven: "ideographs—language imperatives which hinder and perhaps make impossible pure thought—are bound within the culture which they define."11 Such a culturally-based view of ideology does not fully account for the effectiveness of foreign policy rhetoric directed to international communities. In order to explain the impact of the Eisenhower administration's internationalist approach, we must accept that some ideologies transcend culture, just as Karl Mannheim's "individual" conceptions of ideology fuse together to form a "collective" ideology.12 To account for the effectiveness of foreign policy rhetoric, it may be that certain ideographs, like metaphors, are archetypal because of their universal appeal that is "unaffected by cultural variation."19
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The Period of Naivete
At the end of World War II, Truman administration officials attempted to extend the propaganda activities of the Office of War Information. In justifying a peacetime propaganda program, they characterized democracy in very powerful terms. In 1947 and 1948, congressional officials felt assured that once foreign peoples understood the principles of democracy, its tenets would naturally spread, thwarting any communist advancement. Once legalized, America's propaganda mirrored this confidence and celebrated democratic principles. Clearly, the Truman administration's rhetorical strategies were influenced by the ideology of democracy during the first years of the Cold War. Justificatory arguments and America's propaganda were both driven by a belief in the inherent naturalness of democracy. The important task for America's propagandists was simply to inform the world of America's story. As the cold warriors implied, any other governmental philosophy was bound to fail when pitted against democracy's moral force.
The Smith-Mundt Deliberations
In May of 1947, Republican Congressman Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, with the help of Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), introduced H. R. 3342 in Congress to legalize America's first official peacetime propaganda program.14 The Smith-Mundt Act was designed to "enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."15 After investigations were held by the subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Smith-Mundt Act passed into law with President Truman's signature on January 27, 1948.16 These deliberations were significant because they determined the themes for America's earliest Cold War propaganda.
A major focus of the Smith-Mundt debates centered on constructing a new portrait of the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II, a strategy designed to warrant the need for a permanent propaganda program. Some congressional supporters told of totalitarian abuses, with Fred E. Busbey (R-IL) highlighting the Soviets' use of "concentration camps" and "firing squads" that spread "terror" across Eastern Europe. Others, like John E. Rankin (D-MS), emphasized the atheistic tendencies of the Soviet Union: "Communism is making a world-wide attempt to destroy Christianity and all free governments that are based on Christianity." Still others stressed the imperialistic aims of the Soviet Union. Congressman Mundt constructed a metaphorical image of a Russian bear taking over weaker countries: "While we with the dove of peace were cooing to ourselves, the Russian bear was moving out pulling into its bosom a swarm of little countries ... making them part of its domain."17
Political leaders juxtaposed this characterization of communism with a celebration of democratic values. Congressman Charles J. Kersten (R-WI), for example, reminded his colleagues that America was founded upon the principles that "the individual... comes first before the state, and that the rights that the individual gets are not from the state but from his God."18 Senator Carl A. Hatch (D-NM) provided a similar view of democracy, advocating that it was founded upon "the rights of free men, the freedom of the individual, [and] the rule of law and order."19
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Because of its superiority, Smith-Mundt supporters urged that the United States was morally obliged to explain the principles of democracy to world audiences, allowing for its institutionalization everywhere. Representative Dewey Short (R-MO) argued: "It is essential that American democracy be able to speak with a voice of its own on the international stage." Congressman Joseph R. Bryson (D-SC) explained the urgency: "I am convinced that we have in our democratic system the ultimate hope for the world. We must sell it to the world, by letting the world know how it operates." The ultimate goal, Congressman Charles A. Eaton (R-NJ) claimed, was "to make Americanism dominant in every portion of the world."20
Proponents of the propaganda program concluded that once the voice of democracy was heard, people all over the world would forcefully reject communism. Many in Congress went so far as to claim that the Soviet people would denounce their own government's propaganda because of democracy's supremacy. When asked whether the Russian populace swallowed "all of the propaganda of their government," former ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman, replied that the Soviet people were "conscious of the fact that all Soviet information [was] controlled and slanted," leaving them with a "great desire for the other side."21 Because people abroad allegedly possessed the capability for discerning "truth" from "lies," Representative Pete Jarman (D-AL) called upon the program to direct its propaganda to "the fellow out in the little mud hut,"22 since they could, as Assistant Secretary of State William Benton declared, "determine the actions of their governments."23 Such an understanding, Representative Mundt concluded, would allow international communities to "become strong enough and well enough organized to resist and repel communism."24
The confidence on the part of the Smith-Mundt proponents was grounded in a conception of democracy as the natural state of human affairs. These political officials implied that foreign audiences would naturally believe the "truth" disseminated by America and naturally reject the principles of communism. While Congressman Kersten argued that "the Government of the United States is based upon the true nature of man,"25 Democratic Representative Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois maintained that "the dream of freedom is common to all men; and America is the tangible form of that dream everywhere."26 At bottom, the rationale for the propaganda program rested upon this premise: people would naturally prefer democracy if only they knew more about it because of the inherent benefits and freedoms derived from it. General Dwight D. Eisenhower's statement before the 1947 Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs typified this sentiment: "The more the advantages of [our] government are spread throughout the world, the more likely it will be that system is followed by other countries."27
Clearly, the hegemonic influence of ideology influenced these political actors' views of the Cold War. As McGee maintains, ideologies become "part of the real lives of the people whose motives they articulate,"28 illustrating their power. Those involved in the debate over the Smith-Mundt Act appeared to believe that democracy's superiority would actually be accepted even by those who were unfamiliar with its tenets and whose governments were openly hostile to its precepts. The Smith-Mundt debates thus led propaganda officials to focus predominandy on the United States in their propaganda, ignoring communist activities. The culturally-based ideological framework that guided American propagandists during this period
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blinded them to the possible negative reactions that such propaganda might have. The thought processes of die propagandists, though, are clearly understood when grounded within an ideological framework that fostered a belief in the inherent truths of democracy.
The Propaganda of Democracy
In celebrating the "truths" about democracy abroad, America's propagandists used the United States as the divine example. One example of such propaganda involved the Voice of America (VOA) radio series, Know North America, which aired in Latin America in 1947 and 1948 and typified other propaganda attempts of that time. The Know North America series consisted of "weekly program[s]" that traced the "adventures of two travelers as they discoverfed] the many miracles of the past and present life in the United States."29
During each broadcast, the travelers accentuated the varying attributes or natural resources of the United States. In Texas, for example, the narrator stated: "It is not only her history but her present day life which is as fantastic as the past. Texas is larger than France and produces everything: wheat, rice, fruits, catde, gold, silver and oil."30 Speaking more generally about the United States during the Wyoming story, one of the travelers commented: "The thing that surprises me most about the United States is that everywhere one finds the same conveniences; there is no difference between New York and the smallest town."31
The Know North America broadcasts abo defined the values that exemplified America's superiority. During the Wyoming broadcast, the travelers stressed the importance of equality. According to the narrator, a "continual concern" of the "government" is "to raise the standard of living in the whole country, because if some live better than others, there is inequality . .. and inequality is not democracy."32 Linking the work ethic to democracy, the narrator commented: "In order to know the United States well... it is necessary to visit the humble dwellings where true democracy is forged and Alabama is the perfect symbol of the poor state ... becoming rich through work."33 The Pennsylvania broadcast, of course, afforded the opportunity to stress the value of liberty. In discussing the crack in the Liberty Bell, the traveler asked, "Is it true that they rang it so much when the Declaration of Independence was signed that it cracked?" The narrator responded, "Perhaps that is a legend, but it deserves to be a true story." Regarding Constitution Square, the travelers implied the universal need for democracy by concluding that if "every country" had such a square that emphasized "liberty, equality and fraternity," the "world would not be what it is today."34
Even though America's propaganda program followed the congressional prescriptions of celebrating democratic ideals as oudined in the Smith-Mundt debates, political officials quickly learned that broadcasts such as Know North America achieved unintended consequences. Rather than gaining support for democracy, the broadcasts aided in creating resentment among world communities. John Henderson claims that such propaganda "provoked envy, jealousy, and resentment in underdeveloped countries."35 As Fitzhugh Green explains, "Foreigners were treated to copious descriptions of America's prosperity in terms of millions of automobiles, washing machines, and bath tubs for every citizen." Intending to contrast the material benefits of democracy with the substandard living conditions under comnm-
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nism, the propaganda created instead "envy" and "resentment" in many parts of the world.36 In Latin America, specifically, people appeared suspicious of American activities during that time even though varying propaganda broadcasts had been targeted toward that region.37
Congressional leaders also soon learned that communism did not falter once the world learned more about democracy. In fact, communism continued to march forth strongly, gaining power in parts of the world. In February of 1948, for example, the communists carried out a successful coup and forced Czechoslovakia into the "Russian orbit." The Soviets also occupied what eventually became known as East Berlin, while North Korean troops invaded the Republic of South Korea, and Nationalist China adopted communism as its form of government. As communism gained strength, reports also mounted of communist subversion in the United States Government. But, most significantly, the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb in the winter of 1949-1950.38 All of these factors helped bring about the changing tone of American political discourse and overseas propaganda.
The rhetoric that exemplified the early years of the Cold War is best explained from an ideological perspective. The beliefs in democracy's superiority led to the development of naive rhetorical strategies that proved counter-productive. Propaganda officials learned that democracy's precepts lacked intercultural appeal, and that simply telling America's story to the world would not result in a predilection for American "truths." Such a result is not surprising since a culturally-driven rhetoric is bound to encounter persuasive resistance in different societies. Thus, a rhetoric steeped in the ideology of democracy, while effective domestically, lacked effectiveness abroad, illustrating the naivete of a culturally-based rhetoric for foreign policy issues. The Truman administration thus set out to devise a more strident rhetoric that would aggressively combat America's Cold War enemy—an enemy who appeared to be winning the "war of words."
The Period of Hysteria
In the latter three years of the Truman administration, political officials began talking less about democracy and more about communism in debates over America's propaganda program. Seemingly adopting the view that international audiences had to be manipulated into supporting America's foreign policy objectives,39 Truman administration officials began relying on a more combative propaganda approach. Rather than being driven by the ideology of democracy, this stage of the Cold War produced rhetoric that was influenced more by an American conception of communism. Because of communism's alleged power, the Truman administration, through its Campaign of Truth, sought to literalize the savagery image of communism abroad, relying upon varying archetypal metaphors. These metaphors, while designed to discredit communism, instead seemingly empowered the enemy and functioned to export American fears.
The Campaign of Truth
From 1950 through 1953, Truman administration officials attempted to garner increased funding for America's propaganda efforts through what they called an international Campaign of Truth.40 In support of that campaign, the Truman
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administration established the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to integrate propaganda strategies with other aspects of America's foreign policies, like the military, economic and diplomatic areas.41 To test the Campaign of Truth's effectiveness, members of Congress focused increased attention on the propaganda program, with the House and Senate Appropriation committees attempting to measure the impact of the program's propaganda in light of increased expenditures. By 1953, the program had drawn even more congressional attention, with the Senate Committee on Government Operations, through its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (McCarthy committee), holding hearings on the Voice of America and the program's information libraries.42 These congressional deliberations produced a much more aggressive propaganda during Truman's last years in office.
Throughout the Campaign of Truth deliberations, policymakers argued that the Soviet Union conspired to undermine the United States Government, justifying the need to step up America's propaganda efforts. Mose Harvey of the State Department's Division of Research on the Soviet Union reported that a "hate America" campaign was launched on January 21, 1950, by the Soviet Union.43 Saul K. Padover explained that this Soviet campaign accented the corruption of big business in the United States, charging that American imperialism sought to dominate the world economy.44 As Senator H. Alexander Smith proclaimed, the Soviets portrayed themselves as "the champions of the downtrodden" trying to overthrow the "domination of other powers" like the United States—a "capitalistic, materialistic, dollar-sign nation."45
Most disturbingly, propaganda officials urged, Soviet propaganda was believed by many in the international community. Senator William Benton (D-CT), former Assistant Secretary of State, readily admitted that Soviet propaganda had significant effect: "It was Soviet Russia . . . that has shown the tremendous power, for good or evil, of projecting ideas in international relations."46 Other congressional leaders agreed, with Senator Homer Ferguson (D-MI) arguing that the Soviets had "mastered the techniques of using words as a substitute for deeds."47 The fall of China and the North Korean invasion of South Korea provided evidence for their claims.48
By 1953, policymakers had begun articulating the fear that Soviet actions gravely threatened democratic principles. Throughout the McCarthy committee hearings, the testimony of former Communist Party members contributed to a portrait of an all-potent communist conspiracy. Professor Louis Francis Budenz, a key witness for the committee, stressed the urgency of the communist threat, arguing that even the most elaborate defense system would not suffice: "I think we must arm ourselves, decidedly. And then, along with armament, we must maintain our own internal security and protect our morale and have those firm policies which will make our armament also worthwhile." Committee members appeared to accept Budenz's views unquestionably, with Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO) concluding that the United States needed an "adequate national security" system, even at the expense of America's "standard of living."49
McCarthy committee members elevated the impact of the communist message by advocating its censorship. To begin with, congressional leaders such as Senator John L. McClellan (D-AR) charged that "books and documents" available in the overseas libraries acted as "sources of propaganda" for the "Communists in Russia" who made "derogatory" statements against the "American system." Budenz, a former
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communist himself, confirmed McClellan's fears/alleging that these books represented a major way of "breeding communism." As a result, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI) not only called for the removal of certain books from the overseas libraries, but went so far as to support the burning of such books. Regarding one particular book, McCarthy declared: "Frankly, I do not care what they do with [this] book after they remove it, whether they burn it or not. I can see no objection to destroying it."50 As a result of the McCarthy committee investigations, Robert Goldston alleges, hundreds of books from the overseas libraries were either banned or burned.51
By speaking of communism in such hysterical terms, the McCarthy committee ordained America's Cold War enemy with immeasurable power. A message simply espousing the ideals of democracy could no longer compete against the powerful propagandistic forces of communism. As a result, congressional leaders called upon America's propagandists to adopt more aggressive tactics in order to thwart communist "lies." As Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) urged, the United States needed "a fighting policy, aim[ed] at the soonest possible collapse of the Red Hierarchy"—one relying on the "techniques of psychological warfare to match such a policy."52
The Propaganda of Fear
America's propaganda from 1950-1953 mirrored congressional precepts, focusing more on the evils of communism and less on the attributes of democracy. The analysis of certain metaphors found in America's propaganda reveals what Robert L. Ivie refers to as the "motive" or the "interpretation of reality" for the Truman administration as it literalized the savagery image of communism.53 Such a focus, though, inadvertendy communicated the power of communism.
During the Campaign of Truth, the VOA aired a series entitled, Life Behind the Curtain, which portrayed communism as a living entity. In one particular story, dated December 28, 1950, communism was depicted in humanistic terms: "The State is the flesh from the flesh of the people, blood from the blood of the people. He who infringes the laws and decrees of this State, therefore, cuts into flesh of the people." The VOA broadcaster concluded the story by indicating that viewing the "state as a living creature... would have excited envy in Hider."54 By describing communism in anthropomorphic terms, propagandists also implied the strength of that governmental form.
This "living creature" metaphor was furthered through the reoccurring theme that communism seemed to be spreading beyond control. During a February 15, 1951, story entitled, "Spotlight on Dictatorship," the VOA emphasized that "Comin-form leaders [had] instigated war in Korea, Indo-China, Malaya and elsewhere." The broadcaster concluded that "new evidence" existed that the "Soviet slave labor system" had even spread into "Czechoslovakia and other satellites," including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania.55 While the motivation for emphasizing the spread of communism may have been to arouse support for America's foreign policies, the focus on its growth could also have been interpreted as proof of its persuasiveness and power.
The threat that communism posed to the United States and other free countries was seen in the metaphors VOA adopted to illustrate the potential effect of
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communism's successes. The following excerpt from a 1951 VOA story on the "Causes of International Tension" epitomized the severity of that threat:
It is the existence of these huge military forces . .. that has forced the West to look to its defenses. To do less in view of the post war record of Soviet aggression would be suicide. Clearly, until the West has built the defensive strength in Europe which will serve as a deterent force against aggression, the peace is not safe.56
Not only did the "force" of communism threaten the "peace," but its "force" could lead to the death of democracy. According to the VOA, "suicide" could result if America's inaction persisted. While designed to create a sense of urgency, these vehicles also communicated the vulnerability of democracy.
Even though many congressional leaders applauded the more aggressive approach to disseminating propaganda, this paranoid style caused problems as well. To begin with, Richard H. Rovere alleges that the investigations of the McCarthy committee "scandalized a good many foreigners" who had been in "the habit of listening to [the VOA]."57 Moreover, according to Wilson P. Dizard, communist propaganda capitalized on this evidence of "American hysteria, American weakness, [and] American immaturity." For the Kremlin, McCarthyism and America's propaganda confirmed that communism was, in fact, taking hold in many nations of the world.58 Finally, the effectiveness of the newly created Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) also proved disappointing. According to Robert E. Elder, "the PSB apparently had little influence upon actions" in the political, economic, and military fields as designed under the Truman administration.59 Such shortcomings further inhibited the effectiveness of America's propaganda during the Campaign of Truth.
The Truman administration's propaganda problems can be explained in part by its lack of intercultural appeal, as shown by the metaphors used. These communist metaphors represent what Edwin Black has called the "idiomatic token of an ideology,"80 indicative of America's conceptions of communism. Even though Truman succeeded in literalizing die savagery metaphor of communism at home, as Ivie has suggested, this literalization process did not necessarily extend beyond the borders of the United States and its allies. The period of hysteria thus represented as much naivete as did the first stage because of the assumptions that America's values would once again be shared by tile world community. The Truman administration practiced what Sproule has identified as an "old rhetoric" view, with the message directed more to "an assumed whole discursive public." Such an approach was soon rejected by Eisenhower administration officials, who adopted a "new managerial style," illustrating that "rhetoric is able to capitalize on the measured proclivities of various segments of the crowd."61 Such a shift in thought represented just one new strategy that the Eisenhower administration instituted in its conceptualization of the Cold War battle and the role of propaganda within it.
The Period of Psychological Strategy
From the outset, Eisenhower acknowledged communism as humanity's primary enemy.62 Yet he also maintained that democracy could prevail so long as his administration enacted strategic foreign policies substantiated by astute psychological warfare tactics. Inspired by the advances of science and thus the imminent threat
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of nuclear war, Eisenhower approached the Cold War as a competition between equals. While "science" equalized democracy and communism, inspiring the Eisenhower administration to avoid a physical confrontation, "science" also became central to his administration's propaganda strategy—a bargaining tool that could give the United States the psychological edge. For more than a year, the Eisenhower administration attempted to equate the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the United States, while discrediting the Soviet Union's attempt to co-opt the ideograph of peace for themselves. Such a strategy transcended the ethnocentric approach of the Truman years because of the great concern for adapting propaganda to more universal values and audiences. The Eisenhower administration was able to develop this more international approach in part through the use of archetypal metaphors. Overall, the international approach reflected much more subtle propaganda strategies than the bombastic persuasive tactics of the Truman years.
The Jackson Committee's Strategies for the USIA
Shortly after winning the election in 1952, Eisenhower appointed the President's Committee on International Information Activities (Jackson committee) for the purpose of evaluating "international information policies."63 Named for its chair, New York businessman William Jackson, this eight-member committee began its inquiry on January 26, 1953 and issued a final report on June 1 of that same year.64 At the time of the investigation, the Eisenhower administration determined that "no publicity" should be given "to the Committee or its work";65 the bulk of the committee's recommendations thus remained classified until the 1980s. We now know, however, that the Jackson committee played an integral role in the Eisenhower administration's Cold War strategies. The committee's work also impacted the creation and operationalization of the United States Information Agency (USIA), which began on August 1,1953.66
While the Jackson committee worked from the premise that the Soviet rulers sought "world domination," committee members concluded that political warfare would be the Soviets' key weapon in the Cold War. Unlike some earlier political officials, the Jackson committee recognized the Soviets' skill in political warfare and believed "communist ideology" possessed "significant appeal to many people." Despite this realization, committee members felt confident that the United States and the free world could win the "war," provided that "psychological warfare" functioned as America's primary weapon. Thus, they set out to develop strategies to enhance democracy's appeal and underscore communism's blemishes to people around the world.67
The Jackson committee first identified problems with the Truman administration's propaganda program. To begin with, committee members agreed that "opportunities had been missed to take the offensive in global propaganda campaigns," with many of the past programs articulating a "defensive" message unrelated to America's foreign policies. The committee also complained that "the United States [had spoken] with a multitude of voices," resulting in "haphazard projection of too many and too diffuse propaganda themes." At bottom, the committee concluded that Truman's propaganda program suffered from a severe credibility problem because the information served "little use for ... foreign audiences," who were quick to take "offense at advice and exhortation received from abroad."68
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In order to overcome existing problems, the Jackson committee called for a total restructuring of America's propaganda program. Committee members determined that the program needed more direction "from the President" and called for the centralization of power regarding propaganda operations under the National Security Council (NSC), with the help of the newly established Operations Coordinating Board (OCB).69 At the same time, the committee wanted to insure that propaganda would actually "serve national policy." This reconfiguration would thus integrate the practice of propaganda with other areas of foreign policy while turning the new agency into a propaganda tool of the president's.70
Beyond centralizing propaganda strategy, the Jackson committee proposed that the propaganda program adopt one central strategy, designed to "harmonize whenever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States."71 This goal was designed to accentuate values associated with the ideologies of the individual countries. As the Eisenhower administration concluded: "The art of persuasion is to give him what he wants so truthfully and so skillfully as to influence his thinking in the process."72
In addressing the credibility problems of America's propaganda program further, the Jackson committee called for America's propaganda to reflect a more news-oriented approach rather than the strident style of the Truman administration. The committee recommended, for example, that the VOA broadcast "objective, factual news" that served as a "source of truth and information about world events." The defining characteristic of these channels became the distribution of material "for which the United States government [was] prepared to accept responsibility."73 Eisenhower concurred, adding that while "the tone and content should be forceful and direct," a "propagandist note should be avoided."74
Even though the Jackson committee believed that America's overseas program should develop the ethos of a news agency, committee members were not so naive as to expect the world's audiences to reject the communist message automatically. The committee thus believed the United States Government had to combat communist propaganda, yet in a more covert and credibility-enhancing manner: "all material intended for purposes of political warfare against the Soviet regime . . . [should] be diverted to Radio Liberation or other non-official stations."75 Even though these agencies were not officially connected to the United States Government, they received funding and direction from it.76 Eisenhower agreed with such a maneuver, calling for "clandestine arrangements" to be made with "magazines, newspapers... and book publishers in some countries" to supplant official propaganda operations.77
While the covert channels assumed the more explicit propaganda tasks, the USIA still performed more subtle propaganda functions. As indicated by a Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) blueprint,78 America's propaganda program was to become the center for a "psychological warfare offensive" against the Soviet Union. This offensive would attempt to force Soviet leaders into "difficult decisions of policy," while pressing "a clear and fresh vision of American purposes on the Soviet and satellite peoples." In the end, international audiences were to "associate their aspirations" with those of the United States Government.79
With the brainpower of the Jackson committee, the Eisenhower administration revamped America's propaganda program. As suggested by the Jackson committee,
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the Eisenhower administration would assume more direct control of America's propaganda. While reducing congressional control over its propaganda operations, the Eisenhower administration sought to inculcate a much more internationally-sensitive propaganda that encompassed more covert persuasive tactics. In order to integrate propaganda strategy with foreign policy goals, the Eisenhower administration developed two propaganda campaigns around the central theme of "peace," a potentially cross-cultural ideograph of the nuclear age.
The Propaganda of Peace
Even before the Jackson committee completed its work, and even before the USIA had officially begun operating, the Eisenhower administration began implementing the committee's plan for a new global propaganda offensive, centered around two major presidential addresses: "Chance for Peace" and "Atoms for Peace." Both denned America's major foreign policy strategies for the next year and provided the nucleus of larger campaigns designed to meet international propaganda aims. For the Eisenhower administration, the focus centered on the achievement of "peace" and the development of scientific advancements for peaceful means via more subue propaganda tactics. The Eisenhower administration, while establishing the United States as the scientific superpower, sought to literalize the archetypal ideograph of peace with the United States, in part, by using archetypal metaphors. For the Eisenhower administration, peace functioned as a more cross-cultural ideological commitment in the post-war world because of the continued threat that nuclear war posed, causing the administration to try to erase any connection between peace and communism. Overall, the administration adopted a much more audience-driven approach to propaganda, which reflected a marked change from the institutionally-determined propaganda of the Truman years.
The "Chance for Peace" address, delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, 1953,80 juxtaposed the peaceful intent of the "free world" versus the war-like behavior of the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period. Eisenhower credited the United States with seeking "true peace" after the war and condemned the "Soviet government" for exhibiting "force: huge armies, subversion, rule of neighbor nations." Despite the grim outlook, however, Eisenhower provided a resolution to the problem—one to which the United States had already committed—and one which Eisenhower asserted was "neither partial or punitive." While emphasizing that the United States was prepared to "dedicate" its "strength to serve the needs, rather than the fears, of the world," the President urged the Soviet Union to take action: to sign the "Austrian treaty"; to offer an "honorable armistice in Korea"; and most importantly, to reduce "the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world." Such measures, Eisenhower stressed, provided world governments with a "precious chance to turn the black tide of events."81
In the days following the speech, Radio Free Europe (RFE) continued portraying the United States as the country in search of genuine peace. When equating peace with the United States, RFE used the following descriptors: "total peace," "sincere and complete peace," "true peace," "just peace," "honest peace," "future peace," "lasting peace," "global peace," and the "real peace offensive."82 In contrast, RFE attempted to arouse suspicion concerning the Soviets' peace claims, using the
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following phrases: "so-called peace," "false peace," "peace maneuvers," "peace overtures," and an "empty and ambiguous peace."83
As the Eisenhower administration worked to co-opt peace for the United States, RFE helped insure that an American peace would be viewed as beneficial to all. During a broadcast to Albania on April 17, 1953, for example, the anchor stressed
that Eisenhower "is talking to us----He has feud down ... the terms of a peace that
would ... benefit all people."84 In the Czechoslovakian broadcast on the same date, the commentator stressed: "We Czechoslovaks, and the enslaved peoples behind the Iron Curtain can be deeply gratified by Eisenhower's statements. It puts an end to the period of containment."85
When American-Soviet tensions mounted in mid-1953, the Eisenhower administration developed several new propaganda strategies, most of which were blended into a new campaign called "Atoms for Peace." The "Atoms for Peace" campaign, launched by Eisenhower's address of December 8,1953, before the United Nations, sought to fulfill multiple propaganda exigencies while serving to establish new themes for the USIA. Martin J. Medhurst notes that while the address was intended to appear as a "serious proposal that could ... lead to a climate more conducive for nuclear disarmament,"86 a January 8, 1954, Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) document on the "exploitation" of the speech indicated that it sought to associate the "peaceful development of atomic energy" with the United States, thus placing "the USSR in a defensive position."87 Ivie goes so far as to claim that such peace proposals lacked sincerity, and were designed simply to place the United States in a superior propaganda position.88
During the speech, Eisenhower subdy portrayed the United States as the atomic superpower, which voluntarily chose the path of peace. While insuring that his audience realized the ability of America's "defense capabilities" to "inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor," Eisenhower then stressed that his country chose "to be constructive, not destructive." But because the United States functioned as the atomic weaponry superpower, Eisenhower implied that America should logically act as the superpower of "peaceful use[s] of atomic energy," reversing "this greatest of destructive forces... for the benefit of all mankind."89 An OCB document concerning the "Atoms for Peace" campaign verified that administrative officials wanted the United States to be thought of as the leader of atomic energy development, calling for the country to become the "cream of {the] world's scientific" community.90
In addition to portraying America as the atomic superpower, Eisenhower attempted to establish peace as an universal commitment in the "Atoms for Peace" address, presumably designed to gain support for America's foreign policy efforts. Early in the speech, Eisenhower spoke of a collective and historical commitment to peace: "Occasional pages do record the faces of the 'Great Destroyers' but the whole book of history reveals mankind's never-ending quest for peace." He then juxtaposed the threat of nuclear war with the hope of peace through archetypal metaphors: "So my country's purpose is to move out of the dark chamber of horrors into die light, to find a way . .. [to] move forward toward peace and happiness."91 The United States, of course, would lead the world down that peaceful path.
The link between "peace," "science," and the United States is most noticeable in four "Presidential Statements" that were drafted in July of 1953, which used archetypal metaphors. Even though it is not clear whether or when these drafts were
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deivcred, the NSC nonetheless sought to equate the United States with a positive use of science and the Soviet Union with the threat of nuclear war. Indraft number one, the Soviet Union's science was portrayed as "dark clouds over the pathways of scientific advance." The utilization of "dark clouds," which symboMzed nuclear attack, curiously became the vehicle for which the Soviet Union was framed. In contrast, the draft outlined the need of Western scientists to "frame a new declaration of scientific independence for all the world to see," establishing "beach-heads of scientific light in the darkness of the Soviet scientific nether world."92 As the Jackson committee had recommended, the object of such strategies was to harmonize the national self-interests of other countries with the foreign policies of the United States Government.
While attempting to link peace with the United States, "Atoms for Peace" officials also went to great lengths to adjust the propaganda to the audiences' individual needs. This adaptation process is especially noticeable in a film developed for Japanese citizens entided, Blessing of Atomic Energy. Throughout most of the 30-minute film, scientific advancements were discussed in terms of benefits for the people of Japan. The USIA narrator, for example, spoke of atomic energy helping to develop better fertilizer for rice fields and aiding chickens in "producing more and better eggs." The narrator also stressed the safety of such research, which was reinforced by images of Japanese people working direcdy with the atom for advancements in agriculture, medicine, and industry.93
The USIA also attempted to lessen fears of atomic energy while emphasizing its significant benefits. The use of an archetypal metaphor, however, simultaneously reinforced the need for America's supervision over future scientific advancements. The narrator of the same USIA film asserted:
Just as when primitive man first discovered fire and gradually learned to make it serve his needs, so men of today are learning how the tremendous power of the atom—the second fire—can be used by mankind now and for all generations to come.94
The comparison of atomic energy to "fire" heightened the atom's importance archetypally while also lessening apprehensions about its use since fire represents a universal and more natural phenomenon. But, because of the destructive potential of fire, the metaphor is fueled by an element of fear. Such fear is transferred to atomic energy, requiring the need for a scientific superpower to "control" its development even for peaceful purposes. The United States, of course, functioned as that superpower because of its advancements in atomic energy—advancements which were cited in the beginning of the film.95
In sum, both the "Chance for Peace" and the "Atoms for Peace" campaigns were strategically structured to insure that stated goals and hidden aims were intertwined in public pronouncements through much more subde tactics. Part of this strategic process involved the attempt to link "peace" and "science" with the United States by drawing upon archetypal metaphors. While the Soviets were given chances to redeem themselves by following America's prescriptions for peace, the use of "dark" metaphors continually communicated the danger of placing atomic energy in their hands. Thus, while the Eisenhower administration clearly and strategically attempted to inculcate a more international ideology by drawing upon the universal
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values of peace, a hint of fear remained, requiring the need for a superpower like the United States to safeguard the world.96
Overall, the Eisenhower administration's propaganda program achieved a higher level of success than the Truman administration's program. First, Robert E. Elder argues that the USIA's status with such inter-agency coordinating bodies as the NSC and the OCB had improved under Eisenhower, illustrating a greater coordination between propaganda strategy and foreign policy.97 Wilson P. Dizard concurs, asserting that for the "first time the overseas information program was to participate officially in both the formulation and the development of foreign policies."98 Regarding the specific campaigns, Blanche Wiesen Cook argues that the "Chance for Peace" campaign represented "the top side of political warfare," calling the initial speech "stunning,"99 while Fred I. Greenstein refers to the "Atoms for Peace" address as "one of the rhetorical landmarks of Eisenhower's eight years in office."100 Finally, a 1960 report completed by the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague committee), the bookend to the Jackson committee report, provided a positive assessment of the "Atoms for Peace" campaign. In the final report, the bulk of which remained classified until 1990, committee members argued that the "Atoms for Peace" campaign "contributed gready to the positive image of the United States as a peace-seeking nation." Committee members thus called for more propaganda campaigns since "Atoms for Peace" was "largely responsible for conserving and even extending support for United States positions on disarmament."101
Conclusion
The early years of America's first peacetime propaganda program exhibited significant impact on America's credibility abroad. After realizing that a celebration of democratic principles created resentment among international peoples, the Truman administration countered with an equally ineffectual rhetoric steeped in fear, which enhanced Soviet propaganda efforts. Determined to transform the Truman administration's rhetorical mistakes, Eisenhower's administration approached the Cold War with greater concern for psychological strategy. Most significandy, Eisenhower realized that not all of the world communities shared a commitment toward democratic values, requiring careful construction of messages that appealed to more universal ideologies. Such an approach promoted a more positive image of the United States.
This case study illustrates the greater success of an internationalist approach to propaganda over a more culturally-driven one. Five basic distinctions existed between the international and domestic approaches. To begin with, more subtle persuasive strategies were adopted with the internationalist approach. Rather than relying on the more obvious or aggressive style of the Truman years, the Eisenhower administration attempted to develop a respectable news agency out the Voice of America. In addition, while portraying the Soviets as the "evil" enemy, the Eisenhower administration also constructed seemingly viable resolutions to the conflict, depicting the United States as a peacemaker. This peacemaker status then established the United States as the likely leader of scientific advancements for peace. Second, propaganda under Eisenhower's administration was more audience-centered than Truman's institution-centered approach. In the Blessing of Atorw
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Energy film, for instance, the USIA focused on issues of interest pertaining to the Japanese audience, particularly the fear of the atom's destructive forces. Under Truman, propaganda was driven first by an American ideology of democracy and second by an American conception of communism, which foiled to account for international views. Third, Eisenhower managed to integrate propaganda strategy with foreign policy, something Truman's administration could not achieve. Such integration allowed for more coordinated planning, which enhanced the implementation of the planned propaganda strategies. Fourth, the Eisenhower administration developed more global propaganda offensives, including "Chance for Peace" and "Atoms for Peace," which forced the Soviet Union into a defensive posture.102 Under Truman's Campaign of Truth, the United States found itself reacting more to Soviet propaganda than instigating new propaganda offensives. Finally, the use of archetypal metaphors and ideologies heightened the impact of the propaganda.103 As Osborn asserts, the "universality of appeal" provided by archetypal metaphors insures they will "touch the greater part" of audiences.104 In the aftermath of World War II and nuclear destruction, peace functioned as a cross-cultural ideograph. The Eisenhower administration's construction and use of peace heightened this ideograph's cross-cultural appeal.
As this study suggests, propaganda can transcend culture and impact audiences from differing societies. Eisenhower's administration demonstrated that propagandists could overcome the cultural barriers existing between communities by focusing more on universal values. Since most propaganda studies examine discourse where audience and propagandist reside in the same society, it is not surprising that propaganda is assumed to be culturally driven.105 By examining messages that are cross-cultural in nature, however, we are able to see that propagandists can overcome the cultural constraints of language in order to advance their interests abroad.
Just as propaganda can function effectively cross-culturally, so too can the ideologies that form the foundation of those messages. While ideographs are culturally-based, as McGee suggests, these ideographs can be reconfigured in such a way so as to insure the success of cross-cultural messages. While the Truman administration's propaganda failures can be explained in part by its inability to transcend the hegemonic forces of democratic ideologies, Eisenhower's administration illustrated the ability to overcome such ideological obstacles.106 Thus, it stands to reason that some ideographs, like metaphors, are archetypal, traversing the cultural barriers of given communities.
The early years of the Cold War functioned as a time of rhetorical experimentation for American cold warriors. The complexities of their task were compounded by the necessity of constructing messages not only to convince the world of the evils of communism but also to persuade international audiences of America's moral and superpower prowess. Truman's administration can be credited with preparing the American people to batde communism, while Eisenhower's administration cultivated a more internationally-sensitive approach that helped develop America's image as peacemaker and atomic superpower. Both administrations, though, can be credited with institutionalizing a peacetime propaganda program. In the years following the creation of the USIA, no serious debate ensued over whether the United States should disseminate peacetime propaganda. In fact, their rhetorical
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strategies continued to be followed by many cold warriors and propagandists that followed,107 illustrating the legacy of both Truman and Eisenhower.
Notes
Shawn J. Parry-Giles is an assistant professor in the Department of Speech Communication and Theater Arts at Monmouth College, Monmouth, IL. This essay is derived from the authors doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, I992, completed under the direction of Dr. J. Michael Hogan. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the CSCA/SSCA Convention, Lexington, KY, 1993.
'See J. David Kennamer, "Deceptive Advertising and the Power of Suggestion," in Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective, ed. Ted J. Smith, III (New York: Praeger, 1989) 139-149; Stanley B. Cunningham, "Smoke and Mirrors: A Confrontation of Jacques Ellul's Theory of Information Use in Propaganda," in Smith 151-163; j. Michael Hogan and David Olsen, "The Rhetoric of'Nuclear Education'," in Smith 165-179; J. Justin Gustainis, "Propaganda and the Law: The Case of Three Canadian Films," in Smith 115-126; and Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 2d. ed. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992) 229-262.
8See J. Michael Sproule, "Propaganda Studies in American Social Science: The Rise and Fall of the Critical Paradigm," Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987): 60-78; J. Michael Sproule, "Social Responses to Twentieth-Century Propaganda," in Smith 5-22; and J. Michael Sproule, "Progressive Propaganda Critics and the Magic Bullet Myth," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 6 {1989): 225-246.
sGil Cranberg, "Propaganda and the United States," Etc. 41 (1984): 185.
4U. S. Congress, House, Untied States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948, H. R. 3342,8.
5 Many studies consider the impact of America's Cold War message at home, neglecting a full examination of how America's Cold War messages were perceived abroad, especially in more "hostile" regions. See Lynn Boyd Hrads and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., The CM War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950 (New York: Praeger, 1991); David Henry, "Eisenhower and Sputnik: The Irony of Failed Leadership," in Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994) 223-249; Robert L. I vie, "Eisenhower as Cold Warrior," in Medhurst 7-25; Rachel L. Holloway, " 'Keeping the Faith': Eisenhower Introduces the Hydrogen Age," in Medhurst 47-71; Lawrence W. Haapanen, "The Missed Opportunity: The U-2 and Paris," in Medhurst 251-271.
6See John Henderson, The United States Information Agency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969) 46-47; Fitzhugh Green, American Propaganda Abroad (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988) 24-25; Wilson P. Dizard, The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U. S. Information Service (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961)43.
'See Robert L. I vie, "The Ideology of Freedom's 'Fragility' in American Foreign Policy Argument,"/ounta/ of the American Forensic Association 24 (1987): 27-36. While Ivie argues that "freedom" is conceived in American foreign policy argumentation as a fragile entity, this case study illustrates that democracy is conceived of similarly in debates over an American propaganda program.
8 See Michael Calvin McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology," Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 5. For the purposes of this analysis, I accept, in part, McGee's conception of ideology: "ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with a capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and behavior."
9Philo C. Wasbum, Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality (Westport: Praeger, 1992) xxi.
,eJowett and O'Donnell 266.
"McGee 9.
12 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. L. Wirth (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936) 1-108.
"Michael Osborn, "Archetypal Metaphor in Rhetoric: The Light-Dark Family," Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 116. Osborn argues that "archetypal metaphors" are "grounded in prominent features of experience, in objects, actions, or conditions which are inescapably salient in human consciousness."
"Dizard 37-38.
w United States Code Congressional Service, vol. 2 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1948) 1011. 16Henderson41.
"Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947,5298,550,10689. ^Congressional Record, 1947,7613. ^Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948,265-^Congressional Record, 1947,7507,5289, 6565.
S1 Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1947, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947,37.
45 Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 222.
"Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Department of State Appropriation BUI for 1948, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947,375-376.
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^CongressionalRecant, 1948,3753. ^Congressional Record, 1947,7613. i6 Congressional Record, 1947,6546.
"Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 218 2*MeGee 7.
*>Know North America—Pennsylvania, 24 November 1947. Charles Huhen Papers, Box 15, Harry S. Truman Library.
MKnow North America—Texas, 15 December 1947. Charles Huhen Papers, Box 15, Harry S. Truman Library. 31 Know North America—Wyoming, n. d. Charles Hulten Papers, Box 15, Harry S. Truman Library. 52 Know North America—Wyoming.
nKnow North America—Alabama, 29 December 1947. Charles Hulten Papers, Box 15, Harry S. Truman Library.
MKnow North America—Pennsylvania. 35 Henderson 46-47. MGreen 24-25.
"See Dewey W. Grantham, Recent America: The United States Since 1945 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1987) 32-33.
38Arthur S. Link, American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890s, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1965) 703-706; and Grantham 17-36, 61.
39 See Sproule, "Propaganda Studies in American Soviet Science: The Rise and Fall of the Critical Paradigm," 64. Sproule asserts that after World War I, a "new awareness" emerged of "how public opinion could be manipulated by news and advertising."
40See Dick Fitzpatrkk, "America's Campaign of Truth Throughout the World," Journalism Quarterly 28 (1951): 3-14; and Henderson 46-47.
41 See "Report to the President from Gordon Gray," 22 February 1952. Records of the Psychological Strategy Board, Box 25, Harry S. Truman Library, 1-7.
42 Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1987) 208-212.
43 Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1953, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952,415,408.
44Saul K. Padover, "Psychological Warfare and Foreign Policy," American Scholar 20 (1951): 153. ^ Congressional Record, 82dCong., 1st sess., 1951, 1127.
"^Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Expanded International Information and Education Program, 81st Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 243,1950,6. *'Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950,9909.
4SSee Congressional Record, 1950, 9907; and Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1950,141.
49Senate Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations, State Department Information Program—Information Centers, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953,52, 56.
50Senate Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations, Information Centers, 48,50, 53,461.
51 Robert Golds ton, The American Nightmare: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and the Politics of Hate (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973) 122-123.
52 See Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1953, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952,1038; and Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of State, Justice, Commerce, and the. Judiciary Appropriations for 1952, 82dCong., 1st sess., 1951,1693.
5:1 See Robert L. I vie, "Literalizing the Metaphor of Soviet Savagery: President Truman's Plain Style," Southern Speech Communication Journal 51 (1986): 91-92; Robert L. Hie, "Images of Savagery in American justifications for War," Communication Monographs 47 (1980): 279-294; and Robert L. Ivie, "Metaphor and the Rhetorical Invention of Cold War 'Idealists'," Communication Monographs 54 (1987): 166.
MZi/e Behind the Curtain—#44, 28 December 1950. Charles Hulten Papers, Box 18, Harry S. Truman Library.
""Spotlight on Dictatorship," 15 February 1951. Charles Hulten Papers, Box 18, Harry S. Truman Library. ^"Causes of International Tension: Armaments and the Paris Meeting," 6 March 1951. Charles Hulten Papers, Box 18, Harry S. Truman Library (emphasis added).
"Richard Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959) 198. MDuard43.
MRobert E. Elder, The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign PoUcy (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968) 37.
wEdwin Black, "The Second Persona," Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970): 115.
61 J. Michael Sproule, "The New Managerial Rhetoric and the Old Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 (1988):474.
M Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981) vi.xxi.
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M Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to James S. Lay, Jr., 24 January 1953. U. S. President's Committee on International Information Activities: the Jackson Committee, Box 1, Dwight d. Eisenhower Library.
"Robert William Pirsein, The Voice of America: An History of the International Broadcasting Activities of the United States Government, 1940-1962 (New York: Arno Press, 1979) 318-319.
65"Appraisal Survey of Our Cold War Effort," 26 November 1952. U. S. President's Committee on International Information Activities: the Jackson Committee, Box 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
MDizard 24,43.
67"The President's Committee on International Information Activities: Report to the President," 30 June 1953. U. S. President's Committee on International Information Activities: the Jackson Committee, Box 14, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 1-17. Hereafter cited as the Jackson Committee Report.
^Jackson Committee Report, 58, 99, 106.
69See Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1982) 133; and Martin J. Medhurst, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic Communicator (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993) 73-74. Greenstein explains that the OCB was designed as an extension of the NSC and functioned to insure that the plans developed by the NSC and the president were enacted rather than filed away. According to Medhurst, both the NSC and the OCB functioned as powerful bodies in the articulation of policy during the Eisenhower presidency.
70Jackson Committee Report 56-60.
71 Jackson Committee Report 75.
75 "Memorandum on Radio in Psychological Warfare," 22 June 195S. White House Central Files-Confidential File, Box 61, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 8-9. 7sJackson Committee Report, 34,36,68.
74 "Progress Report to the National Security Council on Implementation of the Recommendations of the Jackson Committee Report," 30 September 1953. Psychological Strategy Board—Central Files Series, Box 22, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Annex A, 1.
75Jackson Committee Report 76,35.
76See Jackson Committee Report, 33-44; and Donald Feinstein, "Free Voices in the Battle of Men's Minds," JwmoMmQparteriy 31 (1954): 193-200.
"Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to William Benton, 1 May 1953. D. D. E. Diary Series, Box 3, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
78See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) 92. The Psychological Strategy Board was established by the Truman administration and was replaced by the Operations Coordinating Board under Eisenhower once the USIA began official operations in August of 1953. From January through August of 1953, the PSB operated under the Eisenhower administration.
79"Proposed Plan for a Psychological Warfare Offensive," n. d. Psychological Strategy Board—White House Office—National Security Staff, Box 9, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 1-3,5.
80See Martin J. Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech: A Case Study in the Strategic Use of Language," in Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology, Martin J. Medhurst, et al. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990): 30-31. According to Medhurst, the "Chance for Peace" address marked the first pronouncement made by Eisenhower after Stalin's death on March 6,1953.
81 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address The Chance for Peace' Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors," PvMk Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 179-188.
88See "Sunday Talk," No. 51, Radio Free Europe—Poland, 19 April 1953. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Radio Free Hungary, n. d. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; "Eisenhower's Speech," Radio Free Europe—Albanian Desk, 17 April 1953. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; "Our New York Correspondent Reports," Radio Free Europe—Czechoslovak Desk, 17 April 1953. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; and "International Commentary," Radio Free Europe—Poland, 16 April 1953. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
8SSee "International Commentary," Radio Free Europe—Poland; "Special Commentary on the Occasion of President Eisenhower's Speech," Radio Free Europe—Bulgaria, 19 April 1953. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953—1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Radio Free Europe—Hungary; and "Daily Commentary," Radio Free Europe—Romania, 18 April 1953. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, Dwight d. Eisenhower Library.
""Eisenhower's Speech," Radio Free Europe—Albania, 6-8.
""International Commentary"—Radio Free Europe—Czechoslovakia, 4.
1,6Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech: A Case Study in the Strategic Use of Language" 33, 39—40; and Dwight d. Eisenhower, "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," Pubttc Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960)813-823.
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87"A Program to Exploit the President's UN Speech of December 8, 1953, in Domestic and International Public Opinion Fields," 8 January 1954. White House Central Files—Confidential File, Box 13, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
88 Ivie, "Eisenhower as Cold Warrior" 11-13,19-20.
89 Eisenhower. "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 817-821.
^"Check List For Possible Exploitation of President's Atomic Energy Speech," 14 December 1953. White House Central Files—Confidential Files, Box 13, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
91 Eisenhower, "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," 817.
^"Presidential Statement," 20 July 1953. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, Box 10, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 1-4.
95 Blessing of Atomic Energy, 1956. The United States Information Agency, Record Group 306, The National Archives Motion Picture Collection.
^Blessing ofAtomic Energy. ,Ji Blessing of Atomic Energy.
96 See Ivie, "Eisenhower as Cold Warrior" 21-22. Ivie notes that Eisenhower left behind a "legacy of fear" that remains with us today in the post-Cold War era.
97 Elder 40. 98Dizard44. "Cook 180-181. 1MGreenstein 181.
101 President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad Conclusions and Recommendations, December 1960. Ann Whitman File—Administration Series, Box 33, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 21-22,47. While the objectivity of committee members may be called into question because Eisenhower appointed them, the credibility of their assessment is heightened by their critical assessment of other areas of the USIA. In addition, this report remained a secret document for almost 40 years, indicating its results were less likely to be used for public relations purposes.
,02See J. Michael Hogan, "Eisenhower and Open Skies: A Case Study in 'Psychological Warfare'," in Eisenhower's War of Words, ed. Martin J. Med hurst 132-155. As Hogan demonstrates, the Eisenhower administration continued to develop global propaganda campaigns after 1953, evidenced by its "Open Skies" effort.
103See Medhurst, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic Communicator 30. While Medhurst argues that Eisenhower employed contrasting archetypal metaphors prior to and during his 1952 presidential campaign bid but seldom thereafter, an examination of his foreign policy rhetoric proves otherwise.
1MOsborn 116.
,85See Wasburn 91-138. Wasburn is one of the few scholars who examines international propaganda. Despite his case study, he still comes to the conclusion that propaganda's meaning is culturally based.
106See Martin J. Medhurst, "Eisenhower's Rhetorical Leadership: An Interpretation, in " Eisenhower's War of Words 285-297. Medhurst asserts that Eisenhower "tailored his messages in such a manner as to elicit the responses he desired."
1OTSee Green 35-43,189-193.
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