Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In
Daniel Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack
International Security, Volume 25, Number 4, Spring 2001, pp. 107-146 (Article)
Published by The MIT Press
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Let Us Now Praise Great Men
In January 1762, Prussia
hovered on the brink of disaster. Despite the masterful generalship of Frederick
the Great, the combined forces of France, Austria, and Russia had
gradually worn down the Prussian army in six years of constant warfare. Austrian
armies had marched deep into Saxony and Silesia, and the Russians had
even sacked Berlin. Frederick’s defeat appeared imminent, and the enemy coalition
intended to partition Prussia to reduce it to the status of a middle German
state no more powerful than Bavaria or Saxony. And then a miracle
occurred. The Prusso-phobic Czarina Elizabeth unexpectedly died, only to be
succeeded by her son Peter, who idolized the soldier-king. Immediately Peter
made peace with Frederick and ordered home the Russian armies. This reversal
paralyzed the French and Austrians and allowed Frederick to rally his
forces. Although Peter was soon ousted by his wife, Catherine, the allied armies
never regained their advantage. In the end, Frederick held them off and
kept Prussia intact.1
Frederick’s triumph in the Seven Years’ War was essential to Prussia’s eventual
uniªcation of Germany and all that followed from it. Conceiving of European
history today without this victory is impossible. It is equally impossible
to conceive of Prussian victory in 1763 without the death of Elizabeth and Peter’s
adoration of Frederick. In the words of Christopher Duffy, “It is curious to
reºect that if one lady had lived for a very few weeks longer, historians would
by now have analyzed in most convincing detail the reasons for a collapse as
‘inevitable’ as that which overtook the Sweden of Charles XII.”2
In short, had it
not been for the idiosyncrasies of one man and one woman, European history
would look very, very different.
Let Us Now Praise
Great Men
Daniel L. Byman and
Kenneth M. Pollack
Bringing the Statesman Back In
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107–146
© 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
107
Daniel L. Byman is the Research Director of RAND’s Center for Middle East Public Policy. Kenneth M.
Pollack is a Senior Research Professor at the National Defense University.
The authors would like to thank Nora Bensahel, Daniel Markey, Robert Mullins, Gideon Rose, Stephen
Peter Rosen, Richard Samuels, Jeremy Shapiro, Abram Shulsky, Benjamin Valentino, Stephen
Van Evera, an anonymous reviewer, and the members of the John M. Olin seminar series at Harvard
University for their helpful comments on previous versions of this work. Comments are welcome
at byman@rand.org and kenpollack@erols.com.
1. Christopher Duffy, Frederick the Great: A Military Life (New York: Routledge, 1985), pp. 226–243;
and Dennis E. Showalter, The Wars of Frederick the Great (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 309–320.
2. Duffy, Frederick the Great, p. 233.
The story of Prussia’s reprieve is, admittedly, an extreme example of the role
that individuals play in international relations, but such inºuence is by no
means exceptional—far from it. How can we explain twentieth-century history
without reference to Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, Franklin Roosevelt,
Winston Churchill, Mahatma Gandhi, or Mao Zedong? Nor would any
policymaker in any capital try to explain the world today without recourse to
the personal goals and beliefs of Bill Clinton, Vladimir Putin, Jiang Zemin, and
Saddam Hussein, among others. Indeed the policymaking community in
Washington takes it as an article of faith that who is the prime minister of
Great Britain, the chancellor of Germany, or the king of Saudi Arabia has real
repercussions for the United States and the rest of the world. As Henry
Kissinger remarked, “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal
forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities
make.”3
For these reasons, the tendency of scholars to ignore the role of personalities
in international relations is particularly troubling. Most political scientists,
when pressed, will admit to the importance of personal idiosyncrasies and human
error in determining the course of international relations. Most will further
concede that because they do not attempt to explain the roles of either
human error or personality in international relations, they cannot explain all of
the variance in the affairs of nations.
However, political scientists most frequently have argued that they must set
aside both fortuna and virtú, and instead focus only on impersonal forces as the
causes of international events. Their reasons for doing so fall under three rubrics.
First, many political scientists contend that individuals ultimately do not
matter, or at least they count for little in the major events that shape international
politics. Instead they argue that the roar of the anarchic system, domestic
politics, and institutional dynamics drown out the small voices of
individual leaders. Second, other political scientists posit that although individuals
may matter from time to time, their inºuence does not lend itself to the
generalizations that political scientists seek. Simply put, individuals are too individualistic.
Third, several leading international relations theorists have
raised a number of speciªc objections that they argue render the study of individuals
theoretically hopeless.
We believe that political scientists are simultaneously too modest and too arrogant
in these claims. Too modest because political scientists need not throw
International Security 25:4 108
3. A background talk with reporters in January 1975, as quoted in Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 13.
up their hands and believe that they have nothing useful to say about the role
of individuals in international relations. The theoretical objections raised over
the years do not stand up under closer examination and should not prevent us
from mining this rich ore. Too arrogant because too many political scientists
imply or assert that the impersonal forces on which they focus their attention
explain the vast majority of events in international relations. In so doing, they
marginalize the crucial impact of individuals on war and diplomacy and neglect
the extent to which social science can tease out useful generalizations regarding
the role played by individuals.
It is time to rescue men and women, as individuals, from the oblivion
to which political scientists have consigned them. This article is not intended
as a comprehensive account of the importance of individuals—such an
effort would require the work of many lifetimes—but it is intended to question
scholars’ current assumptions about international politics and show
the plausibility of analyzing international relations by focusing on the role of
individuals.
What is the impact of individuals on international relations? What aspects of
state behavior do they affect? Under what conditions are they inºuential?
These are the questions this article seeks to answer. We contend that the goals,
abilities, and foibles of individuals are crucial to the intentions, capabilities,
and strategies of a state. Indeed individuals not only affect the actions of their
own states but also shape the reactions of other nations, which must respond
to the aspirations, abilities, and aggressiveness of foreign leaders. Of course,
individuals matter more to international relations under certain circumstances.
Individual personalities take on added signiªcance when power is concentrated
in the hands of a leader, when institutions are in conºict, or in times of
great change. Individuals also shape many of the drivers identiªed by other
theorists, such as the balance of power, domestic opinion, and bureaucratic
politics. These paradigms suffer when individuals are ignored.
This article has four parts. We ªrst rebut the speciªc, theoretical arguments
denigrating the utility of theories of the impact of individuals on international
relations. We then counter the argument that individuals do not
have a signiªcant impact on international events by examining ªve historical
cases that show that the role of individuals was crucial to the outcome of
each. We next refute the argument that it is impossible to generate hypotheses
regarding the role of individuals, by teasing out plausible, testable hypotheses
from the cases in the previous section. We conclude by noting
how the study of individuals enriches our understanding of international rela-
tions.
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 109
Rebutting the Theoretical Objections
The study of individuals has not been attacked so much as ignored by international
relations theorists. This is not to say that no work has been done on this
topic. At least since the time of Aristotle, scholars have tried to explain politics
in terms of individual behavior. Indeed classical realist thinkers such as Thucydides,
Niccolò Machiavelli, and Hans Morgenthau all explicitly acknowledge
the impact of individual personalities on international relations. Since then,
however, work on individuals in political science has generally been left to
psychologists, historians, and area studies specialists.4
These scholars have
produced many excellent studies on the importance of individuals, but they
have not treated the subject in a systematic fashion that would help answer the
general questions of when and how individuals affect international relations.
These works provide a foundation on which to build, but as they are, they remain
incomplete.5
International Security 25:4 110
4. Other useful work for understanding the role of individuals in international relations comes
from historians and area studies experts. Fred I. Greenstein has published an exemplary work
demonstrating how the personality traits of postwar presidents have shaped U.S. foreign policy.
See Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (New York: Free
Press, 2000). See also James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev,
Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and David
Shambaugh, ed., Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994). Daniel Markey has written an interesting study of how individuals’ desire for prestige affects
international relations. Markey, “The Prestige Motive in International Relations,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University, 2000.
5. Political psychologists and political scientists drawing on their insights also devote considerable
attention to the biases and perceptions that may shape human behavior, paying particular attention
to the behavior of leaders and elites in general. See Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976). Three valuable
examples of works on leaders and perceptions are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius,
eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The
Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). For an interesting work
comparing the role of new leaders on the formulation of public policy, see Valerie Bunce, Do New
Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). A good summary of
literature on leadership can be found in Robert J. House and Mary L. Baetz, “Leadership: Some
Empirical Generalizations and New Research Directions,” in L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw,
eds., Leadership, Participation, and Group Behavior (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 1–84.
Other important works include Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical
Approach (London: Kegan Paul, 1947); Alexander L. George and Julliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson
and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964); and Harold D. Lasswell and
Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). For a sample of more recent interesting works on individual decisionmaking,
see Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1993); and Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965). For an interesting assessment of different views of the individ-
One exception to political scientists’ neglect of individuals is Kenneth
Waltz’s seminal work, Man, the State, and War. Waltz famously outlines three
levels of analysis, calling them “images” of international relations. In the ªrst
image, the behavior of nations springs from the behavior of individuals.
Waltz’s second image considers the behavior of nations to be driven by
their internal organization, positing that different kinds of governments and
social structures produce different kinds of international behavior. Finally, the
third image contends that the behavior of nations is driven by their relative position—in
terms of both power and geography—in an anarchic international
system.6
Although Waltz is unusual in even considering the ªrst image, he nonetheless
rejects it. Waltz, and those following in his tradition, believe that the third
image best explains international relations—or the most important elements of
it, such as the causes of great power wars and alliances.7
Champions of the
third image have many critics. Nevertheless, even scholars who challenge
Waltz’s focus on the third image generally do so in the name of second-image
factors, such as bureaucracy, culture, and political systems. Thus even Waltz’s
critics neglect the ªrst image.8
objection 1: the first image cannot provide an adequate explanation
for international relations because human nature is a constant,
whereas international relations vary
In Man, the State, and War, Waltz argues that if human nature is constant, the
behavior of nations—the example he employs is war making—should also be
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 111
ual throughout history, see Janet Coleman, ed., The Individual in Political Theory and Practice (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For works that assess when personality factors should be examined
to explain political outcomes, see Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham,
1969); Fred I. Greenstein, “The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away
the Underbrush,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 629–641;
Margaret Hermann, “When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions,” in
James Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326–333; and Margaret
Hermann, “Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J.
McKeown, eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 77–94.
6. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), especially
pp. 16, 80–81, 159–165.
7. In his words, only a theory drawn from the third image can offer a “a ªnal explanation because
it does not hinge on accidental causes—irrationalities in men, defects in states.” Ibid., pp. 231–232.
See also pp. 224–238; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGrawHill,
1979), pp. 60–68.
8. For example, the world system, domestic politics (“second image”), and other mainstream approaches
also slight the importance of individuals. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern WorldSystem
I (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For an example of the second image as
constant. That is, nations should always be at war. Because nations are not always
at war, Waltz claims that human nature cannot possibly explain why nations
go to war.9
On this point, Waltz is simply mistaken: Human nature is not
a constant; it is a variable. By deªning the ªrst image solely in terms of an ineffable
quality shared among all humans, Waltz has constructed a straw man.
Not all men and women are entirely evil, aggressive, greedy, or vainglorious. A
few are, but a few others are wholly generous, humble, and restrained. The
vast majority of humans, however, possess a mix of traits. Thus “human nature”
entails a tremendous range of variance. Properly understood, the ªrst
image should generate theories derived from the distribution of these traits
across the population and their impact on international relations.
As soon as one recognizes that personalities vary widely, Waltz’s criticism of
the ªrst image becomes unconvincing. Because personalities differ, it is entirely
possible that variance in the traits of individuals explains differences in
international relations. For instance, although not all wars have been caused by
aggressive, risk-tolerant, greedy, or vainglorious leaders, those leaders who
did manifest these traits regularly went to war—often for seemingly absurd
reasons, and often more than once. Indeed leaders most notorious for these
traits, such as Louis XIV, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, Napoleon
Bonaparte, Napoleon III, Wilhelm II, Benito Mussolini, and Hitler, have fomented
some of the greatest conºicts in modern European history.10
objection 2: theories focused on the inºuence of individuals in
international relations cannot be parsimonious
In his book Theory of International Politics, Waltz claims that parsimony must be
an important criterion for judging the value of a theory.11
He argues that the
International Security 25:4 112
related to democracies, see Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169.
9. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, pp. 27–30. As an example, on page 28, he claims that human nature
cannot explain the outbreak of war in 1914 because the same human nature that conceived
World War I must have caused peace in, for example, 1910.
10. We recognize a likely selection bias in this claim: It may be that there were leaders who did
possess these traits but did not go to war, and therefore the fact that they did possess these traits
was not well known beyond their intimates, and perhaps their biographers. We believe that a more
rigorous analysis of this claim is warranted.
11. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, especially pp. 19–20. We note that Waltz has retreated
from his earlier defense of parsimony in his more recent work. For instance, in 1997 he observed
that “the explanatory power of a theory, not its parsimony, is the criterion of a theory’s success.”
Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn
1996), p. 57.
more closely a model approximates reality, the more variables it will include;
therefore a realistic theory will be less parsimonious and thus less useful.12
First, we contend that it is possible to derive elegant theories from the ªrst image—a
challenge we answer in the third section of this article. Of greater relevance,
however, we dismiss the contention that parsimony is somehow more
important than accuracy when deriving political science theory. The ªeld of international
relations is an effort to explain the interaction of states and, ultimately,
predict their behavior. Consequently, realism (with a small “R”) is the
best, and perhaps the only, determinant of the utility of a theory: How well
does the theory actually explain behavior and allow us to predict future actions?
Creating parsimonious models may be useful for illustrative or heuristic
purposes, but this is, at best, several steps removed from the actual goals of the
discipline. A massive model with hundreds of variables that took a month to
run but predicted international behavior perfectly would be far more useful by
any measure than a model with only a single variable that could illustrate only
occasional tendencies and only in badly underspeciªed circumstances.13
objection 3: state intentions are not germane to theories of
international relations
Many proponents of the third image acknowledge that individual leaders often
have a heavy inºuence on state goals.14
Because they believe that state intentions
are not necessary to the construction of a theory of international
politics, however, any impact that individual personalities may have in this
sphere is likewise irrelevant. Instead they claim that all states are functionally
equivalent, and therefore their intentions are irrelevant because they all have
the same primary or “dominant” goal, namely their own security.15
Even the
most benign state is not certain how other states will act, either now or in the
future, and thus must take steps to defend itself.16
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 113
12. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 19–20, 61–68.
13. This is not to suggest that parsimony is not desirable. Undoubtedly, a parsimonious theory is
better than a complicated theory, all other things being equal. When all other things are not equal,
as is usually the case, we prefer an accurate complexity over an inaccurate parsimony.
14. In his defense, Waltz himself recognizes this. See, for example, Waltz, Man, the State, and War,
p. 218.
15. Again, the best statement of these views is Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 91–101;
and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December
1997), p. 915.
16. The deªnitive expression of this is Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,”
World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 168. Joseph M. Grieco argues that cooperation will
The assertion about the essential irrelevance of actor preferences is empirically
weak and (again demonstrating the danger of overly parsimonious models)
analytically misleading. For example, Stephen Walt’s work on alliance
formation demonstrates that, by omitting state intentions, Waltz’s argument
that alliance formation is based purely on the distribution of power poorly predicts
actual alliance patterns.17
Other scholars have established the importance
of the distinction between “status quo” states—those nations content with the
state of affairs as they are—and “revisionist” states—those unhappy with the
current state of affairs and willing to change it. Revisionist states want more
territory, inºuence, prestige, or other objectives that are not always directly related
to their security. They may go to war or otherwise disrupt the international
system even when they are secure. At times, they may even jeopardize
their security to pursue these aims.18
On the other hand, status quo states are
able to assure potential rivals of their benign intentions—thus preventing uncertainty
and misunderstanding from escalating into war. This allows status
quo states to take steps, such as keeping their defense budgets low, even
though this would endanger their security in a world that followed structural
realist precepts. In short, state intentions are a critical factor in international relations
and, to the extent that individual personalities shape those intentions,
they too must be considered important.
Individuals Matter: Lessons from History
Individuals play a central role in shaping international relations, including the
causes of war, alliance patterns, and other areas that international relations
scholars consider important. To demonstrate this claim—and to provide the
historical foundation on which we build testable hypotheses in the next section—we
draw on ªve cases: (1) Germany under Hitler; (2) the contrasting impact
of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II on European
politics; (3) France under Napoleon Bonaparte; (4) a comparison of Iraq under
International Security 25:4 114
fail as a result of these dynamics. See Grieco, Cooperation among Nations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1990), p. 45.
17. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
18. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Proªt: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72–107; Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status
Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90–121;
and Arnold Wolfers, “The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice,” in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration:
Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), especially
p. 124.
Saddam Hussein and Syria under Haªz al-Asad; and (5) the behavior of Iran in
its war with Iraq under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
We chose these cases according to several criteria. They demonstrate the importance
of individuals regardless of political system, period of time, or region
of the world. They highlight particular aspects of the impact of individual
leaders on international relations. Each case also suggests theories derived
from the ªrst image related to some of the most fundamental questions of international
relations theory of the last thirty years: the causes of war, the formation
of alliances, and the likelihood of cooperation under anarchy, to name
only a few.19
adolf hitler
The personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies of Adolf Hitler led to the
deaths of millions and changed the history of the world. Hitler’s unique pathologies
were the single most important factor in causing both World War II
in Europe (at least in the sense of the continent-wide total war that ensued)
and Germany’s eventual defeat. Hitler deªed both domestic opposition and
systemic logic in igniting World War II, leading Germany to astonishing victories,
visiting unimaginable misery on the world, and then causing the collapse
of the empire he had built. Understanding international relations during the
1930s and 1940s is impossible without grasping the impact of Hitler himself.
Germany after World War I was clearly a revisionist state, but Hitler’s ambitions
far exceeded those of the people he led. The German people detested the
terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Most believed that Germany should rearm, regain
its pre-Versailles territory in the east, and demand integration with Austria
and the German-populated Sudetenland.20
However, though revisionism
was the Zeitgeist in interwar Germany, European hegemony and global domination
were not. The vast majority of Germans had lost any inclination toward
military expansion after living through the horrors of World War I. Although
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 115
19. A caveat is in order regarding our case selection. This article does not seek to test ªrst-image
theories of international relations. Instead it seeks to generate testable hypotheses to demonstrate
that the ªrst image is a valid line of inquiry for international relations scholars. Consequently, we
have chosen “easy” cases—cases in which the individual’s inºuence is self-evident, even to the
point of obviousness—rather than “hard” cases or a random sample.
20. Most Germans had accepted the loss of Alsace-Lorraine because they recognized that these
territories could not be recovered without ªghting a major war with France. Gordon A. Craig, Germany:
1866–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 674; Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign
Policy of the Third Reich, trans. Anthony Fothergill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973),
pp. 29–37; and Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York:
Doubleday, 1995), pp. 309–310.
many Germans wanted to revise the Treaty of Versailles, few were willing to
wage another major war to do so.21
Indeed, on September 27, 1938, when Hitler
mobilized the German army to attack Czechoslovakia, the Berlin crowds
turned their backs on the German troops marching through the streets of the
capital.22
Nor were most German elites sympathetic to Hitler’s aspirations. Even most
of the mainstream nationalist parties and the army high command—among
the most bellicose groups in Germany—wanted only to restore their country to
its pre-1914 status. Although they were probably more willing than the average
German to use force to achieve these goals, the great majority were equally
chary of another major war and had no aspirations to continental mastery.23
On the uniqueness of Hitler’s aspirations, Gordon Craig has written: “Adolf
Hitler was sui generis, a force without a real historical past . . . dedicated to the
acquisition of power for his own gratiªcation and to the destruction of a people
whose existence was an offence to him and whose annihilation would be
his crowning triumph. Both the grandiose barbarism of his political vision and
the moral emptiness of his character make it impossible to compare him in any
meaningful way with any other German leader. He stands alone.”24
International Security 25:4 116
21. Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 328, 403; Kenneth Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal
Flaws of German Generalship from Moltke to Guderian (London: Greenhill, 1996), pp. 72–75; Ernest R.
May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 15–110; Richard
Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 9–10, 298–305; Richard Overy
with Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, rev. and updated ed. (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 41;
A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), pp. 58–59; Donald
Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939 (New
York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 30, 33, 38–39, 105; and Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 7. We have purposely included citations from Taylor not
despite, but because of, his apologies for Hitler to demonstrate the strength of our arguments.
22. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, abridged ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991),
p. 268.
23. Ian Kershaw provides the deªnitive contemporary assessment of how Hitler’s foreign policy
diverged from the revisionist aspirations of other German elites in Kershaw, “Nazi Foreign Policy:
Hitler’s ‘Programme’ or ‘Expansion without Object’?” reprinted in Patrick Finney, ed., Origins of
the Second World War (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 129–135. See also Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny,
pp. 176, 233–240, 258–259, 268; Craig, Germany, pp. 679, 693, 697–699; Hildebrand, The Foreign
Policy of the Third Reich, pp. 24–37; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 339; Macksey, From Triumph to
Disaster; May, Strange Victory, pp. 15–110, 215–232; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 40–41,
48–49, 53, 71; Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 7; Watt, How War Came, pp. 104–105; and Corelli
Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).
24. Craig, Germany, p. 543. Craig’s view is the consensus among contemporary historians. Both the
Taylor/Fischer revisionist school (Hitler was no different from other German statesmen) and the
functionalist school (Nazi foreign policy stemmed from domestic pressures) have been effectively
discredited. See Patrick Finney, “Introduction: History Writing and the Origins of the Second
World War,” and “Commentary,” in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 4–7, 41–42; the response
by Richard Overy to Tim Mason, reprinted in “Debate: Germany, ‘Domestic Crisis,’ and
War in 1939,” in ibid., pp. 99–109; and especially Kershaw, “Nazi Foreign Policy,” pp. 121–144.
For their part, Britain and France did not want war with Germany and were
prepared to make considerable sacriªces (in terms of both their own relative
security and other people’s territory) to appease Berlin. Public opinion in Britain
during the interwar years was sympathetic to Germany, believing that the
terms of the peace had been overly harsh. Moreover, the possibility of a World
War I–like bloodbath terriªed Britain, and London was willing to write off considerable
portions of Eastern Europe to avert another one.25
Although the
French were less sympathetic to German aspirations, they were equally afraid
of another continental war and thus were willing to give in to at least some
German demands for revisions to the Versailles treaty, including demands for
territory in the east. In addition, to the extent that France contemplated using
military force against Germany, it was unwilling to do so without Britain’s full
participation.26
For these reasons, the French and British acquiesced to German
rearmament after 1933, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss
with Austria, and the occupation of Sudeten Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the evidence
indicates that Britain and France would not have gone to war to prevent
German reoccupation of the Polish corridor.27
In short, Britain and France were
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 117
25. Sidney Aster, “‘Guilty Men’: The Case of Neville Chamberlain,” in Finney, Origins of the Second
World War, pp. 62–64, 66–70; Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 269, 293; David Dilks, “‘We
Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst’: The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and Hitler’s
Germany, 1937–1939,” in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 52–53; Finney, “Introduction,”
pp. 13–16; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 290–307, 340–342; May, Strange Victory, pp. 169–212;
Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 52, 73–120; R.A.C. Parker, “Alternatives to Appeasement,”
in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 211–220; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp.
xi–xii, 34, 45–46, 58, 68, 74–77, 94–95, 99–100, 135–136, 160, 165, 189, 227–228; and Watt, How War
Came, pp. 27–29, 83–84, 168, 385–386.
26. Anthony Adamthwaite, “France and the Coming of War,” in Finney, Origins of the Second World
War, pp. 78–90; Kagan, On the Origins of War, pp. 296–298; May, Strange Victory, pp. 6, 113–160; Stephen
A. Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,” in Finney, Origins of the Second
World War, pp. 224–227, 238–239; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 73–76, 91, 98–100,
155, 188; and Wright, Ordeal of Total War, p. 8. Taylor concludes that ultimately “the French were
therefore willing to surrender everything [to Germany] except their own security.” Taylor, Origins
of the Second World War, p. 188. See also Finney, “Introduction,” pp. 17–20.
27. Beginning at Locarno in 1925, British and French statesmen repeatedly made clear that they
would not go to war over the Polish corridor per se. Right up to the German invasion, they continued
to believe that the “question of Danzig” should not be a casus belli—and encouraged Polish
concessions to Germany on Danzig in hope of forestalling a war. The British and French guarantees
to Poland in 1939 had committed the Allies to ªght for Polish independence, but neither London
nor Paris had guaranteed every inch of Polish territory, speciªcally meaning Danzig. Their
decision to go to war to defend Poland in September 1939 was not based on any change of heart regarding
Danzig. Rather it was a reaction to Germany’s invasion of all of Poland, demonstrating
that Hitler was determined to make Germany the hegemon of Europe under his leadership. See
Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, p. 293; Anna M. Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy,
1939: Determination to Fight—or Avoid War?” in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 414–
415, 417–426, 428–429; Dilks, “‘We Must Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst,’” p. 53;
Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 311; May, Strange Victory, pp. 198–212; Overy with Wheatcroft,
willing to swallow hard and accept virtually any German demands—short of
granting Berlin a hegemonic position in Europe or ceding their own territory—
as long as they believed that by doing so they could avert a war. Consequently,
Germany should have been able to achieve the moderate revisionist goals espoused
by most Germans without sparking a general European war. Only Hitler’s
personal ambitions made such a conºict unavoidable.
Thus World War II, at least in the sense of the global conºagration that eventually
ignited, was caused by the unique aspirations of Adolf Hitler, not by the
widespread German desire to revise the order established at Versailles in 1918.
The outbreak of World War II was prompted by the German invasion of Poland—a
country that few Germans were willing to risk war with Britain and
France to remove from the map of Europe. Moreover, the British and French
did not go to war for Polish sovereignty per se, but only because they saw the
German attack on Poland (and the earlier occupation of Bohemia in violation
of the 1938 Munich agreement) as incontrovertible proof that Hitler would not
be satisªed with modest revisions of the postwar peace, but instead was determined
to make himself master of all Europe.28
Hitler’s personal role in the course of world politics did not end with the
start of war between Germany and the Western Allies. Instead he relentlessly
pushed Germany down the road to annihilation. Every step of the way, the decision
to act was effectively Hitler’s alone, taken despite the opposition of
whatever independent voices still existed. Indeed the army high command
consistently opposed Hitler’s foreign adventures until it was ultimately battered
into submission. Hitler also made sure that all other opposing voices
were stilled or subverted. Thus the opposition parties, the foreign ministry,
and ultimately even the army were all brought under his control, leaving German
decisionmaking entirely in his hands.29
International Security 25:4 118
Road to War, pp. 14–17, 113, 119; Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, pp. 38, 54, 59–60, 194–199,
207–212, 213–221, 238, 249–252, 264–265, 270–273; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 59, 69, 186, 320–
321. In Taylor’s words, during the August 1939 crisis, “[Britain, France, and Italy] were convinced
that Danzig was not worth a war; all three were agreed that it should return to Germany, with safeguards
for Polish trade.” Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
28. Adamthwaite, “France and the Coming of War,” pp. 84–87; Aster, “‘Guilty Men,’” pp. 64–65,
72–73; Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy,” pp. 418–421; Dilks, “‘We Must Hope for the
Best and Prepare for the Worst,’” p. 53; Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 410; May, Strange Victory,
pp. 291–308; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 9; Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 15–17; Taylor,
Origins of the Second World War, pp. 205–214, 249–252, 264–265, 270–273; and Watt, How War Came,
pp. 168–169, 186, 385–386, 509–510.
29. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 233–240, 258–259, 268, 321–325; Kershaw, “Nazi Foreign
Policy,” pp. 121–144; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 20–21, 24–25, 255, 441. In particular, on the
Hitler’s decision to invade France in 1940 propelled Germany and the world
further down the road to total war. Given the terror of the British and French of
becoming involved in another major war with Germany, it is not clear what
they would have done had Germany not attacked France. The stalemate that
prevailed along the Rhine from October 1939 to May 1940 suggests that they
might ultimately have acceded to Germany’s conquest of Poland.30
Hitler,
however, was determined to destroy France to remove it as an obstacle to his
plans for expansion in the east.31
Once again, he was opposed by the senior
army leadership, who believed that German troops would be unlikely to
achieve the same success against the French army, then considered the most
powerful force on the continent.32
But Hitler insisted on attacking and turning
“phony war” into total war.
Hitler’s next, and most self-destructive, step was attacking Russia. Once
again, this was essentially his idea alone, taken over the opposition of his generals
(including even his most pliant lackeys such as Hermann Göring, Wilhelm
Keitel, and Alfred Jodl), who unanimously believed that Germany
should not attack Russia—and certainly not until Britain had sued for peace.33
The attack on Russia marked the beginning of the end for Hitler’s Reich. Although
there is still much debate over whether Germany could have defeated
Russia had the German generals been given a free hand to ªght the war as they
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 119
army’s efforts to oppose Hitler’s foreign policies and his ultimately successful efforts to subvert
the ofªcer corps, see Barnett, Hitler’s Generals; Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933–1945
(Lanham, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990); Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 65, 79–80, 132–
134; and Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 23–24.
30. Even after declaring war in September 1939, there was no discussion in Paris of an offensive
against Germany. Overy with Wheatcroft, Road to War, p. 15; May, Strange Victory, pp. 271–336;
A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 264–266; and Watt,
How War Came, pp. 330–332. The German general staff was also convinced that the French and British
would not take the offensive and would eventually accede to the German conquests if Berlin
refrained from attacking France. See Cooper, The German Army, p. 180.
31. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, pp. 204, 296, 319; Craig, Germany, p. 677; Hildebrand, “The
Foreign Policy of the Third Reich,” p. 88; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s World View (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 37–38; Taylor, Bismarck, pp. 131–132; Wright, Ordeal of Total
War, p. 6; and Watt, How War Came, pp. 42–43.
32. On German army opposition to the invasion of France, see Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny,
pp. 233, 321–325; Cooper, The German Army, pp. 178–182; Craig, Germany, pp. 716–717; Macksey,
From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 79–80; and May, Strange Victory, pp. 15–27. Indeed Cooper notes that
even Keitel—Hitler’s worst lackey among the generals—objected to the attack on France.
33. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 246–258, 286; Kenneth Macksey, “Guderian,” in Barnett, Hitler’s
Generals, pp. 451–452; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 132–134; and Bernd Wegner, “The
Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941–1943,” in John Gooch, ed., Decisive Campaigns
of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 107–108. There were some German
generals, including the chief of staff, who were not opposed to the idea of attacking Russia in the
abstract, but only after the war with Britain had been won. See Cooper, The German Army, pp. 252–
256.
wished, there is no dissent that it was the Red Army that eventually destroyed
the Wehrmacht and sealed Hitler’s fate.
Here as well, it is interesting to consider what might have happened had
Germany not attacked Russia in 1941, which would likely have been the case
(given the unanimous opposition of the general staff) had Hitler not been in
charge. Even assuming that the United States had joined the war that December,
it is at best unclear whether the Anglo-Saxon powers could have found a
way to get ashore and defeat the Wehrmacht in Western Europe without the
Red Army pinning down two-thirds of the German military.34
Against a German
Reich possessing most of the resources of continental Europe, a Cold War
between Britain and Germany seems the most likely outcome, leaving Germany
the hegemon of Europe.
Just as Hitler was the most important cause of World War II, and the most
important factor in the vast, sudden expansion of the German Reich, so too was
he the most important cause of Germany’s defeat.35
As recent work such as
Richard Overy’s superb analysis of Allied victory makes clear, German strategic-
and operational-level defeats were the decisive factor in the destruction of
the Wehrmacht. Allied material strength—and the growth in the ability of the
Allied armed forces to wield that strength—played an important role, but only
the German failures at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk made it possible for the
Allies to bring that material strength to bear. In each of these instances, Hitler
deserves the lion’s share of the blame for defeat.36
Even after Hitler lost these
crucial battles, he insisted on retaining command and greatly hastened Allied
victory by leading superb German armies to defeat after defeat. Despite a
International Security 25:4 120
34. Accounts of the Normandy invasion, such as Overy’s superb analysis, make clear just how
dicey an operation it was, and how much harder it would have been if the Wehrmacht had been
able to concentrate its forces in France. See Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 134–179.
35. In October 1941, Stalin put out diplomatic feelers to see what surrender terms he might get
from Germany. Hitler brushed these entreaties aside because nothing short of the destruction of
the Soviet state and the enslavement of the Russian people would satisfy his objectives. We do not
know what concessions Stalin might have been willing to make, but given the military balance at
the time and the German advances up to that point, the two sides might have agreed on a settlement
similar to the 1917 Brest-Litovsk treaty, in which Lenin conceded the Ukraine, Belarussia, and
the Baltic states to Germany. If Germany had accepted such terms from Stalin, it would have
“won” the war. Only Hitler could have considered such a victory inadequate. See Overy, Why the
Allies Won, pp. 14, 19.
36. Cooper, The German Army, pp. 260–287, 316–325, 340, 423–428, 437–441, 456–460; Macksey,
“Guderian,” pp. 452–456; Macksey, From Triumph to Disaster, pp. 135–136; Martin Middlebrook,
“Paulus,” in Barnett, Hitler’s Generals, pp. 366–367; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 2–7, 67, 98–100;
R.H.S. Stolª, Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1993), 82–89; and Wegner, “The Road to Defeat,” especially pp. 111–123.
never-ending stream of revisionist work on World War II, the evidence and
scholarly analysis remains compelling that Adolf Hitler’s “generalship” crippled
the German army and so was the principal cause of Nazi defeat and
Allied victory.37
Summarizing Hitler’s importance is difªcult given the magnitude of his
inºuence. Hitler determined the intentions of the German state, shaping its decisions
to go to war, its choice of enemies, and the extent of its ambitions. Hitler
also meddled directly in Germany’s strategy for achieving its goals—
interference that led to the Wehrmacht’s defeat and his own undoing. Hitler’s
aggressiveness and malevolence also inspired a strong anti-German coalition,
leading even such anticommunist stalwarts as Winston Churchill to ally with
the Soviet Union.
otto von bismarck and wilhelm ii
Germany’s Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, through sheer force of genius, created
a diplomatic structure that kept peace in Europe from 1871 to 1890. Kaiser
Wilhelm II, who dismissed Bismarck in 1890, brought Bismarck’s architecture
crashing down through sheer force of idiocy. The nature of the threat to Germany,
bureaucratic interests, and other impersonal factors remained roughly
constant during the period before and after 1890. Yet Germany veered from being
the pillar of Europe’s status quo states to the leader of its revisionist camp.
Clearly changes in the balance of power played an important role. A comparison
of the two periods, however, reveals the key role that individuals play in
forging and maintaining alliances, guiding bureaucracies, and paving the road
to war.
A brilliant diplomatic tactician, Bismarck forged a complex series of alliances
to strengthen Germany’s position as a status quo power and preserve the
peace in Europe. Bismarck’s alliances were designed to prevent Germany from
falling victim to a coalition of great powers on both its borders—a German
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 121
37. For recent historical work concurring that Hitler’s leadership was the most important of a
range of factors leading to the defeat of the German army, see Paul Adair, Hitler’s Greatest Defeat:
The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944 (London: Arms and Armour, 1995), especially pp. 23,
66–67, 84, 104, 168; Corelli Barnett, “Introduction,” in Barnett, Hitler’s Generals, pp. 2–7; Cooper, The
German Army, especially pp. 246, 304, 316–325, 400, 406, 423–428, 437–441, 456–484, 491, 510–511,
518, 528–531; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 67, 87–88, 175, 198–207, 274–281; Macksey, From Triumph
to Disaster, p. 225; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941–1945 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio,
1971), especially pp. 113, 404, 459, 529–535; Stolª, Hitler’s Panzers East, especially pp. 72–73;
Wegner, “The Road to Defeat,” pp. 105–127; and Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel,
Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments, trans. Helmut Bolger (London: Arms and Armour, 1993),
pp. 16–22.
nightmare later realized in World War I. To ease other powers’ security concerns,
Bismarck tried to portray Germany as a sated power.38
Bismarck also
sought to keep his allies from ªghting one another, recognizing that Germany
could easily become involved if conºict ºared. Thus he forged alliances with
Austria and Russia that were explicitly defensive.39
Bismarck also sought to
maintain Britain’s goodwill and to placate French opinion on every issue except
Alsace-Lorraine.40
Bismarck deªed the systemic logic of balancing in forging his coalitions. He
succeeded in crafting alliances despite the growing industrial might of the
Ruhr and Germany’s evident military prowess, as demonstrated by its decisive
victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870–71. Indeed rather than balance
against Berlin, other European powers looked to Germany for diplomatic
leadership.41
When Bismarck left ofªce in 1890, France and Britain were competing
bitterly for colonies in Africa, while Russia and England were rival
players in the Great Game. The idea that these three powers would ally was almost
unthinkable.42
By championing the status quo and refusing further expansion in Europe after
1871, Bismarck also deªed the wishes of the German people and bureaucracies.
Bismarck, as A.J.P. Taylor notes, “stood outside party or class, a solitary
ªgure following a line of his own devising.”43
Bismarck alone restrained Germany.
As one contemporary noted in 1888, “All the world is really pro-war
here. . . . With the almost exclusive exception of His Excellency [Bismarck],
who exerts himself to the utmost for the maintenance of peace.”44
Germany’s
military leadership in particular harbored aggressive goals and repeatedly
considered preemptive war against both France and Russia. Bismarck killed
International Security 25:4 122
38. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 101.
39. For example, in the 1887 Reinsurance treaty, Germany and Russia promised neutrality if the
other engaged in a war against a third country unless Germany attacked France or Russia attacked
Austria. In other words, as long as the countries had defensive goals they would be allied. Henry
Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 165. Bismarck also used their alliance
to rein in Austria. He repeatedly reminded Vienna of the alliance’s defensive character and
refused to support it in its Balkan ambitions. In 1882 Bismarck brought Italy into its alliance with
Austria. Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 108.
40. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 160. To distract Paris, Bismarck urged the French to engage in colonial
adventures. Bismarck also pushed the British and the Austrians to work together to preserve the
status quo in the Mediterranean. The result, the “Mediterranean agreement” of 1887, led Britain to
become associated with the Triple Alliance and thus deter Russian and French adventurism. Craig,
Germany, p. 131.
41. Craig, Germany, p. 116.
42. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 171.
43. Taylor, Bismarck, p. 53.
44. Friedrich von Holstein, as quoted in Kagan, On the Origins of War, p. 115. At the time Holstein
worked in the German Foreign Ofªce.
these ideas. Even though most Germans disliked allying with Russia and favored
Austria’s position on the Eastern Question, Bismarck tried to keep close
to Moscow and prevent Vienna from expanding in the Balkans. Unlike his successors,
he recognized that Germany could not afford problems on both borders
and, given France’s unrelenting hostility, Germany’s eastern border had
to be secure.45
Indeed critics have faulted Bismarck for devising a strategy so individual
dependent that only a diplomatic genius could carry it out. Henry Kissinger,
for example, notes that “where Bismarck failed was in having doomed his society
to a style of policy which could only have been carried on had a great man
emerged in every generation.”46
Yet in truth we will never know whether it
was inevitable that Bismarck’s successors should have chosen to substitute rigidity
for ºexibility and bullying for conciliation.47
His successors did not fail to
maintain his intricate system; they simply never tried.
The year 1890 is rightly seen as a turning point in German foreign policy, but
this can be explained only by the change in German leadership. Germany’s social
and bureaucratic structures remained unchanged, as did its trade patterns.
No great technological leap radically altered the nature of military might or national
wealth. Of course, German power did rise steadily following German
uniªcation. But this gradual rise cannot explain the radical disjuncture between
the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine foreign policies. Although Germany’s
power rose gradually, in the few short years after Bismarck’s demise Germany
went from a champion of the status quo to its greatest challenger. Only the
change in leadership can explain this sudden transformation.
Once settled on his throne, Kaiser Wilhelm II ousted the aging chancellor,
and Germany quickly shed Bismarck’s policies. Bismarck’s successors abandoned
his alliance strategy of restraint, abruptly ended their alliance with Russia
(much to St. Petersburg’s dismay), and blindly lashed themselves to
Austrian policy in the Balkans, disregarding its potential to provoke a war
with Russia.48
Understanding Wilhelmine Germany is difªcult without focusLet
Us Now Praise Great Men 123
45. Taylor, Bismarck, p. 210. During the Congress of Berlin, the German parliament urged Bismarck
to take a stronger stand vis-à-vis the Eastern question. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 156. Moreover, in
1887 some leading German military ªgures urged a preemptive war on Russia—an idea Bismarck
rejected out of hand.
46. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 138.
47. Kissinger notes that the removal of Bismarck’s genius did not by necessity usher in a policy of
idiocy. Ibid., p. 169. Similarly, Craig notes that even when the Germans had solid grounds for their
actions, their interventions were often menacing, insulting, and violent. Craig, Germany, p. 243.
48. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 179; and Paul M. Kennedy, “The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik:
Reºections on Wilhelm II’s Place in the Making of German Foreign Policy,” in John C.G. Rohl and
Nicolaus Sombart, eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
ing on the role of Wilhelm II himself. As Paul Kennedy has argued, a
structuralist approach “tells us why Wilhelmine Germany was expansionist at
a certain time, but it has much less explanatory power when we move on to the
equally important questions of what sort of expansionist policies were chosen,
and why, and with what effects.”49
As if alienating St. Petersburg was not enough of a blunder, the kaiser’s pursuit
of a ºeet in the face of British opposition drove London into anti-German
alliances and bought Germany little in return. The naval program indicates
how individuals shape bureaucratic politics and even domestic economic interests.
Without Kaiser Wilhelm II, there would have been no naval program.
As Kennedy further observes, “From the beginning to the end of the
Flottenpolitik, the kaiser played a critical and fatal role.”50
Only after the naval
program got into high gear did the kaiser ªnd a domestic base for it.51
Not surprisingly, after 1890 the kaiser’s misguided policies and alarming behavior
destroyed the protective web of alliances that Bismarck had created and
drove the three former adversaries—Britain, France, and Russia—into a Triple
Entente opposing Berlin. Most foreign governments and populaces saw Wilhelm’s
rhetoric as German policy.52
Where Bismarck had tried to downplay the
image of German power, the kaiser swaggered. At the Congress of Berlin in
1878, Germany under Bismarck had sought to promote peace among the European
powers and demonstrate that Germany was a satiated power. Wilhelm II,
on the other hand, was an incorrigible jingoist who, rather than reassure other
capitals, regularly frightened them by rattling Germany’s saber and demanding
more “respect” for Berlin. True, Wilhelm’s Weltanschaung was shared by
many of his countrymen. However, though the kaiser may have been closer to
the norm than Bismarck, he was hardly normal. Wilhelm showed an uncanny
knack for stampeding Germany’s erstwhile allies into anti-German coalitions
International Security 25:4 124
Press, 1982), p. 164. Bismarck’s successor as chancellor, Leopold von Caprivi, confessed that he
wanted to simplify foreign policy because he lacked Bismarck’s ability to keep eight balls in the air
at once. Russia, to preserve the alliance, offered several concessions with regard to Germany’s position
with Austria, but Caprivi still refused to renew the alliance. Kagan, On the Origins of War,
p. 122.
49. Kennedy, “The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik,” p. 151. See also Robert G.L. Waite, “Leadership
Pathologies: The Kaiser and the Führer and the Decision for War in 1914 and 1939,” in Betty Glad,
ed., Psychological Dimensions of War (Newbury Park, N.J.: Sage, 1990), pp. 143–168.
50. Kennedy, “The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik,” p. 162.
51. Blaming German industry, as some scholars do, does not explain the German decision to build
a large ºeet. As Kennedy notes, it cannot have mattered to Krupp whether the government spent
millions on infantry divisions or on battleships, as the giant arms manufacturer would have supplied
the guns for either. Ibid., p. 152.
52. Ibid., p. 160.
while cajoling his ministers into policies that they knew were foolish. Just before
World War I, Chancellor Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg lamented this turn
of events: “A Turkish policy against Russia, Morocco against France, ºeet
against England, all at the same time—challenge everybody, get in everyone’s
way, and actually, in the course of all this, weaken nobody.”53
Given the
growth in German power by the turn of the century, even Bismarck might have
been hard-pressed to avoid an anti-German entente, but his successors worsened
rather than helped the problem.
The comparison between Bismarck and Wilhelm II reveals several points
about the importance of individuals. With the shift from Bismarck to
Wilhelm II came a change in Germany’s alliances and foreign policy posture.
This shift did not reºect a new strategic environment or domestic pressures,
but rather the different visions of the individuals at the helm of the state.
Bismarckian Germany sought to preserve the status quo; Wilhelmine Germany
sought to become Europe’s hegemon. Not only did the choice of alliance partners
change, but so too did the nature of the alliances: Under Bismarck, Germany’s
alliances were defensive and intended to restrain its allies; under
Wilhelm II, they encouraged Austria and others toward aggression. Similarly,
the face that Germany presented to the world went from the reassuring peacemaker
of the Berlin Congress to the bellicose expansionist of the two Moroccan
crises (and numerous others) provoked by Wilhelm II. As a result, the nations
of Europe banded together to oppose German expansionism. The comparison
of Bismarck with Wilhelm II also demonstrates the role that individuals play in
the success or failure of diplomacy. Balances of power are created by individuals,
not fostered solely by power politics.
napoleon bonaparte
Napoleon Bonaparte’s impact on nineteenth-century European affairs demonstrates
that an individual leader can determine not only the intentions of his
state but also its capabilities and the reactions of other states. Like the personalities
of Hitler and Wilhelm II, Napoleon’s was a major impetus to war. Napoleon’s
unique role in shaping European politics in the early nineteenth century
encompassed more than just his megalomaniacal pursuit of glory, however.
Napoleon not only profoundly shaped French intentions; he was also a crucial
component of French power. Napoleon’s military skills were so great that, as
an individual, he affected the balance of continental power and so helped force
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 125
53. Kurt Riezler, Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente, ed. Karl Dietrich Erdman (Göttingen, Germany:
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1972), p. 188, as quoted in Craig, Germany, p. 337.
the other states of Europe to move against him as much as to move against
France.
One cannot blame Napoleon entirely for the wars that bear his name. Even if
Bonaparte had never taken power, there is an argument to be made that revolutionary
France might still have launched a crusade to liberate the world from
the chains of absolute monarchy even after the cannonade of Valmy ended the
threat to the new republic in 1792.54
The philosophy of the revolution demanded
that its blessings of “Liberté, Egalité, et Fraternité” be spread to the benighted
peoples of the rest of Europe.55
But the French Revolution explains only part of the story. The War of the
First Coalition (1792) was the only conºict France fought in the age of Napoleon
that was unequivocally defensive. Thereafter French motives were increasingly
aggressive. Defending, or even spreading, the revolution became
less and less relevant and, especially after 1807, France’s wars were fought
largely to sate the personal demons of the emperor. As early as the War of the
Third Coalition (1805), Austria and Russia sought only to compel France to
disgorge its conquests since 1791, whereas Napoleon fought this campaign as
much to establish his control over central Germany as to end any threat from
the Third Coalition.56
Reºecting on Napoleon’s aggressive nature, David
Chandler has conceded that “there can be no denying that many of these attacks
were, in the last analysis, provoked by the Emperor.”57
Following the Battle of Friedland in 1807, Czar Alexander I and the king of
Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III, signed the Peace of Tilsit, leaving Napoleon the
hegemon of Europe. After Tilsit, the tatters of the argument that his wars were
defensive or the result of the unstoppable tide of revolution disintegrate. The
French people were satisªed by the glories they had won and grew increasingly
disenchanted with the costs of Napoleon’s constant war making.58
Prince
Metternich (then Austria’s ambassador to Paris) wrote in December 1808 that
“it is no longer the French people who are waging war, it is Napoleon alone
who is set on it. . . . Even his army no longer wants this conºict.”59
Despite the
ast conquests he had achieved at Tilsit, however, Napoleon was not content. In
International Security 25:4 126
54. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1966), pp. xxix–xxx.
55. Such expansionary behavior is typical of revolutionary states. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and
War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
56. Alistair Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? Napoleon, 1805–1815 (Armonk, N.Y.: St. Martin’s, 1996),
p. 69; and Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 400.
57. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, p. xxix.
58. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? pp. 296–297; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 305, 434, 478,
482–495.
59. Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, p. 400.
the words of Alistair Horne, “The trouble was that, for all his new, consolidated
power, Napoleon had to go on. . . . As he himself had written as a youth,
‘Ambition is never content, even on the summit of greatness.’”60
Thus Napoleon,
because of his overweening ambition and ego, was as much the cause of
the wars of 1796–1815 as were the forces unleashed by the French Revolution.
Indeed Napoleon’s ego may have been the most important of the forces unleashed
by the revolution.61
One telling commentary on the increasingly idiosyncratic nature of French
war making was the reaction of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Napoleon’s
brilliant but despicable foreign minister. As the years passed,
Talleyrand steadily distanced himself from the emperor because he concluded
that Napoleon’s ambitions could lead only to disaster. After Austerlitz,
Talleyrand urged Napoleon to offer Austria generous terms to win it over as an
ally (precisely the course Bismarck would pursue so successfully sixty-one
years later), but Napoleon’s ego demanded that Austria be humiliated. The
peace he inºicted on Vienna ensured the undying enmity of the Hapsburgs.
Talleyrand ardently opposed Napoleon’s subsequent invasions of Portugal
(1807), Spain (1808), and Russia (1812) as dangerous and unnecessary adventures.
By 1812, Talleyrand had effectively abandoned Napoleon and was working
for the czar because he recognized that Napoleon’s unquenchable ambition
would condemn everyone around him to certain doom.62
Napoleon’s personal ambition was not the only facet of his personality that
made him a crucial factor in the international relations of his time. Napoleon
was also a military genius, one of the greatest generals in history. At the beginning
of the nineteenth century, France was the wealthiest and the second most
populous nation in Europe. In addition, the manpower furnished by the levée
en masse combined with the military reforms of the late eighteenth century
gave France formidable military power. These factors alone suggest that revolutionary
France would have been a tougher foe for the other European powers
to contain than Louis XIV’s France. Nevertheless, Napoleon himself was a
“force multiplier” of tremendous value.63
The Duke of Wellington remarked
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 127
60. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? p. 235.
61. See also Felix Markham, Napoleon (New York: Signet New American Library, 1963), pp. 55–56.
62. Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? pp. 237–240; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 248–250, 417–
418, 478. Schom also notes that Napoleon’s secret police chief, Joseph Fouché, perhaps the third
most powerful man in the empire, also constantly sought peace despite the emperor’s compulsive
war making. See Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 271–272.
63. Perhaps the best examples were the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. By then, Napoleon had lost
the advantage of superior military effectiveness because most of his best-trained combat veterans
had been slaughtered in Spain and Russia, while his enemies had reformed their own militaries
that Bonaparte’s presence on the ªeld of battle was worth 40,000 men.64
His
skills as a general were repeatedly showcased in virtuoso performances such
as the Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena/Auerstadt, Friedland, and Wagram campaigns—where
he scored colossal successes although regularly outnumbered
by his adversaries. When Napoleon was at his best, he could achieve almost
anything as a general, regardless of the forces arrayed against him. At his
worst, he still inspired his troops to superhuman efforts and terriªed even his
most able opponents. Ultimately, Napoleon proved so uniquely important to
French aggressiveness and power that the other European powers broke with
centuries of tradition and made his removal a principal war aim.65
saddam hussein and haªz al-asad
Although Saddam Hussein and Haªz al-Asad faced many similar problems as
leaders, their preferred solutions were very different. They were both Arab dictators
ruling illegitimate regimes who feared they would be overthrown. They
both ruled in countries where domestic institutions were feeble and therefore
did not signiªcantly constrain policymaking. They both ruled fairly weak Arab
states bordering considerably stronger neighbors (Israel, Turkey, and Iran) as
well as weaker ones (Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia). They were
both members of minority groups in the countries they ruled and were both
challenged by the majority communal groups, whom they suppressed in
bloodthirsty fashion. For both, their own continued rule was their preeminent
concern. To stay in power, they centralized decisionmaking in their own
hands, created divided and competing bureaucracies, and ruthlessly quashed
any individual or group that appeared to be gaining independent power for
fear that it could become a rival.
Despite these similarities, the two leaders—and as a result the two states
they led—had very different intentions and strategies. Although both sought
to aggrandize the power of their respective states (and so their own power),
Asad’s ambitions were more limited than Saddam’s. Whatever Asad’s early aspirations
to a “greater Syria” comprising the entirety of the Levantine littoral,
International Security 25:4 128
along French lines. Likewise his adversaries had adopted their own versions of the levée en masse,
and so the French were badly outnumbered as well. Nevertheless Napoleon nearly won each of
these campaigns, and his conduct of the 1814 campaign in defense of France was nothing short of
astonishing. See Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 865–1004.
64. Markham, Napoleon, p. 141. This in an era when 100,000 men was considered a large ªeld army.
65. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 899, 947, 994, 1001; and Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, p. 414.
Schom contends that the allies recognized that Napoleon had to be removed because of his bellicosity
and martial skills as early as 1805 after the Battle of Austerlitz. Chandler argues that the
Austrians were convinced of the necessity of this course only after the Battle of Leipzig in 1813.
for the last eighteen years of his life his primary foreign policy goals were
regaining the Golan Heights from Israel, institutionalizing Syrian suzerainty
over Lebanon, and perhaps regaining the Hatay/Alexandretta province from
Turkey. On the other hand, Saddam has repeatedly sought to don Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s mantle of “leader of the Arab world.” Saddam’s invasions
of Iran and Kuwait, his pursuit of all manner of ballistic missiles and nonconventional
weapons, his efforts to build a massive Iraqi military, and his various
diplomatic gambits have all been explicitly pursued—at least in part—in
the name of making himself and Iraq the voice of the Arabs in regional and
global affairs.66
Even when such goals were clearly secondary to more immediate
concerns (such as the threat from revolutionary Iran in prompting his decision
to attack in September 1980), Saddam has never failed to remind his
people of the larger stakes he always believes are involved.67
An even greater difference between these two despots lay in how they pursued
their goals. To say that Saddam is risk tolerant would be a gross under-
statement.68
Even when his motives are defensive, his course of action is
usually offensive. Whenever he has confronted a difªcult situation, Saddam
has frequently chosen the most reckless of all available options. When faced
with the threat from Syrian Ba’thism and Syria’s damming of the Euphrates
River in the mid-1970s, Saddam was ready to attack Syria had Asad not moved
to defuse the situation.69
Fearing the threat from Ayatollah Khomeini and the
Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s, Saddam attacked Iran.70
To avoid economic
hardship, Saddam attacked Kuwait in 1990.71
Confronted by a thirtyLet
Us Now Praise Great Men 129
66. See, for example, Ofra Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents (Tel
Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1992), pp. 14–17.
67. F. Gregory Gause III, “Gulf Regional Politics: Revolution, War, and Rivalry,” in W. Howard
Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992), p. 52; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1985), p. 245.
68. For an interesting analysis of Saddam’s decisionmaking, see Jerrold M. Post, “The Deªning
Moment of Saddam’s Life: A Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and DecisionMaking
of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf Crisis,” in Stanley A. Renshon, ed., The Political Psychology
of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conºict (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 49–66.
69. Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1984), pp. 45–46, 149–150; Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968 (Washington,
D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 68, 161–164; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq,
pp. 230–231.
70. Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, pp. 151–162; Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1992), pp. 25–39; and Marr, Modern History of Iraq, pp. 292–294.
71. Amatzia Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad,” in Baram and
Barry Rubin, eds., Iraq’s Road to War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), pp. 6–9; Lawrence Freedman
and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conºict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 38–41, 45–47; and F. Gregory Gause III, “Prospect
nation coalition led by the world’s only superpower, Saddam gambled that he
could ignore the coalition’s air forces, stalemate its armies, and force the rest
of the world to accept his annexation of Kuwait.72
Three years later, while
Iraqi society slowly suffocated under international sanctions, Saddam refused
to give up the remnants of his nonconventional weapons programs and instead
tried to attack Kuwait once again. Nor have the recurrent crises with
Baghdad since then given any indication that Saddam has learned his lesson:
He continues to bully, threaten, and provoke. Indeed even the decline of Iraqi
power appears not to have affected the aggressiveness of Baghdad’s foreign
policy. Undeterred by the loss of three-quarters of his military power to the
U.S.-led coalition in 1991, Saddam has continued to provoke Washington as if
Desert Storm meant no more to him than a weather forecast.
Asad, on the other hand, was one of the most cautious leaders in the Middle
East. Asad agonized over difªcult decisions, only choosing a course of action
long after it had become imperative for him to do so. He alone among the
Syrian leadership opposed Syria’s invasion of Jordan in September 1970 for
fear that it was too risky.73
Asad agonized over his own coup, delaying it until
long after it could not possibly fail.74
He did not invade Lebanon until 1976,
after every other course of action had failed him and he realized that further
hesitation could undermine the stability of Syria.75
He threatened to attack
International Security 25:4 130
Theory and Iraqi War Decisions,” paper presented at the 1997 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28–31, 1997.
72. On Saddam’s aggressive grand strategy beginning in early 1990, see Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion
of Kuwait,” pp. 5–28; and Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, pp. 11–34.
73. Neville Brown, “Jordanian Civil War,” Military Review, September 1971, p. 45; Alasdair Drysdale,
“The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery,”
in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats:
Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1982), pp. 68–69; Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945–1986: Politics and Society (London: Unwin Hyman,
1988), pp. 51–52; Fred H. Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 68; Moshe Ma’oz, “The Emergence of Modern Syria,” in Ma’oz
and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin’s, 1986), p. 26; and Nikolaos Van
Dam, The Stuggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1978
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1979), pp. 84–88.
74. Ma’oz, “The Emergence of Modern Syria,” p. 28; Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria (London: I.B.
Tauris, 1988), p. 171; and Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, pp. 87–92.
75. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1991), pp. 3–22; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York: Atheneum,
1990), pp. 80–91; Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, pp. 33–44; Hopwood, Syria, pp. 60–62; Moshe
Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making (London: Oxford University Press, 1995),
pp. 160–165; Itamar Rabinovich, “The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an
Issue, and an Instrument,” in Ma’oz and Yaniv, Syria under Assad, pp. 179–184; Itamar Rabinovich,
The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 36–37, 47–56, 85–
88, 201–236; Seale, Asad of Syria, pp. 267–289; and Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in
Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 95–213.
Jordan several times in the early 1980s but drew back every time.76
He tried
hard to avoid a war with Israel in 1982 and fought back only when the Israelis
attacked him despite his efforts.77
Similarly, he moved against his brother
Rif’at only after Rif’at tried to seize control of the government in 1984, even
though the rest of Syria’s top leadership had been urging him to defang Rif’at
for years.78
Perhaps the best indication of the differing approaches of these two Arab
dictators to foreign policy was their divergent responses to the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Asad adopted a policy of appeasement, while Saddam assumed
a policy of aggressive expansion. Both concluded that the loss of the Soviet
Union as a counterweight to the United States would allow Washington
and Israel to bring greater pressure to bear on them. Saddam’s response was
offensive: Seize Kuwait to secure its economic resources, overawe the other
Arab states, and demonstrate Iraqi military might.79
Indeed many experts suspect
that Saddam consciously sought to challenge the United States to demonstrate
its (relative) weakness and Iraq’s strength.80
The fact that this action
threatened to provoke war with the United States (something that considerable
evidence indicates Saddam fully understood) was an acceptable risk to him.81
On the other hand, Asad reacted to the Cold War’s end by moderating many
of his more aggressive policies. He curbed Syria’s involvement in international
terrorism, joined the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, and, in his own
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 131
76. Joseph Nevo, “Syria and Jordan: The Politics of Subversion,” in Ma’oz and Yaniv, Syria under
Assad, p. 145.
77. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 132–136; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R.
Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 1, The Arab-Israeli Conºicts, 1973–1989 (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1990), p. 83; Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 174–175; Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s
Lebanon War, ed. and trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117–118, 155–
156; and Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 380.
78. The best account of Rif’at al-Asad’s fall is Michael Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Defense Companies:
Proªle of a Praetorian Unit,” unpublished manuscript, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
1989, pp. 8–12.
79. For Saddam’s analysis of the new world order and aggressive prescriptions for Iraq and the
other Arab states, see his address to the Fourth Summit of the Arab Cooperation Council, Amman,
February 24, 1990, reprinted in Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, pp. 37–49.
80. Baram, “Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” pp. 10–11; Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis, p. 15;
and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conºict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the
New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 31.
81. The best known of Saddam’s statements implying that he understood the risk that the United
States might intervene if Iraq attacked Kuwait was his warning to U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie
that American society “cannot accept 10,000 fatalities in one battle,” in their infamous meeting on
July 25, 1990. See Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents,
Opinions (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 125. However, Iraqi ofªcials restated this after
the war. See, for example, “Aziz Interviewed on Outbreak of Gulf War,” Milliyet, May 30, 1991,
in Foreign Broadcast Information Service–Near East–South Asia-91-107, June 4, 1991, pp. 13–14;
and Milton Viorst, “Report from Baghdad,” New Yorker, June 24, 1991, pp. 66–67.
dysfunctional and dithering manner, showed a surprising—albeit painfully
cautious and unrealistic—willingness to actually consider a peace treaty with
Israel.
Comparing Saddam Hussein and Haªz al-Asad, two of the most brutal tyrants
of the Arab world, demonstrates that the course of despotic regimes can,
to a considerable extent, be predicted by the personality of their leaders. Despite
all of their similarities, Saddam and Asad shared a crucial difference:
Where Saddam is aggressive, reckless, and extremely expansionist, Asad was
defensive, cautious, and only modestly expansionist.
ayatollah ruhollah khomeini and the iran-iraq war
Hitler and Napoleon are hardly history’s only leaders who extended wars beyond
what systemic, domestic, and bureaucratic pressures might dictate. Although
Saddam Hussein may have started the Iran-Iraq War, its duration
beyond 1982 can largely be blamed on the determination of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the charismatic Iranian leader. In 1982 Iranian forces had
recovered the territory lost in the initial Iraqi invasion of 1980, but Khomeini
kept the war going for six more years in the hope of removing Saddam from
power. Khomeini insisted on conducting fruitless offensives to try to break the
Iraqis. During this time powerful allies cast their lot against Iran, leading elites
began to oppose the war, and the Iranian people became increasingly disgruntled.
Yet the ªghting dragged on. To the Imam, the dictates of his revolutionary
Islamic credo mattered more than military and economic realities.82
Only the
complete collapse of Iran’s armies along the front in 1988 led the Imam to
“drink the bitter cup of peace,” in his own words. As William Quandt laments,
hundreds of thousands of Iranians and Iraqis died as a result of “this old man’s
intransigence.”83
Khomeini, like Napoleon, was himself a source of fear. This fear affected the
reactions of other states, particularly within the Middle East. State borders did
not limit the draw of his charisma, which ampliªed the strength of his revolutionary
credo. In Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, and elsewhere in the Muslim world,
Shi’a radicals and Islamist militants of all sects were drawn by the commandInternational
Security 25:4 132
82. See Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Penguin,
1996), pp. 322–328, for statements on Khomeini’s ideology as it relates to the war’s continuation. A
good overview of Khomeini’s theology can be found in Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The
Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993),
pp. 409–484.
83. William Quandt, “The Middle East on the Brink: Prospects for Change,” Middle East Journal,
Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 13. See also R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), p. 74.
ing image that Khomeini presented. It was in part this threat that led the traditional
monarchies of the Persian Gulf to form the Gulf Cooperation Council
and work with Iraq against Iran.84
Hypotheses on the Role of Individuals in International Relations
The ªnal charge we have left to fulªll is to demonstrate that the ªrst image can
produce plausible, and testable, hypotheses about international relations.
Ideally, future research would test and elaborate on these hypotheses to develop
a more comprehensive set of theories regarding the role of individuals in
international relations. The very existence of these credible hypotheses, however,
demonstrates the value of the ªrst image: It can be used to derive important
theories that scholars can test and reªne.
Below we present thirteen hypotheses on the role of individuals in international
relations. The ªrst set of hypotheses describes the most general ways in
which individuals shape the behavior of nations. The next set delves down to a
deeper level of analysis, presenting hypotheses that detail how speciªc personality
traits of leaders may cause certain patterns of outcomes in international
affairs. The third set of hypotheses examines the conditions under which leaders
have the most inºuence. The fourth and ªnal group suggests how the ªrst
image interacts with the other two—simultaneously shaping them and being
shaped by them in turn.
the basics: foundational hypotheses on the impact of individuals
The ªrst four hypotheses presented below address how individuals can shape
the broadest contours of international relations. At the most basic level, the
core question of this article is, Do individual personalities matter to the affairs
of nations? Our conclusion is a resounding “yes.” These four hypotheses are
intuitive, obvious (we hope), and perhaps even commonsensical. Their obviousness
should not detract from their value, however—quite the opposite. In
Aristotelian fashion, sometimes it is important to catalogue knowledge—even
that which after having been articulated seems obvious—in search of new
insights.
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 133
84. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), pp. 259–260. On the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, see David Priess,
“Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the GCC,” Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer
1996), pp. 143–171; Lenore G. Martin, The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 24–27; and Emile A. Nakleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems,
and Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1986).
hypothesis 1: individuals set the ultimate and secondary intentions
of a state. One of the most important roles of individuals is to shape, if not
determine, a state’s intentions. At times, the inºuence of individuals can be so
great as to transform a defender of the status quo into its greatest nemesis. Bismarck
fought for the status quo in Europe, whereas Wilhelm II fought to overturn
it. Even when a country’s people and leaders already oppose the existing
order, a leader can greatly magnify the extent of the state’s revisionist ambitions.
The German people and their generals sought only a greater Germany,
but Hitler would be satisªed with nothing less than the enslavement of Europe.
Similarly, Napoleon’s ego, not the aspirations of the French people, drove
la grande armée to destruction on the steppes of Russia and the mountains of
Spain. A prescient leader also can direct foreign policy toward important longterm
goals that are often ignored by demagogues, bureaucrats, and the general
populace. Bismarck recognized the danger of alienating Russia even though
most German ofªcials were hostile to the czar.
Of course, a country’s strategic position, domestic politics, culture, and other
factors—both systemic and domestic—also shape a state’s intentions. The
cases presented above, however, suggest that individuals can often transcend
these factors, play them off against one another, or otherwise exercise a direct
and decisive inºuence on a state’s behavior.
hypothesis 2: individuals can be an important component of a state’s
diplomatic influence and military power. Just as individuals can determine
a state’s intentions, so too are they often an important aspect of a state’s
capabilities. Sterile, quantiªable measures such as industrial output and orders
of battle are only part of a country’s military power: The competence or ineptitude
of its leaders also weighs heavily in the balance. By itself, France was a
formidable military power, capable of matching, or even besting, any of its rivals.
With Napoleon leading its armies, France could be defeated only by the
combined forces of all of Europe. Hitler, in contrast, diminished Germany’s
military power: His foolish strategies and amateurish orders destroyed Germany’s
superbly led and trained armies. Great leaders also can strengthen a
country’s diplomatic power. It is individuals who build the alliances, and create
the threats, that maintain or destroy balances of power. Bismarck forged alliances
where others would have failed: Absent the Iron Chancellor, it is hard
to imagine a defeated Austria aligning with Prussia after the humiliations of
Sadowa and Königgrätz. Similarly, it is equally hard to imagine a leader other
than Wilhelm II repeatedly antagonizing Britain for so little purpose. This emphasis
on the impact of individuals on state power is not to belittle geography,
resources, state capacity, or other vital factors. But political scientists must recInternational
Security 25:4 134
ognize that these factors alone often fail to account for a state’s overall military
might or political inºuence.
hypothesis 3: individual leaders shape their state’s strategies. Leaders
shape not only a state’s goals and capabilities but also the manner in which
the state employs its resources in pursuit of its goals. Napoleon was a soldier
ªrst and last. All too often, the emperor ignored Talleyrand’s sage advice to
solve his foreign policy problems at the bargaining table, preferring to solve
them instead on the battleªeld. Whereas Asad dithered in response to challenges,
Saddam invariably reached for the sword.
One particular manifestation of this role is the inºuence that individuals
have in making and breaking alliances. The idiosyncratic preferences of leaders
often cause them to ally with one state over another even in the face of
strong systemic or domestic pressures. Because of his animus against the
House of Windsor, Wilhelm II would consider allying with Britain only if London
would grovel before him. Moreover, Wilhelm II demanded simplicity in
Germany’s alliances and thus let relations with Russia and Britain deteriorate.
Bismarck could juggle many balls, Wilhelm II one on a good day. As scholars
often forget, balances of power are not inevitable: They rest on the shoulders of
individuals.85
hypothesis 4: individual leaders affect the behavior of opposing
states that must react to leaders’ idiosyncratic intentions and capabilities.
Leaders not only inºuence the actions of their states; they also shape
the reactions of other states. At times the mere presence of charismatic, moronic,
bellicose, or puissant ªgures alters how other international actors behave
toward the state. Napoleon’s overweening ambition coupled with his
overwhelming military prowess convinced the rest of Europe that the emperor
himself had to be deposed. The Gulf oil monarchies, fearing both revolution
and invasion, banded together to oppose the threat from Islamic Iran led by
the charismatic Khomeini. Incompetence, as well as ability, can force other
states to react. Wilhelm II’s erratic diplomacy and provocative swaggering led
other European leaders to see him—and thus Germany—as untrustworthy
and dangerous. And we will not even mention Hitler.
building on the obvious: foundational hypotheses and the future of
china. The above four hypotheses can be faulted as obvious, but if true, international
relations scholars must change their analytic approach. Consider any
assessment of the future of China—a vital question for the coming years.
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 135
85. Indeed Henry Kissinger—one of the premier realists—devotes much of his early work to examining
how such a balance was created in nineteenth-century Europe. See Kissinger, A World Re-
Neorealists might stress China’s ability to generate power and the relative
power of its rivals. Second-image theorists would add a discussion of how the
communist legacy shapes Beijing’s behavior and the relative power and agendas
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) party apparatchiks, and other institutions.
Still other scholars might weigh China’s strategic culture, the existing
offense-defense balance, or the presence of important domestic interest groups,
such as farmers and factory workers.
If our hypotheses above are true, however—even to the point of being obvious—then
scholars cannot understand the future impact of China on international
relations without also understanding the mix of skills and abilities of
China’s leaders, such as Jiang Zemin. Does Jiang, like Mao Zedong and Deng
Xiaoping before him, exert tremendous inºuence over China’s overall policies?
How will he pursue China’s foreign policy objectives? Is Jiang a skilled diplomat,
or will he transform China’s potential friends into real enemies? If Beijing
goes to war, will he shape the PLA’s strategy, or, like so many leaders, tragically
overreach? How do China’s neighbors and other key states view Jiang: as
a dangerous warlord, a man of peace, or some uneasy mix? The answers to
these questions do not, by themselves, provide a perfect guide to China’s future
behavior. But ignoring the particular qualities of Jiang’s personality risks
courting disaster.
how individuals matter: hypotheses on personality traits
Of course, it is not enough to speculate merely on whether individuals “matter”
to the course of international relations. What is necessary to demonstrate
the utility of the ªrst image is to show that it can generate speciªc, testable hypotheses
regarding how individuals affect international relations. As we argued
earlier, the ªrst image should be able to generate testable hypotheses in
which the variance in the distribution of personality traits among leaders is
said to cause states to act in particular ways. The hypotheses listed below are
hardly exhaustive, but drawing on the case studies presented above, they demonstrate
the kind of hypotheses that can be inferred regarding the correlation
between the distribution of leaders’ personality traits and international relations
outcomes.86
International Security 25:4 136
stored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifºin, 1957),
for a superb example.
86. We recognize that there is a selection bias in the cases from which we generated several of
these hypotheses. For example, we note the correlation between risk tolerance and war, but our
cases focus largely on instances of war. Additional testing of these hypotheses using cases of peace
is necessary, as are tests using leaders who are not risk tolerant, egotistical, and so on.
hypothesis 5: states led by risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to
cause wars. Some leaders are more willing than others to tolerate high levels
of risk, and this willingness to accept risk often determines how aggressive a
state is. Hitler and Napoleon stand out as leaders willing to take risks to gain
resources, glory, or other objectives. Hitler’s invasion of France was a daring
venture, to say nothing of his foray into Russia. Napoleon repeatedly rolled the
dice, risking his empire in the pursuit of further conquests. A more cautious
man might have opted to consolidate his power rather than trust in his star so
absolutely. The contrast between Saddam Hussein and Haªz al-Asad highlights
the importance of risk tolerance. Saddam’s willingness to accept high
risks led him to attack Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel—and to
repeatedly provoke the United States. Asad, on the other hand, generally
sought to avoid risky undertakings: He intervened reluctantly in Lebanon only
after exhausting all other options; he backed down from confrontations with
Jordan and Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s; and after 1982 he challenged Israel only
indirectly, preferring to work through proxies rather than risk a direct confrontation.
Faced with similar circumstances, Saddam saw opportunities where
Asad saw dangers. This different perspective has often meant the difference
between war and peace in the Middle East.
hypothesis 6: states led by delusional leaders start wars and prolong
them unnecessarily. Some leaders view the world through cracked lenses.
Their ideology or their pathology clouds their vision, leading them to ignore
reality and to overestimate their chances of success. A variety of work on
decisionmaking shows that individuals interpret information in different
ways, with certain fallacies being common but present to different degrees. Delusional
individuals are particularly likely to ignore or misinterpret systemic
imperatives, and domestic constraints, causing them to overestimate their
chances of victory in war or to underestimate the value of an alliance. Delusional
leaders see threats that do not exist. They miscalculate balances of
power. And they imagine alliances where none are possible.
Needless to say, words such as “crazy” and “delusional” are overused.
Saddam Hussein, although certainly evil and often foolish, is not insane. Rationality
is a spectrum: Some leaders follow a hyperrational course, whereas others
are more prone to wishful thinking. But leaders such as Hitler and
Khomeini have clearly slipped over the edge. Hitler believed that his German
Ubermenschen could defy the entire world, and continued to believe this even
as armies of Russian Untermenschen approached Berlin. Khomeini refused to
countenance any peace with Iraq’s government of heretics, even after the impossibility
of military victory became obvious to everyone around him.
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 137
Delusional leaders and the security dilemma interact in particularly pernicious
ways. In its classic depiction, Robert Jervis explains that in an anarchic
world system, a state’s actions to defend itself often cause a counterreaction by
its rivals, which in turn leaves all states less secure. It is not always the anarchic
system that imposes the security dilemma. A delusional or foolish leader
can create one through his or her own actions. Wilhelm II saw Germany as surrounded
by hostile powers (including several that had been Germany’s diplomatic
partners until the kaiser dismissed Bismarck) and believed that their
militaries and alliances threatened German ambitions, indeed Germany’s very
survival. In turn, Wilhelm’s own actions, most notably his development of a
ºeet, spurred the British and French to see him as a threat. Delusional leaders
can create security dilemmas where none previously existed, or cause precarious
situations to spiral into calamity.
hypothesis 7: states led by leaders with grandiose visions are more
likely to destabilize the system. It is difªcult for the international system
to accommodate the outsized dreams of leaders. The status quo has great
difªculty with leaders who cannot be sated with minor concessions and modest
territorial transfers. These leaders often overreach in a desperate attempt to
realize their ambitions. Triumphs that would have been the crown jewels for
Louis XVI were disdained as cut-glass baubles by Napoleon. Similarly, Hitler’s
ambitions soared beyond those of other German leaders. In both cases, their
ambitions exceeded not only the capabilities of their states, but also the ability
of the international system to contain them without massive dislocation. The
determination of Napoleon and Hitler to rule all of Europe (and dominate the
world) sparked wars and upheaval that changed the face of the continent. Nor
is vast military power a necessity: Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini
had dreams of similar proportion, and even without commensurate military
power, both managed to radically shake the international affairs of the Persian
Gulf, and to some extent, the world. Had their dreams been less ambitious, history
books and atlases would look very different.87
Vast dreams also produce numerous enemies. By attacking all of Europe,
Hitler and Napoleon turned all of Europe against them. Iran’s modest power
made it little threat to any state beyond its neighbors. Yet by seeking to export
Iran’s revolution throughout the Islamic world, Khomenei even made enemies
of distant Indonesia and Morocco. Seeking to lead the Arab world, Saddam inInternational
Security 25:4 138
87. See Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, pp. 192–198.
stead alienated it by attacking ªve Middle Eastern states and threatening a half
dozen others.
hypothesis 8: states led by predictable leaders will have stronger
and more enduring alliances. A state whose behavior can consistently
be predicted is one that can be trusted—trusted to do good or trusted to do
evil, but trusted nonetheless. States may forge alliances with states whose
behavior they do not trust, but they are unlikely to adhere to these ties for
long or place much weight on them for the achievement of their goals. Furthermore,
such alliances are unlikely to realize their full potential because their
cohesion will be weak and their actions disjointed. In many of these cases, it
is the predictability of leaders that is at issue. For example, although Hitler
and Mussolini had many goals that were either shared or complementary, each
repeatedly surprised the other, destroying any trust between them with the
result that their actions often ran at cross purposes, and their alliance was
as often a source of weakness as of strength.
Indeed the personal relationships among leaders often overcome systemic
dynamics or other factors. As Hans Morgenthau notes, “The smooth and effective
operation of an alliance, then, depends in good measure upon the relations
of trust and respect among its military statesmen.”88
Churchill deliberately cultivated
a “special relationship” with Roosevelt, which paid off with unswervingly
close cooperation, even when the United States and Britain had
diametrically opposed ideas about the conduct of World War II. Observers of
the Middle East have often remarked that Iraq and Syria should have been natural
allies—they shared an ideology, common internal problems, common external
enemies, and generally compatible aspirations—yet they detested each
other. As a result, Syria, the self-proclaimed champion of Arab nationalism,
was the only Arab state to back Persian Iran against Iraq.
It may be that one contributing factor to the democratic peace is that democracies
are more likely to produce leaders whose behavior can be predicted
and thus trusted, especially by other democratic leaders. Trustworthiness
and consistency are qualities rewarded by voters in democratic systems. In
addition, modern democracies tend to have a range of institutional checks
on leaders, which makes it difªcult for them to push their countries too far
from their preexisting course. Consequently, it may be that the success of democratic
alliances and the easier ability of democratic leaders to avoid wars
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 139
88. Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 201.
when their interests clash come in part from the fact that democratic systems
select for the kind of behavior that foreign leaders ªnd predictable and trust-
worthy.
Critics may contend that characteristics such as risk tolerance and a proneness
toward delusions are impossible to operationalize. Such criticisms, however,
were once also applied to culture, ideology, ideas, and norms, but
scholars over time developed methods to measure and weigh these concepts,
greatly enriching the study of international relations. Psychologists have a
wide range of measures for determining degrees of rationality. Scholars of
decisionmaking have identiªed situations such as a desire to preserve one’s
political position or make good on sunk costs that steer individuals toward
risky behavior.89
International relations scholars must draw on these studies in
their own work. Just because we lack analytic measures today does not mean
we should assume we always will.
when individuals matter: enabling factors
Leaders do not have the same impact on foreign policy in all situations. No
matter how delusional, egocentric, or risk acceptant, some leaders are unable
to gain popular support, whereas others are overwhelmed by bureaucratic,
systemic, cultural, or other factors. Below we present three hypotheses that
suggest when individuals have a greater impact on international relations, and
consequently under what conditions theories derived from the ªrst image
should most likely have the greatest explanatory power.
hypothesis 9: the more power is concentrated in the hands of an individual
leader, the greater the influence of that leader’s personality
and preferences. Individuals are only one of many factors that determine a
state’s actions. In vying to set policy, leaders often must contend with a bewildering
array of institutions and actors, such as a nation’s military, parliament,
bureaucracy, political opposition, elites, and people. When other institutions
are strong, the ability of any individual leader to shape policy is correspondingly
diminished. If a soldier of Napoleon’s ability entered the French army today,
it is unlikely that he would shake the foundations of Europe. On the other
hand, when institutions are weak or unformed, the impact of leaders increases.
Consequently, individuals generally matter most in authoritarian regimes with
International Security 25:4 140
89. Jack Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), p. 93; and Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and
Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conºict,” International Political
Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1996), p. 189. A leader’s proneness toward risk could be measured
by examining how he or she responded to similar circumstances before assuming power.
weak institutions. As Bismarck’s adviser Friedrich von Gentz described the
czar’s position, “None of the obstacles that restrain and thwart the other sovereigns—divided
authority, constitutional forms, public opinion, etc.—exists for
the Emperor of Russia. What he dreams of at night he can carry out in the
morning.”90
Nevertheless, an exceptionally charismatic leader can overcome even strong
institutions. Figures such as Hitler and Napoleon—and other modern giants
such as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Mao, Simon Bolívar, Nasser, and Gandhi—are
able to defy the wishes of pragmatic elements around them and succeed in
having their followers follow. Ayatollah Khomeini, of course, represented almost
an ideal-type of the Weberian charismatic leader. As Max Weber noted,
the charismatic authority can defy convention and standard arguments: Such a
leader is able to note, “It is written . . . but I say unto you.”91
Thus Khomeini’s
grip on the Iranian people allowed him to ignore the opposition of other leading
ªgures to the war with Iraq. The hundreds of thousands of Iranians slaughtered
on the battleªelds of al-Basrah, al-Faw, and Kurdistan testify to the force
of his charisma.
Individuals, however, still matter even when strong institutions shape their
behavior and limit the impact of their personal idiosyncrasies. As former presidential
adviser Clark Clifford once noted, “The executive branch of our government
is like a chameleon. To a startling degree it reºects the character and
personality of the President.”92
Even in a democracy with well-established
checks and balances, recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of the leader is
essential.
hypothesis 10: individuals are more important when systemic, domestic,
and bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous. At times institutional,
systemic, and domestic factors may be strong, but their interaction
leads to vague or conºicting pressures on policymaking. In these circumstances,
the preferences of individuals assume greater importance. Although
not one of the historical cases we examined, an excellent example of how individuals
can choose among equally viable options is British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher’s decision to confront Argentina over the Falkland Islands.
Today many analysts chalk up Thatcher’s attack on the Falklands as a (successLet
Us Now Praise Great Men 141
90. Friedrich von Gentz, “Considerations on the Political System in Europe” (1818), in Mack
Walker, ed., Metternich’s Europe (New York: Walker and Co., 1968), p. 80. Quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy,
p. 140.
91. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 243 (ellipsis
in the original).
92. Quoted in Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 189.
ful) attempt to restore her government’s ºagging popularity. At the time, however,
what path Britain would choose was not so clear. The Foreign Ofªce
counseled against any provocation and urged Thatcher not to send a task
force.93
Defense ofªcials doubted that Britain could retake the Falklands, and
the treasury feared the impact of the cost of war on Britain’s struggling econ-
omy.94
A narrow majority of public opinion polls taken before the ªghting began
indicated that the British public felt that the Falklands were not worth
British casualties. The United States also pushed for a diplomatic solution.
Thatcher, however, played down voices urging restraint and led her nation
to war. As Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins note: “The ªgure of Margaret
Thatcher towers over the Falklands drama from its inception to the euphoria of
the ªnal triumph. . . . Each of the participants interviewed for the war made
similar remarks: ‘It was Mrs. Thatcher’s war. She held us to it. She never
seemed to ºinch from her conviction about its course. She took the risks on her
shoulders and she won. She emerged as a remarkable war leader.’”95
Without
the Iron Lady, Britain might well have chosen negotiation over confrontation,
and the Falklands War—for better or for worse—would never have occurred.
hypothesis 11: individuals are more important when circumstances
are fluid. In times of tremendous change, individuals often assume greater
importance. Individuals, in contrast to large bureaucracies or unwieldy parliaments,
can act decisively and purposefully. There was a good reason why the
Roman Republic transferred the powers of the Senate to a dictator in times of
crisis: A single person can react quickly to rapidly unfolding events, seizing
opportunities and fending off calamities. In the 1930s, Europe was in chaos.
The dramatic political changes resulting from World War I, the emergence of
communism and fascism, and the dislocation caused by the worldwide depression
threw the power structure of Europe into disarray. Hitler skillfully exploited
this disorder. He played Britain, Italy, France, and Russia off one
another, effectively paralyzing them as he remilitarized the Rhineland and
International Security 25:4 142
93. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983),
p. 66. Throughout the conºict, key cabinet ofªcials, such as Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and
Home Secretary William Whitelaw, urged compromise over confrontation. The Sunday Times of
London Insight Team, War in the Falklands: The Full Story (New York: Harper and Row, 1982),
pp. 177–178.
94. The military contingency ªle for an invasion of the Falklands stressed the logistical problems
of operations so far from British shores. It also noted that Britain might not be able to meet its
NATO commitments if it were engaged in a conºict in the Falklands. Most ominously, it argued
that not even the largest task force could retake the islands after an Argentine invasion. Hastings
and Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands, p. 56.
95. Ibid., pp. 335–336.
gobbled up Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Haªz al-Asad also took advantage
of the ºuid circumstances created by the end of the Cold War and the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to secure Syria’s suzerainty over Lebanon even while
moving closer to the United States.
the interacting images
It is ultimately impossible to explain all of international relations by resort to
only one of the three images. None can effectively explain all of the variance in
the world. Furthermore, none of the images is entirely discrete—each shapes
the others. Thus their impact is felt both directly on events and indirectly
through the inºuence they exert on the other images.96
The ªrst image is no exception.
At least some of its utility as a predictor of international relations lies
in the indirect inºuence it exerts through the other two images.
hypothesis 12: individuals can shape the second image. Domestic opinion,
bureaucratic politics, and other second-image factors are not independent
of individuals. In bureaucratic politics, it is not inevitable that where you stand
depends on where you sit, especially if where you sit is determined by the
leader. The German military was a hindrance to Hitler’s machinations only until
he was able to oust the strong, independent generals running the army and
replace them with pliant lackeys who owed their positions to his beneªcence.
Likewise the public opinion that guides states is often created by the deliberate
actions of leaders who can employ charisma, propaganda, or other means to
twist public opinion into an enabling factor. Hitler, Stalin, Saddam, and other
dictators have adeptly incited nationalist fervor, created specious casus belli,
and otherwise played their publics like violins to support their policies.
Khomeini’s messianic appeal created a mass following for whatever policies
he enunciated. If the Imam wished it so, then his followers wanted it too.
Nor are interest group politics independent of individuals. In the early
1900s, an aggressive coalition of German industrialists and naval ofªcers
championed Germany’s “risk ºeet,” making it difªcult for Berlin to back away
from the hostile spiral it was fostering with London. This coalition, however,
came into being only after the kaiser had decided to begin the Flottenpolitik.
Without his ill-conceived ªrst effort, the interest group never would have become
so strong.
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 143
96. For a similar study of interacting images, see Philip Gourevitch, “Second Image Reversed: International
Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978),
pp. 881–911.
Leaders also build institutions.97
Khomeini, for example, created a bizarre
system of overlapping administrative bodies—governmental, religious, and
parastatal—that functioned adequately during the Imam’s life because he had
the requisite blend of political power, charisma, and religious learning to control
the system. Khomeini’s legacy lives on in the institutions he created to suit
his rule. Today, without the Imam, the system he created is fractious and chaotic,
with power diffused among a multitude of competing organizations—a
direct legacy of a system created for a unique man.
Nor do all leaders lead equally well. Some inspire their subordinates, getting
the most out of their governing teams, military staffs, and diplomatic corps.
Napoleon’s ofªcers were ªercely devoted to him, making superhuman efforts
to carry out his grandiose vision. Similarly, as Fred Greenstein notes, some
leaders create a climate of tolerance that allows dissent and creativity to
ºourish.98
Other leaders, however, are bad at receiving advice from their subordinates.
Saddam has created a system where fear and sycophancy are necessary
for survival. Not surprisingly, he seldom receives objective or useful
advice.
hypothesis 13: individuals can shape the third image. To the extent that
third-image theories rest on the assumption that the distribution of power is a
key moving force in international relations, then individuals must be counted
when measuring the distribution. As noted in hypothesis 2, the skills of individual
leaders are often key components of national power. When judging the
balance of power between France and its rivals in the early nineteenth century,
scholars must recognize that Napoleon’s military genius multiplied the value
of sterile production ªgures and orders of battle.
Hypothesis 8, the impact of a leader’s trustworthiness and reliability, posits
another inºuence of the ªrst image on third-image considerations. A key component
of cooperation under anarchy appears to be the willingness of leaders
to trust one another. In the absence of a common threat, cooperation becomes
quite difªcult. For cooperation to survive, leaders must feel able to predict one
another’s behavior and trust them to act in a mutually beneªcial manner.
The role of individuals extends beyond merely serving as an input into a
third-image model. For instance, a key aspect of some third-image theories is
that the uncertainty and imperfect information inherent in the anarchic international
system fosters certain patterns of behavior in states. As we noted
International Security 25:4 144
97. Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, for example, created a national security structure that
has lasted for decades after their terms ended. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference, p. 195.
98. Ibid., pp. 195–196.
above, this geopolitical fog is frequently the creation of individual leaders. Often
it is not a lack of information that leads to miscalculation, but self-deception
on the part of leaders. Few human beings are perfectly objective
processors of information, and many of the world’s most important ªgures
have lived in deep denial, even psychosis. For this reason, proponents of the
third image are adamant that even if the future brings perfect information, it
will not eliminate these long-standing systemic pressures because the problem
is not necessarily in the quality or quantity of information, but in its interpretation.
In other words, the fault lies not in our stars but in ourselves.
Conclusions
Giants still walk the earth. International relations cannot be understood if the
role of the individual is ignored. Critics may still contend that we have focused
on exceptions. And indeed we have. Yet such exceptional individuals knit the
tapestry of history: Explaining international relations while ignoring Hitler,
Bismarck, Napoleon, and other monumental ªgures is like trying to understand
art or music without Michaelangelo or Mozart. Thus policymakers and
politicians are right to pay attention to the goals, abilities, and idiosyncrasies of
the world’s leaders. It is time for scholars to play their part, helping us better
understand when and how individuals can make a difference.
Recognizing the importance of individuals is necessary to explode one of the
most pernicious and dangerous myths in the study of international relations:
the cult of inevitability. Just because a particular event occurred does not mean
it was fated to do so. Scholars often fail to acknowledge that common international
behavior—balancing against a threat, choosing a grand strategy, or
marching off to war—results from decisions made by individuals. It was not
inevitable that Germany became bellicose in the late nineteenth century: Without
Bismarck, it might have happened earlier, and without Wilhelm II it might
not have happened at all. Scholars are too quick to dismiss individuals’ behavior
with reference to “Cleopatra’s nose,” but—as the hypotheses we present
above suggest—scholars can deduce useful generalizations about the role of
individuals.
We hope that our work spurs a renewal in the study of the ªrst image. Although
the range of issues to explore is vast, several suggest themselves immediately.
First, although we argue that the ªrst image has an impact on military
and diplomatic power, clearly individuals do not shape all elements of power
equally. For example, leaders can affect important factors such as strategy and
training, but have less of an impact on the tactical level during the conduct of
Let Us Now Praise Great Men 145
operations. A more complete assessment of how individuals inºuence the factors
that make up military and diplomatic power would be highly useful. Second,
we barely scratch the surface of when individuals matter. The autocratic
political systems that allowed individuals far more freedom are (fortunately)
becoming fewer in number. Institutions in all their variety should be assessed
for the latitude they allow individuals and the particular policy areas that are
most and least affected. Third, scholars should explore the role of individuals
on issues other than war and alliances, which has been the focus of this initial
foray. Individuals may be important to such tragedies as ethnic conºict, mass
killing, the perpetuation of tyranny, and other wrongs (and of course rights)
whose understanding is basic to the study of politics. Fourth, work on the impact
of individuals outside the role of state leader is essential. The personalities
of generals, diplomats, religious authorities, and other shapers and implementers
of policy cannot be ignored. Fifth, scholars should examine whether
different political systems routinely produce certain types of leaders.
Like other approaches to international relations, the ªrst image does not provide
all the answers. Within the discipline of international relations, the study
of individuals can be only one part of a larger whole. Ignoring their role is foolish,
but so too is ignoring the inºuence of other forces such as systemic factors,
domestic politics, and bureaucratic pressures.99
International relations are
complex and cannot be understood by focusing on any one aspect of politics
alone: A foolish parsimony is the hobgoblin of small minds. Of course, recognizing
the role of individuals will make the job of scholars and analysts more
difªcult. Political scientists will have to employ biography and psychology in
addition to traditional tools such as economics and history. Such additions,
however, will result in a far richer product that is better able to explain our
world and anticipate coming challenges.
International Security 25:4 146
99. Favoring one level of analysis at the expense of the others is perhaps the most pernicious form
of “reductionism.” See Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1994), p. 7. Likewise, we echo Fareed Zakaria’s plea for scholars to “develop a tolerance
for more limited—but more accurate—generalizations,” by developing theories of
international affairs that draw on both internal and external factors to explain state behavior. See
Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1
(Summer 1992), pp. 178–179.