2 Participatory, liberal and
electronic democracy
Dieter Fuchs
Introduction
The reluctance of citizens in present-day democracies to participate in politics is
a matter of considerable concern to many observers. Their concern is fed by two
sources: first, this reluctance is understood to reflect an erosion of the legitimacy
of these democracies; and second, it is set against the background of a normative
understanding of democracy, according to which political participation is a constitutive
characteristic. This understanding is implicit in the democracy concept,
for government by the people, however it may operate in detail, and is quite
simply inconceivable without the political participation of the citizens.
However, there are widely differing ideas about the necessary extent and type of
participation. They depend on the normative model that serves as our point of
reference. The issue of political participation by the citizen can accordingly not
be discussed in isolation; it can be meaningfully addressed only in the framework
of normative models of democracy.
The first goal of the following analysis is to outline the most important democracy
models and the status they confer on political participation. Our account is
simplified: we restrict ourselves to a few fundamental models.1
We proceed in
three steps. First, antique democracy is described. There are several reasons for
taking this as our point of departure. It was the first democracy in history and
also a form of democracy in which the people literally governed themselves. It is
therefore archetypal and exemplary for many modern models of participatory
democracy. In addition, taking this point of reference can avoid the frequent
overburdening of the democracy concept with almost arbitrary content and criteria
(Eder 1998). Finally, the democracy of antiquity can provide insight into
the conditions under which participatory democracy can be realized.
The second step is to describe modern democracy, generally referred to as
liberal democracy, and which, from an institutional point of view, is representative
democracy. We are interested not so much in providing yet another compilation
of its characteristics but in comparing it with antique democracy. The
intention is to demonstrate that, although both models can be understood as
democracy, they imply quite different meanings of the term.
In the third step we turn to participatory and electronic democracy. The two
terms can subsume a multitude of approaches. With regard to participatory
democracy, we concentrate on what is presumably the most important variant
under discussion in contemporary democracy, namely deliberative democracy.
As regards electronic democracy, we consider only ideas that are committed to
the ideal of participatory democracy. Proponents argue that participatory democracy
can be realized under the conditions of modern societies thanks to technological
innovations in information and communication media: “The new
challenge of direct democracy lies in the startling fact that it is now technically
possible” (Budge 1996: 1). The subject of this third step of analysis is therefore
participatory democracy as electronic democracy or electronic democracy as
participatory democracy.
The second goal of our chapter is to discuss how realistic it is to uphold the
ideal of participatory democracy under present-day circumstances, and the
extent to which it can be realized even approximately. It is, of course, beyond
the ambition of this paper to settle this controversial issue, but theoretical plausibilities
and scholarly findings can contribute to the discussion. Without engaging
in this discussion the postulate of “bringing citizens back in” can come to
nothing.
Antique democracy
The antique democracy is perceived as a model in a double meaning of the
word. First, in the sense that it is a descriptive model that gives a simplified
account of the complex reality of Athenian democracy in antiquity and which is
restricted to identifying essential characteristics. Second, in the sense of a normative
model, since for many modern theoreticians and practitioners, this antique
democracy has been a natural example to be emulated. In describing antique
democracy we are guided by both components of the democracy concept. What
are the essential characteristics of the demos and the kratos in the original form
of democracy? We begin with a formal definition of the demos, going on to deal
with the kratos. Certain normatively relevant characteristics of antique democracy
are then discussed in greater detail, and in this context we return to a
consideration of the demos.
In the democracy of antiquity, the demos included all citizens, i.e. all male
inhabitants of Attica with political rights. When in antiquity it was said that the
demos rules, two meanings have to be distinguished: first, it meant rule by the
mass (plethos), the many (polloí) or the people (demos) and not by the few, let
alone an individual. Second, the equality (isótes) of citizens was emphasized.
Poor and rich citizens, less well and well-educated citizens had equal part in
government regardless of class and education. In the antique understanding of
democracy, political equality between citizens is of decisive importance, and
historically the isonomy concept (isonomía) to denote the system of government
based on the equality of citizens precedes the democracy concept (Meier 1993;
Bleicken 1994; Eder 1998; Raaflaub 1998).
If the notions that the people should rule and that all are equal in the system
30 Dieter Fuchs
of rule are considered fundamental to democracy (Bleicken 1994), it begs the
question of how they have been institutionalized. And the question of institutionalization
concerns the “kratos components” of the democracy concept. The
structure of the democratic system of government in antique Athens was based
on four institutions: the assembly of the people (ekklesía), the council of the five
hundred (boulé), the magistrates (archaí) and the people’s courts (dikasteria).2
The basis institution and center of government was the ekklesía. Every Athenian
citizen had the right to attend and speak. And the vote of every citizen had equal
weight. The ekklesía made all important decisions concerning the common
affairs of the polis, and which were binding on the polis. The ekklesía met at
least thirty times a year for this purpose. The number of participants presumably
varied between a tenth and a fifth of the citizenry. Although only part of the citizenry
was ever present in the ekklesía, it was also regarded as being the demos
as a whole (Welwei 1999). This is expressed in the formula with which the
decisions on the ekklesía were introduced: “demos and boulé have decided.”
The council of the five hundred (boulé) had a double function (Hansen 1991;
Bleicken 1994). In the first place, it was to ensure the efficient functioning of the
ekklesía. It achieved this, for example, by preparing every matter to be put to the
ekklesía, drawing up a “preliminary decree” (proboúleuma) which provided
the basis for debate in the ekklesía. Second, the boulé directed and supervised
the entire activities of the magistrates (archaí). In order to perform these functions,
at least part of the boulé was in permanent session, thus ensuring government
by the demos even when the ekklesía was not meeting. This naturally
presupposed that the boulé was a direct expression of the demos and could not
dissociate itself from the latter in its activities. This was ensured by a number of
arrangements. All councilors (bouleutés) were replaced each year by lot, no
citizen could belong to the boulé for two years in a row or more than twice in his
life. The boulé was therefore a committee randomly selected from among the
demos, and there was no possibility of it giving rise to a governing elite with
corresponding ruling knowledge (Meier 1993; Welwei 1999).
We will not go into detail about the magistrates (archaí) and people’s courts
(dikasteria), but it should be noted that the archaí and the judges (dikastai) of the
dikasteria were newly appointed each year and were also chosen by lot.3
These
institutional arrangements ensured that the demos itself did literally rule. In a
famous passage from his Politics (1317a40–1317b7, see also 1261a31ff.), Aristotle
described taking turns at ruling and being ruled as the essential feature of
democracy.
The permanent rotation of rulers and ruled, the choice of office-holders by lot, the
mass magistracy with relatively few powers (Bleicken 1994) and, especially, the
concentration of the power to make binding decisions for the polis in the ekklesía
realized what modern democracy theory calls the identity of rulers and ruled.
Finally, we look at certain aspects of the reality of antique democracy that are
very important for current participatory democracy theories: (a) the extent of
participation by citizens, (b) the nature of political opinion-building, (c) the
nature of the decisions made, and, (d) the demos as a collective subject.
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 31
If Athenian democracy was to function at all, an extraordinary level of political
participation by citizens was needed, and was, in fact, given. Every year 500
councilors and about 700 magistrates were required, and a further 700 or so
magistrates were active for the Maritime League. If we include the 6,000 citizens
from among whom the officers of the courts of justice were chosen by lot,
we have a total of about 8,000 citizens who held and exercised public office in
the polis each year. Given an approximate total of 35,000 citizens this amounts
to almost a quarter. This list does not include participation in the ekklesía and
activities in the communities (demoi). The enormous extent of political engagement
on the part of Athenian citizens is incontrovertible. According to Meier
(1993: 491f) “the expenditure of effort by the Athenians is almost incomprehensible,”
and “it is a mystery how political life concretely related to work.” Hansen
(1991: 313) takes a similar view: “The level of political activity by the citizens
of Athens is unparalleled in world history, in terms of number, frequency and
level of participation.”
One of the most characteristic features of the reality of Athenian democracy
was the extensive discussion on polis affairs by citizens in public places. This
includes conversations in the marketplace (agora), and especially oratory and
deliberation in the institutionalized meetings like the ekklesía and the boulé.
Bleicken (1994: 341) even describes the freedom of speech in assemblies,
isegoría, as the “key element of democracy” (see also Hansen 1991; Raaflaub
1998). This practice of participation in oratory and deliberation also determines
the type of opinion-building by the demos and the type of decisions made. The
will of the demos was formed through joint deliberation by the physically
present demos in the ekklesía. To this extent one can indeed speak of a collective
will of the demos that is more than an aggregation of individual opinions. A
decision adopted by the ekklesía was an outcome of the deliberations and
accordingly constituted an authentic expression of the collective will.
The principle that guided deliberations was the common good of the polis.
This is shown, for example, by a passage in Euripides (1970: 435 ff.), which
cites the following introductory formula for discussion in the ekklesía: “Who
wishes to bring a proposal before the assembly that is useful for the polis?” In
surviving records of discussions in the ekklesía, the contribution of a speaker is
repeatedly justified in terms of the utility (symphéron) for the polis, and this
utility for the polis is valued more highly than utility for the individual. What is
useful for the polis is also seen as equitable. If we express these notions in the
language of contemporary democracy theory, contributions by speakers were
legitimate only if they appealed to the common good and were therefore nonparticular
in nature.
The institution of the ekklesía and the opinion-building that takes place there
had another far-reaching consequence. From the perspective of each and every
participant, the communal and public nature of deliberation in the ekklesía
involved a limited and observable number of actually present citizens. He could
ascribe every spoken contribution to a specific citizen and attribute every
decision to the present gathering of citizens including himself. The demos of
32 Dieter Fuchs
Athenian democracy was thus constituted not as an imagined collective subject
as is the case in modern nation states but as a tangible collective subject. And
this satisfies a demand associated with the democracy concept. The subject of
government should not be merely an aggregate of single citizens but the demos
as a whole.
The experience of commonality was not limited to the ekklesía. Political discussions
were conducted in other public places, the marketplace, gymnasiums,
etc. If one considers the relatively small number of citizens, it is highly probable
that people came across acquaintances on public occasions and in the exercise of
public offices. This commonality experienced in public places was underpinned
by the marked ethnic-cultural homogeneity of the citizenry. This homogeneity
was grounded in a long, organic and unquestioningly accepted tradition which
was highly valued as such by Athenians.
Modern democracy
Institutional and procedural characteristics of modern democracy
Modern democracy – generally termed liberal democracy – differs fundamentally
from the antique democracy. Before we address these differences, some of
its characteristics shall be considered. This can be done rather succinctly.
According to Dahl (1989) it is the result of the “second democratic transformation,”
initiated by the extraordinary change of scale (territorial space,
number of citizens). As a result, the principle of democracy merged with the
principle of representation. And this had profound institutional and procedural
consequences. Whereas in antique democracy the ekklesía was the institutional
focus, in modern democracy it is the parliament and the government. In both
institutions representatives perform the business of governing. Since the
representation principle is not a democratic one per se, it gains its democratic
character only through the specific selection of the representatives of the people
by the people. This is done through elections, and elections are democratic only
if the voter has alternatives, if all citizens who wish to take part can indeed do
so, and if every vote has equal weight. These criteria are met in liberal democracy
by the institution of periodic and competitive elections, generally implemented
by the constitution.
The institutionalization of modern democracy through elections and through
parliaments and governments has a far-reaching impact on what democracy
means, transforming it dramatically. Sartori (1987: 86) puts it tersely and almost
cynically: “Since in order to have democracy we must have, to some degree, a
government of the people, let us immediately ask: When do we find a ‘governing
people,’ the demos in the act of the role of governing? The answer is: at
elections.”
The mere fact that the demos elects representatives who take on the business
of governing is, however, insufficient to satisfy a reasonably demanding understanding
of democracy. If, after election, these representatives were willing and
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 33
able to govern only according to their own wishes without any regard for the
demos, the idea of government by the people would be completely devoid of
sense. It must therefore be ensured with the institution of elections that representatives
rule in accordance with the will of the demos. The concept of responsiveness
(Dahl 1971; Fuchs 1998) has become established to describe this state of
affairs. According to the theory of liberal democracy, responsiveness is to be
structurally generated through the periodicity of elections and the possibility of a
change in government. The prospect of the next elections obliges the rulers to
take heed of the opinion of the demos in their own interest.
The responsiveness of rulers to those ruled introduces a completely new criterion
to the semantics of democracy. It played no role in antique democracy. If
there is identity of ruler and ruled, there can perforce be no difference between
them. But where elected representatives are in government, such a difference is
almost structurally inbuilt. The situation between rulers and ruled thus changes
fundamentally in modern democracy. This change naturally affects the meaning
of political participation by citizens. Politics is concerned with regulating the
common affairs of a polis or a state through generally binding decisions. If in
liberal democracy this decision-making activity is performed by representatives
– even though elected by the people – this must drastically modify the concept
of popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty can no longer consist in the participation
of the demos in governing but only in the control of government action
by the demos, or – which is the same seen from another angle – the responsiveness
of the rulers to the will of the demos. The institution that is to generate this
responsiveness structurally is, as we have seen, periodic and competitive elections.
This considerably reduces the standing of political participation by the citizens,
which assumes quite a new character. Whereas in antique democracy
participation by the citizens in government was both means and end, in liberal
democracy it is now only a means to an end. Under the second democratic transformation
popular government is thus no longer direct participation in government
by the people but the choice of rulers by the people and the responsiveness
of the rulers to the people.
Comparison between antique and modern democracy
Some important differences between antique and modern democracy have been
dealt with in the preceding section. They include the nature of participation by
the demos in government. In antique democracy, the demos was directly
involved, one could even say that through annual and mass rotation in ruling and
being ruled and through the institution of the ekklesía, the demos not only
participated in government, but governed itself. In modern democracy, in contrast,
which is representative democracy, there is only indirect participation in
government, in that the demos chooses representatives to govern, and – through
the institution of periodic and competitive elections – imposes more or less
strong constraints on the latter to act in accordance with the will of the demos.
The type of participation in government partly determines the extent of par-
34 Dieter Fuchs
ticipation. Since elections do not take place very often and are concerned not so
much with policy content than with the selection of representatives, political participation
by citizens in modern democracies can be described as occasional and
limited. But participation in elections does not exclude engagement on the part of
citizens in political parties and collaboration in civil society voluntary associations.
In fact, however, only tiny minorities are involved. Precisely this state of affairs
together with the declining participation in elections to be observed in many countries
is the source of concern for many observers mentioned in the introduction and
which has led to the postulate of “bringing citizens back in.”
Another important difference between antique and modern democracy lies in
the nature of opinion-building. In modern democracies, on account of the scale
involved, no joint deliberation by the demos in assemblies occurs. For the individual
citizen, political opinion-building is largely monologistic, or takes place
in very restricted communication in the primary life-world. The demos as a
whole can at best be reached through the mass media. And something like a discussion
occurs there. But it is not discussion among citizens but advocatory discussion
among journalists and representatives that is conducted in public and,
perhaps, for the public. Through this type of political opinion-building, anything
resembling a deliberatively constituted will of the demos can scarcely come into
being. The will of the demos in a liberal democracy is accordingly a factor calculated
on the basis of procedural rules – primarily the majority rule. The basis
for applying this procedure is the preferences and interests of individual citizens,
factors largely exogenous to the democratic process. Anything in the way of a
common good can therefore hardly be the outcome of these processes and is
reduced to a non-binding, rhetorical formula.
In what sense can we speak of a demos at all in a modern democracy? The
demos is a political community and, like every community, it constitutes itself
through two mechanisms (Fuchs 2000b). First, by drawing a boundary that
decides who belongs and who does not; and, second, through commonalities
among those who belong, which provide a starting point for more or less strong
identification of members with the community. In both antique and modern
democracy, boundary drawing is very exclusive. Since Pericles’ 451/450BC citizenship
law, only a male resident of Attica whose parents were born Athenians
could be an Athenian citizen. In modern democracy the boundary is drawn by
the law relating to nationality.
In antique democracy there was further exclusion within the population of
Attica. Citizenship was denied to women, slaves and so-called metics
(metoikoi). The latter were free foreigners living and working in Attica. This
internal exclusion is one of the main points of criticism extended by contemporary
analysts of antique democracy, and in this regard the modern understanding
of democracy differs considerably from the view taken by antiquity. Dahl (1971,
1989) considers the inclusion of all members of the social community in the
demos as one of the most important criteria of a fully developed democracy.
This is likely to be one of the few aspects where modern democracy can be
regarded as being “more democratic” than antique democracy.
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 35
A crucial difference between the demos in antique and modern democracy
has already been mentioned in discussing political opinion-building. The demos
of antique democracy was a real community formed through interaction between
physically present citizens in public places. This interaction was based on an
extraordinarily homogeneous culture with shared values and modes of behavior.
These commonalities were permanently manifested in interaction, thus stabilizing
the political community. This real community was one of the preconditions
for the demos to be able to constitute itself in actuality as the collective subject
of government. Because every single citizen had the experience of being a
member of a demos he could comprehend what it means to be involved in discussing
and determining the affairs of the polis together with the other members.
In modern societies these preconditions are not met or, at best, are met only
in a very diluted form. The community of modern societies is characterized by
pronounced ethnic-cultural plurality, and its members are spread over the extensive
territory of a state. For the individual, other citizens are therefore necessarily
strangers; he knows only that they exist. This knowledge is underpinned by
extremely selective encounters in public situations and by reports about other
citizens in the mass media. But if they are to be understood as citizens and thus
classed as belonging to a political community, this community must exist. And it
can exist only as an imagined community, not a real one as in antique Athens.
But such an imagined community, too, must be moored to something substantial
that, first, embraces ethnic-cultural plurality and, second, draws a boundary. In
European nation states this is achieved by the idea of the nation, and the nation
is characterized above all by factors like a shared language, history, tradition and
territory (Smith 1991; Fuchs 2000b). Such a political community, whose collective
identity is that of a nation, is a cognitively and affectively highly contingent
construction. And it is questionable whether this construction can be maintained
under the conditions of globalization (see final section).
The comparison between modern and antique democracy undertaken in the
previous section makes one thing clear: if antique democracy is seen as the
ideal, modern democracy is indeed a pale imitation of this model. Instead of
actual self-government, there is only choice of the rulers by the ruled and more
or less effective control of government action by the demos. Instead of joint and
deliberative opinion-building by the demos, there are at best advocatory discussions
in the mass media limited to a small selection of subjects that need to be
decided. Instead of an authentic popular will that substantively constitutes a
common good, the decisions made in liberal democracies are a procedural
aggregation of particular group interests. In modern democracy the demos is not
a collective subject but a collection of individual subjects, and, at best, an imagined,
i.e. abstract community. Because of these considerable differences, Meier
(1993: 478) asks the skeptical question: “In all, it [Athenian democracy] was so
characterized by peculiarities that we must question whether our democracy
deserves this name at all when compared with the antique model.” We will take
this skepticism a step further with the postulate that modern democracy is undemanding
in comparison with the antique ideal.
36 Dieter Fuchs
This matter of fact can occasion different responses. One possibility is to
problematize the antique democracy as a normative reference point and to claim
normative independence or even superiority for liberal democracy. Another possibility
is to uphold the normative ideal of a participatory democracy. This does
not necessarily mean confronting the reality of liberal democracy with a
fundamentally unrealizable ideal and thus adopting a resigned stance. Some proponents
of participatory democracy seek to show what it means under modern
conditions and how it can possibly be realized. This is the perspective that is
interesting in the context of our analysis and one we will return to. First of all,
however, we must recall certain restrictions that are imposed on greater political
participation by citizens in a modern society.
The complexity of society and restrictions on political participation
The normative question of how a political system should be designed can never
be answered with any finality by referring to realization problems. One can
stand by normative ideas, even counterfactually, for very good reasons.
However, such realization problems cannot fail to affect the justification of
normative positions.
The second democratic transformation, which led to the formation of liberal
and thus representative democracy, was not the chance outcome of a historical
process. As we have already described, it was made necessary by a change in
scale (states covering large territories, a public amounting to millions) (Dahl
1989). This change in scale does not limit the possibility of political participation
per se. But if it is not a matter of some participation or other but of selfgovernment,
we have quite a different state of affairs. Self-government means
that the demos itself actually rules, and, by definition, this means not via representatives.
And such self-government by the demos presumably requires the
presence of citizens in assemblies all the more if opinion-building is to proceed
in the form of deliberations. However, the bigger the territory and the greater the
number of citizens, the more implausible ruling without representatives and
ruling in assemblies becomes.
In Dahl’s (1989) concept of the second democratic transformation, one decisive
characteristic of modern societies has not yet been taken into account: societal
complexity. A modern society is a functionally differentiated society, in
which the primary societal subsystems have to perform specific services for the
others. The political system, as we know, is responsible for controlling functions,
for providing infrastructure, for ensuring internal and social security, etc.
This is associated with a decision-making activity that can no longer be compared
at all with antique democracy as regards the complexity of problems. If
these services are to be performed, the political system needs to be differentiated
into professionalized roles. And if this is the case, self-government is no longer
possible unless one is prepared to accept dedifferentiation and to renounce the
gains in effectiveness and increases in options associated with the growth in
complexity. It is questionable whether this would be in keeping with the will of
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 37
the demos. In accordance with Sartori (1987: 65), the argument can be summed
up and formalized in the following proposition: the intensity of self-government
attainable stands in inverse relation to (a) the extent of the territory, (b) the
number of citizens, (c) the quantity of decisions, and, (d) the complexity of the
problems.
We now shift our perspective from the systemic to the individual level and
consider the rationality of political participation under the conditions of modern
societies. As argumentative background we draw on rational choice theory. This
theory assumes that, in an action situation, an actor chooses the alternative
which he expects to bring the greatest benefit at the lowest cost. These choices
are made under situational and structural constraints. At least three constraints
can be distinguished. Identifying a benefit of one’s own political participation
involves information costs, and in complex societies the corresponding expenditure
of time and energy is systematically insufficient (Downs 1957). If a benefit
can nonetheless be identified, the problem arises as to the significance of personal
participation. In elections, for example, the weight of an individual’s vote
in an electorate of millions is infinitesimal. The probability of actually bringing
the preferred party to power through personal participation in the election and,
by this means, to realize the perceived benefit, is accordingly almost zero.
But this raises the question of opportunity costs, i.e. of lost benefits owing to
action alternatives not taken. In a modern society, the realization of personal life
plans and action goals and the achievement of the highest possible social status
depend much more strongly than in antique society on subsystems other than
politics. Investing the scarce resources of time and energy in actions in other
subsystems would therefore be more rational for the majority of citizens. There
is empirical evidence to support this theoretical assumption. In the analysis by
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995: 129), the three most important reasons
stated by American respondents for their political inactivity were the following:
“I don’t have enough time” (39 percent), “I should take care of myself and my
family before I worry about the community or nation” (34 percent), “The
important things of my life have nothing to do with politics” (20 percent). The
findings of the comparative World Values Survey point in a similar direction. In
comparison with other spheres of life, the subjective importance of politics is
lowest in all Western countries (the data are not provided here; see Fuchs 2000a;
van Deth 2000). Most important were family, friends and work. From a normative
point of view it is a matter of concern that leisure time is seen as much
more important than politics. This alone indicates that it is likely to be
difficult to mobilize time resources invested in leisure activities for political
participation.
Participation in self-government by the demos would mean comprehensive
and everyday engagement on the part of citizens. And, as we see it, reality
imposes restrictions in modern societies that are difficult to overcome. But if
participatory democracy theory wishes to do more than uphold an ideal without
consequences, it cannot entirely eschew discussion on how such participation
can be motivated and institutionalized under contemporary societal conditions.
38 Dieter Fuchs
Participatory and electronic democracy
Participatory democracy
Unlike the models of democracy discussed so far, participatory democracy is a
purely normative model. Of the wide spectrum of approaches that can be
classed under this heading, we concentrate on those that have played a prominent
role in the democracy theory discussion over the past two decades, and
which focus on the notion of deliberation. Specifically, we will be looking at
the theory of strong democracy put forward by Barber (1984), at Habermas’s
(1992) theory of discoursive democracy, and at the directly-deliberative polyarchy
theory of Cohen and Sabel (1997). The three theories overlap in important
aspects.
Their starting point is criticism of existing liberal democracy. It proceeds
from two perspectives, normative and practical. From a normative point of view,
they object that liberal democracy is now hardly in keeping with a reasonably
demanding interpretation of the democracy principle. From a practical point of
view they presume that liberal democracy confronts problems no longer
amenable to solution within its institutional framework and by its procedures
alone. The most important problem they see is the unquestioned dominance of
particular interests in politics, which in the long run erode the foundations of the
democratic process itself:
Liberal democracy is based on premises about human nature, knowledge,
and politics that are genuinely liberal but that are not intrinsically democratic.
Its conception of the individual and of individual interest undermines
the democratic practices upon which both individuals and their interests
depend.
(Barber 1984: 4)
Habermas (1992) stresses that the social and political integration of modern
societies can no longer be effected only by systemic mechanisms and the bargaining
of particular interests, but needs also to be placed on a communicative
basis. According to these approaches, participatory democracy is thus the normatively
desirable and the practically necessary form of democracy; it is: “desirable
both in itself and as a problem solver” (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 314). The
extent to which it is also possible, that is to say, actually implementable, is a
moot point. We will leave this question to one side for the moment and turn to
the normative dimension.
It has been indicated that the two central characteristics of all three variants
of participatory democracy are the directness of participation by citizens in governing
and deliberation in political opinion formation. Another common feature
is the attempt to adapt the model to the conditions of modern societies. This is
shown in the following three definitions by Barber. The first describes
unrestricted participatory democracy:
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 39
Participatory democracy [. . .] denotes the form in which the people literally
rule themselves, directly and participatorily, day in and day out, in all
matters that affect them in their common lives [. . .] To its advocates [. . .]
participatory democracy involves extensive and active engagement of citizens
in the self-governing process; it means government not just for but by
and of the people.
(Barber 1995: 921).
The correspondence between this definition and antique democracy is
obvious. The contrasting form of democracy is the liberal democracy of modern
society: “A form of government in which some of the people, chosen by all,
govern in all public matters all of the time” (Barber 1984: XIV). Barber concedes
that liberal democracy can no longer be replaced by a participatory democracy
in the unconditional form, and therefore weakens his normative
requirements, using the term “strong democracy” to denote a realistic model of
participatory democracy: “A form of government in which all of the people
govern themselves in at least some public matters at least some of the time”
(Barber 1984: XIV). We will be looking at the implications of this normative
dilution of the ideal of pure participatory democracy as it existed in antiquity at
a later point. It is not quite so clear how we are to understand direct participation
by the citizens in Habermas’ (1992) and Cohen and Sabel’s (1997) variants.
Their argumentation tends to remain on a fundamental and normative level.
After directness, the second focus of the three theoretical approaches under
consideration is deliberation. Two basic justifications are offered. The first is
purely normative. With explicit or implicit reference to the ideal of participatory
democracy in antiquity, it is postulated that a collective decision by representatives
and, above all, a collective will of the demos should be brought about by
deliberation. The aggregative procedure of liberal democracy is thus to be confronted
by the deliberative procedure. The other justification is a combination of
normative and practical arguments. On the one hand it is stated that democratic
politics are controlled by a collective will of the demos and that its purpose
ought to be the pursuit of common goods. On the other hand, it is realistically
stated that modern society is characterized by a plurality of particular interests
and that there is no going back on this “fact of pluralism” (Rawls 1993). The
conclusion is that the multiplicity of particular interests is only the starting point
for the democratic process and that they are to be transformed by joint deliberation.
Barber (1984: 119, 173) states accordingly: “The stress on transformation
is at the heart of the strong democratic conception of politics [. . .] at the heart of
strong democracy is talk.” Through this strong democratic talk,4
the isolated citizens
of liberal democracy are once again to form a community and thus restore
the demos as a collective subject of self-government. Habermas (1992) goes a
step further, defining democracy as the legal institutionalization of discursive
opinion and will-formation by the citizens. Cohen (1989) offers a similar definition.
He sees a democracy as an association whose affairs are governed by the
public deliberation of its members.
40 Dieter Fuchs
The status of deliberation is thus extraordinarily high, and we must ask what
exactly it means and how it can effect the claimed transformation. Barber (1984:
173) starts with a negative definition: “talk is not mere speech.” Although he is
referring to modern liberal democracy, the reduction of talk to speech can in a
certain fashion be said to be a problem of antique democracy, too. The assembly
of the people included up to 6,000 citizens, and no real discussion was therefore
possible. In actual fact, it consisted of a series of speeches that did not interrelate
in any great measure. It was more a matter of convincing those citizens present
to adopt a certain view than of reaching agreement among the citizens. And
deliberative procedures are concerned with the latter. The basic postulate is that
deliberations proceed in argumentative form, which means the systematic
exchange of information and reasons between the parties (Cohen 1989). A
further postulate is that deliberations are inclusive and have to be public: no-one
must be excluded and everyone who may possibly be affected by the decisions
to be taken must have the same opportunity of access to the deliberations.5
Habermas (1992) concurs with this characterization of deliberative procedures,
adding another aspect: in deliberative procedures reasons are legitimate only if
they are impartial and can therefore, in principle, be accepted by everyone.
According to Habermas, it is this criterion of impartiality that distinguishes the
discourse from bargaining. He sees bargaining as a procedure of compromise
formation between particular interests, which as such are not at all transformed
through the procedure.
This understanding of deliberation shows an interesting situation. In the
present-day variant of participatory democracy as compared with the antique
variant, directness is normatively weakened whereas deliberation is strengthened.
This makes it all the more necessary to enquire into the realization and
implementation of participatory democracy as deliberative democracy. We will
deal with this issue and then go on to look at electronic democracy.
Cohen and Sabel (1997: 334–337) devote a separate section to the question.
In their model of a directly-deliberative polyarchy, collective decisions are made
through public deliberation in public arenas open to all citizens. However, they
do not explain exactly what these public arenas are and how they can be set up.
The institutional proposal made by the authors is primarily a change in the role
of existing institutions like legislatures, courts, executives and administrative
agencies. This change in role consists of the enablement of directly-deliberative
arenas and provision of an infrastructure for the exchange of information
between these arenas and political units at various levels. We see this not so
much as a proposal for the implementation of deliberative democracy but as a
further postulate.
Although Habermas (1992) takes the institutionalization of discursive
opinion and will-formation as the central criterion of his democracy concept, his
definition of this institutionalization remains curiously vague. He works with the
figure of a complex communication cycle between institutionalized deliberations,
elections and informally formed public opinions. This communication
cycle is ultimately to lead to decisions made in the politico-administrative
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 41
system being linked back to the “communicatively generated power” (Habermas
1992: 362). This communicative power is generated in an autonomous public
sphere through deliberation. The autonomous public has its basis in a civil
society equally distant from state and market. Its structure is composed of a
network of voluntary associations. The important point for our context is that the
autonomous public and its civil-society basis can be institutionalized through
legal norms only to a very limited degree. Habermas (1992: 366) therefore logically
has recourse to an accommodating political culture and socialization: “Precisely
deliberatively filtered political communications have to rely on a liberal
political culture and on an enlightened political socialization, and especially on
the initiatives of opinion-building associations, which to a large extent constitute
and regenerate themselves spontaneously.” But at least a political culture cannot
be deliberately institutionalized.
The relatively most concrete proposals for the institutionalization of deliberative
democracy are made by Barber (1984). He suggests an institutional framework
for strong democracy, and one of the criteria for the institutions is that they
should be “realistic and workable” (Barber 1984: 202). At this point we will not
deal in great detail with the entire institutional setting but consider only the most
important elements. With reference to Arendt and Tocqueville, Barber regards it
as absolutely essential for strong democratic talk to be institutionalized at the
level of small local units. This is where citizens can deliberate in direct interaction
about matters that directly concern them, thus acquiring and practicing
civic competence. For this purpose he proposes so-called neighborhood assemblies.
In these assemblies not only local problems could be discussed; they could
also provide forums for the discussions of regional and national referendums
and initiatives. Such neighborhood assemblies can be established purposefully
and to this extent they are a realistic proposal. But Barber (1984: 273) himself
points to a serious problem: “Neighborhood assemblies offer vital forums for
ongoing political talk, but they reach only local constituencies and can divide
and parochialize both regions and nation as a whole.” For this reason, strong
democratic institutions are also needed at the regional and, especially, at the
national levels. Only they can ensure that the demos participates in discussions
and decisions that affect all equally. Barber (1984: 273ff., 281ff.) proposes electronic
town meetings and national referenda and initiatives as such institutions.
The latter two institutions play an important role in the discussion on electronic
democracy, and we will be dealing with them in that context. The problem of
motivation, extremely important for the institutionalization of a deliberative
democracy, has already been discussed.
The concept of electronic democracy
Expectations for electronic democracy
The concept of electronic or digital democracy subsumes a multiplicity of different
approaches and analyses concerned with how the new information and
42 Dieter Fuchs
communication media affect modern democracies and what opportunities they
offer for it.6
For our purposes, we can reduce the complexity of this discussion to
two criteria. We first limit ourselves to the aspects that are relevant for the
model of participatory democracy, and second, we follow Kaase (2002: 268) in
assuming that the technical, political and economic problems involved in implementing
an electronic democracy have largely been resolved. This assumption is
prerequisite to any consideration of the participatory potential of electronic
democracy.
Owing to the technological focus of electronic democracy, it cannot be an
independent model. The technological innovations are of value only in the
framework of traditional models of democracy (Bellamy 2000; van Dijk 2000).
Our point of reference is the model of participatory democracy. This model
repeatedly confronts the objection that it cannot be realized under the conditions
of modern society. And despite the claim by some proponents of this normative
model that it can indeed be put into practical effect, this has, in my opinion, yet
to be convincingly demonstrated. This is the case with regard to institutionalization
at least.
Now technological developments in the information and communication
media seem able to eliminate or at least considerably reduce structural obstacles
to the realization of a participatory democracy in modern societies. There are at
least high expectations in this direction. In the introduction we quoted Budge
(1996), who claims that, with the new media, we face the startling fact that
direct democracy is now technically possible. Barber argues in the same vein,
albeit more cautiously:
new telecommunications technologies have offered the possibility of interaction
among widely dispersed citizens across space and time in a fashion
that encourages new experiments with participation. Aristotle had argued
that the ideal republic was small enough that a man could walk across it in a
single day, thus ensuring regular participation in the assembly by all citizens.
Interactive telecommunications technologies, which in effect permit
the hundreds of millions of citizens of a mass society to be in touch without
leaving their television screen, raise the possibility of “teledemocracy” and
“virtual communities.”
Barber (1995: 922)
Grossman (1995: 33) has the most ambitious expectations: “Today’s telecommunications
technology made it possible for our political system to return to the
roots of Western democracy as it was first practiced in the city-states of ancient
Greece. Tomorrow’s telecommunications technology almost certainly will.” Can
participatory democracy be restored in modern times in the form of electronic
democracy? Before discussing this question, we need to systematize the most
important expectations for electronic democracy that technology has fostered.
Dahl (1989) has described the change in spatial dimensions as one of the
causal factors in the development of representative democracy. And this factor
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 43
space becomes relative because of rapid and direct communication via computer
networks (Zittel 2001). A virtual space comes into being that overcomes the
restrictions of real space (Abramson, Arterton and Orren 1988; Negroponte
1995). Space loses its physical quality and becomes merely a metaphor for a
“place” of electronic communication among dispersed individuals. This relativization
or perhaps even the death of space can, in conjunction with other
technological properties, fundamentally change modern democracy. These properties
include the multiplication and decentralization of information stocks
which citizens can access rapidly and almost at will. But perhaps the most
important is the possibility of interactive communication between citizens in
virtual space.
The two following expectations for electronic democracy as participatory
democracy can be formulated on the basis of these technological possibilities.
The first is concerned with the criterion of directness and the second with the
criterion of deliberation in the model of participatory democracy we have been
discussing:
1 Through technologically facilitated referendums, citizens can again be comprehensively
and permanently involved in government (kratos component).
2 Through interactive communication between citizens in virtual space, a
common will of the demos can be formed deliberatively (demos compo-
nent).
The following two sections discuss how plausible and realistic these two expectations
for electronic democracy are.
Direct participation by citizens in government
Barber (1984) describes referendums at the national level as one of the most
important forms of institutionalization for participatory democracy in modern
society. There were, of course, referendums before the innovations in the electronic
media. In the discussion on electronic democracy, these media have certainly
quite rightly been considered a particularly effective means for conducting
such referendums (Slaton 1992; Budge 1996). At the press of a button or the
click of a mouse, citizens scattered over a wide area can take part in referendums
and thus in political decision-making. For the citizens themselves, this participation
is low-cost, and the organization of such referendums requires comparatively
little effort. In principle, this permits comprehensive and lasting
participation by citizens in government. But the technological facilitation of referendums
changes nothing in the nature and implications of this instrument. This
is already the subject of ongoing discussion. We will look at a number of aspects
important for the normative benchmarks of participatory democracy.
One aspect is a problem caused by societal complexity and the associated fact
that the political system has to perform a broad range of services for society.
This means that the quantity of generally binding decisions that have to be made
44 Dieter Fuchs
has reached enormous proportions. Previously, we formulated the postulate that
the intensity of achievable self-government by the demos is inversely proportional
to the quantity of decisions. Barber (1984: XIV) ultimately accepts this,
defining his strong democracy “as a form of government in which all of the
people govern themselves in at least some public matters at least some of the
time.” He has thus adapted his model of participatory democracy to reality. On
the other hand, this normative weakening means that the idea of self-government
is largely abandoned and reduced to a greater or lesser degree of citizen participation
in decision-making processes, which are largely carried out by elected
representatives. The possibility of increasing the quantity of referendums
through the use of electronic media does perhaps reduce the problem somewhat,
but not fundamentally. Budge (1996) suggests therefore that referendums be
restricted to fifty important laws adopted by parliament. But from the point of
view of information and discussion on the relevant issues, this number is still
very high. Above all: since citizens have widely varying preferences, it is not
possible to establish which problems and which laws are particularly important
(Kaase 2002).
A second aspect has to do with societal complexity: the difficulty and interrelatedness
of the problems with which politics has to deal. This calls for expert
knowledge, the building of compromises between differing positions, and the
development of policy packages. And it is for this reason that the political
system has differentiated itself as a functional system. Referendums, however,
are concerned with single issues and, in voting, citizens almost always have to
rely on inadequate information, all the more so as the number of referendums
increases. Budge (1996) answers this objection by pointing out that professional
politicians have no “monopoly of expertise,” and, as far as Switzerland is concerned,
Kirchgässner et al. (1999) note that members of parliament and average
citizens do not differ substantially in the level of their political information. We
have some doubt whether this claim is empirically tenable, and its applicability
in general terms would in any case have to be empirically demonstrated. But the
point at issue is not a monopoly of expertise and the general political knowledge
of representatives but the specific knowledge of political and administrative entities
about certain issues and about the possibility of aggregating different policies
through appropriate procedures to create meaningful packages.
A third aspect is motivation for participation in referendums. The normative
postulate of self-government can be approached only if the institutional possibilities
are available and if they are also used by citizens. As we have seen, there
are systematic restrictions on the political participation of citizens in modern
societies owing to factors such as information and opportunity costs and the
relatively low status of politics. If this thesis is valid, it would also hold true for
referendums. The astonishingly low average participation by Swiss citizens in
referendums (Kirchgässner et al. 1999) certainly does not contradict this thesis.
This state of affairs raises questions about the essential democratic postulate of
equal weight for every vote, a postulate that is much more strongly redeemed
when it comes to electing representatives. Sometimes very small minorities
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 45
make binding decisions for correspondingly large majorities. This intensifies the
nature of the decision as a zero-sum game (Sartori 1987), for compromise building
between differing or opposing interests is not possible in referendums. The
argument that every citizen can participate is, in my view, not sound. It forces
the citizen to obtain costly information, for without it he has no way of identifying
his own interest in the given issue, and his vote would then be senseless.7
This is relevant above all against the background of the alternative of leaving the
identification and enforcement of one’s interests to elected representatives. The
basis for this election is another matter that is not at issue here.
A fourth aspect is the blurring of the democratic logic of a representative
system. Such systems are based on the clear accountability of elected representatives
in the political decision-making system for their actions and the outcomes
of these actions. The democratic mechanism of re-election or voting functions
only through undiluted accountability. And it is primarily in this mechanism that
the exercise of popular sovereignty in representative democracies is grounded.
The more referendums are conducted, the more of a problem accountability
becomes.
A fifth and last aspect leads us over to the demos component, which is to be
discussed in the next section. According to Sartori (1987), referendum democracy
is a direct democracy of isolated individuals and not of interacting citizens.
But this interaction is the precondition for constituting a demos with a
collective will, and it is a basic postulate of participatory democracy.
The interactive constitution of a common will of the demos
If a referendum democracy is a direct democracy of isolated individuals and not
of interacting citizens, this does not satisfy the normative requirements of a participatory
democracy. Emphatic advocates of the referendum instrument are
aware of this problem and suggest linking votes on political issues in referendums
to prior discussion (Kirchgässner et al. 1999). Switzerland can be cited as
a practical example of this procedure, and the authors mentioned claim that, by a
number of criteria, Switzerland performs better than purely representative democracies.
We will not go into the validity of this assertion. But for the purposes of
our analysis, this linkage involves a further inverse relationship: the more
strongly referendums are tied to prior discussion, the fewer referendums can be
held, and the less self-government by the demos can be realized by means of referendum.
From a normative point of view, technologically facilitated referendums
are thus almost without importance.
But regardless of how direct participation by the demos in making generally
binding decisions is conceived and implemented, two questions first need to be
answered: To what extent can electronic democracy contribute to the interactive
constitution of a common will of the demos? And to what extent can it contribute
to constituting the demos as a community? We will consider each in turn.
In antique democracy, the collective will of the demos was formed in joint
discussion among its members in a real place. If one considers that only a
46 Dieter Fuchs
minority of Athenians ever took part in discussion in the ekklesía, its structure
can be characterized in brief as some-to-all communication in which all participants
were physically present. The will of the demos constituted thus can be
regarded as authentic and not as merely procedurally calculated. And it can be
expected that those who took part also felt bound by it. The more strongly this
collective will controls the decisions actually made, the more closely in keeping
this is with the concept of self-government.
Owing to the problem of scale alone, will-formation in the democracy of
modern societies is completely different. A discussion is conducted primarily in
the conventional mass media – before the citizens and not by them. This type of
discussion reaches very many, optimally almost all, citizens. In simple terms, it
is very-few-to-almost-all communication in which the few are visually present
and the many play no role. Nonetheless, conventional mass communication has
two advantages: first, its reach, which means at least that the attention of a large
part of the demos is occupied by the same issues at the same time, leading to a
measure of communication in the private sphere and in public places in the
primary life-world. Second, according to Gerhards and Neidhardt (1991), there
is a code of communication in the general public sphere which requires arguments
which can be generalized, rather than particular benefits to justify the
views of a party. A certain degree of control or filtering of public discussion by
the regulative idea of the common good can therefore by assumed, even if many
actors appeal to it for primarily strategic motives.
In comparison with conventional mass communication, the Internet public
sphere offers a different but highly ambivalent picture. In principle, “the Internet
permits interactive communication by any number of participants at any spatial
distance” (Zittel 2001: 433). Citizens can thus communicate with each other
almost without restriction and no longer have to accept a largely passive role in
hierarchically structured mass communication. Does electronic democracy then
mean the restoration of the antique a-gora in the form of a virtual e-gora? There
are at least two fundamental arguments against this hope.
In Internet communication, who communicates with whom is not determined
a priori, but it is neither technically possible nor practicable for everyone to
communicate with everyone on the same subject. On the Internet, a multiplicity
of thematically focused communication communities forms. We can therefore
argue that the Internet public sphere is fragmented (Wilhelm 2000) and as such,
lacking one of the advantages of conventional mass communication. And a fragmented
public can hardly contribute to interactively constituting a common will
of the demos.
A second fundamental argument against the restoration of the antique agora
in the form of a virtual e-gora lies in the character of “actors” communicating on
the Internet. Partners in communication are neither physically nor visually
present; they are mutually anonymous others. Basically, they remain concealed
behind the communicated information. Each knows only that the source must be
someone. But this someone can literally not take shape, except by fabrication in
a completely unreal projection. This problem can perhaps be somewhat reduced
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 47
but not solved by associating a picture with the message. The authenticity of pictures
on the Internet is always subject to doubt, and a picture without action,
gestures and facial expressions offers practically no additional information. In
Internet communication, the anonymous other is thus not identifiable as a citizen
belonging to the same demos as ego himself. Besides anonymity, the blurredness
or even absence of boundary-drawing associated with Internet communication
makes attributability to the demos more difficult. For these reasons,
interactive will-formation by members of the demos through Internet communication
generating a collective will is unlikely.
So far, we have been talking about the interactive constitution of a common
will without clearly stating what is to be understood by this interactivity. The
normative model of participatory democracy postulates not any sort of interaction
or communication between citizens but deliberative interaction. It is only
through deliberation that the transformation mentioned can be effected. The
question is therefore how the specific properties of Internet communication
relate to the deliberation requirement. Deliberation means the systematic
exchange of arguments by persons present. This presence is doubly important.
First, it alone permits the mutual ascription of arguments to specific persons,
which is a precondition for the progressive process of building a common will.
Second, it is only the fact that arguments are put forward by other people that
generates the credibility that may induce a participant to change his opinion.
Internet communication fulfills neither the criterion that communication takes
place between identifiable persons nor that these persons be present in a physical
or at least visual form. It is thus not very surprising that a number of studies conclude
that Internet communication is primarily a superficial expression of views
by anonymous sources and has little to do with deliberation (Rosenfield 1998;
Galston 1999; Wilhelm 2000).
The virtual nature of Internet communication must necessarily affect the
nature of the community it enables. And this can be interpreted positively.
According to Poster (1995), it is precisely the anonymity and boundlessness of
Internet communication that offer completely new freedoms. Everyone can
present himself as he wishes, and everyone can communicate with whom he
wishes. Biological, social and spatial constraints are abolished. A virtual
community is thus the result of free decisions by individuals with multiple and
decentralized identities that come together because they have common interests
(Poster 1995). This interpretation is indeed possible. But from a democracy
theory perspective another interpretation is more plausible. We share the view of
other authors (Turkle 1995; Ravetz 1998; Galston 1999) that virtuality cuts the
ground from under the feet of credible, serious and thus far-reaching cooperation
between citizens in dealing with common affairs. If this is the case, then the
finding of Galston (1999) that participation in virtual communities leads to withdrawal
from traditional communities is normatively alarming.
In concluding our analysis, we return to the criterion of deliberation. It is of
strategic importance for the variant of participatory democracy we have been
considering (see also Cooke 2000). To effect the asserted transformation, delib-
48 Dieter Fuchs
erative procedures must be carried out in practice. This raises two problems:
institutionalization and motivation. We have looked at both when discussing
direct participation by citizens, but they are even more serious in relation to
deliberative participation. One of the few concrete proposals for institutionalizing
deliberative procedures has been put forward by Fishkin (1991, 1995).
According to him, parliaments should be flanked by representative citizens’
forums whose task it would be to supply the parliament with deliberatively
grounded citizens’ opinions. Once again, however, they would be representative
bodies and would not provide for any notable direct participation by citizens.
And if the problem of representativeness can be solved (Kaase 2002), we still
have to ask why the vast majority of citizens, who have not taken part in deliberations,
ought to accept the outcome as binding. Both – representativeness
and the binding nature of decisions – are unsolved problems for all advocatory
deliberations.
The structural restrictions on the political participation of citizens in modern
societies have been discussed previously. But deliberative participation raises
further problems. Every procedure has to be implemented by means of rules, and
this is true in a special sense for deliberative procedures. A rule holds only if it
is accepted and obeyed in fact. It will be accepted and obeyed only if there is a
motive or an interest to do so (Alexy 1995). According to Habermas (1992: 141)
this is, in the case of deliberations, an “interest in correctness.” The question is
the extent to which citizens in modern democracies can be assumed to have this
interest. Habermas (1992: 142) is undecided: “It is certainly too optimistic to
assume that every human being has an interest in correctness [. . .] But it is also
too pessimistic to assume that no human being has an interest in correctness.”
Regardless of how one assesses the distribution of this interest, it is clear that a
deliberative procedure as such cannot generate it. We must therefore count on
the citizens possessing the appropriate virtues and on an accommodating political
culture. To a certain degree, however, this presupposes what is supposed to
be generated by deliberation, like the transformation of particular interests into
general interests.
Summary and discussion
The system of government that has since been known as democracy came into
being in antique Athens. For the first and only time in history, literal selfgovernment
by the people was realized. The notion of a democratic system of
government was taken up again in the modern age. Under changed societal conditions,
it was implemented not as direct democracy but as liberal, i.e.
representative democracy. However, political thinking developed that upheld the
ideal of self-government by the people, and confronted existing liberal democracy
with this ideal. But the onus of proving how this ideal could be realized
has always been on the theory of so-called participatory democracy. The alternative
would be for it to remain an interesting but merely cerebral pursuit.
The versions of participatory democracy we have discussed stress deliberaParticipatory,
liberal and e-democracy 49
tive forms of procedure and participation, and are accordingly referred to as
theory of deliberative democracy. They assume that deliberative democracy is
not only normatively desirable in modern society but also necessary to solve the
practical problems of liberal democracy. If it is to do so, however, it must be
possible in real terms. And to establish this, answers are needed to the questions
of institutionalization and motivation. In our view, they have yet to be given,
and can perhaps not be given at all. The structural restrictions of modern societies
are presumably so strong that the ideal of participatory democracy cannot
be realized even approximately.
The only really concrete proposal for institutionalizing direct participation by
citizens in the making of generally binding decisions has been advanced by
Barber (1984), who advocates the instrument of the referendum at the national
level. But there is a fundamental mismatch between the quantity of decisions
that have to be made in the politico-administrative system and the quantity of
referendums that can be held. This state of affairs is exacerbated by coupling
referendums to prior discussions or deliberations, indispensable for the theory of
participatory democracy. In this regard, Barber (1984: XIV) adjusts to reality in
describing his strong democracy as a form of government “in which all of the
people govern themselves in at least some public matters at least some of the
time.” The number of decisions in which all citizens can participate directly, is,
however, likely to be so small in relation to the total number of decisions to be
made that this has almost nothing more to do with the normative postulate of
self-government.
The more participatory a democracy is from an institutional point of view, the
more strongly it has to rely on political participation by the citizens. It cannot be
a question of only sporadic participation in demonstrations and the like. What is
needed is optimally enduring and comprehensive engagement by citizens and
commitment to the demands of deliberative procedures. This is highly contingent,
and Barber (1984: 265) accordingly asks: “How then can we expect either
the self-interested or apathetic to identify with a program of participation and
civic renewal in which their most immediate interests would be ignored, at least
in the short run?” His answer is as follows: “Through persuasion, through the
self-education yielded by democratic participation itself [. . .] The taste for participation
is whetted by participation: Democracy breeds democracy” (Barber
1984: 265). In view of the grounds we have given for the rational citizen to
abstain from political participation, we must regard this argument as rather
unconvincing wishful thinking.
What possibilities does electronic democracy offer for technologically overcoming
structural obstacles in modern society and bringing us closer to participatory
democracy? We have argued that coupling referendums with prior
deliberations – indispensable for participatory democracy – deprives technologically
facilitated referendums of any practical importance. But the production of
a virtual public sphere and a virtual community abolishing the restrictions of
space and scale is praised by the proponents of electronic democracy as one of
its most important advantages. In this way, autonomous will-formation by the
50 Dieter Fuchs
demos as a collective subject is to be restored under the conditions of modern
societies. However, a number of studies conducted in the context of the discussion
on electronic democracy have found the situation to be contradictory.
Trends towards fragmentation of the public and the erosion of traditional
communities are just as plausible. And these trends would be more likely to
weaken than strengthen both the constitution of a common will of the demos in a
general public sphere and responsible cooperation between citizens in a
community of which they consider themselves members and with which they
identify.
In the discussion on electronic democracy, we have abstracted from real
problems posed by the new media. The intention has been, where possible, to
probe the potential of electronic democracy for approximating to participatory
democracy only on the basis of the technical properties of the media and the
associated communication logic. Real problems like the complete commercialization
of the Internet, the possibilities for monitoring Internet communication,
the manipulation of voting via electronic media, etc., have naturally been left
aside. Taking such real problems into account, Barber (1999) developed “three
scenarios for the future of technology and strong democracy.” Only one of them
– which he calls the Jefferson scenario – was positive by the normative benchmarks
for strong democracy. But this is precisely the one he describes as least
realistic. It therefore seems that the possibilities for realizing a participatory
democracy under the conditions of modern society by means of electronic
democracy are to be regarded with skepticism for both “logical” and “realistic”
reasons. From a normative point of view, it cannot be excluded that electronic
democracy even falls short of the status quo of liberal democracy.
The dissemination and utilization of the new media is an irreversible development.
The most optimistic proponents of an electronic democracy anticipate that
the new media will trigger a “third democratic transformation” (Dahl 1989;
Grossman 1995). This is expected to bring us back towards a participatory
democracy under the conditions of a modern society. According to our analysis,
however, it is more probable that it will tend rather to depart from this ideal. The
most important reason has been stated to be the greater difficulty in forming a
collective will and constituting a political community. And both are preconditions
for the demos to govern itself as a collective subject.
If the predictions advanced in the globalization debate prove correct, the
trend towards the dissolution of a collective subject through immigration and
multiculturalism will strengthen. And nation states are tending to lose their
capacity to control their own societies. They compensate this loss of control
partly by implementing international and supranational regimes. In an attempt to
address and positively interpret this development caused by virtualization and
globalization, a further model of democracy is advanced: cosmopolitan democracy.
In this model, the importance of democracy is more or less reduced to
some sort of participation by some citizens of the world in decision-making by a
multitude of national, international and supranational regimes. In other words,
this means that the unambiguity of the demos, the kratos and of the relation
Participatory, liberal and e-democracy 51
between them begins to dissolve. This has hardly anything more to do with the
idea of democracy that came into being in antique Athens about 2500 years ago
and to which the models of participatory democracy are fundamentally commit-
ted.
Notes
1 See Held (1996) for a differentiated discussion of a wide range of democracy models.
2 At this point we disregard the legislative commission (nomothétai), which was set up
only in 403/402.
3 One of the few exceptions was the office of military strategist.
4 Strong democratic talk, deliberation and discourse are different terms for largely identical
concepts.
5 Other postulates on and conditions for deliberative procedures are to be found in the
study by Cohen (1989).
6 For an overview on this discussion see Kamps 1999; Hacker and van Dijk 2000; Hoff,
Horrocks and Tops 2000; Zittel 2001.
7 See Dahl’s (1989) democratic criterion of “enlightened understanding.”
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