Communist and Post-Communist Studies 1994 27(l) 95-109
The Communist Torturers of Eastern
Europe:
Prosecute and Punish or Forgive and Forget?
John P Moran
Llepartment of Political Science, The George Washington University.
Washington, DC 20052, USA
One of the most difftcult dilemmas that post-authoritarian societies face in the
early years of democracy involves the treatment of those authoritarian offtcials
who are guilty of gross violations of human rights. Should a new democracy
prosecute and punish or should it forgive and forget its former “torturers”?
The process leading to a resolution of this “torturer problem” is complex and
often misunderstood. This paper argues that the correlation between the
“democratization process” and the outcome of the “torturer problem” is a
specious one in the East European context. The unfolding of events in the last
several years has demonstrated that a much stronger correlation exists between
the variables of “exit” and/or “voice” under communism and the outcome of
the “torturer problem.”
In 1991 Samuel Huntington published The Third Wave: Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century, in which he proposed a conceptual framework for the
democratization process of the 3.5 nations that have become democracies since
1974. His cogent hypotheses and enticing conclusions seem particularly applicable
to many of the newly democratized nations of Southern Europe, Latin America,
and East Asia. However, upon close examination, the application of his framework
to the newly democratized nations of Eastern Europe appears to be more
problematic.
This paper will deal with the application of only one aspect of Huntington’s
framework to Eastern Europe-that which he terms the “torturer problem.” It will
argue that the link that Huntington attempts to make between the independent
variable of “democratization process”and the dependent variable of “outcome of
the torturer problem” is a specious one in the East European context. The events
that have occurred in post-1990 German Democratic Republic (GDR).
Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria have demonstrated this. The first section of this
paper will examine Huntington’s argument itself. The following sections will
discuss the pre- and post-transition events in these three East European countries
and attempt to determine the applicability of his argument in relation to the
eminent “torturers” of the region-members of the respective Interior Ministries
and Security Services. In the course of this argument, a new paradigm will be
0967-067X/94/01/0095-15 0 1994 The Regents of the University of California
The Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe: J.P. Moran
proposed which suggests that a psychological variable, one linked with the
concepts of “exit” and “voice,” functions as a more appropriate indicator for the
eventual outcome of the “torturer problem.”
The Torturer Problem: Prosecute and Punish or Forgive and Forget?
In dealing with the democratization process, it is perhaps inevitable that
Huntington (1991) p.211) raises the question of, “How should the democratic
government respond to charges of gross violations of human rights-murder,
kidnapping, torture, rape, imprisonment without trial-committed by the officials
of the authoritarian regimes?” Should the new government prosecute and punish
or should it forgive and forget? Huntington casts aside moral and legal arguments
dealing with what a newly democratized government should do, looking rather at
what it actuaZly did. From his studies Huntington (Ibid., p.215) concludes that, “In
actual practice what happened was little affected by moral and legal considerations.
It was shaped almost exclusively by politics, by the nature of the democratization
process, and by the distribution of political power during and after the
transition.” Somewhat later, he clarifies, “Justice was a function of political power.
Officials of strong authoritarian regimes that voluntarily ended themselves were
not prosecuted; officials of weak authoritarian regimes that collapsed were
punished, if they were promptly prosecuted by the new democratic government”
(Ibid., p.228).
Huntington theorizes that democratization can occur by one of four processes.
The first he calls “transformation.” In this process, reformers emerge from within
the old regime and maintain power simply by transforming their political beliefs.
The second he terms “transplacement.” In this process, the old regime starts the
move toward democracy, but losses both its initiative and its legitimacy, and is
quickly outpaced by opposition reformers, who then proceed to take power. The
third he calls “replacement.” This involves the overthrow and complete replacement
of an unrepentant and unreformed government by the opposition. The last
is called “intervention’‘-a process in which a democratic government is established
by an outside force.
As mentioned above, Huntington hypothesizes that the tendency of a newly
democratized state to prosecute and punish or forgive and forget will depend on
which of these four transition types occurs. Transplacements and transformations
result in the tendency to forgive and forget. This was seen in Nicaragua and South
Korea (transplacements), and in Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala (transformations).
Replacements, on the other hand, result in the tendency to prosecute and punish.
Huntington looks to Argentina and Greece as the two primary examples here.
Unfortunately, he does not deal with “interventions” and their relationship to the
“torturer problem.”
Huntington’s Eastern Europe
Huntington’s approach to Eastern Europe is as what might be expected. He classifies
Hungary and Bulgaria as transformations; Poland and Czechoslovakia as
transplacements; and East Germany and Romania as replacements (intervention
as a democratic transition process does not play a role here). Consequently, he
observes that, “In Eastern Europe, apart from Romania and East Germany, the
initial overall tendency was to forgive and forget.” Once this tendency has been
established, he argues, it tended to persist. He points out that, “The popular
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support and indignation necessary to make justice a political reality fade; the
discredited groups associated with the authoritarian regime re-establish their legitimacy
and influence. In new democratic regimes, justice comes quickly or it does
not come at all.” In communist-type systems, the pervasiveness of the party structure
as well as the potential social impact of a public reading of the “torturers”
secret files, further contribute to this tendency to forgive and forget (Huntington,
1991, p.228).
What has, in fact, happened in Eastern Europe in the two years since the
publishing of this book directly contradicts Huntington’s theories and predictions.
Events in this region are characterized by two overarching phenomena (1) the lack
of a causal link between “democratization process” and “outcome of the torturer
problem,” and (2) the differences between the East European countries
themselves, which can account for one other very significant variable-one dealing
with psychology-playing a clear role in determining the outcome of the “torturer
problem.” In order to illustrate these two phenomena, one country from each of
Huntington’s “process types” has been chosen: the GDR (replacement),
Czechoslovakia (transplacement), and Bulgaria (transformation). It will be argued
that not only do Czechoslovakia, a transplacement country, and Bulgaria, a transformation
country, exhibit more and more of a tendency to prosecute and punish
than the GDR, a replacement country, but that the psychological variables of
“exit” and “voice” are much more pertinent to the eventual resolution of the
“torturer problem” than is Huntington’s structural paradigm.
The German Democratic Republic and its Torturers
Since the 1989 transition to democracy in the GDR two paradoxical factors can
be found to characterize the outcome of the “torturer problem.” First, the
GDR/All-German government has clearly not opted to prosecute the vast majority
of “torturers” in spite of the “replacement” nature of the transition. Second,
although many moral, legal, and historical arguments were involved in deciding
whether the Stasi should be prosecuted or forgiven, the overall tendency to forgive
seems to hinge upon a variable that made the GDR somewhat unique among its
East European neighbors. This was a psychological variable-a legacy of
Honecker’s “exit” policy-which allowed the East Germans to proceed with their
democratization process in a less vengeful way.
From the very outset of the democratization process in the GDR, the opposition’s
demands for the complete dismantling of the Ministry for State Security, or
the Staatsicherheit (Stasi), fostered an environment in which prosecution and
punishment would logically follow. At the very first session of the opposition
round table, on December 7, 1989, the government helplessly agreed to abolish
the successor agency to the Stasi (the Office for National Security). On December
17, this surprising fact was reported in the official press (Donovan, 1990, p.11).
The fact that this was one of the opposition’s capital demands further became
apparent when, on January 12, the opposition threatened to withdraw their
support of the government after Prime Minister Hans Modrow announced that it
was necessary to establish a new security service to “prevent a ‘security vacuum’
from developing” (Donovan, 1990, p.10). In justifying this action, the government
claimed a new threat to social order in the form of neofascism and stressed that
strong tactics were necessary to keep this from happening. On the streets, the
populace reacted by significantly heightening their protests (Ibid., p.12). These
protests, along with the prospects of losing opposition support, forced Modrow to
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back down on this proposal shortly after its announcement. Clearly Modrow had
misjudged the “Stasi issue.” Any sort of legitimacy that his government might have
gained by disbanding the first organization was immediately lost when he tried to
establish a second. For the opposition, Modrow’s mistake allowed them to raise
the stakes. It immediately demanded that he deliver a report on the condition of
the security services, a government element which was already to have been
dissolved.
This report, when it was given on January 15, caused a storm in Berlin. Just
before its deliverance, Modrow again promised to abandon his plans for establishing
a new security service before the May elections. His main adviser, Manfred
Sauer, then delivered the prepared report on the status of the Stasi. The effect of
this report was stunning. As one commentator wrote, “Sauer’s report was astonishing,
even to those with a highly developed Stasi-consciousness. The force
consisted of 85,000 regular employees, of whom only 30,000 had been dismissed;
it also included 109,000 secret informers. That is, one of every eight persons in the
country ... In short, the Sauer report confirmed the wildest fantasies of the Stasi
alarmists” (Darnton, 1990, p.18). The alarm felt by those who heard the report
was compounded by the fact that the evening before evidence had surfaced that
a new security agency had already, secretly, been established and that it had been
operating since January 2 (Donovan, 1990, p.11).
By five o’clock that evening, a demonstration organized by the New Forum, and
numbering up to 100 000 people, gathered in front of the central Stasi office building
in Berlin under the slogan “Imagination against Stasi and Nasi” (Darnton,
1990, p.19). Soon thereafter elements of the crowd broke through the front doors
and led a riot through the hallways and offices. Although it is now virtually impossible
to determine if this was the original intent of the demonstration, the message
sent to the leadership was powerful. In fact, psychologically, this could very well
have been the death knell for the government. One observer noted, “The damage
was actually far less than the million marks announced by the government, but far
more, psychologically, than the government can afford. For the first time since the
beginning of their revolution, the Germans have resorted to violence” (Ibid., p.19).
Thus, from this violent outburst it was possible to deduce two facts: (1) the
“Stasi issue” was one of the crucial issues both to the opposition and to the public
at large, and (2) this was one of the few issues over which Germans were willing
to get violent. Although Honecker himself could very well have been a personal
target of the people’s wrath (as Ceaucescu was in Romania), most people seemed
to want vengeance on the Stasi.
By January, 1990, public opinion and opposition demands in the GDR indicated
that prosecution and punishment of Stasi members would logically follow. It
appeared highly unlikely that the Stasi would be given any sort of clemency before
the inevitable “replacement” would occur. However, the storming of the Stasi
headquarters seems to have been the climax of East German wrath. As time went
by, a conciliatory tendency became more and more apparent. The Spanish and
Polish approach--“put the past aside...no vendettas, in exchange for powersharing”-was
looked to as the model approach (The Economist, 1992, p.22).
This philosophy, which found its best advocate in Peter-Michael Diestel,
appointed East Germany’s Interior Minister in April, 1990, was propounded for
both idealist and pragmatic reasons. Although it was his job “to dismantle the
Stasi,” he was convinced of the efficacy of the non-punitive approach (Emerson,
1990, p.19). He explained, “The old Stasi may try to reorganize if we totally
remove them from society. If we try to eradicate the Stasi violently, we will
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certainly lose the war and our future” (Ibid., p.20). Aside from dismantling the
agency, his task was to uncover the terrorist organizations that had received Stasi
support (such as the Red Army Faction). In order to do so, testimony from former
Stasi agents would be necessary. Friendly cooptation was the method. On top of
this, Diestel had to reckon with an organization that was still very much of a
hidden power in the country. This hidden power was manifest in the Stasi’s ability
to blackmail large portions of the population-reportedly, up to 20 per cent of all
Stasi files were still in their possession.
Diestel’s desire to extend a blanket amnesty to all Stasi members who were not
involved in violent activities however was tempered by West Germany’s desire to
prosecute those involved in espionage-violent or not. Markus Wolfe was one of
the central issues here. The West German government’s handling of his case
brought the prosecute/forgive debate very much into the open. While Diestel’s
justifications for his actions were based upon practical and “healing” reasons, the
West German government and much of the East German populace were more
concerned with moral and legal arguments. Interestingly, however, the issue that
most aroused the East German populace was the government’s handling of the
Stasi’s secret files.
As early as November, 1989, most people of the GDR were aware of the
existence of the secret files. At that time, a newly formed Citizens’ Committee
quickly perused the files and determined that prudence was the more practical
virtue. It announced, “To release the information...would be to set off endless
feuds among people who had been denounced by their neighbors or betrayed by
their spouses” (Darnton, 1990, p.16). It argued that the disbanding of the Stasi was
sufficient in itself, and that its, “myth could be allowed to dissipate in tavern talk”
(Ibid., p.16). They closed the files to the public.
However, in the summer of 1991 a discernible shift in opinion occurred regarding
the secret files. Superficially, this seems to have been caused by two factors:
(1) the persistence of economic troubles in spite of many optimistic predictions,
and (2) the occurrence of a right-wing coup with KGB involvement in the Soviet
Union. East Germans began to mumble aloud that former communist officials
were blocking reform in their country (The Economist, 1992, p.22). It was at this
point that pressure for a greater degree of punishment for the “torturers”
occurred.
This was most plainly seen in a law passed on January 2, 1992, which gave every
East German citizen a right to read his or her own file. The new philosophy can
best be summed up by Joachim Gauck, custodian of the Stasi archive-“If
Parliament had rejected the law granting people access to their files, I would have
left this job ... That would have been a way of telling people from East Germany
that we were too immature to handle these truths, that the Government would
make this decision for us. That is not the right message to give people who are
getting their first taste of democracy after living under dictatorship continuously
since 1933” (Kinzer, 1990, ~52).
As could be expected, many unsavory bits of East German lives became known.
One parliamentarian and long-term opposition leader discovered that her husband
had been betraying her for years (Kinzer, 1990, p.25). Another woman found that
her own father had been reporting on her activities (Ibid., p.52). A certain
phenomenon not completely healthy for any society began to emerge. One source
reported, “Almost every day, the Stasi files reveal new details, new cases, new
conspiracies. Information from the files has already ruined several promising political
careers, destroyed countless friendships and plunged many Eastern Germans
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into crises of anger and depression. All of Germany is transfixed by the drama
emerging from what the magazine Der Spiegel calls ‘the horror files’ ” (Ibid., p.25).
Thus, the mere existence of these files created a condition of spiraling anger
and frustration against former members of the Security Services. However, and
quite unexpectedly, the calls for punishment were still limited to those who had
violated human rights or committed violent acts. Emotional moral and legal
arguments, calling for punishment for those who committed lesser crimes, were
not raised. Illustrative of this was the fact that Erich Mielke, former chief of the
Stasi, was eventually indicted for only two charges of murder that he allegedly had
committed in 1931. The only other indictments involved several border guards,
tried for murder, who were following shoot-to-kill orders on the border (The
Economist, 1992, p.22).
The prosecution of these violent acts aside, by mid-1992 most East Germans
had resigned themselves to let the past rest. One source accurately noted, “Stasi
victims are slowly coming to realize that the democratic state has no way to
compensate them for what they have suffered. They simply join the long list of
victims of 20th-century tyrannies” (Kinzer, 1990, p.52).
Unique Variables in the GDR
Why, then, did the East Germans react so differently than, say, the Argentinians
or the Greeks? It will be argued here that the Stasis position in the GDR was
radically different from the “torturers” of these other countries and placed them
in a category by themselves. The factors that place them there are (1) the size and
efficiency of the Stasi, (2) the political culture of the GDR, and (3) the important
role of the secret files.
The size and efficiency of the Stasi easily set them apart from anything found in
the non-East European Third Wave. Somewhere around 86 000 full time employees
and approximately two million unofficial informers worked for the Stasi. That
is, one in every eight East Germans. On a comparative scale that would be akin to
the CIA in the US deploying 30 million people (Martin, 1991, p.74). However, size
did not decrease their efficiency. Stasi steam rooms were attached to post offices,
and in some East German cities, every piece of mail was opened and read
(Emerson, 1990, p.20). They were adept at such delicate operations as destroying
dissident careers and marriages and corrupting priests and ministers. They riddled
Western intelligence agencies with untold numbers of agents. And not only did they
receive the country’s “creme of the crop” graduates, but they also received the
lion’s share of Eastern Europe’s largest economy. No other non-East European
Third Wave country could come close to possessing all of these factors.
East Germany’s political culture was another factor that differentiated it from
Third Wave countries in other regions of the world. Three factors come to mind
here. (1) East German events were heavily influenced by its richer and stronger
Western “democratic brother”-the Federal Republic. No other Third Wave
country had such a “democratic brother.” (2) The Stasi had extremely close ties
with the Soviet occupiers, and in particular the KGB. Again, no other non-East
European Third Wave country had similarly tight contacts with a foreign intelligence
service involved in an occupation. (3) The GDR’s Nazi past had conditioned
the country to a cycle of confrontation-atonement-forgiveness (but not forget-
ting).
The last, and perhaps most obvious, factor that seems to differentiate the East
German scenario from that of other areas of non-East European Third Wave was
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the existence of millions of secret files. One source reported, “Stasi files fill 125
miles of shelf space, with each mile containing about 17 million sheets of paper
and weighing nearly 50 tons” (Emerson, 1990, p.26). This included information on
two million West Germans and on six million East Germans-one-third of the
country (Martin, 1991, p.74). Again, no other non-East European Third Wave
country had to deal with this sort of “smoking gun.”
These factors clearly differentiated East Germany from other non-East
European Third Wave countries and may very well explain why the East Germans
reacted differently than citizens of other “replacement” countries. However, the
variables themselves do not explain why the East Germans choose not to prosecute
most of their torturers-in fact, many of the variables should logically have
augmented the populace’s anger toward their former torturers and led them to
call for prosecution.
One concept that could explain this unexpected tendency can be illustrated
using a portion of Albert 0. Hirschman’s theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (for
a brief synopsis of Hirschman’s argument see Barry, 1991). Hirschman argues that
individual loyalty tends to exhibit itself in “voice” (that is verbally attempting to
reverse a decline in a system or nation). Those politically active individuals who
do not have this voice option (for whatever reason), have the option of “exit” from
the nation or system. Not wanting to allow for “voice” in its system, the GDR had
consistently embraced this “exit” option for politically active oppositionists. This
was seen mainly in its pre-Berlin Wall policies and in its policies during the “Trebiexodus”
of 1989. In this way, the GDR communists somewhat successfully
depoliticized the populace by letting the politically active ones out. The few that
remained and exercised the “voice” option were found in the Protestant
churches-and they were severely oppressed. The remaining were either apolitical
or loyal.
The evidence found in this paper will suggest that in the newly democratized
countries of Eastern Europe the tendency to forgive and forget can be found in
those countries-Poland, Hungary, and the GDR-where either exit and/or voice
were allowed under the old regime. In countries where neither exit nor voice were
allowed-Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia-calls for punishment eventually predominated.
Thus, it seems that those most set on retribution against the former torturers
were those who were allowed neither voice nor exit but yet felt strongly about
political issues. In this sense, the outcome of the “torturer problem” can be looked
upon as a pressure cooker, where exit and voice provide for a pressure release.
Where the release is not allowed, the former torturers face explosive situations in
the post-transition period.
Czechoslovakia and its Torturers
While the repressive nature of the Czechoslovak communist regime was similar to
that of its GDR counterpart, post-transition events unfolded in one fundamentally
different way-while rational practicality eventually outweighed emotional
moral/legal arguments in the GDR, in Czechoslovakia the opposite tendency can
be observed (in spite of the “transplacement” nature of the transition). Thus, calls
for punishment have overwhelmed those for forgiveness.
The crucial event of the Czechoslovak transition to democracy occurred on
November 17, 1989, when riot police beat students who were participating in a
legal march marking the 50th anniversary of the martyrdom of Jan Opletal.
Widespread public condemnation forced a quick pace of events. On November 25,
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Party General Secretary Milos Jakes was replaced by Ladislav Adamec and on
December 3 his Internal Affairs Minister Frantisek Kincl was replaced by
Frantisek Pint. By shifting personnel in this way, the party hoped to appease the
protesters. However, just as Modrow had underestimated the importance of
placing an acceptable (non-communist) man in the Interior Ministry, so Adamec
had miscalculated in appointing Pint. In a clumsy attempt to recover from this
move, one of Pint’s first tasks was to apologize for the police action on November
17, “in the name of honest policemen” (Obrman, 1990a, p.10). He also declared
his intention to ensure that the State Security forces would, “play a different role
in the future.” The unsatisfied opposition continued to push for further reform
and eventually succeeded in pressuring Pint out of his job. Again, trying to keep
ahead of events, on December 21 the Prime Minister ordered a halt to the activities
of the State Security’s Administration of Investigations Department. The
following day, Ivan Prusa, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, announced
that, “State Security members who had broken the law would be prosecuted”
(Ibid., p.11).
This move, a call for prosecution, did not strengthen the position of the communist
party. In fact it fell from power shortly afterwards. On December 29, Vaclav
Have1 was elected President and a new non-communist government was formed.
One of Havel’s first appointments was Richard Sacher, Czechoslovak People’s
Party member and practising Catholic, who became Minister of Internal Affairs.
Sacher, in turn, abolished the Administration of Investigations Department,
dissolved all State Security units, released all of these units’ members from active
duty, and called in all weapons and archival material. Having heard rumors of a
conspiracy or an impending coup he ordered the dissolution of the State Security
division of the Corps of National Security on February 1, 1990.
In spite of all this, it was clear that Sacher was attempting to approach the task
of reorganization in a tolerant and non-vengeful way. At one point he stated that,
“a democratic attitude toward [members of the security forces], based on trust, is
the road we can best follow” (Obrman, 1990b, p.21). This was his overriding
philosophy as he proceeded to downsize his ministry to a target number of 6000
employees (the communist-run ministry had 12 000 to 18 000) (Obrman, 1991b,
p.9). Many of these individuals were former employees of the old service-only
8500 of the 18 000 State Security members (47 per cent) were not initially reemployed
(Obrman, 199Oc, p.18). As of September, 1990, only 20 per cent of the
border guards were forced to resign (Ibid., p.21). Overall, Sacher’s approach
involved the “depoliticization” of members of the entire Ministry. He insisted that,
“FBIS [Security Service] employees must not be members of any political party,
nor are they allowed to take part in political activities” (Obrman, 1991b, p.8). For
those Ministry employees who were not to be re-employed, Sacher’s treatment
was quite generous. They would continue to receive their salaries for an additional
six months and a special commission would determine if they had the appropriate
professional skills to apply to another department. For the suspicious, however,
Sacher made it clear that, “it would be naive not to keep former State Security
members under surveillance” (Obrman, 1990a, p.11). In general, punishment and
retribution were rather limited.
By thus observing the rather tolerant way in which the former “torturers” were
treated, it seems quite logical to call Czechoslovakia a “transplacement.” However,
just as in the GDR, it is important to keep in mind that the pre-transition size and
significance of the inter-party opposition was quite minimal. Sharon Wolchik
(1989, p.414) writes, “In contrast to the situation in Poland and Hungary, there
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was no strong reformist group in the party that might have eased the transition
by opening negotiations with the opposition before November, 1989.” Keeping this
very important point in mind, however, this similarity does not help to explain
why, at a certain point in the transition to democracy, the Czechoslovaks turned
their backs on forgiveness and began to seek punishment.
The change from rational forgiveness to vengeful prosecution culminated on
October 4, 1991, when the Czech and Slovak National Assembly passed what
became known as the “lustration” act. This act targeted former secret policemen
and their agents, former communist officials (from the district level up), members
of the Peoples’ Militia, and members of the National Front Action committees.
Those who had received police training in Moscow were also targeted by this law
(Laber, 1992, p.5). Czechoslovaks found to have been associated with these groups
would be barred, for a five-year period, from holding jobs in high-level governmental/administrative
posts, the military, the intelligence services, the police corps,
state radio and television organizations, news agencies, state-owned enterprises
(including foreign trade companies), railways, banks, high academic positions, the
judicial bench, and other positions connected with the courts (Ibid., p.5).
The enactment of this law was not without some precedent. Even at the outset
of the “velvet revolution,” Have1 initially agreed to a limited screening of governmental
personnel to “avoid possible scandals” (Obrman, 1991b, p.4). Although
uneasy about such a procedure, Have1 concluded that “a certain amount of vetting
was painful but necessary” (Ibid., p.9).
However, just as in East Germany, economic difficulties mounted and continuing
frustration with reform efforts (as well as rumors of an impending coup) led
to calls for a closer examination of the forgive and forget policy. Initially, the
discovery of secret files led the Czechoslovaks in the same direction as the East
Germans-a public viewing. However, President Have1 and Prime Minister Calfa
strongly opposed such a move, arguing that it would violate the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and a number of other international agreements
(Obrman, 1991b, p.10).
Logically Have13 opposition to the lustration act followed the same line of
thought. He argued (Havel, 1992, p.8) that, “The problem is that the relevant legislation
is based on the principle of collective responsibility; it prohibits certain
persons from holding certain offices solely on the basis of their membership in
certain groups defined by external characteristics, without giving them the right to
have their cases considered individuaIly. This runs counter to the basic principles
of democratic law. The files kept by the now abolished secret police are made the
highest, the final, the one and only criterion of eligibility. It is a necessary law, an
extraordinary law, a rigorous law. Yet at the same time, from the viewpoint of
fundamental human rights, it is a highly questionable law.” However, Havel’s
opposition to both acts failed to stop their enactment: on October 4, 1991, the
lustration act was passed; and on March 4.1992, the Czech and Slovak Parliaments
agreed to the concept of allowing people to see their own secret files (Laber, 1992,
P.0
The wide-ranging effects of this law may or may not have been foreseen by the
legislators. The International Labor Organization claims that more than one
million people could be affected by this law (Laber, 1992, p.5). Paradoxically, this
law affects the most unlikely people. Under threat of revelation, Jan Budaj,
Chairman of the Public against Violence (Civic Forum’s Slovak counterpart)~
admitted that he had signed a cooperation agreement with the state security police
in return for a passport (Obrman, 1993a, p.5). A pail was cast upon Jan Kavan,
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for contacts he had while he was a student in London. Other illustrious individuals
that could be affected are Zdenek Mlynar and Rita Klimova (Laber, 1992,
PP.6-7).
This lustration act clearly represents a move from rational forgiveness to
emotional vengeance. As one source recently put it, “Many leading politicians
appear willing to sacrifice some of the basic principles of the rule of law to politically
motivated retribution. Moreover, the discussion surrounding the screening
law reveals that many politicians and large segments of the public prefer revenge
to justice and that political objectives are sometimes more important than the rule
of law” (Pehe, 1992, p.14).
This act also represents a flaw in Huntington’s “torturer problem” paradigm in
which he speculates that “transplacements” are followed by general amnesties and
clemencies by the newly democratized governments. Admittedly, this seems to
have happened in Poland and Hungary, but it clearly did not happen here. Why?
Unique Variables in Czechoslovakia
Many of the variables that differentiated the GDR from the non-East European
Third Wave countries are also found in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak
Security Services were large and effective, they had close ties with the Soviet KGB,
and had large numbers of secret files. Additionally, the nation as a whole had an
ambiguous political history of flexibility and atonement (at the very least, Svejkian
passive values). Thus, the fact that Czechoslovakia behaved differently, than say,
South Korea, can be expected.
However, these commonalties in kind with the GDR differ in the degree in which
they were found here. The Czechoslovak Security Services had only 18 000 fulltime
workers and 140 000 informers-the GDR had 86 000 and 2 million respectively.
Thus, while the ratio of security to non-security people in the GDR was 1:8,
in Czechoslovakia it was 1:lOO. As regards political culture, the Czechoslovaks have
had a much closer tie with the Russians than the East Germans and can claim to
have had a strong and legitimate native communist party throughout their history.
And while the Czechoslovaks had to deal with the trauma of large numbers of
secret files, the archival findings here were not as elaborate nor as exhaustive as
those found in the GDR. Reportedly, the Czechoslovak files contained information
on only 140 000 individuals (Laber, 1992, p.5).
From these commonalties in kind but differences in degree it would be natural
to expect in Czechoslvakia a similar but lessened tendency toward vengeance. The
lustration law as well as the Czechoslvak desire to prosecute individuals for nonviolent
crimes displays that this difference is both qualitative and quantitative. This
might be explained by two additional factors.
The most obvious factor that differentiates Czechoslovakia from other Third
Wave countries in the region is not only the fact that it was, at the very outset,
on the verge of a political split (the Czech lands from Slovakia), but that it had,
in general, a history of political pluralism. In this sense, political debate and
competition came quite naturally to the Czechoslovaks. The unfortunate ramification
of this factor, however, was that the treatment of the security forces itself
became a partisan issue. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar complained that,
“extremist political forces: were trying to gain political capital from the screenings
and claimed that experiences with vetting had been negative, as some people
accused of having spied for the communists were completely innocent” (Obrman,
1991a, p.6).
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Yet another, and perhaps more critical, factor that seems to have arisen in
Czechoslovakia is psychological. One human rights activist wrote that, “Those
most actively seeking vengeance are not...the former dissidents who suffered more
than others did at the hands of the communists. Having spoken out all along, the
dissidents appear to have less need for catharsis now; nor do they feel they have
to prove themselves. The people seeking vengeance, on the whole, come from the
‘gray zone’-neither communists nor dissidents, they sat back, did nothing to incur
disapproval, and were not persecuted. They suffer now, some say, from a guilty
conscience and are taking revenge for their own humiliation. By insisting on
‘purification,’ they want to show that they are pure” (Laber, 1992, p.7).
As mentioned above, these are the people who choose neither “exit” nor
“voice.” The fact that they have a “guilty conscience” seems applicable to those
who felt strongly about political issues but did not act. In the East German
scenario, most of the people in this category left for the West. Legal emigration
was, of course, unheard of and socially the Czechoslovaks, unlike the East
Germans, did not have a culturally and linguistically compatible neighbor that was
waiting with open arms to be “exited” to. This eliminated the “exit” option for
most Czechoslovaks. And, unlike Poland or Hungary, dissent was not allowed
(without severe punishment). Thus, Czechoslovaks had neither the “exit” nor the
“voice” option. Consequently, the post-transition psychological tendency was
toward punishment rather than forgiveness, with the only brake on that tendency
being those leaders (such as Vaclav Havel, Jiri Dienstbier, etc.) who had exercised
the voice option in the past. As more and more non-exiters/non-voicers gain in
power, the tendency towards prosecution becomes more pronounced. The same
tendency can also be observed in Bulgaria.
Bulgaria and its Torturers
In many ways the oppressive conditions found under the communists in Bulgaria
parallel those found in Czechoslovakia. Psychologically, dissidents had neither the
“exit” nor “voice” options and were by and large suppressed by the government.
And, as is the case in Czechoslovakia, this could very well explain at least in part
why the Bulgarians have slowly but steadily changed course from their forgive and
forget policy to one of prosecute and punish-and all of this in spite of the “transformation”
nature of their democratic transition.
On the surface, the pattern of the Bulgarian revolution was very similar to the
anti-communist revolutions that occurred in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Here
the main opposition force was an environmental group, which organized demonstrations,
expanded their demands, and forced the leader to resign under pressure
from his colleagues. Economic and political reforms were demanded by the
opposition, political prisoners were freed, round table talks were had, and
elections were scheduled.
The difference here, of course, was that the party itself survived the transition
phase. The Bulgarian Communist Party managed this through a series of political
shake ups of the top leadership. The first was the removal of Todor Zhivkov from
power. Next came the resignation of Petar Mladenov (his successor). Following
that, the Lukanov/Lilov team came in for a short time in which the party itself
was purged and reorganized. And finally, Mladenov returned to the Presidency
(Laber, 1990, p.34).
In the spring of 1990 large-scale organizational changes and personnel cuts were
conducted in the Internal Affairs Ministry (Engelbrekt, 1991b, p.5). However, just
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The Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe: J.P. Moran
as in Czechoslovakia the stress seemed to be on the “depoliticization” of this
crucial ministry. This work was begun in early 1990 by the communist/socialist
Minister of Internal Affairs General Atansas Semerdzhiev (Perry, 1990, p.4). After
a short time he was followed by General Georgi Pilev, who predictably announced
that, “he would like to see a secret police that was not under the influence of
politicians and that would act only in accordance with the law” (Engelbrekt, 1991b,
p.6). Although he admitted that he had been a loyal member of the Bulgarian
Socialist Party, he said that he would not turn in his membership card on purely
“ethical grounds” but, “only as part of a campaign to depoliticize the state authorities”
(Ibid., p.6). However, his stay in the Ministry was also short. In October,
1990, he was replaced by 20-year veteran, Petko Angelov, who, again, did not
represent any new policies or philosophies (Ibid., p.6).
The Interior Ministry did realize however that certain changes would have to
be accomplished so as not to totally alienate the populace and the opposition. In
February, 1990, it was announced that Department “Six” (the secret police department
in charge of dissidents) had been disbanded. Additionally, the Interior
Minister signed a pledge that eavesdropping devices would not be placed in the
offices of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) (Laber, 1990, p.34).
Much as in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the composition of the police forces
remained largely unchanged. Their emphasis was now to uphold the new laws. As
could be expected, however, the police suffered from an image problem, low
morale, and poor recruitment prospects. Crime was rising as well. What sets
Bulgaria off from the others, in this regard, was the indignation with which the
police bore this burden. One source reported, that on August 13, “almost every
militiaman in Sofia wore a tricolor band [white, green, and red-the colors of the
Bulgarian flag] protesting what they perceived as the loss of prestige and insufficient
legal and social safeguards for the profession” (Perry, 1990, p.2). With the
memory of the massacres in Timisoara still in the minds of most Bulgarians, the
nerve of these policemen must either be admired or ridiculed.
As could be expected the general populace accepted most of these changes with
considerable skepticism. Most believed that, “the policemen have probably been
sent to other departments where they are doing the same thing” (Laber, 1990,
p.34). The behavior of many Bulgarian officials did not help to change this
attitude. For the most part they let it be known that they were interested in
economic, not political, peresrroika (Ibid., p.36).
Thus, right up until the elections in October, 1991, the Bulgarian Socialist Party
(the renamed communists) still unapologetically controlled the levers of power in
Bulgaria. In May, 1990, one author even concluded that, “...the revolution in
Bulgaria is not over; the communists and, it appears, the secret police are clearly
in control” (Laber, 1990, p.34). This made it a clear example of Huntington’s
“transformation” process.
However, a major shift in governmental policy occurred on April 13,1991, when
President Zhelyu Zhelev announced that the past activities of the Bulgarian intelligence
services should be revealed to the public. He listed three reasons for this
new policy: (1) the threatening potential of the reformed secret services, (2)
Bulgaria’s international image problem, and (3) prospective cooperation with
Western intelligence agencies (Engelbrekt, 1991a, p.1). In essence, the party
(communist-turned-socialist) was turning on its own people. International standing
seemed to be at the heart of this change in policy. Many Western countries
had long voiced suspicions about Bulgarian Secret Service involvement in the
murder of Georgi Markov as well as the assassination attempt of John Paul II.
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Additionally, there were concerns about possible Bulgarian involvement in international
terrorism and the drug trade.
The work begun by socialist/communist Zhelev carried on and gained in force
under the government headed by non-communist Filip Dimitrov and his Union of
Democratic Forces Party (UDF), who defeated Zhelev’s Socialists in October,
1991. One source reported that the time had come, “to take a much closer look
at some of the more shady aspects of the country’s communist past. Instead of
punishing just those at the very top for gross abuse of office, systematic corruption,
major human rights offenses, and other crimes under the previous regime,
politicians and jurists began to consider ways to identify and prosecute others for
serious offenses committed during the communists era” (Engelbrekt, 1992, p.6).
Four highly publicized cases emerged as being significant in this regard. The first
involved the prosecution of former leader Todor Zhivkov on charges ranging from
murder to misappropriation of funds (Engelbrekt, 1992, p.8). The second case
involved charges of criminal negligence and the withholding of information after
the Chernobyl accident. Among those indicted were Former Deputy Premier
Grigor Stoichkov and former Deputy Health Minister Lyubomir Shindarov (both
were convicted and received one and three years sentences respectively) (Ibid.,
p.9). The third case, involved charges of excessive industrial pollution in which
people were hurt (Ibid.). The fourth, involved two primary issues. The first sought
an explanation for the current economic crisis. The second sought to determine
what happened to the $11 billion dollars borrowed from Western banks. Up to 47
people were indicted, although court proceedings moved along at an excruciatingly
slow pace (Ibid., p.10).
As is clear from the above chronology of events, the Bulgarian leadership has
evolved from a position of forgive and forget-a position to be expected from a
“transformation” process-to one of prosecution and punishment. What is particularly
surprising in this case is that the “torturers” are being prosecuted for rather
minor crimes (such as environmental and embezzlement crimes) relative to those
in the GDR or Czechoslovakia. Thus, in examining these three countries it would
seem that Huntington’s paradigm is completely reversed-the “replacement”
country becomes the most tolerant toward the torturers, the “transformation”
country the least. Again, this begs the question, why?
Unique Variables in Bulgaria
Bulgaria shares many of the traits of the GDR and Czechoslovakia that differentiate
them from other non-East European Third Wave countries. The size and
efficiency of the Bulgarian Security Service was considerable. It was estimated to
employ between 6000 to 9000 employees (with each officer having from 10 to 30
agents working for him). Overall, that would make a high-end ratio of 1:33 for
security to non-security associated people in the country. On an East European
scale that falls between Czeckoslovakia’s 1:lOO and the GDR’s 1:8 (Engelbrekt,
1991b, p.6). However, judging by the figures given by Huntington, on a non-East
European scale that is abnormally high.
Like Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria also had historically close ties with the Soviet
occupiers and had a long history of communist party activity. The security services
of the two countries were extremely close. In one interview, Major General Oleg
Kalugin. a formerly high-ranking KGB officer, explained that they treated the
Bulgarian Security Service, “almost like employees of our own organization”
(Engelbrekt, 1991b, p.8).
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Yet there were variables that differentiated Bulgaria from the GDR and
Czechoslovakia. Foremost among these was the Turkish minority issue. In the
winter of 1984-1985 the Bulgarian government unleashed a violent campaign of
forcible assimilation of Bulgaria’s large Turkish minority (one-tenth of the nation’s
population) (Laber, 1990, p.36). Although this might have been the post around
which Zhivkov’s opponents first rallied, it also created a situation in which a vast
majority of the population (Bulgars) feared post-transition reprisals by the sizable
minority (Turks).
Yet another factor unique to the Bulgarian scene was the treatment of the secret
files. Just as in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, the Bulgarian Security Service had
compiled files. However, the popular outrage seen in the GDR and
Czechoslovakia was averted when, in late March, 1991, it was learned that, “nearly
all documents kept by the Sixth Department on the former nomenklatura had
disappeared and had probably been burned” (Engelbrekt, 1991b, p.7).
Additionally, aside from the fact that in 1989 Bulgaria had virtually no tradition
of civil society, the communist party here was huge-one million people (oneninth
of the population). It also represented the “best and the brightest.” These
two factors, as well as those mentioned above, would logically militate against
post-transition retaliation against the torturers.
In actuality, quite the opposite happened. As time went by and increasing
numbers of new entrants to the political system became involved in the policy
making process, the calls for prosecution became more and more acute. Just as in
Czechoslovakia, it seems that the lack of either the “voice” and/or “exit” options
in communist Bulgaria created a large pool of frustrated neutrals. And, as would
be expected, these became the people calling for vengeance. In this sense, the
Bulgarian pressure cooker had exploded in the face of the “torturers.”
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to show that Huntington’s two sets of variables“democratization
process” and “outcome of the torturer problem” are spurious in
the East European context. Although many of the indictments and attempts to
retaliate against the former East European torturers have not yet come to fruition,
the mere attempt to do so indicates an attitude on the part of the government that
is not in congruence with Huntington’s paradigm. Additionally, this paper has
argued that the psychological variables of “exit” and “voice” are more exact
indicators in determining the outcome of this problem. In this sense, the mechanisms
surrounding the outcome of the “torturer problem” may be analogous to a
pressure cooker with “exit” and “voice” as release valves. On a normative level
this should not be surprising. After all, forgiveness and vengefulness are emotions
located within the human psyche that are often relieved through cathartic behavior.
On an empirical level, the events in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria
have demonstrated the importance of these psychological variables on a mass
scale.
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