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**Yemen v KSA and the non-state actors**

Contemporary Middle East – Conflicts, Crisis, and Challenges (MVZb2077)

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**Introduction**

Centuries ago, the Romans called what is now the Republic of Yemen “Arabia Felix” because they saw it as a lucky and fertile region. The development of the last decades however shows us that the story of Yemen wasn’t a lucky one. The historical development divided Yemen into the Southern and the Northern part, fragmenting the country and contributing to the numerous challenges that Yemen faces today. Yemen has many internal issues, such as the development of militias, spread of radical thoughts and the different interests of each actor in the conflict, as well as the internal fighting of the supposed allies. Finally, Yemen, as it is a strategic region, knows the influence of other powers, such as the United States, Saudi Arabia or Iran. The ongoing conflict destabilizes the state, and Yemen is actually one of the poorest countries in the region, facing severe humanitarian challenges. In this paper, we will analyze Yemen's rich history and its conflict. Therefore, we will go into depth of the main actors, their goals and motivations. Due to the complexity of the conflict, in this paper, we are only focusing on the main actors - the Houthis, Saudi-led coalition, Yemeni government, radical Islamic groups and the Southern movement. Finally, we will look at the possible outcomes of the conflicts and what the future may hold.

**History of Yemen’s conflict**

In Yemen’s most recent history, the country has been divided into two parts - North and South. This came as a result of the lengthy presence of foreign powers in today's Republic of Yemen. With the events of the 20th century the presence of the Ottomans and the British was brought to an end and what followed was a completely different development in the two successor states when „the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (…) would emerge as the only Marxist-orientated state in the Middle East and North Africa'' in the 1960’s (Heibach, 2021).

The unification was welcomed throughout Yemeni society with hopes of a prosperous future. However, Southerners soon came to a bitter awakening as after the unification the living standards in the south rapidly declined and the Southerners faced ever more groving marginalisation and discrimination from the North (al-Hamdani and Lacker, 2020). The 1993 election results brought on the dominance of the North, subsequently leading to the outbreak of the 1994 Civil War in which the South had lost, strengthening the North’s dominance even more and laying down the basis of the Southern Movement, also known as al-Hirak (Heibach, 2021).

To this day Yemen still remains a fragmented country, divided by paramount, economic, religious, cultural and geographical differences with the North being Shia, while the South Sunnis. The tradition of tribes in the North, and of blood vengeance does not help the country’s stability (Martínková, 2020).

The current conflict in Yemen, involving non-state actors and external actors, is devastating Yemen’s infrastructure and jeopardizing the safety of 33 million Yemenis (Kirsch, 2020). Analyzing the complicated relationships between the multiple actors of this conflict is therefore necessary in order to progress towards healing and rebuilding any prospective state structure in the future.

**Actors of the conflict**

**The Houthis**

„God is great, death to the U.S., death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam,“ this slogan belongs to the Houthi rebels, who rule over 25% of Yemenis and are in active conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. The Houthis or Ansar Allah (Arabic for Supporters of God) are a political and military Islamist movement that originated in Yemen in 1994 (Zaiden, 2023).

The Houthis, named after their founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, are a group rooted in the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam. Zaydis played a significant role in the genesis and evolution of the Houthi rebels movement and were also considered warriors against corruption and injustice in the region (Kroft, 2021). For a thousand years, Zaydis lived in the mountains and uninhabited territories of former North Yemen, in what is now Saada province bordering Saudi Arabia. In 1980, Saudi-funded Salafi institutes were established in northern Yemen, making the Zaydis feel marginalized, and later, they responded by trying to strengthen their religion and culture under the leadership of Hussein Badreddin al Houthi (Minority Rights Group International, 2018). This is how the Houthi movement was born, however, the war in Iraq during 2003 is what made the group even more politically active, when Hussein and Houthis began criticizing Saleh´s politics. As a response to their critics, he tried to fight against the movement by sending troops to arrest Hussein al Houthi, but this triggered the first armed conflict between the government and the Houthis (Laub, 2015).

Hussein al Houthi was killed in 2004 and his brother took over. Saleh had support from the Saudis in campaigns, nonetheless, the Houthis won against both Saleh and the Saudi army. That loss was very humiliating, especially for the Saudis, who have spent billions of dollars on their military during this conflict (Riedel B., 2017). The Houthis achieved military success, which provoked more Saudi-backed government forces. The rebel movement was accused of receiving support from Iran including weapons and training, but both of them denied these allegations. The parties then reached a ceasefire agreement in 2010. A year later, when the Arab Spring erupted in Yemen, the Houthis were one of many groups calling for Saleh to step down, but then, they realized this happening weakened their territorial power.

The new President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, also backed by Saudis, had trouble stabilizing the country (McKernan B., 2018). In 2014, the Houthis took over the Yemeni capital city, Sanaa. This move marked a turning point in the conflicts. Following the capture of Sanaa, the Houthi movement established a parallel government, challenging the authority of the internationally recognized government led by President Hadi. As Houthi rebels advanced toward Aden, President Hadi felt threatened and fled to Saudi Arabia. The actions of the Houthi movement and their strong expansion triggered the Saudi-led coalition and their allies. In March 2015, they responded by launching a military intervention to restore Hadi´s government and push back the Houthi rebels (Riedel B., 2017). Unfortunately, this conflict has continued for years and was marked by very intense airstrikes, fighting, and conflict with the. Houthis, this day, still having control over significant parts of northern Yemen, including Sanaa.

**Saudi-led coalition**

After the Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi requested military assistance and fled to Riyadh, Operation Decisive Storm was launched. On 26th March 2015, a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia made an intervention in Yemen (Ruys and Ferro, 2016). The Saudi-led Coalition originally consisted of other 8 Sunni-majority Arab states - the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan and Egypt, with huge political and material support from the US, UK and France (Robinson, 2023). However, in 2021, President Biden announced the end of support for the coalition and their operation in Yemen (Friends Committee on National Legislation, n.d.).

         There were many reasons why Saudi Arabia wanted to back Hadi. They were mainly alarmed by situation on their South borders, connected to rising power of Houthis and the Houthi alliance with Saudi's rival Iran. In addition, the Saudis wanted to ensure their control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an oil shipping line linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the loss of this route would mean a crisis not only for Saudi Arabia but also for the whole world, since it moves millions of barrels of oil per day. The third reason was that control over Yemen would allow Saudi Arabia to create an oil pipeline from their southern border into the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Saudi Arabia would be more independent on shipping oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which has its borders next to Iran. Finally, the last reason was the political ambition of the crown prince Mohammad bin Salman, as it would help him gain bigger recognition and power (Friends Committee on National Legislation, n.d.).

         Since Iran was the main supplier of the Houthis, Saudi Arabia implemented the naval blockade in 2015. Although, the intervention was mostly based on air campaign that aimed to oust the Houthis and restore the Hadi’s government (BBC, 2023). Only in 2015, the Saudis spent around 5 billion dollars on this campaign (Feierstein, 2023). This intervention didn’t receive any prior fiat from the UN Security Council (Ruyas and Ferro, 2016).

**The Internationally Recognised Yemeni Government**

Despite the fact that Yemen is theoretically a multi-party system, it was for a long time dominated by one party, the General People's Congress, in power since 1993, when it won the parliamentary elections. Emerging from the Yemeni Socialist Party and the Yemeni National Front, the GPC was established in 1982 by Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was president in the north, and played a crucial role after the Unification of Yemen in 1990.

The reign of Ali Abdullah Saleh can be characterized by nepotism, corruption and several human right’s violations. He had dedicated years to establishing a system of alliances among Yemen's military, civil and tribal groups, making huge societal divisions by playing enemies off one another in a bid to weaken his opposition, calling this survival strategy „dancing on the heads of snakes'' (Al Jazeera, 2017). Even after the civil war between the South and the North in 1994, Saleh remained in power. After the 9/11 attack in 2001, Saleh joined the US as an ally in its War on Terror.

The Yemen’s government under Saleh has known of multiple conflicts. First, a War with Houthis took place between 2006 and 2007, partly due to longstanding tensions between the government and the Houthis, including religious discrimination against the Zaidi Shia community. Although the war officially started in 2006, the conflict itself began in 2004, when the Houthis launched a series of uprisings against the government and were engaged in armed confrontations in the Saada region. Saleh responded to the Houthi rebellion with military force and accused them of seeking to overthrow the regime and cooperating with external actors, such as Iran. In 2011, a wave of protests called the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East. Demonstrations in Yemen called for Saleh to step down as the president. Because of Yemen´s poor economical and political state, president Saleh was presented with a transition plan created by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), that he finally signed after some reluctances, and Abdrabbuh Mansur al-Hadi became the new president of Yemen.

Even though Saleh stepped out of the presidency, he continued to be an influential player in Yemen´s politics, as he stayed the head of the General People's Congress party, and in 2014 started unofficially cooperating with Houthis, regardless of the fact there had been 6 wars between Saleh´s government and the Houthis. In the same year, with the support of Saleh, Houthis took over the capital Saana, starting the ongoing civil war. In 2015, Saleh announced an official cooperation with the Houthis, which was followed by UN Security sanctions against him. A year later, a large gathering took place in Saana, where Saleh attempted peace talks with the Saudi-led coalition, but the same year signed a Houthi-appointed political council that allowed them to run the country from Saana (Al Jazeera. 2017). In 2017, however, Saleh was killed by the Houthis, after blaming them for the country’s crisis on national television.

Under the deal made by Saleh and the GCC, Saleh transferred constitutional powers to Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. His reign has been marked with economical and humanitarian crises, including political instability and conflicts with Houthi rebels. As Hadi was not popular, he depended on Gulf States, especially on Saudi Arabia. After the Houthi takeover of Saana, Hadi was pressured to appoint a prime minister acceptable for Houthi rebels, and was forced to resign, later he retracted his resignation but it was unclear whether he still had authority in Yemen. Meanwhile, the Houthis assumed control of the state institutions in the areas they held (Freedomhouse, 2023).

In January 2018, government forces experienced a setback when southern secessionists, who were allied with them, called for Hadi to dismiss his administration. After several fights between the pro-Hadi forces and the secessionists, which were both part of the Saudi-led coalition, the government assets were returned to Hadi, and he is internationally recognized as a president by the Saudi-led coalition and the West (Britannica, n. d.). He however stepped down in April 2022, paving the way for a newly appointed seven-member presidential council, led by Rashad al-Alimi, which aims to better reflect political diversity in Yemen.

**Radical groups: al-Qaeda and ISIS**

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), described by the US government as the “most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate” is probably, alongside with ISIS, the principal beneficiary from the situation (Laub, 2015). In this conflict, they support the anti-Houthi/Saleh bloc, as they are anti-Houti and view Shias as heretics (Serr, 2017). Because of the government being unable to provide basic services or opportunities for its citizens, AQAP is gaining support, and is getting more extreme in the region. Therefore, there is a strong fear that if the Yemeni regime happened to fall, al-Qaeda would be in charge of territories and radicalize young generations, build terrorism training facilities and plan bigger operations. Their three goals are to establish an Islamic state that would follow the sharia law, to link this state to the other Islamic countries, and to remove heretics from the territory while liberating Muslims (Philipps, 2011). They want to gain control over the territory and resources, by challenging the authority of the present regime*.*

AQAP are embedded in some Yemen’s tribes and are using them to extend their ideas. They draw much of their strength from the disaffection of the Yemenis for their government and with the perception that they can provide more to tribal groups or to the population than the government can. Considering the current instability in Yemen’s internal politics, this task is easier (Philipps, 2011).

Even though Yemenis are religiously conservative, they are not inherently radical and support for Al-Qaeda is that that spread considering what they stand for, and that includes violence endangering civilians. As AQAP promotes a version of Salafism and puritanical nihilism, many Yemenis resent these ideologies, considering that they do not are in favor of their local customs and daily survival needs. “Yemen’s tribes do not need AQAP, but AQAP needs the tribes” (Philipps, 2011).

Both AQAP and IS capitalize on the breakdown of local government authority and the Houthis’ expansion into Sunni areas, as this offers opportunities for recruitment. AQAP and IS are in competition for the same recruits, leading to high tensions between them (Serr, 2017). Despite this rivalry, both groups have gained significant political and territorial power in the ongoing war. Their advancements are likely to continue until a capable government emerges to confront them (Philipps, 2011).

**The Southern Movement**

The current movement traces its origins to minor protests in 2007, organised by former military officers who after 1994 were forced to retire and were replaced by Northerners, with these protests calling for their reinstatement and/or adequate pensions. But reasons for secessionist movement in the South lie even deeper, as after the 1994 Civil War political, cultural, social and economic spheres where all controlled by the central government in Sana’a. The ongoing marginalisation, influence of conservative religious norms from the North, economic distress and land usurpation by Northerners combined with a brutal response by Saleh’ s government soon led to the spread of protests to other parts of Yemeni society. At the beginning, demands called for fair employment opportunities, end of marginalisation and corruption, equal access to state positions, decentralizationdecentralisation and larger financing of the South, however after the Arab Spring of 2011 had reached Yemen more and more voices called for Southern secession (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Heibach, 2021; al-Hamdani and Lacker, 2020).

When a new conflict emerged in 2014 international actors were drawn into Yemen as a part of a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and thus Operation Decisive Storm began in 2015. The Southern Movement joined the anti-Houthi bloc, who are their ideological enemies, alongside the Hadi government and the Saudi-led coalition. The alliance with the Hadi government, however, wasn’t influenced by the movement's pro-government view as much as its anti-Houthi stance. Hadi is a rather unpopular figure in the South, being perceived as a Southerner who migrated to the North when his faction lost a power scuffle in 1986 and is often blamed for the South’s defeat in the 1994 Civil War in which he supported Saleh (Sterr, 2017; al-Hamdani and Lacker, 2020).

The Southern Movement is composed of a large number of different secessionist groups. Among them, in recent years, one has come to a somewhat prominent position - The Southern Transitional Council. The STC was established on May 11, 2017, following protests against Aidrous al-Zubaidi’s dismissal from office as Aden’s Governor after he was accused by Hadi of disloyalty. The UAE, member of the Saudi-led coallition, played a pivotal role in the STC establishment. This comes due to the fact that the control over South Yemeni ports and waters are of great concern for the UAE. After its establishment the movement then proclaimed its goal to reinstate the South Yemen Republic and has since clashed with internationally recognised government’s forces and in 2020 even declared a state of emergency and said it would self-govern the south of Yemen after accusing the government of corruption and mismanagement. This evolvement fractured the already deeply divided Yemeni political spectrum and disturbed implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, an agreement between the STC and Hadi’s government that called for a formation of new government based in Aden, which would bring an end to the infighting and strengthen the anti-Houthi coalition (Al Jazeera, 2020; al-Hamdani and Lacker, 2020; Heibach, 2021).

As of 2023 Hadi is no longer in office after he handed his power over to the newly formed Presidential Leadership Council, Yemen’s new executive body, of which the STC is a member (Al Jazeera, 2022). Al-Zubaidi, who is now the Vice President of the new internationally recognised government had, in June 2023, declared that the new reality of divided Yemen has to be accepted and that the talks about country’s future have to accommodate this new reality with the issue of a Southern state being at the forefront of any future discussions (Guardian, 2023).

**War in Yemen**

 In January 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen. Yemeni people felt inspired by the wave of pro-democracy movements and started to demand political reforms, especially linked to Ali Abdullah Saleh. Yemenis started protesting, demanding an end to Saleh's 33-year corrupted rule. After being proposed a transition plan by the GCC, Saleh was forced to resign and transfer his presidency to Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi. However, his replacement did not solve their existential problems. Yemen suffered from massive unemployment, food insecurity, and suicide bombings mainly from the separatist movement in the south. All of that sparked the war between Houthis and forces loyal to the new Hadi government.

The Houthis were showing support to former president Saleh, although they were formed as an opposition group against him. In 2014, Houthi forces seized control of Saana province and Yemen's capital city, Sanaa. The conflict became even more violent after March 2015, when the Saudi-led coalition got involved and made an “Operation Decisive Storm”. This coalition of Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and supported by the US, UK and France, played a key role in coordinating military forces and providing significant resources. Their goal was to counter the Houthi rebels and restore the government of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who fled to Saudi Arabia.

A month after air strikes against Houthi targets by the coalition, the Operation Decisive Storm came to its end and was replaced by the Operation Restoring Hope followed by bombing Houthi positions. At the same time, Houthis were able to capture the city of Ataq. Former president Saleh, who was previously against the Houthis, followed by troops still loyal to him, officially announced his alliance with them.

KSA considered the Houthi attacks as an immediate threat and feared that this conflict could be a great opportunity for Iran to earn support on their border. Saudi Arabia accused Iran of espousing the rebels, however, Teheran denied any involvement with this group. The Saudi-led coalition was unable to take the North side of the country (including Sanaa), because Houthis and Saleh loyalists were keeping an eye on this territory. Being scared of Iran, the Saudi-led coalition also set a naval blockade to prevent Iran from supplying the Houthis (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). In 2016, fights between the Houthis and the coalition continued. There were several ceasefires, however, both sides of the conflict allegedly broke them. A year later, in 2017, the Yemen crisis was declared as one of the worst humanitarian emergencies in the world((Marcus Montgomery, 2021).

After Saleh´s assassination in December 2017, the conflict intensified on the western coast of Yemen, leading to a significant number of casualties as a result of Saudi airstrikes and security operations. As a response to this, the Houthis intensified their efforts to target Saudi territory, launching missiles at oil installations and airports. By August 2019, The UAE completed its troop withdrawal in Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council effectively controls cities of Aden, Abyan and Shawba. The Houthis then launched “Operation Victory from God” against the Saudi-led forces, attacking Saudi oil installations, causing a significant loss in Saudi output capacity. During the COVID-19 pandemic, both sides agreed to maintain the ceasefire to prevent the spread of Covid in Yemen. In 2021 and 2022, the missile and drone attacks on Saudi air bases and airports escalated. The Houthis continued to gain ground against Hadi government forces (Marcus Montgomery, 2021).

At the beginning of 2022, Houthi rebels launched unprecedented attacks on the UAE and KSA, including air border assaults and seizing a UAE cargo ship Rawabi, which was carrying medical supplies to a Saudi hospital. These types of attacks continued for the rest of the year. In response, the coalition bombed Saana and a telecom facility in Hodeidah, causing an internet blackout. Despite the two-month truce between the sides, which was held until April, Houthi forces resumed their attacks. In March 2023, representatives from KSA and Iran traveled to Saana with the goal of negotiating a long-term ceasefire deal with the Houthis. Simultaneously, in the same month, Yemeni rebels and government forces released a significant number of prisoners. To this day, the fights still continue.

More than 7 years of this devastating and brutal conflict have pushed millions of citizens of Yemen to the edge and more than 80% of people are in need of humanitarian help. Since the beginning of this conflict, thousands of people have been killed, and approximately 4,5 million people were displaced.

**Yemen’s humanitarian crisis**

As of this year Yemen’s ongoing conflict has reached its 8th anniversary and has brought on what many are calling the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, with 21.6 million (OCHA, 2023) out of Yemen’s almost 35 million population in need of humanitarian aid. Since 2015, 8,983 civilians were killed and an additional 10,243 civilians were injured in the conflict and hundreds of thousands of others were killed due the indirect influence of the conflict (Yemen Data Project, 2023). The humanitarian crisis encompasses a large spectrum of issues such as water and food accessibility, economic troubles, health care unavailability and spread of various infectious diseases as well as forced displacement and other social hardships that came as the consequences of the conflict. (maybe add the truce in 2022 and its influence on the situation)

According to World Food Programme (2023) 17 million of Yemen’s population face food insecurity with 3.5 million being acutely malnourished due to their inability to secure proper nutrition. Among the most endangered groups are the children under the age of 3 and pregnant or lactating women who make up around one fourth of acutely malnourished cases (IFSPC, 2023). The issues of economic decline and insufficient access to many services, such as health care, nutritious diet, sanitation or hygiene that came as consequences of the conflict are the key factors in the case of Yemen’s worsening food insecurity. Another issue that factors in the declining situation is an enormous, over 60%, cut in humanitarian aid over the last 5 years (IFSPC, 2023; Save the Children, 2023).

Water scarcity is another one of Yemen’s countless problems. According to UNICEF, 16 million people in Yemen, out of which almost 8.5 million are children, are in need of WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) assistance. Improper usage of existing water sources (84% of water in Yemen is used for agricultural purposes, out of those 84%, 30% is used solely for the cultivation of qat), changing climate and the ongoing conflict deteriorates Yemen’s clean water accessibility problem (UNDP, 2022). What may befall on Yemen in the future is the possibility of water-motivated conflicts, which would only prolong Yemen’s suffering (Al Jazeera, 2022).

Healthcare system represents another one of Yemen’s conflict affected areas. Most of the Yemen’s population lacks access to basic health care due to number of factors such as the fact that only 51% of Yemen’s hospitals or other health facilities are operating, financial situation also plays a vital role in accessibility of health care, lack of medical staff is another of said factors as many of them were forced to flee or were killed in the conflict (ICRC, 2021).

Lack of adequate health care combined with inaccessibility to clean water and sanitation resulted in many infectious disease outbreaks in Yemen.

The Cholera epidemic, being called the worst one of modern times, struck Yemen in 2016, reaching over 2.5 million cases by the end of 2020 and killing almost 4000. In 2017 Diphtheria outbreak has spread through Yemen. The airborne disease, mostly eradicated in the rest of the world, resurfaced in Yemen due to low vaccine availability. In 2020 Polio reemerged in Yemen due to limited access to vaccination (Alhadheri et. al, 2023). As of 2023, according to the UN, there is an „alarming surge in measles and rubella cases in Yemen  with 34,000 cases and over 400 deaths (UN, 2023).

The conflict in Yemen, among numerous other issues, had been characterised by many human rights violations and abuses. Unlawful attacks and airstrikes by Saudi-led coalition military forces have been reported, targeting civilian infrastructure such as homes, hospitals or schools, oftentimes resulting in civilian casualties. Arbitrary detentions, torture, ill-treatment and disappearances were carried out by all the actors involved in the conflict. Humanitarian access and aid have been repeatedly blocked with different groups imposing lengthy and unnecessary restrictions blocking access to basic goods or medicine. Freedom of movement has been often violated as there are many road closures imposed by different parties of the conflict. Over 4 million people were displaced in Yemen’s conflict violating their right to housing. Yet, no responsibility has been imposed on any of the fighting parties (HRW, 2023).

**The Future**

The future of an actual resolution of Yemen's conflict is unsure. There are many suggestions that the end of the Saudi-led intervention is nearby. The question about how the political structure of Yemen would look is more likely unanswered. It is hard to make any assumptions or think that after years of battling the structure would be the same as it used to be. People support political parties and movements rather than a central government. The whole political settlement is also difficult to handle with all the violence from the Houthis (Alasrar, 2022).

         The War in Yemen triggered one of the worst humanitarian crisescrisis in the world. The UN speculates that this conflict caused around 400 000 deaths. Ten of thousands of people there live in famine-like conditions and they are not able to get drinkable water. Through the war, Yemen suffered from one of the largest cholera outbreaks with 2.5 million suspected cases (BBC, 2023).

         Currently, the only path to peace in Yemen is the UN. To avoid more fighting and further escalation, the parties involved in the conflict should come back together and revitalize the UN-led peace process and talks. Both sides are avoiding the UN involvement since it looks like a threat to both parties, Saudi and Houthis. The Houthis are a militarily dominant actor right now and if Riyadh wants to ensure their own security, the fights need to stop. There are ongoing talks between Saudi Arabia and Houthis, mostly in Oman, but both sides excluded UN, Western actors and Yemen government as well (Ali-Khan, 2023). For an effective and fair resolution of the talks, the UN needs to bring to the table topics connected to the rapidly changing culture, guaranteed religious and political freedom to all Yemeni’s citizens and Houthis, local community protection, planning the end of militia recruitment or revision of holding the heavy weapons. (Alasrar, 2022)

         There are no quick fixes in this conflict since it is a complex war. The other state actors, such as the US, the EU, the UK, Gulf states or Jordan might help parties to find a middle golden path. The same applies to the non-state actors such as the UN (Ali-Khan, 2023). Both parties have a lot to lose but it is not an unachievable task to get some resolution for.

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