

Yemen Nowadays:

Contemporary Security Threats
Through the Lenses of
Copenhagen School



 CBAP

ISBN: 978-80-270-8670-2

Impressum

Published by CBAP, Prague, October 2020

ISBN: 978-80-270-8670-2

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'You play with a snake and call it a worm - Tal'ab bi hanash wa taquluh dudah.' (Yemeni proverb)

Yemen has been facing an ongoing conflict for an extended period. Based on the recent development, it can be argued that Yemen lacks worldwide attention, mostly due to other ongoing conflicts, for instance, in Syria. Notwithstanding, Yemen is essential and plays a vital role among the aspiring regional powers to achieve regional hegemony – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Regarding the regional struggle for power, Yemeni territory represents another proxy-war. Furthermore, Yemen also faces the inter-state issues carried out by local militias, notably divided among the ethnic-confessional lines. In addition to this, it is evident that Yemen is not merely beset by the military security concerns from the realistic point of view. For example, due to aspiring regional power's external interference, particular threats of the religious-ideological nature can be traced.

Moreover, undoubtedly, such a social ambiance does not entirely contribute to the inter-ethnic reconciliation, which is crucial for creating a stable societal environment. Additionally, of course, Yemen's situation has also been deteriorated by the worsening of the environmental situation associated with global warming. Besides, in the light of Yemen's situation, the authors argue that the Yemenis security threats are unexplored and essentially contested; likewise, Barry Buzan (1983: 6) said about the nature of security itself.

As mentioned in the text above, Yemenis are supposed to deal with a wide range of security threats. In other words, the security environment is extremely multifaced. Yemenis are facing various security challenges daily. Therefore, this publication's authors decided to bring a wide range of empirical evidence that would explore the contemporary security threats in Yemen. Hence, it appeared to use the Copenhagen school of thought as the most convenient tool to trace the threat's nature.

Regarding the Copenhagen school, the authors are fully aware the nature of the security threats has considerably changed since the 1990s, where Copenhagen's attitude was presented by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde in their book: *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. For example, to illustrate, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde

did not consider the cyberthreats. However, even though in 2020 this theoretical approach can have specific cons, the authors of this publication are convinced the vast majority of threats coming from the societal, environmental, military, political, and economic sectors can still apply to the vast majority of the cases.

This publication will be divided into several chapters. The first chapter will present the theoretical perspective of the Copenhagen school. Furthermore, this chapter will describe in detail what kind of threats each sector contains. The following chapter will portray the historical perspective of the Yemeni conflict because it is inevitable to achieve a specific knowledge of the Yemeni context. The further chapters will present each security sector related to Yemen. Therefore, the authors will seek to bring many empirical shreds of evidence to explore the threats that belong to the particular sector.

In terms of the methodological perspective, as mentioned earlier, five in-depth analysis corresponding to the Copenhagen school's security sectors will be presented. In addition to this, each particular analysis will be tracing the Copenhagen school's security threats, and as mentioned above, the Copenhagen school's theoretical framework will be described in the following chapter. The empirical data set will be principally based on the news reports, academic articles, political commentaries, and interviews due to the character of the information we are seeking.

Finally, the authors believe that this publication will clarify many unanswered questions given the character of the security threats that have emerged due to the conflict and the geopolitical situation derived from Yemen's geographical position. Correspondingly with the aforementioned Yemeni proverb, the analysis also aims to better clarify and explain the existing threats that could be easily overshadowed. By this time, on the one hand, some potential security threats might have been fortunately eliminated. However, on the other hand, some might have just been deteriorated, mainly due to the nature of security threats that immensely fluctuate. Nevertheless, the authors are convinced that the crucial threats were mentioned in the text.

The *Copenhagen school* indicates a specific group of experts in security studies that were formed in Denmark's capital. The most popular scholars are Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, which are also those who assembled the principles of the theory.

One of the backbones of the theory is the notion of *security* and what is part of its expertise. Generally speaking, the concept of security is related to the military sphere and, in the international domain, the states are the actors who control the armies and so are involved in providing security. In international relations, the notion of security can also concern other fields, e.g. the political domain, which in turn produces additional sub-categories that enter in the security sphere (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Once mentioned in which fields security could be assimilated, it is necessary to understand what needs to be securitized and what does not or there would be a blurred boundary in which everything can be perceived as a security issue (Taureck, 2006). The point in question should be analyzed objectively, but as the academics mention, the judgment is usually intersubjective, and this leads to a socially constructed securitization of the object that is perceived as a threat (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

The Copenhagen scholars claim that the concept of *security* is closely related to the notion of *survival*; a particular menace needs to be secure to allow the object in peril to survive (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). They make an example of states; when the existence of a country is in danger, countermeasures are planned to determine its survival.

The same pattern can be used in other areas, and Buzan *et al.* give a universal key of interpretation to explain how the securitization process starts. The issue goes through 3 steps:

- Nonpoliticized: the issue does not belong to the realm of politics yet;
- Politicized: the issue becomes the interest of the political debate;
- Securitised: after the issue has been recognized as a threat, any action devoted to its eradication is encouraged to permit the object's survival (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

The second question which arises is regarding who are the parties involved in the securitization. The book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* mentions that there are three parties implicated in the process, which are:

- 1) The *referent object*: it is the object that is in peril and needs to be protected to guarantee its survival. Usually, it is identified with the state (which requires to ensure the sovereignty), and with the nation (which needs to protect the identity);
- 2) The *securitizing actors*: they are those that take care of the threatened object's securitization. Usually, this role is played by the government or more generally by political leaders. Typically, they point out what is the menace and what is threatening, putting pressure on its securitization.
- 3) The *functional actors*: these actors might not be identified with the referent object or with the securitizing actor, but they have a leading role in influencing the policy of securitization; (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998)

The scholars give few more fundamentals concepts which allow a more exhaustive comprehension of the Securitisation theory and how the process works.

The first one is what is called *securitization*, which is what happens between the «non-politicized» and «politicized» steps; the issue is perceived as a threat, and it needs to be secure, so it moves from one level to the other (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

The second fundamental is the *securitizing speech act*; when the term «security» is used in a particular context, it means that there is an issue that is perceived as a menace and so it might enter the sphere of the securitization (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). The *speech act* is used by the speaker to convince the audience that the issue is a real menace, and it has to be handled. To be considered as an existential threat, it has to be presented as such. As it has to be perceived as a menace, it has to be legitimized by security experts who have the authority to declare the extent of the threat (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

The third concept is the *securitizing move*, and it is triggered if the *speech act* is efficacious; the notion implies all the operations focus on securing the threat.

If the *securitizing move* results effectively, it is possible to move to the fourth concept, which is the *desecuritization*. At this stage, if the operations to secure the threat have been successful, the issue moves from the sphere of security to the political debate. The issue can escalate again to the security domain or can be reduced to the last concept.

Finally, the fifth (and last) concept is *asecurity*, in which the threat is not in the security domain; it is labeled as a “standard issue”, and it is addressed as a political problem (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

In their work, the academics mention diverse areas in which security can play a leading role, e.g. the *societal sector*, the *environmental sector*, the *military sector*, the *political sector*, the *economic sector* (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

SOCIETAL SECTOR

The Copenhagen’s scholars point out that *societal* security and the *societal* one are two distinct elements; the former is usually related to the economic sphere while the latter is associated with the identity (in this case, it represents the *referent object*).

Moreover, they denote the term “societal” can be equivocal at the moment it is used to indicate the inhabitants of a country, which in most cases do not share the same identity (for instance, the same problem occur with the term “nation”) (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

The scholars indicate that the ambiguities of the sense of these terms exist because of their socially constructed nature; the individuals that use them had experiences and developed different knowledge and so because of that, they interpret the terms in diverse ways (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). Therefore, the meaning of nation and identity differ based on the community that attributes it, and so does the idea of «threat». As mentioned before, the most common menace to a society that has constructed the differentiation between *them* and *us* is to jeopardize its identity (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Societal security takes care of these threats, and it recognizes that the most common are divided into three groups:

- Migration: the population of a community risk to be mixed with people coming from a different group. The identity of the welcoming society is in danger; the structure of the community changes because of the incorporation of new people and new identities.
- Horizontal competition: the population of a community will modify a part of its culture because of the prominent influence of the neighboring country (e.g. Canada and the American influence)

- Vertical competition: part of the population of the community does not feel part of it anymore. The individuals want to be able to choose a different identity than the original (Catalonia, Yugoslavia, Kurdistan) (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Societies react to the threats in different ways, principally depending on their identities and the extent of the perceived menace.

The socially constructed idea of peril increases the attention over an issue and makes it perceived as a threat that might be dangerous for the community and its identity; so it needs to be secure (McDonald, 2008).

ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR

Copenhagen's scholars (and other academics) point out that many issues can be included in this area and have to go through a securitization process. For instance, the alteration of the ecosystem (climate change, extinction of animal species), energy issues (limited access to natural resources, human/natural catastrophes), population's issues (epidemic, poverty, extreme exploitation of the territory), food issues (its overall consumption, availability, wastefulness, distribution), and problems caused by wars and other violent episodes (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

The issues mentioned above can all be considered as *referent objects*; however, accordingly, to the Copenhagen school, the real referent object is what they call "the risk of losing achieved levels of civilization while being able to prevent doing so." (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). So, environmental security concerns the safeguarding of the biosphere human communities rely on for their survival and development. In this case, there are two *referent objects*; the environment and the population (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Numerous characters play the role of *securitizing actors* with different levels of involvement. There are *lead actors*, such as countries that actively commit to protecting the environment. On the other hand, some important actors hinder the *securitizing actors'* operation. They are labeled as *veto actors* and the *veto coalition* (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998), and they can be identified as specific lobbies or even countries that refuse to implement environmental policies.

Ultimately, there are, once again, multiple *functional actors*. They range from transnational corporations that can affect the biosphere in different ways, to intergovernmental organizations and even to armed forces.

MILITARY SECTOR

In the military sector, usually, the state is the primary *referent object*, and those who hold power are the *securitizing actor* (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). However, in the modern world, the delineation of the referent object may not be that easy, as some states have different ethnic or religious communities that may feel threatened.

The rulers aim to administrate the country (*referent object*), maintain the sovereignty, keep order, peace, and the integrity of the state from internal and external threats. The academics denote that the former can be, for instance, protests, rebels, secessionist movements, but also different ideologies (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). On the other hand, the risk of being attacked by another country or secure its international legitimacy are considered external threats.

In order to do so, the government push their “military agenda”, also intended as their ability to exercise legitimate violence, to assure their survival.

The *securitizing actor* has to ensure the survival of the referent object; in some states, this role is related to an institutional figure or even international organizations (e.g. NATO, the UN). However, there are realities in which the securitizing actor’s role is taken by those that can exercise strong leadership and have broad support. It is the case of rebels, gangs, mafias, or rival clans when showing a well-organized structure and strong power relations (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Finally, the *functional actors* are represented by the armed forces; however, external figures, for instance, mercenary groups and army industries, fall into this category as well.

Controlling the *functional actors* is the primary interest for those who want to influence the military sector and so, the state’s (domestic and international) politics (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

POLITICAL SECTOR

The scholars recognize that it is one of the most challenging sectors to define because everything can be analyzed under a “political security” perspective (including the other sectors they theorized) (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

However, they agree on postulating that the political sector analyses the threats related to the sovereignty of the state; these menaces can be internal (for instance, political groups, different ideologies, relationship with the citizens) or external (those that can affect the sovereignty as well as the ideological legitimacy).

As can be imagined, the *referent object* is the state (more generally, the political unit) (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998) but, in specific situations, societal groups (tribes, clans, minorities) and transnational organization can take its place. According to the case, if the *referent object* is the state, usually the government is the protector. However, in weak states, if the ruling class lacks legitimacy, it may try to identify itself as the *referent object* to secure its position and survival through securitization practices.

ECONOMIC SECTOR

The scholars tried to delineate the guidelines to analyze economic security objectively; however, they mention how difficult it can be because each economic trends have different priorities in securing the objects. For instance, some systems put in the first place the individuals, whereas others choose to protect either the market or politics (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Nevertheless, several issues fall under the economic security area and that worries the *securitizing actors*; for instance, states' ability to maintain their independence relative to military production, or avoiding dependencies that can be politicized and used against them. Furthermore, there are issues related to the market trend, which can increase inequalities between countries and damaging weak economies (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

Depending on the economic path the countries chose to pursue, the *referent objects* differ, ranging from the individuals to the market itself, frequently interchanging. For instance, in a liberal system, the *referent object* is the market, as businesses are seen as an integral part of it, but that can be easily substituted with new ones. However, in different systems, the *referent objects* are the firms (and the individuals); they need to be preserved as they guarantee the country's stability in terms of politics and economy (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

The market always experiences profits and losses; it is the *securitizing actor's* interest to control their extent to secure the economic sector and avoiding upheavals. The government can play the *securitizing actor's role*; however, also intergovernmental

organizations and firms step up to protect the economic sector (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

In the economic sector, the *securitizing actor* and the *functional actor* may interchange; indeed, depending on the case, the state and intergovernmental organizations can play either role (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998).

DECOLONIZATION

North Yemen was under Ottomans' rule since 1873. Ottomans left the North in 1918 after the loss in WWI. Meanwhile, the South was occupied by the British in 1832 and established the protectorate with Aden as its capital and as an important port. Thanks to this position Brits were able to control the trade routes to India and had a significant base for the conquering of the Arab peninsula until 1963. In 1962 during the coup, North Yemen declared a republic. In 1967 South Yemen became an independent South Yemenis People's Republic, and since 1970 it is the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen. In 1972 the first Yemeni war occurred and resulted in the adoption of the treaty of the Unification of both countries. The assassination of the South Yemeni president in 1978 started an armed conflict between both parts. The Treaty of Cooperation was signed in 1981 between both Yemeni lands. This was a first step towards the Unification of North and South Yemen in 1990. Yet another Civil War erupted between South and North in 1994. Nevertheless, both states remained unified (Bahbouh and Kopecký 2018: 61–63).

Before the unification in 1990 South experienced an era of atheist socialism as a part of the Arab Union and the People's Republic of Yemen. The North has a strong religious history, is based on tribal connections and structure. The country is significantly divided by the economy, religion, geographical differences, social status, culture, and traditions up to today. Yemen territory is very specific due to multiple unique and prevailing traditions, an old dialect of Arabic, tribal, and family connections. The terrain consists of parts of the country in mountains which are, and always will be, out of reach of the central government. There is a strong tradition of blood vengeance. On top of this all, the Yemen population includes many recruits of the Afghan-Soviet war, who were bringing back home radical ideology and spreading the influence of Al Qaeda in Yemen, supporting the development of the radical and terrorist organizations in the area (Raděj 2003: 23).

THE 90S AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

North and South Yemen were unified in 1990, The unification was surprisingly easy and successful due to three main factors. The first reason is the fall of the USSR and the rise of the pragmatic wing of the People's Republic Party to power, the second factor is the end of the Cold War, and the last but probably most important is the discovery of

rich resources of oil and gas on the common borderland. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 happened during the Yemenis presidency in the Security Council of the United Nations. Unfortunately, unified Yemen expressed support for Iraqi dictator Hussain. This has caused anger among Arab countries and resulted in the huge expulsion of Yemenis workers from neighboring Gulf countries. Yemen remained isolated. American financial aid was reduced. The connection between Yemen and Iraq was strengthened after the Iraqi-Iranian war, Iraq was exhausted and Yemen went more and more deprived, poorer, isolated. As the only country in the area has not been accepted to the GCC (Raděj 2003: 23; Ponížilová 2016: 110).

In 1994 Yemen was stricken by yet another Civil War, fighting North versus South. War ended with Saleh's conquer of the Aden. President Saleh granted amnesty for all concerned except two main architects of the conflict who are ousted to exile in Saudi Arabia and Oman. The 90s are stained by very cold and tense relations with Saudi and Oman. Caused among other things by the non-demarcated borders. In 1995 Yemen and Oman demarcated borders. In 2000 Saudis and Yemen agreed on the disputed territory. Saudis have been involved in Yemeni affairs since the very beginning because it would like to prevent Yemen from becoming a strong regional rival. However, yet another violent conflict occurred, this time between Yemen and Eritrea, about the disputed territory in borderland consisting mainly of islands in the Red Sea. The conflict had to be resolved by arbitration of the International Criminal Court in Haag in 1998 mostly on behalf of Yemen. This arbitration is seen as one of the most significant at the end of the 20th century (Hague Justice Portal 1998).

Yemen became the bastion of radical Islam meanwhile cooperating with the USA in the fight against terrorism. This cooperation with the USA was cautiously balanced not to anger the Yemeni population as numerous inhabitants were fighters who returned from the wars in Afghanistan during the 80s and 90s. These returnees brought with them a certain level of radicalization and religious indoctrination. Except for this careful balancing policy, Yemen had to deal with several other challenges. Among these factors were severe unemployment, international situation, complicated regional relations, the existence of the terrorist organizations within the tribal insubordination to the central government (Raděj 2003: 23).

In 1998 Al Qaeda committed the attack on the USS Cole in Aden that claimed 17 dead members of the US navy. The attacks of 9/11/2001 have been an important milestone in the fight against terrorism and Yemen cooperated with the USA in the War on Terror since then. This cooperation caused destabilization of the Saleh's regime. The population of Yemen intercepts the cooperation with the US negatively. This resulted in a higher number of votes for the Islamist party Islah known for the criticism of the USA. The tribes in the northern mountains provided a cover for members of Al Qaeda. American actions against these terrorists on Yemen territory are heavily criticized by Islah for violation of state sovereignty. The central government takes strong measures against terrorists: imprisonment, torture, and executions. (Vick 2000).

In 2003 was Yemen the most underdeveloped country in the region, a poor state with a large population that has caused destabilization of the region (Raděj 2003: 23). In 2006 reelection of Saleh for president means that Yemen received foreign loans for the development of infrastructure, trade, manufacturing, and long-term investments. In 2009 a change of constitution was made to declare a lifetime presidency mandate for Saleh and later added a repeatable mandate for president. In 2009 the government was very unstable and decided to postpone the parliamentary elections for 2011. Two years from the original date (Mendel 2015: 288).

In 2011-2012 Arab Spring spread to Yemen as well and brought collapse and chaos. Yemen has been inspired by Egypt and Tunisia. However, Houthis from the North and separatists from the South have escalated the Arab spring to violent conflicts and civil war. Since 2012 there has been a strong involvement of foreign actors (Saudi, US, Iran, UAE,...) and president Hadi escaped to exile to Saudi (Mendel 2015: 301-304). Saudi enters the conflict on the side of the official government and provides the use of the army. The majority of Sunny Arab states back the government, Shia states back the Houthis. Since 2014 Yemen has been officially in the Civil War. In 2015 Operation Decisive Storm took place without the Security Council UN but formally following the UN Charter Article 2. President Hadi has officially authorized intervention in a call to "willing countries that wish to help Yemen to provide immediate support for the legitimate authority by all means and measures to protect Yemen and deter the Houthi aggression" It is an action of the Saudi army and airforce and NATO - USA, GB, FR logistics, and political support. The conflict led to the formation of a coalition of Saudis, UAE, Kuwait,

Sudan, etc. The most important areas are Bab al Mandab and Aden to secure passage of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf via Suez to the Mediterranean Sea. The coalition focused on a naval blockade of important Yemen ports and airstrikes. In 2017 Saudi announced that airstrikes eliminated the threat and a new operation Restoring Hope will take place now. This operation was based on the ground forces of the Saudi National Guard to join the conflict and reduction of airstrikes. In 2018 the UN has appealed for ceasefire and peace negotiation. In 2019 it has become the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. War has brought the growth of radicalism in the country without a centralized government, authority vacuum, and space for terrorist organizations. In the longer-term results, this conflict brought famine, huge casualties, cholera, etc.

The Protests in Yemen were inspired by Egypt and Tunisia. In the beginning, these were peaceful demands for change and civil liberties, but during the next 9 months the atmosphere changed and the demands of the protesters became more radical. President decided to order shooting as a means to disperse the crowd. The solidarity among protesters was surprising, as Yemen is not culturally or socially unified. On 23 November 2011 president Saleh signed the so-called Transitional plan in Riyadh. It was inspired by the Egyptian Initiative. Vice President Hadi promised presidential elections, the government of national unity, and a new constitution to be admitted within 2 years (Khalifa 2016: 44; Zartman 2015: 134).

There are two main political streams involved in the protests - "Reformists" and "Socialists". The Reformist stream is formed from northern tribesmen, moderate fundamentalists, businessmen from the cities, and young Salafists inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood (not always so much moderate). The socialist stream includes workers, craftsmen, socialist, and partisans from the Rafan mountains.

The proposed deal for president Saleh was to leave the post in exchange for immunity for his crimes (corruption, clientelism, etc.). Instead of him, Hadi should be appointed as the president, and H.S. Sinwa would be the prime minister. However, Saleh remained in power until 2012. This led to the general dissatisfaction of Youth movement protesters and radicals. The revolutionaries were against this deal as they were politically independent and would gain nothing due to the post exchange and division. The most influencing protest parties were the so-called Al Shabaab (The Youth movement) and the Shia group Houthi. Protesters from the South, in the area near the southern border with

the Saudi, rejected the Initiative with the argumentation that it would be an “old regime in new robes only”. This declaration was made in 2011 (Mendel 2015: 287; Day 2012: 291).

The variety of protesting bodies does not leave an option for a unified integrated opposition front and thus there were no prospects for democratic elections leading to any reasonable solution to the politically unstable situation in the country. Meanwhile, the regime proceeds with the repression, corruption of the state administration, and disassembling of the state property. Together with the clientelism for the Hashid tribe, huge unemployment, worsening economic situation, lack of water, high illiteracy (over 50%), young population (15-25 years old form 50% of the population) and unreasonable use of oil production resources these factors make Yemen the most underdeveloped Arabic country (Mendel 2015: 281-329). In response to this situation, Arab spring comes with the demand for a new constitution, brings violent reactions from the government and radicalization of the protesters. The government did not suppress the protests widespread throughout the country. The main reason was the influence of western media informing about non-violent protests and their demands for Saleh and his family’s resignation and leaving the country. As well as calls for national unity and progressive reforms. There was an organized protest of ten thousands of people. The core of these protests was formed by the Youth movement inspired by Egypt. The protesters faced many obstacles to keep the protests nonviolent and meanwhile pursuit activism and communication without the presence of social media platforms.

The regime decided to shoot into the crowds which caused the army and police forces to change sides and join the protesters. President Saleh had to use loyal elite squads, militia and secret police, volunteers, and released convicts who were armed to fight for Saleh. The initial nonviolent protests were based on the generational core of young people, dialogue, social meetings and introductions, discussion, and sharing of the knowledge and experiences. Protesters were socialist atheists from the South, national Islamists from the North, a significant amount of girls/women, militant tribes from the mountainous areas. But they all got along in order to fulfill the common goal to get rid of president Saleh.

On 18 March 2011 protests on the Change Square were under gunfire from snipers. This incident was a trigger point for the radicalization of the protesters. President

Saleh was from now on seen as a faithless tyrant and the puppet of western imperialism. This was the moment of transformation to the violent revolution, the spark that made the protest to grow and motivated Members of Parliament to leave the GPC in protest (Mendel 2015: 291–294). As a result, there were incidents of ousting the rebels from governmental positions, leaving rebellious MPs in exile. The following event was a dissolution of the government and the dismissal of high military and police officers because these went on to support the opposition.

The Tribal leaders are appealed to stand against tyranny. Tribal structures are very important in Yemen. President Saleh belonged to the Hashid tribe, which means that he favored his tribesmen. The opposition has bad coordination and suffers from lack of communication, ideological and generation gaps (Youth movement and former leading elites). On 21 March 2011 general Ali M. Al Ahmar joined the opposition. That meant the division of army and power into two pieces. (Mendel 2015: 294) It is not surprising that conflict escalated into the tribal war without any democratic principles and human rights restrictions then. Due to the successful development of radicalization and Islamist presence in the territory Islah party regain more power and influence in the opposition. The Youth movement declared this revolution stolen and openly inclined to the Islah party and radicalism. Socialists and Houthi left the protests of this opposition. Radicalized opposition then demanded the resignation of the president, end of corruption and clientelism based on family and tribal ties. President Saleh was in control of military power. Thus opposition does not have enough power to finish the revolution successfully.

President Saleh did not hesitate to use violence against protesters. On 23 June 2011 Saleh declared his resignation based on the pressure from KSA and the USA. Both states are afraid that Yemen will become the new Afghanistan. On 21 October 2011, the UN Security Council published the resolution n. 2014 regarding the peaceful transition of power. Resolution froze Saleh's property abroad. On 29 November 2011, the Treaty of GCC was admitted. On the 21 February 2012 presidential election was won by Hadi with 99,6% votes, the attendance was 60%. This election was boycotted by Houthi, Youth, and South Yemenis (Černý 2017: 496; Khalifa 2016: 43-46).

The Initiative of the Gulf Countries offered immunity to Saleh. In 2014 former president Saleh supported Houthis in a military coup against Hadi. In 2014 Houthi seized Saana. In March 2015 Operation Decisive Storm was the step of the Sunny coalition involving the shelling of military installations, infrastructure, arms stockpiles, bridges, airports, and even the streets of the cities. This approach caused a lot of casualties among civilians. The Yemen conflict became also a proxy war between Saudi and Iran, Shia and Sunni. The Yemen war is a very complex conflict based on local dynamics and the regional struggle for hegemony. The violent roots of this conflict come from the very north of Yemen in the province of Saadah. According to Brandt, there are multiple reasons for the conflict. As the main reasons, she states shifting of internal power balance, uneven distribution of resources, uneven political participation, accumulation of mutual grievances, growing sectarianism, tribalisation (Brandt 2017: 2). In 2017 Yemen conflict is in stalemate and battlefronts are frozen. In the winter of 2017 Saleh is killed by Houthis during bloody clashes in Sanaa. In response to this incident Tarek Saleh (nephew of a late ex-president) joined governmental forces of president Hadi to gain vengeance on Houthis.

In 2018 governmental forces of president Hadi joined the Saudi-led Coalition. In summer 2018 governmental forces attacked Houthis in Hodeida with naval and air support from the Coalition and seized the port. As a result of this maneuver, 15 million people in the city could have been cut off from food and medical supplies threatening to become severe humanitarian crises. This crisis was igniting events for the organization of NDC ceasefire negotiations in Stockholm arranged by the UN envoy. In 2018 NDC succeeded with the fragile truce in Hodeida as a part of the Stockholm agreement (Day 2019).

Thanks to 500 representatives of all concerned parties of Yemen conflict and external actors a common goal was set up for the drafting of a new constitution and plan for 6 region states (along the boundary lines of existing provinces and newly granting Saada province access to the Red Sea port). (Day 2019) UAE withdraws forces from Hodeidah as a part of the redeployment of all its units from Yemen. Due to the active involvement of UN envoy Martin Griffith, the years-long stalemate of the Yemen conflict was on the path to negotiation for the future structure of the republic. Stockholm addressed the main issues which need to be overcome to find a peaceful solution for all sides included. The

Southern Transitional Council seized control over institutions in Aden and other southern cities as a preliminary step for the secession of the Southern region.

In 2019 there is severe growth of malnutrition, an outbreak of cholera, and a shortage of fuel due to the blockade imposed by Coalition and Hadi's regulations of oil resources use and transfer (Brandt 2017: 2). In August 2019 violent clashes of Hadi and Secessionist in Aden were moderated by Saudis and a Riyadh agreement was reached. The agreement means the cooperation of Hadi's government and STC. Hadi promised STC part in the current government and STC forces joined his forces and Coalition in the fight against Houthis. Thanks to this agreement UAE and Saudi are staying on the same side however the secessionist issue is not solved yet (Human Rights Watch 2019).

As Stockholm clearly showed all concerned parties are highly motivated to hold their grounds and continue fighting while negotiating over small issues. To gain better ground and leverage for future important negotiation of Yemen structure and their involvement in the policymaking. The topic of the future structure of Yemen will need to be covered if there shall be even a small chance for peace (Day 2019). All sides of the conflict are suspected of committing war crimes and abuse of violence. This issue is one of many that will have to be addressed in order to move toward reconciliation and reconstruction of any future form of the state.

The consequences of the end of the Cold War and a complete change of security discourse caused that security perspective is not only about political, human, or military area, but also the social one. Social security reflects mainly the ability of society to react to security changes and what are the ways of overcoming the situation. Unfortunately, this security perspective has never been one of the most analyzed and very often has stayed aside. It is essential to analyze the current social situation in Yemen according to several social aspects.

The first part of social security is related to the well-being of each inhabitant, the ability to gain food and water and to fulfill all necessary needs. As the conflict has been spreading all over the country and has involved several states and groups as mentioned in other parts of this conflict report, it was inevitable that it would influence also the supply of water, food, but furthermore medicine and other medical equipment. The on-going fights have left more than 70% of the population with the need for humanitarian aid. (Harden and Knights, 2019) It is crucial to mention that even before the conflict, Yemen has been dependent on the import of food as was explained in the economic part of this report.

It is estimated that in 2022, 79% of people in Yemen will be living under the poverty level and more than 60% within the extreme poverty level. UN has recognized this crisis in Yemen as the biggest one in the world, pointing out the level of famine, which has been one of the highest in history. It has been an issue that Huthí have been confiscating the food supplies and reselling it to get more financial means for the war. As it is one's interest to start the fight against food trafficking and financing the war by food supplies, a new system has been developed including using fingerprints, or facial recognition which would help to detect any kind of smuggling or using food supplies in a black market. (Alles 2017) Moreover, the Saudi-led coalition has been attacking civilians including homes, farms, schools, and hospitals, but also food tracks and therefore has eliminated the chance to complete the food supplies by the government or other humanitarian organizations where it is needed. More than 50% of the population within the main city has not been receiving food supplies. Speaking about the inequality with food supplies and a very limited source of water, the inevitable consequence has

arisen. Around 1,5 million of people have been suffering from Cholera, many of them without proper treatment or medical assistance. (Al-Jazeera 2019)

Oxfam, one of many organizations operating in Yemen, which has been also cooperating with state administrators, officers, and the government, has established a program focusing on this issue. Their main focus has been on women's rights, health care, and overcoming stressful situations. This organization has been very intensively operating to secure the supply of clean water, trucking drinking water or to build latrines. (Oxfam 2019) Last but not least, they have been processing vouchers for buying food or, on the other hand, have been offering job opportunities to provide people with a chance to earn some money in order to secure at least their basic needs. In terms of the spread of Cholera, apart from what has been already mentioned, the organization has helped to start educational programs about the right hygienic habits, cause of Cholera, main symptoms, etc.

As medical and health services and infrastructure have been completely disrupted and many buildings intentionally destroyed by an air raid, international intervention in this manner has been necessary. Doctors without borders have been in general helping in Yemen since 1994. This well-known international organization has been working at 13 hospitals and medical centers and has supported 22 more of them. Unfortunately, as the attacks on hospitals and medical centers have arisen, some of its activities must have been terminated. It has been worsening already a very dangerous and terrific situation across all societal casts and the country. (Doctors without borders 2019, 2020)

Speaking about medical assistance, it is crucial to stress out the fact that not every medical center has the equipment to perform surgery, which can be life-saving, and sometimes the patients must be transported more than 100 km far from the first place of medical service. It has happened several times that due to the continuous attacks and military interventions near or on these centers, thousands of Yemeni people have not had the chance to find medical assistance. These attacks have been continuing even though it is a breach of international humanitarian law. The most often cases which Doctors without borders have been dealing with are, apart from war injuries and cholera, chronic malnutrition, problems with lactation, or complicated labors. Furthermore, very often doctors have been a target for both sides. (Šebek 2019)

Another issue strongly related to social security is the situation of children soldiers, who have been in presence in many conflicts since ever. In every conflict, children have been used for a variety of reasons, as potential soldiers who can be hidden within the society, like soldiers who are not usually under suspicion of security forces, etc. Both sides of this conflict have abused children in this manner. (Kirkpatrick 2018) According to the UN report, over 60% of all recruited children were recruited by Houthis in 2019. For these children, they are using the chance to live a normal life, they are forced to leave their family and under no circumstances, they can see their families again. Many of these children are forced to go to the most dangerous and deadly situations. (Vinet 2019) For a very young child, who has not experienced stability, democracy, relatively stable social status, it can mean the only possible way of living in his country. For a very young person, it can be very easy to become convinced to convert to one specific belief and perception of life. It can make them think that this way is the only possibility to stay alive, for being a part of the society, and as the only option of having a social role and status. (Crosta 2018)

The disappearance and targeted attacks have been in the presence also in terms of specific social statuses and roles which are essentially related to the social security of individuals. Each person has his social status, which determines rights but also responsibilities to each other, or society. The social role, on the other hand, is a predicted way of behavior, for instance, a doctor, a journalist, a professor, or a student. And the ones, who are the most needed, doctors and professors, have been the main targets of both groups. All people with these social roles are afraid of a potential attack and losing their lives, or being kept in detention. Furthermore, targeting these very specific roles is another way how to disrupt and divided Yemen's society. It is perceived that these roles can be the most influential within society and can be a potential risk for both fighting sides in terms of preparing any kind of resistance, which would make the whole conflict even more complicated. (Bollag 2020)

If we look at these young people being held in captivity or being taken from families and society in general, they can start feeling that their perception of the world and life is against the belief. Moreover, those who survive can have PTSD (post-trauma stress disorder) which can lead to depression, apathy state, emotional instability, aggression, nightmares, but it can have also physical consequences as bulimia, anorexia,

self-damages, or neurotic problems. It can also include a feeling of insecurity, disbelief, the problem with being part of the society again. (D'Alesandra 2020) From the other point of view, when the war is over or when a child is saved, it has happened several times when the person rejected being saved and felt that someone has stolen his life.

The next part of social security is related to women's rights. In general, the perception of women and women's rights in the Middle East is a complete opposite as it is usual in the Western world. Not every country has its limitation, but Yemen has been one of those countries, where women have not had the same rights and equality is on a minimum level. This situation has been there even before the conflict started. Most of the Yemeni society has been very traditional in terms of cultural and religious life. Therefore, there has been a very high level of political inequality and a very low number of women's rights. For instance, willingly leave a house and go outside has been strictly forbidden, without a man's approval. (Harb 2019) It also goes along with any services or medical help. Women can be examined usually by a woman, or by a man, but only with family approval. Sometimes, it can be a potential threat for a woman if she is seriously injured due to the war situation in the country. Unfortunately, as women's rights have been very limited, it goes along with cultural heritage and religious path. If a woman is getting married and her husband realized she is not a virgin, her father has the right to kill his daughter. (Šebek 2019)

Even before the conflict, Yemen has been one of those countries where sexual abuse and being married at a very young age has been a usual situation. However, the ongoing war and the damages have done so far by both sides within the social structure in Yemen have caused an extreme worsening of this issue. Since the war started, sexual violence has raised about 60%. Unfortunately, within the Yemeni society, sexual violence and abuse are perceived as a stigma. Every day, there have been cases of humiliation in public usually one side targeting women of the other fighting side. Furthermore, probably due to the stress level, uncertainties, and the all-over terrific situation in the country, there has been a rise in the level of domestic violence. (UNFPA 2015)

If we look at sexual violence from a security and conflict perspective, this way of violence has been in presence since ancient times. It has always played a very crucial role in a conflict no matter what kind of conflict it is. Sexual violence can have various types and therefore sometimes it is a little bit harder to differentiate whether it is sexual violence

or not. The main types of sexual violence include incest, child assault, ritual abuse, rape, marital rape, any kind of sexual contact or harassment. It is perceived as a tactic in waging war or conflict in the social sector. We should not forget that sexual violence is not related only to females, but also to males. Sexual violence is a very effective and essentially low-cost way of how to disrupt society and how to weaken an opponent in conflict. The less modern society it is, the easier it is to do so because of already mentioned stigma, or rights inequalities. (Bastic et al, 2007)

Furthermore, every victim reacts differently according to the particular situation or what a person has experienced. The main factors influencing this area are values, society, norms, and cultural heritage. The most often reactions can be again as mentioned above psychological, and emotional. Physical impacts can include sexual injuries, pregnancy, self-injury, or loss of weight due to the change in eating habits. Emotional and psychological are strongly related. Both groups of impacts are represented by phobias, shocks, problems with potential intercourse or starting relationship, depression, and others. (Ellis et al 1981) From the other point of view, the use of sexual violence has its outcome also towards the society or family of the victims. It is not only about the spread of fear and potential danger for the rest of society, but many victims are not accepted back into society or family, can lose their jobs, or to be excluded from normal life. (Jeglic et al 2016)

As the social system has been disrupted, almost every child cannot attend school education as professors have been targeted by the Houthi group and schools have been closed since the conflict arisen at the international level. In several cases, some of these children have never experienced a normal life without being in a war zone and having a normal life including going to school. Considering being kept only within the closest family, without having the ability to socialize, we cannot predict how influential can it be. (GEM report 2020). Fortunately, many underground units and volunteers are trying to secure this aspect of social security, but as both sides are attacking civil targets, it has been more and more difficult.

Living a normal life is for some of them something unimaginable. These children left aside without proper help, are called lost children. It is a very similar case as in Syria. It is necessary and crucial to focus also on this issue as we need to secure that these children and very young people will understand that living in a warzone is not the only

option and that there are other options for a better life. It is necessary to support them not only in terms of education but also to help them to learn the right socialization. The other problem has occurred very soon after the start of the conflict. During every war or military conflict, there have always been migration waves with different intensity, but this time, in the case of Yemen, it is completely different. Even though more than 4 million Yemeni inhabitants have been displaced and forced to leave their homes, there have not been many refugees in a classic meaning. (IDMC 2020) They are trapped in their own country, only with a small chance to leave the country not only because of other states participating in this conflict but also due to the destroyed infrastructure, poverty, and being without a source for paying smugglers to help them with the movement.

Yemen is the worst humanitarian crisis and unfortunately a “meeting place” for several fighting sides. Not only the internal struggle between different groups but also interventions and participation of other states have destroyed social infrastructure and have caused the elimination of almost any kind of social security. The terrific level of famine, impossibility to earn money, and therefore not being able to secure food and water, or in general, fulfill the basic needs, have shown the importance of humanitarian intervention and the necessity to consider another possible solution for both sides, or at least, to call for a temporary peace or cease-fire to enable the humanitarian organization actively participate on improving the social security in the country. Moreover, international organizations should pay attention to the increase of violence against women and the use of child soldiers of all actors participating in this conflict. Speaking about social security, the UN security council should consider and analyze the risk of genocide, but also the lack of human security perception of fighting sides in terms of bombing medical centers, schools, or targeting civil places, which is perceived as a breach of international agreements.

It is argued that in the last three decades traditional thinking about national security has been influenced by topics of environmental protection and policy development (Goodman, 2012). In the 1950s, when it started to gain international attention, the narrative was very different. It involved discussions on the usage of the environment and its resources to contribute to economic and social development (Jackson, 2007). Nowadays, the narrative argues for a link between environmental issues and security or to be more precise human - security. Moreover, it has been estimated by the United Nations that in the past 60 years 40% of civil conflicts have been driven by natural resources (The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, 2012). On these accounts, the following chapters will discuss relations between an ongoing war in Yemen and the environmental conditions of Yemen. Firstly, I present how is the environment in Yemen affected by open armed conflict. Secondly, I am dealing with how the environment damaged by the war affects the overall security in Yemen. Finally, a sum of recommendations will be provided on how the environment might become the mean of peacebuilding.

THE WAR IN YEMEN THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Regarding the crisis in Yemen environmental conditions, natural sources, energy, and agricultural infrastructure are believed to play a decisive role in fuelling the conflict (UNOCHA Yemen; Human Rights Watch; Mwatana for Human Rights). There has been documented numerous cases when strategic infrastructure was damaged or destroyed either purposely or because of warfighting since the start of the conflict in 2011 and then its escalation in 2015. Already in 2011, strategic oil pipelines were deliberately attacked by tribesmen in central Marib province (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Furthermore, a 2016 report states: „*Repeated coalition airstrikes on factories and other civilian economic structures raise serious concerns that the coalition deliberately sought to inflict damage to Yemen’s limited production capacity*” (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The most recent report lists other continuously occurring violations affecting the environment in Yemen.

Firstly, in violation of the law of war, attacks have been made on civilian infrastructure deliberately hitting farms, agricultural sites, irrigation systems, and water points. There have been more than 20 100 airstrikes according to the Yemen Data Project (in Human Rights Watch, 2020). Since 2018 five deadly strikes on Yemeni fishing boats have been also documented by the Human Rights Watch (2020). Secondly, the imposition of blockades on port cities and imports by the Saudi-led coalition as well as by Houthi rebels is another factor. Fuel tankers are regularly diverted causing insufficient supply to pump drinking water from wells as an example. Blockades and naval operations led by the Saudi coalition and the Yemeni government are often explained as operations to stop the supply of weapons to Houthis. However, it is hard to support the claim with evidence as well as with international law, especially, when numerous civilians suffer from these measures (Fink, 2017). Moreover, the city of Taizz and port city Hodeida are continuously under indiscriminate aerial bombing. Consequently, strategic storages, roads, and infrastructure are destroyed preventing essential goods to be delivered. Thirdly, landmines have been found along the western coast of Yemen installed in farmlands, roads, and wells that affect communities and their access to clean water sources (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Based on country reports, there is evidence that the ongoing conflict has aggravated an already weak environmental situation in Yemen. Regarding its geographical position, demography, and political, economic, and funding obstacles and complexities the country is incapable to meet the demands of its population. Yemen is thus highly dependent on the supply of basic goods like wheat, corn, or oil for energy production as it will be explained later. It demonstrates that hard climate conditions had been a problem in Yemen even before the violent conflict broke out.

SECURITY IN YEMEN: THE ROLE OF WATER RESOURCES, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, AND ENERGY SECTOR

As the statistics show, 90 percent of staple food was imported to Yemen before the conflict escalate (UNOCHA Yemen, 2019). It refers to imports of basic foods like corn, wheat, and other grains. Imposing restrictions while the conflict is open and ongoing inflict Yemen enormously. Moreover, security risk prevents the country to be recovered and worsen the already harsh environmental conditions. Out of a population of 30.5

million, there are 24 million people in need. In concrete, 20.1 million Yemenis are in the need of food and agriculture security. The scarcity of food is particularly caused by restrictions on ports and roads. The most essential in this matter is the port of Hodeida. It is one of the strategic ports at the Red Sea which imported 80% of food to Yemen before the escalation of conflict in 2015. Stores of food, water, and medicine are also situated there (Suter, 2018; Runge 2020).

Other contributing factors to lack or no access to basic goods are Yemen's poor infrastructure and high-security risks aggravated by landmines. Consequently, it relates to high transport costs that further the scarcity of goods. In 2018 fuel prices rose about 19%, especially due to lower imports and poor supply into local markets inflicted by the conflict (UNOCHA Yemen, 2019). Insufficient imports of fuels then affect imports of other goods in the agriculture and water sector. For the illustration, in 2018 prices for transport of safe drinking water by trucks doubled and average food prices were 150 times higher in comparison to prices before the conflict (ibid.). Internal displacement of people is another aspect to take into consideration. In 2018, there were 3.3 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Yemen (ibid.). A high concentration of people in some areas creates additional pressure on the local environment and its resources. Water resources or arable soil are prime examples (Suter, 2018).

From another point of view, a theory of "water as a weapon" (Gleick, 2019; Aklan et al. 2019) or of "water weaponization" (Moyer et al., 2019) is discussed. Water resources, ground-based, and surface are shared throughout political borders in Yemen. That is why the lack of the commodity may result in local conflicts. Rural areas in Yemen might be even more prone to conflicts and disputes since identity is usually tied with water rights (Hadil et al., 2017). It is argued that societies in fragile states going through conflicts, experiencing violence, or facing instability risk are likely to experience lack or no access to safe water and sanitation services. When deliberately attacked as military targets it disrupts access to resources, agricultural, and electricity production creating pressure among communities. Numerous cases have been reported in the period 2015-2018 when water infrastructure became a target during the conflict in Yemen. Examples include airstrikes on water tanks and equipment in the city Sa'ada, on the Al-Sham bottling plant in Hajjah and beverage factory in Sana'a, on seawater desalination facility near Mocha, on water supply system in Al Mokha, or strikes at the Al-Hamazat water

system in Sa'ada destroyed along with a solar power system. Much of the damage is caused by aerial bombing campaign perpetrated by the Saudi-led coalition (Gleick, 2019). Attacks on the water system also affect health and water-related diseases within the society that is why cholera is one of the most spread diseases in Yemen. Other factors like heavy rains, inoperable sewage systems, and polluted wells enhance the spread of diseases like cholera as well (Hadil et al., 2017).

During the conflict in Yemen, famine and hunger became “weapons”, too. The concept takes famine and hunger as deliberately imposed conditions on the population to reach certain political goals. These means to enhance conditions of famine particularly include the already mentioned blockades of port cities like Hodaida with its storages. Nevertheless, agricultural facilities and farms that are all vital for food production are regularly attacked and degrade by landmines and cluster munitions (Runge, 2020).

Additionally, the complex political landscape of Yemen creates conditions for certain groups to exploit the environment and its resources, particularly in times of war. Tribalism in Yemen accounts for the fundamental principle of organizing society. It is determined by a structure with tribe divisions and tradition of clan communities. Central governments lose control and its absence in many areas means local warlordism is another feature of Yemeni society. It is based on close relations between local tribes and separatists, rebel, and other movements. They are maintained through the provision of basic goods, especially, when the central government is incapable of securing them. For example, in 2015 Al Qaeda of the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) captured huge parts of the province Hadramaut where oil infrastructure is situated including Tarim and neighboring oil fields (Swietek, 2017). To put it in a perspective, Yemen is highly dependent on oil with regards to its energy production. Respectively, in 2017 the primary energy supply was as follows - oil 76%, natural gas 16%, biofuels and waste 3.7%, wind, and solar 1.9% and coal 2.4% (Sufian, 2019). The collapse of the government is further associated with insufficient water governance that results in illegal pumping and degrading water infrastructure.

HOW PEACE COULD BE ENHANCED THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY?

As has been demonstrated the environment plays a crucial role when it comes to the conflict in Yemen. On the one hand, climate and geographical factors had been a condition even before the escalation of the conflict. It continues to fuel smaller local conflicts especially in rural areas where resources are scarce and the access to water and arable lands is insufficient or impeded by the ongoing war. On the other hand, open-armed conflict continues to damage strategic sites and infrastructure causing environmental degradation and embedding scarcity of essential resources. To rebuild Yemen this cycle of destruction, degradation, and scarcity has to be broken. Otherwise, it will continue to fuel the conflict while at the same time it is fuelled by the conflict and its destructive capacity.

First, it is the scarcity of water. Even before the war, only 40% of rural areas had the access to public water (ICRC, 2015). On the other hand, due to Yemen's climate 90 % of groundwater is absorbed by the agricultural sector for irrigation (UNOCHA Yemen, 2019). That is why smaller local conflicts may emerge easily between rural and urban areas as well as between the domestic and agricultural sectors. It is estimated that water-related disputes have caused more deaths than unrest in 2011 and 2012 (Talhami in ICRC, 2015). The problem is, however, a matter of politics and economics, too. Scarce access to water has been aggravated by bad management policies. For example, by favoring certain crops, the Yemeni Government has made the groundwater and irrigation cheap. The water is thus mostly exploited for the cultivation of qat. It is a very water demanding plant and due to favorable conditions, it is cultivated in mountainous areas of Sanaa and Taiz. The problem is that 95% of the Yemen population uses the drug while only 5% is profiting from cultivation. Nevertheless, the government is encouraging cultivation since there is a high demand among the population. It is favored even before the cultivation of nearly extinct coffee trees (Zahran et al., 2014). That is why access to water resources is not determined solely by the open armed conflict. This is just one example, but it demonstrates how crucial the management of water resources and irrigation systems are for Yemen. Sustainable irrigation techniques projects are introduced by the ICRC in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture. One of the ideas is to make water supply

more sufficient by proper conservation of water and by harvesting rainwater for farming (ICRC, 2015).

Proper water management includes the decision about what crops should be cultivated. This is especially important when we look at the geography of Yemen. The total area of Yemen constitutes 52 797 million ha. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, only 1 546 ha is considered a cultivated area that consists of arable land and permanent crops¹ (2016). The decision should be made in a way to benefit the majority of the Yemeni population and made the country more self-sufficient since the majority of basic grains like wheat and corn depending on supply.

Secondly, most of the arable land is situated on the west coast near big cities and port cities where irrigation systems are developed (see the picture below). As previous chapters demonstrate, the problem is that most attacks are concentrated there around strategic points in Yemen. Moreover, landmines must be cleared out of arable lands, roads, and infrastructure to eliminate risks for transport and high prices of imports and goods. Since cultivated lands amount to such a small amount, Yemen needs all these resources to cover the demand of its population. On the other hand, it is the reason why the supply is even more important when cultivated lands along the west coast are contaminated by landmines and thus cannot be used for agricultural purposes.

¹ „Permanent crops are sown or planted once, and then occupy the land for some years and need not be replanted after each annual harvest, such as cocoa, coffee and rubber. This category includes flowering shrubs, fruit trees, nut trees and vines, but excludes trees grown for wood or timber, and permanent meadows and pastures.“ (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, n.d.)



YEMEN

FAO - AQUASTAT, 2008

Contamination affects not only arable lands but water resources as well. Moreover, it precludes the Government from implementing development and recovery plans. Accordingly, the most essential step is to secure the clearance of landmines by properly trained workers and supported by sufficient funding. Risk education must be provided as well to communities to prevent unnecessary deaths and damages. In that matter, a cooperation plan for the 2017-2020 guides demining activity in Yemen. It has been established between the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC). It is the national mine action management actor that works under the National Mine Action Committee (NMAC). However, there is no national strategic plan that would guide the process in Yemen also through united political decisions based on the Mine Ban Treaty ratified in 1998 (Landmine and cluster munition monitor, 2018).

The most explicit recommendations would be to stop using strategic sites and infrastructure as military objects, to stop the supply of weapons but also to stop restriction on ports to guarantee the supply of necessary goods. Contrary, long-term recovery and development mean that Yemen must become less reliant on the supply of basic goods and

more self-reliant based on proper management policies. In relation to electricity production and dependency on oil, Yemen must recover its damaged energy production facilities, but at the same time decrease the dependency on oil by installing renewable sources of energy as solar panels and become more interconnected. Nevertheless, peacebuilding goes beyond and necessitates political agreements contributing to peace through economic development and recovery.

Yemen has always been considered as one of the poorest countries in the Middle East, and the ongoing and escalating civil war massively deteriorated economic conditions and drew the country to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Economic and social prospects in 2020 and beyond are uncertain and hinge critically on the political and security situation. Affordability of food is a rapidly emerging threat to household welfare, as pre-existing global food price increases, and real depreciation is now interacting with COVID-19 related trade restrictions by food exporters (Yemen's Economic update 2020). Such a dire economic situation has a direct impact on social, political security, and military segment.

SECURITY VS MILITARY DEFENCE

It is also believed that security forces operate by their own rules and security forces the leader's interests (Al-Shami, 2020). This perception may have deteriorated by an escalation of conflict and growing tension between officially recognized government forces and Houthi rebels. Also, social cleavage and instability contribute to a different perception of threats, and it all undermines security in the country.

Today, Yemen is a fragmented state into several territories with competing authorities and interests. Although the police force has a centralized structure, it does not have unified and independent action power, and it mostly depends on the group claiming authority in their respective area (The State Of The Police In Western Yemen, 2020). Moreover, police forces have relatively weak representation on the local level. In rural areas, its representation is on the constant decrease (Ibid.) Such a security setting inside a state makes the state more vulnerable. Both inside and outside and is limiting its stability. The perception of inability to act in the protection of citizens and weak belief in police and security forces, in general, arises more significant support to local armed groups and contributes to the additional fragmentation of the country. All that hugely support the sectarian system and division in the country that has been based on Sunni Shia division in particular.

The takeover of the Ministry of Interior and handover of police institutions to Houthi rebels led significantly to the more profound fragmentation of the country. Many police officers transitioned from the previous authority to Houthis; rebels attracted further support by funding police structures (Ibid.).

According to sociologist research, almost 62% of Yemenis indicated, they have had a negative experience with police forces (Yemen Polling Centre, 2014) The negative experience reflects a low trust in police forces. Only 26% of Yemeni respondents have faith in the police and believe the structure can guard security. On the contrary, almost 60% replied they have little confidence in the police².

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR LOW TRUST IN SECURITY (POLICE) FORCES IN THE COUNTRY?

Firstly, Yemen suffers from contrast division between rural and urban areas. And according to research, almost 89% of rural area respondents indicated that there is no police station in their area. A weak police representation or its unbalanced distribution creates a feeling of vulnerability in society. The unstable setting evokes a low perception of security in the country and distrust in government police forces to guarantee protection and security. People in rural areas where the help of the police force is more difficult to get may tend to act on their behalf, which limits the creation of the rule of law in the country (HiiL, 2012). Also, another security risk may be that people feeling a lack of fair treatment from security forces tend to join paramilitary groups and are easier to be recruited into a terrorist organization and exposed to the radicalization of youth (Bizina, 2014).

Secondly, corruption in Yemen is also reflected in the perception of police forces. The weak rule of law and absence of stability discloses a low trust in military and security services to supply security to its citizens. Yemen has been ranked as one of the most corrupted and most impoverished countries in the Gulf. One of the highest bribery rates reaches nearly four in five public service users paying a bribe (which is 77%) (Corruption: the Middle East & North Africa Survey 2016). Security and governance are performed by the style of corrupt authoritarianism, where personal gain and achievement is connected more to loyalty rather than merit and skill. The military-security institution troops tend to be more loyal to their respective commanders than the state. Their protection comes above the protection of the population (Yemen Polling Centre 2014). Guarantors of security in the country are different stakeholders depending on the area,

² Ibid. see graph 2

only in Sanaa-City police forces represent the significant number of police representation in security (Ibid.)³.

The society in Yemen perceives the corrupted system in police forces that can be referred to as a threat. The problems of corrupted security forces, distrust, and unequal allocation constitute a considerable barrier to security in the country, and in any attempt to peace process and reconciliation, these issues need to be addressed.

MILITARY DEFENCE

Military agenda revolves mainly around the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats. Still, it can also involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against non-military threats to their existence (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 78). As Buzan differentiates securitizing actor, referent object, and functional actor, the conflict in Yemen shows how complex is and how all three points are interconnected to each other.

THE ISSUE OF THE REFERENT OBJECT

The referent object in this instance is a state. The officially recognized government aims to guard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yemen that has tribal character including foreign interference from the outside and interests in Yemen. The regime of President Hadi fights against Houthi rebels, pro-Houthi external actors, that are inspired by the Iranian revolution and have many supporters and donors outside Yemen. The tribal character underlines the so-called anti-Houthi bloc that composes of Southern separatists, Sunni Islamists that are hugely supported by Saudia-Arabia and UAE, fighters with tribal or regional motivations to defend and secure their territory. Additionally, Al-Qaeda still plays a considerable role is widely seen as being one of the big winners from the war (*Yemen: Key Players And Prospects For Peace* 2015). The lack of a common long-term strategy creates even more fragmented actions and confusion in the field (Al-Lahbi and Bonnefoy, 2019). Considering the depth of hostility between each of these, it is hard to believe that any coordination can be achieved daily basis or in terms of long-term objectives (ibid.) The government has a lack of strategy to secure a state as a referent object.

³ See graph 12

THE ISSUE OF SECURITISING ACTOR AND THE WEAK POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT

For most of Yemen's history, all indigenous military power (excluding foreign occupiers) had been concentrated in the tribes, so the creation of a new military power-base was a sensitive issue from the outset (Knights, 2013).

Above all, the government, as the securitizing actor perceived Houthis, particularly as an internal threat. And it, declared the Houthi leader as wanted for trial on charges of "harming Yemen's stability and interests (Ibid.: 152). Between 2004 and 2010, an ongoing war in the Sa'ada region led to an enormous proliferation of the conflict between government and opposition forces and consequently involved tribes and pushed for new dynamics in such complex and multi-layered conflict.⁴ During the Arab Spring, the regime lost its support of small groups and alliances that previously supported the regime of Saleh, and fighting between tribal and military forces began. The peaceful protests demanding respect for the rule of law and greater freedom turned into violence between the government and protesters. They resulted in a significant number of dead and injured (Arimatsu, Choudhury 2013).

The international community (UN Res 2014) largely supported an initiative to implement a political settlement. Followed by the transition process forming Government of National Unity, and in which president Saleh transferred its power to vice-president Hadi who would lead the country to new elections forming a new government. Nevertheless, President Hadi and the Government of Yemen continued to be challenged by several domestic and regional actors, and intervention in Yemen's internal affairs was having a detrimental effect on implementing the Agreement on the implementation mechanism for the transition process in Yemen (UN Doc S/2015/125).

⁴ See also 'All Quiet On The Northern Front? | Uninvestigated Laws Of War Violations In Yemen'S War With Huthi Rebels' (*Human Rights Watch*, 2010) <<https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/04/07/all-quiet-northern-front/uninvestigated-laws-war-violations-yemens-war-huthi>> accessed 5 January 2020.

THE ISSUE OF FUNCTIONAL ACTORS

The international community (UN Res 2201) deplored Houthi's violent actions against governmental institutions. President Hadi officially asked for foreign intervention based on the principle of self-defense of article 51 of the UN Charter. The decision to invite foreign troops to help fight Houthis internationalized the conflict and increased the number of functional actors. However, after years of war, the military face a significant lack of credibility.

Today military structure does not represent a transparent body with well-deserved ranking and achievement. Political interference as an integral part of the Yemeni military significantly undermines the belief and trust of the public in the structure of armed forces. Military appointments were made based on personal ties or tribal affiliations, creating shadow structures tied directly to the president. Tribes used the military to bolster their positions and secure patronage; military ranks conferred no authority without a link to an influential tribe; and communication ran along tribal lines, not command structures. These practices were even bolstered during Saleh's presidency, and the government also admitted to illegally re-exporting weapons to embargoed countries (Gaub, 2015).

Besides, the armed forces have been perceived to exploit their positions to enrich themselves; and they are still actively involved in the smuggling of food, fuel, and other commodities, while they 'pay off' tribes with small arms (Ibid). Bribery, corruption is rooted in all spheres of the military. There are also many instances in which individual soldiers themselves sell heavy weapons and military vehicles provided by either the internationally recognized Yemeni government or the Saudi-led coalition to anyone who meets their asking price. According to several independent sources, senior commanders and their subordinates reportedly sell weapons to interested buyers either directly, through intermediaries, or via the local arms market (Combating Corruption in Yemen, 2018).

The issue of so-called ghost-soldiers continues to be active. There are ongoing military payrolls with non-existent soldiers. The senior officers are incentivized to grossly exaggerate the number of soldiers under their command by the financial reward of pocketing excess salary payments as well as additional rewards that accrue to those commanding larger forces. Government officials are also thought to be complicit in this scheme (Ibid.) In this setting, the war becomes business for all parties to the conflict

supported by allies from outside. It is becoming an industry with difficult predictability foreseeing the end and severe consequences for civilian society in Yemen.

Since 2015 Yemen territory has been in a state of civil war. Thus, speaking about the political security of the country is very difficult. It demands us to consider Yemen as still an existing one-state sovereign actor. However, Yemen is facing several significant threats to its political security. During the development of conflict to the civil war, Yemen has been deprived of legitimate, democratic, and free elections as well as numerous civic freedoms. The territory is partially occupied by radical Islamist movements and terrorist groups preying on the tribal structure and geographical disadvantages. The absence of a legitimate and sovereign national government leads to the violation of civil liberties, religious freedom, and insecurity of the citizens. The vulnerability of the territory, historical damage to relations of the south and north part of the country, and absence of central authority provides an opportunity for a long-existing secessionist effort of the Southern part of the territory.

Among internal threats to the political security in Yemen are changes and threats caused mainly by civil war and political disunity of the territory and absence of legitimate political representation. These events cause several problems that Yemen has to face now. The other source of threats to political security is external factors.

In the case of Yemen, these external threats are based on the influence and strong involvement of foreign state and non-state actors in the civil war. As most of the fighting parts have their sponsors and allies outside Yemeni borders these actors are posing a severe threat to the political security and sovereignty of the Yemen republic.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE ABSENCE OF A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT

The last presidential elections were officially in 2012 but there was only one candidate - former vice-president A. M. Hadi. This presidential election was held due to existing protests against former president Saleh and as a result of the constant pressure of the USA, GCC, and the UN to interrupt violent protest suppression of the former government. However, Hadi was elected only for the interim period of two years to stabilize the country.

In the 2014 National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in Stockholm decided on a year prolongation of his term during the preparation of the new constitution draft and referendum on this constitution. The NDC came with the plan on the transformation of

Yemen into a 6 region state federation. In nine months the constitutional draft was ready (Day 2019). The Saudi-led Coalition intervention in March 2015 and following seizure of the capital by Houthis put obstacles to the previously agreed plan from Stockholm. As the following step Houthis disbanded Parliament. In 2015 Hadi and his government fled into exile to Saudi. Due to his unclear and weak mandate, he lacks control over the country. He is recognized as an official president of Yemen by the international community but he does not exercise power over the country other than with the help of a few chosen individuals and thanks to the huge financial support of external actors mainly Saudi and the USA (Freedom House 2020).

Yemen has not seen parliamentary elections since 2009. In 2020 Yemen still lacks the electoral framework and there is no actor exerting power over the whole territory. Political parties in Yemen still exist but are repressed by Houthis and due to their control over the Criminal Court in Sanaa are opponents facing trials and convicted to illegitimate death sentences. UAE security forces are blamed for arbitrary arrests, detention, forced disappearances, and torture of opponents of southern secessionists whom they provide support. Often these opponents come from the al-Islah religious conservative party (Day 2019).

TERRORISM AND THE GROWTH OF RADICALISM

The environment of the absence of central government control has been an opportunity for the growth of multiple movements and radical groups. Due to historical experience of Yemeni warriors in the Afghan wars was religious radicalism and cooperation with terrorist groups brought to Yemen territory. The common border with Saudi Arabia, the political and religious influence of Shia countries and movements, and tribal structure are reasons for the existence and spread of several different movements and sources of Islamic radicalism. The first main groups consist of supporters of Sunni Islam. The most powerful Islamic and as well political Sunni movement in Yemen is Islah (variation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen). However, the side of Sunni Islam supporters in the war also concerns several terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS (Chatham House 2015: 9-10). AQAP has control over the Southeastern port of Mukalla and is expanding towards Aden. ISIS focuses mainly on attacks on Houthis in Sanaa and Aden. Neither of these actors is prospective for the future

development of the state. There is no alliance or plan for the government (Day 2019; Crisis Group 2017).

These terrorist groups are interested in the spread of their ideology and maintaining the most possible share of the territory and power. Based on the internationally accepted policy of non-negotiation with the terrorist groups and heritage of the War on Terror official cooperation with the radicals is not any of the possible scenarios for the conflict resolution. To secure the territory and regain control over the country, these actors would have to be eliminated and defeated by force as well as the ideological fight against their radical and violent teaching of their followers. It is a very difficult situation considering that many important local tribes support AQAP in the unreachable mountainous areas and a significant part of the Yemen population is inclined to support terrorist fighters due to common war experience from Afghanistan. (Kendall, 2017: 27-30)

In the opposition to the supporters of the Sunni Islam, there is Zaidi Shia ideology embodied in the movement of the Houthis. The Houthis have conflicted with the governmental forces since 2004. The Shia movement feels threatened by Wahabi Sunni Islam from KSA, economic marginalization of North (Saada province). Houthis are believed to be supported by Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. Technically Houthis have never been a political party, they lack a political program. The Houthis are one of the tribes empowered thanks to Saleh's policy. The Houthis endorsed the protests in 2011. In 2014 Houthis formed a military-tribal marriage of convenience with former president Saleh and his GPC party, stating that they both are: "defending the nation against external threats" (Chatham House 2015).

TRIBAL FAVORITISM AND CORRUPTION

Yemeni tribes are important internal political actors. Different Yemeni tribes are based on common ancestry, ethical values, set of ideal characteristics, connoting honor, courage, pride, and usually protection of the weak (Brandt 2017: 18). Zaidi Hadawi doctrine states that northern tribes are descendants of imam Zaidi, seen as Shia nobility in the area but also as immigrants to the territory of Yemen. Southern tribes are seen as local/native to the area. During the republican period after 1960 began the empowerment of tribal leaders. This development is connected to the major transformation of social, political, and economic agendas. The inception of the so-called "patronage policy" which

made certain southern areas weak in political and economic support while the Saleh administration supported the northern area. This led to militarization, smuggling, and shadow economy in the southern tribal territories. Saleh distorted the function of tribes by elevating the importance of the authorities, the practice of economic favoritism of chosen Shaykhs. This transition caused underdevelopment, income gaps, intolerable economic and social imbalance, resentment, discontent, and detachment of the part of the population from the central government. At the same time, the Houthi tribe has flourished (Brandt 2017: 72; Schmitz 2011: 17-18).

Due to this unique situation when the tribal structure is the significant base of the state power and there is no possibility to defeat these opponents by force, the government will have to negotiate and find an agreement with tribal leaders to consolidate power and unify Yemen in the pre-2015 borders. This claim appears to be especially vulnerable in the terms of favoritism, clientelism, and corruption. The actor offering enough influence, sources and power could easily gain the support of certain tribes. On the contrary, tribes are significant actors and their influence is one of the vital attributes to be able to consolidate power and rule the country. For a strong sovereign and undivided state, the allocation of power, sources, and influence would have to be equal and carefully balanced to maintain peace and enhance the development of all parts of the country (Al-Hamdani, Stowe 2019: 17-21). Otherwise, these imbalances lead to conflicts, underdevelopment, the spread of radicalism, weakening of the rule of law, instability, and poverty. The unequal allocation of sources, wealth, influence, and power is one of the reasons Yemen is in the current situation (Schmitz 2011: 19-20).

So far the main goal for tribal fighters in the war was defending themselves and their territories. Thus legitimate and power consolidating government could be an acceptable option as long as the security and stability are provided. With a government strong enough to offer an environment and conditions similar to the previous Saleh's rule, tribal resistance would not be necessary (Al-Hamdani, Stowe 2019: 21).

SECESSIONISM

The disruption of territory coherence is a significant security threat. Due to its harsh historical development and existence of two separate states, Yemen is vulnerable to the secessionist attempts. In the recent development of the events, the basic threat to the unified sovereign Yemen state is Hirak (Southern Movement). The foundation of the anti-Saleh secessionist movement was motivated by an under-developed Southern economy, illegal seizing of southern lands by the government, and enrichment of the North. Hirak is very popular and has strong support in the South. Considering all these factors it is an eligible actor for negotiation about the solution of the systematic problems (Chatham House 2015).

The southern movement was founded as a protest against Northern steps in the South area. Northerners buy the lands, buy or build factories in the South, don't allow southern people to be involved in the administration, and this situation has worsened in the time since 1994 (Chatham House 2015). As punishment for previous secessionist tendencies North has the major power over the southern territory. The tribal membership and 150 years of different developers have been an insurmountable obstacle. The government refused to provide the amount of self-administration and political and economic autonomy that the South has been demanding for a long time. There are no democratic principles in internal relations. Since 2009 the calls for separation and independent South Arabia (Yemen) are intensifying. In April 2011 there was a strict demand for the formation of a confederation or definitive separation of the South (Tuma 2016: 59-75). According to the Freedom House Index 2011-2014, Yemen has been in 6 to 7 places (non-democratic and non-free country) (Freedom House 2020).

STATE ACTORS INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS

The war in Yemen is the clash of Sunni and Shia branches of Islam. The interstate Yemeni movements and parties are used as proxies by foreign state actors. The influence and future development in Yemen are of vital interest to several powerful states.

The strongest involvement in the war belongs to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi/KSA). The ideological and political influence of Saudi is interconnected with the existence of a strong Sunni base of the believers in the region. There is the issue of the borderlands. The Saudi-Yemen borderland is the clash territory of the Sunni and tribal Shia religious beliefs. In 2013 Saudi decided to construct the fence on the borders as a

precaution to prevent the spread of radicals and Shia Islam due to the Yemen conflict. This decision was a hard blow to Saudi-tribal cooperation (Tūma 2016: 59-75). Furthermore, Saudi has never wished for Yemen to become a strong regional actor. Saudi Yemeni relations are defined by the competition for religious and political influence. There is the threat of the spread of radicalism and terrorism over the borders as well.

There is yet another reason for Saudi involvement in the Yemen conflict. The well-known regional rivalry between Saudi and Iran. King Salman in 2015 is more independent of the USA and more proactive in the elimination of the influence of Iran. The first sign of Saudi determination to get more involved in Gulf politics is the brutal suppression of the Arab Spring uprising in Bahrain. Saudi became more engaged in the regional power politics and matters of neighboring countries. In the case of Yemen Saudi did not hesitate to form an armed coalition against anti-governmental Houthi rebels. Houthis are supported by Iran as the result of the balance of power principle (BBC 2020).

In 2015 the Arab coalition was formed to eliminate the influence of Iran and Islamists. The Coalition consists of several Arabic and North African countries (Egypt, Morocco, Jordania, Djibouti, Eritrea, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Somalia, Kuwait, Sudan) under the leadership of KSA. In the coordination with the superpowers and international organizations. The Coalition of solely Sunny states is led by Saudi and UAE. Another quite active member in Sudan (Al Jazeera 2011). Despite the role in the coalition, UAE also provides support for the Southern secessionist movement. UAE does not wish for a strong unified Yemen. In July 2019 UAE unilaterally withdrew forces from the Red Sea Coast region while pro-Hadi Yemen and Sudanese forces remained (Day 2019).

As an important Saudi ally USA could not restrain from the involvement in Yemen Affairs either. The New Strategic alliance for the 21st century was formed by the US and Saudi to preserve their economic agendas. As a result, Americans' investments of billions of dollars were put in Saudi infrastructure, banking, technical services, construction sector, mining, and refinery. In the military area, the USA supplied after the Saudi exhausted their sources in the Yemen war (Farouk 2019). The USA sold munitions, supported airforce attacks, etc. The Saudi and American involvement in the Yemen War is without the approval of the UN Security Council. The USA provides intelligence, logistics support, and refueling in the flight. The USA sold to Saudi more than 600 pieces

of Patriot shells, ships, helicopters, etc (Tuma 2016: 61; Congressional Research Service 2020). Saudis even used cluster bombs which caused numerous casualties.

Though the USA and KSA are involved in the Yemen war together, KSA was heavily criticized by the Obama administration for the pursuit of proactive self-serving politics instead of a reasonable attitude. The USA is critical because the war in Yemen is stealing focus, attention, and sources away from the fight against Daesh in Syria. Furthermore, Saudi refused to participate in the Peace Initiative in Syria with Iran (Al Jazeera 2011).

In the opposition to the Sunni coalition, pro-Houthi foreign actors are involved as well. However, these are not so openly and militarily engaged in direct conflict. Russia has diplomatic interests in the conflict and is backing the Houthis together with Iran wishes to weaken the influence of the US and Saudis in the region. Russia is not inclined towards a 6 state peace solution (Day 2019). The biggest Shia and Houthi supporter is Iran. According to GPI Iranian military expenditure increased to 4,56% GDP in 2019 (Global Peace Index 2019). It is mainly due to its prevailing presence in the Syrian conflict, but no doubt that part of this budget was allocated to the Yemen conflict as well. Iran is supporting Houthis to oppose pro-Hadi Saudi-led Coalition and Sunni Islamist groups. Iran has historically had only a small amount of influence in Yemen. But the founder of the Houthi movement Hussain al-Houthi was inspired by the Iranian revolution based on Zaidy principles.

THE ABSENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Yemen's official religion is Islam but there are non-muslim minorities as well. In pre-war Yemen, Sharia was the main source of law. Furthermore, the government of President Saleh was not democratic (Mendel 2015: 288). This combination created the environment of the absence of certain political and several basic human rights. The strange combination allowed only a few private media and tolerance of freedom of assembly, women's rights, etc (Freedom House 2020). Currently, all human rights are violated in the wake of conflict and the clashes of armed forces. In the period preceding the 2011 uprising, the majority of the media has succumbed to governmental control. The absence of a central government capable of controlling the territory caused a lack of civil and human rights protection and the spread of religious and tribal sources of law (Human

Rights Watch 2019). The absence of authority is a severe security threat and can be solved only by a strong democratic government consolidating power over the territory.

“As the implementation of the politics, ideologies, and religious hermeneutics demands the full involvement of local people, the formulation of local agendas is an important step in the resolution of the conflict, reconstruction of the state, and reconciliation” (Brandt 2017: 2). Yemen will not succeed as one nation-state under a single authority with control over the whole state. It would be a huge mistake to try to reconstruct the previous status of the country as there is no historical, nor cultural common ground for a peaceful one-state solution. Unified Yemen has never remained peaceful and prospering. Furthermore, there is a long tradition of diversity and fragmentation.

The only road toward peace in Yemen is to consider the questions of the future structure, several states, status and sovereignty (federation, confederation, independent states) of these states and provide solutions acceptable for main concerned parties (Day 2019). As the very long negotiations of the NDC “8+8” committee proved, there is not yet a conclusion or agreement on the structure, form, and the number of states which could make final peace agreement and reconstruction possible (Day 2014).

Furthermore, there is one more factor that needs to be considered. Yemen is not only fragmented politically (provided a significant number of regional actors represented in the NDC) but also the experience these actors and participants (including civilians) gained in the course of war differs immensely. This experience needs to be accounted for in the decision-making process about their future (Albukari, Heinze 2018: 38).

Due to regionalism and sectarianism in the territory, animosity, and different experience of war, there is no such thing as Yemen nation or Yemeni citizenship. The post-Westphalian optics on national self-determination and sovereignty of state territory, in the case of Yemen, are far beyond the applicable solution. There is however the strong opinion that the Yemeni war could be resolved via assured percentual participation of main actors in the future government as well as assured quota per female representatives. That is the elementary scenario the NDC committees contemporary work on.

The fact is that the future of Yemen will be strongly influenced by the interests of external actors due to its strategic location, the poor population very sensitive in the matter of foreign forces trying to shape their future. As at the beginning of 2020, the most

probable solution would seem to be at least two states as the powers are regionally divided in the prosperous “capitals” South Aden (STC) and North Sanaa (Houthis vs. pro-Hadi Coalition) (Al Jazeera 2020). In 2019 signed the government and STC Riyadh agreement for the first template for peace negotiations and treaties with individual political actors. In the agreement, STC has been promised a 50% representation in the future government of Yemen. The Coalition and government call this agreement a milestone to the period of the new stability of Yemen. Nevertheless, both sides are struggling with the implementation ever since. Saudi objective is for an agreement to unify two major anti-Houthi parties and provide fundamentals for a new one-state solution respecting the Saudi interests and diminishing the Iran influence (Balasubramanian 2020).

There is no military solution to this war. In 2019 there is no clear support among the Yemen population for Hadi or Houthis. The population is the one who suffers the most in this conflict and their interest lies in the ending of the conflict but not so much in the details of its solution. As a result of this situation and lack of electoral framework, not free elections could be used as a tool for establishing a new one state government. There will never be a fully effective institutionalized one nation-state in Yemen. The draft for two and more state confederation seems more likely.

Even before the escalation of the intrastate conflict, Yemen has been considered as one of the poorest countries in the world, and the poorest country in the Middle East and North Africa region. For most of the 21st-century Yemeni economy was dependent on external financial help (international organizations IMF, IDA, and USAID provided the help), which was conditioned by implementing reforms, that should have led to liberalization and democratization. However, as several reports from these organizations show, there has been just a little progress made in implementation and therefore the funds were withdrawn. The already bad economic situation, connected to widespread poverty and malnutrition, has been worsened by on-going war, and predictions are not very optimistic. This chapter will look at the economic impacts of the war on three levels of analysis: impacts on individuals, on the country, and on the international system, which includes regional and global reach.

IMPACT ON INDIVIDUALS

According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, we can talk about individual economic security “in terms of basic human needs. Individuals live or die according to the provision of the necessities for sustaining human life: adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and education” (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998: 104). In other words, individuals who are not economically secured, are lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society. It means not having enough to feed and clothe a family, not having a school or clinic to go to, not having the land on which to grow one’s food or a job to earn one’s living, not having access to credit. Therefore, we can consider poverty as a synonym to economic security, which is very important to remember, as this chapter works with poverty very often when measuring the impacts of the war.

The individuals living in war-torn Yemen feel the most disastrous consequences of the conflict, even if they are not directly involved in it. The destroyed agricultural land and infrastructure, altogether with displacement, due to battle operations and air bombing, and redistributing of imported goods, are causing the largest humanitarian catastrophe in the world, and the situation will not change for a longer period even after the end of the violence. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, if the violence is ceased in 2022, it will cost nearly half a million victims, and more almost 65% of the population will live under the extreme poverty line, and more than 57% of children

will be malnourished (UNDP 2019, 9). The current population of Yemen (June 2020) is more than 29,8 million (Worldometer 2020), from which around 60% are young people up to the age of 24 (CIA 2020). If the violence truly ends in 2022, it would leave more than 19 million people live with no more than \$1,9 per day, and the annual population growth rate, which is currently 2,3% (worldometer.com 2020), will decrease, as malnourished children will rise the infant mortality and death of children under the age of 5.

The overall population will diminish. Food and water insecurity are a serious problem for Yemenis, and currently, the whole population stands at the edge of famine. Long before the war, Yemen was dependent on food import, as 90% of all food was imported, especially wheat (90%) and rice (100%), which are “country’s staple foods” (Oxfam 2017). However, due to the Saudi-led coalition blockade, the major food pipelines in and within the country were disrupted and food stocks were running low. There remained two sources of food: agriculture, and fishing. Despite the fact, that agriculture is a vital part of the Yemen economy, and it is a source of employment for 37% of the population (FAPDA 2014, 1), it is underdeveloped, suffers from water scarcity and other relevant natural resources scarcity (New Agriculturist 2010). Since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition is targeting agricultural land and infrastructure to eliminate food processing. According to Yemen’s Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) and Yemen Data Project (YDP) data, it is visible, that since 2015 the coalition has chosen the strategy in which it moved from targeting mostly military targets to hit civil targets, specifically food processing (Mundy 2018). The already insufficient infrastructure could not survive more than 4 years of air bombing, causing hundreds or thousands of dead and destruction of the infrastructure. Therefore, the distribution of the food is far more worsened because the people have no access to neither foreign nor local food stocks.

Fishing has always been a tradition in Yemen and thanks to domestic and foreign support it became a major and growing contributor to Yemen’s economy, the second largest after oil production (New Agriculturist 2010). Unfortunately, this sector has been targeted by the Saudi-led coalition too: airstrikes caused a fall in fish catches and sales of at least 50%, destroyed ports, dead fishermen (in 2018 it was 146), and damaged offshore fishing installations (Mundy 2018).

Water scarcity was recognizable in Yemen long before the war. However, the

access to it emerged as a weapon of all sides of the conflict. Elimination of water resources as a strategy to force the other side to surrender, destroying water and sanitation infrastructure, and shortages of fuel to water companies resulted in more than 19 million people (in 2018) having no access to clean water and sanitation. Furthermore, with bad hygienic and sanitation conditions, Yemen faced cholera epidemic, which was worsened due to more than half of healthcare services were unfunctional. In 2018 the epidemic fell back, but if there are so many people left without clean water, it is just a matter of time, when another water-borne disease spread among the population (Suter 2018).

Yemen has put the development of education as a top priority of the government, and together with international development programs like UNICEF, USAID, World Bank, etc., it tried to improve literacy and higher education of the population to erase poverty and increase employment. According to the World Bank data from 2016, 84% of children were enrolled in primary education (which is in the country free of charge and takes place between years 6 and 14 (Study Country 2020)), and 72% of them completed this level of education. However, far fewer children continue in secondary (48%) and tertiary (10%) education (Worldbank 2020).

During the war, many schools were destroyed or are not available (school buildings might be used e.g. for accommodating displaced population), teachers and other civil servants have not been paid for their job, and children (mostly in governorates affected by violence) have no access to education. According to UNICEF data from 2019, the aspects mentioned above-disrupted education for more than 3,7 million children in 11 governorates (half of the governorates of the country) which are hit by battle operations (UNICEF 2019). Current humanitarian programs are trying to substitute or support functional schools in Yemen to get the education to as many children as possible (check: UNICEF Education Programme in Yemen and USAID Yemen Education Fact Sheet).

IMPACT ON THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde note, that economy of a state can be securitized, whether, its basic needs are threatened, or (from the liberals' point of view), the economy of countries are securitized, when they cannot be competitive in the international economy and they might be marginalized or destroyed (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 105).

As mentioned above, Yemeni's economy has been dependent on foreign aid and imports long before the war. Still, it managed to generate wealth from domestic resources, especially thanks to rich oil and gas fields. However, oil production is declining in the last decade, as the country's reserves are running out. Therefore, gas resources will be far more important than at the beginning of the 2000s, because it will become the main resource for export, as well as for electricity production. The income from gas will be lower than from oil, but it will be more sustainable, ecological and Yemen will not be that dependent on oil anymore (Schmitz 2012)

The conflict has shown how much is Yemen dependent on oil. 85% of exports consist of raw crude oil (Trading Economics 2020), but it is used in the domestic energy sector as well. Due to the bad security situation in the last 5 years, oil production has been minimalized, because the foreign companies stopped their work and left the country (ibid.). On the other hand, this temporary break in production extended time, when the resources run out, and that could be used for economic restart after the conflict end (Plaut 2008).

The termination of production caused the downfall of the value of exported goods. For example, in 2013, the value of exported goods was more than 7 billion dollars, in 2016 (when it reached the lowest number) it was only almost 152 million dollars (Trading Economics 2020). This affected the governmental budget, which lost one of its highest incomes, and deepened the international debt, as the governmental expenditures have been higher than incomes, and also because of Yemen's high dependence on imports. The estimated value of international debt for 2020 is more than 43,6 billion dollars, which is around 2,5 times more than in 2014 (Statista 2020). Its amount will depend on when the conflict will end and how fast the economy will be functional, and reforms implemented. Yemen's import has also fallen as a result of war, but still, it's lowest value was 43 times higher than the lowest export value.

According to Collier, the GDP per capita annual rate of a country hit by civil war will be declining by 2,2% annually. The decline is caused "*because war directly reduces production and partly because it causes a gradual loss of the capital stock due to destruction, dissaving, and the substitution of portfolios abroad. These affect sectors differential*" (Collier 1999, 181). The two most important sectors of Yemen's economy, agriculture, and crude oil production were seriously damaged by the conflict, which also

affected other sectors (services and manufacturing). There could not be found certain data about these losses, but GDP indicators are still available. According to them, Yemen's GDP is ranked as 102nd out of 189 countries, worth 31,39 billion dollars, and with GDP per capita worth 1052 dollars (World Population Review 2020). The annual growth rate is slowly getting better, as in 2015 it fell to -16,7 %, but in 2018 it rose to -2,7 % (World Bank 2020), and the estimated annual growth rate for 2020 is -3 % (IMF 2020). Despite this fact, the unemployment rate has significantly declined, as in 2019 12,91% of the total labor force was unemployed, which is the lowest number in the last 5 years (World Bank 2020). The number might decrease thanks to international programs to support employment. Some programs are focused on young people, who have problems to establish themselves on the labor market.

One of the international responses to the conflict was implementing sanctions on Yemen. In 2014, the UN Security Council accepted resolution 2140, which put restrictions on individuals, whose actions threaten international peace and security. All UN members are obliged to freeze funds, financial assets, and other economic resources, and are prohibited from entry into or transit through the member states' territories. First, there have been 5 individuals sanctioned, and it was amended by UN resolution 2216 in 2015 (Security Council Report 2020). This resolution added two more individuals on the sanctions' list and put an arms embargo on all leaders and their groups who stand against the internationally recognized government of Yemeni President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi (former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim, and Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Huthi) (UN SC 2015). Both resolutions are still in force.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS

The prolonged and internationalized crisis in Yemen forced the international community and neighboring countries to take actions in order to minimize humanitarian catastrophe and contain the unrest within the country, so the region remains stable.

One of the most common responses to a raging civil war in the neighborhood is rising military expenditures, which usually ends in regional arms races (because qualitative and quantitative arming is faster and more expensive than during peace times). According to the World Bank report, which as a source has used work of Collier and Hoeffler, "a government tends to increase its military expenditure sharply, typically by around two percentage points of GDP. This may be partly because of a perceived threat,

and partly because of norm-setting and the emulation and rivalries of military leaderships” (World Bank 2003, 34). In the case of the Yemeni civil war, Oman increased its military expenditures from 10,1 % in 2014 to 11,9 % in 2016. Since then it again began to decrease (in 2018 the expenditures were around 8,2 % (World Bank 2020)), which may be caused by lowering the intensity of the conflict, or because of a fact, that the most of the conflict is happening in the western part of Yemen, which is far from the Omani borders. As for Saudi Arabia military expenditures, second Yemen’s neighbor, we cannot say it increased due to conflict containment, as Saudi Arabia directly intervened in the conflict and therefore, it has become its part, so the expenditures had to be heightened to lead a successful battle campaign, and remain its military position in the region.

Higher military expenditures create a lack of resources in other sectors, in which the development or normal functioning can be halted (education, health services, etc.). Among military investment, another economic burden is refugees escaping from the war through international borders. According to UNHCR 2018 update around 190 thousand people fled from Yemen to neighboring countries (UNHCR 2018)- Saudi Arabia and Oman. These people need to be fed, need a shelter upon their heads, and health facilities are also required to stop an infection from spreading through refugee camps. UNHCR and other international organizations are trying to help the neighboring countries with these camps. Furthermore, there are few millions internally displaced people in Yemen, which need urgent help as well.

A civil war may affect the economic growth rate of neighboring countries. Again, according to Collier’s work, if a neighbor is at war, the country’s annual growth rate statistically decreases by “around 0,5 percentage points” (Young 2017, 11). Civil war does not need to be internationalized, but it still affects not just the country’s economic growth, but the growth of the whole region as well. The question is, how does the intervention of any of the states of the region (or international actors) influence the economic growth positively or negatively. Last but not least, economic insecurity brought with ongoing civil war can damage other sectors of security described in this publication. One of the security-economic international problems is the threat of Somalia’s pirates, who “are taking advantage of the absence of an operational Yemen Coast Guard” (Munteanu 2016, 11). If we look at a map, Yemen is surrounded by the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are important sea routes for international trade, and can damage it

significantly if no security forces are landed in the area. Even more, piracy in the area put pressure on international companies, which will be forced to hire private security companies to defend their cargo ships.

Before writing this report, we worked with a hypothesis, that export reduction will hurt Yemen's export partners. After data analysis, we found out, that Yemen's export to China, Saudi Arabia, and UAE (the largest export partners) creates not even 0,2% of all imported goods to any of these countries, although Yemen exports more than 40% of its goods to them (OEC 2018). So, the only country's economy that was damaged by export reduction was Yemeni's.

The civil war in Yemen has revealed how vulnerable is the economy of the poorest country in the region, which is dependent on oil export, and the government is not redistributing resources to the society properly. In the current state, the country's regime is not capable of helping its citizens due to the overwhelming cost of human suffering and very limited funds. After the conflict is ended, it will take a long time to get the economy back to the pre-war state, and even further. According to a UNDP report, if the conflict had ended in 2019, the human development would have been set back for 21 years (meaning that the effort of the whole one generation will be destroyed), and the longer the conflict is, the further the setback will be (UNDP 2019, 6). To make the economy reconstruction quicker and more effective, and to minimize impacts on human lives, there are several recommendations in this conclusion, which resulted from the analysis of the economic sector of the conflict on the previous pages.

As noted above, Yemen's regime has not enough resources to fund the country's reconstruction alone. Help from its neighbors to get food, water, clothing, and proper education to those who are in need is already flowing to the country, and there are also several programs of international organizations under the aegis of the UN to help Yemeni's people. However, these programs usually have not enough finances to get all that help to the country and are often forced to beg member states for support or to look for it elsewhere or complete the program only partly. Therefore, international organizations should have a bigger mandate from the member countries to get more resources and more help to Yemen.

Regarding the international community, one more recommendation should have been taken in mind- that both state and non-state actors should follow the restrictions and

sanctions put on Yemen, so the conflict will not escalate anymore. Furthermore, the UN should enforce and control the measurements if it is needed.

As for Yemen itself, after the war it will have to implement reforms, that would liberalize the economy. After that, better participation in the global market would be possible, which could lead to a more attractive position for foreign investors. However, it is not enough only to implement these reforms, but there is another aspect of the state apparatus that needs to be fought with- corruption. According to Transparency International, Yemen is one of the most corruptive countries in the world (in 2019 it is placed as the 177th most corruptive country out of 180) (Transparency International 2020). Again, international help will be needed in ending corruption.

But, one thing that could help not just Yemen's economy but also beat corruption, is restructuring the economic sectors. Oil production (mainly for export) as a primary source of income creates space for corruption and non-transparency. Also, it is highly dependent on global oil prices, which if they are very low, might cause an economic crisis in a state. Plus, oil deposits will be empty in a couple of years, so Yemen is required to find not just other sources of income, but also sources of energy. For example, power plants are mostly powered by oil, so if it runs out, millions of people will be left without electricity, including most of the economics and government. One of the solutions is, to support other economic sectors, including the processing industry (Yemen exports oil, but imports fuel), agriculture (which is often underdeveloped and suffers from several issues), and services.

None of these recommendations will be done easily and quickly. It will need a lot of effort, international cooperation, and dedication to the local authorities. Last but not least, the government will have to ensure stability in other sectors described in this publication, because none of them can truly work independently.

As our analysis shows, Yemen as a state is destroyed and unsecured among all spheres of life. It is not only about political or military security but also in terms of unemployment, lack of medical assistance or impossibility to continue in education.

Yemen's infrastructure has been destroyed almost from the very beginning of the conflict as it has been one of the main targets from both sides. Speaking about infrastructure and strategic sites, both sides have been targeting these strategic places. It has caused not only the impossibility to travel across the country, but also to be able to receive any kind of food supplies or clean water. Even though international humanitarian organizations have been trying to intervene and assist Yemeni people, it has been almost impossible to deliver all supplies to the most destroyed places not only because of almost non-existing infrastructure but also due to the military forces, who have been participating in food smuggling. Even before the conflict, Yemen has been the poorest country in the Middle East and North Africa and has been dependent on food supplies. Almost 90% of the food has been imported. The worsening situation has been followed by an increasing level of malnutrition and an extremely high number of mortalities of very young children.

Lack of food and clean water (water scarcity) has caused the spread of several diseases, including Cholera. Unfortunately, due to both sides fighting and targeting civil targets have led to difficulties in getting medical assistance such as medicaments, antibiotics, and others.

Further problem which has occurred in this conflict has been the restrictions applied to ports that have been crucial for food or oil supplies. Military presence and participation in illegal activities have spread unbelief and lack of credibility among Yemeni people.

Another part of our analysis has shown a fragile role of law and almost complete absence of stability and quite low trust in police forces, which is linked to a high level of corruption.

Yemen has been located in a very strategic location, which has led to the intensive attention of other countries and international organizations. Saudi Arabia, who has been very active in the territory last decades, has had its interests in Yemen and therefore has been one of the most intervening and participating actors in the conflict. Their main goal

is to set a unified state which would be respecting Saudi perception of the region and vision, and therefore to limit the influence of another strong actor in the Middle East, Iran.

It is crucial to acknowledge that an open military conflict or a war is not the right solution as it is going to lead to more deaths, more destructive impact on the whole country, and economic situation in the region. It is essential to enable humanitarian organizations, including, for instance, Doctors without borders to actively work in the region and participate in improving the situation in the country. All participating actors should negotiate about a cease-fire and under UN surveillance discuss possible solutions. Part of these negotiations and the participation of human rights organization should also include the questions of sexual violence and child-soldiers and should be considered while applying international law and charge for war crimes.

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