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European Journal of Politics and Gender • vol XX • no XX • 1–18
© European Conference on Politics and Gender and Bristol University Press 2023
Print ISSN 2515-1088 • Online ISSN 2515-1096
https://doi.org/10.1332/251510821X16742321076420
Accepted for publication 20 January 2023 • First published online 24 February 2023
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Parting with ‘interests of women’: how feminist
scholarship on substantive representation could
replace ‘women’s interests’ with ‘gender
equality interests’
Mette Marie Staehr Harder, mm.harder@kau.se
University of Copenhagen, Denmark and Karlstad University, Sweden 
The concept of ‘women’s interests’ has received a large amount of scholarly attention. In
particular, the problematic assumption underpinning this concept – that women share
interests – has been an object of much consideration. Yet, while scholarship on the substantive
representation of women has today moved free of this assumption, three other assumptions
have not been scrutinised to the same degree. These are: (1) that political interests are attached
to social groups; (2) that women and men have different interests; and (3) that there are only
two genders. This article argues that these three assumptions are problematic for feminist
scholarship on substantive representation, which warrants replacing the attached ‘women’s
interests’ with an alternative interest: the unattached ‘gender equality interests’. In addition,
the article sets forth three distinct ways for future studies to operationalise the substantive
representation of gender equality.
Key words substantive representation • identity • gender equality • men • social groups •
non-binary
Key messages
•	The term ‘women’s interests’ sets up gender as a binary and frames male actors as
less important.
•	Researchers may study how the interests of political groups are substantively represented
without setting off from identity.
•	We should think of political interests as unattached from social attributes.
•	‘Women’ should be replaced with ‘gender equality’ when studying substantive representation.
To cite this article: Harder, M.M.S. (2023) Parting with ‘interests of women’: how feminist
scholarship on substantive representation could replace ‘women’s interests’ with ‘gender
equality interests’, European Journal of Politics and Gender, XX(XX): 1–18,
DOI: 10.1332/251510821X16742321076420
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Mette Marie Staehr Harder
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Introduction
The extent to which elected representatives represent the interests of women has been
a central area of focus for feminist political scientists over the last three decades. Today,
an extensive and well-integrated literature has analysed the degree to which women’s
interests are substantively represented in parliaments,1 including their representation in
legislative committees (Grace and Sawer, 2016; Harder, 2017), at party group meetings
and in women’s caucuses (Johnson and Josefsson, 2016), as well as in legislative bills
(Thomas and Welch, 1991; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008) and parliamentary debates
(Childs, 2002; Celis, 2008). Of all social groups, women have been the object of the
bulk of scholarly interest within studies of substantive representation (see Erzeel and
Rashkova, 2022), and the literature has been characterised as one ‘of great innovation
in its dealings with theories and practices of representation’ (Severs, 2012: 169).
In particular, this innovation has been driven by the need to move past the idea
embedded in the concept of ‘women’s interests’ that women share interests (see
Baldez, 2011). Today, the literature has navigated beyond this problematic assumption
(Squires, 2008; Severs, 2010). Most notably, this has been done through ambitious
research designs that emphasise intersectionality and the dynamic character of interest
formation and representation (see, for example, Celis et al, 2014; Severs, 2010; Celis
and Mügge, 2018). However, in this article, I argue that despite these noteworthy
advances, the literature has accepted three other assumptions that are likewise logically
embedded within the concept of women’s interests. These are: (1) that political
interests belong to social groups (or, in the words of Hanna Pitkin [1967: 190–208],
‘that interests “are attached” to groups’); (2) that women and men have different
interests; and (3) that there are only two genders.
The word ‘interest’ may sound odd to the reader. As I have illustrated elsewhere,
in Pitkin’s (1967) classic book, ‘interest’ is a dual concept, as an interest exists in
one of two forms: either an interest is thought of as attached to a particular group
of people (a so-called ‘attached interest’), or it is pictured as existing in a form that
is not attached to any particular group of people (a so-called ‘unattached interest’)
(Harder, 2020). To stress the dual character of interests, I here define this concept
as: ‘that which furthers either the well-being of an individual or the promotion of an
abstraction as these are defined in objective, subjective or constructivist terms’. The
article shows how moving from thinking of interests as attached towards thinking
of these as unattached (and thus moving beyond the first of the three assumptions
examined in this article) will assist feminist scholarship on substantive representation
and gender2 to also move free of the problematic assumptions that women and men
have different interests, and that there are only two genders.
Before discussing the research on women’s interests, attached and unattached
interests, and the problematic assumptions further, it is important to express admiration
for the decades of feminist research that have generated essential knowledge of
representation and gender. This research has provided insights and arguments for
practical political action in societies all over the world, and made it possible to
address fundamental problems of gender-based inequality. Yet, concepts that seem
straightforward in one temporal area may appear highly problematic in another (Goertz
and Mazur, 2008: 22). Accordingly, in a time where identifying outside of the logic
of a gender binary is becoming increasingly difficult, we – as feminist scholars – need
to critically assess the terms we use and the genders these terms prescribe. In addition,
we need to consider the potential critical actors that our academic terms construct. In
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Parting with ‘interests of women’
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particular, we should consider how society is served by research that constructs political
actions for greater gender equality as something that is primarily the responsibility of
representatives who identify as women. By raising these considerations, this article
aims to spur a conversation on the performative effects of the variable ‘women’s
interests’, while exploring alternative variables.
In the next section, I start by reviewing the literature on the substantive
representation of women, with a focus on the dependent variable in this scholarship
(that is, ‘women’s interests’) and the innovative ways through which scholars have
moved beyond the assumption that women share interests. Then, in the third section,
I explain the first of the three unexamined assumptions of women’s interests: that
interests are attached to social groups. I describe how this conceptualisation of interests
makes it difficult to conceive of substantive representation and gender outside the
matrix of identity – an ambition that I have recently raised elsewhere (see Harder,
2020) but that was already envisioned by Young (2000: 126) two decades ago. Based
on my reinterpretation of Pitkin’s concept of substantive representation (on Pitkin
[1967], see Harder, 2020), I outline an alternative conceptualisation of interests,
that is, the notion of unattached interests, which will enable scholars to conceive of
substantive representation outside the logic of identity.
Having discussed the first of the unexplored assumption in the third section, I
move to discuss the second and third of these assumptions in the fourth. In the fifth
section, I construct the unattached ‘gender equality interests’as a practical alternative
to the attached ‘women’s interests’, and I present three ways for future scholarship
to operationalise gender equality interests. Finally, in the last section, I discuss the
change and concerns that moving from the interest of women to those of gender
equality will have for research on substantive representation and gender.
As I hope the article conveys, I do not see changing the dependent variable from
‘interests of women’ to ‘gender equality interests’ as ‘an easy fix’. For example, this
substitution does not enable sudden gender-neutral research or diminish the difficult
methodological (and political) choices scholars must make. In turn, since each study’s
results hinge on a combination of its theoretical approach and methodology – along
with its concepts – it is not given that changing how we conceptualise the dependent
variable will bring changes in the findings of our research. Yet, as I argue later, such
changes may influence the ways in which political actors conceive of genders and
political action.
The literature on the substantive representation of women
In this section, I review the literature that studies how the interests of women are
substantively represented in legislative bodies.3 The review focuses on the literature’s
dependent variable and on how this literature has managed to move free of the
assumption that women share interests.
After having been initially concerned with exploring ‘when’ and ‘how women
act for women’, today, scholars in the field now widely follow the research agenda
set forth by Childs and Krook in 2009. This agenda leads to research such questions
as: ‘How does the substantive representation of women occur and what do specific
actors do?’ (Childs and Krook, 2009: 126). At first glance, these research questions
appear open-ended concerning the gender of potential critical actors because the term
‘women’ has been replaced with ‘actors’. Indeed, researchers following a precedent
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like the one set by Childs and Krook are less likely to assume that only female
representatives act on women’s behalf (see, for example, Palmieri, 2013; Celis et al,
2014; Celis and Erzeel, 2015; Höhmann, 2020). Nevertheless, despite the change
in the description of potential critical actors, the dependent variable has remained
unchanged. Due to this, the literature contains an unspoken, uncontested and almost
unanimous agreement that scholars are to apply the notion of ‘women’s interests’(or
dynamic subgroups of women’s interests) as the dependent variable. Hence, today,
still only a few studies have investigated alternative dependent variables, and those
that have are primarily analyses of the way in which key concepts (such as ‘gender
equality’) are constructed in parliamentary settings (see, for example, Kantola and
Lombardo, 2017).
Despite the implicit agreement on treating ‘women’s interests’ as the dependent
variable, this concept is heavily contested. Most notably, the assumption that women
share interests – which is linguistically embedded in the concept – has been a point
of great feminist concern. In particular, political activists and scholars of political
representation have pointed to the fact that different groups of women live different
lives, gain different perspectives and do, indeed, tend to hold different political ideas
and opinions (see, for example, hooks, 1981; Mohanty, 1991; Crosby, 1992; Grant,
1993; Butler, 1999; Young, 2000).
Several solutions have been developed to overcome this issue. In particular, such
solutions address how the group of women is perceived and often apply an intersectional
approach to questions of identity formation (Crenshaw, 1991; Young, 1994; Hancock,
2007; Smooth, 2011; Weldon, 2011; Celis and Mügge, 2018). In a similar vein,
different ways to approach the concept of interests have been formulated (Jónasdóttir,
1988; Beckwith, 2011; Reingold and Swers, 2011). For example, inspired by the
definition of Jónasdóttir (1988), which she develops, Beckwith distinguishes among:
‘interests, which are fundamental to women’s life chances and their options for action;
issues, which are strategic choices that emphasize components of interest as points
of mobilization; and preferences, which position actors to select among discrete
and limited alternatives’ (Beckwith, 2011: 424). In a different vein, Reingold and
Swers encourage scholars to cease treating the concept of interests as an exogenous
variable. Rather, they argue, studies should focus on how political actors construct
women’s interests within political arenas of power (Reingold and Swers, 2011).
Additionally, scholars of representation have set forth new ways to understand the
process of substantive representation itself (Mansbridge, 2003; Squires, 2008; Saward,
2010; Severs, 2010), which have been cleverly applied within research on women’s
substantive representation as a means to break free of the assumption of shared interests
(see, for example, Celis et al, 2014; Celis and Mügge, 2018).
In sum, because of these innovations within its key concepts, scholarship on the
substantive representation of women has broken free of the assumption that women
are a homogeneous group with similar interests. Yet, the ‘interests of women’, or,
alternatively, the interests of smaller, more- or less-dynamic subgroups of women,
still constitute its key dependent variable (for a similar evaluation of this scholarship,
see Squires, 2008: 189; Kantola and Lombardo, 2017: 328–30).
Moving on from the thoroughly examined assumption of women’s shared interests,
I now turn to discuss how conceptualising of the dependent variable in a novel way
will assist feminist scholars to move free of the three unexplored assumptions. Initially,
this involves moving from thinking of the dependent variable as something that is
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Parting with ‘interests of women’
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owned and defined by a particular social group to something in which everybody
may participate, thus moving free of the first of the unexplored assumptions. This
can be done by following Pitkin’s second way of substantive representation (see
Harder, 2020).
From attached to unattached interests
In her 1967 book, Pitkin uses the terms ‘interests’, ‘welfare’and ‘wishes’as synonyms.
An important accomplishment of Pitkin is that she argues that interests may be thought
of as either ‘attached’or ‘unattached’, and as something that may be defined through
subjective or objective means (Pitkin, 1967: 146, 210). Hence, in Pitkin’s view,
interests are defined as a spectrum, where ‘the political wishes of the citizen as this
person sees it’constitutes one pole and ‘the objective values in a nation’constitutes the
other. Therefore, building on Pitkin’s (1967) book, an overall definition of interests
needs to capture both extremes, which is why more particular definitions of interests
are preferable (Pitkin, 1967: 209–11).
In this section, I will unpack Pitkin’s distinction between ‘attached’and ‘unattached’
interests. These adjectives concern the role played by those who are substantively
represented in the ‘interests’in question.4 When political scientists conceive of interests
in an attached form, formulating the content of such interests is based on the people
who are represented in these interests: if representative A represents attached interest
X, the content of X is defined in terms of the specific characteristics or attributes5
(Y) of the people who ‘own’X. Accordingly, in this case, social attributes (Y) define
the content of interest (X) (as illustrated in Figure 1). Think, for example, of workers’
interests, women’s interests, the interests of Danish sailors or the dynamic and contextdependent
interests of a young, queer Muslim who has recently immigrated to a
large city in Holland.
Within the scholarship that deals with how interests related to gender are
substantively represented in parliaments, the conceptualisation of interests as ‘attached’
is, by far, the most common way to think of these. However, according to Pitkin,
there is another way to think of interests that involves thinking of them as unattached
to particular individuals: just as abstractions or ideals may exist unattached to specific
individuals, so may interests. For example, Pitkin (1967: 154–5) lists union solidarity,
truth and peace as examples of such abstractions.
Pitkin’s idea of unattached interests makes it possible to understand the content of
political interests without starting with the attributes of the people who participate in
furthering such interests (see Harder, 2020: 7–10). Figure 2 illustrates the relationship
between the content of unattached interest X and the important attributes6 of the
people who are represented in it, which may be Y but could also simultaneously be
Z, V, W and so on.
One may ask where unattached interests come from. Here, the answer is that the
birth of interests does not have to be all that different from the birth of attached
interests: they could arise as a response to new evidence of injustice in society or as
a sudden collective feeling that ‘something needs to be done’; or they could arise
based on a rational analysis of the way power, capital or social privileges are divided
in society – a division that no doubt benefits some social groups while disadvantaging
others. Nevertheless, in its unattached form, interests are not defined by either of
these groups.
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From groups with attributes to groups with attitudes
Besides the theoretical possibility of separating the content of unattached interests
from the attributes of the people who are represented in these, another difference
between unattached interests and their attached counterparts is that from a linguistic
perspective, the people who are represented in an unattached interest only participate
in this; they do not own it. The abstract nature of unattached interests, coupled with
the absence of ownership, creates a much-needed distance between the content of
an interest and the attributes of those who participate in it.
It is important to point out that the existence of a distance between the content of
an interest and its participants does not indicate ‘that there are no people represented
in these interests’. As highlighted by Pitkin, substantively acting for someone involves
being potentially responsible for that person (Pitkin, 1967: 155; Severs, 2010).
This type of potential responsibility also applies to the representation of unattached
interests. In other words, for us to conceive of an act as substantive representation, it
must reflect potential responsibility for specific people. When interests are thought
of as unattached, the people for whom the representative is potentially responsible
are those who participate in the unattached interests being represented. Like others,
these people have attributes that gain socially constructed meanings in relation to
others. As such, scholars may still study the social attributes and the social group
relations of the people who participate in an interest when an interest is conceived of
as ‘unattached’. However, in contrast to the mainstream view of studies of substantive
representation and gender, when we conceive of an interest as unattached, neither
the social attributes of the interest participants nor their membership in social groups
form the analytical point of departure; rather, the shared political beliefs or attitudes
of these people do.
When we conceptualise politics through the matrix of unattached interests, we
may find that people who participate in the same unattached interest do not have
similar attributes and that they do, in fact, belong to very different social groups.7
Figure 2: Unattached interests
Content of interest ≠ Specific attribute(s) of those represented in the interest,
(interest participants)
X ≠ Y, Z, V, W, etc.
Note: Content of interest ≠ specific attribute(s) of those represented in the interest (interest participants): X ≠
Y, Z, V, W and so on.
Figure 1: Attached interests
Content of an interest = Specific attribute(s) of those represented in the interest,
(interest owners)
X = Y
Note: Content of an interest = specific attribute(s) of those represented in the interest (interest owners): X = Y.
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Alternatively, we may find that they have similar attributes and belong to the same
social group. In practice, whether or not the people who participate in an interest
have similar attributes will typically depend on how narrowly we conceptualise the
political interest in question (as well as, obviously, the participants’ social attributes).
Accordingly, if interests are defined in very broad terms – for example, gender equality
interests or the interests of putting an end to human-caused climate change – we
may find that the social attributes of the people who participate in the interest are
less homogeneous than if we conceived of the interest in narrower terms, such as the
interest of shared, fully publicly funded parental leave or the interest of using only
carbon-neutral means for the transportation of building materials by 2030.
Revisiting the vision of Young
Thinking of interests as unattached bears similarities to Phillips’(1995) term ‘politics
of ideas’(which Philips sets forth while describing her ‘politics of presence’), as well
as the phenomena that Young (2000: 133–41) terms ‘opinions’ (which is different
from her concepts of ‘perspectives’and ‘interests’). The theoretical goal that I aim to
reach is similar to Young’s vision of being able ‘to conceptualise representation outside
the logic of identity’. Yet, Young (2000: 126) proposed that this would be possible
by perceiving representation through ‘the metaphysics of presence’. Accordingly,
in Inclusion and Democracy, she suggested that thinking of political representation
through Derrida’s concept of différance ‘as a process involving a mediated relation of
constituents to one another and to a representative’might resolve the paradox of how
the identities and opinions of a myriad of people are being made present through
the actions and identity of a single representative (Young, 2000: 126). Hence, just as
more recent scholars of representation, such as Celis et al (2014) and Saward (2010),
Young suggested that scholars alter how they approach the act of representation.
Instead, I propose that the concept of identity can be separated from the concept of
substantive representation by altering how we approach interests.
Departing from the second and third assumptions
I now turn to discuss the problematic character of the second and third assumptions
of women’s interests, that is, that women and men have different interests, and that
there are only two genders, which have not yet received much attention. My overall
claim that the term ‘women’s interests’is problematic for feminist research rests on the
idea that social research and political society are interlinked (Bourdieu, 1991; Butler,
1999; Brubaker, 2002). For example, Brubaker (2002: 177–84) has illustrated how
scientific conceptualisations of ethnic groups produce exactly these kinds of ethnic
tensions in a society, and he advises that researchers apply less constitutive ethnic
categories. Similarly, in feminist political science, how this line of research influences
society has recently become a topic of scholarly concern (Dahlerup, 2006; Murray,
2014). Given the fact that research may have performative effects, in the following,
I discuss how the term ‘women’s interests’ could indeed be counterproductive for a
scholarship that aims for a more gender-diverse and gender-just society.
As pointed out earlier, when we conceive of interests as attached to specific people,
we normally assume that the people who ‘own’ an interest will want to advance it
and that others will not. Thus, ‘women’s interests’positions women as the owners of
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these interests and thus as its implied agents. Scholars have pointed out that such a
conceptual practice places an implicit burden on the shoulders of female representatives
(see, for example, Lovenduski, 2000: 154). An additional aspect of this assumption
that has not received similar attention is that the combination of the binary term
‘women’and the attached form of interest initially sets forth ‘women’s interests’as not
being in the interests of men (for similar accounts, see Grant, 1993; Baldez, 2011).8
In other words, it is not necessarily expected for men to act on women’s interests.
Given the performative effect of academic terms, such language could encourage
suggestions like that of activist Michael Kaufmann (2001: 50) that men must ‘possess
some inherent goodness’ to address issues9 of violence against women. In this way,
according to Kaufmann, when acting to eliminate gender-based violence, men are
doing something extraordinary.
My suggestion that political interests that are framed as belonging to women gain
less support from male representatives has been illustrated in a Scandinavian context.
For example, having controlled for political affiliation, Dahlerup et al (2021) find that
male representatives who self-identify as feminists are not inclined to also endorse
‘acting for women’. Accordingly, ‘acting for women’ and ‘being a feminist’ are seen
as two different things, and male representatives are more inclined to do the second,
which does not apply a binary term or an attached interest. In addition, Erikson
(2018) has shown that Swedish women representatives are aware of this tendency
and plan their political strategies accordingly. Thus, seeking to engage their male
colleagues, they deliberately frame prostitution as a problem that affects everyone, not
as a ‘women’s issue’.10 Consistent with these observations is the circumstance that as
the share of women representatives increases, male representatives in Swedish local
councils indicate that they are less likely to ‘personally represent women’s issues and
concerns’ but not less likely to ‘work toward a gender equality society’ (Kokkonen
and Wängnerud, 2007). Accordingly, this finding could also illustrate that Swedish
local, male representatives conceive of women’s interests and gender equality interests
as two different things, and do not see the latter – non-binary and non-attached –
interests as interests in which they are not to engage.
Finally, the term ‘women’ implies a binary, heteronormative view of gender, in
which people are either male or female (see Butler, 1999). Of course, we could
presume that this should not be a matter of much concern, as most people identify
as either male or female. However, assenting to a discourse that indirectly muffles
minorities should not be the first option for feminist scholars, especially not at a
point in history when the rise of right-wing extremism and extreme conservatism
has meant that ‘racial forms of intersectional inequality are legitimized’ (Verloo
and Kantola, 2018: 208) and the rights of people who do not identify as either a
man or woman are currently being hampered to a degree that no one could have
predicted only a decade ago (Verloo and Paternotte, 2018; see also Chiva, 2023).
Although not all feminist scholarship needs to focus on this concern, I believe that
all feminist scholars should consider how their key variable feeds the anti-multiplegenders
sentiment.
An alternative dependent variable: gender equality interests
As stated earlier, I propose ‘gender equality interests’ as a practical alternative
to ‘women’s interests’.11 In this section, I discuss the term ‘gender equality’ and
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set forth three distinct ways in which future scholarship may operationalise this
dependent variable.
As pointed out by Walby (2009: 48), ‘gender equality is a “contested signifier,” an
“essentially contested concept”’, and constructivist analysis, in particular, has illustrated
how the meaning of gender equality is repeatedly stretched and bent (Lombardo
et al, 2009: 4–5; Kantola and Lombardo, 2017). Accordingly, in this manner, the
concept of gender equality is similar to that of ‘women’s interests’, which has also
been shown to be a hotly contested concept (Celis et al, 2014; Celis and Childs,
2014). In addition, the term ‘gender equality’is probably more political than that of
‘women’s interests’, as conservatives – who often support certain ‘women’s interests’–
may not agree that gender equality should be advanced at all. Therefore, the concept
of gender equality interests certainly does not embrace the views of all women, and
scholarship on the substantive representation of gender equality needs also to study
opposition to gender equality.
How could scholars of the substantive representation of gender equality
operationalise gender equality interests? In the following, I set forth three distinct
paths for future research of the substantive representation of gender equality to
operationalise its dependent variable into measurable variables. All three paths draw
on the scholarship on the substantive representation of ‘women’s interests’. Taking
advantage of the breadth of this scholarship, the paths are epistemologically and
ontologically very different. In particular, they vary according to their sensitiveness
towards illustrating diversity within the variable in question, as well as the degree to
which they approach the operationalisation of gender equality interests as exogenous to
the actual study of their substantive representation. Moreover, they differ concerning
the degree to which they apply qualitative and quantitative methods. To stress each
path’s different ontological starting point, I term these the ‘objectivist’, ‘subjectivist’
and ‘constructivist’ paths.
Objectivist path
Within the objectivist path, knowledge about the social world is approached as
a matter of fact and of political priority. Scholars who apply this path could use
exogenous parameters to operationalise the content of gender equality interests. First,
scholars may look to knowledge on gender inequality as illustrated in analyses of the
world. Based on this knowledge, gender equality interests may be operationalised as
political actions meant to increase the level of gender equality in society. For example,
Dahlerup (2014: 69–70) suggests that scholars look to global gender indexes like
the Global Gender Gap (World Economic Forum). Second, following the example
of Baldez (2011: 422), who advocates using the political goals of the 1979 UN
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
to operationalise the content of ‘women’s interests’, international conventions could
be applied to operationalise the content and issues of ‘gender equality interests’ (for
example, CEDAW Articles 3–16). Third, yet in a very different manner, scholars
could operationalise the content of these interests based on rational argumentation and
feminist theories. Accordingly, to break free of the political relativism that sometimes
follows from constructivist approaches (I address this later), Walby (2009) advises that
feminist scholars trust the power of everyday rationality and argumentation. Based
on Habermas’s idea of communication, she calls on feminist scholars to move out of
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the shadow of ‘the politics of location’and set forth feminist positions against which
policies may be evaluated (Walby, 2009: 36–40). An example of such a position that
could be agreed upon after rational deliberation is ‘freedom outside of the binary’or
‘paid parental leave for all parents’. Subsequently, scholars with the aim of studying
the substantive representation of gender equality could investigate the degree to
which policies that will advance these goals in society are legislated and scrutinised
in parliament.
Each of the three objectivist designs raises different, yet related, concerns. First,
as argued by Verloo and Kantola (2018: 213), it is important to acknowledge that
the fact that specific measures of gender equality have been agreed upon by political
actors does not render them politically neutral. In addition, scholars have rightly
argued that when operationalising ‘women’s interests’by applying feminist and leftist
measures, research smuggles feminism in through the back door (though not in these
exact words) (see Celis et al, 2014; Celis and Childs, 2014; Celis and Erzeel, 2015).
However, an analogous critique of the use of similar measures to operationalise
‘gender equality interests’ is not equally appropriate, as the term ‘gender equality’,
unlike that of ‘women’s interests’, indicates a political position, not membership of a
social group. Thus, although such an operationalisation could be criticised on other
grounds, it does – contrary to studies of the representation of ‘women’s interests’ –
invite feminism in through the front door.
Subjectivist path
Within this path, knowledge about the social world is viewed as something that
is accessible through the eyes of social actors only. Thus, such knowledge is very
much subjectivist, and to establish the content of gender equality interests, one must
understand the perspectives of those who participate in these interests. One method
could be to conduct qualitative interviews with interest participants to understand their
subjectivist perspective of the content of gender equality. Alternatively, scholars could
study this in more processual terms by analysing how groups agree on the content
of interests through interpersonal processes of communication or how subjectivist
perspectives are altered through such processes. Here, the research design proposed by
Reingold and Swers (2011), which includes the concept of power,12 could serve as
inspiration. Accordingly, Reingold and Swers (2011) suggest that scholars determine
the content of ‘women’s interests’ by observing how these interests are negotiated at
party group meetings, thus exploring how identity, institutions and power intersect
in the process of finding common ground within the group.
An important benefit of the subjectivist research design – which may involve
utilising various methods of observation and interviews at several points in time – is
that it focuses the attention of the scholar towards diversity among interest participants
and the processes of finding common ground. A focus on such phenomena could
be especially important in studies of the substantive representation of gender
equality, in which neither the attributes of individuals, the situated knowledge of
social groups nor power are initially the focus. Indeed, feminist research has often
illustrated how structures of power interact with the social attributes of people, thus
making it easier for some people (and some groups of people) to speak their minds
than others. In other words, although the alternative variable of gender equality
involves ceasing to apply social attributes and social groups as the starting points of
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Parting with ‘interests of women’
11
the study of interest representation, this does not mean that scholars should ignore
these facts altogether. At a practical level, feminist knowledge about structures of
power could be integrated into studies of substantive representation and gender
through methods that focus on power and the process through which common
ground is found among interest participants.
Constructivist path
Finally, the third path views phenomena in the social world as constructed through
the actions of social actors. Following this path to gain knowledge of the content of
gender equality interests, scholars should analyse how – and with what effect – these
interests are constructed. Inspiration for such analyses can be found in studies of the
processes through which actors claim to act for women (Celis et al, 2014; Celis and
Childs, 2018). Most notably, such scholars apply the theoretical framework developed
in the writings of Saward (2010), Mansbridge (2003) and Squires (2008).
Thus far, constructivist-inspired studies of women’s substantive representation,
as well as studies of the way in which concepts are constructed and contested in
political arenas, have proved extraordinarily effective in illustrating the diversity within
views of social concepts (see, for example, Kantola and Lombardo, 2017: 328–30).
Nevertheless, like studies that set out to explore ‘who claims to act for women’,
scholars of the substantive representation of gender equality would need to focus
more on the actual acts of substantive representation (Who acts for the various types
of gender equality, when and how?), rather than primarily on the variety of the
discourses presented, which is typically the aim of the excellent, constructivist-inspired
literature. Additionally, in line with the claim-making approach as redefined by Severs
(2010), such scholars could also address how such representative acts are received.
A potential problem with studies that solely focus on public claims made by political
actors and the way in which groups mobilise for or against such claims is that only
interests that are articulated within the social space are studied. Therefore, the interests
in which people with little or no opportunity to articulate their views participate
fall outside the scope of such studies. However, a possible means of dealing with
the problem of ‘only existing if articulated’has been proposed by Celis and Mügge’s
thorough methodological approach (see Celis and Mügge, 2018).
Another issue that relates to the constructivist approaches in particular – but
that can also become a problem for studies applying a processual approach – is that
advocates of these methods sometimes suggest that interests that are articulated by
relevant actors should not primarily be evaluated in terms of their content; rather,
scholars should evaluate the process through which these interests are represented.
For example, to fully acknowledge the diversity embedded within the concept of
women’s issues, Celis and Childs (2018; 2020: 90–2) advise employing a procedural
approach through which only the quality of the representative process – not the
content of the represented interests – is evaluated.13 However, for feminist research,
such an approach could constitute a political dead end (for a critique of constructivist
representation theory more generally and Saward’s theory in particular, see Lord and
Pollak, 2013; Disch, 2015). Concerning this important debate, it should be mentioned
that when envisioning a normative model for feminist democratic representation,
Celis and Childs (2020: 183) have recently formulated so-called ‘kitchen rules’, or
the existence of a feminist red line for the type of claims that cannot be accepted in a
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Mette Marie Staehr Harder
12
feminist democracy due to their content. The three ways of operationalising ‘gender
equality interests’ are summarised in Table 1.
In conclusion, each of the three paths has particular advantages and disadvantages.
Yet, the severity of a particular issue may change when the interest in question
changes its format from attached to unattached, and vice versa. Most notably, unlike
the interest of women, objectivist paths for operationalising gender equality interests
do not invite ideas of gender equality in through the back door; rather, they open the
door in the front of the house for everyone to see. In a similar vein, substantive and
constructive paths for operationalising gender equality interests should be particularly
concerned with notions of power because no primary interest subject is automatically
determined. How to ensure this in ways that go beyond the ideas briefly sketched
earlier will hopefully be a topic for future consideration.
Conclusion
In this article, I have called attention to three unexplored assumptions of ‘women’s
interests’ that constitute the dependent variable in most studies of substantive
representation and gender: the assumption that political interests are attached to groups
with a certain identity; the idea of gender as a binary phenomenon; and the idea
that the interests in question are of concern to women actors primarily. Considering
current political developments in society and the political ambition of this research,
these assumptions seem unfitting. Due to this, I have argued that feminist scholars of
substantive representation and gender should consider conceptualising their dependent
variable as the unattached ‘gender equality interests’, instead of the attached ‘women’s
interests’. Finally, I have presented three distinct ways of operationalising this new
dependent variable.
One may raise various concerns about applying gender equality as a dependent
variable in future studies. It may be claimed that there are contexts in which it
would be inappropriate to conceptualise an interest concerning gender as something
in which women and men alike might participate, for example, when the political
divide between men and women is so deep that this simply does not make sense, or
that the political spearhead is lost when women are not made the explicit subject
of gender equality. Yet, as pointed out by Brubaker, it is particularly in societies in
which severe group cleavages exist that conceptualising interests as something that
belongs to these groups risks further solidifying such divisions (see Brubaker, 2002).
From a political point of view, it has been claimed that concepts involving the
term ‘gender’, such as ‘gender-sensitive’ and ‘gender-friendly’, are often applied by
feminist political scientists for strategic reasons, for example, ‘to avoid conflict over
their exact meaning and even hiding more radical goals’ (Dahlerup, 2014: 60; see
also Childs and Dahlerup, 2018; Kantola and Verloo, 2018: 211). There are certainly
Table 1: Three approaches to operationalising gender equality interests
Objectivist path Subjectivist path Constructivist path
Interest opera-
tionalisation
Interests are operationalised
as facts about the world or as
normative feminist goals
Interests are
operationalised as
subjective matters
Interests are
operationalised as
constitutive acts
Input needed to
operationalise
the interest
Factual knowledge of the world or
of normative feminist positions
Knowledge of
relevant actors’
views
Knowledge of the
claims made by
relevant actors
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Parting with ‘interests of women’
13
contexts and episodes in which this is true. However, today, as has also been pointed
out by several scholars, the concept of gender equality is contested and politically
controversial (Verloo and Kantola, 2018: 206–7; Phillips, 2019).
In addition, scholars have argued that using the term ‘gender equality’ is not
progressive enough, or that it implies the existence of a male standard (Walby
[2009: 43] and Phillips [2019: 25–7] both point to this argument, which they do
not promote themselves). Although it cannot be denied that this may be the case in
specific circumstances, there does not seem to be any (inherent) reason why insisting
on the equality of all genders should result in adopting a male standard. Nevertheless,
just as when measuring the substantive representation of women’s interests, scholars
who study the substantive representation of gender equality should be attentive to
this potential problem, which is to be prevented by incorporating intersectional
knowledge on the needs and priorities of all genders.
In the end, formulating the dependent variable of any social science study is a
political and normative choice. Although this article may not have convinced all
readers that applying the concept of gender equality is the way to move forward for
feminist research, it may have raised attention towards the political implications of
‘women’s interests’, which have thus far not received much attention. Hopefully,
it will spur norm-critical research on the concepts applied in feminist research
more generally.
An important question – which is unfortunately outside of the scope of this
article – is the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation.
Accordingly, it seems evident that some of the arguments for women’s descriptive
representation will need to be reconsidered when one does not conceive of
interests as belonging to the group(s) of women (Phillips, 1995; Young, 2000;
Dovi, 2002; Celis and Childs, 2020). In particular, I believe that arguments for
a better descriptive representation of social groups concerning how deliberation
occurs will have to be readdressed because deliberating on unattached interests
requires people with diverse testimonies, experiences or perspectives, not
diverse interest owners. Hopefully, conceiving of interests as unattached will
serve as inspiration for mapping out new arguments for increasing diverse
descriptive representation.
Notes
	1	By applying the concept of substantive representation,the article follows the taxonomy
of representation set forth by Pitkin;hence,substantive representation concerns acting
for (somebody’s) political interests,whereas descriptive representation concerns standing
for somebody by resemblance (Pitkin, 1967).
	2	As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, there is currently no established academic
field or literature on ‘substantive representation and gender’, only on the ‘substantive
representation of women’. Thus, when writing about research on substantive
representation and gender,I envision a new academic focus and stress the transformative
aim of this article.
	3	Although scholars have recently highlighted the importance of studying representation
as it occurs beyond legislative arenas (see, for example, Squires, 2008; Saward,
2010), I have chosen to focus on studies of legislatures because such studies are still
most common.
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Mette Marie Staehr Harder
14
	4	It should be stressed that, in this section, the concepts of ‘attached’ and ‘unattached’
interests are applied in the way I have previously suggested.Thus, they are inspired by,
but not identical to, the concepts exemplified by Pitkin in 1967 (Harder, 2020).
	5	Here, I apply the term ‘attributes’ as it was defined byYoung (2000: 90).
	6	Since attributes only gain social meaning in social settings (Young, 2000: 90), the
question of which attributes are important depends on the setting in question.
	7	It should be noted that although Young applies the term ‘interest’ very differently
compared to me, she too states that individuals with various interests may belong to
the same social group (Young, 2000: 88, 122).
	8	It should be noted that some activists, as well as scholars, state more explicitly that
women and men have opposite interests.Accordingly, from this perspective, it is also
explicitly assumed that men as a group have interests that are not in the interest of
women (on radical feminism, see Dahlerup, 2018: 16–17).
	9	I apply the term‘issue’in its everyday meaning.Hence,an issue is‘a subject or problem
that people are thinking and talking about’ (see: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
dictionary/english/issue).
	10	Unlike in the study of Dahlerup et al (2021),who differentiate between women’s issues
and feminist viewpoints, Erikson (2018) generally categorises feminist and women’s
issues together, that is, as a category that differs from other (male) issues. Hence, even
though the two studies apply the term‘feminist’in different ways,both studies present
perceptions of policy interests that are framed as women’s interests (in which male
representatives do not engage) and interests that are framed without the identity of
women (in which male representatives do engage).
	11	Instead of ‘gender equality interests’, one could apply ‘feminist interests’; yet, since it
may be difficult to conceive of feminism without also conceiving of specific groupings
of (self-)identified feminists, thus coming close to conceiving of the interest in
attached form (by grammatically implying an ownership),‘gender equality interests’
are probably preferable.
	12	I define power as ‘the ability to influence the perceptions, wants or behaviours of
others’.This definition is inspired by Lukes’ (2005) three dimensions of power.
	13	Celis and Childs (2018) formulate three criteria for such evaluations:‘Is the process
responsive?’;‘Is it inclusive?’; and ‘Does it treat all claims equally?’
Funding
Funding was received from Carlsberg, Internationalisation Post-doctoral Fellow Grant,
CF18-0578.
Acknowledgements
This article has been a long time in the making and there are many I wish to thank.
First and foremost, the Danish Carlsberg Foundation, Ulf Mörkenstam, Lenita
Freidenvall and Mari Teigen, as well as the Department of Political Science at the
University of Stockholm and the Centre for Research on Gender Equality at the
Institute for Social Research, Oslo, for hosting me while writing the main part of
the article. I also wish to thank for their comments and suggestions: the participants
at the Research Group Seminar at the Centre for Research on Gender Equality at
the Institute for Social Research in Oslo; the participants at the Gender and Politics
Seminar at the Department of Political Science, Uppsala University; the participants
at the Feminist Seminar at the Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research; the
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Parting with ‘interests of women’
15
participants at the Feminist and Critical Studies in Politics Seminar at the Department
of Political Science, Stockholm University; the participants at the Research Group
Seminar of Liza Mügge at the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences,Amsterdam
University; the participants at the 2021 European Consortium for Political Research
Joint Sessions ofWorkshops on Substantive Representation;and the participants at the
Research Seminar Series at the Department of Politics and International Relations,
Royal Holloway, University of London. Finally, I especially wish to thank Drude
Dahlerup, Ekaterina Rashkova, Flemming Juul Christiansen, Helena Olofsdotter
Stensöta, Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, Judith de Jong, Jyl Josephson, Sarah Childs, Silvia
Erzeel, Suzanne Lynn Dovi and the anonymous reviewers for thoroughly engaging
with my work.All errors and opinions expressed are my own.
Author biography
Mette Marie Staehr Harder is a senior lecturer at Karlstad University, Sweden,
and a research postdoc at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. She publishes
on representation, gender and indigenous politics. In 2021, her paper ‘Pitkin’s
second way: freeing representation theory from identity’, won the Representation best
paper prize.
Conflict of interest
The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
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