

Democracy and the Adoption of Electoral Gender Quotas Worldwide

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Electoral gender quotas—policies requiring that a certain share of women be included as legislators or candidates—have been adopted by more than 130 countries. As a result, the literature on this rapidly spreading electoral reform has increased dramatically during the past two decades.¹ Adding to a rich literature that examines where and under what circumstances quotas are adopted,² this article theorizes and empirically investigates the role of democracy in quota adoption.

Although quota adoption has been analyzed in all regime types, spanning advanced democracies³ through transitional democracies⁴ to autocracies,⁵ scholars have suggested competing accounts about its broader relationship to democracy.⁶ On the one hand, democratic governance signifies normative commitments to inclusiveness and creates space for women’s movements to exert pressure for change,⁷ which suggests that democracy increases the chances of gender quota adoption. On the other hand, authoritarian states may take steps to promote women in politics to appear more modern, to attract foreign aid, or to distract from other forms of political exclusion.⁸ Furthermore, in less democratic countries, national legislatures often wield less influence, which could lower the cost of quota adoption. Between these positions, some scholars suggest that quotas commonly are adopted when political institutions are under negotiation, for instance after a conflict or in a democratic-transitional setting.⁹

Although empirical examinations of quota adoption have seldom been framed in terms of democracy or regime type,¹⁰ empirical research on quota adoption has suggested that level of democracy and gender quota adoption are correlated. One of the few large-N analyses touching on the relationship between democracy and gender quota adoption suggests that the relationship is curvilinear: quotas are most likely to be adopted at the middle of the democracy scale.¹¹ An emerging body of evidence further

suggests that democracy pushes countries into adopting distinct quota types—candidate quotas (i.e., quotas that require parties to nominate a certain proportion of women for office) versus reserved seats (i.e., quotas that set aside a certain number of seats in the legislature for women). Scholars have suggested that democracies (mainly in Europe and Latin America) mostly adopt candidate quotas, whereas more autocratic countries (mainly in Africa and the Middle East) tend to adopt reserved seats.¹² The two types of quotas have been claimed to be rooted in different logics, target distinct parts of the electoral process, and yield varied results.¹³ Yet, due to data limitations, these propositions about democracy and quota adoption have been made mostly in small-N case study analyses and have rarely been tested in large-scale statistical analyses.

To add even more complexity to this discussion, democracy as a concept is multi-dimensional and its different dimensions may imply different incentives for how to include women and push countries toward one trajectory of quota adoption versus another. We follow in the tradition of democratic theorists (notably Robert Dahl) and many democratization scholars who distinguish the democratic dimension of having free and fair elections that include an authentically competitive political opposition from the dimension of effective guarantees of civil liberties.¹⁴ Each dimension of democracy implies distinct constraints on and incentives for the political actors who may push for quotas (e.g., civil society activists) or ultimately debate and vote for quotas (e.g., political elites).

Using a new, global, and longitudinal dataset, Quota Adoption and Reform over Time (QAROT),¹⁵ we analyze how the different dimensions of democracy relate to the adoption of different types of gender quotas. These new data on quotas for the first time distinguish reserved seats from candidate quotas cross-nationally and longitudinally. Combining QAROT with a well-established measure of two dimensions of democracy (political rights and civil liberties) provides the opportunity for novel hypothesis testing. To examine the relationship, we make use of event history analyses.

Our results corroborate earlier findings that quotas are more likely to be adopted in countries at the middle of the democracy scale, or that the relationship between democracy and quota adoption is curvilinear.¹⁶ However, we demonstrate that considering only an average effect masks two distinct processes: the adoption of reserved seats peaks at lower levels of democracy, whereas the adoption of candidate quotas peaks at middle to upper levels of democracy. Further, we demonstrate that separating dimensions of democracy reveals further complexity in understanding quota adoption. Political rights (our measurement of having free and fair elections that are fully contested) has a stronger effect on the adoption of reserved seats. Countries with lower (but not the lowest) levels of political rights are most likely to adopt reserved seats, whereas countries on the high end of political rights approach a zero probability of introducing them. On the other hand, it is the dimension of civil liberties (having freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, etc.) that better predicts candidate quota adoption. The likelihood of adopting candidate quotas is highest in countries with higher (but not the highest) civil liberties.

By showing this nuanced relationship between democracy and quota adoption, our study makes several contributions. It provides, to our knowledge, the first global pieces of evidence that countries, depending on their levels and dimensions of democracy,

follow distinct trajectories in their adoption of different types of gender quotas. Understanding the distinct routes to reserved seats and candidate quotas is important not only for scholars, but also for policymakers, practitioners, and activists interested in adopting new quotas across countries that vary in level and dimension of democracy. In addition, and more broadly, the study speaks to researchers of authoritarian regimes and democratization processes, suggesting that reserved seats, and gender equality policies more broadly, may represent an unexplored legitimization strategy used by authoritarian leaders engaging in elections.¹⁷

Gender Quotas and Their Adoption

Electoral gender quotas can take the form of national law (legal quotas) or be voluntarily adopted by political parties (party quotas). Here, our focus is only on the adoption of legal quotas and their two main types: reserved seats and candidate (or legislative) quotas.¹⁸ These two quota types share the common purpose of increasing the number of women in legislative institutions, and, because they are legal quotas, they also have to be approved as changes to the electoral law by the legislature. The fact that reserved seats and candidate quotas apply to different stages of the election process, however, also makes them different in important ways. Applying to the stage of the elected, reserved seats is the only quota type to guarantee that a minimum number of women are elected to the legislature. In addition, reserved seats are often characterized as “add-on seats,” that is, they are commonly adopted by enlarging the legislature and the election of women to these seats usually runs parallel to the existing electoral system.¹⁹ Women elected to reserved seats are elected directly (e.g., in elections with only women candidates) or indirectly (e.g., after the election has taken place).²⁰ In contrast, as candidate quotas apply to the level of candidates, this quota type is integrated in political parties’ regular selection process. Consequently, women elected through candidate quotas are selected in the same way as men.²¹

A large number of studies have focused on understanding where quotas have been adopted. They have noticed that quota adoption has taken place in all regions of the world, in developed as well as in developing countries, and in contexts where gender equality is more advanced as well as in countries where women have very few seats in parliament.²² Quota types distribute differentially around the world: Reserved seats primarily exist in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, whereas candidate quotas have mainly been adopted in Latin America, Europe, and Africa.²³

Gender quota adoption is also seen as related to democracy, although scholars have suggested that the relation between the two is complicated.²⁴ Large-N analyses looking at the relationship between level of democracy (or regime type) and gender quota adoption show that countries at the middle of the democracy scale are the most likely quota adopters. Using descriptive statistics, Dahlerup shows that 32 percent of “semi-democratic” countries have adopted quota laws, whereas 16 percent of democratic countries and 21 percent of authoritarian countries have done so.²⁵ Hughes, Krook et al. were

the first to demonstrate a curvilinear relationship between democracy and gender quota adoption using multivariate analysis.²⁶ In line with Dahlerup, they find that countries at the middle of the democracy scale are the most eager adopters of legal gender quotas, whereas more advanced democracies and more full-fledged authoritarian states are less likely to reform their electoral systems.²⁷ One explanation of this pattern is that quota adoption is more likely in countries where the political framework is under negotiation in some way. They may be post-conflict settings or countries in which democratizing reforms are underway. When constitutions and election laws are open to change, this may be a window of opportunity for political gender equality gains, including the introduction of gender quotas.²⁸

However, one limitation of prior statistical analyses on the relationship between level of democracy and quota adoption is that they consider quotas as singular, without acknowledging differences between reserved seats and candidate quotas. Since the two types of quotas are so different, the processes that lead to their adoption are likely to be different as well. Further, by drawing on scholars that have employed a definition of democracy that includes at least two dimensions—free and fair contested elections and guarantees of civil liberties²⁹—we suggest that different dimensions of democracy may also influence processes of quota adoption in different ways. We therefore suggest: (1) that the influence of the level of democracy may vary across reserved seats and candidate quotas and (2) that the different dimensions of democracy may differentially affect quota adoption of different types. Towards the goal of getting a more comprehensive picture of how different regimes adopt gender quotas, we next seek to theorize the relationship between different dimensions of democracy and the adoption of quotas of different types.

Democracy and Quota Adoption

While the final decision for legal quota adoption often lies with members of parliament (MPs), the literature identifies other actors as critical for pushing for this reform, including women's and international organizations. Various analyses have emphasized women's collective mobilization—both in national³⁰ and transnational³¹ organizations—as fundamental for quota adoption. Women in civil society, political parties, and legislative institutions have pushed for reforms to increase their presence in political decision-making bodies. Women have, in some cases, been backed up by international organizations, pushing for quota adoption as part of their democracy promotion efforts.³² International organizations have been important actors whenever quotas have been one of many components in post-conflict peace operations. In some cases, the adoption of gender quotas has also been integrated in international organizations' development aid programs.³³ Civil society actors like women's movements and international organizations both intersect with political elites within a given political (democratic) context. The democratic context provides them with either opportunities or limitations to push for quota adoption in general and of specific types. That is, the different levels

and dimensions of democracy provide incentives and constraints that create unique trajectories for quota adoption. Importantly, the constellation of level of democracy and its dimensions produces trajectories that more easily lead to a candidate quota or to a reserved seat quota.

Let us begin with the adoption of candidate quotas, the more common type of gender quota that is pushed by both women's movements and international actors. A country at the upper levels of democracy, where citizens are granted individual liberties and freedoms, is more open to pressure from both above and below. This pressure is likely to be for candidate quotas rather than reserved seats because where quota advocates are able to engage in large coalitions, the nature of quota debate tends to be fairly transformative. The emphasis is often on moving away from women playing a secondary role in politics and putting them on par with men in their political parties. Women's ambition is to challenge and replace men, including sitting incumbents, to level out inequalities in political power. With such a focus, attention is naturally paid to the reshuffling of parties' candidate lists. As a consequence, the adoption of candidate quotas becomes the plausible policy choice for countries at a higher level of democracy.³⁴

This argument makes clear that guarantees of civil liberties are the key dimension of democracy operating in the adoption of candidate quotas. For coalitions that include both women party activists and autonomous women's movements to emerge, freedom of expression, association, and assembly are needed. Wherever governments repress civil society actors, they also restrict the possibilities for quota advocates to push for policy adoption. Thus, we expect civil society actors such as women's movements to be most successful in pushing for candidate quotas in countries where individual liberties and freedoms are relatively protected. In such countries, citizens are more often able to mobilize politically between elections, and civil society actors have more space to advocate for changes in the electoral system.³⁵

To give an example, Argentina's pioneering candidate quota law (in 1991) has been attributed to the country's return to democratic rule. With democracy reinstalled, women party activists increased their contacts with women in other organizations in the Argentine civil society as well as with politically active women in other countries. The broad coalition of women, with different ideological positions, focused on transforming the political parties and their candidate selection practices. Activists met with women from countries where women's representation was larger and where women had a stronger position in political parties (e.g., Germany and Sweden). When discussing what strategies to use, they decided both to put pressure on political parties to change their party statutes and to push for an electoral reform that included the adoption of gender quotas. From the first bill proposal presented by a woman senator in 1989 and forward, the quota debate concentrated on candidate quotas. The possibility to adopt reserved seats rather than candidate quotas never reached the government's agenda.³⁶ After Argentina became the first country in the world to adopt a sizeable candidate quota law, quota advocates in other countries learned from Argentina, which resulted in similar reform processes and the adoption of the same quota type in many other Latin American countries.³⁷

In contrast, the adoption of reserved seat quotas generally comes from a different set of incentives for political actors. Although elite women and women's groups have pushed for reforms in all sorts of political contexts (including in authoritarian regimes), adopting a quota as a signal of a democratic reform fits the agenda of authoritarian regimes, in particular the large group of electoral authoritarian countries that hold, but often manipulate, multiparty elections.³⁸ In an effort to appear democratic, gain international recognition, and attract foreign aid and loans, (electoral) authoritarian rulers have often considered the adoption of reserved seats as a low-cost strategy.³⁹

Remember that international organizations push democratization, as well as quota adoption. We suggest that their influence is most present and most efficient in less democratic countries, such as in electoral autocracies.⁴⁰ Of course, such a suggestion does not imply that these organizations (such as the UN and the EU) lack influence on quota campaigns in other contexts. For example, the UN's Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) put pressure on most governments across the globe to adopt quotas. However, international organizations have primarily actively pushed for quotas in less democratic countries where they have also engaged in democracy-promoting activities.⁴¹ International organizations have often pushed for quotas as part of peacebuilding operations and post-conflict constitution-making, as well as in developing aid programs. In the latter case, they have encouraged aid-dependent countries to signal their commitment to democracy by adopting quotas.⁴²

Following a "low-cost strategy," therefore, largely autocratic leaders responding to pressure from international organizations will most commonly prefer reserved seats quotas. This quota type is less likely to challenge incumbents and the existing political system than candidate quotas. In other words, it is a relatively "safe" quota for political leaders to adopt, and they have the maneuverability to do so because of low contestation in the electoral arena. A reserved seats strategy quickly increases the number of women in parliament (and thus meets the goal of international organizations) without posing a threat to incumbents.

Thus, free and fair elections that include an authentically competitive political opposition are the key dimension of democracy operating in the adoption of reserved seats. A nondemocratic regime wishes to signal some normative compliance without threatening the existing power structure. The regular election system can continue to work in parallel to the reserved seats, and thus sitting (men) incumbents do not run the risk of being replaced by women as a consequence of the quota policy. This feature of reserved seats makes this quota type attractive for those leaders who want to strategically use quotas to increase legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, or to electorally boost the ruling party.⁴³ We would mainly expect the adoption of reserved seats in cases where the regime's power is secure and where contestation in the electoral arena is low (such as in electoral authoritarian regimes that include a dominant party).

To give just one example, in electoral authoritarian Tanzania the dominant party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), has been able to design reserved seats quotas in a manner that does not threaten incumbents' power and that reinforces the party's electoral

power vis-à-vis weak opposition parties. In this aid-dependent country, where the CCM has upheld an uneven electoral playing field for decades, women are elected indirectly to reserved seats, after the election has taken place. Thus, the election of women to reserved seats does not interfere with the regular election process or threaten the CCM's electoral dominance. While a broad range of politically active women support quotas, the group of women that have benefitted most from the reserved seats are those women who are already coopted and strongly controlled by the ruling party.⁴⁴

Summing up the argument, we suggest that making a distinction between quota types, as well as the relevant dimensions (or attributes) of democracy, qualifies our understanding of the relationship between democracy and quota adoption. Redefining the curvilinear relationship identified by Hughes, Krook et al.,⁴⁵ we expect the curves to look different for reserved seats and candidate quotas. The adoption of the former quota type will peak at the lower end of the democracy scale whereas the latter quota type will be preferred by countries at the mid to high end of the democracy scale. The underlying arguments backing up these expectations relate to different dimensions of democracy. Whereas international organizations' targets are mainly governments of countries where electoral institutions are poorly developed or manipulated by the governing party, broad and effective coalitions of women activists are more likely where citizens have effectively enforced liberties and freedoms. Consequently, we expect candidate quota adoption to be most likely where citizens are granted a set of civil liberties, whereas we expect reserved seats adoption to peak where (multiparty) elections are not free and fair and where there is rarely an authentic political opposition to the regime.⁴⁶

These arguments are, of course, not without exceptions. For instance, there are examples of women's groups and elite women in less democratic or semi-authoritarian regimes (e.g., Algeria and some Arab states) who have put strong pressure on the ruling men to adopt gender quotas, sometimes in coalitions with international organizations. In addition, in democracies men elites have also adopted quotas for strategic reasons: to attract new groups of voters by signaling to constituents that their party is progressive,⁴⁷ to give party gatekeepers more control over candidate selection,⁴⁸ and because men incumbents believe that it will increase their reelection possibilities if they face inexperienced women candidates.⁴⁹ Still, we believe our general argument—that particular constellations of international organizations, coalitions of women activists, political elites, and democratic institutions will result in differential adoption of candidate versus reserved seat quotas—will hold globally across a range of countries, as we now proceed to test.

Data and Methods

Our analysis includes 150 countries at all levels of democracy from 1989 to 2014. Our selection criteria include sovereignty and population size. States not independent in 1989 enter the analysis in their first year of sovereignty. This means, for instance, that the constituent parts of Communist states like the USSR (e.g. Russia

and Ukraine) and SFR Yugoslavia (e.g. Serbia and Croatia) enter the analysis in their first year as sovereign states, while the Communist states themselves (i.e. the USSR and SFR Yugoslavia) are excluded from the analysis. Countries that reached formal independence after 2000 are excluded from the analysis. Following cross-national research conventions, we analyze only countries with a population greater than one million in the year 2000.

Modeling quota adoption requires that we consider when, in historical time, the “risk” of quota adoption begins (e.g., when we start the clock). Expectations of widespread policy adoption are not appropriate prior to being demonstrated by a pioneering state. Therefore, we consider the risk of quota introduction to begin in 1989, when Uganda became the first state to adopt a reserved seat quota guaranteeing women at least a 10 percent share of seats (Uganda’s quota was 18 percent). Argentina shortly thereafter, in 1991, became the first country to adopt a sizeable candidate quota with an electoral law mandating that parties nominate at least 30 percent women. Once a quota law has been introduced in at least one country, it is reasonable to assume that all sovereign countries are also at “risk” of passing one.

Given our interest in explaining quota adoption across countries over time, duration or event history analysis is the appropriate method.⁵⁰ Because parliamentary information is typically recorded yearly, we use discrete time logistic regression models. In this analysis, time represents historical time.⁵¹ That is, a country’s “risk” of adoption begins at particular historical dates rather than in relation to a country’s internal clock. We are interested in the first attainment of a quota law, so we do not treat quota adoption as a repeatable event, even though some states have revised or repealed their laws. Countries that have not yet adopted a quota by 2014 are right censored.⁵²

Dependent Variable Drawing from the new, global, and longitudinal Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT) dataset,⁵³ we predict the adoption of gender quotas affecting the lower or single house of the national legislature. Adoption is coded as the year that a gender quota first becomes part of a country’s constitution or secondary law such as the electoral law and is coded whether the law was ever implemented in an election. Consistent with other research on quota adoption,⁵⁴ we exclude quotas that regulate less than 10 percent of candidates or seats and those that do not specify a quota threshold. We see these lower-threshold quotas, which emerged in the 1950s, typically as very small reservations, as distinct from the newer wave of quotas that took hold in the 1990s and have transformed women’s descriptive representation. Practically, this exclusion rule affects ten countries that adopted quotas after 1989, and all but one country (Romania) went on to adopt a more substantial quota during our study period.

We model quota adoption looking first at all national quotas and then separately at reserved seats and candidate quotas. To reiterate, reserved seats set aside seats in the legislature for women, whereas candidate quotas require all parties to field a certain percentage of women candidates or nominees. A handful of countries use a combination

of reserved seats and party list requirements for candidates (e.g., Rwanda) and therefore do not fit neatly into either category. In the models that distinguish reserved seats from candidate quotas, we model these cases as having reserved seats.⁵⁵

For both practical and theoretical reasons, we do not analyze voluntary party quota adoption. Because these measures are introduced by individual political parties, large and small, information on exact years of their adoption is not available for all cases.⁵⁶ Furthermore, given that their adoption often stems from considerations of party ideology and electoral competition, pressures on parties to pursue quotas are different than those operating on a national scale.⁵⁷

Independent Variables To measure our two-dimensional conceptualization of democracy, we make use of data on democracy from Freedom House (2010) that reports annual ratings from 1972 to the present. Freedom House breaks its scales into political rights and civil liberties, which resonate well with our two dimensions: free and fair elections that are fully contested (political rights) and guarantees of civil liberties, discussed above. According to Freedom House, political rights exist to the extent that a meaningful process elects the national government and parties compete for political power. In particular, Freedom House assesses political rights as “Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government.”⁵⁸ Civil liberties, on the other hand, exist when the people of a country have the freedom to express political opinions in any media and the freedom to organize and to participate in any political group. Freedom House assesses civil liberties as “Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.”⁵⁹ We estimated the models using the full Freedom House democracy score (civil liberties and political rights) as well as political rights and civil liberties separately.⁶⁰ We model all three as both linear and nonlinear. Below we also discuss the results from auxiliary models substituting another frequently used measure of democracy, Polity IV’s composite democracy measure (polity2), for Freedom House’s full measure of democracy.⁶¹

Understanding the relationship between democracy and quota adoption requires placing both in a reasonable baseline model of quota adoption. Based on the set of existing cross-national analyses of quota adoption, we include control variables of two types: those that assess international influences on quota adoption and those that address the national characteristics that may affect whether a country is willing or easily able to adopt a national quota measure.

International Influences Researchers have increasingly considered global and regional forces on quota adoption, focusing especially on the impacts of foreign aid and regional diffusion.⁶² We first account for the importance of foreign aid on a country’s decisions to adopt gender quotas with a logged measure of official development assistance.⁶³ Second, following research demonstrating that growth in quotas in a region increases the chances

of quota adoption by other countries in that region,⁶⁴ we construct a measure of the density of regional adoption. We measure the share of countries within a given region that have adopted a gender quota by a given year. For example, by 2000, 27 percent of Asian countries had adopted some form of national quota, while only 7 percent of Eastern European countries had done so. The regional density variable is therefore coded twenty-seven for all Asian countries in 2000 and seven for all Eastern European countries for that year. Region is coded into six categories: the West, Eastern Europe and former Soviet Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In auxiliary models we test effects of a sub-regional measure of diffusion (see our results below). We also considered the robustness of our models with the addition of a measure of the global institutionalization of the international women's movement,⁶⁵ but it does not substantively change our main results.⁶⁶


Domestic Factors Case-study, comparative, and cross-national researchers have identified a wide range of national characteristics that may affect quota adoption.⁶⁷ We include four as controls. First, electoral systems are coded into four categories: PR, plurality-majority, mixed-PR, and an "other" category that includes periods of one-party rule, coup years, and other legislative interruptions. Plurality-majority systems are the reference category. Second, we also differentiate all countries currently or historically Marxist-Leninist from those never under Marxist rule.⁶⁸ Third, to test whether quota adoption is more likely during post-conflict reconstruction,⁶⁹ we include a time-varying measure of armed conflict that begins three years prior to the first election after conflict has reached high intensity (more than 1,000 battle deaths) and runs through the first post-conflict election. Finally, we include women's national legislative presence measured as the percentage of women in the lower house of the national legislature, lagged one year. Note, however, that many countries experience periods of legislative interruption due to coups or armed conflict. We thus carry forward prior levels of women's representation to fill gaps in the data. Countries never electing a woman parliamentarian are assigned values of zero.

In auxiliary models, we also assess effects of economic development by including measures of GDP per capita in constant 1990 USD, logged to reduce skew. Our primary measure is from Maddison, who offers the best coverage of countries and time points.⁷⁰ However, economic development has no significant effects on quota adoption, and, by including it, we lose a considerable number of observations. Therefore, consistent with other research predicting quota adoption,⁷¹ we exclude it from our models presented below.

Results

We begin by presenting histograms that visualize the percent of countries that adopted a gender quota at each level of political rights and civil liberties. These figures help us to identify whether countries tend to adopt gender quotas when they are at a particular level of civil liberties or political rights.

Figure 1 The Distribution of Civil Liberties and Political Rights across Countries in the Year Prior to Quota Adoption, by Quota Type



The upper histogram in Figure 1 focuses on the fifty-two countries that adopted candidate quotas over our period of study, and the lower histogram focuses on the sixteen countries that adopted reserved seats. The dimensions of democracy are coded such that large numbers mean that civil liberties and political rights are well protected. Looking first at candidate quotas, we see that countries with moderate levels of civil liberties are frequently adopting quotas. Half of the countries that adopted a candidate quota scored either a four or a five on the civil liberties scale, and nearly 80 percent of countries that adopted a candidate quota

scored between three and six. However, we observe a different pattern for political rights, where countries at low, medium, and high levels of political rights are adopting candidate quotas. Turning to reserved seats in the lower histogram, what is most striking is the lack of adoption of reserved seats in countries with even moderately high levels of democracy. We also see differences when we compare civil liberties and political rights. Reserved seats are especially common when political rights are low (i.e., poorly protected)—a score of two is the most common—and when civil liberties are moderately low—a score of three is the most common. Overall, these histograms illustrate clearly that even though civil liberties and political rights are highly correlated with one another ($r=.98$), a country’s levels of civil liberties and political rights during the run-up to quota adoption can be dissimilar.

Turning to multivariate analysis, Table 1 displays the first set of results, the baseline model, in which we include the average measures of democracy and make no distinction between quota types. Starting with Model 1, our discrete-time event history model

Table 1 Discrete Time Event History Models Predicting National Quota Adoption with Average Level of Democracy

	Model 1	Model 2
Average Democracy	-0.08 (0.09)	0.68 (0.43)
Average Democracy Squared		-0.09 ^t (0.05)
Marx-Leninism	-0.17 (0.32)	-0.19 (0.32)
PR Electoral System	1.08** (0.37)	1.02** (0.37)
Mixed-PR Electoral System	0.73 ^t (0.43)	0.70 (0.43)
Other Electoral System	0.55 (0.48)	0.78 (0.50)
Logged Foreign Aid	0.58 (0.36)	0.31 (0.40)
Recent Civil War	1.24*** (0.36)	1.32*** (0.36)
Regional Diffusion	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
% Women in Legislature	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Year	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Intercept	-45.92 (55.86)	-51.67*** (56.12)
N-Country-Years	3014	3014

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.10$, two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses.

shows no linear relationship between democracy and national quota adoption. The average democracy coefficient is substantively non-existent and statistically insignificant. However, when we take the possibility of a non-linear relationship into consideration, we find a significant relationship, at $p < .10$ level of significance (Model 2). Countries at the middle of the democracy scale are more likely to adopt national quotas than advanced democracies (highest numbers on the scale) or more full-fledged authoritarian states (lowest numbers on the scale). Moving from one to four on the democracy scale doubles the predicted probability that a country would adopt a quota in any given year (from .50 percent to 1.00 percent; see Figure 2).⁷²

Next, we evaluate whether the relationship between democracy and quota adoption varies by dimension of democracy and across quota types. Models predicting the adoption of candidate quotas appear in white, and those predicting the adoption of reserved seats are shaded light grey. Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 demonstrate that the curvilinear relationship between democracy and quota adoption generally holds across both quota types. Reserved seats as well as candidate quotas are most frequently adopted in countries that are neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic. However, the relationship with candidate quotas is only significant at $p < .10$ level of significance.

Disaggregating democracy into separate dimensions reveals important differences in the factors that predict candidate quotas and reserved seats. Most notably, only civil liberties significantly predict the adoption of candidate quotas (Models 5 and 6 in Table 2). Political rights are not close to being statistically significant. For the adoption of reserved seats, we observe (in Models 7 and 8 in Table 2) a slightly (but not entirely) reversed pattern: mainly political rights have an effect on this quota type. The effect of civil liberties on the adoption of reserved seats is substantively smaller, and, in contrast to our other main findings, it is sensitive to model specification.⁷³

Figure 2 helps us to visualize these different effects. Here, we convert coefficients into the predicted probability of quota adoption in a given year. Whereas the solid line shows the nonlinear, inverted U-effect of average democracy on the adoption of all types of quotas (Model 2 in Table 1), here we concentrate on the dashed and dotted line. Looking first at the dashed line, it shows the effect of the civil liberties dimension of democracy on the probability of adopting a candidate quota (Model 6 in Table 2). While still an inverted U, the peak shifts toward countries with higher levels of civil liberties. The adoption of a candidate quota is more likely when a country has a moderately high level of civil liberties. Moving to the dotted line, it displays the effect of the political rights dimension of democracy on the probability of adopting a reserved seat quota (Model 7 in Table 2). This graph shows a sharply different pattern. Lower levels of political rights increase the probability of adopting reserved seats for women. Countries in the midrange of political rights have a lower probability of adopting a reserved seat, and there is zero probability of a country at a high level of political rights adopting a reserved seat quota.


Taken together, our findings suggest that distinguishing among the dimensions of democracy helps us better understand how quotas are adopted. Civil liberties generally increase the probability of adopting candidate quotas, in a nonlinear manner, with a peak

Table 2 Disaggregating Dimensions of Democracy and Gender Quota Types (Discrete Time Event History Models)

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	<i>Candidate Quotas</i>	<i>Reserved Seats</i>	<i>Candidate Quotas</i>	<i>Candidate Quotas</i>	<i>Reserved Seats</i>	<i>Reserved Seats</i>
Average Democracy	0.85 (0.52)	2.87* (1.38)				
Average Democracy Squared	0.10 [†] (0.06)	0.56* (0.24)				
Political Rights			0.23 (0.42)		2.56* (1.16)	
Political Rights Squared			-0.03 (0.05)		-0.50* (0.21)	
Civil Liberties				1.22* (0.59)		2.06 [†] (1.24)
Civil Liberties Squared				-0.12* (0.06)		-0.41* (0.21)
Controls						
Marxist-Leninism	0.21 (0.34)	-2.50* (1.18)	0.19 (0.34)	0.25 (0.34)	-2.48* (1.18)	2.61 [†] (1.19)
PR Electoral System	1.55** (0.48)	-0.49 (0.88)	1.63*** (0.48)	1.49** (0.48)	-0.40 (0.84)	0.34 (0.87)
Mixed PR Electoral System	1.37** (0.53)	[NCA]	1.41** (0.53)	1.28* (0.53)	[NCA]	[NCA]
Other Electoral System	0.94 (0.71)	0.34 (0.70)	0.62 (0.70)	1.07 (0.68)	0.46 (0.73)	0.56 (0.70)
Logged Foreign Aid	-0.03 (0.20)	1.13* (0.55)	-0.01 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.19)	1.10* (0.56)	1.19* (0.56)
Recent Civil War	1.09* (0.45)	2.39*** (0.71)	1.00* (0.45)	1.21** (0.45)	2.34*** (0.68)	2.11** (0.69)
Regional Diffusion	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
% Women in Legislature	0.00 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Year	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.07)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)
Intercept	-21.50 (63.09)	-117.21 (147.63)	12.05 (34.70)	-23.60 (62.85)	-105.20 (149.00)	-151.07** (145.13)
N-Country-Years	3014	3014	3014	3014	3014	3014

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, [†]p<0.10, two tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses; "NCA"=No countries achieved (coefficient will not estimate).

Figure 2 Relationship between Democracy and Quota Adoption (from Discrete Time Event History Models)



at higher levels of civil liberties. Increasing political rights suppress adoption of reserved seat quotas. Countries with lower levels of political rights have the greatest probability of adopting a reserved seat quota. Building on our theoretical expectations, these findings suggest that the trajectories for (or forces behind) the adoption of candidate quotas and reserved seats are different.

Although our focus is on effects of democracy, it is also important to look briefly at our controls, which provide additional evidence of different trajectories for quota adoption. Perhaps most important for our theoretical argument is the impact of foreign aid, which is an important driver of reserved seats, but not of candidate quotas (see Table 2, Models 5–8). This result is in line with our suggestion that countries that want to secure international benefits are more likely to adopt reserved seats. Similarly, the finding displayed in Table 2 that regional diffusion matters for candidate quotas but not for reserved seats also resonates well with our theoretical expectations. As mentioned above, women’s movements in many Latin American countries—where civil liberties such as freedom of association are protected—learned from the experiences of Argentina and its pioneering candidate quota law. They pushed their governments to adopt similar quota policies. In addition to these two findings, the results for the other controls show that electoral systems are important drivers of candidate quotas,⁷⁴ Marxist-Leninist history and women’s share of seats in the legislature matter for reserved seats, and recent civil war increases the likelihood of adoption for both quotas (although the effects for reserved seats are much stronger).⁷⁵ The significant effect of women’s representation in the legislature on reserved seats suggests that women MPs can play a role in quota adoption in semi-authoritarian regimes.

Conclusion

This article has contributed to scholarship on gender quota adoption by theorizing and empirically investigating how a country's level of democracy relates to the adoption of different quota types. Our results corroborate previous empirical research that there is a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped, relationship between democracy and quota adoption. However, taking a closer look at the group of countries at the middle of the democracy scale, this analysis qualifies these findings in several ways. Most importantly, we show that different quota types are related to different dimensions of democracy: the adoption of a candidate quota is more likely when a country's citizens are guaranteed certain civil liberties such as freedoms of association, whereas reserved seats are most commonly adopted by countries with relatively low levels of electoral contestation.

These findings are in line with our theoretical expectations, which suggested that different levels and dimensions of democracy produce different incentives and constraints on key actors in processes of quota reforms. For instance, civil liberties such as freedom of organization are crucial for the "bottom-up" processes that research commonly has shown characterize the adoption of candidate quotas. Case studies on countries and regions such as Mexico⁷⁶ and the Balkans⁷⁷ (e.g., North Macedonia) have highlighted the connections between domestic grassroots movements and politicians as important for candidate quota adoption. These studies bolster our findings by demonstrating that a fair amount of civil liberties are needed for activists to openly meet, learn from each other, and criticize, cooperate, and influence those in power. This latter point is important because the candidate quota type is likely to pose more of a challenge to the existing system, including to incumbents. Thus, a certain level of democracy measured as civil liberties creates the space needed for these kinds of reform demands to emerge and be successful.

There are also several case studies, on countries such as Morocco,⁷⁸ Cameroon,⁷⁹ Rwanda,⁸⁰ Uganda,⁸¹ and Jordan,⁸² that support our other main finding and illustrate why countries where electoral contestation is low commonly adopt reserved seats. Such countries often have a dominant political actor that is unlikely to pass any form of legislation that could threaten the regime's electoral dominance. Therefore, in countries with low political rights, dominant parties set the limits for women's rights advocacy (including for quota adoption advocacy). These parties have large leeway to respond to demands (e.g., by international organizations) and adopt quotas if and only if the quota reform serves their purposes, either to increase international legitimacy⁸³ or by designing them in a manner that electorally favors the ruling party.⁸⁴

Thus, our study demonstrates that the curvilinear relationship found between level of democracy and quota adoption hides some important differences. With a more nuanced analysis, distinguishing both between quota types and between dimensions of democracy, we add to those who have pointed at the multiple causes of quota adoption by proposing two substantially different processes of quota adoption.⁸⁵ Pushing our argument further, our analysis raises the question whether quotas really should be perceived of as one type of electoral reform. As already noted, candidate quotas and reserved seats are fundamentally different in design, apply to different stages of the election process,

and affect political parties and parliament in different ways. They also seem to be pushed through by partly different actors, with different agendas, and, as our results show, in different political systems. Therefore, it is important to separate reserved seats and candidate quotas in large-scale, global assessments of gender quotas, for instance, their effects on women's substantive and symbolic representation.⁸⁶

One implication of this work is that scholars should break down both quotas and democracy more than has been typical. A lot of prior quantitative cross-national research has focused on gender quotas generally.⁸⁷ Differentiating candidate and reserved seats quotas bore fruit for our analysis. Future research might similarly benefit by making distinctions within reserved seat quotas or between candidate quotas with and without strengthening features like placement mandates. Consider too the distinction between the adoption of a gender quota and its implementation. Adopted quotas have sometimes been challenged and removed, or simply abandoned.

Our argument and findings imply similar benefits to considering more fine-grained understandings of the dimensions of democracy. Scholars of democracy conceptualize a variety of dimensions of democracy that, in some cases, go beyond the two we have considered here (see endnote 14). For example, the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem) distinguishes between multiple "principles" of democracy including electoral, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Since our findings suggest that distinguishing among two dimensions of democracy helps us better understand quotas, future research could consider whether quota types relate to other dimensions of democracy in even more nuanced ways. So too might additional research consider democracy as moments of transition, rather than the continuous, dimensional construct we have theorized and modeled here. It is possible that specific democratic transition points open unique opportunities for the adoption of quotas, something that scholars can assess in the future.⁸⁸

Another possible extension of our research is to analyze the exceptions to the broader patterns we observe. For instance, although we show that it is less likely that countries that are more democratic adopt reserved seats, we know that a few of them have done so (e.g., India, at the local level). We theorize that acknowledging multiple actors, such as political elites, civil society, and international actors, as well as the particular constellation they take in a country, will yield clues as to the types of quotas considered for adoption. Therefore, we suggest that case studies using process-tracing would further understanding of the motives for selecting certain quota types and contribute to a more complete picture of the broader relationship between democracy and quota adoption.

Finally, on a broader note, we call on scholars of (electoral) authoritarian regimes to increasingly include gender dynamics in their analyses.⁸⁹ Our global analysis of a wide-reaching contemporary electoral reform provides support to studies that have suggested that reserved seat adoption fits the agenda of authoritarian leaders.⁹⁰ In other words, there is increasing evidence that authoritarian regimes that hold (multiparty) elections not only respond to pressures for quota adoption but also make strategic use of certain gender equality policies to "mimic the appearance of liberal democracy"⁹¹ in order to avoid receiving pressures for democratization. The analysis of gender quota adoption suggests that an increased focus on these

strategies is warranted. They deserve the attention not only of scholars but also of practitioners working with democracy promotion and with the reduction of gender inequalities in politics.

NOTES

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1. Melanie M. Hughes, Pamela Paxton, and Mona Lena Krook, "Gender Quotas for Legislatures and Corporate Boards," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 43 (July 2017), 331–52.

2. Drude Dahlerup, ed., *Women, Quotas and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Mona Lena Krook, *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

3. Rainbow Murray, Mona Lena Krook, and Katherine A. R. Opello, "Why Are Gender Quotas Adopted? Party Pragmatism and Parity in France," *Political Research Quarterly*, 65 (September 2012), 529–43; Tania Verge, "Institutionalising Gender Equality in Spain: From Party Quotas to Electoral Gender Quotas," *West European Politics*, 35 (February 2012), 395–414.

4. Lisa Baldez, "Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 29 (May 2004), 231–58.

5. Gihan Abou-Zeid, "The Arab Region: Women's Access to the Decision-Making Process Across the Arab Nation," in Dahlerup, ed., 2006, 168–93.

6. Melanie M Hughes, Mona Lena Krook, and Pamela Paxton, "Transnational Women's Activism and the Global Diffusion of Gender Quotas," *International Studies Quarterly*, 59 (June 2015), 357–72.

7. Dahlerup, 2006.

8. Sarah S. Bush, "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures," *International Organization*, 65 (Winter 2011), 103–37; Sarah S. Bush and Eleanor Gao, "Small Tribes, Big Gains: The Strategic Uses of Gender Quotas in the Middle East," *Comparative Politics*, 49 (January 2017), 149–67; Melinda Adams, "'National Machineries' and Authoritarian Politics," *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 9 (May 2007), 176–97; Amanda B. Edgell, "Foreign Aid, Democracy, and Gender Quota Laws," *Democratization*, 24 (September 2017), 1103–41; Melody E. Valdini, *The Inclusion Calculation: Why Men Appropriate Women's Representation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Sarah S. Bush and Pär Zetterberg, "Gender Quotas and International Reputation," *American Journal of Political Science*, 65 (April 2021), 326–41; Abou-Zeid.

9. Aili Mari Tripp, *Women and Power in Postconflict Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Melanie M. Hughes and Aili Mari Tripp, "Civil War and Trajectories of Change in Women's Political Representation in Africa, 1985–2020," *Social Forces*, 93 (June 2015), 1415–540.

10. For exceptions, see e.g. Gretchen Bauer and Jennie E. Burnet, "Gender Quotas, Democracy, and Women's Representation in Africa: Some Insights from Democratic Botswana and Autocratic Rwanda," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41 (November–December 2013), 103–12; Mi Yung Yoon, "Special Seats for Women in Parliament and Democratization: The Case of Tanzania," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41 (November–December 2013), 143–49.

11. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.

12. Dahlerup, 2006.

13. Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, eds., *The Impact of Gender Quotas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

14. There is, of course, no scholarly agreement on a single definition or measure of democracy, neither among theorists nor among comparative politics scholars working on democracy and democratization. However, Dahl's distinction between contestation and inclusiveness has been hugely influential (Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), ch. 15). The two dimensions we include, fully contested free and fair elections and guarantees of civil liberties, hew closely to this original conception-

alization and are commonly used as baseline attributes in definitions of democracy (David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," *World Politics*, 49 (April 1997), 434. See also Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Michael Coppedge, Angel Alvarez, and Claudia Maldonado, "Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness," *The Journal of Politics*, 70 (July 2008), 632–47). Other definitions may exclude a dimension (e.g., Adam Przeworski's minimalist focus on contestation alone, in Adam Przeworski, R. Michael Alvarez, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Fernando Papaterra Limongi Neto, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)) or increase dimensions (e.g., Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Allen Hicken, Matthew Kroenig, Staffan I. Lindberg, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Holli A. Semetko, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, and Jan Teorell, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 (June 2011), 247–67) but all must ultimately reckon with the fundamental Dahlian differentiation between contestation and inclusiveness.

15. Melanie M. Hughes, Pamela Paxton, Amanda B. Clayton, and Pär Zetterberg, "Global Gender Quota Adoption, Implementation, and Reform," *Comparative Politics*, 51 (January 2019), 219–38.

16. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.

17. C.f. Jennier Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections Under Authoritarianism," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12 (August 2009), 403–22.

18. In some cases, quotas apply to the level of aspirants. However, this quota type is quite rare and is not included in our analysis. Dahlerup, 2006.

19. Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, "Removing Quotas, Maintaining Representation: Overcoming Gender Inequalities in Political Party Recruitment," *Representation*, 47 (July 2011), 187–99.

20. Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg.

21. Krook, 2009.

22. Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Ragnhild Muriaas, Liv Tønnessen, and Vibeke Wang, "Exploring the Relationship between Democratization and Quota Policies in Africa," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41 (November-December 2013), 89–93.

23. Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo; Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg.

24. Drude Dahlerup, "Electoral Gender Quotas: Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality Of Result," *Representation*, 43 (July 2007), 73–92; Bauer and Burnet; Mona Lena Krook, "Gender Quotas and Democracy: Insights from Africa and Beyond," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41 (November-December 2013), 160–63.

25. As for another quota type, voluntary quotas, Dahlerup shows that they are more common in democratic countries: in 39 percent of these countries at least one of the political parties had included quotas in their party statutes. In semi-democratic and authoritarian countries, the number was substantially lower: 16 percent and 18 percent, respectively. Dahlerup, 2007.

26. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Bush; Hughes and Tripp; Tripp.

29. See e.g. Collier and Levitsky; Levitsky and Way; Dahl.

30. Alice J. Kang and Aili Mari Tripp, "Coalitions Matter: Citizenship, Women, and Quota Adoption in Africa," *Perspectives on Politics*, 16 (March 2018), 73–91.

31. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.

32. Ann Towns, *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

33. Bush.

34. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2011.

35. Mala Htun and Mark P. Jones, "Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: Electoral Quotas and Women's Leadership in Latin America," in Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux, eds., *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 32–56; Mona Lena Krook, "Gender Quotas as a Global Phenomenon: Actors and Strategies in Quota Adoption," *European Political Science*, 3 (June 2004), 59–65; Karen Celis, Mona Lena Krook, and Petra Meier, "The Rise of Gender Quota Laws: Expanding the Spectrum of Determinants for Electoral Reform," *West European Politics*, 34 (May 2011), 514–30; Bauer and Burnet.

36. Maria José Lubertino, "Pioneering Quotas: The Argentine Experience and Beyond," The Implementation of Quotas: Latin American Experiences, Lima, Peru, February 23–24, 2003, International IDEA.

37. Adriana Piatti-Crocker, ed., *Diffusion of Gender Quotas in Latin America and Beyond: Advances and Setbacks in the Last Two Decades* (New York: Peter Lang, 2011).

38. For an introduction to electoral—or competitive—authoritarianism, see e.g. Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (April 2002), 51–65; Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006); Gandhi and Lust-Okar.

39. See e.g. Abou-Zeid; Bush and Gao; Adams.

40. See also Bush; Towns.

41. Towns.

42. Bush.

43. See e.g. Bush; Daniela Donno and Anne-Kathrin Krefl, “Authoritarian Institutions and Women’s Rights,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 52 (April 2019), 720–53.

44. Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, “Gender Equality Reforms on an Uneven Playing Field: Candidate Selection and Quota Implementation in Electoral Authoritarian Tanzania,” *Government and Opposition*, 51 (July 2016), 464–86.

45. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.

46. Our argument does not preclude the possibility of exceptions from our suggested broader pattern. Individual cases, with unique histories, constellations of political actors, etc. could behave differently than what the theory suggests. Exceptions and outliers to any patterns we observe are fruitful places to focus additional research.

47. See e.g. Krook, 2009.

48. See e.g. Ana Catalano Weeks, “Why are Gender Quota Laws Adopted by Men? The Role of Inter- and Intra-Party Competition,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 62 (December 2018), 1935–73.

49. Guillaume Fréchette, Francois Maniquet, and Massimo Morelli, “Incumbents’ Interests and Gender Quotas,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 52 (October 2008), 891–909.

50. Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

51. Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, “Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series—Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 42 (October 1998), 1260–88.

52. Kazuo Yamaguchi, *Event History Analysis* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1991).

53. Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg.

54. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.

55. In robustness tests, we also excluded these hybrid cases. Removing these cases from the analysis does not substantively change our results.

56. Hughes, Paxton, and Krook.

57. Unfortunately, the QAROT data set does not include quotas that specific political parties have voluntarily adopted. Arguably, the adoption of party quotas by the dominant party in a one-party-dominant state (e.g., the African National Congress in South Africa) may produce a similar effect as a national quota law. However, such cases are relatively rare. “Gender Quotas Database,” International IDEA (2000), <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/>. See also Mona Lena Krook, “Candidate Gender Quotas: A Framework for Analysis,” *European Journal of Political Science*, 46 (May 2007), 367–94.

58. Freedom House (2020), <https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology>

59. *Ibid.*

60. Although we believe that Freedom House’s measurements of democracy best capture our definition of democracy, we acknowledge that this operationalization is not free from criticism. For instance, Freedom House’s measurements include also non-procedural aspects of democracy, such as liberties related to socio-economic issues. Thus, its index is more maximalist than Dahl’s definition of democracy. Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 35 (February 2002), 5–34. In addition, scholars have suggested that “political rights” and “civil liberties” are—empirically speaking—too similar and should not be used as indicators of distinct aspects of democracy. Michael Coppedge, Angel Alvarez, and Claudia Maldonado, “Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness,” *Journal of Politics*, 70 (July 2008), 632–47. While we take criticisms of Freedom House seriously, we argue that it mainly makes our test harder: if the critique holds, we should not expect to find any differences across the two dimensions of democracy. It should also be added that other scholars have found these multiple dimensions to be appropriate. Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, “Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (February 2000), 58–86.

61. To run such models is important because some scholars have found that different measures of democracy do not correlate as much as we would expect. Thus, there is a risk that different operationalizations of democracy yield different results. See e.g. Edward McMahon and Emilie Kornheiser, "Assessing the Assessors: Correlating Democracy Methodologies," *Social Indicators Research*, 97 (2010), 269–77.

62. Bush; Edgell; Liam Swiss and Kathleen M. Fallon, "Women's Transnational Activism, Norm Cascades, and Quota Adoption in The Developing World," *Politics & Gender*, 13 (September 2017), 458–87; Miriam J. Anderson and Liam Swiss, "Peace Accords and the Adoption of Electoral Quotas for Women in the Developing World, 1990–2006," *Politics & Gender*, 10 (March 2014), 33–61.

63. World Bank (2017), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD>.

64. Bush; Swiss and Fallon.

65. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.

66. Our measure of the institutionalization of the international women's movement combines three world-level indicators: (1) cumulative foundings of WINGOs; (2) the cumulative count of international conferences, UN treaties, and UN groups related to women; and (3) yearly resources of United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). We combine the three indicators by estimating values (factor scores) of the underlying latent variable—the global institutionalization of the women's movement—using confirmatory factor analysis.

67. See Hughes, Paxton and Krook for a review.

68. We update data from Pamela Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes, and Jennifer L. Green, "The International Women's Movement and Women's Political Representation, 1893–2003," *American Sociological Review*, 71 (December 2006), 898–920.

69. Mona Tajali, "Gender Quota Adoption in Postconflict Contexts: An Analysis of Actors and Factors Involved," *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 34 (July 2013), 261–85; Gretchen Bauer and Hannah E. Britton, *Women in African Parliaments* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Tripp.

70. Angus Maddison, "Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD," (2010), retrieved November 17, 2011, from <http://ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm>.

71. Bush.

72. Auxiliary models with Polity's democracy measure shows a similar curvilinear pattern. However, in contrast to Freedom House's average democracy score, the Polity democracy index is not statistically significant with the adoption of electoral gender quotas. It is only in some auxiliary models that the nonlinear effect reached statistical significance (at $p < .10$, i.e. the same level of significance as the one presented in Model 2 in Table 1). Plots of the curve show that quota adoption peaks when the Polity democracy index is 3 (on a -10 to 10 scale, where 7 and above usually is characterized as "democratic"), and then declines, although not as sharply as we observe using the Freedom House average democracy score. Full results from these auxiliary models are available upon request. Polity does not provide separate measures of civil liberties or political rights, so we are unable to replicate our remaining models.

73. For example, adding GDP per capita to the model or removing major armed conflict or Marxist-Leninist history both produce results with no statistically significant effects of civil liberties on reserved seat adoption. These same changes do not disrupt the statistical significance of our other main findings (auxiliary models are available upon request).

74. See also Mark P. Jones, "Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women: Evidence from the Latin American Vanguard," *Comparative Political Studies*, 42 (January 2009), 56–81.

75. Notably, auxiliary models (available upon request) show that diffusion has a positive and statistically significant relationship with quota adoption for both types when diffusion is measured at the subregional level, suggesting that the diffusion of reserved seat quotas may not reach as far as diffusion effects for candidate quotas.

76. Baldez.

77. Milica G. Antic and Sonja Lokar, "The Balkans: From Total Rejection to Gradual Acceptance of Gender Quotas," in Dahlerup, ed., 2006, 138–67.

78. James N. Sater, "Reserved Seats, Patriarchy, and Patronage in Morocco," in Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, eds., 72–86.

79. Adams.

80. Jennie E. Burnet, "Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *African Affairs*, 107 (May 2008), 361–86.

81. Anne Marie Goetz, "No Shortcuts to Power: Constraints on Women's Political Effectiveness in Uganda," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40 (December 2002), 549–75.

82. Bush and Gao.

83. E.g. Abou-Zeid; Bush.

84. Ragnhild Muriaas and Vibeke Wang, "Executive Dominance and the Politics of Quota Representation in Uganda," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 50 (June 2012), 309–38; Donno and Kreft.

85. See e.g. Krook, 2009.

86. C.f. Amanda Clayton and Pär Zetterberg, "Quota Shocks: Electoral Gender Quotas and Government Spending Priorities Worldwide," *Journal of Politics*, 80 (July 2018), 916–32.

87. E.g. Hughes, Krook, and Paxton; Clayton and Zetterberg; Edgell.

88. As an additional extension to such a discussion, future empirical work could look closer at what Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires refer to as "political citizenship models," which they argue help explain variation in the type of (if any) quota adopted. Mona Lena Krook, Joni Lovenduski, and Judith Squires, "Gender Quotas and Models of Political Citizenship," *British Journal of Political Science*, 39 (October 2009), 781–803.

89. See also Gandhi and Lust-Okar.

90. See e.g. Abou-Zeid; Adams; Muriaas and Wang; Sater; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016; Bush and Gao; Donno and Kreft.

91. Bush and Gao, 2017, 150.