Gender quota politics

Fall 2023

Quota?

- How do you understand quota? What does it mean?
- Why is this controversial?
- What about quota and democracy?
- What is the dominant discourse in your country?
- Quota: yay or nay?

Quotas as a 'fast track' to equal representation for women (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005)

- Incremental vs. Fast-Track route
- Nordic countries: 70 years to get to 30%
- Costa Rica from 19 to 35% in one election
- Incremental: liberal discourse, gradual changes in social norms, education, party recruitment, get rid of barriers, quotas seen as discriminatory
- Fast track: formal and informal discrimination, glass. Ceilings, active measures, quota compensation of structural barriers
- What can be the downside of quota?

The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws
Lisa Baldez 2006

- Gradual change not working

- Right quota provision and right context

- Goal = increase in the numbers

- Not more democratic or transparent process

- Quota = legitimacy to alod nomination processes (Lat Am)

- Parties don't comply (PRI in 2003 – primaries instead of quota)

- How to implement qouta in decentralized systems (USA?)

Democracy and Adoption of Quota Worldwide. Zetterberg, Bjarnegård, Hughes, and Paxton 2022

- The levels of democray matter

- Adoption more likely by countries in the middle

- Limited political rights = reserved seats (not threatening to elites)

- More contested elections = canidate quota

Quota worldwide

Quota worldwide

- Spread after 2000

- Over half of the countries apply some

- Quota database: IDEA

- 1st wave: 1970s and 1980s Scandinavia (and Communist regimes)

- 2nd wave: after 1991 (Argentina) in Latin America, Beijing Action Plan 1995

- 3rd wave: current reforms of quota measures (to make them effective)

Figure 2   Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time

Count of Quota Adoption and Reform by Year

adoption
reform

Cumulative Quota Adoption and Reform

adoptions
reforms
total activity

Defining quota

- Affirmative action measure

- No. or % of women nominated or elected

- Fast-track measure

- For women or gender neutral

Quota arguments (Dahlerup 2017)

Opponent's arguments	Proponent's arguments
Descriptive representation	**Descriptive representation**
1. Quotas unnecessary, number of women will gradually increase	1. Quotas necessary to achieve rapid increase in women's representation
2. It will not be possible to find sufficient number of (qualified) women. Women will not want to be nominated because of their sex	2. There will be a sufficient number of women if the parties look for women more seriously
3. Quotas are violations of free choice of voters, are demanding on women and undermine the principle of merit	3. Quotas will contribute of enlarging the pool of potential candidates and make much better use of diverse qualifications in society.

Substantive representation	Substantive representation
4. Women elected via quotas will be only seen as "quota women", their political effectiveness will be limited	4. A critical mass of women will bring a different style and approach of politics
5. Quota women will be regarded as token or proxy women, too dependent on their party leaders or husbands	5. A critical mass of women will be able to introduce new policy concerns onto political agenda

Symbolic representation	Symbolic representation
6. After women quotas, other minorities will also demand quotas (including the left-handed and redheads)	6. Gender is one of the most important axes of power in society, they are not only important but also necessary
7. Quotas are only a symbolic gesture and will not treat the real causes of under-representation	7. Quotas will contribute to the process of democratization

TYPES OF QUOTA

- Reserved seats
- Legislative quota (electoral law or constitution)
- Party quota

- Sometimes a combination (i.e., Rwanda: 2 reserved. Seats per province + 30% quota for candidates on the ballot)

Quota around the world

- Reserved seats: Asia, Middle East, North Africa

- Legislative quota: Latin America, Europe, Africa

- Party quota: Europe, South Africa

- EU countries often go from voluntary party quota to legislative quota: France, Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Croatia, Poland

Does quota work? Under what conditions?

- Reserved seats (with higher thresholds)
- Placement mandate (double quota),but ceiling effects
- Penalties for non-compliance (must be strong)
- Different effects in different contexts

Why is quota adopted?

- Social movement
- International organizations, international reputation
- Spillover effect
- Party dynamics and rational party strategies

Intra and inter-party competition

- Why parties adopt quota laws and not just party quota?
- Political incentives
- National party leaders adopt quota to get advantage over local actors
- Parties adopt quota laws when losing votes to progressive challengers
- Examples:
- Belgium (vs. Austria)
- Portugal (vs. Italy)
- Weeks 2018

Inclusion calculation

- Rational motives
- When party/government loses legitimacy
- Women new element (not stereotypical politicians)

- Quota draw attention
- Signal commitment
- Can protect power of male elites
- Qouta ineffective and temporary

Effects: legislators' quality?

- France quota law = elected women as active and efficient lawmakers as men (no. of bills co-signed, contributions to plenary session, committee sessions, no. of repots written)(Murray 2010)

- No difference in quality between women in reserved seats and contested seats in Uganda (O´Brien 2012)

- In Italy, educational attainment of both female and male MPs increased after quota (Baltrunaite et al. 2014)

Legislator quality: Italy (Weeks and baldez 2015)

- Quota women in Italy -> improvement of overall levels of qualification

- Quota women no less qualified and competent than men, indicators:
  - Characteristics: Previous political experience, occupation, education
  - House performance: No. Of bills introduced, absenteeism, re-election
  - Compare also quota women and non-quota women from 1994 one-time quota election (mixed electoral system, applied quota only to PR tier of election)

Discrimination by leaders – not low qualifications – that explain lower numbers of nominated women in 1996

Table 3. Comparison of quota women and non-quota women

	Quota women	Non-quota women	P-value
N	50	42	
Mean higher education (0 or 1)	0.64	0.73	0.31
Mean pre-election income (€100s)	45.69	42.68	0.65
Mean national government experience (0 or 1)	0.26	0.31	0.77
Mean local government experience (0 or 1)	0.30	0.45	0.13
Mean number of bills proposed	4	7.5	0.13
Mean absentee rate	0.30	0.32	0.50
Mean re-election (0 or 1)	0.71	0.85	0.16

Notes: *P*-values are for a Pearson χ^2 goodness of fit test (with Yates' continuity correction) when the variable is binary, or Welch Two Sample *t*-test (when the variable is continuous or count). Both test the hypothesis that proportions are the same for quota women and non-quota women. Analysis was carried out in R.

Table 5. Determinants of legislator quality

|	(5) Bills proposed	(6) Absentee rate	(7) Re-election
λ Female*PR (quota woman)	−0.12 (0.29)	−0.08 (0.04)*	−1.22 (0.50)**
α Female (non-quota woman)	0.27 (0.19)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.75 (0.38)
γ PR	−0.28 (0.14)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.38 (0.23)
Constant	2.44 (0.37)	0.39 (0.07)	0.30 (0.69)
N	630	599	456
P-value, test ($\alpha = \lambda$)	0.36	0.35	0.02
P-value, test ($\lambda = \gamma$)	0.68	0.04	0.01
McFadden's pseudo R^2	0.39		
Adjusted R^2		0.21	
χ^2			88.04

Notes: White-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Model (5) is estimated using negative binomial regression, model (6) is estimated using ordinary least squares regression, and model (7) is estimated using probit regression. The sample for model (7) includes only those representatives who ran for re-election. The sample for model (6) is smaller due to missing data in the dependent variable. All models include controls for age, national government experience, higher education, log (pre-election income), local government experience, appointment in government or parliament, and electoral political party (models 5 and 6) or parliamentary party (model 7). All analyses were carried out using Zelig for *R* (Imai *et al.*, 2008).
Significant codes: ***0.001; **0.01; *0.05.

Case study: Swedish social democratic party

- 1994: 50:50 gender quota (zipper)

- Besley et al. 2017: analysis of candidate competence prior and after the quota

- Candidate earnings prior to politics (conditional on age, education, occupation)

- Competence of candidates INCREASED after quota adoption

- Mediocre men resigned, quality of party leaders increased, they picked more competent candidates

- Rainbow Murray was probably right

share of elected women in local parties

Legend:
- ● Social Democrats
- ■ Conservatives
- ▲ Center Party

X-axis: Election year (1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014)

Panel B. Average changes in share of elected women

X-axis: Change in the share of elected women (−0.5, −0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5)

Legend:
- Conservative Party: recommendation of gender parity on lists, 1993
- Center Party: recommendation of gender parity on lists, 1993
- Social Democrats: zipper quota, 1993

FIGURE 6. EFFECT OF THE GENDER QUOTA ON SURVIVAL RATES OF COMPETENT AND MEDIOCRE MALE LEADERS

Notes: The figure shows the estimated changes in the survival probability of mediocre and competent male leaders relative to the reference year (1991), depending on the change in the share of elected women when the quota was introduced (1994–1991). The outcome variable captures the survival of the individual politician using a binary indicator that takes a value of 1 if he reappears on the ballot in an election, and 0 otherwise. The unit of observation is an individual male politician in each election, and the sample includes politicians ranked in one of the top three slots on the ballot in the previous election. The sample period is 1985–2014. Panel A shows the results for estimating equation (6) (see the description in the notes to Figure 4) separately for mediocre and competent men. The outcome variable is replaced with the survival indicator. The interaction for the year 1991 is omitted to make the immediate pre-quota election the reference category. That is, we normalize β_{91} to 0 and mark this reference year with a vertical line. Panel B shows the estimated difference in the treatment effect of the quota between mediocre and competent male leaders. A fully saturated triple-difference model, see equation (7), is used to estimate these differences, and the vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals for this difference. The sample excludes 20 local parties that did not comply fully with the quota (having fewer than 40 percent elected women in 1994). It also excludes local parties with a female leader in 1991. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are estimated and all regressions are estimated using OLS.

Effects: Women's leadership

- Does quota lead to stigmatization of „quota women"?
- Or does quota promote female leadership?
- O'Brien and Rickne 2016

TABLE 1. Logistic Regression Models (with Difference-in-Difference Estimation) of Quota Impact on Female Leader Selection and Survival

1991 = Reference	Including Noncompliers		Excluding Noncompliers	
	Female leader selection	Female leader survival	Female leader selection	Female leader survival
1988* quota impact	0.59		-0.28	
	(2.35)		(2.52)	
1994* quota impact	3.82*	4.53	4.01*	3.61
	(2.13)	(4.75)	(2.30)	(4.77)
1998* quota impact	3.60*	-0.69	3.02	0.23
	(2.13)	(4.87)	(2.32)	(4.87)
2002* quota impact	5.63***	2.29	5.33**	5.54
	(2.10)	(5.53)	(2.29)	(5.78)
2006* quota impact	3.54*	-3.36	2.77	-1.18
	(2.10)	(5.34)	(2.30)	(5.51)
2010* quota impact	5.10**	-4.16	3.87*	-4.43
	(2.10)	(5.57)	(2.28)	(5.89)
Observations	1,505	265	1,191	213

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects.

Resistance to quota (Krook 2016)

Table 1. Stages and forms of resistance to gender quotas

	Goals	Forms	Actors	Effects	Tools	Counter-strategy
Pre-election period	Criticize quotas Foster ambiguity re:legal status	Appeal to legal frameworks to overturn or minimize quotas	Aggrieved men Media Legal "purists"	Quotas declared unconstitutional or illegal *or* Quotas affirmed as constitutional or legal	False universalism of political principles	Constitutional and legal reforms to "legalize" quotas Gender-neutral phrasing of quotas
Election period	Violate spirit and/or letter of quota rules	"Misunderstand" or "forget" quota requirements Apply minimal interpretation of quota rules Engineer women's electoral losses Commit violence, intimidation, or electoral fraud Nominate wives and daughters of male politicians	Party elites Male rivals	Quotas not effective in electing more women Elect but dis-empower women as political actors	Male power and political survival	Clarifications to quota requirements Improved monitoring of compliance Legal judgments and reforms to strengthen women's political rights Name-gathering campaigns
Post-election period	Reduce women's capacity and legitimacy as legislators, whether or not elected through quotas	Raise doubts that quota women are "qualified" Undermine women's legislative performance	Male rivals Media Citizens	Disparage female politicians Reduce other women's political ambitions	Gender and leadership norms	Studies on qualifications of quota and non-quota officials Women-specific orientations and training Laws and policies on violence and harassment