# Political parties and women in politics

Fall 2023




Why are parties essential?

## Central role of political parties

- Nomination for elected offices
- Nomination for executive offices
- Representation of interests (policies)

#### Supply-demand side of candidate recruitment

- Political parties are difficult to place in this model
- Demand
- But can prompt supply too



*Figure 9.2* The vertical ladder of recruitment and the supply and demand model *Source*: Adapted from Lovenduski and Norris (1993), Norris and Lovenduski (1995) and Verge (2015).

# How to win a party nomination?

- Party gatekeepers more likely to promote people like themselves
- Female gatekeepers support women also informally
- Case study: Canada (2004 and 2006 elections)
- Each party nominates one candidate per district, if more candidates – primaries at local level



#### Canada 2004 and 2006

Local party leaders can influence slection processes on local level

Even if not directly responsible for selection

	Probit	
	coefficient	SE
Female president	.174**	.081
Incumbent	069	.117
District ideology	.002	.003
Share of women 18+ in	.063**	.029
the district population		
Share of female	.968**	.426
candidates since 1980		
Share of female	.972****	.188
party candidates since 1980		
Competitiveness	0002	.003
Contested nomination	.0166	.087
Share of English speakers	.001	.003
in the district population		
Share of college graduates	.018	.018
in the district population		
Average household income	.001	.003
Share of Catholics	.001	.003
in the district population		
Year 2006	.066	.073
Region dummies <sup>a</sup>		
West	.025	.171
East	107	.203
North	.678	.458
Ontario	019	.162
Party dummies <sup>b</sup>		
Bloc Québécois	060	.303
Conservatives	368**	.171
Liberals	0005	.149
New Democratic Party	.132	.136
Constant	<b>4.798***</b>	1.585
2		

120

1,567

Table 2. The Effect of Local Party President's Gender on the

Candidate's Gender

Note: Dependent variable is *female candidate* a. The reference category is Quebec. b. The reference category is the Green Party. \*\*\* $p \le .05$ , two-tailed. \*\*\* $p \le .01$ , two-tailed.

χ²

Ν

#### Selection criteria in parties

- Party statuses
- Gender neutral rules
- Candidate background
- Candidate qualifications
- Candidate experience
- Candidate electability
- 32 countries (Africa, Asia, CEE), 101 parties
- Bjarnegard and Zetterberg

**Table I.** The relationship between formal selection criteria and the proportion of women representatives per party (multivariate analysis).

	Model I	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Background	<i>−</i> 6.50 <sup>***</sup> (2.63)			
Qualifications		-2.43 (3.22)		
Experience			-6.69 <sup>**</sup> (3.10)	
Electability				-3.22 (I.92)
Party age	0.14** (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)	0.13* (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)
Party quotas	4.52 (3.71)	3.84 (3.56)	3.89 (3.62)	3.53 (3.46)
Democracy	-1.22** (0.48)	− <b>Ⅰ.07</b> * (0.58)	-1.62*** (0.59)	-1.27** (0.54)
Democracy (squared)	0.20* (0.10)	0.19 (0.12)	0.24** (0.10)	0.22* (0.11)
Low corruption	3.59** (1.53)	3.68** (I.55)	3.56** (1.49)	3.55** (I.55)
Socioeconomic development	-8.84 (l6.74)	-11.56 (Î6.97)	-10.27 (16.75)	-12.19 (17.30)
Gender quota law	10.75** (4.86)	II.26** (5.49)	8.66 (5.64)	10.75* (5.44)
Electoral system (majoritarian)	-6.29* (3.46)	-5.27 (3.40)	-6.24* (3.51)	-5.77 (3.50)
Constant	4.04 (7.68)	5.15 (7.34)	6.34 (7.50)	5.83 (8.14)
R <sup>2</sup> (N)	0.23 (101)	0.22 (Î0I)	0.24 (101)	0.22 (Ì0I) (

*Note*: OLS: ordinary least squares. Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients. Clustered robust standard error in brackets. Checked by VIF statistics to be free of multicollinearity problems.

\*\*\*\*significance at <0.01; \*\*significance at <0.05; \*significance at <0.10.

## Informal rules

- Enduring rules, nnorms, prectices, shaping collective. Behavior
- Collective effect
- Not codified
- Rewards and sanctions from within and outside institutions
- Prefernce for party experience (not in fromal rules) and local political expertise
- Preference for incumbents
- Assumption that women do not want to run
- Scouting (in favore of women Green party, violation of informal rules that candidates should come forward themsleves) (van Dijk 2023)

#### Outsiders on the inside?


- Role of social networks
- Party office holding is a gendered resource!
- Sitting in party's executive office(s) = crutial for nomination
- A key predictor in political carreers
- Having a position in the party = different effects on men and women
- Ca 30% of female top party positions (2006)
- Men insiders are often ideal candidates

# Outsiders on the inside?

Verge and Claveria 2013 (CCS 2005-12)

#### Table 2. The determinants of viable candidacy (I).

	Model I	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Sex (women $= 1$ )	-0.227	0.290	0.447	- <b>0.94</b> I <sup>+</sup>	-0.282
	(0.153)	(0.308)	(0.353)	(0.508)	(0.537)
Party office	0.808****	I.023 <sup>****</sup>	0.648**	0.391 <sup>***</sup>	0.613**
	(0.150)	(0.308)	(0.249)	(0.137)	(0.271)
Incumbency	4.680***	4.681 <sup>′≈</sup> **	4.826***	4.840***	4.905 <sup>****</sup>
,	(0.360)	(0.364)	(0.339)	(0.321)	(0.412)
Sex $ imes$ Party office	· · · ·	-0.584 <sup>+</sup>	-0.729 <sup>*</sup>	· · · ·	-0.886*
,		(0.326)	(0.354)		(0.448)
Monthly hours (logged)		· · · ·	0.309***	0.234*	0.229 <sup>′+</sup>
, ( 36 /			(0.108)	(0.116)	(0.117)
Sex $ imes$ Monthly hours				0.243	0.324***
,				(0.150)	(0.115)
Educational level				· · ·	0.270**
					(0.087)
Age					0.017*
5					(0.008)
Constant	-3.867***	<b>-4.061</b> ***	<b>-4.806</b> ***	-4.354***	_7.I33 <sup>****</sup>
	(0.157)	(0.225)	(0.390)	(0.367)	(0.946)
Observations	7946	7946	6442	6442 <sup>´</sup>	4728
Number of clusters	12	12	H	H	10
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.3269	0.3275	0.3523	0.3528	0.3893



Notes: Logistic regression. DV: Elected in most recent election (1), Non-elected in most recent election (0). The CCS (2014) does not include data on monthly hours of party work for Belgium and for Sweden age is not coded. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 1. Predicted probabilities for viable candidacy (95% confidence interval).

	Model I	Model 2	Model 3
Sex (women = 1)	<b>−0.913</b> ****	-0.876**	$-0.852^{*}$
· · · ·	(0.345)	(0.340)	(0.384)
Party office	0.550*	0.596+	0.730 <sup>*</sup>
	(0.268)	(0.315)	(0.320)
Women $ imes$ Party office		-0.181	-0.30 I
		(0.611)	(0.751)
Political experience			0.028***
			(0.008)
Policy expertise			0.174
			(0.247)
Educational level			0.466*
			(0.226)
Specialist systems	0.157	0.153	-0.066
	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.308)
Constant	-0.833****	-0.845***	-1.382***
	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.258)
Observations	419	419	359
Number of clusters	22	22	22
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0371	0.0373	0.0678

 Table 4. The determinants of portfolio allocation.

Notes: Logistic regression. DV: Inner portfolio (1); Outer portfolio (0). Standard errors in parentheses. <sup>+</sup>0.1; \*0.05; \*\*\*0.01; \*\*\*0.001.






Figure 2. Predicted probabilities for ministerial and post-ministerial recruitment (95% confidence interval).

#### Parties need to actively recruit women

- Experiment form the USA
- Role of local party leaders
- Subtle: manipulation of supply and demand side






Note: Raw experimental results are shown with no controls or adjustments for county.

Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Spikes represent 83% confidence intervals.

FIGURE 3 Estimated Proportion of State Delegates Who Are Women, by Condition



*Note*: Predicted values are from Model 4 in Table 3, with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Spikes represent 83% confidence intervals.

#### How to Elect More Women: Gender and Candidate Success in a Field Experiment (1)

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 Brigham Young University

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 Brigham Young University

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Abstract: Women are dramatically underrepresented in legislative bodies, and most scholars agree that the greatest limiting factor is the lack of female candidates (supply). However, voters' subconscious biases (demand) may also play a role, particularly among conservatives. We designed an original field experiment to test whether messages from party leaders can affect women's electoral success. The experimental treatments involved messages from a state Republican Party chair to the leaders of 1,842 precinct-level caucus meetings. We find that party leader's efforts to stoke both supply and demand (and especially both together) increase the number of women elected as delegates to the statewide nominating convention. We replicate this finding in a survey experiment with a national sample of validated Republican primary election voters (N = Our results suggest that simple interventions from party leaders can affect the behavior of candidates and voters and tely lead to a substantial increase in women's descriptive representation.


tion Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are le on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://dx.doi. 7910/DVN/UQAIZI.

# Party-level factors of women's representation?



# Party ideology

 "How might a party's ideology directly or indirectly influence the success of women candidates?""



## Ideology?

- The main predictor of inclusion of women
- Duverger 1955: Political Role of Women
- Feminization of right-wing parties (sometimes: UK, LA, CDU)
- Gender gap closing?
- Ideology losing power?
- Socio-economic vs post-materialist dimension

# Does ideology still matter?

- Better explanation when we abandon the one-dimensional measure of ideology
- Two dimensions: socio-economic and post-material
- Post-materialist left more connected to feminist post-materialsims
- 2008-2012 PARTIREP comparative survey among MPs
- (AT, BE, DE, FR, HU, IT, NL, NO, PL, PT, ES, SE, UK)

Table 1. Legislators' speaking at PPG meetings, by party family (mean scores on 4-point item) (N = 844).

	Speaking on behalf of women in PPG Mean score (SD)
Parties in 'left' block	
Green/ecologist parties $(N = 33)$	2.52 (1.18)
Socialist/social democratic parties ( $N = 310$ )	2 (1.08)
Parties in 'right' block	
Christian democratic parties $(N = 143)$	1.64 (0.96)
Liberal parties ( $N = 115$ )	1.91 (0.99)
Conservative parties $(N =  185)$	1.62 (0.93)
Far right/anti-immigrant parties ( $N = 33$ )	1.94 (1)
Other $(N = 25)$	2 (1.06)
'Left' block ( $N = 345$ )	2.05 (1.2)
'Right' block ( $N = 499$ )	1.73 (0.98)

Note: SD: standard deviation. Only the largest party families are displayed as separate party families; the other parties are included in the category 'other'.

Erzeel and Celis 2016

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Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression explaining legislators' speaking on behalf of women, with clustered robust standard errors (Reference category = Non-actors; N = 811).

	Model I B (SE)		Model 2 B (SE)	
	Occasional actors B (SE)	Frequent actors B (SE)	Occasional actors B (SE)	Frequent actors B (SE)
Intercept	-1.707 (0.611)**	0.012 (0.519)	-0.733 (0.804)	0.188 (0.7)
Left-right economic	0.019 (0.059)	-0.004 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.064)	-0.026 (0.051)
Left-Right post-materialist	-0.077 (0.059)	-0.129 (0.046)**	-0.116 (0.062)	-0.12 (0.05)*
Presence women's group (Ref = yes)			0.051 (0.245)	-0.258 (0.202)
% women in PPG			-0.016 (0.008)*	-0.005 (0.008)
Electoral system (Ref $=$ PR)			-0.469 (0.246)	-0.764 (0.237)**
MPs' sex (Ref = woman)	-0.872 (0.223)***	-1.19 (0.189)***	-0.96 (0.229)***	-1.124 (0.198)***
Seniority (log)	0.318 (0.454)	0.738 (0.415)	0.357 (0.459)	0.855 (0.425)
Age	0.024 (0.011)*	-0.002 (0.009)	0.023 (0.011)*	0.001 (0.01)
Government (Ref = government)	0.304 (0.197)	0.581 (0.179)***	0.304 (0.212)	0.680 (0.202)***
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.1		0.13	· · ·

\*\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05.

**Table 6.** OLS regression explaining legislators' position on the feminist scale, with clustered robust standard errors (N = 813).

	Model I B (SE)	Model 2 B (SE)
Intercept	4.232 (0.144)***	3.915 (0.174)***
Left-Right economic	-0.095 (0.016)***	-0.087 (0.016)***
Left-Right post-	-0.103 (0.014)***	-0.094 (0.015)***
materialist		
Presence women's group		-0.082 (0.055)
(yes = I)		
% women in PPG		0.007 (0.002)***
Electoral system		-0.047 (0.062)
(PR = I)		
MPs' sex (woman $= 1$ )	0.415 (0.05)***	0.373 (0.052)***
Seniority (log)	0.194 (0.104)	0.203 (0.106)*
Age	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Government $(= I)$	-0.023 (0.049)	0.01 (0.05)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.315	0.325

Note: Multi-collinearity is not a problem: highest VIF score = 1.997, lowest tolerance score = 0.501 (% women in PPG') in model 2. \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05.

#### Feminization of parties: UK

#### Labour in UK

- Change in 1997
- Blair Babes (101 out of 120)
- All-women shortlist
- Blair, Brown focused on women electorate

 "It is illustrative of how on the one hand women politicians are expected to make a difference and criticized for not transform centuries of male-designed traditions of politics. But on the other hand, they are expected to fit in with the culture of the institution an prove themselves according to the criteria developed during its long history as a male institution." (Lovenduski

# Feminization of the UK parties 2

Conservative party under D. Cameron

"scandalous under-representation of women in the party" as major problem

2010 party program

No adoption of AWS

Austerity policy and traditional conservative positions



#### Women's orgainzations within parties

- Women's section important in the past
- Mobilization
- Even before female suffrage
- In 1980s rise of women's activities and demands
- Dilemma: party structures or movement?
- Scandinavian countries as an example
- Change of the role of the sections



#### Women's organisations: yes or no?

- Do women's sections prevent women from integration?
- Not a modern feature
- Parties abolishing these
- Kittilson and Childs 2016
- Data from 2011-2013

Country	# Parties with women's organizations/total # parties
Australia	3/4
Austria	2/5
Belgium	6/12
Canada	3/5
Czech Republic	1/5
Denmark	0/8
Germany	3/7
Hungary	2/4
Ireland	2/5
Israel	4/9
Italy	5/5
Norway	3/7
Poland	2/6
Portugal	2/6
Spain	0/5
Sweden	6/8
United Kingdom	4/4

Purty women's examinations, by country




Figure 1. The presence of party women's organizations by party family.

Table 4.	The influence of party women's organizations on
the NEC.	

	% Women on party NEC	Variance inflation factor
Party women's organization	0.37	1.04
Party gender quotas for NEC	2.29	1.08
Left-Right ideology	-1.77	1.08
Constant	40.33***	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	
Durbin-Watson	1.186	
Number of cases	65	

Note: Table entries represent coefficients from linear regression. \*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.005.

Table 5. The influence of party women's organizations on quota rules.

	Candidate quotas	Party gender quotas NEC
Party women's organization	-0.19	0.96*
Left-Right ideology	-0.24*	-0.24*
Constant	1.4*	0.30
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.12
Number of cases	79	79

Note: Table entries represent coefficients from logistic regression. \*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < .005.

### Women candidate training programs

Podporují nás



#### CAMPAIGN BOOT CAMP TRAINS LIBERIAN WOMEN CANDIDATES ON SAFETY AND SECURI

#### EMERGE



**Building** a reflective democracy, one win at a time

DONATE

O nás


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STATISTIKY, ANALÝZY,

VÝZKUMY

Mentoringové programy





#### We're building a world where 51% (or more!) of elected officials are women.

We're a multi-partisan organisation working to