P  U  S
https://doi.org/10.1177/09636625221092145
Public Understanding of Science
2022, Vol. 31(6) 784­–798
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/09636625221092145
journals.sagepub.com/home/pus
Poly-truth, or the limits of pluralism:
Popular debates on conspiracy
theories in a post-truth era
Jaron Harambam
VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Kamile Grusauskaite and Lars de Wildt
KU Leuven, Belgium
Abstract
Conspiracy theories are central to “post-truth” discussions. Official knowledge, backed by science, politics,
and media, is distrusted by various people resorting to alternative (conspiratorial) explanations. While elite
commentators lament the rise of such “untruths,” we know little of people’s everyday opinions on this
topic, despite their societal ramifications. We therefore performed a qualitative content analysis of 522
comments under a Dutch newspaper article on conspiracy theories to study how ordinary people discuss
post-truth matters. We found four main points of controversy: “habitus of distrust”; “who to involve in
public debates”; “which ways of knowing to allow”; and “what is at stake?” The diverging opinions outline
the limits of pluralism in a post-truth era, revealing tensions between technocratic and democratic ideals
in society. We show that popular opinions on conspiracy theories embody more complexity and nuance
than elite conceptions of post-truth allow for: they lay bare the multiple sociological dimensions of
poly-truth.
Keywords
conspiracy theories, disinformation, epistemology, expertise, experts, pluralism, poly-truth, post-truth,
public debate
1. Introduction
Conspiracy theories are central to contemporary public discourse. No longer in the dark extremist
margins of society, these allegations, usually of some secret cabal operating behind the everyday
screen of reality, now take center stage in various societal debates. Think of former US president
Corresponding author:
Jaron Harambam, Athena Institute, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The
Netherlands.
Email: Jaron.harambam@gmail.com
1092145PUS0010.1177/09636625221092145Public Understanding of ScienceHarambam et al.
research-article2022
Research article
Harambam et al.	 785
Donald Trump, or his following propelled by Q-Anon theories to fight against a nefarious “deep
state,” or the so-called anti-vaxxers to 9/11-truthers and climate skeptics, who all challenge the
“official” accounts of reality. This widespread distrust toward mainstream epistemic authorities
and the knowledge they produce is a serious concern for many who fear the dissolution of a shared
truth, spiraling polarization, and the demise of democratic societies (d’Ancona, 2017; Rosenblum
and Muirhead, 2020; Sunstein, 2018). The coronavirus pandemic only aggravated and intensified
this socio-cultural development often dubbed post-truth: much of our understanding of the virus,
how it impacts our bodies and societies, and what to do about it, is contested from various pockets
in society (Harambam, 2020b). It is not hard to imagine that the pervasiveness of these alternative
accounts of officially sanctioned truths strongly influences people’s opinions on public institutions
such as the media, politics, and science and on the functioning of democratic societies. They also
lead to heated personal and public debates, and societal polarization.
Yet we find very little academic research on how people regard the presence of conspiracy theories
in the public sphere. Over the last two decades, a burgeoning research field on conspiracy theories
emerged (Butter and Knight, 2020; Douglas et al., 2019; Drążkiewicz and Harambam, 2021;
Uscinski, 2018). Scholars from many different academic disciplines study conspiracy theories:
What are they? Where do they come from? Which people adhere to them? How many people
believe them? What meaning do they have? How do they function? What consequences do they
have?And so on. Such research centers, rather logically, around conspiracy theories/-ists. However,
this exclusive focus obscures the fact that conspiracy theories operate in societal context, affecting
many more people beyond conspiracy theorists alone. Elite opinions of commentators in media,
politics and science on the dangers of conspiracy theories abound, but what about people’s everyday
appreciations of these competing truth claims? They are remarkably invisible in academic
research.
In this article, we therefore study public opinions of conspiracy theories to empirically show
how people think and talk about them, and ultimately, to grasp the multiple cultural meanings of
these “stigmatized forms of knowledge” in contemporary Western societies (Barkun, 2006;
Birchall, 2006). To pursue this research question, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of
522 comments by Dutch speakers below a newspaper article about conspiracy theories published
in May 2020 on the largest online news platform in the Netherlands. The news article consists of
an interview with the main author of this article and discusses the contemporary popularity of conspiracy
theories, and whether and how we should engage with conspiracy theorists. As a mainstream
popular news outlet, NU.nl draws a diverse crowd, making the sample fit to obtain a general
overview of the variety of public opinions on conspiracy theories. More precisely, it gives insight
into the various positions and logics of the public debate on conspiracy theories in the midst of the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic when various alternative perspectives on the crisis were rampant.
Quantitative survey research makes visible the amount of people endorsing various conspiracy
theories (Uscinski, 2018), but gauging people’s opinions of conspiracy theories is perhaps even
more important to understand their cultural and societal significance.
Both in private and public contexts, conspiracy theories appear a divisive topic. Many point to
the personal and public harms conspiracy theories may cause: from interpersonal and intergroup
conflicts and societal polarization, to increased prejudice toward other groups, harmful health
choices, science denial, lower political engagement, extremism, radicalization, and sometimes
even violence (Byford, 2011; Cassam, 2019; Douglas et al., 2019). Such commenters argue that
conspiracy theories pose clear dangers to various public institutions as their legitimacy and authority
are called into question (Kakutani, 2018; Lewandowsky et al., 2017; Sunstein, 2018). But conspiracy
theories also connect people, give meaning to experienced disparities and corruption in
society, and may force mainstream institutions and authorities to be more accountable (Dentith,
786	 Public Understanding of Science 31(6)
2018; Fenster, 2008; Harambam and Aupers, 2017). Conspiracy theories are simply not as straightforward
as is often portrayed. Indeed, we might ask: if we listen to what everyday people say about
conspiracy theories, what do we hear and learn?
2. Conspiracy theory as the epitome of post-truth
Scholarly analyses of conspiracy theories can be divided into two opposing camps. On one hand,
there are those that pathologize conspiracy theories: building on seminal works of Karl Popper
(2013) and Richard Hofstadter (2012), these scholars regard conspiracy theories to be flawed,
irrational, and dangerous understandings of reality. They argue that conspiratorial ideas are reminiscent
of outdated religious worldviews and embody pseudoscience; they are the delusional
thought of disturbed, overly paranoid minds; and go against the (preferred) political virtues of
moderation, deliberation, and consensus (Barkun, 2006; Byford, 2011; Cassam, 2019; Pipes, 1997;
Sunstein, 2018). By contrast, other scholars, mostly from a more anthropological bent, take a less
normative approach to better understand their cultural significance (Harambam, 2020a). They
relate conspiracy theories to the complexities of today’s globalized, hyperreal and risk-saturated
world, and see them as “necessary,” “creative,” “logical,” “appropriate,” “tactical,” and even “productive”
responses to technological, social, and cultural change (Birchall, 2006; Dean, 1998;
Fenster, 2008; Knight, 2000; Melley, 2000). Furthermore, they argue that what constitutes a conspiracy
theory is a consequence of societal power asymmetries which enable their stigmatized
labeling and societal exclusion (Bjerg and Presskorn-Thygesen, 2017; Bratich, 2008; Husting and
Orr, 2007; Pelkmans and Machold, 2011). Prevalent academic distinctions between irrational conspiracy
theories and rational science can therefore be seen as professional boundary work, upholding
the epistemic authority of science (Harambam and Aupers, 2015).
The latter cultural perspective seems remarkably absent in most contemporary post-truth discussions.
Conspiracy theories are commonly juxtaposed with science and factual knowledge
(Biesecker, 2018), and put on par with equally slippery concepts such as fake news and mis/disinformation,
which together come to designate what post-truth is about (Lewandowsky et al., 2017;
McIntyre, 2018). In this new era, the argument goes, shared agreements on what constitutes facts
and truths are ignored or dismantled, and a gratuitous usage of those terms in the public sphere is
no longer taken to be problematic (Kakutani, 2018). Appeals to emotion and personal beliefs
appear more influential in shaping public opinion and political debates than so-called objective
facts or expert knowledge (Bennett and Livingston, 2018). Various actors make claims on truth
without empirical support and discard inconvenient facts simply by calling them false (Rosenblum
and Muirhead, 2020), and their followers continue to support such actors even when their claims
are widely debunked (Lewandowsky et al., 2020). These developments seriously alarm academic
scholars, media professionals, and politicians alike: they point to dangerous consequences of the
demise of reason and facts in public debate (Kakutani, 2018; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017). Such
nefarious forms of untruthful information delegitimize science and public institutions, may support
and motivate anti-democratic politics, and often fuel racist ideologies and actions (Berlet, 2009;
Byford, 2011; Pollard, 2016).
The dominant diagnostic response to post-truth issues is the reinstalment of the modernist legitimation
narrative of science (Harambam, 2021): conspiracy theories (and other forms of “inferior”
information) should be debunked (fact-checked) and/or banned from the public sphere (content
moderation), while people should listen to legacy media and scientific experts again (Drążkiewicz
and Harambam, 2021; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017). While some Science and Technology Studies
scholars have rightfully pointed to the confluence of values, politics, and facts in scientific and
public knowledge (Fuller, 2018; Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017; Marres, 2018), most post-truth
Harambam et al.	 787
discourse presents clear-cut distinctions between the esteemed objective realm of facts, science,
and reason and the dangerous subjective realm of emotions, ideology, and irrationality.
The point here is not to argue which academic perspective is right, but to show how different academics
draw different boundaries around conspiracy theories and ascribe different meanings to them.
The interesting observation to make is that while diversity is much advocated by academics and elite
commenters across different domains (be it about age, race/ethnicity, gender, religion, or culture), this
does not seem to fly for people who have other ideas about the truth. Key to democratic “open societies”
may be the plurality of opinions, ideologies, and media to foster a productive confrontation of
ideas (Popper, 2013), but in contemporary post-truth debates this ideal is not easily found. In fact,
clear limits on free speech are enforced when it comes to truth, while modern distinctions between
facts and non-facts (values, feelings, opinions) are upheld. Does this resonate with a general public?
Here, we follow a cultural-sociological approach to study what boundaries everyday people
draw when they speak about conspiracy theories in the public sphere. There has been remarkably
little research on people’s appreciations of dubious information in the public sphere: most scholarly
analyses of post-truth are either theoretical or essayistic (Kakutani, 2018; McIntyre, 2018), or
focus on the media ecosystem (Bennett and Livingston, 2018). Some scholars did, however, study
the public opinion and perceptions of fake news in the US context, finding that these were polarized
along partisan identities (Tong et al., 2020), while others showed people’s reactions to fake
news and their effects on interpersonal relationships (Duffy et al., 2020). Yet, a systematic and indepth
analysis of people’s everyday ideas and conversations about these post-truth matters is wanting.
The comments we analyze in this article display people’s ordinary discussions and are informed
by their everyday encounters with conspiracy theories/-ists. Do they believe that we should do
something about their popularity or are they seen as a valuable contribution to pluralist societies?
Now that elite appreciations of conspiracy theories/-ists and post-truth abound, and inform much
public debate and institutionalized policy, we wonder how that resonates with the opinions of a
more general and diverse public. Is the post-truth condition perhaps an elite concern?
3. Method, data, and analysis
We performed a qualitative content analysis on the comments section below the interview article
with the main author on NU.nl. The interview was about the contemporary popularity of conspiracy
theories, how their stigmatization may engender radicalization, and whether we should include
their propagators in public debates. Such discussions are increasingly held in the Netherlands
where conspiracy theories thrive, just as other North-Western European countries, in various pockets
of society (from leftist urban hipsters to right-wing extremists) and across different demographic
groups (Butter and Knight, 2020; Harambam, 2020a). Instead of trying to contain it, the
Dutch media find it important to discuss those matters publicly, and various news reports, documentaries,
and TV shows on the topic emerge. The comments were rich and detailed enough to
warrant a sociological content analysis, while NU.nl is a suitable general news platform to gauge a
wide variety of opinions. NU.nl is the largest online news platform in the Netherlands at 7 million
users (>45% of the Dutch population), free of charge to readers, and posts original journalistic
content including news, opinions, and interviews from various viewpoints. It furthermore has an
active comments section below articles, which is rare in Dutch news media nowadays (Hille and
Bakker, 2014). NU.nl has a moderation team, which removes comments that go against their
guidelines, which mostly come down to hate speech. Nonetheless, NU.nl shows when comments
are removed, and most were recovered by us, as shown in our publicly available dataset.1
Selfselection
may obviously at play: commenters may be more invested in the subject matter or have
more outspoken opinions. However, in qualitative analyses, representativeness (of the general
788	 Public Understanding of Science 31(6)
population or NU.nl readership) is not the goal, but instead a wide diversity of standpoints is.
Although readership demographics are not shared by NU.nl, Dutch online news readership in general
is high and well-distributed across different demographic groups. The annual Digital News
Report Nederland 2021 indicates that NU.nl is seen by readers across age groups as more diverse
than other news platforms (Newman, et al., 2021). The resulting dataset consists of all 522 comments
until the discussion was closed three days later. Informed consent was not deemed necessary
under NU.nl’s terms and conditions (De Wildt and Aupers, 2020).
Our qualitative analysis was done inductively, loosely following the principles of Grounded
Theory (Charmaz, 2006). We focused on finding common themes and patterns in the data to incrementally
develop higher level concepts that are (Weberian) “ideal-typical reconstructions” (Inglis
and Almila, 2016: 33). We used qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti to systematize our analysis
throughout the four iterations from data to concepts. From the start, we worked closely to
ensure analytical consistency: first, to arrive at a coding book, the three authors independently
coded 20% of all comments. We then jointly discussed the meaning, process, and logic of our
codes, resulting in 87 open codes (e.g. “conspiracy theories irrational,” “no conversation possible,”
or “dogmatic scientists”), with which we then analyzed a third of the data each. Second, through
axial coding, we subsumed and connected codes to condense them to a code tree of 34 concepts
(e.g. “multiple voices important” or “distrusting elites”). A third and fourth interpretative round
regrouped and subsumed those codes into 10 and later 4 theoretically informed “supercodes”
which now form the backbone of the following results section.
4. Popular debates on conspiracy theories in a post-truth era
Our analysis showed a wide range of opinions about conspiracy theories, and their role in public
debates. Discussion topics ranged from what conspiracy theories are (and how to draw lines
between legitimate critiques of dominant truths and dogmatic accusations of conceit), how people
experience conspiracy theorists, what forms of knowledge they find legitimate, which epistemic
sources to follow and why, and what the societal consequences of these choices would be. We now
present this variety along the four main categories of dispute: “habitus of distrust,” “actors,”
“knowledge,” and “consequences.”
Habitus of distrust: How to appreciate established truths?
On the most abstract level, commenters discussed the rationality of conspiracy theorists’ ‘habitus
of distrust’: a deep-seated suspicion of elites, institutions, and official truths. While some argue that
this attitude to the world is too extreme and poisonous, others view this as legitimate, logical, and
even useful.
The first group of commenters views distrust in elites and public authorities as irrational and
criticizes conspiracy theorists for their paranoid style of thinking. They question the need to challenge
existing truths: if something has been considered true, stood the test of time, and “had the
same outcome before” (Kbg), why contest it? Instead, they conservatively trust established knowledge:
“the problem with conspiracy theorists is that many of the things they contest have already
been studied and proved otherwise” (William). One commenter draws an analogy with parenting
and compares trust in mainstream institutions to trusting one’s parents:
Did your mother cite sources? Did you ever double-check her findings growing up? Or instead, did you
trust that she is speaking the truth because she is your mother and had your best interests at heart? Being
critical is allowed, but having a little faith in others isn’t bad either. (Umuriel)
Harambam et al.	 789
Conspiracy theorists thus go too far in their distrust of institutions that actually merit more credit.
But they also go too far in their creativity to imagine ever greater schemes of deception. Such commenters
point to underlying parsimony principles as reasons to trust established knowledge: “an
important measure is Ockham’s razor, freely translated: you should need as little as possible to
explain an observation” (hs5), and established truths simply have “fewer assumptions to explain
the world. That doesn’t mean that conspiracies don’t exist, but that they would be improbable”
(JHP). They hold that “there may be an infinite amount of explanations possible, but we need to
stick to the most plausible ones for which there is evidence” (Klopger). According to these commenters,
conspiracy theorists’ questioning of established knowledge arises from a habitus of distrust
that is both overly suspicious and illogical.
Other commenters highlight the opposing position that a habitus of distrust is a logical attitude
to understand today’s world. First, they argue that it would be foolish to assume that expert knowledge
is the “truth” merely because it has been accepted as such. A common example to illustrate
this argument is the historical debate over the spherical earth: “there was once a conspiracy theory
that the earth would be round instead of flat. You could be hanged for believing it, but it led to valuable
insights” (Marc_Heijdra). Pointing to the dynamics of contemporary expert knowledge production,
they furthermore contend that once a “truth” emerges, other experts build on it “without
replicating the underlying research,” which is problematic because “a certain vision is increasingly
taken as true, simply because it is confirmed by others” (Saksaf). Commenters argue that those
producing established truths may have interests in preserving the status quo: “where there is power,
people can manipulate reality and render other truth-seekers unbelievable” (Cor_Arnhem), “politicians
hide the truth and make it difficult to find” (Maarten1), “many scientists prefer their ego to
science” (Viggo), and “scientists are so full of their truths that they refuse to study divergent ideas
or dismiss them because that would prove their truths wrong, which costs money! Money is what
most of the scientific status quo is about” (Koen_de_Vos). These commenters are “often surprised
about the lengths that people go to hold onto the official narrative” (Ray_Man). Instead, they argue
that conspiracy thinking and a habitus of distrust is how new ideas are formed: “we should not by
default assume that what the mass media tells us is true, and instead look for new (possible)
answers” (Patricia_C).
Such commenters often base the rationality of distrust on the fact that “conspiracy is inherent to
life” (PeterR_2), and that conspiracies have happened before, thus “how insane are conspiracy
theories then?” (kos_kosso). They point to various examples of covert US state projects such as
“Operation Northwoods, Project Sunshine, MK-Ultra or Tuskegee Syphilis Study” (display_name)
or “the ‘legalized’ invasion of Iraq by Bush who had ‘proofs’ of weapons of mass destruction,
which turned out to be a massive lie. Conspiracy theorists distrusted this narrative back then, but
were discarded as ‘loonies,’ but who’s the fool now?” (Hokkie_Stick). But commenters mention
more mundane yet widespread “price fixing, tax fraud and insider trading” (Cooknbacker), “how
governments concealed the dangers of asbestos” (Keesdie), or industry fueled myths such as
“drinking milk is healthy. Or tobacco. 30 years later things look very different. Distrust towards
truths is just not misplaced” (Jacques_de_vogel). These people often illustrate their habitus of
distrust as resulting from personal experiences: “conspiracy theorists are streetwise and often experienced
injustice themselves, which made them realize that people are not always good” (Skunk83),
and “one thing I learned in my career with the military and the UN: take rumors very seriously,
since there is always some truth to them, even if it seems impossible. I always have that approach
in discussions with conspiracy thinkers” (loko_loki). Another commenter agrees, conspiracy theories
may seem extreme at first, but “they simply indicate alternatives to accepted points of view.
And because such counter-narratives aren’t given space, they need to be magnified to make a statement”
(Oneshe). Such commenters all agree that a habitus of distrust may simply be reasonable in
a corrupt world in which conspiracies do actually happen.
790	 Public Understanding of Science 31(6)
Actors: Who should have a say in public debate?
Many discussants argued that experts (academics, politicians, journalists) should be the ones to
listen to since they have specialized knowledge and acknowledge their own limitations, while
conspiracy theorists are irrational and uninformed. By contrast, others argued that a broader public
should be included to widen the narrow perspective of experts: laypersons can be more creative
and do not have ulterior motives as experts are suspected of having.
Those favoring experts in the public debate see conspiracy theorists as irrational people, basing
their ideas not on “facts and science,” but “believ[ing] in higher powers” and “hav[ing] a weird
form of logic” (Bigmama_here). They “are unwilling to listen and discuss, everything is already
decided and is brought back to the military-industrial complex, Bilderberg group, Illuminati and/or
Rothschild family” (De_Observant). Harry_Gl adds, they “do not ask questions (anymore), but are
locked in their own answers,” and if they do ask questions, these “are opinions disguised as cynical
questions” (PdC). There is after all “a big difference between conspiracy theorists and people with
diverging opinions” (De_Observant). Conspiracy theorists, these people contend, suffer from
“self-made delusions” (Kaaselot), “dreams and phantasms” (Umuriel), and “paranoid explanations”
(hs5). One commenter even portrayed conspiracy theorists as mental patients that belong in
psychiatric institutions rather than in public debate:
the more exotic their convictions, the clearer they are disturbed people that can be ignored. We’ve got great
education and journalism, so no need to succumb to weird conspiracy theories. Whoever goes cuckoo
needs personal attention from a psychiatrist. (PdC)
Moreover, these commenters hold, conspiracy theorists “show herd behavior by sharing populist
statements” (Dit_vind_ook_ik_ervan), “traffic in ridiculous generalizations and superlatives”
(Asimo), and “always blame the same people, lumping whole industries (pharmaceuticals) or companies
(Monsanto and Shell) together as devilish” (Bart_de_Koning). They point to “the DunningKruger
effect” (Thijzer, Ria_Heijnsbroek, Rene_Fijnhart), referring to the cognitive bias through
which incompetent people overestimate their own abilities (Kruger and Dunning, 1999), “which is
the reason that exactly those with least knowledge of things are most convinced of being right”
(Rene_Fijnhart).
Experts are different, “like the prime minister, the RIVM and OMT [Dutch Public Health
Institutes] who acknowledged from the beginning that they do not know everything” (ligfries), or
who “from the start (and still now) are open and transparent about the fact that much is uncertain
and needs more research” (Umuriel). These commenters express the view that in our complex
societies we should listen to experts because they are the most qualified people:
I am not scientifically educated. I won’t be able to read hundreds of scientific publications. But then my
colleagues with the same background suddenly pretend they can, and suddenly pretend to find the truth? I
can’t take that seriously. (Polygoon)
Another adds that they “want to understand the unknown, but I can only do so if an expert/scientist
explains it to me. I trust scientists, I trust experts. Why? They studied and researched for years”
(VanDijk). They disagree about which experts should have a say, just those who speak “from their
own perspective, like a virologist looking only at the physical impact of viruses and not at their
societal consequences” (Diederik_de_Vries), or beyond, since “that fosters thinking outside of the
box” (Richard Duiventil). But in principle, such commenters conclude, experts should dominate
public debates because only they have relevant expertise and experience.
However, many others argued for a wider inclusion of laypeople and their opinions in public
debates, including those that may seem outlandish and conspiratorial. Such commenters argue that
Harambam et al.	 791
experts are biased and may have ulterior motives, while the general public is independent. Such
commenters wrote that:
focusing blindly on what science says may lead one to miss much and puts us on a dangerous track.
We need both, a golden mean. It’s a mistake to uncritically follow scientists. Science is beautiful, it
brings us much. But it is dangerous when people say: “if we can’t prove it, it does not exist.”
(Thomas_Van_der_Langen)
Experts should therefore be more humble, and “doubt their own truths. I am afraid science passed
that station long ago. Contemporary science is full of its own truths and discards other opinions
directly” (Koen_de_Vos). Some urge experts therefore to be more courageous, saying that “good
science dares to look beyond its boundaries. Much is achieved that way” (Caroline_Danon).
Commenters point to potential ulterior motives, writing that “scientists have the tendency to adjust
their research to the wishes of funders” (Viggo), and “often have interests in certain results”
(Saksaf). Commenters often emphasize governmental corona-mitigation measures, which are seen
as insufficiently substantiated or unconstitutional: “no one knows how and why measures are
taken, which feeds speculators and conspiracy theorists” (Frances1). Especially the responsible
public health institutes are distrusted, saying “there is zero transparency and new research is not
(openly) incorporated. So yeah, then you get the feeling that there is a stubborn group of scientists
dictating and not listening. That’s how people lose their trust” (DeWaarheidabc).
In contrast to experts, laypeople are attributed with having a broader view, giving their voice significance
even though they may not align with mainstream (expert) narratives. This is beneficial
because “that way you see more” (Pieter_de_Vries01010), “listening to people with ‘strange’ ideas
enriches your own world and makes you see things differently” (Zwolse_Zelfstandige_Penvoerder),
and “making space for alternative perspectives can be very productive, especially in a crisis where
nobody holds the truth” (Matthijs_Grit).After all, “those with the least knowledge may actually ask the
best questions” (robielienios), and “it is important to find out why people think in a certain way: that
information can be very valuable” (Keesdie). Such commenters warn against a premature foreclosing
of alternative views, arguing that “as soon as someone has diverging opinions, they get labelled conspiracy
theorists and are dismissed as crazy, while their questions and insights are not that crazy at all”
(kbg), and “it is extremely harmful to ridicule conspiracy theorists. Not all of them believe in Flat Earth
or Corona by 5G” (Oke_dan). Such commenters warn against guilt-by-association, “the problem I
often see is a focus on the craziest stories, which makes the rest look just as insane” (display_name).
Others problematize prevalent clear-cut distinctions between experts and conspiracy theorists,
arguing that “it is a wrong assumption that conspiracy theorists would be people without substance.
Many specialists, doctors, professors and other professionals are also dismissed as conspiracy theorists
if their theory does not correspond with the generally accepted theory” (Gerard_van_der_
Molen_efdacc). Given the fact that some conspiracy theorists advance rather farfetched ideas,
commenters think we should
differentiate between those who ignore hard facts and let their own imagination go wild and those who use
facts but come to a different conclusion. They are fine to discuss with, but are often overshadowed by the
“conspiracy masses.” (Kaaselot)
Such commenters argue that “dogmatics are everywhere. There are those who will always cling to
what the authorities say, while there are conspiracy theorists as well that are critical and who
update their stance with new information” (Ynze_Bakker). So where to draw the line? Others
explicitly value the imagination of conspiracy theorists, perhaps regardless of their truth value,
saying “many are indeed a bit goofy and extreme in their craziness, but still. It happens often
792	 Public Understanding of Science 31(6)
enough that you get a different perspective on matters, which make you rethink. The world would
be a boring place without conspiracy theorists” (loko_loki).
Knowledge: Which ways of knowing should we allow?
Whether by experts or conspiracy theorists, which truths should be allowed as part of the public
debate? For some commenters, expert knowledge is legitimate because it is produced according to
strict methodological procedures, and is based on factual evidence, so who are laymen to contest
it? Others emphasize the value of intuition and experience as valid ways of knowing beyond strict
scientific processes.
First, expert knowledge is presented as legitimate because the proper procedures are used: “I
don’t have blind faith in scientists, but I do trust the scientific process, exactly because the process
is so reliable. It’s big news when something goes wrong” (TheoM), or “put three scientists together
and you have four theories. Their most important activity is constantly gaining new knowledge,
and through discussion, arriving at better collective understandings” (Johan_van_Amersfoort).
These commenters further suggest that “the beauty of science is that truth will always eventually
surface” (W29), exactly because its “repeatable and independent tests and logic” (Bart68). Another
commenter adds that researching alternative hypotheses, such as conspiracy theories, is important,
“but it should be done in a scientific, verifiable way and not according to the ‘but I just feel that
way’ method” (JohanT). These commenters juxtapose expert knowledge with experiential knowledge
saying that “feelings are the culprit for many” (JohanT) and that “you can ‘feel’ forever, but
if I don’t ‘feel’exactly the same I won’t learn anything. Without facts you can’t do much” (VanDijk).
In theory, they hold, quality knowledge could potentially be constructed by everyone, but “what
conspiracy theorists do is ridicule verifiable methods, their motto is ‘if you can’t convince them,
confuse them’” (JohanT).
In line with this argument, conspiracy theories are said to lack evidence. Commenters argue that
“they are labelled conspiracy theories when their claims can’t be substantiated, but in the end, only
facts, and nothing but the facts count” (Stuiter). Unlike “scientists [who] theorize reality on the
basis of plausible evidence. If another theory is more plausible they would support that. Progressive
insights!” (Klopger). Commenters argue that the difference between scientists and heretics, critical
thinkers or whistle-blowers—often alluded to by conspiracy theorists to augment their own epistemic
authority—is that “Galileo and Darwin could scientifically substantiate their theories, conspiracy
theorists cannot” (Kaya_Dee), and “Snowden and Assange are, of course, the opposite of
conspiracy thinkers. They bring hard evidence to the surface. That is precisely what conspiracy
thinkers lack” (Rene_Fijnhart).
Others argue that we should allow for alternative ways of knowing beyond rigorous scientific
processes, most notably through intuition and experience. As Thomas_Van_der_Langen laments,
Why is “proof” so important to take something seriously? You can also feel something, right? Science is
just a perspective, an important, but limited perspective. There is so much that we cannot measure/
understand/grasp. Does that necessarily make it “not true”? If truth is only that which the current state of
science can prove, then . . . Wow.
They argue that “not everything can be explained with facts” (Gerard_van_der_Molen_efdacc),
and highlight
the experience aspect. How can someone live a good life based on facts alone? That’s a technicians’ point
of view. The experience aspect is the compass on which people sail, and that’s exactly what science hardly
sees. (oneshe)
Harambam et al.	 793
These commenters appreciate other forms of knowledge as well, “I have done a lot of research into
different dreams and fantasies which were a revelation to me. I learnt a lot of new things that I
couldn’t have learned at school or in the news. And yes, supported by rigorous research”
(Patricia_C). Experts may not wish to consider such alternative epistemologies, but that is a missed
chance, these commenters hold, because “if they had followed their intuition more often, they
would probably look at it differently. Having experiences makes you know something exists”
(hs5). Such commenters distinguish between those with “book knowledge [vis-à-vis] practical
knowledge to deduce problems and solve them” (Kees_Visser_ccdcbc), arguing that the latter
group’s “common sense” (robielienios), “horse sense and survival instinct” (Wil_P_cbdccd), “lifeexperience
and ‘street-wise knowledge’” (Skunk83) are important epistemologies too. In contrast
to expert knowledge alone, these people argue that we have many more sources of valuable knowledge,
and why not include those?
Consequences: What is at stake when we let conspiracy theorists in?
The consequences of letting people with diverging views and opinions enter public debate figured
prominently. Some people argue that this gives a stage to dangerous fanatics and uninformed people,
legitimizes their views, and will lead to undesired tensions between citizens, flawed policymaking,
and greater societal harm. On the contrary, keeping an open public debate with as little
restrictions as possible is regarded essential in democratic societies. Stigmatization and societal
exclusion may only lead to alienation and radicalization.
Commenters advance various experienced interpersonal conflicts with acquaintances who have
“conspiratorial” ideas. One described how he has “a conspiracy thinker in the family. She is not
stupid but has been through some things. I choose not to bring up conspiracies around her anymore,
because it only leads to quarrels” (HansvaHH). Another commenter brings up that “there are people
in my network who happen to be in the alternative/spiritual corner. Unfortunately, they are
impossible to reason. You are only left to marvel at their positions” (asd_1978). Moreover, such
commenters argue that including people with conspiratorial ideas will only motivate them to
strengthen their views:
if you take people with completely disturbed and self-invented delusions by the hand and listen to them
seriously, this will actually stimulate them to stop looking at the real facts and only see their own ideas as
facts. (Kaaselot)
Including conspiracy theorists in public debate may not just legitimize their viewpoints, but may
lead to dangerous behaviors as well, such as “inciting people with their invented ideas to violence,
or destroying others’ possessions (such as 4&5G-masts). You should not reward them by giving
them a stage” (Frank_Sunny). These commenters especially highlight potentially harmful ideas,
“if someone says corona is just the flu, climate change does not exist and the Holocaust never happened,
you are soon done talking” (Sjors_Koevoets). How can we still speak to each other, these
commenters, ask, if we cannot agree on our basic shared reality?
The role of other ways of knowing adds to those fears of losing common ground, some commenters
speak of “a schism between people who can’t do anything with feelings, and people who
can’t do anything with facts and proof” (Thomas_van_der_Langen). They lament the loss of a
“shared reality”:
the difficulty is that there is no common ground. They constantly move the goalposts. Every counterargument
is a “cover-up.” In the meantime, every meme, YouTube video, random blog, is listed as a
794	 Public Understanding of Science 31(6)
reliable source. It is up to the other to fight that tangle of misinformation, and because there is no common
ground, it is impossible. (W29)
Public discussions with conspiracy theorists are utterly difficult, because “they are unwilling to
listen and discuss. Everything is already set in stone. It is just like with orthodox believers: there is
no discussion possible, because everything in their eyes is black or white” (Elena_7008). Aside
from such communicative problems, commenters also warn that effective governance may be at
stake. Including conspiracy thinkers would “sow unfounded doubt and harm and frustrate political
decision-making” (PdC). The consensus among these commenters is thus that including citizens
with conspiratorial ideas causes both interpersonal and societal problems.
Other commenters defend the notion of an open public debate based on inclusive democratic
arguments. The confrontation of a variety of views contributes to critical evaluations of knowledge,
they argue, saying that “skepticism advances the world and science” (Rob_van_de_Vliet)
and that “a plurality of ideas is critical in advancing insights into how the world works” (TheoM).
Ynze_Bakker testifies to this perspective by saying how she is “open to all kinds of opinions, so I
can form my own opinion from reviewing all those. I also look at so-called ‘conspiracy theories’
and they often contain better-founded opinions than what I see in the ‘mainstream media.’”
According to such commenters, we move forward through an open confrontation of ideas, and all
parties, “conspiracy thinkers” or otherwise, can learn from “the other”:
If you don’t take someone seriously and call them a conspiracy theorist without going into discussion,
neither of you will get anywhere. He will think you’re wrong and will continue doing his thing, and so will
you. While it can be a good learning moment for both. About the point of disagreement and about what led
people to these beliefs. (john_west)
This perspective reframes the notion of conspiracy theorists as “trouble” into something more
productive, “genius and insanity are, after all, close together” (Willum).
Second, having inclusive public debates that are open to marginalized ideas are seen as a way
to prevent alienation and radicalization. Commenters argued, for example, that “if people’s questions
are not taken seriously, this results in dogmatic conspiracy thinking, and critical people
become messiahs with their own following” (duke_bird). As another commenter explains, “I know
from my own experience that ‘not being heard’ can be extremely frustrating. This is probably
grossly underestimated. Ignoring someone for a long time can literally kill such a person!”
(Pardonlul). These comments contrast sharply with those who fear that inclusive public debates are
harmful to society. Instead, they hold, having an arena to openly discuss various ideas would actually
prevent such outcomes. “People behave like you treat them” (Eli_Ri). In addition to including
alternative positions instead of pathologizing them, this group of commenters advances transparency
as an essential ethic in government-citizens relations. “It is difficult to trust the authorities
when they are not transparent, trust entails transparency and integrity, and that’s under severe pressure
now” (Cooknbacker). To prevent conspiracy theories from thriving, they argue, “governments
should be open about the science behind the measures taken. If you keep matters vague and hidden,
this is what you get, that’s how critical thinkers become conspiracy thinkers” (Saksaf).Transparency
and the inclusion of alternative voices are thus important to keep public debates healthy.
5. Conclusion: From post-truth to poly-truth
Post-truth is presented as one of the most defining societal problems of our time. Various (elite)
commenters problematize the presence of untruthful information, such as conspiracy theories, in
Harambam et al.	 795
the public sphere (Kakutani, 2018; Lewandowsky et al., 2017; McIntyre, 2018). They lament the
(apparent) distrust toward facts, experts, and democratic institutions and wish to remedy these
“infodemics” through fact-checking and the removal of dubious contents (Lewandowsky et al.,
2020; Zarocostas, 2020). In such analyses, rather clear-cut distinctions are made between the
esteemed objective realm of facts, science, and reason and the “dangerous” subjective realm of
emotions, ideology, and irrationality. As such, they reinstate the modernist legitimation narrative of
science (Harambam, 2021) and profess the classical “politics of demarcation” (Marres, 2018).
But how do everyday people speak about matters of truth and reliable knowledge in the public
sphere today? Based on our analysis of a vibrant (Dutch) online discussion on conspiracy theories,
we conclude that public opinions show more complexity and nuance than elite conceptions of posttruth
allow for. We show that if we listen to a broader public, post-truth is not so much about having
moved beyond truth, as the dominant definition implies, but instead indicates fierce public battles
about truth. What is at stake is the rationality of distrusting official knowledge (section “Habitus of
distrust: How to appreciate established truths?”), who gets to decide what is true (section “Actors:
Who should have a say in public debate?”), which ways of knowing count (section “Knowledge:
Which ways of knowing should we allow?”), and what consequences this has (section
“Consequences: What is at stake when we let conspiracy theorists in?”). More than a mere “information
disorder” (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017), popular discussions about conspiracy theories
lay bare these multiple sociological dimensions of post-truth.
This recognition leads us to interpret the main disagreement in our findings to center around
poly-truth: the appreciation of multiple actors and forms of knowing. Here, we find clear tensions
between technocratic and democratic ideals. On one hand, people argue in favor of a society which
trusts authorities, experts, and science. They should have a say in public debates, because scientific
experts are well-informed and produce factual knowledge based on strict methodological procedures.
Conspiracy theories have no place here because they go against the scientific method and
because their proponents are not suitable for reasonable debate. On the other hand, we find democratic
arguments favoring a society in which we should not just follow technocratic experts (who
can be biased or have exterior motives), but also other people and perspectives, including conspiracy
theories/-ists, to account for more epistemic diversity and to have a more inclusive society.
These arguments mimic what Mede and Schäfer (2020) describe as “science-related populism”:
such commenters indeed critique the “truth-speaking sovereignty” of science in favor of multiple
actors and multiple ways of knowing, but they do not downplay the importance of scientific
research and experts on the whole, nor does it necessarily come from a populist distrust of elites.
Our analysis highlights an often overlooked tension in contemporary democratic societies:
while we value top-quality experts and their knowledge, this conflicts with widespread democratic
ideals of inclusion and participation. The one-million-dollar question for the twenty-first century is
how to reconcile this issue: how can we include a diverse group of people and ideas, while preserving
the merits of expert knowledge? Sophia Rosenfeld (2018) shows the political and epistemological
foundations of this tension in her history of post-truth, while sociologist Cathrine Holst
(2014) led a research project on knowledge and expertise in modern democracies [EPISTO], which
produced an insightful collection of essays on the topic. Philosopher M. Dentith (2018), politicaltheorist
Alfred Moore (2017) and sociologist Jaron Harambam (2021) independently draw on
deliberative political theory and social studies of science to develop ways of institutionalizing
popular interrogations of expert knowledge in a societally productive way. Similar “citizen assemblies”
showed their success in recent experiments across the world (Farrell et al., 2019; Smith,
2009). We see more future in these efforts than foreclosing public discussions about truthful knowledge
by empty appeals to the authority of facts and science, especially as such citizen platforms
796	 Public Understanding of Science 31(6)
may prevent radicalization, polarization, and even more distrust of our epistemic authorities.
Whereas pluralism, or its contemporary buzzwords of diversity and inclusion, is desired in so
many societal domains today, we wonder why this is not the case with knowledge. Our analysis
showed public opinions on both the merits and dangers of poly-truth. Perhaps that above-mentioned
organized forms of including various people, epistemologies, and interests in public debates
would tame (elitist) post-truth fears of a misinformed and irrational mob stealing Truth from its
pedestal?
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article: This article is based on research funded by the European Commission, Marie
Sklodowksa-Curie Action Individual Fellowship “Media andConspiracy”, No: 799815
ORCID iDs
Jaron Harambam https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8286-7147
Kamile Grusauskaite https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1675-7051
Lars de Wildt https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6901-6903
Note
1.	 Our data set is openly available in Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BW2DLW.
References
Barkun M (2006) A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Bennett WL and Livingston S (2018) The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline of
democratic institutions. European Journal of Communication 33(2): 122–139.
Berlet C (2009) Toxic to Democracy: Conspiracy Theories, Demonization & Scapegoating. Somerville, MA:
Political Research Associates.
Biesecker BA (2018) Guest Editor’s introduction: Toward an archaeogenealogy of post-truth. Philosophy &
Rhetoric 51(4): 329–341.
Birchall C (2006) Knowledge Goes Pop: From Conspiracy Theory to Gossip. Oxford: Berg.
Bjerg O and Presskorn-Thygesen T (2017) Conspiracy theory: Truth claim or language game? Theory,
Culture & Society 34(1): 137–159.
Bratich JZ (2008) Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and Popular Culture. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Butter M and Knight DP (eds) (2020) Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories. Abingdon: Routledge.
Byford J (2011) Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cassam Q (2019) Conspiracy Theories. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Charmaz K (2006) Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
d’Ancona M (2017) Post-Truth: The New War on Truth and How to Fight Back. New York, NY: Random
House.
De Wildt L and Aupers S (2020) Pop theology: Forum discussions on religion in videogames. Information,
Communication & Society 23(10): 1444–1462.
Dean J (1998) Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Dentith M (2018) Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Douglas KM, Uscinski JE, Sutton RM, Cichocka A, Nefes T, Ang CS, et al. (2019) Understanding conspiracy
theories. Political Psychology 40: 3–35.
Harambam et al.	 797
Drążkiewicz E and Harambam J (2021) What should academics do about conspiracy theories? Moving
beyond debunking to better deal with conspiratorial movements, misinformation and post-truth. Journal
for Cultural Research 25(1): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/14797585.2021.1886420
Duffy A, Tandoc E and Ling R (2020) Too good to be true, too good not to share: The social utility of fake
news. Information, Communication & Society 23(13): 1965–1979.
Farrell DM, Suiter J and Harris C (2019) “Systematizing” constitutional deliberation: The 2016–18 citizens’
assembly in Ireland. Irish Political Studies 34(1): 113–123.
Fenster M (2008) Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Fuller S (2018) Post-Truth: Knowledge as A Power Game. London: Anthem Press.
Harambam J (2020a) Contemporary Conspiracy Culture: Truth and Knowledge in an Era of Epistemic
Instability. Abingdon: Routledge.
Harambam J (2020b) The corona truth wars. Science & Technology Studies 33(4): 60–67.
Harambam J (2021) Against modernist illusions: Why we need more democratic and constructivist alternatives
to debunking conspiracy theories. Journal for Cultural Research 25(1): 104–122.
Harambam J and Aupers S (2015) Contesting epistemic authority: Conspiracy theories on the boundaries of
science. Public Understanding of Science 24(4): 466–480.
Harambam J and Aupers S (2017) “I am not a conspiracy theorist”: Relational identifications in the Dutch
Conspiracy Milieu. Cultural Sociology 11(1): 113–129.
Hille S and Bakker P (2014) Engaging the social news user. Journalism Practice 8(5): 563–572.
Hofstadter R (2012) The Paranoid Style in American Politics. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group.
Holst C (2014) Expertise and Democracy. Oslo: Arena.
Husting G and Orr M (2007) Dangerous machinery: “Conspiracy theorist” as a transpersonal strategy of
exclusion. Symbolic Interaction 30(2): 127–150.
Inglis D and Almila A-M (2016) The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Sociology. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Jasanoff S and Simmet HR (2017) No funeral bells: Public reason in a “post-truth” age. Social Studies of
Science 47(5): 751–770.
Kakutani M (2018) The Death of Truth: Notes on Falsehood in the Age of Trump. New York, NY:
HarperCollins.
Knight P (2000) Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to the X Files. Abingdon: Routledge.
Kruger J and Dunning D (1999) Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one’s own
incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77(6):
1121–1134.
Lewandowsky S, Cook J, Ecker UKH, Albarracín D, Amazeen MA and Kendeou P (2020) The debunking
handbook 2020. Available at: https://sks.to/db2020
Lewandowsky S, Ecker UKH and Cook J (2017) Beyond misinformation: Understanding and coping with the
“post-truth” era. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 6(4): 353–369.
McIntyre L (2018) Post-Truth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Marres N (2018) Why we can’t have our facts back. Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 4: 423–443.
Mede NG and Schäfer MS (2020) Science-related populism: Conceptualizing populist demands toward science.
Public Understanding of Science 29: 473–491.
Melley T (2000) Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Moore A (2017) Critical Elitism: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Problem of Expertise. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Newman N, Fletcher R, Schulz A, Andi S, Robertson CT and Nielsen RK (2021) Reuters Institute Digital
News Report 2021. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.
Pelkmans M and Machold R (2011) Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories. Focaal 2011(59): 66–80.
Pipes D (1997) Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes from. New York, NY:
The Free Press.
798	 Public Understanding of Science 31(6)
Pollard J (2016) Skinhead culture: The ideologies, mythologies, religions and conspiracy theories of racist
skinheads. Patterns of Prejudice 50(4–5): 398–419.
Popper K (2013) The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rosenblum NL and Muirhead R (2020) A Lot of People Are Saying: The New Conspiracism and the Assault
on Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rosenfeld S (2018) Democracy and Truth: A Short History. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Smith G (2009) Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Sunstein CR (2018) #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Tong C, Gill H, Li J, Valenzuela S and Rojas H (2020) “Fake news is anything they say!”—Conceptualization
and weaponization of fake news among the American Public. Mass Communication and Society 23(5):
755–778.
Uscinski JE (2018) Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wardle C and Derakhshan H (2017) Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for
research and policy making. Council of Europe Report No. 27, Council of Europe.
Zarocostas J (2020) How to fight an infodemic. The Lancet 395(10225): 676.
Author biographies
Jaron Harambam is Assistant Professor of Participatory AI at the Athena Institute of the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. His research deals with conspiracy theories, news and platform politics, and AI
(content moderation, search/recommender systems).
Kamile Grusauskaite (MSc) is a PhD Candidate at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven University.
Her research deals with conspiracy theories, “post-truth,” social media, and Internet cultures.
Lars de Wildt is postdoctoral researcher in Media Studies at KU Leuven, in the AHRC project “Everything Is
Connected: Conspiracy Theories in the Age of the Internet.” He studies how media change beliefs, including
conspiracy theories in online platforms and religion in videogames.