The Theory That Won't Die: From Mass Society to the Decline of Social Capital
Author(s): Irene Taviss Thomson
Source: Sociological Forum , Sep., 2005, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 421-448
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4540907
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2005 ('t 2005)
DOI: 10.1007/s11206-005-6596-3
The Theory That Won't Die: From Mass Society
to the Decline of Social Capital
Irene Taviss Thomson1
Though it lacks adequate empirical support, the hypothesis of declining social
attachments as a source of American social problems persists. Both mass
society theory in the mid-twentieth century and the theory of declining social
capital in the late-twentieth century have had broad appeal. This paper
demonstrates the continuities in argument and assumptions between these
two theories as well as the modifications of the theory in the face of cultural
change. It suggests that some of the weaknesses in the theory of decreasing
social capital can be traced to the assumptions it shares with mass society
theory assumptions rooted in concerns about individualism.
KEY WORDS: mass society; social capital; intermediate groups; community; individualism.
THE PROBLEM
Within sociology, we can trace the idea that strong intermediate associations
are required for a healthy society to Emile Durkheim. Durkheim's
formulation of the problem over a century ago remains familiar:
A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals that a hypertrophied
state is forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a veritable sociological
monstrosity.... A nation can be maintained only if between the State and the individual,
there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the
individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this
way, into the general torrent of social life. (1960:28)
This image has remained as a template in much of social science to this
day. Twice during the course of the twentieth century, it has been applied to
Social Sciences Department, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, New Jersey; e-mail:
Thomson@fdu.edu.
421
0884-8971/05/0900-0421/0 t 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
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422 Thomson
American s
theory of d
was assert
ened, and
decreased
and the lef
as a seriou
in the pop
assertions was dubious.
Mass society theorists saw industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization,
and the sheer scale of modern society as destroying the strong group
ties-of church, clan, guild, and local neighborhood-that had previously
brought order to society and meaningful participation for individuals. The
absence of such ties was viewed as leaving individuals alienated and vulnerable
to manipulation by elites, demagogues, or extremist social movements.
It was a logical extension of this idea to see the mass media as a tool for the
manipulation of the masses.
Yet empirical researchers continued to find strong primary group allegiances
and organizational affiliations in the American population. There
was no evidence to support the idea that population size, density, and heterogeneity
weaken the bonds of kinship and local community (Kasarda and
Janowitz, 1974:338). Nor did the majority of city dwellers form a "massified
citizenry" who interacted with the polity chiefly through the mass media
(Greer and Orleans, 1962:645). Efforts to learn whether belonging to organizations
protected people against alienation uncovered a complex reality
in which membership in some types of organizations was correlated with
reductions in some types of alienation for certain categories of people, but
no across-the-board correlations were revealed (Neal and Seeman, 1964;
Pollock, 1982). It also remained unclear whether organizational participation
reduces alienation or whether the less alienated more often join and
participate in organizations (Neal and Seeman, 1964).
Communications researchers were unable to confirm the image of a
mass man directly influenced by media messages. No one found evidence
to support the so-called "magic bullet" or "hypodermic needle" hypothesis,
according to which the individual in the mass society was automatically converted
to media-conveyed beliefs and attitudes (Bauer and Bauer, 1960).
Informal communications within one's groups and the influence of one's
subcultures were of far greater significance in affecting one's beliefs. The
individual was apparently not the isolated and vulnerable "mass man" postulated
by mass society theory. Slowly, the theory faded from view, seeming
to disappear altogether after the early 1960s.
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The Theory That Won't Die 423
By the 1990s, the mass media
fled." Television network audie
kets came to dominate cable,
Advertisers sought out and self
cialized audiences, Internet chat
ceivable sort seemed to have re
And yet... In 1995, Francis Fuk
range of intermediate social st
unions, clubs, and charities" (11
ciability in American society. D
isolate and atomize" Americans
uncannily similar to that of ma
Robert Putnam began to gain fa
Putnam argued that the demi
a decline in social networks tha
adequate "social capital" to eng
we continue to join large organ
Retired Persons or The Sierra
with others via the Internet, w
(Putnam, 2000:158). As a result,
than we were three decades ago
diminished sense of trust and r
social disorder and inadequate g
Putnam's work received enorm
tained a degree of celebrity that
tle and the allegation that Amer
from social organizations broug
approbation, there was also crit
alone" elicited responses of "bow
groups" (Lemann, 1996), and "f
suggesting that there was no de
Social scientists also disputed t
ticipation, arguing that both N
those of the Roper Center show
nal membership and that newer
those whose decline is chronicle
2001; Jackman and Miller, 1998
Skocpol, 1999; Warren, 2001; W
from a baseline of the 1940s and
declined may be less relevant to
critic published an entire book p
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424 Thomson
decline in
the much
time, rathe
voting in 1
eration" w
reciprocity
of the soci
militias) co
Landolt, 1
By 2000,
amassed m
the criticis
continued
theory wa
duces alien
so too the
ganizationa
or whether
in organiz
more trus
and these,
homogene
longitudin
support for
a youth sam
adult samp
enced trus
Martin, 20
move beyo
tary associ
Although
group mem
1998; Shah
so critical
2000, 2001
research f
of alienatio
kinds of a
2001; Glan
cantly less
Though Pu
ported by
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The Theory That Won't Die 425
succession-might account for
ple mature. Putnam's "civic g
most trusting because they were
surveys about trust was underta
ably among the baby boom coho
too have begun to show increa
Furthermore, among the youn
early 1980s, suggesting some i
(see Robinson and Jackson, 200
Even if there has been som
trust, what this means is not c
the finding is meaningless bec
(Cohen, 1999:269; Rosenblum
that the factor loadings and pa
trust have remained the same
meaning of trust has changed
seen as something that is "w
1990:121). Wuthnow's study of
trust and community finds th
context of intimate relationsh
how to trust strangers" (1998:1
have also been noted to prod
Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Rahn a
2001; Uslaner, 2000, 2001), as h
which makes it more difficult
(Seligman, 1997:158-161).
There is, to be sure, a major d
society and decreasing social ca
ated, for the most part, withou
awash in such data. But their data are far from incontrovertible. A recent
study of trends in social capital in the United States notes that of six e
pirical studies of the matter, only Putnam's finds pure decline. Three f
no change, one finds an increase, and the authors themselves find a m
ture of stability and decline, depending on which measure of social cap
is at issue (Costa and Kahn, 2003). Putnam's measures aggregate all kin
of connections between people that may have different meanings to t
participants, different effects within the larger polity, and different cause
for any decline they manifest. A decline in the frequency of family din
that seems unlikely to have an impact on generalized trust and reciproc
in the larger society is lumped with organizational declines that might
flect cultural changes away from gender- and race-based organizations
Skocpol, 1999) and with declines in church membership that may refl
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426 Thomson
political c
2002). Yet
regard or
duces a po
sidered hy
have vani
with frien
the public
2000:403).
Whether or not measures of social cohesion such as Putnam's "social
capital index" predict beneficial outcomes-and there is room for debat
about the meaning and significance of these correlations-the thesis of c
cern here is that there has been a national decline in social capital. An
that thesis is hard to substantiate. Because Putnam uses survey data an
membership numbers, he is led to view social capital as something that
heres in individuals, rather than in specific networks or structures of
lationships (Foley and Edwards, 1999). Since social capital is a matter o
resources that are embedded in social networks, Putnam's data may no
constitute an adequate measure (Lin, 2001:211-212; Portes and Land
1996:19). One would need measures of ties across various groups to ass
social capital for the society as a whole (Paxton, 1999). And association
differ in the degree to which their members are involved in multiple or
nizations (Paxton, 2002) and the degree to which they inhibit or encour
such multiple affiliations (Rosenblum, 1998).
Thus, while late-twentieth-century Americans were more likely to j
associations that are "temporary, ephemeral, and contingent" (Pescosoli
and Rubin, 2000:63), and while civic activity is more likely to consist of
hoc arrangements focusing on specific projects" (Wuthnow, 1998:30), th
is no reason to assume that social capital has declined as a result. A qu
ter of a century ago, an empirical researcher suggested that social solidarity
may be the result of "the coordination of activities through network p
cesses" (Wellman, 1979:1226). But "for those who seek solidarity in tid
simple hierarchical group structures, there may now be a lost sense of community"
(1227).
The "lost sense of community" view has a long and enduring intelle
tual history that appears to survive the absence of empirical verificatio
In what follows I explore major developments in this theory over the l
half-century to show how decreasing social capital theory relies on assum
tions very similar to those of mass society theory, as well as the ways
which the theory itself has been modified in the face of change. I trace som
of the weaknesses in the theory of declining social capital to the assum
tions it shares with mass society theory-assumptions that betray both
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The Theory That Won't Die 427
primordial individualism and a
that the appeal of the theory in t
cerns about the excesses of indi
of community, left-right conve
a role as well. The exploration b
ciety theory was applied to Am
was dismissed in the 1960s, rea
during the 1970s and 1980s, and
decreasing social capital.
THE MASS SOCIETY IDEA
Mass society theory is rooted in those nineteenth-centu
society that gave birth to sociology itself-ideas relating to
ganization produced by industrialization and urbanization. I
the conservative reaction to the French Revolution-a reaction that saw
increasing insecurity and alienation, rather than individualism and s
lar rationalism, in response to the breakdown of traditional group tie
Bramson, 1961; Walter, 1964; Giner, 1976).
Thus, while Durkheim argued the need for strong intermediate st
tures, his contemporary, Georg Simmel, embraced the emerging att
ment between the individual and the larger society. In Simmel's view,
attachment created "a common antithesis... against the middle part..
personal, passionate commitment by the individual human being usuall
volves the narrowest and the widest circles, but not the intermediate
Whoever will sacrifice himself for his family will perhaps do the sam
his homeland.... For intermediate structures, however, he will scarce
it, neither for his province nor for a voluntary association" (1971:267)
thermore, Simmel argued, there is a sequence of historical stages, so
the great control over the individual once exercised by the guilds is
exercised by the family and the state (268).
During the heyday of mass society theory in the United States ha
century later, the same juxtaposition of arguments appears. While ma
ciety theorists saw "social alienation, or the distance between the indiv
and his society" (Kornhauser, 1959:237) as the central issue, critics o
theory such as Edward Shils perceived "more of a sense of attachme
the society as a whole, more sense of affinity with one's fellows.., .th
any earlier society" (1962:53). And this more widely shared common
ture, Shils argued, "has been dialectically connected with the emergen
a greater individuality" (58). Those theorists who embraced individu
as a positive outcome of social change, one that liberates humanity f
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428 Thomson
oppressive
mediate st
What cam
that as int
distinction
were more
integrated
Because th
morality a
purpose" (
The perce
inally seen
1959)-as a
mid-twenti
culture" be
In the "de
danger to
ments (see
1965). But
with elitis
treme indi
suggested
bers from
had given
AMERICA AS A MASS SOCIETY: THE 1950S
Why, then, does an idea with an elitist European heritage
a highly individualistic and democratic American society? And
do so in what appears to be a most unlikely time period: the stabl
1950s, dominated by Putnam's "civic generation"?
To be sure, the less well-known underside to the calm and
postwar period includes anxieties about nuclear weapons and
movements, the Beat Generation writing about alienation, and
critics writing of "mass culture" and "mass man." But the pr
which American social behavior was understood at this time
the critique of conformity-of "other-direction" (Riesman, 1
"organization man" (Whyte, 1956). Critics saw Americans as
value on harmonious living than on individualism. The new
the growing ranks of the large bureaucratic corporations, they ar
filled with people who looked to each other for standards of
sought acceptance rather than uniqueness.
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The Theory That Won't Die 429
For mass society theorists, wh
by the social critics was not so
nity." Nisbet argued that people
with all its cohesions and const
tured symbols of togetherness, th
patio festivals in suburbia,... fo
state, political party, business,
become remote and increasingly
(ix).
Although Nisbet-on the right-was concerned with the absence of
belonging, Mills-on the left-emphasized individual powerlessness. Yet
mass society theorists of all political stripes characterized mass society as
alienating and saw psychological harm to the individual from the remoteness
of social institutions. In Mills's view, governments and corporations
were becoming larger and more remote, while voluntary associations were
becoming mass organizations inaccessible to individual influence. The result
was that there were no longer any associations in which individuals could
feel both secure and powerful.
Both Mills and Nisbet saw the absence of strong intermediate
groups as generating meaninglessness. For Mills, "life in a society of
masses.., .isolates the individual from the solid group; it destroys firm group
standards. Acting without goals, the man in the mass just feels pointless"
(1956:323). Nisbet argued similarly that the individual in modern society
"has become isolated from... the sense of meaningful proximity to the major
ends and purposes of his culture" (1969:72). As a result, some individuals
became susceptible to the appeals of "pseudo-community" that were found
in totalitarian movements and mass persuasion campaigns.
The hungering for community arose as subcultural differences were
eliminated by the homogenization and standardization of modern societies.
"If we look at the city of the twenties from the perspective of the city of
the fifties," one mass society theorist argued, "the widespread 'marginality'
caused by exposure to diverse sub-cultures appears almost attractive
when compared with the superficial homogeneity of... modern city
life.... [Today] secondary agencies like standardized news, entertainment,
and education have leveled the population, reducing sub-cultural distinctiveness
considerably" (Stein, 1960:43-44). Critics like Dwight MacDonald
worried not just about "bad" culture driving out the "good," but also about
the inability of the masses "to express themselves as human beings because
they are related to one another neither as individuals nor as members of
communities" (1957:69). By contrast, social commentators who looked with
favor on the liberation of the individual from social constraints did not see
the mass media as a homogenizing influence. Rather, they viewed the media
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430 Thomson
as offering
selves from
It was pre
mass societ
of individ
highly succ
modern so
bonds sets
masses do
(Broom an
The mass
dards, pos
dition of L
on the oth
They have
become su
We can vi
nected to
wake of su
44 to 37%
increased
tionalization of American culture in the wake of television-65 % of American
households had television sets by 1955 (Spigel, 1992); and the postwar
fears of Communist movements-expressed most vividly in McCarthyism.
But while these trends continued, the theory appeared to have vanished by
the mid-1960s. Those who believed that mass culture would impoverish the
arts and those who feared the demise of small-town traditions continued
to find mass society ideas attractive, and the language of mass society remained
in the writings of some scholars in the humanities But within the
social sciences, not only had there been a dearth of empirical support for
mass society hypotheses, but a series of powerful critiques had portrayed
the theory as ideological (Bramson, 1961), "more poetic than theoretical"
(Walter, 1964:410), internally inconsistent (Bell, 1962), and a "gross distortion"
of the truth (Shils, 1962:47). Thus, social scientists discredited the
theory, while the educated reading public moved on to more immediately
pressing concerns.
THE INTERVENING YEARS: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S
Beginning in the latter half of the 1960s, the very antithesis of t
mogenized and atomized masses appeared to take center stage in
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The Theory That Won't Die 431
society: the civil rights movem
youth counterculture, the fem
ment. Group identity and group
atomized individuals, seemed cr
ments (Rochon, 1998:124). Gusfie
failure to recognize that "attach
promote a shared sense of alien
order" (1962:26) must have seem
gue that intermediate structure
is a precipitating strain (Pinard
ments develop not under condi
ordinary or typical processes t
(Halebsky, 1976:8; see also Isaa
seen as generating new identitie
ity groups, with "televised milit
gave meaning to life through i
were thus able to transform sta
tities"; "women and students ar
(148).
As the activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s began to abate, social
critics began to decry "the me decade" (Wolfe, 1976). An outpouring
of books and articles condemned "the culture of narcissism" (Lasch,
1979) and "the fall of public man" (Sennett, 1978), and attacked middleclass
Americans for their withdrawal into a private world concerned only
with self-fulfillment. Lasch attributed the narcissist's failure to achieve selffulfillment
to causes that echo mass society themes: to the "overorganized
society, in which large-scale organizations predominate but have lost the
capacity to command allegiance" (99). The "apparent freedom from family
ties and institutional constraints does not free" the individual "to stand
alone or to glory in his individuality. On the contrary, it contributes to his
insecurity" (38). This is perhaps the oldest argument in the arsenal of mass
society theory: the link between individualism and insecurity. Also redolent
of mass society theory was a small book by Berger and Neuhaus (1977), arguing
that the "mediating structures" of neighborhood, family, church, and
voluntary association must be strengthened.
In the 1980s, Bellah et al. (1985) continued the critique of "expressive
individualism" in Habits of the Heart and bemoaned the decline of
those true communities that prevent us from becoming a mass society. "If
we are not entirely a mass of interchangeable fragments within an aggregate,
if we are in part qualitatively distinct members of a whole, it is because
there are still operating among us, with whatever difficulties, traditions that
tell us about the nature of the world, about the nature of society, and about
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432 Thomson
who we ar
a revised e
capital the
bership" (x
It was in the 1980s as well that the communitarian movement arose.
Communitarians argued the need to correct liberalism's emphasis on individual
rights with an appreciation of the needs and significance of commu
nities. Many of the assumptions underlying the communitarian perspectiv
are akin to those of the mass society theorists. Thus, Etzioni argues that
rational, individual decision-making is possible "only within communities,"
because only there do "people find the psychic and social support that is
required to sustain decisions free of pressures from the authorities, demagogues,
or the mass media" (1988:xi). And an analysis of communitarian
philosophy notes that what "communitarians fear most" is "the atomized,
mass society of mutually antagonistic individuals, easy prey to despotism."
(Bell, 1993:174).
The mass society arguments that appeared in the social commentaries
of the 1970s and 1980s were embedded in popular works that, although written
by sociologists (Sennett and Bellah et al.) and nonsociologists (Lasch)
alike, were not supported by empirical evidence. Only with the emergenc
of decreasing social capital theory in the 1990s were data brought to bear
on the assertions.
AMERICA AS DEFICIENT IN SOCIAL CAPITAL:
CONTINUITIES IN THE THEORY
The theory of declining social capital shares several assum
mass society theory about the relationship between individu
ciety. Both theories argue that an individual without ad
ties is "mobilizable," a prey to demagogues. Putnam expr
way: "Prophylactically, community bonds keep individuals f
prey to extremist groups that target isolated and untethered
(2000:338). Two presumptions inhere in such assessments: th
bers are psychologically deficient or in need of social contr
groups of people are not readily mobilized. Both may fail to
empirically.
Mass society theorists saw the masses-those freed from traditional
bonds-as incapable of behaving in accordance with dominant social values.
While Putnam's argument is not so elitist, he does perceive an increased
incivility in "interactions among strangers" (2000:142-143) and a decreased
adherence to the rules among those who lack organizational ties. "People
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The Theory That Won't Die 433
who are more active in commu
condone cheating on taxes, insu
ment applications" (137). The pr
take part in community organiz
social controls that constrain behavior.
Both theories view the optimal connection between the individual
and society as a kind of nesting structure in which individuals are embedded
in small groups that are incorporated into larger groups to form
a whole society. In the 1950s, Nisbet noted that the most successful
and "allegiance-evoking" business enterprises and cultural associations
see themselves as "associations of groups, not of raw individuals"(Nisbet,
1969:277). The reason is that the ends of the culture or of any large
association within it must be made meaningful to individuals through
"smaller relationships" (277). Almost half a century later, many of the organizations
whose decline Putnam bemoans are of this sort: national organizations
that had local and state chapters with substantial grassroots
participation.
Because mass organizations neither build upon nor support their members'
primary relations, mass society theorists argued that membership
in these organizations tends to involve "a fragile bond" (Kornhauser,
1968:59). Putnam argues similarly that volunteerism among those who
never attend church or club meetings is less stable than it is among those
who do have such organizational involvements. The pro-life movement has
a more stable basis than the abortion rights movement because it draws
upon existing church-based groups (2000:154). Implicitly, then, Putnam too
thinks that larger cultural ends must be made meaningful, or must be reinforced,
by "smaller relationships." Because personal connections are required,
technological mechanisms for generating social solidarity are insufficient.
Mass society theorists did not consider television as a vehicle for
social integration just as social capital theorists question the ability of the
Internet to produce true community.
Underlying both theories is the assumption that social solidarity does
not occur naturally, that individuals require reasons to participate in the
intermediate structures of society. In the past, mass society theorists argued,
such reasons were amply present. Now, they are lacking. Thus, "family,
church, local community drew and held the allegiances of individuals
in earlier times not because of any superior impulses to love and
protect,.., .but because these groups possessed a virtually indispensable relation
to the economic and political order. The social problems of birth
and death, courtship and marriage, employment and unemployment, infirmity
and old age were met.., .through the associative means of these social
groups" (Nisbet, 1969:53-54).
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434 Thomson
In the dec
perceived
ences in gr
Regardless
socially be
ish withdr
become mo
of others"
The presu
with mass
ideas have received. Because he assumes that individuals must be induced
to join communal or organizational groups lest they fall into anomic or
antisocial behavior, he views social capital as always positive. The onl
"dark side" of social capital that Putnam sees is the potential for generatin
individual intolerance or reinforcing inequality. He is able to dismiss th
issue by finding correlations between civic engagement and both toleran
and equality (2000:350-363). He thus fails to address the concerns
many critics that associations may themselves have nefarious purposes,
that associational life may promote either liberal democracy or nativism
(Chambers and Kopstein, 2001:854), and that intermediate structures may
either tie people into the society or reinforce shared alienation (as Gusfie
had noted in criticizing mass society theory). Indeed, even the America
fraternal organizations of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuri
that represented fellowship and communal engagement have been seen
as impeding Americans' ability to achieve a larger social unity (Kaufman
2002). Social capital at the group level may work at cross-purposes t
societal social capital-as in Kaufman's study of fraternal groups or
Coleman's example of price-fixing within an industry (1988:98). Individual
may also appropriate social capital in ways that undermine collective soci
capital-as in Portes's example of individual "connections" that allow them
to bypass regulations and gain public contracts (2000:4).
The implicit assumption that individuals may remain "untethered" if
not persuaded to join with others has led to an emphasis on face-to-fac
interaction. But the assertion that face-to-face connections are the only b
sis for drawing individuals into the larger society has left the theory ope
to the charge that it takes as a premise what should be a matter of empirical
investigation (Selle and Stromsnes, 2001). Furthermore, in privileg
ing face-to-face connections, the theory fails to recognize the numerou
beneficial consequences that large-membership organizations may have,
not only in representing interests and placing certain issues on the publi
agenda (Schudson, 1996; Foley and Edwards, 1997), but also in providing
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The Theory That Won't Die 435
individuals with a link to the p
Minkoff, 1997).
The ever-present danger of an
has also generated a tendency
better than fewer, so that shee
connections (Grix, 2001). And t
voluntary associations in order
have precluded attention to the
associations (see Warren, 2001;
and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001
the current dominance of prof
ciations have argued that "mass
cratic participation; institution
able citizens to have "sustained
AMERICA AS DEFICIENT IN SOCIAL CAPITAL:
CHANGES IN THE THEORY
For all the similarities between the two manifestations of the theory,
several important differences reflect the changes of the half-cen
that separates them. The most obvious difference is the abandonmen
the concept of "alienation" and its replacement with the idea of "tru
Why are weak intermediate structures no longer seen as generating al
ation? Alternatively, why is the decline of trust-in both institutions
other persons-not seen as a form of alienation? Are the differences
tween alienation and lack of trust merely a matter of fashions in wo
usage?
"Alienation" is a concept with a venerable history and considerable
intellectual baggage. Its relative absence in contemporary discourse is not
accidental, nor is its disappearance from the current incarnation of mass
society theory. In its origins and in its use within mass society theory, alienation
was tied to the social structure; people felt alienated from a society
whose institutions were inaccessible, beyond their comprehension and
control.
The entire thrust of the theory of declining social capital is quite different.
It assumes that individuals have willfully chosen to reduce their commitments
to the society. If mass society theorists saw individuals as being
left adrift by the remoteness of the major institutions from their daily lives,
declining social capital theorists tend to view individuals as deliberately retreating
into their own private universes of concern. The individual ceases
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436 Thomson
to particip
tions that
A major s
ence: rath
social stru
are the act
alienation.
ing with s
others. Ev
control, th
sumed to b
to be beyo
the role o
textbooks
media mes
media infl
the media
poses, tele
in a very d
declining
of time wa
communit
As we mov
capital, the
tutional structures to individual behavior. Whereas Nisbet and Mills were
concerned with the failure of modern institutions to provide the individu
with a sense of meaning and purpose, Bellah et al. maintain that although
Americans still get involved in civic associations, "they do not understand
the moral meaning that was once given to such relationships" (1985:115)
They join voluntary associations either to satisfy their self-interests or be
cause of an affinity with certain members, but they lack any vision of th
public good, any desire to "sacrifice their self-interests to the public good
(67). In similar fashion, both Fukuyama and Putnam suggest that only "selfish"
groups-interest groups or self-help groups-are currently thriving.
Paradoxically, although decreasing social capital theorists see individual
behavior rather than institutional structure as the key to the weakness of
intermediate structures, they pay scant attention to the meaning or psychological
relevance of group participation. Indeed, the experience of group
membership seems all but irrelevant to them. Consider the following exam
ple. Putnam cites a survey in which respondents were asked, "What are th
ways in which you get a real sense of belonging or a sense of community?
Among all age groups, family and friends were the most frequently cited
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The Theory That Won't Die 437
followed by co-workers. But pe
likely as those born between 1
their neighborhood, church, lo
zations in which they held me
generation felt less connection
ent offsetting focus of belongi
calculus in which the quantity
individuals involved-is assumed
or intensity of one's connection
This stands in strong contrast t
orists who argued that interme
ingful if they are to integrate
of attention to the individual's
related to the change in focus f
structural explanations were d
tions to incorporate the individ
How these groups functioned a
were considered germane to th
agency, people are seen as choo
basis of an individual calculus o
tial dimension of group membe
is the societal benefits of group
are "transferable from one soc
tine choral societies participate
participation strengthens the T
1993:38).
That mass society theorists took the nature of the group more seriously
is nicely illustrated by the treatment of card-playing in the two theories.
Whereas social capital theorists consider the decline in card-playing to be
yet another indicator of the decrease in social capital, mass society theorists
only grudgingly recognized card-playing as a form of "group integration."
To the mass society theorist, card-playing was "symptomatic of the
intrusion of the mass even into the small group," an indication that "the inner
resources of groups, deriving from the socialization of individuals into
groups with a rich traditional basis of group identification, have been dissipated"
(Crespi, 1957:421). In seeking "entertainment from without," the
card-players revealed that they lacked the strengths of what Mills had called
"solid groups." As the group itself begins to lose identity in a mass society,
it can no longer serve as a mechanism for controlling the individual
or integrating him or her into the society. For the social capital theorist, in
contrast, group membership needs only to instill traits of cooperation and
reciprocity. Any group can serve this purpose, and a strong group identity
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438 Thomson
is likely to
to as "bond
"thin" trust.
The movement from structure to agency exacerbates the assumption of
primordial individualism, producing a tendency to treat social capital as created
solely by individual actions that generate trust and reciprocity. Absent
here is the element of constraint that has long been seen as central to the
functioning of social capital. It is the existence or the possibility of sanctions
that makes possible both effective norms and trustworthiness (Coleman,
1988:107). Moreover, Putnam's version of the theory makes no reference
to the authority vested in intermediate groups. This is a substantial change
from the mass society theory, which argued that such groups could function
well only if their authority was not co-opted by a centralized state (Nisbet)
or a manipulative power elite (Mills).
SPECULATIONS ON THE ENDURING APPEALS AND
CONTEMPORARY RESURGENCE OF THE THEORY
It should not be surprising that the late twentieth-centur
the theory presumes more individual potency than its middecessor.
Theorists too are captives of their times, and the la
century was a time of progressive individualization. Bo
and American social theorists view individual acts of identification with
groups as increasingly important in the contemporary world-a world of
"neo-tribes" (Bauman, 1991:249), of "specializing identity claims" (Frank
and Meyer, 2002:90), of "moral freedom" (Wolfe, 2001), a world in whic
the basic figure is "the single person" (Beck, 1992:122). Just as mass societ
theory was a response to the emergence of individualism in the wak
of industrialization, declining social capital theory is to some extent
response to increased individualization in the wake of globalization.
It is also, more directly, an outgrowth of the worldwide discourse about
"civil society" that emerged following the demise of Communism in Eastern
Europe. Though "the ubiquity of the phrase is enough to make it suspect"
(Himmelfarb, 1998:117), the idea of civil society has been championed b
partisans of all manner of political philosophies and has been studied by
researchers in all the social sciences. Civil society concerns abroad became
transformed into concern for decreasing social capital in the United States
in a manner reminiscent of the way in which mass society theory was im
ported from Europe and applied to American social problems.
Yet only in the United States has a decline in attachment to intermedi
ate groups been perceived at both the middle and the end of the twentiet
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The Theory That Won't Die 439
century. why nave Americans
in community? Why did both t
receive great attention in the po
the answer can never be more t
idea calls for some attempt at e
Although mass society theory
the fate of the individual in a
about the weakening of the int
check. Individuals left to their o
ical harm and generating negat
ing social capital version of the
consequences of weak group me
without strong social ties gener
fear of excessive individualism.
the theory's enduring appeal.
To a greater degree than els
American society. Of the 16 na
ues Study, for example, the Un
sonal freedom to equality, in bl
favoring jobs that encourage in
eryone works together (van Elt
the American population, its re
educational stratification, more
four different national surveys
enterprise, the value of compet
the belief that "what happens t
Support for such economic and
American society, despite some
(see Mann, 1970; Bobo, 1991).
But when individualism is def
autonomy, the ambivalence inc
this meaning of the term may
where "conformity" is almost a
almost always a positive one. In
Americans had the highest per
statements that the family is ver
family would be a positive deve
(1988) terms "middle America
"involuntary conformity," but
than with originality and distin
a kind of "local communalism
Revolution (see Grabb et al., 1
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440 Thomson
were coun
which allowed dissidents to move on and form their own enclaves. And
in the contemporary setting, popular individualism is offset by the de
for autonomy associated with the upper middle class. Ambivalence abo
individualism is manifest in contemporary surveys that indicate a desire for
both individual autonomy and the more traditional ties of a less liberat
era (see, for example, Wolfe, 1998, 2001).
Clearly, if we value both individualism and community, then we mu
keep individualism within bounds. The pitfalls of excessive individuali
have been recognized at least since deTocqueville's commentary in
early ninteenth century. And over the course of the twentieth centu
American social critics were as apt to criticize excessive individualism
excessive conformity (Thomson, 2000).
American ambivalence toward individualism appears to exemplify t
idea that every culture involves "a kind of theater in which certain contrar
tendencies are played out" (Erikson, 1976:82). On the one hand, Am
icans have trouble imagining non-individualistic motivations. Communi
activists, for example, often assume "that they themselves must really
self-interested.... [I]t was considered common sense, and they sometim
even scrounged for self-interested sounding explanations of their own
volvement" (Eliasoph, 1998:187; see also Eliasoph and Lichterman, 2003
Similarly, volunteers legitimate their efforts via a language of fulfillm
rather than a language of duty because Americans translate altruistic m
tives into more familiar selfish ones (Wuthnow, 1991:95-96). On the oth
hand, Americans do not wish to appear uninvolved with their commu
ties, and they are therefore known to lie to survey researchers in order
exaggerate both their church attendance and their voting frequency. A
they compel young people to "volunteer" to help their communities. I
quite easy for such a population to believe that their own communities
weaker than those of previous generations.
Despite the attraction of community, individualism dominates the
American narrative. Thus, the perception of Americans as "lonely" ha
been a constant: The Lonely Crowd (Riesman, 1950), The Pursuit of Lon
ness (Slater, 1970), and, of course, Bowling Alone (Putnam, 2000). The f
two of these books are at the top of the best-seller list of books written
sociologists (See Gans, 1997).
When "identity groups" and self-defined "cultural" groups began
enter the public arena in late-twentieth century, the optional nature of ind
vidual identification with such groups was emphasized. As a result, ev
"multiculturalism" was seen as representing a radical individualism (se
Bellah, 2002; Hunter, 2002). And in the absence of a common enemy a
ter the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, social cohesion appeared
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The Theory That Won't Die 441
De more proolematlc, ana alscu
wars" were accompanied by co
(Schlesinger, 1992). At the end o
excessive individualism came to
groups.
It is thus not surprising that social capital theorists do not view
collective-identity groups, self-help groups, or even interest groups as contributing
to the stock of social capital. Putnam expresses concern that "television
privileges communities of interest over communities of place," thus
encouraging "civic disengagement" (2000:242). Implicit here is the idea that
civic engagement is purely local. The statement also reveals a peculiarly
dispassionate view of civic participation, with "communities of interest" being
defined as outside the realm of civic engagement. In a similar vein, the
Internet is seen as a threat to "bridging" social capital because it fosters
communication among those with shared interests, albeit different demographic
characteristics (178). Without a fear of "selfish" groups, one might
well argue that the Internet fosters social capital precisely because it does
cut across demographic categories.
The fear of excessive individualism makes self-interested action,
whether undertaken by individuals or groups, seem "uncivic." Thus, Putnam
dismisses the contribution that an individual's political activities make
to the stock of social capital. A person who tries to influence government
through such solo activities as letter-writing and petition-signing, he says,
is acting "as disgruntled claimant" rather than "as participant in collective
endeavor to define the public interest" (1996:27). And the fact that "workbased
networks are often used for instrumental purposes" diminishes their
"value for community and social purposes" (2000:91). The distaste for selfinterested
actions is part of a romantic image of community in which conflict
does not appear to play a role. Yet clearly democracy requires groups
that "assert themselves"; it needs "organized conflict and distrust" as well
as cooperation and trust (Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999:14).
Clearly, too, in a time of anxiety about our social cohesion, works that
remind Americans of their civic traditions are appealing. As Americans no
longer take "value-integration" for granted, the work of Bellah et al., has
provided "a reassuring and timely restatement of classic American republican
ideas" (Favell, 1998:224). This is the case even if in a fluid society with
migration from other cultures, "it becomes less self-evident that social cohesion
in society follows from the cumulation of the binding ties of diverse
micro-societies" (Pahl, 1991:351).
Yet both the mass society and declining social capital theories assume
that such small-group ties are the foundation of social integration-and
this too is part of their appeal. Indeed, the assumption that social stability
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442 Thomson
requires sm
degree of
through th
rect: Amo
framework
rification o
a populatio
Nostalgia
Right and
dal relatio
Perhaps t
weakened
ory. As wi
creasing so
of individu
1999) versu
assignmen
of governm
virtues of
convergen
Although
economist
and to exa
alone" the
ology inst
lie not onl
a whole"-a
in its illu
Durkheim
uniquely s
of the pow
such force
social capit
ically, bec
Coleman's
for institu
American
et al., 1973
intermedi
work of P
acclaim.
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The Theory That Won't Die 443
The broad appeal of social cap
ing quality-the idea that societ
trust each other-and its easy r
pointed out, social improvemen
require any fundamental econom
ample O'Connell, 2003; Pearce a
CONCLUSION
In American society, the recurrent perception that indivi
tied to their groups than they were in the past reflects a society
vidualism reigns. American social theories both assume indiv
fear its excesses. Consider the frequency with which the "sea
munity" has been invoked to explain any new social phenom
populism and class solidarity in the 1930s to appeals to the ma
1940s and 1950s, from student protest movements in the 1960s to
of new religious cults in the 1970s and the rise of Christian fu
in the 1980s (Wrong, 1990:25-26).
In its emphasis on the local community and face-to-face
Putnam's theory is in the tradition of the characteristically
"congregational" model, which sees the congregation as bein
maintained by the continuous consent of its individual mem
1990:63). But the image of society as resting on such groups
cally threatened. The emerging national society of the 1950s t
individuals from their local groups was one such occasion; th
global society of the 1990s that further liberated individuals
The response in both cases was to reassert that the health o
depends upon individual participation in local community gro
that won't die are those that confirm our most basic assumpti
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